Re: Notion of (mathematical) reason
On 09 Jun 2015, at 09:11, Bruce Kellett wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: On 08 Jun 2015, at 15:13, Bruce Kellett wrote: But comp is false, as has been demonstrated by many observations. What? Reference? You mean the brain is not Turing emulable? Strong AI, or the possibility that part or all of your brain can be emulated by a computer does not entail that consciousness is only a computation. Consciousness is not a computation, when we assume computationalism. So what is it then? A mental, subjective, state. A first person view. Indeed the one at the base of all the others that we can be aware of. Consciousness supervenes of the physical brain, and if that brain is replaced by a computer, then it supervenes on that physical computer. If consciousness is not a computation, does it merely supervene on a computation? Or is the whole theory hopelessly confused? The theory is that a (generalized) brain is Turing emulable, at a level such that I remain conscious (and feel no difference by introspection). You can say in that case that it merely supervene on the activity of the brain, but not necessarily on the physical activity of the brain, which can be shown arbitrarily variate. It is only contingently related to consciousness. Nor does it entail that only computations can be conscious. A computation cannot be conscious. Only a (first) person can be conscious. It is a category error to believe that something 1p can be identified with some 3p thing. So a physical person with a physical brain is not conscious? Consciousness is something that has intersubjective aspects -- we can all agree that x, y, and z are conscious. We do not have direct first-person experience of anyone's consciousness other than our own, but that does not mean that we cannot know that another person is conscious. To say otherwise is simple solipsism. We cannot know as such, or for sure,, but this does not entail that e cannot know in the larger Theaetetus' sense indeed. We can believe that others are conscious, and they might be conscious. But then it is the person in Platonia which is conscious, not the one we see (in our indexical time) as this one is a construction of our brain: it does not exist literally. That is counter-intuitive, but not more than SR. In fact, it is quite difficult to come up with a definition of computation such that only computers and brains perform computations. The structure of a Turing machine can be emulated by a rock, for instance. With toilet papers, and pebbles, yes. You still need to play the role of the processor. Now, a rock does not emulate an arbitrary turing machine. Why not? If it can emulate a specific purpose Turning machine, it can emulate a universal Turing machine. I think Putnam's argument for unlimited pancomputationalism implies this. I am not convince by that argument. Show me a rock program computing the prime numbers. With comp, rock are not even object, but map of accessible continuations. I expose only the mind body problem, and show that the machine's solution fits QM and neoplatonism. I don't defend any truth or religion, just the right to do those things with some rigor. But computationalism does not even give any new insights into the nature of consciousness, I think AUDA shows on the contrary a lot of new insight. We get a complete theory of qualia, and explanation of souls which fits with both QM and all neoplatonist researchers. In the seventies it predicted the rise of Artificial Intelligence and ... the possibility of quantum computing. It explains easily why physics is based on math, and it gives some light on the possible after-life etc. much less give any useful results for physics. No new one should be expected soon, but that was not the purpose at all. You can't blame a coffee machine for not doing tea. You can do things with all the rigour you want, but if you can't extract any useful results, you are wasting your time. Perhaps this is the irreconcilable difference between the physicist and the mathematician. Yes, I am interested in a theory of everything, which means to me mainly a theory which does not eliminate consciousness. I saw that physicists avoid the question, but a bridge is born between math and cognitive science, thanks to theoretical computer science (a branch of math). I am not sure I see your point. Comp is not useless, comp is the actual theory of the materialists, and I show that contrary to a widespread belief: materialism and computationalism are incompatible (without adding non-comp magic). Comp is not presented as a solution, but as a problem. In the second part, I show the propositional solution, but you need to understand the problem before. Actually, I think that you have seen the problem, but want to conclude to much quickly that comp is false. The math part shows that this is
Re: The scope of physical law and its relationship to the substitution level
On 09 Jun 2015, at 01:26, Bruce Kellett wrote: LizR wrote: On 9 June 2015 at 05:31, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net mailto:meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 6/8/2015 1:03 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: or that maths exists independently of mathematicians. That even just arithmetical truth is independent of mathematician. This is important because everyone agree with any axiomatic of the numbers, but that is not the case for analysis, real numbers, etc. Everyone agrees on ZFC in the same sense. So does that make set theory and its consequences real? Reality isn't defined by what everyone agrees on. What makes ZFC (or whatever) real, or not, is whether it kicks back. Is it something that was invented, and could equally well have been invented differently, or was it discovered as a result of following a chain of logical reasoning from certain axioms? Why do not those same arguments apply equally to arithmetic? What axioms led to arithmetic? Could one have chosen different axioms? Take RA, PA, PA+con(PA), PA + con(PA + con PA), etc. (con PA = PA is consistent), DA, etc. All those theories leads to the same arithmetical truth. Each theory is just included in the next theory, but if one of them say that a proposition is a theorem, the negation of it will not be a theorem in any of them. So there are many different theories of arithmetic, but they all describes the same structure. That's not the case in set theory, where many different theories leads to different theorems. Of course, by incompleteness, you could take the theory PA + ~con(PA). That theory will lead to new theorem, which are false in the standard model, but arithmetical truth is defined using the standard model. Non standard models have some interest, but not for comp or for number theory; unless when use indirectly, to make some argument non valid. Bruno I recall that RA = Robinson arithmetic: it has the following axioms (on the top of predicate calculus): 0 ≠ s(x) (= 0 is not the successor of a number) s(x) = s(y) - x = y (different numbers have different successors) x = 0 v Ey(x = s(y))(except for 0, all numbers have a predecessor) x+0 = x (if you add zero to a number, you get that number) x+s(y) = s(x+y) (if you add a number x to a successor of a number y, you get the successor of x added to y) x*0=0 (if you multiply a number by 0, you get 0) x*s(y)=(x*y)+x(exercise) PA is RA + the induction axiom (on first order sentence). DA is Dedekind Arithmetic: it is like PA, except you can throw out most axioms, as it has the very powerful second order full induction axioms (on all set of numbers). DA defines categorically the standard model, but is not an effective theory (you can't check all proofs, as the notion of set is too vague). Bruno Bruce -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: The scope of physical law and its relationship to the substitution level
Bruno Marchal wrote: On 09 Jun 2015, at 07:40, Bruce Kellett wrote: Given a set of axioms and some agreed rules of inference, the same results always follow, regardless of by whom or at what time the application is made. This is not what is usually referred to as kicking back. Johnson did not apply some axioms and rules of inference in answer to the idealists, he kicked a stone. But people can kicked stone in dreams too. But do they wake up with broken or bruised toes? Bruce -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: The scope of physical law and its relationship to the substitution level
On 08 Jun 2015, at 19:31, meekerdb wrote: On 6/8/2015 1:03 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: or that maths exists independently of mathematicians. That even just arithmetical truth is independent of mathematician. This is important because everyone agree with any axiomatic of the numbers, but that is not the case for analysis, real numbers, etc. Everyone agrees on ZFC in the same sense. Not at all. There are many non isomorphic approach to set theory and analysis. For the natural numbers, this does not occur. All theories have a clear standard model on which we all agree. As Gödel saw, even intuitionist arithmetic is isomorphic to classical arithmetic: it changes only the vocabulary. So does that make set theory and its consequences real? It is a theory which explain too much. It is interesting for logicians. Nobody use it, really. people refers to it when confronted with possible paradoxes, but mathematicians avoid the paradoxes naturally, and the modern one will use some category or elementary toposes to fix the thing. Read books on the subject. Arithmetic has a solidity status not obtained by analysis, or even geometry.Some use ZF + ~AC, ZF + kappa, or other will use NF (a very different set theory), or intuitionist ZF (quite different from ZF), or NBG, etc. Bruno Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Notion of (mathematical) reason
On 08 Jun 2015, at 19:45, meekerdb wrote: On 6/8/2015 3:24 AM, Bruce Kellett wrote: LizR wrote: On 8 June 2015 at 13:30, Bruce Kellett bhkell...@optusnet.com.au mailto:bhkell...@optusnet.com.au wrote: If not, there is no possibility for a time variable in arithmetic per se, and consequently nothing can 'emerge' from arithmetic, since emergence is a temporal concept. No it isn't, not in the sense being used here. The concept that is relevant in this case is ontological priority. If you think emergence is temporal then you will get very confused by discussions of the MUH (or even of how the universe arises as a 4D manifold from the laws of physics) Which law of physics gives rise to the 4D manifold? It is my understanding that a 4D pseudo-Riemannian manifold was a basic postulate underlying general relativity -- if that hypothesis emerged from anything, then it came from the fact that space-time was observed to be a 4 dimensional structure. So the 4D manifold is not actually derived from anything other than observation. Kant made the mistake of thinking that Euclidean space was a necessary law of thought. Observation proved him wrong. Maybe observation also proves the MUH wrong? Observation can't prove anything wrong about a theory that says everything happens in some universe. ;-) Everything (consistent) happens in the mind of some machines, but the laws are in the relative measure, provided notably by the logical intensional nuance brought by incompleteness. Bruno Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: The scope of physical law and its relationship to the substitution level
On 09 Jun 2015, at 02:37, LizR wrote: On 9 June 2015 at 11:26, Bruce Kellett bhkell...@optusnet.com.au wrote: LizR wrote: Reality isn't defined by what everyone agrees on. What makes ZFC (or whatever) real, or not, is whether it kicks back. Is it something that was invented, and could equally well have been invented differently, or was it discovered as a result of following a chain of logical reasoning from certain axioms? Why do not those same arguments apply equally to arithmetic? What axioms led to arithmetic? Could one have chosen different axioms? The arguments do apply. The point is that once the axioms are chosen, the results that follow are not a matter of choice. Arithmetical truths appear to take the form if A, then (necessarily) B. However, some of the elementary axioms (or even perhaps axions! :-) do appear to be demonstrated by nature - certain numerical quantities are (apparently) conserved in fundamental particle interactions, quantum fluctuations can only occur in ways that balance energy budgets, etc. So one could say that for anyone of a materialist persuasion, the assumptions of elementary arithmetic aren't unreasonable, at least (Bruno often mentions that comp only assumes some very simple arithmetical axioms - the existence of numbers and the correctness of addition and multiplication, I think) So if you choose Peano arithmetic, then such-and-such follows, while if you choose modular arithmetic, something else follows. The kicking back part is simply the fact that the same result always follows from a given set of assumptions. To put it a bit more dramatically, an alien being in a different galaxy, or even in another universe, would still get the same results. Nature is telling us that given A, we always get B. The difference is that for arithmetic (non modular arithmetic of the natural numbers), although there are many different axioms systems possible, either they have all the same theorems, or they are included in each other (one theory being just more powerful than another), but they all get the same theorems, when they get them. That is not true for set theory, where the theories can overlap, but also have different incompatible theorems. For the comp TOE, we need only to assume a (Turing) universal theory: we get the same physics, the same consciousness, etc. The kicking back is done at the elementary finite combinatorial level. For set theory, you need transfinite induction, which is philosophically much more demanding. Bruno -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Notion of (mathematical) reason
