Edwina, Clark, List: One thing that I am curious about is whether it is feasible to follow Peirce's lead in expanding the scope of semeiosis from human cognition to the physico-chemical and biological realms, *without *maintaining Peirce's distinctive metaphysics of objective idealism--"the physical law as derived and special, the psychical law alone as primordial," such that "matter is effete mind, inveterate habits becoming physical laws" (CP 6.24-25). In other words, I am not sure that we can fruitfully separate his scientific thought and its contemporary implications from his philosophical thought and its contemporary implications, or intelligibly discuss the former without taking the latter into account.
Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Thu, Mar 30, 2017 at 4:15 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> wrote: > Clark - thanks for your comments - and they are indeed very valid. What > I'd like to see, in discussions on the Peirce list, is an expansion of his > work from the focus on human cognition - to the physico-chemical and > biological realms. Peirce himself used his semiosis in those realms but it > doesn't get discussed on this list, which seems to be 95% made up of those > focused strictly on philosophy and philosophers - and human cognition. > > So- given the make-up of the posters on this list and their interest [in > philosophy] then, I don't see the point of bringing up the > non-philosophical focus of Peirce's work. > > Edwina > -- > This message is virus free, protected by Primus - Canada's > largest alternative telecommunications provider. > > http://www.primus.ca > > On Thu 30/03/17 5:04 PM , CLARK GOBLE cl...@lextek.com sent: > > On Mar 30, 2017, at 8:35 AM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> wrote: > > I don't see the point of outlining my research on this list - as I'd get > reactions of 'Peirce didn't say that!' and 'That's Taborsky-semiotics and > it's not Pure Peirce!... > > I think my point was just that what gets discussed is largely determined > by the list members. If we don’t like what’s being discussed we can start > new discussions. > > I’ll confess that many of the discussions the past year I didn’t find that > interesting, although I occasionally chimed in here and there on say the > religion topic. Partially because it was just something I was fairly > ignorant on. So I like learning things I don’t know. Sometimes they end up > being helpful in unexpected ways with my own pursuits. > > I’ve started a few topics myself including the question of the > metaphysical nature of truth in Peirce. > > But there’s definitely other topics I’m interested in. One that someone > brought up was what it means to equate two signs. I’d add what does it mean > to repeat a sign, particularly relative to the index and icon parts of the > sign. This is actually a big topic in Continental philosophy in the 1960’s > especially by figures like Derrida and Deleuze. > > If you have other topics I’m game. I wouldn’t mind going back to the > reading we did on natural propositions a year or so ago. There were parts > of that discussion I wasn’t able to join in on due to time demands that I > still have questions about. > > I also am studying more typical epistemological questions in a Peircean > framework. It’s an interesting question to me since of course traditional > epistemology is again a more static analysis of justification at the time > of knowledge. There are problems with that. But if we switch to a more > Peircean focus on inquiry, what is the place of those more traditional > epistemological justifications? > >
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