Jeff, List: CSP: But in order that anything should be a Sign, it must "represent," as we say, something else, called its *Object*, although the condition that a Sign must be other than its Object is perhaps arbitrary, since, if we insist upon it we must at least make an exception in the case of a Sign that is a part of a Sign. (CP 2.230; 1910)
I am having trouble seeing the relevance of this quote for either the continuity of semeiosis or the ongoing discussion of my Semeiotic Argumentation for the Reality of God, since Peirce's emphasis on the non-immanence of the latter rules out the possibility that the entire Universe as a Sign is a part of another Sign. JD: In this case, it is the crucifix and not the pen that is serving as the object of the proposition. How is that object also functioning as a sign (of itself)? I have acknowledged repeatedly that anything is a Sign of itself in a *trivial *sense, but it is not in the relation of *representing *unless it stands for something *other than* itself. JD: This example suggests that the relations that are represented as holding between subjects in a proposition are, themselves, also the objects of the proposition. I disagree with this analysis. "Cain," "Abel," and "killing" are the subjects of the Proposition, which therefore denote its Objects (or "one complex Object"). The relation between them corresponds to the continuous predicate, "_____ stands in the relation of _____ to _____," which therefore signifies the Proposition's Interpretant. In fact, this is precisely the example that Peirce gave elsewhere of a sentence in which the continuous predicate is expressed entirely by *syntax*. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Mon, May 20, 2019 at 10:58 PM Jeffrey Brian Downard < jeffrey.down...@nau.edu> wrote: > Jon S, Gary F, John S, Edwina, Gary R, List > > I'd like to raise some questions about the assertion that every sign has > an object that is separate, in some sense, from that sign. The basis of the > claim that the object must be *separate* from the sign, I am supposing, > is that the object *determines* the sign. As a matter of principle, an > object cannot be the kind of thing that determines a sign if that object is > not separate from the sign. > > This assertion seems, at least to me, to be clearest in the case > of the actual objects that determine indexical sinsigns--where the objects > and signs stand in the relation of agent and patient. This type of relation > is classified as a dynamical dyadic relation that is formally ordered. For > this type of sign, the object, as agent, cannot determine the indexical > sinsign, as patient, if the two are identical. Diversity is requisite for > the relation to hold. > > If we can all agree on this much, then what shall we say about the case of > a sign that is part of a sign? In order to anchor the discussion of this > question about Peirce's semiotics in a text, l'd like to focus our > attention on the following clarification that is offered in "Meaning" from > 1910: "But in order that anything should be a Sign, it must "represent," > as we say, something else, called its *Object, *although the condition > that a Sign must be other than its Object is perhaps arbitrary, since, if > we insist upon it we must at least make an exception in the case of a > Sign that is a part of a Sign." > > Here is the larger paragraph from which this sentence has been abstracted: > > SIGNS AND THEIR OBJECTS > > The word Sign will be used to denote an Object perceptible, or only > imaginable, > or even unimaginable in one sense--for the word "*fast*," which is a Sign, is > not imaginable, since it is not *this word itself *that can be set down > on paper or pronounced, but only *an instance *of it, and since it is the > very same word when it is written as it is when it is pronounced, but is > one word when it means "rapidly" and quite another when it means > "immovable," and a third when it refers to abstinence. But in order that > anything should be a Sign, it must "represent," as we say, something else, > called its *Object, *although the condition that a Sign must be other > than its Object is perhaps arbitrary, since, if we insist upon it we must > at least make an exception in the case of a Sign that is a part of a > Sign. Thus nothing prevents the actor who acts a character in an > historical drama from carrying as a theatrical "property" the very relic that > that article is supposed merely to represent, such as the crucifix that > Bulwer's Richelieu holds up with such effect in his defiance. On a map of > an island laid down upon the soil of that island there must, under all > ordinary circumstances, be some position, some point, marked or not, that > represents *qua *place on the map, the very same point *qua *place on the > island. A sign may have more than one Object. Thus, the sentence "Cain > killed Abel," which is a Sign, refers at least as much to Abel as to Cain, > even if it be not regarded as it should, as having *"a killing" *as a > third Object. But the set of objects may be regarded as making up one > complex Object. In what follows and often elsewhere Signs will be treated > as having but one object each for the sake of dividing difficulties of > the study. If a Sign is other than its Object, there must exist, either > in thought or in expression, some explanation or argument or other context, > showing how--upon what system or for what reason the Sign represents the > Object > or set of Objects that it does. Now the Sign and the Explanation together > make up another Sign, and since the explanation will be a Sign, it will > probably require an additional explanation, which taken together with the > already enlarged Sign will make up a still larger Sign; and proceeding in > the same way, we shall, or should, ultimately reach a Sign of itself, > containing its own explanation and those of all its significant parts; > and according to this explanation each such part has some other part as its > Object. According to this every Sign has, actually or virtually, what we > may call a *Precept *of explanation according to which it is to be > understood as a sort of emanation, so to speak, of its Object. (If the > Sign be an Icon, a scholastic might say that the *"species" *of the > Object emanating from it found its matter in the Icon. If the Sign be an > Index, we may think of it as a fragment torn away from the Object, the two in > their Existence being one whole or a part of such whole. If the Sign is a > Symbol, we may think of it as embodying the *"ratio," *or reason, of the > Object that has emanated from it. These, of course, are mere figures of > speech; but that does not render them useless.) [CP 2.230] > > Consider the three examples Peirce offers to illustrate this point about > a sign that is part of a sign: > > a) "Thus nothing prevents the actor who acts a character in an > historical drama from carrying as a theatrical "property" the very relic that > that article is supposed merely to represent, such as the crucifix that > Bulwer's Richelieu holds up with such effect in his defiance." Bulwer is > the author who penned the famous phrase "the pen is mightier than the > sword" in the play *Richelieu**.* In this case, it is the crucifix and > not the pen that is serving as the object of the proposition. How is that > object also functioning as a sign (of itself)? > > b) "On a map of an island laid down upon the soil of that island there > must, under all ordinary circumstances, be some position, some point, > marked or not, that represents *qua *place on the map, the very same > point *qua *place on the island." We've discussed this example earlier. > The discussion following the three examples, seems to suggest that the > point being made about the self-referential character of some signs is a > rather general point. > > c) "A sign may have more than one Object. Thus, the sentence "Cain killed > Abel," which is a Sign, refers at least as much to Abel as to Cain, even > if it be not regarded as it should, as having *"a killing" *as a third > Object. But the set of objects may be regarded as making up one complex > Object." This example suggests that the relations that are represented as > holding between subjects in a proposition are, themselves, also the objects > of the proposition. Taken together, the two subjects and the relation may > be regarded as one complex object. In saying that the object is *complex*, > it appears that it is something more than a mere aggregate. > > How might these examples be used to clarify the following parts of > Peirce's central claim? > > i) Now the Sign and the Explanation together make up another Sign, and > since the explanation will be a Sign, it will probably require an additional > explanation, which taken together with the already enlarged Sign will make > up a still larger Sign; > > ii) and proceeding in the same way, we shall, or should, ultimately reach > a Sign of itself, containing its own explanation and those of all its > significant parts; and according to this explanation each such part has > some other part as its Object. > > Yours, > > Jeff > Jeffrey Downard > Associate Professor > Department of Philosophy > Northern Arizona University > (o) 928 523-8354 >
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