*`when once it is written, every composition trundles about everywhere in the same way, in the presence both of those who know about the subject and of those who have nothing at all to do with it.. ~ *Phaedrus
*Few persons care to study logic, because everybody conceives himself to be proficient enough in the art of reasoning already. But I observe that this satisfaction is limited to one's own ratiocination, and does not extend to that of other men.* ~ Fixation of belief Best, Jerry R On Wed, Mar 29, 2017 at 4:36 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com> wrote: > Edwina, List: > > It has never been my intention to insult you, and I have never resorted to > name-calling as you routinely have. I have simply expressed my considered > opinion that your model of sign-action is significantly different from > Peirce's, and I have provided the reasons why I take that position. I wish > that we could have a friendly discussion about this, rather than a > debate--and that others would join us in doing so--but unfortunately, we > cannot seem to get past our directly opposing convictions. > > ET: I use Peirce's term of 'representamen' rather than 'sign' to > acknowledge the unique role in the triad; that mediative function/action in > the triadic set - and to differentiate it from the WHOLE Sign, the triad. > > > Again, Peirce does not define the Sign as a *triad *(or a triadic > *function*) that *includes *the Representamen; rather, he defines it *as *the > Representamen, the first correlate of a triadic *relation*. The Object > and Interpretant are not *additional parts *of the Sign, they are the *other > two* *correlates *in that triadic relation. To me, this is absolutely > fundamental to Peircean semeiosis, so any model that denies it is by > definition non-Peircean. > > ET: As I've often said, none of the parts of this triad exist 'per se' on > their own. They are not each 'subjects' in their own right and I disagree > that each is 'a constituent in their own universe'. I don't consider that > the three modal categories are 'universes'. > > > Of course they "exist," albeit only when they are in the mode of 2ns. > Peirce explicitly referred to the Sign/Representamen, Object, and > Interpretant as "subjects" (EP 2:411); and he explicitly called the three > modal categories "Universes" (EP 2:478-479); and he explicitly stated that > the Sign, both Objects, all three Interpretants, and their relations are > all constituents of one or another Universe (EP 2:480-490). Hence your > disagreement on these matters is with him, not just with me. > > ET: There is nothing wrong with using different terms. > > > I agree! My issue is with (a) using the same terms that Peirce did, but > then assigning different definitions to them; and (b) using different > terms, but then claiming that your model is the same as Peirce's. > > ET: With regard to 'habits of formation' - what the heck do you think > those 'habits' are doing? > > > What I am questioning is your definition of the Representamen as "a set of > habits of formation." I do not see where Peirce ever associates the > Representamen with habits. Rather, he identifies a habit as a final > logical *Interpretant*, precisely because it *does not* act as a > Representamen to determine any *further* logical Interpretants (EP 2:418). > > ET: As Peirce notes, 1.414, a 'bundle of habits' is a 'thing' or a > substance. That seems pretty clear to me that this 'bundle of habits FORMS > the thing. > > > Saying that bundles of habits *are *substances (as Peirce did) is not the > same as saying that bundles of habits *form *substances (as you do). > When they are Existents (mode of 2ns), Representamina, Objects, and > Interpretants are *all *bundles of habits in this sense. > > Regards, > > Jon S. > > On Wed, Mar 29, 2017 at 3:30 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> > wrote: > >> >> Jon - I will say this only once; I won't get into a debate with you. >> >> 1) I use Peirce's term of 'representamen' rather than 'sign' to >> acknowledge the unique role in the triad; that mediative function/action in >> the triadic set - and to differentiate it from the WHOLE Sign, the triad. >> As I've often said, none of the parts of this triad exist 'per se' on their >> own. They are not each 'subjects' in their own right and I disagree that >> each is 'a constituent in their own universe'. I don't consider that the >> three modal categories are 'universes'. >> >> You do not differentiate this mediative process; indeed, you rarely refer >> to it as a vital action. Indeed, all you seem to focus on is NAMING the >> different parts of the Sign. But do you examine the dynamic PROCESS that is >> going on? >> >> I consider that the Sign as a whole is a triadic FUNCTION. Actions are >> going on in that triad! It's not a static or mechanical process! >> >> 2) There is nothing wrong with using different terms. With regard to >> 'habits of formation' - what the heck do you think those 'habits' are >> doing? Do you deny that there are 'habits'? I'm sure you don't, as Peirce >> uses the term! But to what purpose is that habit? You ignore this. What's >> going on in the world that is due to habit-taking? Why don't you explore >> this? Do you think that an atom has no continuity of type? That this >> continuity of type doesn't provide it with a continuity of behaviour? That >> this continuity of type doesn't differentiate it from another atom? WHY do >> habits exist? You don't examine this. >> >> As Peirce notes, 1.414, a 'bundle of habits' is a 'thing' or a substance. >> That seems pretty clear to me that this 'bundle of habits FORMS the thing. >> >> And, as he notes [1.22] "The embryonic being for Aristotle was the being >> he called matter, which is alike in all things, and which in the course of >> its development took on form. Form is an element having a different mode of >> being....My view is that there are three modes of being" 1.22. Here Peirce >> is referring to the FORM that matter takes on, i.e., within the three >> categorical modes of Firstness, Secondness and Thirdness. >> >> You seem to focus only on the words and don't examine what they mean in >> actual actions and in the actual formation of matter. >> >> Again- there's no point in arguing about this - as you will