Helmut Of course the categories refer to composition!! That’s why they are ‘modes of being’! They refer to the modes of composition of the informational content of that site [ the mode of composition of the information held within the Object or Representamen or Interpretnat]. Is the informational content in a mode of 1ns, 2ns, or 3ns? And then…you can ‘classify’ the triad…but the real issue is understanding how informational processes work. And after all- semiosis is about ‘information’..
So- the Interpretant- whether it functions within three types [ Immediate, Dynamic and Final] does not mean that they are in the mode of Thirdness!. Think about it. If the Interpretant is in a mode of Thirdness - then, this means that the Object and the Representamen would also have to be in the mode of Thirdness - since information moves, in the semiosic process, from the DO via the mediating Representamen, to the Interpretants. You can’t have an Object in a mode of 2ns, for example, producing an Interpretant in a mode of Thirdness. As for your outline of god - I won’t get into that since, my view is that the notion of ‘god’ is a belief and outside of scientific analysis. You can hold to it as a belief via authority, tenacity, a priori - but not scientifically. Edwina > On Oct 28, 2024, at 5:25 PM, Helmut Raulien <[email protected]> wrote: > > Edwina, List, > > we have had this question many times. My view is, that the categories > (because they are categories, so they apply to all logic) don´t only count > for classification, but for composition too. The ten classes of signs are a > classification of compositions, whose (categorial compositional) parts are > always the sign, its object- and its interpretant relation, and of this > composition, in the first order, ten classes are possible. "The object", > which in fact is the sign-object-relation (no object without a sign, even not > the spatial outside part), is again functionally (not spatially) composed of > the immediate and the dynamical object, and the interpretant in the same way > has three parts. Am I the only one, who sees it like this?? > > In the same way, I´d say, about the difference between reality and existence: > There are two kinds of reality, a firstness-one, and a thirdness-one. > Existence is secondness. If you have the thirdness variety of reality, this > includes excistence, and if you have the firstness-variety of reality, > existence includes it. Logic or/and God is the thirdness variety of reality, > so it includes some existence. Not the existence of the world, which is > primary secondness, but a secondness of thirdness, the existence-aspect of > God´s, secondness of thirdness. Whatever this might be. So God exists, > somehow. Phew-Peircean theology is special, maybe, but it may bring together > theism and panentheism in a way, both can be regarded for not false. > > Best regards, Helmut > > > 28. Oktober 2024 um 21:39 Uhr > "Edwina Taborsky" <[email protected]> > wrote: > Helmut - I’ll only comment on your last sentence. You wrote: > > The interpretant (3ns) includes the dynamic interpretant (secondness of > thirdness), the medisense includes association (same, if I got it right, > cannot reach the commens dictionary). > > This is incorrect. It is not valid that the Interpretant is in a ‘mode of > thirdness’; that the DI is in a mode of 3-2… > Take a look at the ten classes of signs [ 2.227—] You will find that the > Interpretant can and often is - in a mode of Firstness. Or secondness. It is > only ONCE in a mode of Thirdness and that is in a full Argument [ argument > symbolic legisign]. Just because it is the third ’nodal site’ in the triadic > process does NOT mean that it is, modally, in the mode of Thirdness! > Take a look at the other nine classes of signs -!! > > Edwina > > On Oct 28, 2024, at 4:07 PM, Helmut Raulien <[email protected]> wrote: > > > Supplement: Er, when I think about it, I guess, that in "If A then B", or > let´s say, in "If W, then G" ("W" being the world, and "G" being God), it > might be so, that "W" exists, but "G" merely has to be real? For example: > Logic is real, but does not exist, because it doesn´t materially or > energetically interact, in a role of secondness. It is thirdness. > Nevertheless, without logic, nothing existing would be there, nothing would > work. Jon the evangelist said, that God is logic. So far, I abstractly > understand that, but only by following the rules of this argumental figure. > Really I don´t understand it, because, if existing things interact, and real > things don´t, if they don´t exist too, I don´t see, that thirdness doesn´t > interact, and therefore exists. It makes things happen, isn´t that > interaction? And with Peirce, a thirdness always includes a first-, and a > secondness: The interpretant (3ns) includes the dynamic interpretant > (secondness of thirdness), the medisense includes association (same, if I > got it right, cannot reach the commens dictionary). > > > Edwina, Jon, Gary, List, > > I see, that possibility is a difficult matter, because there are different > kinds of it´s. About necessity I now can only imagine two kinds, depending > for what something is necessary: Something that exists, or something that not > necessarily does. Isn´t it so (I strongly but reluctantly suspect, that it is > not), that "B is necessary for A" means "If A then B"? or "No A without B", > in EG: "(A(B))" ? Whether B exists or not, depends on whether A exists or > not. Now, regarding "Ens necessitans": What for is God necessary? For the > world, which exists, then God too exists. Or for logic, which doesn´t exist, > but is real, then God too is at least real, but does not necessarily exist. > Or do EGs, as they are "existential graphs", and nonmodal logic in general > too, only count for existing things, but not for merely real things? I would > find that funny, because it would mean, that