List - the key problem, I think, in understanding Peircean semiosis
as basic in all forms of matter - and he included the
physical-chemical realm as well as the biological and the human - is
that many people see semiosis primarily as a means of communication.
It has little to do with that; you don't need a triad for
communication - you can achieve that with multiple linear dyads - the
'conveyor belt system'.
Peircean semiosis is triadic, which inserts that vital relation of
Mediation between the external Dynamic Object - and the Interpretant.
This Mediation need NOT be operative, always, within 'genuine
Thirdness' - [3-3] but must, vitally, also operate with the two
degenerate forms of Thirdness [3-2 and 3-1]. Without these two
degenerate modes - the world simply could not function, because 3-3
is pure idealism and Peirce rejected such a Platonic world. Instead,
as an Aristotelian, he 'grounded' semiosic actions with real material
objects. Firstness and Secondness ground reality-into-existence.
Mediation has a transformative function, using its habitual
knowledge base to transform the input sensate data into...an
Interpretant [which can be a concept OR a different form of matter;
i.e., a bird eats seeds to transform into its own flesh]...and, as
well, it has a learning function - , via 3-2, [the 'in touch with
others mode of learning] . and exploring external stimuli in its
environment - to gather information. And consolidating what it has
learned via 3-1 [the iconic mode of habituation]. Genuine Thirdness
[3-3] is the basic Mind, the will-to-organize and network, of the
universe. And as noted, genuine Thirdness vitally needs the two
degenerate modes to function.
Edwina
On Sat 20/01/18 2:05 PM , [email protected] sent:
John, list,
I agree with much of what you’ve said here, and my book deals with
biosemiotics from Chapter 3 on, so I won’t repeat any of that here.
But I’m surprised that no one in this thread has cited Lowell 3.13,
as it’s possibly Peirce’s clearest statement of the possibility of
genuine Thirdness and representation going beyond human thought and
language.
In the Peirce texts I’ve quoted in the past week, he established
that representamen is a more general term than sign, signs being the
kind of representamens that “convey notions to human minds”
(emphasis Peirce’s), and that “Possibly there may be
Representamens that are not Signs.” But “representamen” was
defined in the first place by starting with signs, as “such
conveyers of thought are familiarly known to us,” and making “the
best analysis I can of what is essential to a sign, and I define a
representamen as being whatever that analysis applies to.” This way
he could use the term “sign” to refer strictly to human uses of
them, because he now had a different word for the genuine Thirdness
and triadicity of relatedness which is “essential” to signs apart
from the “accidental human element."
As I explained in the Lowell 3.13 thread, a couple of years later
Peirce decided that he might as well use the word “sign” itself,
instead of “representamen,” for “what is essential to a sign”
(though for awhile he used the words as synonyms). And it was around
this time that Peirce began using the terms “sem[e]iotic” and
“semiosis” much more than he had before. So Peircean semiotics is
naturally associated with a notion of “sign” which is not limited
to human use of signs; but the Lowell lectures may represent his
first clear move in that direction.
Gary f.
-----Original Message-----
From: John F Sowa [mailto:[email protected]]
Sent: 20-Jan-18 11:20
To: [email protected]
Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Biosemiosis (was Lowell Lecture 3.12
Edwina and Gary R,
I changed the subject line to biosemiosis in order to emphasize that
Peirce had intended semiosis to cover the full realm of all living
things. Note what he wrote in a letter to Lady Welby:
CSP, MS 463 (1908)
> I define a Sign as anything which is so determined by something
else,
> called its Object, and so determines an effect upon a person,
which
> effect I call its Interpretant, that the latter is thereby
mediately
> determined by the former. My insertion of “upon a person” is a
sop to
> Cerberus, because I despair of making my own broader conception
> understood.
I believe that "despair" is the primary reason why he didn't say
more.
His insistence on continuity implied that the faculties of the human
mind must be continuous with the minds (or quasi-minds) of all living
things anywhere in the universe. But if he had said that, he would
have been denounced by a huge number of critics from philosophy,
psychology, science, religion, and politics.
Edwina
> I do think that limiting Peircean semiosis to the human conceptual
> realm is a disservice to Peircean semiosis... I won't repeat my
> constant reference to 4.551.
Gary
> I believe, you've had to depend on CP 4.551 as much as you have
(there
> are a very few other suggestions scattered through his work, but
none
> of them are much developed).
The reason why there are so few is that Peirce felt a need to throw
a "sop to Cerberus" in order to get people to take his ideas
seriously. I'm sure that he would gladly have written much more if
they were ready to listen.
For a very important and carefully worded quotation, see CP 2.227:
> all signs used by a "scientific" intelligence, that is to say, by
an
> intelligence capable of learning by experience.
That comment certainly includes all large animals. In addition to
explicit statements about signs, it's important to note his anecdotes
about dogs and parrots. He observed some remarkable performances,
which implied "scientific intelligence". Although he didn't say so
explicitly, he wouldn't have made the effort to write those anecdotes
if he didn't think so.
Since Peirce talked about "crystals and bees" in CP 4.551, he must
have been thinking about the continuity to zoosemiosis, and from that
to the intermediate stages of phytosemiosis, biosemiosis by microbes,
crystal formation, and eventually to all of chemistry and physics.
He would have been delighted to learn about the signs called DNA and
the semiosis that interprets those signs in all aspects of life.
Many people have observed strong similarities with Whitehead's
process philosophy. ANW also had a continuity of mind-like things
from the lowest levels to something he called God. He wrote most of
his philosophical books at Harvard, and he also wrote some
sympathetic words about Peirce. He admitted that he hadn't read much
of Peirce's work, but Clarence Irving Lewis, the chairman of the
philosophy dept. at that time, had studied Peirce's MSS in great
detail. And Whitehead was also the thesis advisor for the two
graduate students, Hartshorne and Weiss, who edited the CP.
ANW must have absorbed much more than he cited in his references.
We should also remember that there are thousands of pages of MSS
that have not yet been transcribed and studied. Nobody knows how
much more might be discovered about all these issues. But the
fragments that do exist show that he had intended much more.
John
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