Helmut, John, List: Thank you for the interesting post. It raises some questions in my mind.
> On Mar 17, 2017, at 3:20 PM, Helmut Raulien <h.raul...@gmx.de> wrote: > > Dear List Members, > I think, that the Peircean truth is the similarity between the immediate and > the dynamical object, achieved in the infinite future, and this similarity > will be perfect (after indefinite time), when the only aspect, that tells it > (the similarity) from sameness, is, that the immediate object is still inside > the sign, whilst the dynamical one is remaining outside of it. > Is that so, or somehow like that? I really do not know how to parse this phrase. Pragmatically, this appears to an impossibility. Perhaps you can amplify the meaning? I do not think of signs having an interior or exterior or an interior and exterior. > Anyway, I guess, that the origins, the histories of both the immediate and > the dynamical object ly in the past, not in the future. So truth, I think, is > a matter of the past, not of the future. > And, if one thinks, that the past and it´s truth may, or even will be > uncovered in the (be it infinite) future, then I would say, that this belief > is a Bayesian one. > Because, as far as I have understood Bayesianism, I think that Bayesianists > believe that the past can be mathematically reconstructed from the present > (no information is completely lost). Bayesian mathematics is restricted to analysis of probability propositions where the antecedent and consequences are given, that is, [0,1]. What is the purpose of introducing “information” into this context? The nature of truth is already compromised by introducing the concept of probability into a proposition. Why further dilute both the semantics and the syntaxes? > So is it ok to say, that Peirce had a belief similar to what later was > called Bayesianism? Thomas Bayes, 1702-1761. > > Cheers jerry > > 17. März 2017 um 16:42 Uhr > "Jerry LR Chandler" <jerry_lr_chand...@icloud.com> wrote: > > John, List > > > On Mar 16, 2017, at 1:49 PM, John F Sowa <s...@bestweb.net> wrote: > > > > But if we use some language with a finite alphabet and limit > > the theories to a finite specification, there are at most > > a countable number of theories. > > > > But there are two ways for a theory expressed in discrete signs > > to describe a continuous aspect of the world: > > Yes, there are two ways, so your assertion is reasonable. > But, is this assertion logically complete pragmatically? > > Can you relate either of your theoretical ways to modes of description or > modes of explanation of genetic material or cellular metabolism, both of > which express discrete signs? > > The number of ways to express discrete signs is limited by the > pre-suppositions about the foundations of mathematics and the illations to > modes of description and modes of explanation. > > Thus, in my mind, the question arises , > “How do the two ways you list relate to categorial modes of description and > functorial modes of explanation?” > > CSP’s “nine-fold way” of creating cyclic arguments to generate legisigns > succeeds in this challenge, does it not? > > I would further suggest that CSP’s nine-fold way succeeds because of the > constraints it places on the meaning of symbols. > > Cheers > > Jerry > > > > John > > > > ----------------------------- > > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > > peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L > > but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY > > of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm > > <http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm> . > > > > > > > > > > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu > . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu > with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at > http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm > <http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm> . > > > > > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu > . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu > with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at > http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . > > > >
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