amea remarks, "the
*natural* logic associated to the connecting modes of the *continuum* is
really an intermediate logic--the intuitionistic logic--in which the
principle of excluded middle does *not* hold" (*Peirce's Logic of
Continuity*, p. 26).
Regards,
Jon S.
On Tue, Sep 10, 2019 at 1:12
gica docens* that depends on Mathematics,
Phenomenology, Esthetics, and Ethics, and is used in Metaphysics and every
Special Science. There is no warrant in his writings for the claim that
there is a *third* version of logic used specifically in Phenomenology.
Regards,
Jon Alan Schmidt - O
B and C are *already* distinct from each other
*before* points f and g are marked--unlike the portions *within* each
circle, which are indefinite *until* their limits are marked.
Regards,
Jon S.
On Mon, Sep 9, 2019 at 5:50 PM Jon Alan Schmidt
wrote:
> List:
>
> While browsing throug
a different opinion.
Regards,
Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
On Mon, Sep 9, 2019 at 11:43 PM John F. Sowa wrote:
>
> Jeff and Jon,
>
> JD to JAS
> &
epends
upon some will's being exerted to complete it. (R 1041:13; 1906)
What Peirce states here about points also applies to *any* limit of lower
dimensionality within a continuum, "such as an oval line on a spheroidal or
anchor-ring surface" (CP 4.642; 1908 May 26). That lea
ase" (R S-30 [Copy T:6]; c. 1906).
Regards,
Jon S.
On Sat, Sep 7, 2019 at 12:00 AM Jon Alan Schmidt
wrote:
> Jeff, List:
>
> I have a few follow-up questions specifically about Smooth Infinitesimal
> Analysis (SIA). Vargas's table indicates that SIA satisfies the cond
argument;
instead, they are artificial creations of thought for *describing *a
hypothetical instantaneous state of the inferential process of semeiosis,
which does not *really *consist of such propositions because it is truly
continuous.
Regards,
Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional
overall title to something like "A
Peirce-Inspired Classification of the Sciences." Otherwise, the diagram
will continue to be a blatant misrepresentation.
Regards,
Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAla
elative to Peirce's
conception of a true continuum?
Thanks,
Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
>
-
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on &quo
Peirce himself used
"homogeneous in dimensionality" in (R S-30 [Copy T:5-7]; c. 1906). It
could then be paired with "homogeneity in contiguity" as the two specific
ways in which "a continuum is that of which every part has itself parts *of
the same kind*" (CP 6.168; c
rs.
>
> --Jeff
> Jeffrey Downard
> Associate Professor
> Department of Philosophy
> Northern Arizona University
> (o) 928 523-8354
> --
> *From:* Jon Alan Schmidt
> *Sent:* Thursday, September 5, 2019 1:04:55 PM
> *To:* peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
> *Subje
ps can be employed in IEGs to represent
modalities as in Gamma EGs. Converting IEGs back into EGs only requires
restoring double cut erasure.
I am always happy to receive feedback from anyone, including well-founded
criticism; but in this case, I would especially welcome substantive
comments fro
viously that in accordance with his objective
idealism, motion is a *degenerate *form of thought/semeiosis, since
"physical events are but degraded or undeveloped forms of psychical events"
and "the phenomena of matter are but the result of the sensibly complete
sway of habits upon m
;
> However, mathematics of logic in Peirce's sense seems *logica docens*,
> not as you call it *logica utens*. *Docens*, because it's explicit and
> theoretical, not to mention rather formal.
>
> Best, Ben
> On 9/3/2019 9:31 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt wrote:
>
> Ben
*Normative *Science.
Regards,
Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
On Tue, Sep 3, 2019 at 7:58 PM Ben Udell wrote:
> Jon A.S., John F.S., list,
>
> On 9/3/2019 1:
and neutralism are ruled out by synechism, the
choice is between materialism and idealism--"Either *mind *is a peculiar
kind of *matter*, or else *matter *is a peculiar sort of *mind*" (R 936:3;
c. 1891). Peirce considered it *more *dubious to assume that physical
entities are primordia
that I have called a
whiteboard (CP 6.206); and the two-dimensional continuum of actuality (2ns)
corresponds to the one-dimensional "discontinuous mark" (NEM 4:345 & CP
6.208). Hence from the standpoint of topical geometry, all three "levels"
in the constitution of being ar
of measurement is quite extraneous to the
fact expressed." Apparently he was there referring *specifically *to the
concept as employed in topical geometry, such that measurement is *not*
intrinsic to the relevant sense of the term after all. I thus stand
corrected.
