Edwina, List,
It’s good to see that you now accept the reality of generals, as your previous post appeared to reject it. That said, we need to focus on logical issues rather than metaphysical ones, as we dig deeper into Peirce’s Lowell lectures. For Lowell 2 especially, which is all about “necessary reasoning” and the logic of mathematics, we’ll need to clarify those issues. I’m ready to start posting from Lowell 2 tomorrow, unless others need more time to digest Lowell 1 before we move ahead. As you are no doubt aware, CP 4.551 is a paragraph from “Prolegomena to an Apology for Pragmaticism” (1906), which was his last and most complete public statement on Existential Graphs and their relation to his pragmaticism. In order to understand that context, and its place in Peirce’s whole system, I think we need to follow the development of EGs, starting with his first presentation of them to an audience, namely Lowell 2. Thanks to the SPIN project, we now have a chance to follow that development step by step. Peirce regarded this as the best way of resolving the logical issues we have been discussing in this thread. As someone with zero formal training in formal logic, I’m really looking forward to this as a way into deeper understanding of Peirce’s whole philosophy. Gary f. From: Edwina Taborsky [mailto:tabor...@primus.ca] Sent: 16-Oct-17 08:24 To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu; Jeffrey Brian Downard <jeffrey.down...@nau.edu> Subject: Re: Re: RE: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 1: overview Jeff, list "Thought is not necessarily connected with a brain. It appears in the work of bees, of crystals, and throughout the purely physical world"....not only is thought in the organic world but it develops there. But as there cannot be a General without Instances embodying it, so there cannot be thought without Signs"...4.551 Peirce was not a materialist, nor am I am materialist. I am not saying that there is nothing 'real' outside of the material world. I am saying that 'reality' - understood as 'a General' only 'exists' within 'instances embodying it'. This means that Mind/thought/reason...which is a General, functions within Signs, and Signs are triadic instances [see his explanation in the rest of 4.551]... A triadic Sign is a 'material' unit, in that it exists in time and space, even if it is existent only as a word rather than a bacterium. Re your first two points - since deduction, induction, abduction, can be valid in themselves as a format, I presume you are talking about the true/false nature of their premises....and since the debate seems to be on the Nature of Truth - then this issue, the truth/false nature of the premises is relevant. Taking that use of the terms into account [truth/false nature of the premises] , I agree with your outline of these three forms of argument.. And I also agree with your other two points. I don't see that my position, which rests on 4.551 and other similar outlines by Peirce, rejects or is any different from his analysis. Edwina On Mon 16/10/17 12:17 AM , Jeffrey Brian Downard <mailto:jeffrey.down...@nau.edu> jeffrey.down...@nau.edu sent: Edwina, List, I assume you are articulating your own view--which is shared by a number of materialist oriented philosophers and scientists including Hobbes, Boyle and others. On my reading of the relevant texts, I believe Peirce argued against such a materialist position--even one that take the material realm to be an "articulation of Mind." It isn't obvious to me what the latter clause adds, but I am willing to be enlightened. Here are four such lines of argument. 1. Arguments for the validity of deduction require at least a verbal definition of the real, where the character of the real is not exhausted by individuals of a material character--not even if one brings a conception of individuals like us with minds into that realm. 2. Arguments for the validity of induction and abduction require a real definition of the real, where that account adds yet more to the character of the real as generals (e.g., general properties, laws of nature, etc.) that govern the relations between what is possible and what is actual. 3. Having developed these two lines of argument within the context of a critical logic, Peirce argues for an account of the real as having the character of what is truly continuous as a regulative principle within methodeutic. Such a principle is necessary for the healthy development and robust communication of scientific theories of all sorts, including natural and social sciences. 4. With these arguments in hand, Peirce applies the principles of logic to the study of questions of metaphysics. Here, he forges a position that unifies elements of both realism and objective idealism. These four strands of argument each seem to work against the claim that there isn't anything 'real' outside of the material world - even when we take the material world to be an articulation of Mind. One way of responding is to say that I'm reading Peirce wrong on one or more of these lines of argument. Another way to respond is to say that your position is different from Peirce's, and that he is wrong and you are right where there is disagreement. Or, there might some third way to respond. Let me know if one of these avenues fits with what you take yourself to be doing. As things stand, it isn't clear to me what you are doing in making such assertions, but my assumption that is fits the second option. --Jeff Jeffrey Downard Associate Professor Department of Philosophy Northern Arizona University (o) 928 523-8354 _____ From: Edwina Taborsky Sent: Sunday, October 15, 2017 1:41 PM To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu <mailto:peirce-l@list.iupui.edu> ; g...@gnusystems.ca <mailto:g...@gnusystems.ca> Subject: Re: RE: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 1: overview I don't think that there is anything 'real' outside of the material world - and I understand the material world to be an articulation of Mind. [Again, I won't repeat 4.551]. I see the reality of Mind as articulated within/as the material world; Mind doesn't exist 'per se' outside of these existential instantiations. Mathematics is an intellectual abstraction of this reality-as-existential. I don't think you arrive at necessary reasoning, deduction, without having gone through the processes of abduction and induction. That is, since Deduction is operationally triadic, then, in a Necessary Deduction, don't its premises have to be true? For example, can I assume that a purely intellectual opinion/conclusion, 'the universe was created in one day"" - is a necessary deductive? The premises would be: 'the bible says so'...etc. Or is it "Deduction is an argument whose Interpretant represents that it belongs to a general class of possible arguments precisely analogous which are such that in the long run of experience the greater part of those whose premises are true will have true conclusions" 2.267...Now, a "Necessary Deductions are those which have nothing to do with any ratio of frequency but profess [or their interpretants profess for them] that from true premises they must invariably produce true conclusions" 2.267 That is - isn't Peirce's Objective Idealism firmly rooted in phenomenology; i.e., in experience- and these experiences have been shown, by repetition, to be true, such that one no longer requires further experience? Edwina
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