John C., List: I was convinced by our List discussion a few months ago that we should not draw sharp distinctions between "universes" and "categories" in this context.
I actually think that what you quoted *only *makes sense if the sign is the representamen alone. Note that it identifies the most characteristic form of 3ns as the *form *of a sign, not the sign *itself*. More to the point, it *does not* say that the sign is a "triad" or "triadic function" that *consists of* the representamen, object, and interpretant. On the contrary, it says that every sign *has *an object and *determines *an interpretant; they are three distinct *subjects* in the sense that Gary F. just mentioned. Peirce's use of the term "correlate" for each of them seems pretty definitive to me; they are three "things" (again, not the best word) that are involved in a single triadic relation, not three components (or "nodes") of a single triadic "thing." Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Thu, Mar 30, 2017 at 10:59 AM, John Collier <colli...@ukzn.ac.za> wrote: > I am not very keen on multiple universes, though I readily admit different > metaphysical categories. But I think any deep difference is just talk. > > > > *From:* Jon Alan Schmidt [mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com] > *Sent:* Thursday, 30 March 2017 3:33 PM > *To:* John Collier <colli...@ukzn.ac.za> > *Cc:* peirce-l@list.iupui.edu > *Subject:* Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] semantic problem with the term > > > > John C., List: > > *[John Collier] Peirce uses “sign” in both ways, which can be confusing.* > > Perhaps I missed them, but I am not aware of any passages where Peirce > used "sign" to mean a "triad" or a "triadic function" that *consists of* > the representamen, object, and interpretant. If there are such passages, I > would be grateful for the citations so that I can take a look at them. > Would you at least agree that Peirce *predominantly *used "sign" in the > way that I am advocating? > > > > *[John Collier] I think the following undated passage in which Peirce > refers to the sign as the most characteristic form of thirdness is hard to > understand if the sign meant here is the representamen alone. It is > essential to being a sign that it have an object and interpretant. I take > this as meaning that it is part of their nature to be triadic. I agree that > Peirce mostly used “sign” to mean the iconic representamen. This issue was > discussed on the list some time ago.* > > > > Firstness, Secondness, Thirdness, and the Reducibility of Fourthness [R] | MS > [R] 914:5-6 > > The most characteristic form of thirdness is that of a *sign*; and it is > shown that every cognition is of the nature of a sign. Every sign has an > object, which may be regarded either as it is immediately represented in > the sign to be [or] as it is in it own firstness. It is equally essential > to the function of a sign that it should determine an *Interpretant*, or > second correlate related to the object of the sign as the sign is itself > related to that object; and this interpretant may be regarded as the sign > represents it to be, as it is in its pure secondness to the object, and as > it is in its own firstness. Upon these considerations are founded six > trichotomic divisions of signs… > > > > John Collier > > Emeritus Professor and Senior Research Associate > > Philosophy, University of KwaZulu-Natal > > http://web.ncf.ca/collier >
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