Regards,
Jon S.
it is possibly not all that important -- we may just be
> playing with words here. So I'll cede the last word in the matter to you as
> I've rather forgotten what the thrust of my earlier posts in this thread
> was given this distraction.
>
> Best,
>
> Gary R
>
>
an existent
> word is it possible to speak of "real possibilities that *never *become
> actualized." Perhaps only for the Scriber can know of such "real"
> possibilities *before* time and space are.
>
> Best,
>
> Gary R
>
> *Gary Richmond*
> *Philosophy
se
points, which *breaks *the continuity.
Regards,
Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
On Thu, Aug 29, 2019 at 11:21 PM Jeffrey Brian Downard <
jeffrey.down...@nau.e
knowledge, or of concrete reasonableness, such
that this diagram *only *models the (indefinite) beginning? Or is it
relevant that the base of the triangle endlessly becomes wider?
Regards,
Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.Linke
y--the tip of the triangle--is a kind of limiting idea.
I quoted and commented on that entire passage very early in this thread as
the sort of reasoning that Peirce might apply to the starting point of the
universe, as well. If the downward-pointing apex of the triangle is the
*beginning*, then wh
g*, but only
the beginnings. It should be called a *conditional being*, since it depends
upon some will's being exerted to complete it. (R 1041:13; 1906)
Regards,
Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSc
something of that sort. There are no points on this blackboard. There are
no dimensions in that continuum. (CP 6.203, RLT 261; 1898)
Rather than "a vague infinity of dimensions," there are no *distinct
*dimensions--no
*definite *dimensions--no *discrete *dimensions at all in the original
cont
space-time
as a continuous whole?
Regards,
Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
On Tue, Aug 27, 2019 at 6:35 PM Jeffrey Brian Downard <
jeffrey.down...@nau.edu>
ding) at least
> the final lecture of RLT. And, I would add, if one really wants to go deep
> into the matter, I'd highly recommend the relevant discussion (that is, the
> cosmological/ blackboard-whiteboard discussion) in Jon's paper, "A
> Neglected Additament: Peirce
as in this case, the evidence suggests that good pragmatic practice
suggest strongly you ought at least consider doing so, say, by re-reading
the last lecture in RLT and everything Peirce wrote on the topic in the
20th century.
Regards,
Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engine
, the situation prior to birth. Switching to Peirce's later
diagram (CP 6.203-208; 1898), as I have said before, there cannot be any
chalk marks (1ns/2ns) without a blackboard on which to draw them (3ns).
Regards,
Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosophe
that metaphysics depends on mathematics and phenomenology for
its principles.
Metaphysics also depends on Logic for its principles, since "Metaphysics
consists in the results of the absolute acceptance of logical principles
not merely as regulatively valid, but as truths of being" (CP 1.487; c.
1
individual persons may imagine it to be. (R S-30
[Copy T:6]; c. 1906)
Regards,
Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
On Sat, Aug 24, 2019 at 6:48 AM wrote:
> Jeff, Jon
ferent universe of
> discourse. That was my point. The implication, as I see it, is that
> Peirce’s cosmology can’t be reduced to physics or any other special science.
>
> Gary f
>
>
>
> *From:* Jon Alan Schmidt
> *Sent:* 23-Aug-19 11:43
> *To:* peirce-l@list.iu
ned essentially
unchanged ever since almost immediately after the beginning of the
universe--which, again, Peirce *denied *in accordance with his
"thorough-going evolutionism."
Regards,
Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
ology by scientists,
theologians, and people who have backgrounds in both. They have a century
more information than Peirce had. Yet they can't make any definite claims.
Of course--again, my interpretation of Peirce is that the "beginning"
itself was indefinite, just like
to understand. In so doing, it is committed to the
assumption that things are intelligible, that the process of nature and the
process of reason are one. (CP 6.581; c. 1905)
Regards,
Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.c
order as those laws grow?
I am not sure. What do you think? How is this particular question "more
to the point" than the previous ones?
Regards,
Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com
actually means, to accept Your Opinion as The Right One] - that I
> would no longer discuss anything with you. I don't need to be told, again,
> that I am either too stubborn or too stupid for a discussion.
>
> Edwina
>
> On Fri 16/08/19 6:48 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm
mind.
Regards,
Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
On Fri, Aug 16, 2019 at 5:11 PM Edwina Taborsky wrote:
> Gary R, list
>
> I think that Peirce's cosmo
s* thorough-going evolutionism or none"
(CP 6.14; 1891, emphasis mine), since "law itself requires an explanation"
(CP 6.613; 1893). If the constitution of being is fundamentally a
*continuum*, then that precludes an *absolute* *discontinuity* as the
starting point for the entire universe.
