Re: Comp: Geometry Is A Zombie
On 13 Feb 2013, at 19:23, John Clark wrote: On Mon, Feb 11, 2013 Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote: Then why can't a one dimensional Turing machine do geometry, It can solve geometry problems, Yes. but it can't generate geometric forms. Can you generate geometric forms? Your fingers can draw a triangle but are you fingers you, if your fingers were cut off would you no longer be you? It has nowhere to draw a triangle and nothing to draw it with, no eyes to see it, and no mind to appreciate it as a form. I don't know what your point is. Yes if you restrict a AI to one dimension then obviously it will not be able to draw a triangle, but you couldn't either. It can tell you all kinds of things about triangles, just like Mary can tell you all kinds of things about red, but there is no experience which is triangular. Then give the AI experience with triangles, after all the brain of a real AI will be just as 3D as your brain. A universe generated by Turing-like arithmetic would not and could not have any use for multi-dimensional presentations. A one dimensional Craig Weinberg would not and could not have any use for multi-dimensional presentations. Since we actually do live in a universe of mega-multi demensional sensory presentations, that means that comp fails Fine, comp fails. I'm glad to be rid of it as I never even knew what the damn word meant and have become increasingly convinced that nobody else on this list knows either. When you don't understand A - B, you shouldn't infer that you necessarily don't understand A. Comp is just the idea that the relevant activity, for consciousness manifestation, of the brain/body, is Turing emulable. Your posts illustrate that you do understand comp, and even defend it as true. You miss the consequences because you fail to distinguish the first person view of duplicated people, with a third person view of those duplicated people. Your tone indicates that you avoid thinking further on the subject. I am still trying to guess why some people can act in that way. Bruno John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: The duplicators and the restorers
On 13 Feb 2013, at 20:36, meekerdb wrote: On 2/13/2013 7:26 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: Experiences cannot be duplicated literally, because I suspect that unique is the only thing that experiences can literally be. I agree with this, in the sense that this follows also from computationalism, and thus 3p-duplicability at some level. An 1p-experience is not duplicable, as it is the unique experience of a unique being. It can still be duplicated relatively to some observer, but not relatively to the experiencer himself. Again what you say concur with comp, making astonishing why you are using those points against the possibility of 3p-duplication, which is so much well illustrated by nature, as life is constant self-body change and duplication (as Stathis argues convincingly). To sum up: with comp, we are 3p-duplicable; the 1p, as attributed by a 3p-person, is relatively duplicable. The 1p, seen from the 1p view, is not duplicable. Like in Everett QM, the 1p can't feel the split in any way. That seems to imply that the 1p view is nothing but a stream of experiences and apart from that sequence of experiences there is no 'person'. Not at all. Both the Bp p, and the UDA-personal-diary definitions relates the first person to a machine in a position of having those experiences, locally. Globally, we might become the same person, and differ only locally by our local experiences, but they still indiduate us relatively to others locally, and so there are locally genuine different persons. There is not only sequence of experiences, but plausible universal bodies and context which relates those experiences, through their self- referential logical and arithmetical (computational) relations. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Simulated Intelligence Mini-Manifesto
On 13 Feb 2013, at 20:44, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Wednesday, February 13, 2013 12:46:23 PM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 13 Feb 2013, at 17:35, Craig Weinberg wrote: Wouldn’t Simulated Intelligence be a more appropriate term than Artificial Intelligence? A better term would be natural imagination. But terms are not important. Except that we already have natural imagination, so what would we be developing? Replacing something with itself? Yes. That's what life does all the time. The distinction between artificial and natural is artificial. Human made. And so it is also natural, as all creatures tend to do that by developing their ego. Machines are just a collateral branch of life. Cars and houses are not less natural than ribosomes and mitochondria. Thinking of it objectively, if we have a program which can model a hurricane, we would call that hurricane a simulation, not an ‘artificial hurricane’. If we modeled any physical substance, force, or field, we would similarly say that we had simulated hydrogen or gravity or electromagnetism, not that we had created artificial hydrogen, gravity, etc. Assuming those