Jon S, List,
My aim was to raise questions about one premiss in the argument. In the versions I've seen, it was a general assertion about the object being separate from the sign. JonS response: "Peirce's emphasis on the non-immanence of the latter rules out the possibility that the entire Universe as a Sign is a part of another Sign." This claim seems separate from the premiss I was calling into question. My own interests are primarily in the semiotic theory. Given these interests, I was focusing on the assertion about objects being separate from their signs considered as a result of Peirce's semiotic inquiries. As a methodological matter, it would seem odd to support claims about the relations between signs and objects in a speculative grammar with assertions about the real nature of the universe or about the non-immanent character of God. Perhaps I am misunderstanding the gist of your response. JD: In this case, it is the crucifix and not the pen that is serving as the object of the proposition. How is that object also functioning as a sign (of itself)? JonS: I have acknowledged repeatedly that anything is a Sign of itself in a trivial sense, but it is not in the relation of representing unless it stands for something other than itself. The example of the crucifix doesn't look a trivial sense of a sign also being its object in a trivial sense. Your comments on each of these examples don't seem to provide much guidance for understanding the larger point Peirce is making. Here is that point again: i) Now the Sign and the Explanation together make up another Sign, and since the explanation will be a Sign, it will probably require an additional explanation, which taken together with the already enlarged Sign will make up a still larger Sign; ii) and proceeding in the same way, we shall, or should, ultimately reach a Sign of itself, containing its own explanation and those of all its significant parts; and according to this explanation each such part has some other part as its Object. Two things stand out to me. First, the claim that the sign and the explanation make up another sign is iterated, endlessly. Second, the relation of a whole to its part--and the parts of those parts, etc.-appears to be important for the sake understanding the point he is making. It might help to consider some further examples involving relations between objects and signs. I suggest that we consider Peirce's example of patterns of inference by abduction, deduction and induction in the example of the beans in the bag. If this example of the beans in the bag seems forced as an illustration of how the forms of inference function as parts of a larger cycle of inquiry, then consider a simplified case like sampling colored beans from an urn with replacement. Yours, Jeff Jeffrey Downard Associate Professor Department of Philosophy Northern Arizona University (o) 928 523-8354 ________________________________ From: Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com> Sent: Tuesday, May 21, 2019 5:15:11 PM To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Continuity of Semeiosis Revisited Jeff, List: CSP: But in order that anything should be a Sign, it must "represent," as we say, something else, called its Object, although the condition that a Sign must be other than its Object is perhaps arbitrary, since, if we insist upon it we must at least make an exception in the case of a Sign that is a part of a Sign. (CP 2.230; 1910) I am having trouble seeing the relevance of this quote for either the continuity of semeiosis or the ongoing discussion of my Semeiotic Argumentation for the Reality of God, since Peirce's emphasis on the non-immanence of the latter rules out the possibility that the entire Universe as a Sign is a part of another Sign. JD: In this case, it is the crucifix and not the pen that is serving as the object of the proposition. How is that object also functioning as a sign (of itself)? I have acknowledged repeatedly that anything is a Sign of itself in a trivial sense, but it is not in the relation of representing unless it stands for something other than itself. JD: This example suggests that the relations that are represented as holding between subjects in a proposition are, themselves, also the objects of the proposition. I disagree with this analysis. "Cain," "Abel," and "killing" are the subjects of the Proposition, which therefore denote its Objects (or "one complex Object"). The relation between them corresponds to the continuous predicate, "_____ stands in the relation of _____ to _____," which therefore signifies the Proposition's Interpretant. In fact, this is precisely the example that Peirce gave elsewhere of a sentence in which the continuous predicate is expressed entirely by syntax. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt<http://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt> - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt<http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt> On Mon, May 20, 2019 at 10:58 PM Jeffrey Brian Downard <jeffrey.down...@nau.edu<mailto:jeffrey.down...@nau.edu>> wrote: Jon S, Gary F, John S, Edwina, Gary R, List I'd like to raise some questions about the assertion that every sign has an object that is separate, in some sense, from that sign. The basis of the claim that the object must be separate from the sign, I am supposing, is that the object determines the sign. As a matter of principle, an object cannot be the kind of thing that determines a sign if that object is not separate from the sign. This assertion seems, at least to me, to be clearest in the case of the actual objects that determine indexical sinsigns--where the objects and signs stand in the relation of agent and patient. This type of relation is classified as a dynamical dyadic relation that is formally ordered. For this type of sign, the object, as agent, cannot determine the indexical sinsign, as patient, if the two are identical. Diversity is requisite for the relation to hold. If we can all agree on this much, then what shall we say about the case of a sign that is part of a sign? In order to anchor the discussion of this question about Peirce's