On 09 Jun 2015, at 07:24, Bruce Kellett wrote: LizR wrote: What comp - or any theory of physics - has to show is that observers will experience the passage of time. SR for example posits a block universe, which at first sight might not seem to allow for us to experience time. But of course it does, even though the whole 4D structure is already there in some sense. The block universe idea is just a picturesque way of describing the way space and time are 'mixed up' (within the bounds of the light cone) by Lorentz transformations in special relativity. As I have said before, the important feature of the SR structure is that there is an absolute separation between spacelike and timelike surfaces or world lines. The subjective experience of time is not part of the relativistic model -- time is given by the behaviour of clocks, and specifically, clocks are physical systems that obey the laws of physics. The oscillations of certain defined transitions in the caesium atom are used to define the standard for physical time. Not because we crawl up world-lines as Weyl poetically put it, but because each moment along our world-line contains a capsule memory of earlier moments, but not later ones. The 'time capsule' idea is a recent proposal by Julian Barbour. Special relativity says nothing about such things. SR is, in fact, completely indifferent to the direction of time -- the equations are time symmetric. (The later ones are just as already there as the earlier ones, according to the theory, but the laws of physics are structured in a way that means they aren't accessible.) Similarly, comp needs to show that observer moments will contain memories of other observer moments, but only those that existed earlier in the sequences of computations that gave rise to the current moment. This isn't physical time, whatever that is, but it does involve that certain laws apply to computation. Well, maybe comp can do this, but it seems to me that it is more important to extract the behaviour of caesium atoms (physical clocks). The 1p experience of time comes from the fact that we are physical creatures embedded in a physical world that has a well- defined concept of time, given in terms of dynamical physical processes. Either comp can give this, or comp is totally useless. Comp is just the statement that there is no magic operating in the brain. If you have a different theory of mind, please give it to us. What, in the brain, would be not Turing emulable. Matter? Then we agree, but you need to abandon all known theory of matter, except the collapse of the wave, which does not make sense to me. But my point was not more than that: comp entails a MWI, and we can test it by comparing it with the MWI of nature. The 1p experience has to relate to intersubjective agreement (the 3p picture), or it cannot reproduce physics. Of course. None of this is known, or proven, of course, but the concept is well understood (as fro example in October the First is too Late) You should not get your physics from science fiction stories -- they are seldom a reliable source. The validity of a reasoning does not depend on the paper on which it is written. Bruno Bruce -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Notion of (mathematical) reason
On 09 Jun 2015, at 02:15, LizR wrote: What comp - or any theory of physics - has to show is that observers will experience the passage of time. SR for example posits a block universe, which at first sight might not seem to allow for us to experience time. But of course it does, even though the whole 4D structure is already there in some sense. Not because we crawl up world-lines as Weyl poetically put it, but because each moment along our world-line contains a capsule memory of earlier moments, but not later ones. (The later ones are just as already there as the earlier ones, according to the theory, but the laws of physics are structured in a way that means they aren't accessible.) Similarly, comp needs to show that observer moments will contain memories of other observer moments, but only those that existed earlier in the sequences of computations that gave rise to the current moment. This isn't physical time, whatever that is, but it does involve that certain laws apply to computation. None of this is known, or proven, of course, but the concept is well understood (as fro example in October the First is too Late) It is proved in the frame of comp, and we don't have there any problem with time and memory, as we get them easily from computer science. See the book of Matiyasevich to see how a diophantine number polynomial relation can simulate a conventional Turing machine. It can simulate a Von Neuman type of computer, with register memory, etc. In my opinion, comp is the *only* satisfactory explanation of why the reality looks quantum, and why there is a difference between quanta and qualia. Physicists take the physical reality for granted, because their goal is to do physics; not cognitive science. Physics fails to explain the origin of matter, without assuming matter of course, and physics does not address the problem of consciousness, afterlife, etc. The problem is only for the aristotelian believers who want a primitive matter, and physicalism. But, if they find a non-comp theory of mind, and if it works, why not. But such theory does not even exist today. So it might be premature. Let us test comp, and see. Up to now, we get starling quantization exactly where UDA shows them to be necessary. So comp is not only not yet refuted, but it really does seem to explain both consciousness and matter, and I don't know any theory which does that (without adding magic or fairy tales). Bruno -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: The scope of physical law and its relationship to the substitution level
On 08 Jun 2015, at 19:37, meekerdb wrote: On 6/8/2015 1:24 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 08 Jun 2015, at 06:31, LizR wrote (to Brent) Note that Bruno rejects the conditioning on justified. Plato's Theaetetus dialogue defines knowledge as true belief. I think that's a deficiency in modal logic insofar as it's supposed to formalize good informal reasoning. But I can see why it's done; it's difficult if not impossible to give formal definition of justified. Yes. See my answer to brent. The whole AUDA is made possible because we do have an excellent axiomatisation of justification. It's an excellent axiomatization that relies on inference from axioms. To say it formalizes good reasoning would mean that I would have to axiomatize vision before I could see anything. It formalize any correct deduction that a system (like the guy talking with its digital doctors) can or cannot prove about itself in the 3p way. We want to explain physics, and consciousness. We are not doing artificial intelligence. We try just to formulate the problem, and solve some part of it. Bruno Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: The scope of physical law and its relationship to the substitution level
On 09 Jun 2015, at 00:21, LizR wrote: On 8 June 2015 at 16:22, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com wrote: It seems here that you've snuck an extra assumption into comp1. We know that brains can be conscious, and we assume that computations can also be conscious. But that doesn't mean that only computations can be conscious, nor does it mean that brains are computations. These two latter statements might be true, but they are not necessarily true, even given computationalism. I may not have phrased it very well, but comp1 is the assumption that consciousness is based on computation, and can't be created by anything else (at least that's comp1 in a simple form - actually, I believe it's the assumption that at some level physics is Turing emulable). At some level, the physics *required* for my consciousness will be. But comp predicts that physics is not Turing emulable. Physics is given by the FPI on the computations, and that is not computable (like the question: will i find up or down when looking at this superposition is also non computable). On that basis, a brain must do computation (at some level), since it's conscious, and an AI could be conscious given the correct programme. Yes, and more importantly, a recording is not conscious, as, if it is, you can no more say yes to a doctor for computation reason. If a recording can be conscious, why not a physical neuron? In thjat cse comp is false. We say yes to the doctor *qua computatio* (if not comp became spurious: we could say yes because we believe in the Virgin Mary power to resurrect us). Bruno (And what's wrong with sneaked ?) -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: The scope of physical law and its relationship to the substitution level
On 09 Jun 2015, at 01:24, meekerdb wrote: On 6/8/2015 4:13 PM, LizR wrote: On 9 June 2015 at 05:29, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 6/8/2015 1:03 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: Hmm Let us be precise. That the computation take place in arithmetic is a mathematical fact that nobody doubt today. UDA explains only that we cannot use a notion of primitive matter for making more real some computations in place of others. It makes the physics supervening on all computations in arithmetic. But my computer does some computations and not others. So there must be some sense in which some computations are real and others aren't. Handwaving that they're all there in arithmetic proves too much. I don't see that. Surely the problem is that it doesn't prove enough - assuming all computations exist (in some sense) in arithmetic, which I believe is trivially true to most mathematicians, how does this produce physics? If you're going to use a comp style explanation, your computer isn't defining which computations are real, it's somehow being generated by all those abstract computations. And all those abstract computations are also generating all possible instances of my computer computing all possible computations, plus many others which are not nomologically possible. So when Bruno says we cannot use a notion of primitive matter for making more real some computations in place of others my question becomes, Ok, what can we use, because some computations ARE more real than others. Some computations are more real relatively to some computations. But, each computations, like each number relation is as much real than any others. Bruno Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: The scope of physical law and its relationship to the substitution level
On 09 Jun 2015, at 07:40, Bruce Kellett wrote: LizR wrote: On 9 June 2015 at 11:26, Bruce Kellett bhkell...@optusnet.com.au mailto:bhkell...@optusnet.com.au wrote: LizR wrote: Reality isn't defined by what everyone agrees on. What makes ZFC (or whatever) real, or not, is whether it kicks back. Is it something that was invented, and could equally well have been invented differently, or was it discovered as a result of following a chain of logical reasoning from certain axioms? Why do not those same arguments apply equally to arithmetic? What axioms led to arithmetic? Could one have chosen different axioms? The arguments do apply. The point is that once the axioms are chosen, the results that follow are not a matter of choice. Arithmetical truths appear to take the form if A, then (necessarily) B. However, some of the elementary axioms (or even perhaps axions! :-) do appear to be demonstrated by nature - certain numerical quantities are (apparently) conserved in fundamental particle interactions, quantum fluctuations can only occur in ways that balance energy budgets, etc. Yes, exactly. That is why I would say that arithmetic is invented as a codification of our experience of the physical world. If we had chosen a set of axioms that did not reproduce the results of simple addition -- add two pebbles to the two already there, to give four in total -- then we would have abandoned that set of axioms long ago. Axiom systems are evaluated in terms of their utility, nothing else. In more advanced mathematics, utility might be measured in terms of simplicity and fruitfulness for further applications. But in the beginning, as with arithmetic and simple geometry/ trigonometry and so on, utility is measured entirely in terms of the applicability to the experienced physical world, and of the utility of the system in helping us live in that world. But that concerns the way human discovered arithmetic, not its fundamental or not status. Anyway, comp makes no sense if we have doubt about 2+2=4, or about the less trivial fact that there are universal diophantine polynomials, or that all natural numbers can be written as the sum of four squared integers, etc. So one could say that for anyone of a materialist persuasion, the assumptions of elementary arithmetic aren't unreasonable, at least (Bruno often mentions that comp only assumes some very simple arithmetical axioms - the existence of numbers and the correctness of addition and multiplication, I think) So if you choose Peano arithmetic, then such-and-such follows, while if you choose modular arithmetic, something else follows. The kicking back part is simply the fact that the same result always follows from a given set of assumptions. Given a set of axioms and some agreed rules of inference, the same results always follow, regardless of by whom or at what time the application is made. This is not what is usually referred to as kicking back. Johnson did not apply some axioms and rules of inference in answer to the idealists, he kicked a stone. But people can kicked stone in dreams too. To put it a bit more dramatically, an alien being in a different galaxy, or even in another universe, would still get the same results. Nature is telling us that given A, we always get B. Nature doesn't particularly tell us that. Rigorous application of the rules of inference to certain axioms tells us that. The physics might, after all, be different in a different universe, but using the same rules of inference on the same axioms will give the same result, regardless of the local physical laws. Yes. Then with comp, physics is the same for all universal machine, and this can be proved in all (Turing complete) theories. Physics is made theory independent, except for assuming at least one universal system. Physics is very well grounded in arithmetic or Turing equivalent. It is made more solid that the extraoplation that we can do from observation. Of course comp might be wrong, and that is why it is nice that it becomes testable. Bruno Bruce -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at
Re: Notion of (mathematical) reason
On 09 Jun 2015, at 07:06, meekerdb wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: On 08 Jun 2015, at 03:30, Bruce Kellett wrote: Note that it is important to distinguish between structures that can be described mathematically and the structure of arithmetic or mathematics themselves. Yes. Quite important. Even after the reversal, although physics is made purely arithmetical, it is only through machine's psychology and theology that this happens, and the science physics are explained to be different from the mathematical science. For example mathematical (arithmetical) existence is some thing like ExP(x), but physical existence is [2]2Ex [2]2P(x). Physics remains untouched by comp., except it is put on logico- arithmetical grounds. What change is physicalism in metaphysics. It becomes testable, and false if comp is true. That last seems incoherent. If comp leaves physics untouched that implies that comp makes no difference to physics and so there can be no test of comp. I meant, IF comp is true. Indeed, the test of comp is done by physics! If comp change the content of physics, and nature follows physics, it will be comp which has to be abandoned. Instead you seem to imply that physicalism, a metaphysical hypothesis, is testable - but how if not via anempirical prediction? It is via an empirical prediction. I was in the frame of supposing comp true. It does not change physics, guven that it is at the origin of physics (IF true).. You say it is false if comp is true; but that's not a test. I say that the idea that we need to assume a physical reality is false. That's like the creationists who, when asked what evidence supports creationism, cite deficiencies in evolution. ? (you lost me). I show that comp has testable consequence in the content of the physical theories, so let us do the test, or work toward it (like optimizing G*, the Z and X logics, etc.). Bruno Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Pigeons offend Islam
