Helmut, Edwina, List, Edwina wrote: Take a look at the ten classes of signs [ . . .] You will find that the Interpretant can and often is - in a mode of Firstness. Or secondness. It is only ONCE in a mode of Thirdness and that is in a full Argument [ argument symbolic legisign]. Just because it is the third ’nodal site’ in the triadic process does NOT mean that it is, modally, in the mode of Thirdness!
As we have in the past, I tend to see matters somewhat differently than Edwina in this matter since I see a kind of interpenetration of the categories in Peirce's Classification of Signs. But first, I have never understood why she uses the expressions 'mode' and 'nodal sites' in consideration of the diagram below, nor what her terminology means outside of her own project. Peirce certainly doesn't use 'mode' and 'nodal site' in discussing this diagram (which he does in detail). I personally think that Edwina's terminology complicates and even muddles an understanding of the grammatical branch of semeiotic, especially for those new to Peirce studies. [image: image.png] Diagram found in Peirce's manuscript (MS 540: 17) for his 1903 Syllabus. Edwina is certainly correct that the Interpretant can be a Legisign, in fact it is in six places. But to suggest that a Legisign (consider just the prefix, legi-, meaning 'pertaining to law') doesn't involve 3ns is, in my view, mistaken. But more on the complexity of categorial relations in the 10 Signs Classification. As I think all agree, the 1903 Classification of Signs divides Signs accordinging to the categories, all 'boxes' in the classification arranged bottom to top are grounded in 1ns, 2ns, and 3ns. These serve as a way to understand the nature of signs through three distinct layers of meaning: 1. 1ns: the quality or possibility of the sign in itself, independent of anything else. 2. 2ns: the dyadic relationship between the sign and its object. 3. 3ns: the mediation by an interpretant whereby the sign and object are connected through a general or law-like meaning However, they are 'read' by Peirce involutionally from the Interpretent , through the relation to the Object, to the Sign itself (as in the diagram). One sees that the three Signs on the upper right corner of the diagram are all Symbols. Now *all Symbols inherently express 3ns**. A* symbol is defined as a sign that operates through a *convention, law, or habit, all closely associated with 3ns*.. This means that symbols depend on interpretative rules or conventional agreements. The word "grapefruit" is a symbol because its meaning depends on shared linguistic understanding. Now 'pampelmousse' is the word-symbol for 'grapefruit' in French, but unless you are familiar with that language, 'pampelmousse' will be meaningless to you. The same is true of the kind of Symbol which is a Dicent Sign, usually, a Proposition (excerpt, for example, in biosemiotics), typically involving several Symbols (3ns) and other Legisigns (3ns). Now it is true that the Symbol is only one of the three ways that a sign can be in relation to its Object: a Sign can relate to its Object by resemblance (Icon), by a physical relation (Index), or -- and this is the point -- *by law/convention (Symbol).* Lawfulness in semeiotic is an expression of 3ns (as are Representation). Further, in the diagram above one can see that *in itself *(as a Sign) *a Sign may be a Legisign*, and as mentioned above, there are 6 signs of this type. Now, again, a Legisign represents a general type or law (again, the very prefix, 'legi-' gives it away). It is any Sign that functions through a rule, habit, or convention, rather than as a unique, individual occurrence. Here's that famous Peirce example I mentioned above of a Legisign. [A legisign] *is of the nature of a general type*. . .. Every legisign signifies through an instance of its application, which may be termed a Replica of it. Thus, the word "the" will usually occur from fifteen to twenty-five times on a page. It is in all these occurrences one and the same word, the same legisign. Now all the above follows from each class of signs in the 10-adic Classification necessarily involving a *complex of triadic relations -- *and not only the categoriality of Sign/Object/Interpretant. In short, the Classification involves these 9.(3 x3) *each with a categorial association -- *in various combinations (I won't get into how they are combined into the 10 classes now as it's now directly pertinent). [image: image.png] This is why a 'Symbol' or a 'Legisign' -- both being clear expressions of 3ns -- can appear in the 10 Classes as they do. In sum: 3ns is not limited to the Argument because the 3 categories deeply interpenetrate in the Classification; but nowhere more so than in living semiosis. Best, Gary R On Mon, Oct 28, 2024 at 6:13 PM Edwina Taborsky <[email protected]> wrote: > Helmut > > Of course the categories refer to composition!! That’s why they are ‘modes > of being’! They refer to the modes of composition of the informational > content of that site [ the mode of composition of the information held > within the Object or Representamen or Interpretnat]. Is the informational > content in a mode of 1ns, 2ns, or 3ns? And then…you can ‘classify’ the > triad…but the real issue is understanding how informational processes work. > And after all- semiosis is about ‘information’.. > > So- the Interpretant- whether it functions within three types [ > Immediate, Dynamic and Final] does not mean that they are in the mode of > Thirdness!. Think about it. If the Interpretant is in a mode of Thirdness - > then, this means that the Object and the Representamen would also *have* > to be in the mode of Thirdness - since information