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}Gary R, list:
The triadic Sign consists of the Object-Representamen-Interpretant.
The Function is also triadic, made up of input/functional act/output.
The focus is on the mediation action by the Repesentamen or Function
which is a powerful agent/subject that assigns meaning to the input
data of the Dynamic Object.
I think it is vital to differentiate the sign/representamen and its
singular action from the triadic Sign of
Object-Representamen-Interpretant.
The "concrete subject that represents' is, in my view, a good
definition of that mediate functional action.
Edwina
On Sat 20/01/18 11:39 PM , Gary Richmond [email protected]
sent:
Gary f, Helmut, Edwina,
Gary f wrote:
[Peirce] used [Sign] as one “correlate” of a genuine triadic
relation. The sign, like the representamen, is “the concrete
subject that represents” (CP 1.540). In this respect the two words
are synonymous; there is no need to make up “a way of seeing "sign"
as as synonym with "representamen".”
Gary, I fully concur, as you can imagine, with your emphasizing
"Sign" as a "correlate" of a genuine triadic relation and not to
mean a function (as I also suggested in an earlier post)
“consisting of sign, object, interpretant.” This idea of
"consisting" leads astray, in my opinion.
Best,
Gary R
Gary RichmondPhilosophy and Critical ThinkingCommunication Studies
LaGuardia College of the City University of New York718 482-5690
On Sat, Jan 20, 2018 at 6:19 PM, wrote:
Helmut,
Many have tried using the word “sign” that way, and some have
even made a habit of it. But I prefer Peirce’s definition(s) of the
word, and he did not use it to mean “a function,” or as “
consisting of sign, object, interpretant.” He used it as one
“correlate” of a genuine triadic relation. The sign, like the
representamen, is “the concrete subject that represents” (CP
1.540). In this respect the two words are synonymous; there is no
need to make up “ a way of seeing "sign" as synonym with
"representamen".”
I think the key challenge in understanding Peircean semiosis is
reading exactly what Peirce wrote about it. The further we spin off
from that, the more confused we become.
Gary f.
From: Helmut Raulien [mailto:[email protected] [2]]
Sent: 20-Jan-18 17:34
To: [email protected] [3]
Cc: [email protected] [4]
Subject: Aw: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Biosemiosis (was Lowell Lecture 3.12
Gary, List,
I have made up a way of seeing "sign" as synonym with
"representamen": A sign consisting of sign, object, interpretant is
possible, because this kind of "consisting" is a functional
composition (A sign is a function, consisting of other functions),
which is different from a spatial composition (range consisting of
domains). In a functional composition this kind of re-entry is
possible: Something consisting of itself and other things too. And,
because function is not the same as domain, a sign (functionally)
consists of (besides itself) the whole object and the whole
interpretant, not only the immediate ones.
1ns: Composition from traits, 2ns: Spatial composition, 3ns:
Functional composition.
Best, Helmut
20. Januar 2018 um 22:54 Uhr
Von: [email protected] [5]
John, you wrote,
[[ This is one more reason for getting a more complete collection
and transcription of Peirce's MSS. He was undoubtedly thinking about
these issues for years, and he must have had good reasons for changing
his terminology. But those brief quotations don't explain why. ]]
What change in terminology are you referring to? And which “brief
quotations”?
The change I mentioned was the change from (1) using
“representamen” as a more general term than “sign” to (2)
using them as synonyms to (3) dispensing with the term
“representamen” as unnecessary. And the explanation of that shift
that I quoted was an excerpt from a 1905 letter to Welby. If that’s
the “brief quotations” you mean, what is it that they leave
unexplained? Here it is again :
[[ I use ‘sign’ in the widest sense of the definition. It is a
wonderful case of an almost popular use of a very broad word in
almost the exact sense of the scientific definition. … I formerly
preferred the term representamen. But there was no need of this
horrid long word. … The truth is that I went wrong from not having
a formal definition all drawn up. This sort of thing is inevitable in
the early stages of a strong logical study; for if a formal definition
is attempted too soon, it will only shackle thought. ] SS p.193 ]
Gary f.
-----Original Message-----
From: John F Sowa [mailto:[email protected] [6]]
Sent: 20-Jan-18 15:01
To: [email protected] [7]
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Biosemiosis (was Lowell Lecture 3.12
Edwina, Gary R, Stephen, and Gary F,
Edwina
> I emphasize that semiosis is operative not merely in the more
complex
> or larger-brain animals, but in all matter, from the smallest
micro
> bacterium to the plant world to the animal world.
Yes. I like to quote the biologist Lynn Margulis, who devoted her
career to studying bacteria: “The growth, reproduction, and
communication of these moving, alliance-forming bacteria”
lie on a continuum “with our thought, with our happiness, our
sensitivities and stimulations.”
https://www.edge.org/documents/ThirdCulture/n-Ch.7.html [8]
Gary R
> Has there been any work (articles, dissertations, etc.) comparing
the
> thinking of the two? As I recall, John, some of your papers touch
on
> this.
Following is the article I presented at a conference on "Pragmatic
process philosophy" in 1999: http://jfsowa.com/pubs/signproc.pdf [9]
Stephen
> Here's
>
somethinghttp://blog.uvm.edu/aivakhiv/2010/05/12/between-whitehead-pei
[10]
> rce/
Thanks for that reference. I googled "peirce whitehead" and found
many other references. Among them was a paper by Jaime Nubiola from
2008: http://www.unav.es/users/PeirceWhitehead.html [11]
Jaime also spoke at the 1999 conference. But the 2008 paper is more
detailed. In it, he quoted Whitehead's biographer, Victor Lowe:
> Convictions common to Peirce and Whitehead have been deservedly
> noticed by commentators, somewhat to the neglect of the first
question
> of
> metaphysics: How shall metaphysics be pursued? — As a science
among
> the sciences, says Peirce. Not so, says Whitehead; it seeks truth,
but
> a more general truth than sciences seek (Lowe 1964, 440).
But I'm not sure that they disagreed on that point. In his 1903
classification of the sciences, Peirce said that the "special
sciences"
depend on mathematics and metaphysics. Therefore, metaphysics would
be more general than the special sciences.
Gary F
> Peircean semiotics is naturally associated with a notion of
“sign”
> which is not limited to human use of signs; but the Lowell
lectures
> may represent his first clear move in that direction.
This is one more reason for getting a more complete collection and
transcription of Peirce's MSS. He was undoubtedly thinking about
these issues for years, and he must have had good reasons for
changing his terminology. But those brief quotations don't explain
why.
John
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