Gary, list:
I presume you are being sarcastic.
I have always accepted the reality of generals and have posted this
view frequently. What is Thirdness????? My point, also posted
frequently, is that these generals, as real, are only 'existential'
within 'material' instances, i.e., Signs, which are a triadic
particular...existent in space and time, whether as a concept/word or
a material entity [bacterium]. I don't see that Reality/Generals have
any existence 'per se' outside of their articulation within
Signs...and this view has been stated often enough by me - and of
course, by Peirce.
So, sarcasm aside - we await your next posting.
Edwina
On Mon 16/10/17 9:21 AM , g...@gnusystems.ca sent:
Edwina, List,
It’s good to see that you now accept the reality of generals, as
your previous post appeared to reject it. That said, we need to focus
on logical issues rather than metaphysical ones, as we dig deeper into
Peirce’s Lowell lectures. For Lowell 2 especially, which is all
about “necessary reasoning” and the logic of mathematics, we’ll
need to clarify those issues. I’m ready to start posting from Lowell
2 tomorrow, unless others need more time to digest Lowell 1 before we
move ahead.
As you are no doubt aware, CP 4.551 is a paragraph from “
Prolegomena to an Apology for Pragmaticism” (1906), which was his
last and most complete public statement on Existential Graphs and
their relation to his pragmaticism. In order to understand that
context, and its place in Peirce’s whole system, I think we need to
follow the development of EGs, starting with his first presentation of
them to an audience, namely Lowell 2. Thanks to the SPIN project, we
now have a chance to follow that development step by step. Peirce
regarded this as the best way of resolving the logical issues we have
been discussing in this thread. As someone with zero formal training
in formal logic, I’m really looking forward to this as a way into
deeper understanding of Peirce’s whole philosophy.
Gary f.
From: Edwina Taborsky [mailto:tabor...@primus.ca]
Sent: 16-Oct-17 08:24
To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu; Jeffrey Brian Downard
Subject: Re: Re: RE: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 1: overview
Jeff, list
"Thought is not necessarily connected with a brain. It appears in
the work of bees, of crystals, and throughout the purely physical
world"....not only is thought in the organic world but it develops
there. But as there cannot be a General without Instances embodying
it, so there cannot be thought without Signs"...4.551
Peirce was not a materialist, nor am I am materialist. I am not
saying that there is nothing 'real' outside of the material world. I
am saying that 'reality' - understood as 'a General' only 'exists'
within 'instances embodying it'. This means that
Mind/thought/reason...which is a General, functions within Signs, and
Signs are triadic instances [see his explanation in the rest of
4.551]... A triadic Sign is a 'material' unit, in that it exists in
time and space, even if it is existent only as a word rather than a
bacterium.
Re your first two points - since deduction, induction, abduction,
can be valid in themselves as a format, I presume you are talking
about the true/false nature of their premises....and since the debate
seems to be on the Nature of Truth - then this issue, the truth/false
nature of the premises is relevant. Taking that use of the terms into
account [truth/false nature of the premises] , I agree with your
outline of these three forms of argument..
And I also agree with your other two points.
I don't see that my position, which rests on 4.551 and other similar
outlines by Peirce, rejects or is any different from his analysis.
Edwina
On Mon 16/10/17 12:17 AM , Jeffrey Brian Downard
jeffrey.down...@nau.edu [1] sent:
Edwina, List,
I assume you are articulating your own view--which is shared by a
number of materialist oriented philosophers and scientists including
Hobbes, Boyle and others.
On my reading of the relevant texts, I believe Peirce argued against
such a materialist position--even one that take the material realm to
be an "articulation of Mind." It isn't obvious to me what the latter
clause adds, but I am willing to be enlightened. Here are four such
lines of argument.
1. Arguments for the validity of deduction require at least a verbal
definition of the real, where the character of the real is not
exhausted by individuals of a material character--not even if one
brings a conception of individuals like us with minds into that
realm.
2. Arguments for the validity of induction and abduction require a
real definition of the real, where that account adds yet more to the
character of the real as generals (e.g., general properties, laws of
nature, etc.) that govern the relations between what is possible and
what is actual.
3. Having developed these two lines of argument within the context
of a critical logic, Peirce argues for an account of the real as
having the character of what is truly continuous as a regulative
principle within methodeutic. Such a principle is necessary for the
healthy development and robust communication of scientific theories
of all sorts, including natural and social sciences.
4. With these arguments in hand, Peirce applies the principles of
logic to the study of questions of metaphysics. Here, he forges a
position that unifies elements of both realism and objective
idealism.
These four strands of argument each seem to work against the claim
that there isn't anything 'real' outside of the material world - even
when we take the material world to be an articulation of Mind. One way
of responding is to say that I'm reading Peirce wrong on one or more
of these lines of argument. Another way to respond is to say that
your position is different from Peirce's, and that he is wrong and
you are right where there is disagreement. Or, there might some third
way to respond. Let me know if one of these avenues fits with what you
take yourself to be doing. As things stand, it isn't clear to me what
you are doing in making such assertions, but my assumption that is
fits the second option.
--Jeff
Jeffrey Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
Northern Arizona University
(o) 928 523-8354
-------------------------
From: Edwina Taborsky
Sent: Sunday, October 15, 2017 1:41 PM
To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu [2]; g...@gnusystems.ca [3]
Subject: Re: RE: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 1: overview
I don't think that there is anything 'real' outside of the material
world - and I understand the material world to be an articulation of
Mind. [Again, I won't repeat 4.551]. I see the reality of Mind as
articulated within/as the material world; Mind doesn't exist 'per se'
outside of these existential instantiations.
Mathematics is an intellectual abstraction of this
reality-as-existential.
I don't think you arrive at necessary reasoning, deduction, without
having gone through the processes of abduction and induction. That
is, since Deduction is operationally triadic, then, in a Necessary
Deduction, don't its premises have to be true?
For example, can I assume that a purely intellectual
opinion/conclusion, 'the universe was created in one day"" - is a
necessary deductive? The premises would be: 'the bible says
so'...etc.
Or is it "Deduction is an argument whose Interpretant represents
that it belongs to a general class of possible arguments precisely
analogous which are such that in the long run of experience the
greater part of those whose premises are true will have true
conclusions" 2.267...Now, a
"Necessary Deductions are those which have nothing to do with any
ratio of frequency but profess [or their interpretants profess for
them] that from true premises they must invariably produce true
conclusions" 2.267
That is - isn't Peirce's Objective Idealism firmly rooted in
phenomenology; i.e., in experience- and these experiences have been
shown, by repetition, to be true, such that one no longer requires
further experience?
Edwina
Links:
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