things exist. Whether they exist or not, the mathematically generated model of X is simulated X. It could be artificial X as well, but whether X is natural or artificial only tells us the nature of its immediate developers. It depends on how you defined Hurricane, and different definition will make different sense in different theories. By calling it artificial, we also emphasize a kind of obsolete notion of natural vs man-made as categories of origin. If we used simulated instead, the measure of intelligence would be framed more modestly as the degree to which a system meets our expectations (or what we think or assume are our expectations). Rather than assuming a universal index of intelligent qualities which is independent from our own human qualities, we could evaluate the success of a particular Turing emulation purely on its merits as a convincing reflection of intelligence rather than presuming to have replicated an organic conscious experience mechanically. Comp assumes we are Turing emulable, Which is why Comp fails. Not only are we not emulable, emulation itself is not primitively real - it is a subjective consensus of expectations. It is a well defined arithmetical notion, which comp assumes. and in that case we can be emulated, trivially. Comp can't define us, That's correct. so it can only emulate the postage stamp sized sampling of some of our most exposed, and least meaningful surfaces. You can't know this. We have to bet on some level, and cannot be sure it is correct. But the consequences of comp are extracted from the mere existence of the subst level, not from the (impossible) knowledge of it. Comp is a stencil or silhouette maker. No amount of silhouettes pieced together and animated in a sequence can generate an interior experience. You can't say that publicly. You can't pretend to know that. It is your non-comp *hypothesis*. If it did, we would only have to draw a cartoon and it would come to life on its own. That's a non sense. Even for doing something as simple as Watson or big blue, it takes a lot of work. To assume this being not possible assume the existence of infinite process playing relevant roles in the mind or in life. But it is up to you to motivates for them. The problem, for you, is that you have to speculate on something that we have not yet observed. You can't say consciousness, as this would just beg the question. It is consciousness, and it is not begging the question, since all possible questions supervene on consciousness. Not sure what you mean about infinite processes or why they would mean that simulations can become experiences on their own. Because any processes finitely describable is trivially Turing emulable. The cost of losing the promise of imminently mastering awareness would, I think, be outweighed by the gain of a more scientifically circumspect approach. Invoking infinities is not so much circumspect, especially for driving negative statement about the consciousness of possible entities. What infinities do you refer to? The special one you need to make sense of non-comp. Putting the Promethean dream on hold, we could guard against the shadow of its confirmation bias. My concern is that without such a precaution, the promise of machine intelligence as a stage 1 simulacrum (a faithful copy of an original, in Baudrillard’s terms), will be diluted to a stage 3 simulacrum (a copy that masks the absence of a profound reality, where the simulacrum pretends to be a faithful copy.) Assuming a non comp theory, like the quite speculative theory of mind by Penrose. Your own proposl fits remarkably ith comp, and some low level of
Re: Does p make sense?
On 13 Feb 2013, at 20:46, meekerdb wrote: On 2/13/2013 8:04 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 13 Feb 2013, at 03:03, meekerdb wrote: On 2/12/2013 5:28 PM, Russell Standish wrote: On Tue, Feb 12, 2013 at 11:05:37AM -0800, Craig Weinberg wrote: When we talk about a Bp, relating to consciousness is that we are making an assumption about what a proposition is. In fact, if we look closely, a proposition can only be another level of B. p is really nothing but a group of sub-personal Beliefs (logarithmically nested as B^n) which we are arbitrarily considered as a given condition...but there is no given condition in actual experience. All experiences are contingent upon what the experiencer is capable of receiving or interacting with. I don't really follow your remaining comments, but I agree with you that the p in the Theatetical definition of knowledge makes me uncomfortable, post Popper. I'm happy for Bp p to apply to mathematical knowledge, with B semantically equivalent to prove, but when it comes to scientific knowledge, requiring absolute truth in things seems a step too far. But I have no constructive suggestions as to how to modify Theatetus :(. Intuitively Bp p does not define knowledge. Why? It obeys to the classical theory of knowledge (the modal logic S4), and in the comp context, we get the more stronger logic S4Grz1, and it works very well. It even makes the knower unnameable and close to the Plotinus universal soul or inner God. As Edmund Gettier pointed out Bp, where B