Regar
lows from both synechism (cf. R 936:3; c. 1891 and CP 6.101;
1902) and tychism (cf. CP 6.102, EP 1:312; 1892) to complete the
metaphysical picture.
Regards,
Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.
to
dualism, nominalism, necessitarianism, and materialism--each of which
emphasizes a different aspect of 2ns, and each of which Peirce adamantly
opposed.
Regards,
Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twi
- some of
> which you reject [1.412] and other texts which outline the same thing - so,
> again, you haven’t provided any argument that ‘mind is primordial’ - other
> than your saying that ‘objective idealism’ means that ‘mind is primordial’
> - and I not only don’t see that but such an i
at another person’s
> interpretation ‘is INVALID or ‘surreal’ or ‘absurd’. Just say that you
> disagree; that your interpretation is very different - and don’t go on to
> the next step of Judge and Jury. Just once, consider that we are all
> rational people on this list; we all
cathing criticism of Edwina for claiming
that Peirce's view, not just her own, was that mind and matter are both
primordial and "co-evolved," despite the complete absence of *any *verbatim
quote from Peirce to that effect? Again, your double standard is obvious
and indefensible.
Reg
mordial but that both co-evolve together.
Dogmatically stand by it all you want, it is an objectively *invalid
*interpretation,
since Peirce stated plainly in CP 6.24 that "placing the inward and outward
aspects of substance on a par," and thus "render[ing] both primordial,&quo
e the ground rules and restrict
participation accordingly, then start your own.
Regards,
Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
On Sun, Aug 11, 2019 at 12:01 AM John F Sowa wrote:
&g
attribution,
then make a *better *argument; but stop trying to forbid me from making
*my *argument in the first place.
In other words, please stop derailing *substantive *threads with
incessant *methodological
*objections. As I have said before, we are here to talk about Peirce and
his ideas, n
.
Regards,
Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
P.S. If you take exception to my interpretation of your words, just
remember ...
ET: My interpretation ... is different
t that is nothing more than your personal opinion. As another
21st-century author, I will say that I find what Peirce wrote more
convincing than Whitehead's process philosophy.
JFS: In summary, I'll quote Lao Zi about the details: One who knows does
not speak. One who speak
rce's metaphysical
views tend to cause a STIR. :-)
Regards,
Jon S.
On Wed, Aug 7, 2019 at 7:13 PM Jon Alan Schmidt
wrote:
> Edwina, List:
>
> ET: Therefore - there is no 'a priori' or separate MIND.
>
> ET: I have disagreed with such a separate linearity.
>
> ET:
them ... (CP 6.101; 1902)
For Peirce, tychism is "subsidiary to" synechism and "must give birth to"
idealism, which is also required by synechism.
Regards,
Jon S.
On Wed, Aug 7, 2019 at 7:13 PM Jon Alan Schmidt
wrote:
> Edwina, List:
>
> ET: Therefore - the
Time. (NEM 4:138; 1898)
Andrew Robinson has offered some fascinating suggestions for understanding
the traditional Christian doctrine of the Trinity in terms of Peirce's
Categories, citing a lecture by Martin Luther on these same verses; but
that is obviously a topic for another thread at anot
ssages that we have been discussing for the assertion
that Peirce *rejected *metaphysical idealism as the doctrine that "the
physical law [is] derived and special, the psychical law alone [is]
primordial"; on the contrary, he *explicitly endorsed *that view.
ET: Now - whether others acc
ting Ogden Rood with
bringing it to his attention--"there must have been some *original*
tendency to take habits which *did not arise* according to my hypothesis
[of 1891-1893]" (R 842:114[128]; 1908, emphases mine). 1ns also precedes
3ns in the evolution of states, but only as an ideal
rmultitudinous.
I agree; again, I quoted and commented on those passages because I think
that they helpfully *illustrate the difference* between the two conceptions
of continuity--bottom-up vs. top-down, a (supermultitudinous) collection
where the parts are real and the whole is an *ens rationis* vs.
is to
seek and seize opportunities to make each *part *of the Universe--including
ourselves--more consistent with that ideal quality of the *whole*.
Returning to the Harvard Lecture on "The Three Normative Sciences," this is
"the only possible ultimate aim" satisfying the require
laws come about after
habits; i.e., that psychical laws are *temporally *primordial (first
definition) relative to physical laws. That *refutes *Edwina's point.
Regards,
Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in
hiteboard),
which logically preceded all determinate and definite existence
(discontinuous mark). Moreover, *all *being requires *necessary *being (*Ens
necessarium*), which Peirce identified with God as "Really creator of all
three Universes of Experience" (CP 6.452, EP 2:434; 1908).