On 09 Jun 2015, at 04:08, meekerdb wrote: This is stupid on so many levels, even on the most basic factual one: You can't see the genitals of a pigeon. They're covered by feathers. You have to poke them to get them even expose their genitals. They confused it with the feet of the pigeon, perhaps. I think they fear pigeons, because they can be used to send messages, even where there is no electricity. The germans have also forbid breeding pigeons, in my country, some time ago, as they were used by the resistance. Bruno Brent On 6/8/2015 4:52 PM, LizR wrote: Support for this is (ahem) dropping... On 9 June 2015 at 07:35, spudboy100 via Everything List everything-list@googlegroups.com wrote: A Coo-Coo Fatwa -Original Message- From: John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com To: everything-list everything-list@googlegroups.com Sent: Sat, Jun 6, 2015 12:15 pm Subject: Pigeons offend Islam ISIS recently banned pigeon breeding because when the birds fly overhead they expose theirgenitals and that is a sin against Islam. Violators will be publicly flogged. http://rt.com/news/264673-isis-breeding-birds-islam/ John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: The scope of physical law and its relationship to the substitution level
On 09 Jun 2015, at 04:00, meekerdb wrote: On 6/8/2015 4:16 PM, LizR wrote: On 9 June 2015 at 05:31, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 6/8/2015 1:03 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: or that maths exists independently of mathematicians. That even just arithmetical truth is independent of mathematician. This is important because everyone agree with any axiomatic of the numbers, but that is not the case for analysis, real numbers, etc. Everyone agrees on ZFC in the same sense. So does that make set theory and its consequences real? Reality isn't defined by what everyone agrees on. Tell it to Bruno, I was just following him. I don't define reality at all, but I do show that with comp, arithmetical truth is enough, ontologically. What makes ZFC (or whatever) real, or not, is whether it kicks back. Mathematics doesn't kick back - except metaphorically. Well, then it is an open problem if physics kick back in any non metaphorical sense. With computationalism, math kick back by leading mathematical entity toi believe in non mathematical kicking back stuff. Is it something that was invented, and could equally well have been invented differently, or was it discovered as a result of following a chain of logical reasoning from certain axioms? I'd say ZFC and arithmetic were both invented and then an axiomatization was invented for each of them. I'm not sure what invented differently means?...getting to the same axiomatization by a different historical path? Or inventing something similar, but not identical, as ZF is different from ZFC. There is only one standard model of arithmetic. There are no well defined standard models of ZF. The notion is controversial. You said all computations explain too much, which is NOT the case (it leads may be to a too much big problem). But set theory explains too much, and flatten the higher order notion too strongly. Bruno Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: The scope of physical law and its relationship to the substitution level
On 09 Jun 2015, at 04:10, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On Tuesday, June 9, 2015, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote: On 8 June 2015 at 16:22, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com wrote: It seems here that you've snuck an extra assumption into comp1. We know that brains can be conscious, and we assume that computations can also be conscious. But that doesn't mean that only computations can be conscious, nor does it mean that brains are computations. These two latter statements might be true, but they are not necessarily true, even given computationalism. I may not have phrased it very well, but comp1 is the assumption that consciousness is based on computation, and can't be created by anything else (at least that's comp1 in a simple form - actually, I believe it's the assumption that at some level physics is Turing emulable). On that basis, a brain must do computation (at some level), since it's conscious, and an AI could be conscious given the correct programme. There are two good justifications for computationalism that I can think of. One is the evolutionary one: that consciousness produces no effects of its own, so must be a side-effect of intelligent behaviour. The other is Chalmers' fading qualia argument. Neither of these justifications make a case for computation *exclusively* being responsible for consciousness. That is an added assumption, and at least in the first instance seems unnecessary. In science we use the axiom available, and here, comp loses its meaning if the survival is not supposed to be due to the computation. If not, even step one does no more follow. I might surivive with an artificial brain thanks to the Virgin Mary, but she might dislike the use of classical transportation, and so would not survive it. I sum this by the qua computatio condition. You can see it as linking the survival to only the computation. My definition of comp is already very weak, compared to most of thoise use in the literature. Without qua computatio, comp becomes so weak that it becomes trivial. Bruno (And what's wrong with sneaked ?) I was trying to be faintly amusing, but I see that snuck may have sneaked into the language: http://dictionary.reference.com/help/faq/language/g08.html -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: The scope of physical law and its relationship to the substitution level
On 09 Jun 2015, at 07:21, meekerdb wrote: On 6/8/2015 7:30 PM, LizR wrote: On 9 June 2015 at 14:00, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 6/8/2015 4:16 PM, LizR wrote: On 9 June 2015 at 05:31, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 6/8/2015 1:03 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: or that maths exists independently of mathematicians. That even just arithmetical truth is independent of mathematician. This is important because everyone agree with any axiomatic of the numbers, but that is not the case for analysis, real numbers, etc. Everyone agrees on ZFC in the same sense. So does that make set theory and its consequences real? Reality isn't defined by what everyone agrees on. Tell it to Bruno, I was just following him. If it was then the religious majority throughout history would have been right. What makes ZFC (or whatever) real, or not, is whether it kicks back. Mathematics doesn't kick back - except metaphorically. Are you claiming an alien in another galaxy wouldn't find that arithmetic works? No. Is that what you mean by kicks back? I'm not making any metaphysical claims about the status of maths, merely saying that most mathematicians would, I think, agree that two people working independently can make the same mathematical discovery by different routes, and that some maths has real-world applications, and that when it does, it works. Arithmetic is a hard example to discuss because it is so simple and probably even hardwired into our thinking by evolution (crows can supposedly add and subtract up to six), but it's not really so inevitable as it seems. In order to count you have to discern distinct objects and group them in imagination into a whole: So you count the players on a college football team (U.S.) and you get 105. Then you count the number on the basketball team of the same school, 35, and you add them to the football team you get 140 - but that may well be wrong. Of course you will say that's just a misapplication; but that's the point, that arithmetic is an abstraction that is invented to apply to certain cases and it is no more out there than other aspects of language. I agree that it's hard to imagine an intelligent species that doesn't perceive discrete countable objects and didn't invent arithmetic to describe them; maybe some plasma being on the surface of the the Sun that thinks only in continua. We need the natural number to just define computationalism, Church thesis, etc. Once you believe in different natural numbers, then you must explain them, and see if the existence of your notion is threatening comp, and how. If not, you can imagine anything to avoid any consequences of any theory. (But I'm not sure how much kicking back you need from something, maybe being independently discoverable and working isn't enough?) Is it something that was invented, and could equally well have been invented differently, or was it discovered as a result of following a chain of logical reasoning from certain axioms? I'd say ZFC and arithmetic were both invented and then an axiomatization was invented for each of them. I'm not sure what invented differently means?...getting to the same axiomatization by a different historical path? Or inventing something similar, but not identical, as ZF is different from ZFC. It means that two people starting from the same axioms and using the same system of logic came up with two different results (and neither made a mistake). That would mean either the axiom system was inconsistent or there was a mistake in logic. Note that Graham Priest has written several books on para-consistent logics, ones in which there can be contradictions but don't support ex falso quodlibet. That can be useful in AI, and for natural language. But not in QED, string theory or theoretical computer science. A rocket using water instead of hydrogen gas will not work. That does not refute that rockets can work. Bruno If within a given system A always leads to B, then it's reasonable to say B is discovered - like, for example, a certain endgame in chess leading to a particular set of possible conclusions. ?? At first reading I thought you meant A logically implies B, which means B is implicit in A. And so I thought the example was a chess endgame in which every move is forced (except resignation), A wouldbe the board position and B the sequence of endgame moves. But then you say B is a set of possible conclusions. Since chess is a finite game the starting position already leads to a set of possible conclusions. But if within a system A can lead to B, C, D etc then it's reasonable to say it's invented, So does the fact that Peano arithmetic lead to many different theorems mean it's invented? Does the fact that it's incomplete and can have infinitely many new axioms added to it mean it's invented? I don't think your
Re: Notion of (mathematical) reason
Bruno Marchal wrote: On 09 Jun 2015, at 07:06, meekerdb wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: On 08 Jun 2015, at 03:30, Bruce Kellett wrote: Note that it is important to distinguish between structures that can be described mathematically and the structure of arithmetic or mathematics themselves. Yes. Quite important. Even after the reversal, although physics is made purely arithmetical, it is only through machine's psychology and theology that this happens, and the science physics are explained to be different from the mathematical science. For example mathematical (arithmetical) existence is some thing like ExP(x), but physical existence is [2]2Ex [2]2P(x). Physics remains untouched by comp., except it is put on logico-arithmetical grounds. What change is physicalism in metaphysics. It becomes testable, and false if comp is true. That last seems incoherent. If comp leaves physics untouched that implies that comp makes no difference to physics and so there can be no test of comp. I meant, IF comp is true. Indeed, the test of comp is done by physics! If comp change the content of physics, and nature follows physics, it will be comp which has to be abandoned. Instead you seem to imply that physicalism, a metaphysical hypothesis, is testable - but how if not via an empirical prediction? It is via an empirical prediction. I was in the frame of supposing comp true. It does not change physics, guven that it is at the origin of physics (IF true).. You say it is false if comp is true; but that's not a test. I say that the idea that we need to assume a physical reality is false. That's like the creationists who, when asked what evidence supports creationism, cite deficiencies in evolution. ? (you lost me). I show that comp has testable consequence in the content of the physical theories, so let us do the test, or work toward it (like optimizing G*, the Z and X logics, etc.). As Brent has suggested. You simply contradict yourself here. You say It [comp] does not change physics, and If comp change the content of physics, and nature follows physics, it will be comp which has to be abandoned. The you say I show that comp has testable consequence in the content of the physical theories... These statements are mutually contradictory. If comp does not change the content of physical theories, then it will have no testable consequences. If comp does change the content of physical theories, then it might become testable, but so far you have given no hint as to what physical content might be changed, or what theories might be in question, you merely note that physics will take precedence over comp. Merely talking about metaphysics does not lead to testable consequences for physical theories. I think we have previously argued at length about the MGA. Because that argument does not address metaphysics, but the actual physics of brain processes, it does not refute some metaphysical hypothesis -- it actually refutes comp itself. This, as has been pointed out, is because the movie graph argument applies equally to physics as emulated by comp and physics as investigated by the physicists, independent of any metaphysical overtones. I think that you will find that metaphysical assumptions are not amenable to either verification or falsification by empirical means. Some metaphysics might be more useful and productive than others, but none is empirically testable. Bruce -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: The scope of physical law and its relationship to the substitution level
On 9 Jun 2015, at 8:07 pm, Bruce Kellett bhkell...@optusnet.com.au wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: On 09 Jun 2015, at 07:40, Bruce Kellett wrote: Given a set of axioms and some agreed rules of inference, the same results always follow, regardless of by whom or at what time the application is made. This is not what is usually referred to as kicking back. Johnson did not apply some axioms and rules of inference in answer to the idealists, he kicked a stone. But people can kicked stone in dreams too. But do they wake up with broken or bruised toes? Bruce Often, yes. Dial up a few YouTube clips of people doing embarrassing and, yes, injurious things while under the influence of the “mistaken belief system we call sleep” aka sleepwalking or nocturnal ambulatory syndrome or whatever. Afer that you can watch the clip of the dog running while asleep and taking off into a bloody brick wall after which it “wakes up to the real world”. You only have to believe that you are awake or asleep. You will always believe what you tell yourself. The point of Bruno’s “people can kick stones in dreams too” is to acknowledge that consciousness cannot be extinguished with cheap excuses like being asleep or dead. Kim -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Notion of (mathematical) reason