resort to >> insults [telling me that I am 'non-Peircean']...and such interactions are >> not a productive debate. >> >> Edwina >> >> -- >> This message is virus free, protected by Primus - Canada's >> largest alternative telecommunications provider. >> >> http://www.primus.ca >> >> On Wed 29/03/17 3:48 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com sent: >> >> Edwina, List: >> >> ET: As I've said repeatedly - the key factor of Peircean semiosis is >> that it is not mechanical or linear but enables an understanding of complex >> morphological generation which is enabled by constant transformative >> RELATIONS between TRIADIC PROCESSES. Again, the full triad is the SIGN. >> None of the other 'parts' of the triadic SIGN exist 'per se' on their own. >> They only function - as functions - within the full triadic interaction. >> >> >> This is what I personally have a hard time recognizing as Peircean semeiosis, >> which is certainly not mechanical or linear--i.e., dyadic--but I understand >> it to be a matter of triadic relations, rather than relations between >> triadic processes. Again, the Sign is not a triadic function, it is one >> participant in an irreducibly triadic relation. The Sign (or >> Representamen), the Object (Dynamic and Immediate), and the Interpretant >> (Immediate, Dynamic, and Final) are not themselves relations, they are >> all real subjects from a logical and metaphysical standpoint. Each of >> them, as well as their relations to each other, can be a constituent of >> any of the three Universes--a Possible (1ns), an Existent (2ns), or a >> Necessitant (3ns). The Sign itself is a qualisign/mark, sinsign/token, or >> legisign/type. The Sign's relation to its Object is what makes it an icon, >> index, or symbol. The Sign's relation to its Interpretant is what makes it >> a rheme, dicent, or argument. >> >> I find all of this to be fully consistent with a straightforward reading >> of Peirce's extensive writings on semeiosis. At the risk of being labeled >> once more as "literal-bound," a quick search of the Collected Papers turns >> up zero instances of "habit(s) of formation," "morphological generation," >> "triadic process," or "triadic function." While these are evidently "key >> factors" in Taborskyan semiosis, to me this suggests rather strongly >> that Peircean semeiosis has nothing to do with any of them. On the >> other hand, "triadic relation" appears 84 times. What is unscientific or >> arrogant about simply stating what the textual evidence clearly indicates >> to me? You express just as much certainty about the validity of your views >> as I do about mine. >> >> Regards, >> >> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA >> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman >> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt >> >> On Wed, Mar 29, 2017 at 12:28 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> >> wrote: >> >>> Helmut, list - I'm not exactly sure what you mean by a 'fact'. I think >>> that is introducing another set of semantics into the Peircean framework >>> and I'm not sure that it has any function. >>> >>> Again, the Dynamic Object functions ONLY within the triadic process of >>> semiosis. It doesn't 'exist' per se. Certainly, objective reality exists >>> but - within a semiosic process. That insect is objectively 'real', but it >>> functions within a semiosic process made up of the basic triad: >>> Object-Representamen-Interpret ant. And we can fine-tune that into Dynamic >>> Object-Immediate Object/Representamen/ Immediate-Dynamic-Final >>> Interpretants. >>> >>> So- the insect, in interaction with the bird watching it - functions as >>> a Dynamic Object within the bird's awareness of it. And...an Immediate >>> Object..which is transformed by the bird's 'mind' into an Immediate and >>> Dynamic Interpretant of 'possible food'. >>> >>> But, the insect is itself presenting itself as a Dynamic Interpretant of >>> the biological processes that resulted in its actual existence as 'that >>> insect'. >>> >>> And of course, the other semiosic processes are included: the habits of >>> morphological formation held within the Representamen of both the insect >>> and bird. >>> >>> AND - increase the complexity by acknowledging that each 'part' can be >>> in a different categorical mode [Firstness, Secondness, Thirdness]. >>> >>> As I've said repeatedly - the key factor of Peircean semiosis is that it >>> is not mechanical or linear but enables an understanding of complex >>> morphological generation which is enabled by constant transformative >>> RELATIONS between TRIADIC PROCESSES. Again, the full triad is the SIGN. >>> None of the other 'parts' of the triadic SIGN exist 'per se' on their own. >>> They only function - as functions - within the full triadic interaction. >>> >>> There is no point, in my view, of analyzing Peirce as 'just another set >>> of terms' used in mapping the semantic movement of one term to another >>> term. - the key concept in Peirce is that it sets up an infrastructure >>> enabling complex morphological transformations of 'meaning -to-meaning' . >>> One morphology to another morphology. >>> >>> Someone else who ventured into this area, is Spencer Brown, with his >>> Laws of Form. As he wrote: >>> >>> "the theme of this book is that a universe comes into being when a space >>> is severed or taken apart. The skin of a living organism cuts off an >>> outside from an inside. So does the circumference of a circle in a plane. >>> By tracing the way we represent such a severance, we can begin to >>> reconstruct, with an accuracy and coverage that appear almost uncanny, the >>> basic forms underlying linguistic, mathematical, physical, and biological >>> science, and can being to see how the familiar laws of our own experience >>> follow inexorably from the original act of severance". [1973:v]. >>> >>> Now - that sounds VERY similar to Peirce's cosmological outline [1.412] >>> of the emergence of the FORMS within the universe. [See his A Guess at the >>> Riddle]. >>> >>> And, as Spencer Brown acknowledges the influence of Peirce - one can see >>> that influence throughout his remarkable book. >>> >>> Edwina >>> >> > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . 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