Regard
nstead you
> are using Peirce's definition of 'idealism' - which is NOT, in my view, the
> same as 'objective idealism'.
>
> As I said - you and I interpret Peirce very differently. I don't think
> that you have the right to say more than this - i.e.,
discipline. Again, the Cantorian pseudo-continuum has turned out to be an
adequate *model *of continuity for many (most?) mathematical, scientific,
and practical purposes; but it does not satisfy the criteria that Peirce
established for the conception of a *true *continuum.
Regards,
Jon Alan Schmidt
24-25 says
nothing whatsoever about a fifth alternative to dualism, neutralism,
materialism, and idealism that involves matter and mind "co-evolving."
According to that text, if neither is primordial, then they are either "two
radically different kinds of substance" (dualism) o
e lost its powers of forgetting & of
> learning, then we are brought to the more elevating theory of idealism.
> (R 936:2-3; no date)
>
>
> From this quote, there can be no reasonable doubt that Peirce considered
> the view that "matter is nothing but effete mind" to b
order to distinguish it from *subjective *idealism,
which denies the reality of matter altogether.
ET: My reading of Peirce is that there is nothing primordial; neither
Matter nor Mind.
There is no such "reading of Peirce," just a predetermined "interpretation"
that can b
standpoint,
the possibility that set-theoretical notions might be sufficient for
mathematically *modeling *continuity strikes me as largely beside the point.
Regards,
Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmid
ore of the constitution of nature burst
in upon the mind with cataclysmal multitude and resistlessness. It is that
synthesis of tychism and of pragmatism for which I long ago proposed the
name, Synechism, to which one thus returns; but this time with stronger
reasons than ever before. (CP 4.584; 190
n, and certainly can't find where Peirce inserted the categories
> in brackets .
>
> As I've said before - you and I interpret Peirce quite differently and I
> don't see that these continued back and forth statements are going to
> convince either of us to change these
ism, that matter is effete mind, inveterate bits becoming
> physical laws". This is absolutely not the same as idealism; there is no
> mention of primordial and no mention of mind as privileged.
>
> And - you haven't referenced 2.322 as I asked. I can't find that se
nserts - I feel that your view of
> Peirce, with its 'idealism' rather than 'objective idealism' is in line
> with your own personal theism. Now - whether these views are also similar
> to those of Peirce - is a matter for debate. You, of course, consider them
> simil
of 'objective' - I think you have denied the complex
> adaptive nature of Peircean semiosis - but - I don't think we are going to
> convince each other of the validity of each other's views.
>
> Edwina
>
> On Sat 03/08/19 10:52 AM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm.
ught reasonably tending to produce
a definite belief. An "Argumentation" is an Argument proceeding upon
definitely formulated premisses. (CP 6.456, EP 2:435; 1908)
Regards,
Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com
many pages; but some hints toward it may be
given. A disembodied spirit, or pure mind, has its being out of time, since
all that it is destined to think is fully in its being at any and every
previous time. (CP 6.490; 1908)
Regards,
Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer
Edwina, List:
Again, Peirce's position is quite plainly stated in the text of CP
6.24-25--not dualism, neutralism, or materialism, but idealism;
specifically, objective idealism, which holds "the psychical law alone as
primordial" and "that matter is effete mind."
R
t, a
great poem,--for every fine argument is a poem and a symphony,--just as
every true poem is a sound argument. (CP 5.119, EP 2:194; 1903)
Regards,
Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - t
understanding and appreciating Peirce's thought overall? What resources
(if any) have you and others found especially helpful for enabling the
uninitiated to get up to speed?
Regards,
Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.Link
s-peirce-papers> for the
Charles S. Peirce Papers. Do you have a different link for the Logic
Notebook manuscript?
Thanks,
Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
On Mon, Jul
ces of the same Sign can (and often
do) have different *Dynamic *Interpretants, even though they all have the
same *Final *Interpretant.
Regards,
Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAla
JFS: Peirce emphasized fallibilism about physics. He would be more
cautious about metaphysics, even his own.
Indeed, we are discussing hypotheses rather than dogmas; and I acknowledge
that Peirce characterized the hypothesis of God, in particular, "as vague
yet as true so far as it is d
, hence my
suggestion that we consider using "indefinite" for Peirce's conception
instead. It strikes me as an important insight on his part that although
continuity itself is *generality* (3ns), the parts of a true continuum are
*indefinite* (1ns) unless and until they are "ma
s a vast representamen, a great symbol of God's purpose, working
out its conclusions in living realities … The Universe as an argument is
necessarily a great work of art, a great poem,--for every fine argument is
a poem and a symphony,--just as every true poem is a sound argument. (CP
1.315 &
quot;vague."