Bruno Marchal wrote: On 08 Jun 2015, at 15:13, Bruce Kellett wrote: But comp is false, as has been demonstrated by many observations. What? Reference? You mean the brain is not Turing emulable? Strong AI, or the possibility that part or all of your brain can be emulated by a computer does not entail that consciousness is only a computation. Consciousness is not a computation, when we assume computationalism. So what is it then? Consciousness supervenes of the physical brain, and if that brain is replaced by a computer, then it supervenes on that physical computer. If consciousness is not a computation, does it merely supervene on a computation? Or is the whole theory hopelessly confused? Nor does it entail that only computations can be conscious. A computation cannot be conscious. Only a (first) person can be conscious. It is a category error to believe that something 1p can be identified with some 3p thing. So a physical person with a physical brain is not conscious? Consciousness is something that has intersubjective aspects -- we can all agree that x, y, and z are conscious. We do not have direct first-person experience of anyone's consciousness other than our own, but that does not mean that we cannot know that another person is conscious. To say otherwise is simple solipsism. In fact, it is quite difficult to come up with a definition of computation such that only computers and brains perform computations. The structure of a Turing machine can be emulated by a rock, for instance. With toilet papers, and pebbles, yes. You still need to play the role of the processor. Now, a rock does not emulate an arbitrary turing machine. Why not? If it can emulate a specific purpose Turning machine, it can emulate a universal Turing machine. I think Putnam's argument for unlimited pancomputationalism implies this. With comp, rock are not even object, but map of accessible continuations. I expose only the mind body problem, and show that the machine's solution fits QM and neoplatonism. I don't defend any truth or religion, just the right to do those things with some rigor. But computationalism does not even give any new insights into the nature of consciousness, much less give any useful results for physics. You can do things with all the rigour you want, but if you can't extract any useful results, you are wasting your time. Perhaps this is the irreconcilable difference between the physicist and the mathematician. Bruce -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Quran Audio
On 9 Jun 2015, at 12:09 pm, Samiya Illias samiyaill...@gmail.com wrote: A good resource for listening to Quran Recitation in Arabic plus Translation for anyone interested in listening to he Quran: http://www.quranexplorer.com/quran/ Samiya YOU WISH Kim -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: The scope of physical law and its relationship to the substitution level
On 08 Jun 2015, at 18:40, John Clark wrote: On Mon, Jun 8, 2015 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: that is enough to conceive the set of the Gödel number of true sentences of arithmetic, and prove theorems about that set. That set can be defined in standard set theory YOU CAN'T MAKE A COMPUTATION WITH A DEFINITION! I can do better. You can't do better than a demonstration! Just make one calculation without using matter that obeys the laws of physics and you've won and this debate is over. To make it physically is impossible, but I have already explain that it is not relevant. The point is that those computations exist in arithmetic, with the relevant redundancies and quantum quantization. Your argument, if valid, would forbid any notion of block universe. You would ask show me a working clock capable of giveing me the time right now with a block universe. The solution is of course that time and space, here and now, are treated by the self-referential indexical. This has been explained, so you should quote the explanation if you don't grasp them. I can prove their existence in arithmetic. Nobody denies that true statements exist in arithmetic, But the I was not saying that. I was saying that computations exist is a true statement in the language of pure arithmetic, and that such statement are independent of the physical laws. but the trouble is false ones do too, and the only way known to sort one from the other is to use matter that obeys the laws of physics to make a calculation. We don't have to sort them. We have to separate them, and as you agree with the excluded middle problem, this is simple math. You forget to put yourself at the place of each continuators, and analyse their first person discourses. And you forgot that when creating thought experiments designed to illuminate aspects of personal identity I think that you have repeated this lie more than ten times. The personal identity aspect needed is in the definition of the 1p and 3p views given with the diaries. The thought experiements are used to explain that physics becomes a branch of machine theology, not to add anything that we don't know already on personal identity. you can't talk about yourself and use personal pronouns in a casual willy nilly manner as you do in everyday life! That is why I have introduced the key notion of 1p, 3p, 31p, in UDA, and that I tranbslate them with the intensional variants in the translation in arithmetic. That has been done, verified, and it works. Only you are using fuzzy pronouns here, in an argument easily refuted. You deny this, but nobody grasp why. Bruno -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: The scope of physical law and its relationship to the substitution level
On 08 Jun 2015, at 19:29, meekerdb wrote: On 6/8/2015 1:03 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: Hmm Let us be precise. That the computation take place in arithmetic is a mathematical fact that nobody doubt today. UDA explains only that we cannot use a notion of primitive matter for making more real some computations in place of others. It makes the physics supervening on all computations in arithmetic. But my computer does some computations and not others. Not just yours. Mine too, and all those existing in arithmetic do - some computations and not others. So there must be some sense in which some computations are real and others aren't. It is the indexical sense, like in a block universe. Handwaving that they're all there in arithmetic proves too much. This is not proposed as an explanation, but as a mathematical fact that we have to deal with. Then it is welcome as it explains, without using observation, why nature looks like the MWI. This predicts Everett QM, both intuitively (UDA) and formally (AUDA). Bruno Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: The scope of physical law and its relationship to the substitution level
On 08 Jun 2015, at 19:27, meekerdb wrote: On 6/8/2015 1:03 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: Hence what I've called comp1 is the default materialist hypothesis (also known as the strong AI thesis, I think) Comp1 is not comp, even if it is comp for a materialist: but that position is proved to be nonsense. Comp is just I am a digitalizable machine. String AI is the thesis that machine can think (be conscious). It does not logically entail comp. Machine can think, but does not need to be the only thinking entities. Gods and goddesses might be able to think too. But in saying I am a digitalizable machine you implicitly assume that machine exists in the environment that you exist in. That is not a problem. In arithmetic I will exist in infinities of environments, played by UMs (with and without oracles). Such existence are relative, and phenomenological. It is this environment and your potential interaction with it that provides meaning to the digital thoughts of the machine. I can agree with this. What does it change in the reasoning? The point is that your generalized brain, as long as it is digital, cannot singularize your soul. If you don't add non Turing emulable magic in matter, the argument shows that matter has to arise from a statistics on all computations going through the current state. If not, could you say precisely when the proof go wrong? Bruno Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Quran Audio
I suppose you can call it that :) People on this list have different assumptions, prejudices, misgivings, queries and (dis)interest level in Islam and the practice of Muslims. Just presenting the original document for any who might want to check for themselves. Actually I was a bit hesitant sharing but then I thought that some will object anyway. Samiya On 09-Jun-2015, at 6:56 pm, spudboy100 via Everything List everything-list@googlegroups.com wrote: Doing Dawa? Interesting. -Original Message- From: Samiya Illias samiyaill...@gmail.com To: everything-list everything-list@googlegroups.com Sent: Mon, Jun 8, 2015 10:09 pm Subject: Quran Audio A good resource for listening to Quran Recitation in Arabic plus Translation for anyone interested in listening to he Quran: http://www.quranexplorer.com/quran/ Samiya -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Pigeons offend Islam
On Mon, Jun 8, 2015 at 10:08 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: This is stupid on so many levels, even on the most basic factual one: You can't see the genitals of a pigeon. They're covered by feathers. You have to poke them to get them even expose their genitals. That's logic, but we were talking about something completely different, religion. With religion the stupider something you believe in is the better as it demonstrates more faith and faith, that is to say believing in something when there is absolutely no reason to do so, is the greatest virtue there is. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Notion of (mathematical) reason
On 6/9/2015 12:51 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 08 Jun 2015, at 19:45, meekerdb wrote: On 6/8/2015 3:24 AM, Bruce Kellett wrote: LizR wrote: On 8 June 2015 at 13:30, Bruce Kellett bhkell...@optusnet.com.au mailto:bhkell...@optusnet.com.au wrote: If not, there is no possibility for a time variable in arithmetic per se, and consequently nothing can 'emerge' from arithmetic, since emergence is a temporal concept. No it isn't, not in the sense being used here. The concept that is relevant in this case is ontological priority. If you think emergence is temporal then you will get very confused by discussions of the MUH (or even of how the universe arises as a 4D manifold from the laws of physics) Which law of physics gives rise to the 4D manifold? It is my understanding that a 4D pseudo-Riemannian manifold was a basic postulate underlying general relativity -- if that hypothesis emerged from anything, then it came from the fact that space-time was observed to be a 4 dimensional structure. So the 4D manifold is not actually derived from anything other than observation. Kant made the mistake of thinking that Euclidean space was a necessary law of thought. Observation proved him wrong. Maybe observation also proves the MUH wrong? Observation can't prove anything wrong about a theory that says everything happens in some universe. ;-) Everything (consistent) happens in the mind of some machines, but the laws are in the relative measure, provided notably by the logical intensional nuance brought by incompleteness. By consistent do you mean logically consistent; thus implying that no event can be nomologically inconsistent? That is the same as denying there is any such thing as laws of physics. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: The scope of physical law and its relationship to the substitution level
On Mon, Jun 8, 2015 Bruce Kellett bhkell...@optusnet.com.au wrote: What axioms led to arithmetic? The Peano axioms. They were chosen because they are very simple and self evident. You need to be very conservative when picking axioms, for example we could just add the Goldbach Conjecture as an axiom, but then if a computer found a even number that was NOT the sum of 2 primes it would render all mathematical work done after the addition of the Goldbach axiom gibberish. Or take Zermelo–Fraenkel set theory (ZFC) and the Continuum Hypothesis which says that there is no infinite number greater than the number of integers but less than the number of Real Numbers; in 1940 Godel showed that ZFC cannot prove the Continuum Hypothesis to be incorrect, and in 1963 Paul Cohen showed that ZFC cannot prove the Continuum Hypothesis to be correct either. So ZFC has nothing to say about the Continuum Hypothesis one way or the other. You could just add an axiom to ZFC saying the Continuum Hypothesis is true but you could just as easily add the Continuum Hypothesis is NOT true, so which one do you add? The problem is that neither of these axioms are simple and neither are self evident. Could one have chosen different axioms? It's never a good idea to change axioms unless somebody finds a set of axioms that are even simpler and even more self evident. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
super intelligence and self-sampling
Hi everyone, Something I have been thinking about. I start with two assumptions: - Super-intelligence is more resilient than human intelligence, so it is likely to last longer (e.g. it is more likely to be able to anticipate existencial threats and prepare accordingly; it is more likely to spread throughout the galaxy); - A super-intelligence is necessarily conscious (I think both computacionalists and emergentists can agree here). If a super-intelligence is created at some point in time, then we can expect there to exists much more of it in an entire timeline than human intelligence. By self-sampling, it is therefore unlikely that I exist as a human and not as a super-intelligence. I can think of three options: 1) We are outliers -- it is hard to estimate the likelihood of this, but it would be tempting to assume that it is very very low if we imagine a galaxy-spanning AI civilisation; 2) No super-intelligence will ever be created; 3) We are already super-intelligences, having an experience in a simulation for some reason. What do you think? Cheers Telmo. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: The scope of physical law and its relationship to the substitution level
On 6/9/2015 12:46 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 08 Jun 2015, at 19:31, meekerdb wrote: On 6/8/2015 1:03 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: or that maths exists independently of mathematicians. That even just arithmetical truth is independent of mathematician. This is important because everyone agree with any axiomatic of the numbers, but that is not the case for analysis, real numbers, etc. Everyone agrees on ZFC in the same sense. Not at all. There are many non isomorphic approach to set theory and analysis. For the natural numbers, this does not occur. All theories have a clear standard model on which we all agree. As Gödel saw, even intuitionist arithmetic is isomorphic to classical arithmetic: it changes only the vocabulary. So does that make set theory and its consequences real? It is a theory which explain too much. It is interesting for logicians. Nobody use it, really. people refers to it when confronted with possible paradoxes, but mathematicians avoid the paradoxes naturally, and the modern one will use some category or elementary toposes to fix the thing. Read books on the subject. Arithmetic has a solidity status not obtained by analysis, or even geometry.Some use ZF + ~AC, ZF + kappa, or other will use NF (a very different set theory), or intuitionist ZF (quite different from ZF), or NBG, etc. So what? That just makes my point that Platonia implies many different realities. First order predicate logic is also a clear standard model. So it must be as real as arithmetic. And arithmetic isn't so complete as you imply - that's why negative numbers and fractions and reals were invented. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: The scope of physical law and its relationship to the substitution level
