Edwina, List: It has never been my intention to insult you, and I have never resorted to name-calling as you routinely have. I have simply expressed my considered opinion that your model of sign-action is significantly different from Peirce's, and I have provided the reasons why I take that position. I wish that we could have a friendly discussion about this, rather than a debate--and that others would join us in doing so--but unfortunately, we cannot seem to get past our directly opposing convictions.
ET: I use Peirce's term of 'representamen' rather than 'sign' to acknowledge the unique role in the triad; that mediative function/action in the triadic set - and to differentiate it from the WHOLE Sign, the triad. Again, Peirce does not define the Sign as a *triad *(or a triadic *function*) that *includes *the Representamen; rather, he defines it *as *the Representamen, the first correlate of a triadic *relation*. The Object and Interpretant are not *additional parts *of the Sign, they are the *other two* *correlates *in that triadic relation. To me, this is absolutely fundamental to Peircean semeiosis, so any model that denies it is by definition non-Peircean. ET: As I've often said, none of the parts of this triad exist 'per se' on their own. They are not each 'subjects' in their own right and I disagree that each is 'a constituent in their own universe'. I don't consider that the three modal categories are 'universes'. Of course they "exist," albeit only when they are in the mode of 2ns. Peirce explicitly referred to the Sign/Representamen, Object, and Interpretant as "subjects" (EP 2:411); and he explicitly called the three modal categories "Universes" (EP 2:478-479); and he explicitly stated that the Sign, both Objects, all three Interpretants, and their relations are all constituents of one or another Universe (EP 2:480-490). Hence your disagreement on these matters is with him, not just with me. ET: There is nothing wrong with using different terms. I agree! My issue is with (a) using the same terms that Peirce did, but then assigning different definitions to them; and (b) using different terms, but then claiming that your model is the same as Peirce's. ET: With regard to 'habits of formation' - what the heck do you think those 'habits' are doing? What I am questioning is your definition of the Representamen as "a set of habits of formation." I do not see where Peirce ever associates the Representamen with habits. Rather, he identifies a habit as a final logical *Interpretant*, precisely because it *does not* act as a Representamen to determine any *further* logical Interpretants (EP 2:418). ET: As Peirce notes, 1.414, a 'bundle of habits' is a 'thing' or a substance. That seems pretty clear to me that this 'bundle of habits FORMS the thing. Saying that bundles of habits *are *substances (as Peirce did) is not the same as saying that bundles of habits *form *substances (as you do). When they are Existents (mode of 2ns), Representamina, Objects, and Interpretants are *all *bundles of habits in this sense. Regards, Jon S. On Wed, Mar 29, 2017 at 3:30 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> wrote: > > Jon - I will say this only once; I won't get into a debate with you. > > 1) I use Peirce's term of 'representamen' rather than 'sign' to > acknowledge the unique role in the triad; that mediative function/action in > the triadic set - and to differentiate it from the WHOLE Sign, the triad. > As I've often said, none of the parts of this triad exist 'per se' on their > own. They are not each 'subjects' in their own right and I disagree that > each is 'a constituent in their own universe'. I don't consider that the > three modal categories are 'universes'. > > You do not differentiate this mediative process; indeed, you rarely refer > to it as a vital action. Indeed, all you seem to focus on is NAMING the > different parts of the Sign. But do you examine the dynamic PROCESS that is > going on? > > I consider that the Sign as a whole is a triadic FUNCTION. Actions are > going on in that triad! It's not a static or mechanical process! > > 2) There is nothing wrong with using different terms. With regard to > 'habits of formation' - what the heck do you think those 'habits' are > doing? Do you deny that there are 'habits'? I'm sure you don't, as Peirce > uses the term! But to what purpose is that habit? You ignore this. What's > going on in the world that is due to habit-taking? Why don't you explore > this? Do you think that an atom has no continuity of type? That this > continuity of type doesn't provide it with a continuity of behaviour? That > this continuity of type doesn't differentiate it from another atom? WHY do > habits exist? You don't examine this. > > As Peirce notes, 1.414, a 'bundle of habits' is a 'thing' or a substance. > That seems pretty clear to me that this 'bundle of habits FORMS the thing. > > And, as he notes [1.22] "The embryonic being for Aristotle was the being > he called matter, which is alike in all things, and which in the course of > its development took on form. Form is an element having a different mode of > being....My view is that there are three modes of being" 1.22. Here Peirce > is referring to the FORM that matter takes on, i.e., within the three > categorical modes of Firstness, Secondness and Thirdness. > > You seem to focus only on the words and don't examine what they mean in > actual actions and in the actual formation of matter. > > Again- there's no point in arguing about this - as you will resort to > insults [telling me that I am 'non-Peircean']...and such interactions are > not a productive debate. > > Edwina > > -- > This message is virus free, protected by Primus - Canada's > largest alternative telecommunications provider. > > http://www.primus.ca > > On Wed 29/03/17 3:48 