Mike B., List: Thank you for the considerable effort that you obviously invested in compiling this comprehensive post. It merits careful consideration, so for now I will simply offer one clarification of my own position. As Gary F. helpfully pointed out regarding my current advocacy of using "Sign" only for the general Type and "Sign-Replica" or "Sign-Instance" for each of its individual Tokens, I am mainly seeking to tighten up *our *usage of terms while remaining faithful to Peirce's concepts, rather than merely trying to sort out *his *usage. I do not dwell on terminology for its own sake, but as a means to a much more important end--namely, *making our (and Peirce's) ideas clear*. My concern remains that associating action/reaction/interaction with 3ns, rather than 2ns, fosters a fundamental misunderstanding of Peirce's Categories, and thus his entire philosophical system.
Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Wed, Aug 15, 2018 at 12:54 AM, Mike Bergman <m...@mkbergman.com> wrote: > Jon, Gary R, Edwina, List, > > A few recent threads have discussed technical terminology, dyadic v > triadic action, and natural language. I was challenged to back up my > assertions about the importance of triadic action and natural language use > and interpretation. I have attempted a broad survey, which I document next, > and I conclude with some summary observations. I apologize for the length > of this post, but I wanted to be both broad and deep in some areas. Skip to > the end if you do not want the details. > > My approach combines some selected Peirce quotes and numerical counts of > instances of various term matches drawn from searching my own internal CSP > reference collection. Since I don't have InteLex, I had previously > assembled my own reference collection, which I store separately from my > scholarly Peirce papers. This enables me to do approximate searches across > Peirce's writings. My reference collection includes the Collected Papers > (CP), Essential Peirce (EP 1 and 2), Lady Welby, New Elements of > Mathematics (all NEM), and a smattering of CSP papers not included in the > others. There is some duplication between the sources, most often between > CP and EP 2, so my search counts should not be taken as absolute (nor could > any such collection be taken as such). Also, please note I have not placed > any bold or italics emphases on Peirce's or my own statements. > > Within this collection there are slightly more than 2500 hits for the term > 'action'. It is clear when reviewing all of these references that most > refer to the dyadic 'action-reaction' action model. Some of the qualifying > terms (and their counts) that CSP uses in referring to the dyadic model > include: > > reaction - 540 > interaction - 17 > mechanical action - 16 > dyadic action - 7 > brute action - 6 > mutual action - 5 > particular action - 2 > regular action - 2 > forceful action - 2 > dynamic action - 2 > > These qualified references to dyadic action are often provided in contrast > to triadic action (see below). Also, generally any Peirce reference to > capitalized 'Action' (see EP 2:272, 1903, and its equating Action to > Secondness) relates to dyadic action, generally when not discussing > contrasts to triadic action. In other contexts, such as "What Pragmatism > Is" (EP 2:331, 1905), lowercase 'action' throughout appears to reference > the dyadic kind. > > These kinds of dyadic action references appear to account for perhaps 70% > of all references to 'action' across my reference collection. However, for > the remaining 20-30%, Peirce is quite clear about asserting triadic > actions, sometimes which he indicates can be analyzed by dyadic relations > (degenerate forms), but some can not (non-degenerate forms). Actions that > cannot be explained by dyadic means are of particular interest to Peirce. > In chronological order, let me skip a stone across Peirce's evolution in > what I interpret as his thoughts about triadic actions. > > As early as 1868 Peirce was talking about 'mental action', devoting an > entire section to it in his 'Four Incapacities' (CP 5.266, 1868). I think > one can see his fleshing out of the universal categories and some of his > sign aspects as he discusses the mental actions of thought: > > "These two sorts of objects, what we are immediately conscious of and what > we are mediately conscious of, are found in all consciousness. Some > elements (the sensations) are completely present at every instant so long > as they last, while others (like thought) are actions having beginning, > middle, and end, and consist in a congruence in the succession of > sensations which flow through the mind. They cannot be immediately present > to us, but must cover some portion of the past or future. Thought is a > thread of melody running through the succession of our sensations." (Make > Our Ideas Clear, 1878) > > His investigations of the Logic of Relatives seemed to bring home the > distinction that not all action may be of the dyadic kind: > > "The need is of one or other of two kinds. In the one class of cases we > experience on several occasions to which our own deliberate action gave a > common character, an excitation of one and the same novel idea or > sensation, and the need is that a large number of propositions having the > same novel consequent but different antecedents, should be replaced by one > proposition which brings in the novel element, so that the others shall > appear as mere consequences of every day facts with a single novel one. We > may express this intellectual need in a brief phrase as the need of > synthetising a multitude of subjects. It is the need of generalisation. In > another class of cases, we find in some new thing, or new situation, a > great number of characters, the same as would naturally present themselves > as consequences of a hypothetical state of things, and the need is that the > large number of novel propositions with one subject or antecedent should be > replaced by a single novel proposition, namely that the new thing or new > occasion belongs to the hypothetical class, from which all those other > novelties shall follow as mere consequences of matters of course. This > intellectual need, briefly stated, is the need of synthetising a multitude > of predicates. It is > the need of theory. Every problem, then, is either a problem of > consequences, a problem of generalisation, or a problem of theory. This > statement illustrates how special solutions are the only ones which > directly mean anything or embody any knowledge; and general solutions are > only useful when they happen to suggest what the special solutions will > be." (Logic of Relatives, 196-197, 1883) > > These ideas of intellectual need or what Peirce called the "action of > thought" (Make Our Ideas Clear, 1878) seem to coincide with Peirce's > attempt over the rest of his career to find the 'true' triadic fact or > action. I suspect the sophistication he gained in his investigations of the > logic of relatives helped point him in this direction, as well as furthered > his understanding of the sign relations: > > "So in a triadic fact, say, for example > > A gives B to C > > we make no distinction in the ordinary logic of relations between the > subject nominative, the direct object, and the indirect object. We say that > the proposition these six sentences express one and the same indivisible > phenomenon. Nevertheless, just as [in] conceiving of two reacting objects > we may introduce the metaphysical distinction of agent and patient so we > may metaphysically distinguish the functions of the three objects denoted > by the subject nominative, the direct object, and the indirect object. The > subject nominative denotes that > one of the three objects which in the triadic fact merely assumes a > non-relative character of activity. The direct object is that object which > in the triadic fact receives a character relative to that agent, being the > patient of its action, while the indirect object receives a character which > can neither exist nor be conceived to exist without the cooperation of the > other two. When I call Category the Third the Category of Representation in > which there is a Represented Object, a Representamen, and an Interpretant, > I recognize that distinction. This mode of distinction is, indeed, germane > to Thirdness, while it is alien to Secondness. That is to say, agent and > patient as they are by themselves in their duality are not distinguished as > agent and patient. The distinction lies in the mode of representing them in > my mind, which is a Third. Thus there is an inherent Thirdness in this mode > of distinction. But a triadic fact is in all cases an intellectual fact. > Take giving for example. The mere transfer of an object which A sets down > and C takes up does not constitute giving. There must be a transfer of > ownership and ownership is a matter of Law, an intellectual fact. You now > begin to see how the conception of representation is so peculiarly fit to > typify the category of Thirdness. The object represented is supposed not to > be affected by the representation. That is essential to the idea of > representation. The Representamen is affected by the Object but is not > otherwise modified in the operation of representation. It is either > qualitatively the double of the object in the Icon, or it is a patient on > which the object really acts, in the Index; or it is intellectually linked > to the object in such a way as to be mentally excited by that object, in > the Symbol." (EP 2:70, 1901) > > Note this language is couched in the context of understanding the parts of > speech of natural language. Clearly