There is much hubris.
Words are defective. we ought to say that we are in thought, and not that thoughts are in us. There are three kinds of signs. The word *symbol* has so many meanings that it would be an injury to the language to add a new one. In the first figure; the middle is the subject of the major premise, and predicate of the minor. Therefore, the middle serves as either the subject or the predicate in the first figure. Ronna: If what philosophy is trying to do is figure out the nature of things, or the way the world is, isn’t there something strange about saying that the right route to that is interpreting a text and trying to figure out what the author meant? Seth: Could you make an analogy between the two-fold character of interpretation- Ronna: And that is? Seth: What does the author mean? and Is it true? Ronna: Okay. Seth: And philosophical thought? The philosopher would make a mistake if he thought that the question was, Is it true? Before he came to the first issue, in regard to whatever he was talking about. So this two-fold character of interpretation- Robert: Meaning and truth? Seth: Right, would also apply to the world. Hth, Jerry R On Thu, Mar 30, 2017 at 11:32 AM, Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com > wrote: > John C., List: > > I was convinced by our List discussion a few months ago that we should not > draw sharp distinctions between "universes" and "categories" in this > context. > > I actually think that what you quoted *only *makes sense if the sign is > the representamen alone. Note that it identifies the most characteristic > form of 3ns as the *form *of a sign, not the sign *itself*. More to the > point, it *does not* say that the sign is a "triad" or "triadic function" > that *consists of* the representamen, object, and interpretant. On the > contrary, it says that every sign *has *an object and *determines *an > interpretant; they are three distinct *subjects* in the sense that Gary > F. just mentioned. Peirce's use of the term "correlate" for each of them > seems pretty definitive to me; they are three "things" (again, not the best > word) that are involved in a single triadic relation, not three components > (or "nodes") of a single triadic "thing." > > Regards, > > Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA > Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman > www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt > > On Thu, Mar 30, 2017 at 10:59 AM, John Collier <colli...@ukzn.ac.za> > wrote: > >> I am not very keen on multiple universes, though I readily admit >> different metaphysical categories. But I think any deep difference is just >> talk. >> >> >> >> *From:* Jon Alan Schmidt [mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com] >> *Sent:* Thursday, 30 March 2017 3:33 PM >> *To:* John Collier <colli...@ukzn.ac.za> >> *Cc:* peirce-l@list.iupui.edu >> *Subject:* Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] semantic problem with the term >> >> >> >> John C., List: >> >> *[John Collier] Peirce uses “sign” in both ways, which can be confusing.* >> >> Perhaps I missed them, but I am not aware of any passages where Peirce >> used "sign" to mean a "triad" or a "triadic function" that *consists of* >> the representamen, object, and interpretant. If there are such passages, I >> would be grateful for the citations so that I can take a look at them. >> Would you at least agree that Peirce *predominantly *used "sign" in the >> way that I am advocating? >> >> >> >> *[John Collier] I think the following undated passage in which Peirce >> refers to the sign as the most characteristic form of thirdness is hard to >> understand if the sign meant here is the representamen alone. It is >> essential to being a sign that it have an object and interpretant. I take >> this as meaning that it is part of their nature to be triadic. I agree that >> Peirce mostly used “sign” to mean the iconic representamen. This issue was >> discussed on the list some time ago.* >> >> >> >> Firstness, Secondness, Thirdness, and the Reducibility of Fourthness [R] >> | MS [R] 914:5-6 >> >> The most characteristic form of thirdness is that of a *sign*; and it is >> shown that every cognition is of the nature of a sign. Every sign has an >> object, which may be regarded either as it is immediately represented in >> the sign to be [or] as it is in it own firstness. It is equally >> essential to the function of a sign that it should determine an >> *Interpretant*, or second correlate related to the object of the sign as >> the sign is itself related to that object; and this interpretant may be >> regarded as the sign represents it to be, as it is in its pure secondness >> to the object, and as it is in its own firstness. Upon these considerations >> are founded six trichotomic divisions of signs… >> >> >> >> John Collier >> >> Emeritus Professor and Senior Research Associate >> >> Philosophy, University of KwaZulu-Natal >> >> http://web.ncf.ca/collier >> > > > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L > but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the > BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm > . > > > > > >
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