you cannot substitute "A" with > what you like, e.g.: "A = reality of A". I find it quite commonsentic and > obvious, that it would be allowed to say: "The possibility of A exists", or > the necessity. But in logic it is forbidden?? > > Best regards, Helmut > > > 28. Oktober 2024 um 01:13 Uhr > "Edwina Taborsky" <[email protected]> > wrote: > > Jerry - > > My view is that one can come to different conclusions using modal logic. > > 1] For example, the Anselm-Hartshorne argument for god is: > ’There’s a necessary being is logically possible [ with logically possible as > the predicate or description of the necessary being] ] > Therefore, there’s a necessary being’. [because it’s possible is a > description of its nature]. > > But - we could also easily conclude: therefore, ’there’s no necessary being > is also logically possible’. > > Or - ’There’s a necessary being is logically necessary > 2] …but- this doesn’t make this necessary being to be ‘god’. It could be a … > > Because one asserts > 3] ‘ God is a necessary being’ - one can conclude that therefore, God is > actual. ' > But the problem with this is that a logical argument, whether possible or > necessary, doesn’t prove that something is actual or existential . That is > - the question has to be on whether the ’necessary’ also implies’ the > actual’. [ Anselm’s ontological says that the two are merged; others disagree > - ie they reject that ’the existence of an idea moves into the actual > existence of a ’thing’. > > Necessity and possibility arguments are complex! > > > > Edwina > > On Oct 27, 2024, at 6:03 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt <[email protected]> > wrote: > > Jerry, List: > > I explained the quoted statement in the remainder of the same paragraph. > > JAS: In logic, possibility and necessity are not predicates any more than > existence/actuality. Instead, they are modalities, which is why axioms must > be added to classical logic to incorporate them, one of which is called T--if > a proposition is necessarily true, then it is actually true. In the Gamma > part of Existential Graphs, anything within a solid cut within a broken cut > is asserted to be possibly true, while anything within a broken cut within a > solid cut is asserted to be necessarily true. However, when Peirce ultimately > abandoned cuts altogether in favor of shading, he needed a new notation for > such graphs--"I shall now have to add a Delta part in order to deal with > modals" (R 500:3, 1911). Unfortunately, he never spelled out what he had in > mind, but my newly published paper describes a plausible candidate > (https://doi.org/10.2979/csp.00026). > > Regards, > > Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA > Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian > www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt > <http://www.linkedin.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt> / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt > <http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt> > On Sun, Oct 27, 2024 at 2:17 PM Jerry LR Chandler > <[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: >> List, Jon: >> On Oct 26, 2024, at 7:17 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt <[email protected] >> <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: >> >> In logic, possibility and necessity are not predicates any more than >> existence/actuality. >> ??? >> Why? >> What forms of logic are you referring to? >> Which grammar of which logic informs your assertion? >> How is it plausible that this assertion is meaningful? >> >> [This statement directly contradicts chemical, biochemical and biological >> equilibrium processes as was well described by A. N. Whitehead.] >> >> Cheers >> Jerry > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ > ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at > https://cspeirce.com <https://cspeirce.com/> and, just as well, at > https://www.cspeirce.com <https://www.cspeirce.com/> . It'll take a while to > repair / update all the links! > ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] > . > ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to [email protected] > with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in > the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . > ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and > co-managed by him and Ben Udell. > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com > <https://cspeirce.com/> and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com > <https://www.cspeirce.com/> . It'll take a while to repair / update all the > links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY > ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > [email protected] . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L > but to [email protected] with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of > the message and nothing in the body. More at > https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by > THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben > Udell. > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com > <https://cspeirce.com/> and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com > <https://www.cspeirce.com/> . It'll take a while to repair / update all the > links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY > ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > [email protected] . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L > but to [email protected] with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of > the message and nothing in the body. More at > https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by > THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben > Udell.
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to [email protected] with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