stands for 'believes' as in non-mathematical discourse, can be accidental. Hence he argued that the belief must be causally connected to the fact of the proposition in order to count as knowledge. We have already discussed this. Edmund Gettier seems to accept a notion of knowledge which makes just no sense, neither in comp, nor in platonism. I don't know what notion of knowledge he accepts, but he rejects accidental beliefs that happen to be true. So we might agree. I don't see how any belief can be accidental in comp, given that a (rational) belief is defined by what a machine can assert for logical reason. That's the B part of Bp ( p). The example he gives is Bob and Bill work together. Bob knows that Bill has gone to pick up a new car he bought. He sees Bill drive a new blue car into the parking lot and concludes that the car Bill bought is blue. In fact it is blue, but it wasn't ready and so the dealer gave Bill a blue loaner to drive that day. So does Bob know that Bill bought a blue car, or does he only believe, truly that he did? He believes wrongly. That distinction is important for the study of natural languages, but not for the theology and physics. I avoid that problem by restricting myself to ideally correct machines, where the important distonction is between Bp and Bp p, with Bp implying p at the meta-level (G*). From my reflection about the dream-argument, it probably means that Gettier believes that we can know things for sure I don't think that follows that all. Even a causally connected belief can be false. The problem is in explicating what constitutes 'causally connected' in complicated cases. OK. In comp causally is a very high level feature, not something which can be explained by the physical realm, which emerges from the low levels. In the low level we don't need causality. Implication is enough. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Simulated Intelligence Mini-Manifesto
On Wednesday, February 13, 2013 10:38:21 PM UTC-5, stathisp wrote: On Thu, Feb 14, 2013 at 2:27 PM, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.comjavascript: wrote: Whether the intelligence has the same associated consciousness or not is a matter for debate, but not the intelligence itself. I disagree. There is no internal intelligence there at all. Zero. There is a recording of some aspects of human intelligence which can extend human intelligence into extra-human ranges for human users. The computer itself has no extra-human intelligence, just as a telescope itself doesn't see anything, it just helps us see, passively of course. We are the users of technology, technology itself is not a user. I think you're conflating intelligence with consciousness. Funny, someone else accused me of the same thing already today: You've conflating 'real intelligence' with conscious experience. Real or literal intelligence is a conscious experience as far as we know. Metaphorically, we can say that something which is not the result of a conscious experience (like evolutionary adaptations in a species) is intelligent, but what we mean is that it impresses us as something that seems like it could have been the result of intelligent motives. To fail to note that intelligence supervenes on consciousness is, in my opinion, clearly a Pathetic Fallacy assumption. If the table talks to you and helps you solve a difficult problem, then by definition the table is intelligent. No, you are using your intelligence to turn what comes out of the tables mouth into a solution to a difficult problem. If look at the answers to a crossword puzzle in a book, and it helps me solve the crossword puzzle, that doesn't mean that the book is intelligent, or that answers are intelligent, it just means that something which is intelligent has made formations available which my intelligence uses to inform itself. How the table pulls this off and whether it is conscious or not are separate questions. I think that assumption and any deep understanding of either consciousness or intelligence are mutually exclusive. Understanding begins when you doubt what you have assumed. Craig -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Does p make sense?
On 13 Feb 2013, at 21:28, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Wednesday, February 13, 2013 10:56:05 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal
wrote:
On 12 Feb 2013, at 20:05, Craig Weinberg wrote:
When we talk about a Bp, relating to consciousness is that we are
making an assumption about what a proposition is. In fact, if we
look closely, a proposition can only be another level of B. p is
really nothing but a group of sub-personal Beliefs (logarithmically
nested as B^n)
?
If I understand it correctly:
If Bp = 'The belief that China is in Asia',
With that example, p is for the fact that China is in Asia.
then p = 'China is in Asia'.
No. It is that China is in Asia. p represents some truth (or falsity),
like 2+3 =6. It does not represent some sentence used for referring
to that fact. If we could define a truth predicate, it would be
equivalent with TRUE('p'). But such truth predicate does not exist, so
we use the sentence itself, to denote the fact.