On 6/9/2015 12:34 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 08 Jun 2015, at 19:27, meekerdb wrote: On 6/8/2015 1:03 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: Hence what I've called comp1 is the default materialist hypothesis (also known as the strong AI thesis, I think) Comp1 is not comp, even if it is comp for a materialist: but that position is proved to be nonsense. Comp is just I am a digitalizable machine. String AI is the thesis that machine can think (be conscious). It does not logically entail comp. Machine can think, but does not need to be the only thinking entities. Gods and goddesses might be able to think too. But in saying I am a digitalizable machine you implicitly assume that machine exists in the environment that you exist in. That is not a problem. In arithmetic I will exist in infinities of environments, played by UMs (with and without oracles). Such existence are relative, and phenomenological. It is this environment and your potential interaction with it that provides meaning to the digital thoughts of the machine. I can agree with this. What does it change in the reasoning? It undermines the MGA because it shows that whether a physical process instantiates a computation is a wholistic question, one whose answer is relative to the environment and interaction with that environment. This means that isolating the movie graph and then showing that it is absurd to regard it as a computation is not a legitimate move. Brent The point is that your generalized brain, as long as it is digital, cannot singularize your soul. If you don't add non Turing emulable magic in matter, the argument shows that matter has to arise from a statistics on all computations going through the current state. If not, could you say precisely when the proof go wrong? Bruno Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: super intelligence and self-sampling
Perhaps most superintelligences end up merging into one super-ego, so that their measure effectively becomes zero. Terren On Tue, Jun 9, 2015 at 1:03 PM, Telmo Menezes te...@telmomenezes.com wrote: Hi everyone, Something I have been thinking about. I start with two assumptions: - Super-intelligence is more resilient than human intelligence, so it is likely to last longer (e.g. it is more likely to be able to anticipate existencial threats and prepare accordingly; it is more likely to spread throughout the galaxy); - A super-intelligence is necessarily conscious (I think both computacionalists and emergentists can agree here). If a super-intelligence is created at some point in time, then we can expect there to exists much more of it in an entire timeline than human intelligence. By self-sampling, it is therefore unlikely that I exist as a human and not as a super-intelligence. I can think of three options: 1) We are outliers -- it is hard to estimate the likelihood of this, but it would be tempting to assume that it is very very low if we imagine a galaxy-spanning AI civilisation; 2) No super-intelligence will ever be created; 3) We are already super-intelligences, having an experience in a simulation for some reason. What do you think? Cheers Telmo. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: super intelligence and self-sampling
On Tue, Jun 9, 2015 at 1:48 PM, Telmo Menezes te...@telmomenezes.com wrote: On Tue, Jun 9, 2015 at 7:28 PM, Terren Suydam terren.suy...@gmail.com wrote: Perhaps most superintelligences end up merging into one super-ego, so that their measure effectively becomes zero. Perhaps, but I'm not convinced that this would reduce its measure. Consider the fact that you are no an ant, even though there are apparently 100 trillion of them compared to 7 billion humans. Telmo. The way I resolve that one is to assume that self-sampling requires a high enough level intelligence to have an ego (the 'self' in self-sampling). This is required to differentiate the computational histories we identify with as identity memory. Let's say the entirety of humanity uploaded into a simulated environment, and that one day the simulated separation between minds was eradicated, giving rise to a super-intelligence (just one path of many to a superintelligence). From that moment on it would be impossible to differentiate computational histories in terms of personal identity/memory, so the measure goes to zero. T -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Pigeons offend Islam
On 6/9/2015 2:01 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 09 Jun 2015, at 04:08, meekerdb wrote: This is stupid on so many levels, even on the most basic factual one: You can't see the genitals of a pigeon. They're covered by feathers. You have to poke them to get them even expose their genitals. They confused it with the feet of the pigeon, perhaps. I think they fear pigeons, because they can be used to send messages, even where there is no electricity. The germans have also forbid breeding pigeons, in my country, some time ago, as they were used by the resistance. Yes, I suspected that was the real reason for the ban. But it is even more stupid to invent a religious reason for the ban which every one will see as idiotic. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Notion of (mathematical) reason
On 09 Jun 2015, at 12:55, Bruce Kellett wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: On 09 Jun 2015, at 07:06, meekerdb wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: On 08 Jun 2015, at 03:30, Bruce Kellett wrote: Note that it is important to distinguish between structures that can be described mathematically and the structure of arithmetic or mathematics themselves. Yes. Quite important. Even after the reversal, although physics is made purely arithmetical, it is only through machine's psychology and theology that this happens, and the science physics are explained to be different from the mathematical science. For example mathematical (arithmetical) existence is some thing like ExP(x), but physical existence is [2]2Ex [2]2P(x). Physics remains untouched by comp., except it is put on logico-arithmetical grounds. What change is physicalism in metaphysics. It becomes testable, and false if comp is true. That last seems incoherent. If comp leaves physics untouched that implies that comp makes no difference to physics and so there can be no test of comp. I meant, IF comp is true. Indeed, the test of comp is done by physics! If comp change the content of physics, and nature follows physics, it will be comp which has to be abandoned. Instead you seem to imply that physicalism, a metaphysical hypothesis, is testable - but how if not via an empirical prediction? It is via an empirical prediction. I was in the frame of supposing comp true. It does not change physics, guven that it is at the origin of physics (IF true).. You say it is false if comp is true; but that's not a test. I say that the idea that we need to assume a physical reality is false. That's like the creationists who, when asked what evidence supports creationism, cite deficiencies in evolution. ? (you lost me). I show that comp has testable consequence in the content of the physical theories, so let us do the test, or work toward it (like optimizing G*, the Z and X logics, etc.). As Brent has suggested. You simply contradict yourself here. You say It [comp] does not change physics, and If comp change the content of physics, and nature follows physics, it will be comp which has to be abandoned. The you say I show that comp has testable consequence in the content of the physical theories... I see how you make appear a contradiction. As I said, comp is true and then is confirmed by physics, or comp is refuted by physics, and on both case comp does not change physics. Just that comp is testable. These statements are mutually contradictory. If comp does not change the content of physical theories, then it will have no testable consequences. In *that*sense, comp change so much physics that it makes it into a branch of machine theology. Sure. If comp does change the content of physical theories, then it might become testable, but so far you have given no hint as to what physical content might be changed, or what theories might be in question, you merely note that physics will take precedence over comp. Well that is the result. Then the logic of the observable has been derived, and tested. Merely talking about metaphysics does not lead to testable consequences for physical theories. Unless that metaphysics is derived from comp, which leads to a theology which include physics, and so get testable. Anyway, I derive this from comp. I think we have previously argued at length about the MGA. Because that argument does not address metaphysics, but the actual physics of brain processes, it does not refute some metaphysical hypothesis -- it actually refutes comp itself. ? This, as has been pointed out, is because the movie graph argument applies equally to physics as emulated by comp and physics as investigated by the physicists, independent of any metaphysical overtones. Comp makes physics NOT emulable by any machine a priori. I think that you will find that metaphysical assumptions are not amenable to either verification or falsification by empirical means. Some metaphysics might be more useful and productive than others, but none is empirically testable. Good, so let us not doing metaphysics, but only cognitive science. Then a theorem is that if the brain is Turing emulable then physics is a branch of machine theology, and the physical reality is recovered through a notion of persistent and stable appearances. Thanks to Gödel, Löb and Solovay, we can axiomatize completely the propositional part of the theology, including the propositional part of physics, and compare it to the logic of the observable. Up to now, it fits (at a place where many have thought this cannot happen, because this marry symmetry and antisymmetry at a deep level, without collapsing the logic. Bruno Bruce -- You received this message because you
Re: The scope of physical law and its relationship to the substitution level
On 09 Jun 2015, at 18:59, John Clark wrote: On Mon, Jun 8, 2015 Bruce Kellett bhkell...@optusnet.com.au wrote: What axioms led to arithmetic? The Peano axioms. Or the Robinson axiom, or many other systems. but they don't disagree on any formula. Even the theories having weird axioms like PA is inconsistent will not disagree on what they say for the standard natural numbers. They disagree only on religion, somehow. They were chosen because they are very simple and self evident. You need to be very conservative when picking axioms, for example we could just add the Goldbach Conjecture as an axiom, but then if a computer found a even number that was NOT the sum of 2 primes it would render all mathematical work done after the addition of the Goldbach axiom gibberish. Or take Zermelo–Fraenkel set theory (ZFC) Well, that is Zermelo–Fraenkel set theory + the axiom of choice. and the Continuum Hypothesis which says that there is no infinite number greater than the number of integers but less than the number of Real Numbers; in 1940 Godel showed that ZFC cannot prove the Continuum Hypothesis to be incorrect, and in 1963 Paul Cohen showed that ZFC cannot prove the Continuum Hypothesis to be correct either. So ZFC has nothing to say about the Continuum Hypothesis one way or the other. You could just add an axiom to ZFC saying the Continuum Hypothesis is true but you could just as easily add the Continuum Hypothesis is NOT true, so which one do you add? The problem is that neither of these axioms are simple and neither are self evident. Could one have chosen different axioms? It's never a good idea to change axioms unless somebody finds a set of axioms that are even simpler and even more self evident. It depends what we need. RA is interesting because it is the simple essentially undecidable theory. Take any of its axioms, 0 ≠ s(x) s(x) = s(y) - x = y x = 0 v Ey(x = s(y)) x+0 = x x+s(y) = s(x+y) x*0=0 x*s(y)=(x*y)+x and remove it. You get a theory which is undecidable, but not *essentially* undecidable. It means you can extend those subtheories into decidable theories, like the theory of real numbers. But RA is already essentially undecidable: all its consistent effective (RE) extensions are undecidable and incomplete (with respect to arithmetical truth). But RA cannot prove many things. It is simple to see that 0 + x = x is undecidable in RA. And RA is not Löbian. It is Turing universal, but cannot prove it, unlike PA, ZF, ZFC, ZF+kappa, etc. Once Löbian, they get the same theology, and the same testable comp physics. Note that ZF and ZFC proves the same formula of arithmetic. Bruno John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: super intelligence and self-sampling
On Tue, Jun 9, 2015 at 7:28 PM, Terren Suydam terren.suy...@gmail.com wrote: Perhaps most superintelligences end up merging into one super-ego, so that their measure effectively becomes zero. Perhaps, but I'm not convinced that this would reduce its measure. Consider the fact that you are no an ant, even though there are apparently 100 trillion of them compared to 7 billion humans. Telmo. Terren On Tue, Jun 9, 2015 at 1:03 PM, Telmo Menezes te...@telmomenezes.com wrote: Hi everyone, Something I have been thinking about. I start with two assumptions: - Super-intelligence is more resilient than human intelligence, so it is likely to last longer (e.g. it is more likely to be able to anticipate existencial threats and prepare accordingly; it is more likely to spread throughout the galaxy); - A super-intelligence is necessarily conscious (I think both computacionalists and emergentists can agree here). If a super-intelligence is created at some point in time, then we can expect there to exists much more of it in an entire timeline than human intelligence. By self-sampling, it is therefore unlikely that I exist as a human and not as a super-intelligence. I can think of three options: 1) We are outliers -- it is hard to estimate the likelihood of this, but it would be tempting to assume that it is very very low if we imagine a galaxy-spanning AI civilisation; 2) No super-intelligence will ever be created; 3) We are already super-intelligences, having an experience in a simulation for some reason. What do you think? Cheers Telmo. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: The scope of physical law and its relationship to the substitution level
On 09 Jun 2015, at 12:07, Bruce Kellett wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: On 09 Jun 2015, at 07:40, Bruce Kellett wrote: Given a set of axioms and some agreed rules of inference, the same results always follow, regardless of by whom or at what time the application is made. This is not what is usually referred to as kicking back. Johnson did not apply some axioms and rules of inference in answer to the idealists, he kicked a stone. But people can kicked stone in dreams too. But do they wake up with broken or bruised toes? Do they ever wake up? Bruno Bruce -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Pigeons offend Islam
On Tue, Jun 9, 2015 at 7:30 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 6/9/2015 2:01 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 09 Jun 2015, at 04:08, meekerdb wrote: This is stupid on so many levels, even on the most basic factual one: You can't see the genitals of a pigeon. They're covered by feathers. You have to poke them to get them even expose their genitals. They confused it with the feet of the pigeon, perhaps. I think they fear pigeons, because they can be used to send messages, even where there is no electricity. The germans have also forbid breeding pigeons, in my country, some time ago, as they were used by the resistance. Yes, I suspected that was the real reason for the ban. But it is even more stupid to invent a religious reason for the ban which every one will see as idiotic. I think it's fairly common for repressive regimes to prefer to avoid acknowledging their people's desires to escape or communicate with the outside. I suspect that part of it is because people feel more powerless if they don't realise that they are far from alone in their dislike of the society they live in. Telmo. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: The scope of physical law and its relationship to the substitution level
