Tom, list,
You wrote,
In the vast majority of our deductions, we are not propelled by any
specific urge or sensation.
[End quote]
I wouldn't say that we are _/propelled/_ by an urge or sensation to
deduction in the way that we are propelled by surprise or perplexity to
an abductive i
Hi Ben, Clark, List,
I'm working on an essay for the conference on Peirce and mathematics that
Fernando has organized in Bogota, and the topic is those three questions at the
start of "The Logic of Mathematics." In order to provide a coherent
interpretation of what Peirce is trying to do, my e
Hello list,
I just finished Vol. 2 of the Collected Papers, and had a couple of
questions, if anyone is interested in helping out.
Going through the material on induction towards the end of the volume, much
of it seemed to be from Peirce's earlier work on induction, where
hypothesis or presumptio
Ben U, List ~
This is a great discussion but I wanted to interject a practical/physical
element that is missing.
One issue touched on is the role of impatience or dissatisfaction as a trigger
for deductive/predictive thinking. Of course, one can whip up impatience or
dissatisfaction at will,
In 1897 CP 4.218, Peirce makes his remarks that projective and metric
geometries are not pure geometry, but goes on to say that they are so if
the plane is defined so broadly as to make those geometries into
chapters in topics (topology).
in 1901 in "Truth (and Falsity and Error)"
http://www.
Correction, /relata/ is plural. /Relatum/ is singular. So, take two:
The word/Secondness/ refers to the category or mode.
/
/The word /Second/ (capital S) refers to the referent which is in the
mode of Secondness because of its relation to a single relatum (but no
other).
The word /second/ (s
Jeff D., Clark, list,
I think it's important in this to get the quotes and dates. I recall
Peirce's views as changing, and partly it's his acceptance of changing
terminology. Earlier, he had regarded geometry as mathematically applied
science of space; later he accepted the idea that geometers
Clark, list,
I don't know whether (A) Peirce would put all applied cenoscopy (applied
_/philosophia prima/_) into Science of Review or whether (B),for Peirce,
some of it could be cenoscopy applied in physics, cenoscopy applied in
psychology, etc. (B) seems much likelier to me. There's philosop
Gary F.,
That was a wonderful explanation! From here on out I'm gonna hold to the
standard you followed:
Secondness refers to the category or mode.
Second (capital S) is the referent which is in the mode of Secondness
because of its relation to a relata (but no other relata).
second (small
> On Oct 29, 2015, at 1:20 PM, Jeffrey Brian Downard
> wrote:
>
> Peirce draws on the distinction between pure and applied mathematics. When
> it comes to geometry, for instance, only topology is pure mathematics. Both
> projective geometry and all systems of metrical geometry import notion
> On Oct 29, 2015, at 11:52 AM, Jeffrey Brian Downard
> wrote:
>
> The temptation of importing conceptions from the normative sciences into our
> examination of the elements that are fundamental for analyzing the
> observations that are the data for this theory is, I believe, a great danger.
Clark, List,
You ask: I wonder how we deal with things like quasi-empirical methods in
mathematics (started I think by Putnam who clearly was influenced by Peirce in
his approach). Admittedly the empirical isn’t the phenomenological (or at least
it’s a complex relationship). I’m here thinking
> On Oct 29, 2015, at 9:06 AM, Benjamin Udell wrote:
>
> I think that I'd agree with Kant's remark "That philosophy which mixes pure
> principles with empirical ones does not deserve the name of philosophy"
> if by "philosophy" one takes him to mean pure philosophy, or pure cenoscopy
> in
Quick note, just to be clear: 'a revised table of the taxa' refers to my
revising myself to add some lines of division. The only revision to
Peirce is the showing of two cycles, he didn't mention such cycles. Also
I've reinserted in Jeff D.'s response the horizontal line that I put
between the
Dear Ben Novak, list,
I should add something for a broader picture.
I've talked about associating a certain impatience for a new perspective
with deduction. Generally, Peirce justifies abductive inference _/in
general/_ as leading more expeditiously than anything else does to new
truths. The
Ben, Gary R., Clark, List,
Ben has offered two things that are quite helpful to me for the purposes of
thinking more clearly about the relationships that hold between math,
phenomenology and the normative sciences.
First, he has pointed out that Kant's remark to the effect "That philosophy
w
Dear Ben Novak, list,
As regards an explanation A's implying the surprising phenomenon C, that
seems more on the level of implication than of an actual inference,
which would be the mind's moving from A as an accepted premiss to
conclude at least tentatively C. The mind already believes C and
> On Oct 29, 2015, at 9:31 AM, Jeffrey Brian Downard
> wrote:
>
> In what sense can phenomenology "draw" things from logic? If it can draw
> something, what can it it draw?
An other question. We tend to think of logic as functional in its own right.
For deduction and the mathematics of othe
List,
Just dropping in with a quick association.
There is something to be said for the thought that phaneroscopy can be regarded
as secondness, relative to phenomenology as thirdness. Logic can be seen as
their relative difference.
Best,
Auke van Breemen
-Oorspronkelijk bericht-
Van:
Gary R., Jon, List,
In what sense can phenomenology "draw" things from logic? If it can draw
something, what can it it draw?
First off, it may have been poor choice on my part to use the word "draw" in
trying to describe what we might gain by looking to logic for the sake of
developing a phen
Jeff D., all, I think I wasn't clear enough about what I was saying in
the list of taxa, so I've revised a bit.
Jeff D., list,
Sorry for the delayed response. I've rarely been so inundated with
practical matters.
I think that I'd agree with Kant's remark "That philosophy which mixes
pure pr
Kobus, from this response, it seems to me that you still haven’t got the point
I was trying to make. So I’ll try once more (but that’s about all I will have
time for, until next week). I’m also copying to the Peirce list since this is
more about Peirce than biosemiotics.
Firstness, Secondnes
Jeff D., list,
Sorry for the delayed response. I've rarely been so inundated with
practical matters.
I think that I'd agree with Kant's remark "That philosophy which mixes
pure principles with empirical ones does not deserve the name of
philosophy" if by "philosophy" one takes him to mea
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Actually, it is logic that draws on both mathematics and phenomenology.
http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2012/05/31/definition-and-determination-4/
http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2014/08/24/c-s-peirce-•-syllabus-•-selection-1/
Who draws quickest and who bites the dust is another question.
Regards
Gary, List,
This issue has been discussed before at least once. I don’t agree with Gary
because I don’t think we ever experience phenomena as pure phenomena, so I
don’t think we ever directly experience firsts. I see them as abstractions that
must be there (both logically and psychologically) f
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