BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px; }Jon - we've been over these terms before. Read 4.551 and you'll see the triad - and it's elsewhere as well.
You know perfectly well that by Sign [capital S] I refer to the triad of Object-Representamen-Interpretant. The Representamen is general when in a mode of Thirdness. But you know all of that anyway. Edwina On Mon 16/10/17 12:22 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com sent: Edwina, List: I think that it would be helpful if you could clarify exactly how you distinguish reality from existence in your statements below. I am also wondering where in Peirce's writings you find the view that every Sign is "a triadic particular...existent in space and time." On my reading, that would preclude any Sign from being truly general. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USAProfessional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Laymanwww.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt [1] - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt [2] On Mon, Oct 16, 2017 at 8:50 AM, Edwina Taborsky wrote: Gary, list: I presume you are being sarcastic. I have always accepted the reality of generals and have posted this view frequently. What is Thirdness????? My point, also posted frequently, is that these generals, as real, are only 'existential' within 'material' instances, i.e., Signs, which are a triadic particular...existent in space and time, whether as a concept/word or a material entity [bacterium]. I don't see that Reality/Generals have any existence 'per se' outside of their articulation within Signs...and this view has been stated often enough by me - and of course, by Peirce. So, sarcasm aside - we await your next posting. Edwina On Mon 16/10/17 9:21 AM , g...@gnusystems.ca [4] sent: Edwina, List, It’s good to see that you now accept the reality of generals, as your previous post appeared to reject it. That said, we need to focus on logical issues rather than metaphysical ones, as we dig deeper into Peirce’s Lowell lectures. For Lowell 2 especially, which is all about “necessary reasoning” and the logic of mathematics, we’ll need to clarify those issues. I’m ready to start posting from Lowell 2 tomorrow, unless others need more time to digest Lowell 1 before we move ahead. As you are no doubt aware, CP 4.551 is a paragraph from “ Prolegomena to an Apology for Pragmaticism” (1906), which was his last and most complete public statement on Existential Graphs and their relation to his pragmaticism. In order to understand that context, and its place in Peirce’s whole system, I think we need to follow the development of EGs, starting with his first presentation of them to an audience, namely Lowell 2. Thanks to the SPIN project, we now have a chance to follow that development step by step. Peirce regarded this as the best way of resolving the logical issues we have been discussing in this thread. As someone with zero formal training in formal logic, I’m really looking forward to this as a way into deeper understanding of Peirce’s whole philosophy. Gary f. From: Edwina Taborsky [mailto:tabor...@primus.ca [5]] Sent: 16-Oct-17 08:24 To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu [6]; Jeffrey Brian Downard Subject: Re: Re: RE: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 1: overview Jeff, list "Thought is not necessarily connected with a brain. It appears in the work of bees, of crystals, and throughout the purely physical world"....not only is thought in the organic world but it develops there. But as there cannot be a General without Instances embodying it, so there cannot be thought without Signs"...4.551 Peirce was not a materialist, nor am I am materialist. I am not saying that there is nothing 'real' outside of the material world. I am saying that 'reality' - understood as 'a General' only 'exists' within 'instances embodying it'. This means that Mind/thought/reason...which is a General, functions within Signs, and Signs are triadic instances [see his explanation in the rest of 4.551]... A triadic Sign is a 'material' unit, in that it exists in time and space, even if it is existent only as a word rather than a bacterium. Re your first two points - since deduction, induction, abduction, can be valid in themselves as a format, I presume you are talking about the true/false nature of their premises....and since the debate seems to be on the Nature of Truth - then this issue, the truth/false nature of the premises is relevant. Taking that use of the terms into account [truth/false nature of the premises] , I agree with your outline of these three forms of argument.. And I also agree with your other two points. I don't see that my position, which rests on 4.551 and other similar outlines by Peirce, rejects or is any different from his analysis. Edwina Links: ------ [1] http://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt [2] http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt [3] http://webmail.primus.ca/javascript:top.opencompose(\'tabor...@primus.ca\',\'\',\'\',\'\') [4] http://webmail.primus.ca/javascript:top.opencompose(\'g...@gnusystems.ca\',\'\',\'\',\'\') [5] http://webmail.primus.ca/javascript:top.opencompose(\'tabor...@primus.ca\',\'\',\'\',\'\') [6] http://webmail.primus.ca/javascript:top.opencompose(\'peirce-l@list.iupui.edu\',\'\',\'\',\'\')
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