the ideas of thoughts and the > understanding of symbols fit into a different type of action: > > "The elements of every concept enter into logical thought at the gate of > perception and make their exit at the gate of purposive action; and > whatever cannot show its passports at both those two gates is to be > arrested as unauthorized by reason." (EP 2:241, 1903) > > It seems clear to me that thought and mentality were becoming understood > by Peirce as a different kind of action: > > "If you take any ordinary triadic relation, you will always find a mental > element in it. Brute action is secondness, any mentality involves > thirdness. Analyze for instance the relation involved in 'A gives B to C.' > Now what is giving? It does not consist [in] A's putting B away from him > and C's subsequently taking B up. It is not necessary that any material > transfer should take place. It consists in A's making C the possessor > according to Law. There must be some kind of law before there can be any > kind of giving, -- be it but the law of the strongest. But now suppose that > giving did consist merely in A's laying down the B which C subsequently > picks up. That would be a degenerate form of Thirdness in which the > thirdness is externally appended. In A's putting away B, there is no > thirdness. In C's taking B, there is no thirdness. But if you say that > these two acts constitute a single operation by virtue of the identity of > the B, you transcend the mere brute fact, you introduce a mental element . > . . . The criticism which I make on [my] algebra of dyadic relations, with > which I am by no means in love, though I think it is a pretty thing, is > that the very triadic relations which it does not recognize, it does itself > employ. For every combination of relatives to make a new relative is a > triadic relation irreducible to dyadic relations. Its inadequacy is shown > in other ways, but in this way it is in a conflict with itself if it be > regarded, as I never did regard it, as sufficient for the expression of all > relations. My universal algebra of relations, with the subjacent indices > and Σ and π, is susceptible of being enlarged so as to comprise everything; > and so, still better, though not to ideal perfection, is the system of > existential graphs.[See CP 4, Book II]" (CP 8.331, 1904) > > Though we can reason and more explicitly and logically communicate using > EGs, a benefit John Sowa emphasizes frequently, and quite applicable to > machine use and reasoning, we humans communicate via our symbolic signs. > Again, I think that is in part why Peirce continues to probe the questions > of triadic action: > > "The action of a sign calls for a little closer attention. Let me remind > you of the distinction referred to above between dynamical, or dyadic, > action; and intelligent, or triadic action. An event, A, may, by brute > force, produce an event, B; and then the event, B, may in its turn produce > a third event, C. The fact that the event, C, is about to be produced by B > has no influence at all upon the production of B by A. It is impossible > that it should, since the action of B in producing C is a contingent future > event at the time B is produced. Such is dyadic action, which is so called > because each step of it concerns a pair of objects." (CP 5.472, 1907) > > There are numerous places where Peirce ascribes triadic action to the > actions of signs or semiosis: > > "But by "semiosis" I mean, on the contrary, an action, or influence, which > is, or involves, a cooperation of three subjects, such as a sign, its > object, and its interpretant, this tri-relative influence not being in any > way resolvable into actions between pairs." (EP 2:411; CP 5.484, 1908) > > So, while Peirce was becoming increasingly specific and understanding of > the distinction of triadic action, it also fit nicely into his universal > categories and prior views of brute Secondness: > > "That whatever action is brute, unintelligent, and unconcerned with the > result of it is purely dyadic is either demonstrable or is too evident to > be demonstrable. But in case that dyadic action is merely a member of a > triadic action, then so far from its furnishing the least shade of > presumption that all the action in the physical universe is dyadic, on the > contrary, the entire and triadic action justifies a guess that there may be > other and more marked examples in the universe of the triadic pattern. No > sooner is the guess made than instances swarm upon us amply verifying it, > and refuting the agnostic position; while others present new problems for > our study. With the refutation of agnosticism, the agnostic is shown to be > a superficial neophyte in philosophy, entitled at most to an occasional > audience on special points, yet infinitely more respectable than those who > seek to