What I'm saying is that p is really hundreds of millions of
experiences in which the location of China is referenced, visually,
verbally, cognitively.
I do not use it in that sense.
The p is the inertia of those implicit memories, balanced against
the absence of any counterfactual experiences. Each one of those
memories, thoughts, and images is itself a lower level 'Bp'. I might
imagine a composite image of a generic world map in my mind, where
China is represented as a green bulge in Asia. That image is a Bp:
'China is shaped like this (China shape) and is part of the shape
called Asia'. There is no objective p condition of China being in
Asia which is independent of all experiences. It is the Bp
experiences, direct and indirect, of China and Asia which define
every possible p about China being in Asia.
?
which we are arbitrarily considered as a given condition...but
there is no given condition in actual experience.
That's why we put Bp p. To get the condition of 1p experience. It
works as we get a non nameable, and non formalisable notion of
knowledge. S4 and S4Grz do succeed in meta-formalizing a thoroughly
non formalisable notion.
I don't know what that means. If notions are non nameable and non
formalisable, it doesn't have to mean that they are all the same
notion.
It means that when we apply the definition of knowledge given by
Theaetetus, we get a modal logic of knowledge, and more, it verifies
some property accepted for Plotinus' inner God or universal soul.
In particular, that first person notion is not a 3p-machine.
All experiences are contingent upon what the experiencer is capable
of receiving or interacting with.
Any proposition that can be named relies on some pre-existing
context (which is sensed or makes sense).
The problem with applying Doxastic models to consciousness is not
only that it amputates the foundations of awareness,
It does not for the reason above. Note that even Bp p can lead to
falsity, in principle. Things get more complex when you add the non
monotonic layers, that we need for natural languages and for the
mundane type of belief or knowledge. Here, of course, with the goal
of deriving the correct physical laws; it is simpler to consider the
case of ideally correct machine, for which us, but not the machine
itself can know the equivalence.
?
You might try to understand UDA before trying to see how the antic
knowledge notions can translate UDA in arithmetic, and be used to
recover physics, in the way UDA asks us to proceed.
Bp p has certainly major defect for human knowledge, but to derive
physics we need only the case of ideally arithmetically-correct
machine, as we search the universal comp-correct physics, not some
human non correct physics.
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
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Re: Does p make sense?
On 13 Feb 2013, at 23:08, Stephen P. King wrote: On 2/13/2013 2:46 PM, meekerdb wrote: On 2/13/2013 8:04 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 13 Feb 2013, at 03:03, meekerdb wrote: On 2/12/2013 5:28 PM, Russell Standish wrote: On Tue, Feb 12, 2013 at 11:05:37AM -0800, Craig Weinberg wrote: When we talk about a Bp, relating to consciousness is that we are making an assumption about what a proposition is. In fact, if we look closely, a proposition can only be another level of B. p is really nothing but a group of sub-personal Beliefs (logarithmically nested as B^n) which we are arbitrarily considered as a given condition...but there is no given condition in actual experience. All experiences are contingent upon what the experiencer is capable of receiving or interacting with. I don't really follow your remaining comments, but I agree with you that the p in the Theatetical definition of knowledge makes me uncomfortable, post Popper. I'm happy for Bp p to apply to mathematical knowledge, with B semantically equivalent to prove, but when it comes to scientific knowledge, requiring absolute truth in things seems a step too far. But I have no constructive suggestions as to how to modify Theatetus :(. Intuitively Bp p does not define knowledge. Why? It obeys to the classical theory of knowledge (the modal logic S4), and in the comp context, we get the more stronger logic S4Grz1, and it works very well. It even makes the knower unnameable and close to the Plotinus universal soul or inner God. As Edmund Gettier pointed out Bp, where B stands for 'believes' as in non-mathematical discourse, can be accidental. Hence he argued that the belief must be causally connected to the fact of the proposition in order to count as knowledge. We have already discussed this. Edmund Gettier seems to accept a notion of knowledge which makes just no sense, neither in comp, nor in platonism. From http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gettier_problem we read: A Gettier problem is any one of a category of thought experiments in contemporary epistemology that seem to repudiate a definition of knowledge as justified true