Edwina, List: I think that it would be helpful if you could clarify exactly how you distinguish *reality *from *existence *in your statements below.
I am also wondering where in Peirce's writings you find the view that *every *Sign is "a triadic particular...existent in space and time." On my reading, that would preclude *any *Sign from being truly general. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Mon, Oct 16, 2017 at 8:50 AM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> wrote: > Gary, list: > > I presume you are being sarcastic. > > I have always accepted the reality of generals and have posted this > view frequently. What is Thirdness????? My point, also posted frequently, > is that these generals, as real, are only 'existential' within 'material' > instances, i.e., Signs, which are a triadic particular...existent in space > and time, whether as a concept/word or a material entity [bacterium]. I > don't see that Reality/Generals have any existence 'per se' outside of > their articulation within Signs...and this view has been stated often > enough by me - and of course, by Peirce. > > So, sarcasm aside - we await your next posting. > > Edwina > > On Mon 16/10/17 9:21 AM , g...@gnusystems.ca sent: > > Edwina, List, > > > > It’s good to see that you now accept the reality of generals, as your > previous post appeared to reject it. That said, we need to focus on logical > issues rather than metaphysical ones, as we dig deeper into Peirce’s Lowell > lectures. For Lowell 2 especially, which is all about “necessary reasoning” > and the logic of mathematics, we’ll need to clarify those issues. I’m ready > to start posting from Lowell 2 tomorrow, unless others need more time to > digest Lowell 1 before we move ahead. > > > > As you are no doubt aware, CP 4.551 is a paragraph from “ Prolegomena to > an Apology for Pragmaticism” (1906), which was his last and most complete > public statement on Existential Graphs and their relation to his > pragmaticism. In order to understand that context, and its place in > Peirce’s whole system, I think we need to follow the development of EGs, > starting with his first presentation of them to an audience, namely Lowell > 2. Thanks to the SPIN project, we now have a chance to follow that > development step by step. Peirce regarded this as the best way of resolving > the logical issues we have been discussing in this thread. As someone with > zero formal training in formal logic, I’m really looking forward to this as > a way into deeper understanding of Peirce’s whole philosophy. > > > > Gary f. > > > > From: Edwina Taborsky [mailto:tabor...@primus.ca] > Sent: 16-Oct-17 08:24 > To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu; Jeffrey Brian Downard > Subject: Re: Re: RE: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 1: overview > > Jeff, list > > "Thought is not necessarily connected with a brain. It appears in the work > of bees, of crystals, and throughout the purely physical world"....not only > is thought in the organic world but it develops there. But as there cannot > be a General without Instances embodying it, so there cannot be thought > without Signs"...4.551 > > Peirce was not a materialist, nor am I am materialist. I am not saying > that there is nothing 'real' outside of the material world. I am saying > that 'reality' - understood as 'a General' only 'exists' within 'instances > embodying it'. This means that Mind/thought/reason...which is a General, > functions within Signs, and Signs are triadic instances [see his > explanation in the rest of 4.551]... A triadic Sign is a 'material' unit, > in that it exists in time and space, even if it is existent only as a word > rather than a bacterium. > > Re your first two points - since deduction, induction, abduction, can be > valid in themselves as a format, I presume you are talking about the > true/false nature of their premises....and since the debate seems to be on > the Nature of Truth - then this issue, the truth/false nature of the > premises is relevant. Taking that use of the terms into account > [truth/false nature of the premises] , I agree with your outline of these > three forms of argument.. > > And I also agree with your other two points. > > I don't see that my position, which rests on 4.551 and other similar > outlines by Peirce, rejects or is any different from his analysis. > > Edwina > >
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