JFS: For more examples and discussion, see "What is the source of
fuzziness?"
Again, as Lane observes, Peirce's "idea of vagueness is quite different
from the contemporary one" (p. 139); in particular, "by 'vague' he did not
mean exactly w
ity, followed by its application to Propositions and then to
the entire Universe as an Argument. That earlier hypothesis was directly
prompted by Lane's "dual-aspect account of truth" (chapter 1), in which a
true belief (1) represents reality and (2) would be permanently settled by
i
r implied that it is anything that *Peirce *intended.
Regards,
Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
On Thu, Jul 18, 2019 at 2:05 PM John F Sowa wrote:
> Jon and Edwi
it was inspired by some of his
ideas and thus qualifies as "Peircean." Why the double standard?
Regards,
Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
On Thu, Jul 18, 2
better argument.
Regards,
Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
On Wed, Jul 17, 2019 at 12:52 PM John F Sowa wrote:
> Jon,
>
> I agree that my comments were abou
ective approaches for studying and discussing Peirce's
views on those topics (and others). We already thoroughly covered that
ground both on- and off-List not long ago, so now those reading along--or,
preferably, joining the conversation--can evaluate for themselves the
appropriateness
o the more elevating theory of *idealism*.
(R 936:2-3)
I made the case for what I understand to be the corresponding cosmology in
my online essay for *Signs - International Journal of Semiotics* (
https://tidsskrift.dk/signs/article/view/103187).
Regards,
Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas,
genuine doubt; it simply requires a willingness
to engage in further inquiry, should such doubt be prompted by new
information. In this case, if there are *later *writings by Peirce that
might be understood to *repudiate *objective idealism as he defined it in
1891, then I would sincerely like to take
propositions must
be *true*, such that "It is false that John gives John to John."
On the other hand, if we scribe the Existential Graph for "John gives John
to John," and then follow the same two steps, we get the corresponding
Entitative Graph--which is identical to Figure 1, e
discovered the far preferable
system, on the whole, of Existential Graphs, which are merely entitative
graphs turned inside out ... (R 280:21; c. 1904-1905)
Regards,
Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt
eet is still that of conditional necessity, but expressed differently--if
not this, then the other, and vice-versa. I apologize for the mistake.
Regards,
Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt
<htt
ws of Form* (LoF) presents a version of diagrammatic
logic that maps to Peirce's Entitative Graphs [CP 3.456-552], the dual
interpretation of Existential Graphs."
Regards,
Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.co
ntitatively *diverse
when they correspond to different essential characters--different Forms,
different conditional propositions--even if they happen to include exactly
the same singulars as their members, and are thus existentially the same.
Regards,
Jon S.
On Sat, Jun 15, 2019 at 1:34 PM Jon
e isn't sensation".
>
> Here, the basic argument of 'knowledge is sensation' is false. How can it
> be supported by a 'better argument, when the belief is itself fallacious?
>
> Edwina
>
> On Mon 24/06/19 5:17 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.
tion being criticized.
Regards,
Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
On Mon, Jun 24, 2019 at 3:44 PM Edwina Taborsky wrote:
> JAS, list
>
> I disagree with your comme
ire to achieve. If someone disagrees
with what I post on the List--whether a particular reading of Peirce's
words, or my own suggestion "inspired by" them--then the proper response is
to offer a *better* argument, instead of just complaining about *mine*.
Regards,
Jon Ala
om his writings. Rather than trying to impose and enforce
rigid rules for how everyone *must *participate on the List, I suggest that
we cut each other some slack and follow the principle of charity not only
in our reading of Peirce, but also in our reading of each other's posts.
Regards,
Jon Al
fully) everyone else on the List, I
consider myself to be *a student of Peirc*e, such that my attempts at
"harmonizing" are primarily for the purpose of *learning *from him; but any
resulting "system" is ultimately my own.
Regards,
Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
alog. There should always be a
"devil's advocate" for challenging any claim.
I agree, and I have found that I indeed learn the most from interacting
with those who *disagree *with me on matters of interpretation--especially
when they are willing to engage in good-faith dialogue.
strongest case for it that I can,
seeing what objections arise, and then figuring out whether and how I can
address them. When no one manages to *persuade *me that I am on the wrong
track, it in no way entails that I am *unwilling *to change my mind.
Again, if someone believes that I am getting somet
you meant that you will be kinder and
gentler in expressing your disagreements with my posts.
Regards,
Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
On Mon, Jun 17, 2019 at 11:16 A
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