moves, in the semiosic > process, from the DO via the mediating Representamen, to the > Interpretants. You can’t have an Object in a mode of 2ns, for example, > producing an Interpretant in a mode of Thirdness. > > As for your outline of god - I won’t get into that since, my view is that > the notion of ‘god’ is a belief and outside of scientific analysis. You can > hold to it as a belief via authority, tenacity, a priori - but not > scientifically. > > Edwina > > > On Oct 28, 2024, at 5:25 PM, Helmut Raulien <[email protected]> wrote: > > Edwina, List, > > we have had this question many times. My view is, that the categories > (because they are categories, so they apply to all logic) don´t only count > for classification, but for composition too. The ten classes of signs are a > classification of compositions, whose (categorial compositional) parts are > always the sign, its object- and its interpretant relation, and of this > composition, in the first order, ten classes are possible. "The object", > which in fact is the sign-object-relation (no object without a sign, even > not the *spatial* outside part), is again *functionally* (not spatially) > composed of the immediate and the dynamical object, and the interpretant in > the same way has three parts. Am I the only one, who sees it like this?? > > In the same way, I´d say, about the difference between reality and > existence: There are two kinds of reality, a firstness-one, and a > thirdness-one. Existence is secondness. If you have the thirdness variety > of reality, this includes excistence, and if you have the firstness-variety > of reality, existence includes it. Logic or/and God is the thirdness > variety of reality, so it includes some existence. Not the existence of the > world, which is primary secondness, but a secondness of thirdness, the > existence-aspect of God´s, secondness of thirdness. Whatever this might be. > So God exists, somehow. Phew-Peircean theology is special, maybe, but it > may bring together theism and panentheism in a way, both can be regarded > for not false. > > Best regards, Helmut > > > 28. Oktober 2024 um 21:39 Uhr > "Edwina Taborsky" <[email protected]> > *wrote:* > Helmut - I’ll only comment on your last sentence. You wrote: > > > The interpretant (3ns) includes the dynamic interpretant (secondness of > thirdness), the medisense includes association (same, if I got it right, > cannot reach the commens dictionary). > > > This is incorrect. It is not valid that the Interpretant is in a ‘mode of > thirdness’; that the DI is in a mode of 3-2… > Take a look at the ten classes of signs [ 2.227—] You will find that the > Interpretant can and often is - in a mode of Firstness. Or secondness. It > is only ONCE in a mode of Thirdness and that is in a full Argument [ > argument symbolic legisign]. Just because it is the third ’nodal site’ in > the triadic process does NOT mean that it is, modally, in the mode of > Thirdness! > Take a look at the other nine classes of signs -!! > > Edwina > > > On Oct 28, 2024, at 4:07 PM, Helmut Raulien <[email protected]> wrote: > > > Supplement: Er, when I think about it, I guess, that in "If A then B", or > let´s say, in "If W, then G" ("W" being the world, and "G" being God), it > might be so, that "W" exists, but "G" merely has to be real? For example: > Logic is real, but does not exist, because it doesn´t materially or > energetically interact, in a role of secondness. It is thirdness. > Nevertheless, without logic, nothing existing would be there, nothing would > work. Jon the evangelist said, that God is logic. So far, I abstractly > understand that, but only by following the rules of this argumental figure. > Really I don´t understand it, because, if existing things interact, and > real things don´t, if they don´t exist too, I don´t see, that thirdness > doesn´t interact, and therefore exists. It makes things happen, isn´t that > interaction? And with Peirce, a thirdness always includes a first-, and a > secondness: The interpretant (3ns) includes the dynamic interpretant > (secondness of thirdness), the medisense includes association (same, if I > got it right, cannot reach the commens dictionary). > > > Edwina, Jon, Gary, List, > > I see, that possibility is a difficult matter, because there are different > kinds of it´s. About necessity I now can only imagine two kinds, depending > for what something is necessary: Something that exists, or something that > not necessarily does. Isn´t it so (I strongly but reluctantly suspect, that > it is not), that "B is necessary for A" means "If A then B"? or "No A > without B", in EG: "(A(B))" ? Whether B exists or not, depends on whether A > exists or not. Now, regarding "Ens necessitans": What for is God necessary? > For the world, which exists, then God too exists. Or for logic, which > doesn´t exist, but is real, then God too is at least real, but does not > necessarily exist. Or do EGs, as they are "existential graphs", and > nonmodal logic in general too, only count for existing things, but not for > merely real things? I would find that funny, because it would mean, that > you cannot substitute "A" with what you like, e.g.: "A = reality of A". I > find it quite commonsentic and obvious, that it would be allowed to say: > "The possibility of A exists", or the necessity. But in logic it is > forbidden?? > > Best regards, Helmut > > > 28. Oktober 2024 um 01:13 Uhr > "Edwina Taborsky" <[email protected]> > *wrote:* > > Jerry - > > My view is that one can come to different conclusions using modal logic. > > 1] For example, the Anselm-Hartshorne argument for god is: > ’There’s *a necessary being* is logically possible [ with* logically > possible* as the predicate