Edwina, List: Please see the response that I just posted, which briefly addresses (again) the claim that the external Object of a Sign must *be *a Sign, which is *not *what Peirce actually wrote in the quoted passage.
ET: That's not a valid argument since the key premiss; i.e., the nature of the Universe as 'having boundaries' is taken-for-granted - and I consider that such a view cannot be 'taken-for-granted'. It's a 'begging the question' fallacy of logic. No, it would only be *begging the question* if either or both of the premisses included the *assumption *that there is something outside the Universe. But that is not the case; it is only from the *conclusion* that we can draw the *further inference* that there is something outside the Universe. Consider an isomorphic syllogism that should not be controversial. - Major premiss: Every Sign is determined by an Object other than itself. - Minor premiss: The word "man" is a Sign. - Conclusion: The word "man" is determined by an Object other than itself. - Further inference: There must be something outside the word "man" that determines it. Perhaps restating the major premiss will be helpful--there is something outside every Sign that determines it. This still does not entail that there is something outside *the Universe*; we can only conclude that once we add the minor premiss--the Universe is a Sign. To deny that there is something outside the Universe, one must either deny that there is something outside every Sign, or deny that the Universe is a Sign--either of which would be a clear and obvious departure from Peirce's explicitly stated views. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Thu, May 16, 2019 at 12:37 PM Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> wrote: > JAS, list > > You are basing your entire argument on the Conclusion that 'the Universe > is a Sign' and a Sign must be determined by an External Object'. But you > are ignoring that this External Object must also be a Sign! [Every sign > stands for an object independent of itself; but it can only be a sign of > that object in so far as that object is itself of the nature of a sign or > thought. ] > > And if this external Object is 'of the nature of a sign or thought' - > then, what is ITS EXTERNAL OBJECT???? > > Or is it 'turtles all the way down'? > > Furthermore - you ignore that for an External Object to be in interaction > with a Sign, this can only take place within the semioisic process - which > means, that the External Object is within/immanent with the whole semiosic > process - and not external to it! > > And you continue to ignore that your 'argument' rests on a simple > syllogism which is actually a complex question because it contains an > unexamined assertion that the Universe has boundaries, such that it has its > own nature as 'internal' - and - an external reality. > > Nowhere does Peirce outline such a situation. And I consider it > insufficient as an argument for you to declare that such a situation exists > BECAUSE Peirce says that the Universe is a Sign and because he requires > that a Sign have an External Object. ….and if the Universe is a > Sign..THEN...an External Object exists....which you call 'God'. > > That's not a valid argument since the key premiss; i.e., the nature of the > Universe as 'having boundaries' is taken-for-granted - and I consider that > such a view cannot be 'taken-for-granted'. It's a 'begging the question' > fallacy of logic. > > Edwina >
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