On 6/9/2015 1:26 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: ... That can be useful in AI, and for natural language. But not in QED, string theory or theoretical computer science. A rocket using water instead of hydrogen gas will not work. That does not refute that rockets can work. Brent :) -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Notion of (mathematical) reason
On 09 Jun 2015, at 15:11, Bruce Kellett wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: On 09 Jun 2015, at 09:11, Bruce Kellett wrote: Why not? If it can emulate a specific purpose Turning machine, it can emulate a universal Turing machine. I think Putnam's argument for unlimited pancomputationalism implies this. I am not convince by that argument. Show me a rock program computing the prime numbers. Show me a Turing machine that can compute the prime numbers Easy but tedious, and distracting exercise. Show me how to emulate just K, that is the function which send (x, y) to x. it is not obvious this can be done, because y is eliminated, you need a black hole for it, and a proof that it does not evaporate. and I can emulate that with a rock. Like with the pebble. For that matter, show me an arithmetical computer in Platonia computing the prime numbers. .. much less give any useful results for physics. No new one should be expected soon, but that was not the purpose at all. You can't blame a coffee machine for not doing tea. Well, if I drink only tea then I would consider a coffee machine totally useless and discard it without further thought! So for comp! ? You say that comp is useless, but what is your theory of mind. What is not Turing emulable in the brain? You can do things with all the rigour you want, but if you can't extract any useful results, you are wasting your time. Perhaps this is the irreconcilable difference between the physicist and the mathematician. Yes, I am interested in a theory of everything, which means to me mainly a theory which does not eliminate consciousness. I saw that physicists avoid the question, but a bridge is born between math and cognitive science, thanks to theoretical computer science (a branch of math). I am not sure I see your point. Comp is not useless, comp is the actual theory of the materialists, and I show that contrary to a widespread belief: materialism and computationalism are incompatible (without adding non-comp magic). Comp is not presented as a solution, but as a problem. In the second part, I show the propositional solution, but you need to understand the problem before. Actually, I think that you have seen the problem, but want to conclude to much quickly that comp is false. The math part shows that this is premature, especially that QM confirms both the comp many-worlds/dreams, but also the quantum tautologies (until now). Comp does not confirm the many-worlds interpretation of QM. Exact. Comp implies trivially the many-dreams. It is QM which confirms the many dreams aspect, and so use of it to get the measure right. You appear to want to draw this conclusion from FPI. But in a discussion with Liz a while back, I challenged this interpretation of your teleportation thought experiments leading to FPI. It was readily shown that such thought experiments were completely orthogonal to quantum mechanics and the MWI. No, You stopped at step 4 (which is already better than John Clark). You need AUDA to get the math of the FPI, and to compare it to physics. We have answered this, but you come back again on what has already been explained in detail: please reread the posts. Similarly for your attempt to bring quantum logic to your cause. Quantum logic was devised by von Neumann in the context of the collapse interpretation of QM, together with the use of projection operators. In Everettian many-worlds interpretations, there are no projection operators, and quantum logic does not have a footing. In fact, it has been pointed out that there is no such thing as a specifically quantum logic -- there is just ordinary predicate logic and a theory in which some operators do not commute. When you can derive the non-commutation of the position and momentum operators from comp, I might be a little more impressed. UDA formulates the problem, and by the way, the non-commutation of some observable is already proved. Of course position and momentum are not yet derived, and it is not clear if they will be derived. Again, I am not proposing a new theory, I show that two old antic theories, often confused or used simultaneously are incompatible. Then I show that appearance of matter is already justified at the propositional level, so comp is not yet refuted. My feeling is that you are not interested in the mind-body problem, but for some reason want to keep physics as *the* fundamental science. If that is the case, you have to produce a non-comp theory of mind. That is less difficult that you might think. Consciousness supervenes on the physical brain, Only if you add some amount of magic in both the brain and matter: which one. I ask the theory, the math, not religious mantra like consciousness supervenes on the physical brain. Today materialist believe that consciousness sueprvenes on the rbain *because*
Re: Notion of (mathematical) reason
On 09 Jun 2015, at 18:53, meekerdb wrote: On 6/9/2015 12:51 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 08 Jun 2015, at 19:45, meekerdb wrote: On 6/8/2015 3:24 AM, Bruce Kellett wrote: LizR wrote: On 8 June 2015 at 13:30, Bruce Kellett bhkell...@optusnet.com.au mailto:bhkell...@optusnet.com.au wrote: If not, there is no possibility for a time variable in arithmetic per se, and consequently nothing can 'emerge' from arithmetic, since emergence is a temporal concept. No it isn't, not in the sense being used here. The concept that is relevant in this case is ontological priority. If you think emergence is temporal then you will get very confused by discussions of the MUH (or even of how the universe arises as a 4D manifold from the laws of physics) Which law of physics gives rise to the 4D manifold? It is my understanding that a 4D pseudo-Riemannian manifold was a basic postulate underlying general relativity -- if that hypothesis emerged from anything, then it came from the fact that space-time was observed to be a 4 dimensional structure. So the 4D manifold is not actually derived from anything other than observation. Kant made the mistake of thinking that Euclidean space was a necessary law of thought. Observation proved him wrong. Maybe observation also proves the MUH wrong? Observation can't prove anything wrong about a theory that says everything happens in some universe. ;-) Everything (consistent) happens in the mind of some machines, but the laws are in the relative measure, provided notably by the logical intensional nuance brought by incompleteness. By consistent do you mean logically consistent; thus implying that no event can be nomologically inconsistent? That is the same as denying there is any such thing as laws of physics. A set of beliefs is consistent if it does not lead to a proof of a statement and its negation. By completeness we can say that a set of belief is consistent if there is a world satisfying those beliefs. It can be nomonological or not. And it has a different semantics according to which theory, or which intensional nuance of a provability predicate it is applied. We might defined nomological inconsistency by [i] ip [i] i~p, for [i] being a material hypostase. Bruno Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: super intelligence and self-sampling
On Tue, Jun 9, 2015 Telmo Menezes te...@telmomenezes.com wrote: Super-intelligence is more resilient than human intelligence, so it is likely to last longer Maybe, but I note that smarter than average humans seem to have higher than average rates of suicide too. Mathematicians kill themselves at a rate 1.8 times higher than the general population, but they're not as bad as dentists, they kill themselves 5.6 times as often. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: super intelligence and self-sampling
On Tue, Jun 9, 2015 at 10:15 PM, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com wrote: On Tue, Jun 9, 2015 Telmo Menezes te...@telmomenezes.com wrote: Super-intelligence is more resilient than human intelligence, so it is likely to last longer Maybe, but I note that smarter than average humans seem to have higher than average rates of suicide too. I wonder if this is because intelligence leads to depression or because it makes one more likely to research and correctly execute a viable method of suicide. Do you know if the rates are also higher on failed attempts? Mathematicians kill themselves at a rate 1.8 times higher than the general population, but they're not as bad as dentists, they kill themselves 5.6 times as often. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: super intelligence and self-sampling
The normal answer to this is as stated - a superintelligence may form, as per various Arthur C Clark (or Olaf Stapledon, really) stories, by merging lots of non-super intelligences. So the chances of finding yourself non-super is vastly greater, because it takes billions of us to make one of them. However, this could lead to you eventually finding yourself super (especially if quantum immortality operates). Or a subset of super. PS Ants aren't relevant, as Russell explains in Theory of Nothing. On 10 June 2015 at 09:41, Terren Suydam terren.suy...@gmail.com wrote: On Tue, Jun 9, 2015 at 5:31 PM, Telmo Menezes te...@telmomenezes.com wrote: On Tue, Jun 9, 2015 at 8:19 PM, Terren Suydam terren.suy...@gmail.com wrote: On Tue, Jun 9, 2015 at 1:48 PM, Telmo Menezes te...@telmomenezes.com wrote: On Tue, Jun 9, 2015 at 7:28 PM, Terren Suydam terren.suy...@gmail.com wrote: Perhaps most superintelligences end up merging into one super-ego, so that their measure effectively becomes zero. Perhaps, but I'm not convinced that this would reduce its measure. Consider the fact that you are no an ant, even though there are apparently 100 trillion of them compared to 7 billion humans. Telmo. The way I resolve that one is to assume that self-sampling requires a high enough level intelligence to have an ego (the 'self' in self-sampling). This is required to differentiate the computational histories we identify with as identity memory. Let's say the entirety of humanity uploaded into a simulated environment, and that one day the simulated separation between minds was eradicated, giving rise to a super-intelligence (just one path of many to a superintelligence). From that moment on it would be impossible to differentiate computational histories in terms of personal identity/memory, so the measure goes to zero. Why zero? There is still one conscious entity. Why wouldn't it remember the great unification and the multitude of humans events before that? Telmo. When I say goes to zero I mean it as in, approaches the limit of zero in the relative measure. I think it would remember the great multitude of human events, but it would remember all of them as a single entity, as a single undifferentiated identity. It effectively collapses the measure from billions to one. Terren T -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Notion of (mathematical) reason
On 10 June 2015 at 01:11, Bruce Kellett bhkell...@optusnet.com.au wrote: That is less difficult that you might think. Consciousness supervenes on the physical brain So (a) what actually is consciousness?, and (b) what is the answer to Maudlin and the MGA? -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: The scope of physical law and its relationship to the substitution level
On 10 June 2015 at 10:37, Bruce Kellett bhkell...@optusnet.com.au wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: On 09 Jun 2015, at 12:07, Bruce Kellett wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: On 09 Jun 2015, at 07:40, Bruce Kellett wrote: Given a set of axioms and some agreed rules of inference, the same results always follow, regardless of by whom or at what time the application is made. This is not what is usually referred to as kicking back. Johnson did not apply some axioms and rules of inference in answer to the idealists, he kicked a stone. But people can kicked stone in dreams too. But do they wake up with broken or bruised toes? Do they ever wake up? Solipsist! Another solipsist? Phew! I was worried I might be the only one. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: super intelligence and self-sampling
On 10 June 2015 at 11:39, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com wrote: On 10 June 2015 at 08:37, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote: The normal answer to this is as stated - a superintelligence may form, as per various Arthur C Clark (or Olaf Stapledon, really) stories, by merging lots of non-super intelligences. So the chances of finding yourself non-super is vastly greater, because it takes billions of us to make one of them. However, this could lead to you eventually finding yourself super (especially if quantum immortality operates). Or a subset of super. PS Ants aren't relevant, as Russell explains in Theory of Nothing. OK, but the same argument can easily be made otherwise: why should you find yourself living in tiny New Zealand rather than populous China? There is a way to show that you are more likely to find yourself in a smaller country. I can't remember the details (but I think a power law is involved :-) But I will have a go. I am more likely to find myself not in China than in China, because the majority of people live outside China. Of the rest of the world, the next most populous country is India, but more people live outside India than in it, so I am more likely not to live in India. Next is the USA, but of the remaining 4 or 5 billion people, most live outside the USA, so... Repeating the process, I end up living alone on an island in the Pacific. Or in New Zealand, which is almost the same thing. (And then the test is given on Tuesday, much to my surprise!) -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: super intelligence and self-sampling
On Wed, Jun 10, 2015 at 09:39:37AM +1000, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On 10 June 2015 at 08:37, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote: The normal answer to this is as stated - a superintelligence may form, as per various Arthur C Clark (or Olaf Stapledon, really) stories, by merging lots of non-super intelligences. So the chances of finding yourself non-super is vastly greater, because it takes billions of us to make one of them. However, this could lead to you eventually finding yourself super (especially if quantum immortality operates). Or a subset of super. PS Ants aren't relevant, as Russell explains in Theory of Nothing. OK, but the same argument can easily be made otherwise: why should you find yourself living in tiny New Zealand rather than populous China? I address that as well. Because of a peculiar conspiracy, country populations follow a near power law, which means it is just as likely that you will be born in a low population country like New Zealand, as a high population country like China, simply because there are more low population countries in just the right number. Which leads one to suspect that self-sampling is another mechanism for the ubuquity of power laws in nature. I had a proof in one version of my paper that fragmentation/coalescence processes in general lead to power law distributions in just the right way to solve self-sampling problems like the above, but referees made me take it out. I suppose I should try to publish that result in a more mathematical journal at some point, but I'm getting tired of arguing with referees all the time ):. -- Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders Visiting Professor of Mathematics hpco...@hpcoders.com.au University of New South Wales http://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: super intelligence and self-sampling