or description of the necessary being] ] > Therefore, there’s a necessary being’. [because i*t’s possible *is a > description of its nature]. > > But - we could also easily conclude: therefore, ’there’s* no necessary > being* is also logically possible’. > > Or - ’There’s *a necessary being* is logically necessary > 2] …but- this doesn’t make this necessary being to be ‘god’. It could be > a … > > Because one asserts > 3] ‘ God is a necessary being’ - one can conclude that therefore, God is > actual. ' > But the problem with this is that a logical argument, whether possible or > necessary, doesn’t prove that something is actual or existential . That > is - the question has to be on whether the ’necessary’ also implies’ the > actual’. [ Anselm’s ontological says that the two are merged; others > disagree - ie they reject that ’the existence of an idea moves into the > actual existence of a ’thing’. > > Necessity and possibility arguments are complex! > > > > Edwina > > > On Oct 27, 2024, at 6:03 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt <[email protected]> > wrote: > > Jerry, List: > > I explained the quoted statement in the remainder of the same paragraph. > > > JAS: In logic, possibility and necessity are not *predicates *any more > than existence/actuality. Instead, they are *modalities*, which is why > axioms must be added to classical logic to incorporate them, one of which > is called T--if a proposition is necessarily true, then it is actually > true. In the Gamma part of Existential Graphs, anything within a solid cut > within a broken cut is asserted to be *possibly *true, while anything > within a broken cut within a solid cut is asserted to be *necessarily *true. > However, when Peirce ultimately abandoned cuts altogether in favor of > shading, he needed a new notation for such graphs--"I shall now have to add > a *Delta *part in order to deal with modals" (R 500:3, 1911). > Unfortunately, he never spelled out what he had in mind, but my newly > published paper describes a plausible candidate ( > https://doi.org/10.2979/csp.00026). > > > Regards, > > Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA > Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian > www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt > <http://www.linkedin.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt> / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt > > On Sun, Oct 27, 2024 at 2:17 PM Jerry LR Chandler < > [email protected]> wrote: > >> List, Jon: >> >> On Oct 26, 2024, at 7:17 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt <[email protected]> >> wrote: >> >> In logic, possibility and necessity are not *predicates *any more than >> existence/actuality. >> >> ??? >> Why? >> What forms of logic are you referring to? >> Which grammar of which logic informs your assertion? >> How is it plausible that this assertion is meaningful? >> >> [This statement directly contradicts chemical, biochemical and biological >> equilibrium processes as was well described by A. N. Whitehead.] >> >> Cheers >> Jerry >> > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ > ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at > https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at > https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the > links! > ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > [email protected] . > ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to > [email protected] with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the > message and nothing in the body. More at > https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . > ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and > co-managed by him and Ben Udell. > > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at > https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . > It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L > subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to > this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] . ► To > UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to [email protected] > with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in > the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► > PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and > co-managed by him and Ben Udell. > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at > https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . > It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L > subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to > this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] . ► To > UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to [email protected] > with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in > the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► > PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and > co-managed by him and Ben Udell. > > > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ > ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at > https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at > https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the > links! > ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > [email protected] . > ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to > [email protected] with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the > message and nothing in the body. More at > https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . > ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and > co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to [email protected] with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
