Edwina, List: Your response seems rather uncharitable; I honestly have neither the time nor the inclination to revisit the argument right now.
That said, I offer my sincere thanks for clarifying how you distinguish reality and existence, as well as your careful limitation of "things" to the latter. I would simply question the notion that anything can exist while having no generality whatsoever. And we explicitly agreed a few months ago to use the term Sign to designate the triad of Immediate Object, Representamen, and Immediate Interpretant. Regards, Jon On Mon, Oct 16, 2017 at 12:21 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> wrote: > Jon - that's a specious attempt to revisit this argument - i.e., your > saying that 'some people might not have heard this debate before'. Well, > tough, frankly it's not worth hearing about - and - I'm not going to > revisit it with you. > > I disagree that existence is a subset of reality, for that implies that > both have the same qualities. An existence/ entity can exist within only > the mode of Secondness and thus, have no generality in it, but reality > requires generality. I disagree that 'some THING' can be real yet not > exist'. If it's a 'thing' then it exists. Reality is Thirdness, or > generality and is not a thing. > > And we've been over your rejection of the Sign as a triad of > Object-Representamen-Interpretant and your confining of the term 'Sign' > to refer only to the mediate Representamen. Again, read 4.551 to its end. > > There is no positive point in continuing this discussion since it's been > done to exhaustion before. > > Edwina > > On Mon 16/10/17 1:02 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com sent: > > Edwina, List: > > I know that we have been over this ground before, and I am not interested > in repeating our past discussions, but there may be some following along > now who were not on the List back then. > > Especially late in his life, Peirce carefully distinguished reality from > existence, treating the latter as a subset of the former. Everything that > exists is real, but something can be real yet not exist--and this is > precisely the case with all generals in themselves (not their > instantiations), as well as some possibilities that have not been (and may > never be) actualized. > > Likewise, anything that is general is (by definition) not particular. If > all Signs are particulars, then (by definition) no Signs are generals. > > Regards, > > Jon > > On Mon, Oct 16, 2017 at 11:27 AM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> > wrote: > >> Jon - we've been over these terms before. Read 4.551 and you'll see the >> triad - and it's elsewhere as well. >> >> You know perfectly well that by Sign [capital S] I refer to the triad of >> Object-Representamen-Interpretant. The Representamen is general when in >> a mode of Thirdness. >> >> But you know all of that anyway. >> >> Edwina >> >> On Mon 16/10/17 12:22 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com >> sent: >> >> Edwina, List: >> >> I think that it would be helpful if you could clarify exactly how you >> distinguish reality from existence in your statements below. >> >> I am also wondering where in Peirce's writings you find the view that every >> Sign is "a triadic particular...existent in space and time." On my >> reading, that would preclude any Sign from being truly general. >> >> Regards, >> >> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA >> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman >> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt >> >> On Mon, Oct 16, 2017 at 8:50 AM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> >> wrote: >> >>> Gary, list: >>> >>> I presume you are being sarcastic. >>> >>> I have always accepted the reality of generals and have posted this >>> view frequently. What is Thirdness????? My point, also posted frequently, >>> is that these generals, as real, are only 'existential' within 'material' >>> instances, i.e., Signs, which are a triadic particular...existent in space >>> and time, whether as a concept/word or a material entity [bacterium]. I >>> don't see that Reality/Generals have any existence 'per se' outside of >>> their articulation within Signs...and this view has been stated often >>> enough by me - and of course, by Peirce. >>> >>> So, sarcasm aside - we await your next posting. >>> >>> Edwina >>> >>> On Mon 16/10/17 9:21 AM , g...@gnusystems.ca sent: >>> >>> Edwina, List, >>> >>> >>> >>> It’s good to see that you now accept the reality of generals, as your >>> previous post appeared to reject it. That said, we need to focus on logical >>> issues rather than metaphysical ones, as we dig deeper into Peirce’s Lowell >>> lectures. For Lowell 2 especially, which is all about “necessary reasoning” >>> and the logic of mathematics, we’ll need to clarify those issues. I’m ready >>> to start posting from Lowell 2 tomorrow, unless others need more time to >>> digest Lowell 1 before we move ahead. >>> >>> >>> >>> As you are no doubt aware, CP 4.551 is a paragraph from “ Prolegomena >>> to an Apology for Pragmaticism” (1906), which was his last and most >>> complete public statement on Existential Graphs and their relation to his >>> pragmaticism. In order to understand that context, and its place in >>> Peirce’s whole system, I think we need to follow the development of EGs, >>> starting with his first presentation of them to an audience, namely Lowell >>> 2. Thanks to the SPIN project, we now have a chance to follow that >>> development step by step. Peirce regarded this as the best way of resolving >>> the logical issues we have been discussing in this thread. As someone with >>> zero formal training in formal logic, I’m really looking forward to this as >>> a way into deeper understanding of Peirce’s whole philosophy. >>> >>> >>> >>> Gary f. >>> >>> >>> >>> From: Edwina Taborsky [mailto:tabor...@primus.ca] >>> Sent: 16-Oct-17 08:24 >>> To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu; Jeffrey Brian Downard >>> Subject: Re: Re: RE: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 1: overview >>> >>> Jeff, list >>> >>> "Thought is not necessarily connected with a brain. It appears in the >>> work of bees, of crystals, and throughout the purely physical world"....not >>> only is thought in the organic world but it develops there. But as there >>> cannot be a General without Instances embodying it, so there cannot >>> be thought without Signs"...4.551 >>> >>> Peirce was not a materialist, nor am I am materialist. I am not saying >>> that there is nothing 'real' outside of the material world. I am saying >>> that 'reality' - understood as 'a General' only 'exists' within 'instances >>> embodying it'. This means that Mind/thought/reason...which is a General, >>> functions within Signs, and Signs are triadic instances [see his >>> explanation in the rest of 4.551]... A triadic Sign is a 'material' unit, >>> in that it exists in time and space, even if it is existent only as a word >>> rather than a bacterium. >>> >>> Re your first two points - since deduction, induction, abduction, can be >>> valid in themselves as a format, I presume you are talking about the >>> true/false nature of their premises....and since the debate seems to be on >>> the Nature of Truth - then this issue, the truth/false nature of the >>> premises is relevant. Taking that use of the terms into account >>> [truth/false nature of the premises] , I agree with your outline of these >>> three forms of argument.. >>> >>> And I also agree with your other two points. >>> >>> I don't see that my position, which rests on 4.551 and other similar >>> outlines by Peirce, rejects or is any different from his analysis. >>> >>> Edwina >>> >>>
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