I was close :) -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: The scope of physical law and its relationship to the substitution level
Bruno Marchal wrote: On 09 Jun 2015, at 12:07, Bruce Kellett wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: On 09 Jun 2015, at 07:40, Bruce Kellett wrote: Given a set of axioms and some agreed rules of inference, the same results always follow, regardless of by whom or at what time the application is made. This is not what is usually referred to as kicking back. Johnson did not apply some axioms and rules of inference in answer to the idealists, he kicked a stone. But people can kicked stone in dreams too. But do they wake up with broken or bruised toes? Do they ever wake up? Solipsist! Bruce -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Pigeons offend Islam
The answer is, pigeon breeders have to make little sets of underwear for their pigeons. Simple, really. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Notion of (mathematical) reason
Bruno Marchal wrote: On 09 Jun 2015, at 12:55, Bruce Kellett wrote: As Brent has suggested. You simply contradict yourself here. You say It [comp] does not change physics, and If comp change the content of physics, and nature follows physics, it will be comp which has to be abandoned. The you say I show that comp has testable consequence in the content of the physical theories... I see how you make appear a contradiction. As I said, comp is true and then is confirmed by physics, or comp is refuted by physics, and on both case comp does not change physics. Just that comp is testable. These statements are mutually contradictory. If comp does not change the content of physical theories, then it will have no testable consequences. In *that*sense, comp change so much physics that it makes it into a branch of machine theology. Sure. OK. So your claim is that physics is recoverable from the computations of the dovetailer, and that if any of the physics so recovered contradicts physics as developed by the usual methods of science -- and tested by observation and experiment -- then that disproves comp. But then, later we have Comp makes physics NOT emulable by any machine a priori. Now if physics is not emulable by any machine, how is it to be recovered from the computations of the dovetailer? I am not at all clear what you mean by physics not being Turing emulable. Is this simply to do with the fact that Turing machines are digital, and physics assumes continuous variables -- real and complex numbers? Or is it, as you have said somewhere, that a machine cannot predict what result you will see when you perform a quantum experiment? As things stand, you do have a conflict here. Bruce -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: super intelligence and self-sampling
On Tue, Jun 9, 2015 at 7:33 PM, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote: On 10 June 2015 at 11:15, Terren Suydam terren.suy...@gmail.com wrote: From a quantum immortality perspective, I think if a superintelligence was merging lots of intelligences, including yours, you find yourself in increasingly unlikely situations where you were able to escape being merged with the superintelligence. Eventually, against all odds, you might be the only non-integrated intelligence left. Yes, that does seem possible. It would imply that closest continuers of you could never be the versions within the Cloud - an alternative might be that the superintelligence starts off new arrivals with full autonomy inside a virtual world indistinguishable from their previous existence, and only gradually allow them to merge into the Overmind ... maybe giving them tests to check if they are ready to do so yet. But that would be a cul-de-sac if eventually the superintelligence reaps all individual consciousnesses. (Which may or may not involve being able to recite the Quran :-) lol, the religious parallels are many. The superintelligence is a sort of ego dissolution into the Void. Terren -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: super intelligence and self-sampling
On 10 June 2015 at 08:37, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote: The normal answer to this is as stated - a superintelligence may form, as per various Arthur C Clark (or Olaf Stapledon, really) stories, by merging lots of non-super intelligences. So the chances of finding yourself non-super is vastly greater, because it takes billions of us to make one of them. However, this could lead to you eventually finding yourself super (especially if quantum immortality operates). Or a subset of super. PS Ants aren't relevant, as Russell explains in Theory of Nothing. OK, but the same argument can easily be made otherwise: why should you find yourself living in tiny New Zealand rather than populous China? -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: super intelligence and self-sampling
On 10 June 2015 at 11:38, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 6/9/2015 2:25 PM, Telmo Menezes wrote: On Tue, Jun 9, 2015 at 10:15 PM, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com wrote: On Tue, Jun 9, 2015 Telmo Menezes te...@telmomenezes.com wrote: Super-intelligence is more resilient than human intelligence, so it is likely to last longer Maybe, but I note that smarter than average humans seem to have higher than average rates of suicide too. I wonder if this is because intelligence leads to depression or because it makes one more likely to research and correctly execute a viable method of suicide. Do you know if the rates are also higher on failed attempts? According to most people on this list, they are ALL failed attempts. Heehee. (Or at least most people are willnig to entertain the possibility.) -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Notion of (mathematical) reason
On 6/9/2015 11:04 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: You say that comp is useless, but what is your theory of mind. What is not Turing emulable in the brain? Its interaction with the universe. Of course that may be Turing emulable too, if the universe is. But in that case you've just emulated everything, and emulated consciousness supervenes on emulated brains. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: super intelligence and self-sampling
From a quantum immortality perspective, I think if a superintelligence was merging lots of intelligences, including yours, you find yourself in increasingly unlikely situations where you were able to escape being merged with the superintelligence. Eventually, against all odds, you might be the only non-integrated intelligence left. Terren On Tue, Jun 9, 2015 at 6:37 PM, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote: The normal answer to this is as stated - a superintelligence may form, as per various Arthur C Clark (or Olaf Stapledon, really) stories, by merging lots of non-super intelligences. So the chances of finding yourself non-super is vastly greater, because it takes billions of us to make one of them. However, this could lead to you eventually finding yourself super (especially if quantum immortality operates). Or a subset of super. PS Ants aren't relevant, as Russell explains in Theory of Nothing. On 10 June 2015 at 09:41, Terren Suydam terren.suy...@gmail.com wrote: On Tue, Jun 9, 2015 at 5:31 PM, Telmo Menezes te...@telmomenezes.com wrote: On Tue, Jun 9, 2015 at 8:19 PM, Terren Suydam terren.suy...@gmail.com wrote: On Tue, Jun 9, 2015 at 1:48 PM, Telmo Menezes te...@telmomenezes.com wrote: On Tue, Jun 9, 2015 at 7:28 PM, Terren Suydam terren.suy...@gmail.com wrote: Perhaps most superintelligences end up merging into one super-ego, so that their measure effectively becomes zero. Perhaps, but I'm not convinced that this would reduce its measure. Consider the fact that you are no an ant, even though there are apparently 100 trillion of them compared to 7 billion humans. Telmo. The way I resolve that one is to assume that self-sampling requires a high enough level intelligence to have an ego (the 'self' in self-sampling). This is required to differentiate the computational histories we identify with as identity memory. Let's say the entirety of humanity uploaded into a simulated environment, and that one day the simulated separation between minds was eradicated, giving rise to a super-intelligence (just one path of many to a superintelligence). From that moment on it would be impossible to differentiate computational histories in terms of personal identity/memory, so the measure goes to zero. Why zero? There is still one conscious entity. Why wouldn't it remember the great unification and the multitude of humans events before that? Telmo. When I say goes to zero I mean it as in, approaches the limit of zero in the relative measure. I think it would remember the great multitude of human events, but it would remember all of them as a single entity, as a single undifferentiated identity. It effectively collapses the measure from billions to one. Terren T -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Notion of (mathematical) reason
On 6/9/2015 11:10 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: We might defined nomological inconsistency by [i] ip [i] i~p, for [i] being a material hypostase. ?? What role does i play in the above? Are you assuming i implies p? Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: super intelligence and self-sampling
On 10 June 2015 at 11:15, Terren Suydam terren.suy...@gmail.com wrote: From a quantum immortality perspective, I think if a superintelligence was merging lots of intelligences, including yours, you find yourself in increasingly unlikely situations where you were able to escape being merged with the superintelligence. Eventually, against all odds, you might be the only non-integrated intelligence left. Yes, that does seem possible. It would imply that closest continuers of you could never be the versions within the Cloud - an alternative might be that the superintelligence starts off new arrivals with full autonomy inside a virtual world indistinguishable from their previous existence, and only gradually allow them to merge into the Overmind ... maybe giving them tests to check if they are ready to do so yet. (Which may or may not involve being able to recite the Quran :-) -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: super intelligence and self-sampling
On 6/9/2015 2:25 PM, Telmo Menezes wrote: On Tue, Jun 9, 2015 at 10:15 PM, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com mailto:johnkcl...@gmail.com wrote: On Tue, Jun 9, 2015 Telmo Menezes te...@telmomenezes.com mailto:te...@telmomenezes.com wrote: Super-intelligence is more resilient than human intelligence, so it is likely to last longer Maybe, but I note that smarter than average humans seem to have higher than average rates of suicide too. I wonder if this is because intelligence leads to depression or because it makes one more likely to research and correctly execute a viable method of suicide. Do you know if the rates are also higher on failed attempts? According to most people on this list, they are ALL failed attempts. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Notion of (mathematical) reason
LizR wrote: On 10 June 2015 at 01:11, Bruce Kellett bhkell...@optusnet.com.au mailto:bhkell...@optusnet.com.au wrote: That is less difficult that you might think. Consciousness supervenes on the physical brain So (a) what actually is consciousness?, and (b) what is the answer to Maudlin and the MGA? Consciousness is that which you lose under anaesthesia, or a sufficiently severe blow to the head. Like many things, it is defined ostensively. It is not clear what you mean when you as what it actually is? Do you want a fully mechanistic account? Or a philosophical account? Or a neurological account? Or a personal account? What is the question of Maudlin and the MGA? Is a recording conscious? Produce one of the required type (a complete and accurate recording of normal conscious brain activity) and ask it. Bruce -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: super intelligence and self-sampling
On Tue, Jun 9, 2015 at 5:31 PM, Telmo Menezes te...@telmomenezes.com wrote: On Tue, Jun 9, 2015 at 8:19 PM, Terren Suydam terren.suy...@gmail.com wrote: On Tue, Jun 9, 2015 at 1:48 PM, Telmo Menezes te...@telmomenezes.com wrote: On Tue, Jun 9, 2015 at 7:28 PM, Terren Suydam terren.suy...@gmail.com wrote: Perhaps most superintelligences end up merging into one super-ego, so that their measure effectively becomes zero. Perhaps, but I'm not convinced that this would reduce its measure. Consider the fact that you are no an ant, even though there are apparently 100 trillion of them compared to 7 billion humans. Telmo. The way I resolve that one is to assume that self-sampling requires a high enough level intelligence to have an ego (the 'self' in self-sampling). This is required to differentiate the computational histories we identify with as identity memory. Let's say the entirety of humanity uploaded into a simulated environment, and that one day the simulated separation between minds was eradicated, giving rise to a super-intelligence (just one path of many to a superintelligence). From that moment on it would be impossible to differentiate computational histories in terms of personal identity/memory, so the measure goes to zero. Why zero? There is still one conscious entity. Why wouldn't it remember the great unification and the multitude of humans events before that? Telmo. When I say goes to zero I mean it as in, approaches the limit of zero in the relative measure. I think it would remember the great multitude of human events, but it would remember all of them as a single entity, as a single undifferentiated identity. It effectively collapses the measure from billions to one. Terren T -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: super intelligence and self-sampling
On Tue, Jun 9, 2015 at 8:19 PM, Terren Suydam terren.suy...@gmail.com wrote: On Tue, Jun 9, 2015 at 1:48 PM, Telmo Menezes te...@telmomenezes.com wrote: On Tue, Jun 9, 2015 at 7:28 PM, Terren Suydam terren.suy...@gmail.com wrote: Perhaps most superintelligences end up merging into one super-ego, so that their measure effectively becomes zero. Perhaps, but I'm not convinced that this would reduce its measure. Consider the fact that you are no an ant, even though there are apparently 100 trillion of them compared to 7 billion humans. Telmo. The way I resolve that one is to assume that self-sampling requires a high enough level intelligence to have an ego (the 'self' in self-sampling). This is required to differentiate the computational histories we identify with as identity memory. Let's say the entirety of humanity uploaded into a simulated environment, and that one day the simulated separation between minds was eradicated, giving rise to a super-intelligence (just one path of many to a superintelligence). From that moment on it would be impossible to differentiate computational histories in terms of personal identity/memory, so the measure goes to zero. Why zero? There is still one conscious entity. Why wouldn't it remember the great unification and the multitude of humans events before that? Telmo. T -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: The scope of physical law and its relationship to the substitution level