bolster up what is really true by sophistical arguments -- the > traitors to truth that they are. . . ." (CP 6.332, 1909) > > Which, in terms of its Thirdness, also ties nicely back to Peirce's > earlier observations that brute Action is a Secondness (see EP 2:272, 1903) > while equating Conduct to Thirdness: > > "By 'conduct' I mean action under an intention of self-control. No event > that occurs to any mind, no action of any mind can constitute the truth of > that conditional proposition. The Immediate Interpretant consists in the > Quality of the Impression that a sign is fit to produce, not to any actual > reaction. Thus the Immediate and Final Interpretants seem to me absolutely > distinct from the Dynamical Interpretant and from each other. And if there > be any fourth kind of Interpretant on the same footing as those three, > there must be a dreadful rupture of my mental retina, for I can't see it at > all." (CP 8.315, 1909) > > Across the reference collection, here are some of the various natural > language ways that Peirce often referred to triadic action (not all > accounts so apply): > > conduct - 547 (sometimes specifically related to 3ns; EP 2:272) > gives - 488 > represents - 366 > reasons - 293 > triadic relation - 150 > thinks - 142 > aggregation - 70 > mental action - 49 > expresses - 47 > conceives - 32 > semiosis - 19 (incl semeoisis) > analyzes - 13 > mediates - 9 (CP 8.332, 1904, others) > triadic fact - 8 > generalizes - 7 > psychical action - 7 > sign action - 5 (incl 'action of sign') > purposive action - 4 > triadic action - 2 > intelligent action - 2 > binds - 2 > > Of course, some of these terms, such as 'gives' or 'reasons' may be used > by CSP in non-specific ways. It is also hard to aggregate all of the > natural language variants by which a specific concept may be referenced > (such as 'sign action' or 'action of sign'). The intent of these counts is > not to be definitive, but indicative. However, we can clearly see the > emphasis Peirce placed on the actions of signs, mentality and intelligence > in his views of triadic action (see also the very related discussions to > 'triadic relation'). > > Each of these qualified terms is worth searching and inspecting within > your own reference collections. There is much context to be gained from > these matches. I have tended to use 'triadic action' to refer to the > aggregate of all of these references even though that was not Peirce's most > common qualified term. Still, I think 'triadic action' provides a useful > summary term. > > On another note, Peirce was also clear that he saw 'action' as within the > proper purview of ethics. "Ethics is the study of what ends of action we > are deliberately prepared to adopt." (EP 2:200, 1903) I think we can infer > that 'action' in this ethical sense is one of dyadic action, though > elsewhere it is also clear that Peirce places pragmatism and actions > related to pragmatism in Thirdness. > > In summary, then, I offer these observations regarding the concept of > 'action' in Peirce's writings: > > * Action most often refers to the dyadic, energetic kind > * Unqualified action nearly always refers to the dyadic, action-reaction > kind > * But Peirce also insisted upon a triadic form of action, referenced in > multiple ways > * Triadic action is most often referenced with respect to mental or > intellectual actions, such as thought > * When contrasted to triadic actions or in that context, Peirce also uses > a number of specific action terms to qualify dyadic action > * The non-degenerate forms of triadic action can not be fully understood > based on dyadic relations. > > Lastly, I do respect Peirce's passion for precise and technical > terminology, but also recognize he sometimes changed preferred terms due to > development of his thought or due to context. The universal categories of > 1ns, 2ns, and 3ns are the very embodiment of how Peirce applied contextual > perspectives across scores of triadic terms [1]. Peirce also is clear in > his understanding of the frailties of natural language, using examples and > a rich, contextual language to improve his communication. A cursory > inspection of references using the qualified terms above clearly shows this. > > My bottom line conclusion is that the meaning of 'action' for Peirce was > very much contextual, most often dyadic in nature, but also often seen > through the lens of natural language, with an important contribution being > his unique views on triadic action. And, yes, while Peirce preferred > precise terminology and had an ethics for such, many ideas and concepts > such as 'action' require natural language to distinguish and provide > clearer communications. > > Mike > > [1] c.f., the table in http://www.mkbergman.com/2077/ > how-i-interpret-c-s-peirce/.
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