Edwina, List: I know that we have been over this ground before, and I am not interested in repeating our past discussions, but there may be some following along now who were not on the List back then.
Especially late in his life, Peirce carefully distinguished reality from existence, treating the latter as a subset of the former. Everything that exists is real, but something can be real yet not exist--and this is precisely the case with all generals in themselves (not their instantiations), as well as some possibilities that have not been (and may never be) actualized. Likewise, anything that is general is (by definition) not particular. If all Signs are particulars, then (by definition) no Signs are generals. Regards, Jon On Mon, Oct 16, 2017 at 11:27 AM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> wrote: > Jon - we've been over these terms before. Read 4.551 and you'll see the > triad - and it's elsewhere as well. > > You know perfectly well that by Sign [capital S] I refer to the triad of > Object-Representamen-Interpretant. The Representamen is general when in a > mode of Thirdness. > > But you know all of that anyway. > > Edwina > > On Mon 16/10/17 12:22 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com sent: > > Edwina, List: > > I think that it would be helpful if you could clarify exactly how you > distinguish reality from existence in your statements below. > > I am also wondering where in Peirce's writings you find the view that every > Sign is "a triadic particular...existent in space and time." On my > reading, that would preclude any Sign from being truly general. > > Regards, > > Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA > Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman > www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt > > On Mon, Oct 16, 2017 at 8:50 AM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> > wrote: > >> Gary, list: >> >> I presume you are being sarcastic. >> >> I have always accepted the reality of generals and have posted this >> view frequently. What is Thirdness????? My point, also posted frequently, >> is that these generals, as real, are only 'existential' within 'material' >> instances, i.e., Signs, which are a triadic particular...existent in space >> and time, whether as a concept/word or a material entity [bacterium]. I >> don't see that Reality/Generals have any existence 'per se' outside of >> their articulation within Signs...and this view has been stated often >> enough by me - and of course, by Peirce. >> >> So, sarcasm aside - we await your next posting. >> >> Edwina >> >> On Mon 16/10/17 9:21 AM , g...@gnusystems.ca sent: >> >> Edwina, List, >> >> >> >> It’s good to see that you now accept the reality of generals, as your >> previous post appeared to reject it. That said, we need to focus on logical >> issues rather than metaphysical ones, as we dig deeper into Peirce’s Lowell >> lectures. For Lowell 2 especially, which is all about “necessary reasoning” >> and the logic of mathematics, we’ll need to clarify those issues. I’m ready >> to start posting from Lowell 2 tomorrow, unless others need more time to >> digest Lowell 1 before we move ahead. >> >> >> >> As you are no doubt aware, CP 4.551 is a paragraph from “ Prolegomena to >> an Apology for Pragmaticism” (1906), which was his last and most complete >> public statement on Existential Graphs and their relation to his >> pragmaticism. In order to understand that context, and its place in >> Peirce’s whole system, I think we need to follow the development of EGs, >> starting with his first presentation of them to an audience, namely Lowell >> 2. Thanks to the SPIN project, we now have a chance to follow that >> development step by step. Peirce regarded this as the best way of resolving >> the logical issues we have been discussing in this thread. As someone with >> zero formal training in formal logic, I’m really looking forward to this as >> a way into deeper understanding of Peirce’s whole philosophy. >> >> >> >> Gary f. >> >> >> >> From: Edwina Taborsky [mailto:tabor...@primus.ca] >> Sent: 16-Oct-17 08:24 >> To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu; Jeffrey Brian Downard >> Subject: Re: Re: RE: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 1: overview >> >> Jeff, list >> >> "Thought is not necessarily connected with a brain. It appears in the >> work of bees, of crystals, and throughout the purely physical world"....not >> only is thought in the organic world but it develops there. But as there >> cannot be a General without Instances embodying it, so there cannot >> be thought without Signs"...4.551 >> >> Peirce was not a materialist, nor am I am materialist. I am not saying >> that there is nothing 'real' outside of the material world. I am saying >> that 'reality' - understood as 'a General' only 'exists' within 'instances >> embodying it'. This means that Mind/thought/reason...which is a General, >> functions within Signs, and Signs are triadic instances [see his >> explanation in the rest of 4.551]... A triadic Sign is a 'material' unit, >> in that it exists in time and space, even if it is existent only as a word >> rather than a bacterium. >> >> Re your first two points - since deduction, induction, abduction, can be >> valid in themselves as a format, I presume you are talking about the >> true/false nature of their premises....and since the debate seems to be on >> the Nature of Truth - then this issue, the truth/false nature of the >> premises is relevant. Taking that use of the terms into account >> [truth/false nature of the premises] , I agree with your outline of these >> three forms of argument.. >> >> And I also agree with your other two points. >> >> I don't see that my position, which rests on 4.551 and other similar >> outlines by Peirce, rejects or is any different from his analysis. >> >> Edwina >> >>
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