Supplement:
I had created some red herrings with my talk about Bayes and objects. My point was, that I think that truth is in the past, not in the future. Now I think, it might be a linguistic problem about the term "truth". So some term-clarifying attempts/proposals:
Truth is only what has happened or been in the past, because there is only one past, the present is unclear, and the future unknown.
A statement or concept is true, if it adresses the truth 100 % correctly. But this statement is not "the truth" then, it merely is true or correct. The trait of this statement is "trueness", not "truth".
A truth (from the past) may stretch out into the future, if it is true, that there are truths which do so, eg. eternal laws of nature.
Other truths change. Example: Given that today it is true, that swans are either black or white, but later some white swans on an island uninhabited by humans copy the eating behaviour of Flamingos, eat red crabs, and turn pink. Nobody notices that, but suddenly the concept of swans being either black or white is no longer true.
So the iteration theory about trueness (not truth) of concepts merely applies to eternal truths.
In which Peirce did not believe, so one might find it inconsistent, that he believed in the iteration theory.
Unless the iteration goes a lot faster than the change of object truth. Which may be so, in many cases, such as inquiry about natural laws.
Ok now? Best,
Helmut
Jon, List,
I think maybe I have mixed too many differnt things with each other. As I have written to Jerry, I had remembered a thread on this list some time ago about Bayes, it was about Quantum-Bayesianism (QBism).
Best,
Helmut
20. März 2017 um 15:36 Uhr
"Jon Awbrey" <jawb...@att.net> wrote:
"Jon Awbrey" <jawb...@att.net> wrote:
Helmut,
A lot has been written on Bayes and Peirce, not all of it nonsense, so you might have some luck with a web search on those two names alone.
The way my stats profs taught it, Bayes' Rule is a deductive theorem, so it cannot add one bit to the information you actually have in the data, only afford different ways of looking at it. It is often proposed as a method for diagnosis, that is, abduction, but it can't really do that in a proper Peircean sense.
Peirce discussed these issues under the heading of "inverse probability" and why there is no such thing, so you might find Peirce-pertinent discussion under that search tag.
Regards,
Jon
Sent from my iPad
Dear List Members,I think, that the Peircean truth is the similarity between the immediate and the dynamical object, achieved in the infinite future, and this similarity will be perfect (after indefinite time), when the only aspect, that tells it (the similarity) from sameness, is, that the immediate object is still inside the sign, whilst the dynamical one is remaining outside of it.Is that so, or somehow like that?Anyway, I guess, that the origins, the histories of both the immediate and the dynamical object ly in the past, not in the future. So truth, I think, is a matter of the past, not of the future.And, if one thinks, that the past and it´s truth may, or even will be uncovered in the (be it infinite) future, then I would say, that this belief is a Bayesian one.Because, as far as I have understood Bayesianism, I think that Bayesianists believe that the past can be mathematically reconstructed from the present (no information is completely lost).But isn´t it rather so, that there is loss of information? And documentation is always incomplete?That would mean, that truth in the sense of "It had happened like this" can never be achieved.But truth in the sense of truth about the nature of nature can, if you believe that the nature of nature (that would be the natural laws) does not change (at least not undocumented, but who or what should do the documentation?)Now, Peirce did not even believe this (see: Tychism). But he did believe in the truth being a function of future time (with truth being an asymptote). So is it ok to say, that Peirce had a belief similar to what later was called Bayesianism?Best,HelmutJohn, List
> On Mar 16, 2017, at 1:49 PM, John F Sowa <s...@bestweb.net> wrote:
>
> But if we use some language with a finite alphabet and limit
> the theories to a finite specification, there are at most
> a countable number of theories.
>
> But there are two ways for a theory expressed in discrete signs
> to describe a continuous aspect of the world:
Yes, there are two ways, so your assertion is reasonable.
But, is this assertion logically complete pragmatically?
Can you relate either of your theoretical ways to modes of description or modes of explanation of genetic material or cellular metabolism, both of which express discrete signs?
The number of ways to express discrete signs is limited by the pre-suppositions about the foundations of mathematics and the illations to modes of description and modes of explanation.
Thus, in my mind, the question arises ,
“How do the two ways you list relate to categorial modes of description and functorial modes of explanation?”
CSP’s “nine-fold way” of creating cyclic arguments to generate legisigns succeeds in this challenge, does it not?
I would further suggest that CSP’s nine-fold way succeeds because of the constraints it places on the meaning of symbols.
Cheers
Jerry
> John
>
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