On 10 June 2015 at 13:35, Kim Jones kimjo...@ozemail.com.au wrote: On 10 Jun 2015, at 9:09 am, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote: On 10 June 2015 at 10:37, Bruce Kellett bhkell...@optusnet.com.au wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: On 09 Jun 2015, at 12:07, Bruce Kellett wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: On 09 Jun 2015, at 07:40, Bruce Kellett wrote: Given a set of axioms and some agreed rules of inference, the same results always follow, regardless of by whom or at what time the application is made. This is not what is usually referred to as kicking back. Johnson did not apply some axioms and rules of inference in answer to the idealists, he kicked a stone. But people can kicked stone in dreams too. But do they wake up with broken or bruised toes? Do they ever wake up? Solipsist! Another solipsist? Phew! I was worried I might be the only one. Surely it isn't a crime to be a solipsist. What's socially unacceptable about the belief that you are the only mind and that all other minds are you as well? I'm not sure if you're asnwering my attempt at humour or Bruce's apparent use of Solipsist! as an insult. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: The scope of physical law and its relationship to the substitution level
On 10 Jun 2015, at 9:09 am, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote: On 10 June 2015 at 10:37, Bruce Kellett bhkell...@optusnet.com.au wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: On 09 Jun 2015, at 12:07, Bruce Kellett wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: On 09 Jun 2015, at 07:40, Bruce Kellett wrote: Given a set of axioms and some agreed rules of inference, the same results always follow, regardless of by whom or at what time the application is made. This is not what is usually referred to as kicking back. Johnson did not apply some axioms and rules of inference in answer to the idealists, he kicked a stone. But people can kicked stone in dreams too. But do they wake up with broken or bruised toes? Do they ever wake up? Solipsist! Another solipsist? Phew! I was worried I might be the only one. Surely it isn't a crime to be a solipsist. What's socially unacceptable about the belief that you are the only mind and that all other minds are you as well? Sounds to me like we should make AS IF this is true because it seems to be a way to get humans to respect each other more. Solipsism is a useful belief to maintain. It emphasises how alike we all are which leads to love of self and selves rather than emphsises our cosmetic differences which leads to war. Kim -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Notion of (mathematical) reason
Bruno Marchal wrote: On 09 Jun 2015, at 15:11, Bruce Kellett wrote: The details of the operation of the brain, and its effect on consciousness, are the realm of study of the neurosciences. Computer scientists only ever confuse themselves over these quite simple matters. The neuro-science are based on comp. Unless you believe like Penrose that the neuron use a non computable ability to reduce the wave packet? is that the case? Is your theory Penrose theory? No, I don't believe that the neuron 'reduces the wave function'. But your claim that the neurosicences are based on comp is something of an overreach. The neurosciences are based on the study of the physical brain. Like most scientists, they do not have any particular metaphysical prejudices, and those that they do have seldom get in the way of their science. You seem to be asking me to provide a detailed mechanism for the phenomenon of consciousness. That is not my area, so I do not feel myself under any obligation to provide such a mechanistic account. I do feel, however, that I have the reciprocal right to ask you to produce the fortran program that instantiates your personal consciousness. You claim that it exists, so why not produce it? Bruce -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Notion of (mathematical) reason
Bruno Marchal wrote: On 09 Jun 2015, at 15:11, Bruce Kellett wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: On 09 Jun 2015, at 09:11, Bruce Kellett wrote: Why not? If it can emulate a specific purpose Turning machine, it can emulate a universal Turing machine. I think Putnam's argument for unlimited pancomputationalism implies this. I am not convince by that argument. Show me a rock program computing the prime numbers. Show me a Turing machine that can compute the prime numbers Easy but tedious, and distracting exercise. Show me how to emulate just K, that is the function which send (x, y) to x. it is not obvious this can be done, because y is eliminated, you need a black hole for it, and a proof that it does not evaporate. You are becoming a physicalist, Bruno! You seem to be concerned by Landauer's principle, and the difficulty of eliminating physical information. This is not a problem for a Turing machine. It is a finite state machine, so define one state as (x,y) and another as (x). Then the operation when the machine finds itself in the state (x,y) is to move to the state (x). Not a problem. Even a rock can do it! Bruce -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Pigeons offend Islam
What if they were, like, a really, really, big pigeons, then you'd spot them real easy! Think about that, Mister! Sakes! -Original Message- From: meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net To: everything-list everything-list@googlegroups.com Sent: Mon, Jun 8, 2015 10:08 pm Subject: Re: Pigeons offend Islam This is stupid on so many levels, even on the most basic factual one: You can't see the genitals of a pigeon. They're covered by feathers. You have to poke them to get them even expose their genitals. Brent On 6/8/2015 4:52 PM, LizR wrote: Support for this is (ahem) dropping... On 9 June 2015 at 07:35, spudboy100 via Everything List everything-list@googlegroups.com wrote: A Coo-Coo Fatwa -Original Message- From: John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com To: everything-list everything-list@googlegroups.com Sent: Sat, Jun 6, 2015 12:15 pm Subject: Pigeons offend Islam ISIS recently banned pigeon breeding because when the birds fly overhead they expose their genitals and that is a sin against Islam. Violators will be publicly flogged. http://rt.com/news/264673-isis-breeding-birds-islam/ John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Quran Audio
Doing Dawa? Interesting. -Original Message- From: Samiya Illias samiyaill...@gmail.com To: everything-list everything-list@googlegroups.com Sent: Mon, Jun 8, 2015 10:09 pm Subject: Quran Audio A good resource for listening to Quran Recitation in Arabic plus Translation for anyone interested in listening to he Quran: http://www.quranexplorer.com/quran/ Samiya -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Notion of (mathematical) reason
Bruno Marchal wrote: On 09 Jun 2015, at 09:11, Bruce Kellett wrote: Why not? If it can emulate a specific purpose Turning machine, it can emulate a universal Turing machine. I think Putnam's argument for unlimited pancomputationalism implies this. I am not convince by that argument. Show me a rock program computing the prime numbers. Show me a Turing machine that can compute the prime numbers and I can emulate that with a rock. For that matter, show me an arithmetical computer in Platonia computing the prime numbers. .. much less give any useful results for physics. No new one should be expected soon, but that was not the purpose at all. You can't blame a coffee machine for not doing tea. Well, if I drink only tea then I would consider a coffee machine totally useless and discard it without further thought! So for comp! You can do things with all the rigour you want, but if you can't extract any useful results, you are wasting your time. Perhaps this is the irreconcilable difference between the physicist and the mathematician. Yes, I am interested in a theory of everything, which means to me mainly a theory which does not eliminate consciousness. I saw that physicists avoid the question, but a bridge is born between math and cognitive science, thanks to theoretical computer science (a branch of math). I am not sure I see your point. Comp is not useless, comp is the actual theory of the materialists, and I show that contrary to a widespread belief: materialism and computationalism are incompatible (without adding non-comp magic). Comp is not presented as a solution, but as a problem. In the second part, I show the propositional solution, but you need to understand the problem before. Actually, I think that you have seen the problem, but want to conclude to much quickly that comp is false. The math part shows that this is premature, especially that QM confirms both the comp many-worlds/dreams, but also the quantum tautologies (until now). Comp does not confirm the many-worlds interpretation of QM. You appear to want to draw this conclusion from FPI. But in a discussion with Liz a while back, I challenged this interpretation of your teleportation thought experiments leading to FPI. It was readily shown that such thought experiments were completely orthogonal to quantum mechanics and the MWI. Similarly for your attempt to bring quantum logic to your cause. Quantum logic was devised by von Neumann in the context of the collapse interpretation of QM, together with the use of projection operators. In Everettian many-worlds interpretations, there are no projection operators, and quantum logic does not have a footing. In fact, it has been pointed out that there is no such thing as a specifically quantum logic -- there is just ordinary predicate logic and a theory in which some operators do not commute. When you can derive the non-commutation of the position and momentum operators from comp, I might be a little more impressed. My feeling is that you are not interested in the mind-body problem, but for some reason want to keep physics as *the* fundamental science. If that is the case, you have to produce a non-comp theory of mind. That is less difficult that you might think. Consciousness supervenes on the physical brain, and was produced by evolution over the course of time by completely natural processes. The details of the operation of the brain, and its effect on consciousness, are the realm of study of the neurosciences. Computer scientists only ever confuse themselves over these quite simple matters. Bruce -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: The scope of physical law and its relationship to the substitution level
On 10 Jun 2015, at 11:53 am, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote: On 10 June 2015 at 13:35, Kim Jones kimjo...@ozemail.com.au wrote: On 10 Jun 2015, at 9:09 am, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote: On 10 June 2015 at 10:37, Bruce Kellett bhkell...@optusnet.com.au wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: On 09 Jun 2015, at 12:07, Bruce Kellett wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: On 09 Jun 2015, at 07:40, Bruce Kellett wrote: Given a set of axioms and some agreed rules of inference, the same results always follow, regardless of by whom or at what time the application is made. This is not what is usually referred to as kicking back. Johnson did not apply some axioms and rules of inference in answer to the idealists, he kicked a stone. But people can kicked stone in dreams too. But do they wake up with broken or bruised toes? Do they ever wake up? Solipsist! Another solipsist? Phew! I was worried I might be the only one. Surely it isn't a crime to be a solipsist. What's socially unacceptable about the belief that you are the only mind and that all other minds are you as well? I'm not sure if you're asnwering my attempt at humour or Bruce's apparent use of Solipsist! as an insult. Both. I'm exploring the concept of solipsism with a positive attitude. What are the benefits? Your attempts at humour always hit the mark (with me.) So yes, I don't think hurling 'solopsist!' at someone hurts them much. So, solipsism is a plural phenomenon. I don't care if I am a solipsist, I'll always have each other. - Mini Me. K -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Notion of (mathematical) reason
Bruno Marchal wrote: On 09 Jun 2015, at 15:11, Bruce Kellett wrote: You appear to want to draw this conclusion from FPI. But in a discussion with Liz a while back, I challenged this interpretation of your teleportation thought experiments leading to FPI. It was readily shown that such thought experiments were completely orthogonal to quantum mechanics and the MWI. No, You stopped at step 4 (which is already better than John Clark). You need AUDA to get the math of the FPI, and to compare it to physics. We have answered this, but you come back again on what has already been explained in detail: please reread the posts. As I recall the discussion, you agreed that FPI in the teleportation experiments had nothing to do with MWI of quantum mechanics. You said that you had only ever raised MWI as an illustration to help those who were familiar with Everettian quantum mechanics to understand the concept of FPI. FPI in the teleportation scenarios, and later in the UDA, have nothing to do with the MWI of quantum mechanics, and one cannot be used to support or justify the other. Similarly for your attempt to bring quantum logic to your cause. Quantum logic was devised by von Neumann in the context of the collapse interpretation of QM, together with the use of projection operators. In Everettian many-worlds interpretations, there are no projection operators, and quantum logic does not have a footing. In fact, it has been pointed out that there is no such thing as a specifically quantum logic -- there is just ordinary predicate logic and a theory in which some operators do not commute. When you can derive the non-commutation of the position and momentum operators from comp, I might be a little more impressed. UDA formulates the problem, and by the way, the non-commutation of some observable is already proved. OK. For what set of quantum operators have you demonstrated non-commutation? Of course position and momentum are not yet derived, and it is not clear if they will be derived. If they are not, comp fails a crucial test Bruce -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: The scope of physical law and its relationship to the substitution level
On 10 June 2015 at 15:23, Kim Jones kimjo...@ozemail.com.au wrote: Both. I'm exploring the concept of solipsism with a positive attitude. What are the benefits? Your attempts at humour always hit the mark (with me.) Thanks! :) So yes, I don't think hurling 'solopsist!' at someone hurts them much. It's basically abusing yourself, if you'll pardon the expression. So, solipsism is a plural phenomenon. I don't care if I am a solipsist, I'll always have each other. - Mini Me. Contrariwise, does a group mind refer to ourself or myselves ? -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