semiotics in a text, l'd like to focus our attention on the following clarification that is offered in "Meaning" from 1910: "But in order that anything should be a Sign, it must "represent," as we say, something else, called its Object, although the condition that a Sign must be other than its Object is perhaps arbitrary, since, if we insist upon it we must at least make an exception in the case of a Sign that is a part of a Sign." Here is the larger paragraph from which this sentence has been abstracted: SIGNS AND THEIR OBJECTS The word Sign will be used to denote an Object perceptible, or only imaginable, or even unimaginable in one sense--for the word "fast," which is a Sign, is not imaginable, since it is not this word itself that can be set down on paper or pronounced, but only an instance of it, and since it is the very same word when it is written as it is when it is pronounced, but is one word when it means "rapidly" and quite another when it means "immovable," and a third when it refers to abstinence. But in order that anything should be a Sign, it must "represent," as we say, something else, called its Object, although the condition that a Sign must be other than its Object is perhaps arbitrary, since, if we insist upon it we must at least make an exception in the case of a Sign that is a part of a Sign. Thus nothing prevents the actor who acts a character in an historical drama from carrying as a theatrical "property" the very relic that that article is supposed merely to represent, such as the crucifix that Bulwer's Richelieu holds up with such effect in his defiance. On a map of an island laid down upon the soil of that island there must, under all ordinary circumstances, be some position, some point, marked or not, that represents qua place on the map, the very same point qua place on the island. A sign may have more than one Object. Thus, the sentence "Cain killed Abel," which is a Sign, refers at least as much to Abel as to Cain, even if it be not regarded as it should, as having "a killing" as a third Object. But the set of objects may be regarded as making up one complex Object. In what follows and often elsewhere Signs will be treated as having but one object each for the sake of dividing difficulties of the study. If a Sign is other than its Object, there must exist, either in thought or in expression, some explanation or argument or other context, showing how--upon what system or for what reason the Sign represents the Object or set of Objects that it does. Now the Sign and the Explanation together make up another Sign, and since the explanation will be a Sign, it will probably require an additional explanation, which taken together with the already enlarged Sign will make up a still larger Sign; and proceeding in the same way, we shall, or should, ultimately reach a Sign of itself, containing its own explanation and those of all its significant parts; and according to this explanation each such part has some other part as its Object. According to this every Sign has, actually or virtually, what we may call a Precept of explanation according to which it is to be understood as a sort of emanation, so to speak, of its Object. (If the Sign be an Icon, a scholastic might say that the "species" of the Object emanating from it found its matter in the Icon. If the Sign be an Index, we may think of it as a fragment torn away from the Object, the two in their Existence being one whole or a part of such whole. If the Sign is a Symbol, we may think of it as embodying the "ratio," or reason, of the Object that has emanated from it. These, of course, are mere figures of speech; but that does not render them useless.) [CP 2.230] Consider the three examples Peirce offers to illustrate this point about a sign that is part of a sign: a) "Thus nothing prevents the actor who acts a character in an historical drama from carrying as a theatrical "property" the very relic that that article is supposed merely to represent, such as the crucifix that Bulwer's Richelieu holds up with such effect in his defiance." Bulwer is the author who penned the famous phrase "the pen is mightier than the sword" in the play Richelieu. In this case, it is the crucifix and not the pen that is serving as the object of the proposition. How is that object also functioning as a sign (of itself)? b) "On a map of an island laid down upon the soil of that island there must, under all ordinary circumstances, be some position, some point, marked or not, that represents qua place on the map, the very same point qua place on the island." We've discussed this example earlier. The discussion following the three examples, seems to suggest that the point being made about the self-referential character of some signs is a rather general point. c) "A sign may have more than one Object. Thus, the sentence "Cain killed Abel," which is a Sign, refers at least as much to Abel as to Cain, even if it be not regarded as it should, as having "a killing" as a third Object. But the set of objects may be regarded as making up one complex Object." This example suggests that the relations that are represented as holding between subjects in a proposition are, themselves, also the objects of the proposition. Taken together, the two subjects and the relation may be regarded as one complex object. In saying that the object is complex, it appears that it is something more than a mere aggregate. How might these examples be used to clarify the following parts of Peirce's central claim? i) Now the Sign and the Explanation together make up another Sign, and since the explanation will be a Sign, it will probably require an additional explanation, which taken together with the already enlarged Sign will make up a still larger Sign; ii) and proceeding in the same way, we shall, or should, ultimately reach a Sign of itself, containing its own explanation and those of all its significant parts; and according to this explanation each such part has some other part as its Object. Yours, Jeff Jeffrey Downard Associate Professor Department of Philosophy Northern Arizona University (o) 928 523-8354
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