Dear List Members,
I think, that the Peircean truth is the similarity between the immediate and the dynamical object, achieved in the infinite future, and this similarity will be perfect (after indefinite time), when the only aspect, that tells it (the similarity) from sameness, is, that the immediate object is still inside the sign, whilst the dynamical one is remaining outside of it.
Is that so, or somehow like that?
Anyway, I guess, that the origins, the histories of both the immediate and the dynamical object ly in the past, not in the future. So truth, I think, is a matter of the past, not of the future.
And, if one thinks, that the past and it´s truth may, or even will be uncovered in the (be it infinite) future, then I would say, that this belief is a Bayesian one.
Because, as far as I have understood Bayesianism, I think that Bayesianists believe that the past can be mathematically reconstructed from the present (no information is completely lost).
But isn´t it rather so, that there is loss of information? And documentation is always incomplete?
That would mean, that truth in the sense of "It had happened like this" can never be achieved.
But truth in the sense of truth about the nature of nature can, if you believe that the nature of nature (that would be the natural laws) does not change (at least not undocumented, but who or what should do the documentation?)
Now, Peirce did not even believe this (see: Tychism). But he did believe in the truth being a function of future time (with truth being an asymptote). So is it ok to say, that Peirce had a belief similar to what later was called Bayesianism?
Best,
Helmut
17. März 2017 um 16:42 Uhr
"Jerry LR Chandler" <jerry_lr_chand...@icloud.com> wrote:
"Jerry LR Chandler" <jerry_lr_chand...@icloud.com> wrote:
John, List
> On Mar 16, 2017, at 1:49 PM, John F Sowa <s...@bestweb.net> wrote:
>
> But if we use some language with a finite alphabet and limit
> the theories to a finite specification, there are at most
> a countable number of theories.
>
> But there are two ways for a theory expressed in discrete signs
> to describe a continuous aspect of the world:
Yes, there are two ways, so your assertion is reasonable.
But, is this assertion logically complete pragmatically?
Can you relate either of your theoretical ways to modes of description or modes of explanation of genetic material or cellular metabolism, both of which express discrete signs?
The number of ways to express discrete signs is limited by the pre-suppositions about the foundations of mathematics and the illations to modes of description and modes of explanation.
Thus, in my mind, the question arises ,
“How do the two ways you list relate to categorial modes of description and functorial modes of explanation?”
CSP’s “nine-fold way” of creating cyclic arguments to generate legisigns succeeds in this challenge, does it not?
I would further suggest that CSP’s nine-fold way succeeds because of the constraints it places on the meaning of symbols.
Cheers
Jerry
> John
>
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PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
> On Mar 16, 2017, at 1:49 PM, John F Sowa <s...@bestweb.net> wrote:
>
> But if we use some language with a finite alphabet and limit
> the theories to a finite specification, there are at most
> a countable number of theories.
>
> But there are two ways for a theory expressed in discrete signs
> to describe a continuous aspect of the world:
Yes, there are two ways, so your assertion is reasonable.
But, is this assertion logically complete pragmatically?
Can you relate either of your theoretical ways to modes of description or modes of explanation of genetic material or cellular metabolism, both of which express discrete signs?
The number of ways to express discrete signs is limited by the pre-suppositions about the foundations of mathematics and the illations to modes of description and modes of explanation.
Thus, in my mind, the question arises ,
“How do the two ways you list relate to categorial modes of description and functorial modes of explanation?”
CSP’s “nine-fold way” of creating cyclic arguments to generate legisigns succeeds in this challenge, does it not?
I would further suggest that CSP’s nine-fold way succeeds because of the constraints it places on the meaning of symbols.
Cheers
Jerry
> John
>
> -----------------------------
> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
>
>
>
>
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