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com sent: > > Edwina, List: > > ET: As I've said repeatedly - the key factor of Peircean semiosis is that > it is not mechanical or linear but enables an understanding of complex > morphological generation which is enabled by constant transformative > RELATIONS between TRIADIC PROCESSES. Again, the full triad is the SIGN. > None of the other 'parts' of the triadic SIGN exist 'per se' on their own. > They only function - as functions - within the full triadic interaction. > > > This is what I personally have a hard time recognizing as Peircean semeiosis, > which is certainly not mechanical or linear--i.e., dyadic--but I understand > it to be a matter of triadic relations, rather than relations between > triadic processes. Again, the Sign is not a triadic function, it is one > participant in an irreducibly triadic relation. The Sign (or > Representamen), the Object (Dynamic and Immediate), and the Interpretant > (Immediate, Dynamic, and Final) are not themselves relations, they are > all real subjects from a logical and metaphysical standpoint. Each of > them, as well as their relations to each other, can be a constituent of > any of the three Universes--a Possible (1ns), an Existent (2ns), or a > Necessitant (3ns). The Sign itself is a qualisign/mark, sinsign/token, or > legisign/type. The Sign's relation to its Object is what makes it an icon, > index, or symbol. The Sign's relation to its Interpretant is what makes it > a rheme, dicent, or argument. > > I find all of this to be fully consistent with a straightforward reading > of Peirce's extensive writings on semeiosis. At the risk of being labeled > once more as "literal-bound," a quick search of the Collected Papers turns > up zero instances of "habit(s) of formation," "morphological generation," > "triadic process," or "triadic function." While these are evidently "key > factors" in Taborskyan semiosis, to me this suggests rather strongly that > Peircean semeiosis has nothing to do with any of them. On the other > hand, "triadic relation" appears 84 times. What is unscientific or > arrogant about simply stating what the textual evidence clearly indicates > to me? You express just as much certainty about the validity of your views > as I do about mine. > > Regards, > > Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA > Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman > www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt > > On Wed, Mar 29, 2017 at 12:28 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> > wrote: > >> Helmut, list - I'm not exactly sure what you mean by a 'fact'. I think >> that is introducing another set of semantics into the Peircean framework >> and I'm not sure that it has any function. >> >> Again, the Dynamic Object functions ONLY within the triadic process of >> semiosis. It doesn't 'exist' per se. Certainly, objective reality exists >> but - within a semiosic process. That insect is objectively 'real', but it >> functions within a semiosic process made up of the basic triad: >> Object-Representamen-Interpret ant. And we can fine-tune that into Dynamic >> Object-Immediate Object/Representamen/ Immediate-Dynamic-Final >> Interpretants. >> >> So- the insect, in interaction with the bird watching it - functions as a >> Dynamic Object within the bird's awareness of it. And...an Immediate >> Object..which is transformed by the bird's 'mind' into an Immediate and >> Dynamic Interpretant of 'possible food'. >> >> But, the insect is itself presenting itself as a Dynamic Interpretant of >> the biological processes that resulted in its actual existence as 'that >> insect'. >> >> And of course, the other semiosic processes are included: the habits of >> morphological formation held within the Representamen of both the insect >> and bird. >> >> AND - increase the complexity by acknowledging that each 'part' can be in >> a different categorical mode [Firstness, Secondness, Thirdness]. >> >> As I've said repeatedly - the key factor of Peircean semiosis is that it >> is not mechanical or linear but enables an understanding of complex >> morphological generation which is enabled by constant transformative >> RELATIONS between TRIADIC PROCESSES. Again, the full triad is the SIGN. >> None of the other 'parts' of the triadic SIGN exist 'per se' on their own. >> They only function - as functions - within the full triadic interaction. >> >> There is no point, in my view, of analyzing Peirce as 'just another set >> of terms' used in mapping the semantic movement of one term to another >> term. - the key concept in Peirce is that it sets up an infrastructure >> enabling complex morphological transformations of 'meaning -to-meaning' . >> One morphology to another morphology. >> >> Someone else who ventured into this area, is Spencer Brown, with his Laws >> of Form. As he wrote: >> >> "the theme of this book is that a universe comes into being when a space >> is severed or taken apart. The skin of a living organism cuts off an >> outside from an inside. So does the circumference of a circle in a plane. >> By tracing the way we represent such a severance, we can begin to >> reconstruct, with an accuracy and coverage that appear almost uncanny, the >> basic forms underlying linguistic, mathematical, physical, and biological >> science, and can being to see how the familiar laws of our own experience >> follow inexorably from the original act of severance". [1973:v]. >> >> Now - that sounds VERY similar to Peirce's cosmological outline [1.412] >> of the emergence of the FORMS within the universe. [See his A Guess at the >> Riddle]. >> >> And, as Spencer Brown acknowledges the influence of Peirce - one can see >> that influence throughout his remarkable book. >> >> Edwina >> >
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