True, they are addressing two different issues, but each might be able to aid the other. Arbor Networks had a blurb on this topic in one of their blogs a while back.
http://www.arbornetworks.com/asert/2008/05/using-rpki-to-construct-validated-irr-data/ "Initially, network operators can implement policies that give preference to route announcement that are verifiable within the RPKI-based IRR (the purple box in the diagram). Subsequently, preference can be given to internal databases and/or IRRs, then third-party IRRs, and then unregistered routes. Ideally, this will quickly evolve to enable more folks to filter customer routes explicitly based on IRR data, and in the near future, explicit bilateral deployment of inter-provider filtering based on trustworthy IRR data. In addition, that same data can be used to generate anti-spoofing data path filters akin to those recommended in BCP 38<http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc3704.txt> ." On Sun, Mar 16, 2014 at 11:46 PM, Majdi S. Abbas <[email protected]> wrote: > On Sun, Mar 16, 2014 at 11:42:48PM -0400, AlbyVA wrote: > > I think BCP38's future hinges on the future of RPKI. > > https://www.arin.net/resources/rpki/ > > Two different problems. > > And even less vendor uptake for RPKI than BCP38. > > --msa > _______________________________________________ > pool mailing list > [email protected] > http://lists.ntp.org/listinfo/pool > _______________________________________________ pool mailing list [email protected] http://lists.ntp.org/listinfo/pool