belief (JTB). The category of problem owes its name to a three-page paper published in 1963, by Edmund Gettier, called Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?. In it, Gettier proposed two scenarios where the three criteria (justification, truth, and belief) seemed to be met, but where the majority of readers would not have felt that the result was knowledge due to the element of luck involved. Bruno's notion involves betting, so luck is a factor! ;-) Not with Bp p. The betting is for observation, not knowledge. The betting is handled with Bp Dt p. Somehow, we impose the consistency: that is, for machine talking first person logic, the existence of at least one reality (Dt). (By Gödel's completeness theorem (not incompleteness !) we have that Dt is true iff B has a model (a mathematical reality satisfying his beliefs)). Bp Dt ( p) makes p true in all the accessible realities in the neighborhood, so the p has measure one, and the corresponding logic is the logic of the probability one. Bruno I don't know what notion of knowledge he accepts, but he rejects accidental beliefs that happen to be true. The example he gives is Bob and Bill work together. Bob knows that Bill has gone to pick up a new car he bought. He sees Bill drive a new blue car into the parking lot and concludes that the car Bill bought is blue. In fact it is blue, but it wasn't ready and so the dealer gave Bill a blue loaner to drive that day. So does Bob know that Bill bought a blue car, or does he only believe, truly that he did? From my reflection about the dream-argument, it probably means that Gettier believes that we can know things for sure I don't think that follows that all. Even a causally connected belief can be false. The problem is in explicating what constitutes 'causally connected' in complicated cases. WTF is a causally connected belief ? I see something related to the idea in this paper but Causality is a concept that is on intimate terms with Time. No? Brent and communicate them as such, making him believe implicitly, at least, that we can know that we are awake, or that our communicable knowledge is secure, but with comp that is impossible. With comp we can be sure of our consciousness only, but that knowledge is typically not communicable. And the belief does not need to be accidental, and hopefully (but only hopefully) is not. And it is never accidental for the ideal case of simpler machine than us, that we need to study to get the physics (quanta and qualia) from the numbers relations. Bruno -- Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails
Re: Simulated Intelligence Mini-Manifesto
On 13 Feb 2013, at 23:40, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Wednesday, February 13, 2013 5:11:32 PM UTC-5, Stephen Paul King wrote: On 2/13/2013 2:58 PM, meekerdb wrote: On 2/13/2013 8:35 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote: Wouldn�t Simulated Intelligence be a more appropriate term than Artificial Intelligence? Thinking of it objectively, if we have a program which can model a hurricane, we would call that hurricane a simulation, not an �artificial hurricane�. If we modeled any physical substance, force, or field, we would similarly say that we had simulated hydrogen or gravity or electromagnetism, not that we had created artificial hydrogen, gravity, etc. No, because the idea of an AI is that it can control a robot or other machine which interacts with the real world, whereas a simulate AI or hurricane acts within a simulated world. ��� What difference that makes a difference does that make in the grand scheme of things? The point is that we cannot 'prove' that we are not in a gigantic simulation. Yeah, we cannot prove a negative, but we can extract a lot of valuable insights and maybe some predictions from the assumption that 'reality = best possible simulation. I just realized how to translate that into my view: Reality = making the most sense possible. Same thing really. That's why I talk about multisense Realism, with Realism being the quality of maximum unfiltered sense. Since sense is subtractive, the more senses you have overlapping and diverging, the less there is that you are missing. Reality = nothing is missing (i.e. only possible at the Absolute level), Realism = you can't tell that anything is missing from your perceptual capacity/inertial frame/simulation. I don't like the word simulation per se, because I think that anything the idea of a Matrix universe does for us would be negated by the idea that the simulation eventually has to run on something which is not a simulation, otherwise the word has no meaning. Either way, the notion of simulation doesn't make any of the big questions more answerable, even if it is locally true for us. Emulation and simulation are arithmetical notion. And with comp, even physical emulation, well, it is no more entirely arithmetical, but it is still explained entirely in arithmetical terms (an infinity of them). Bruno Craig By calling it artificial, we also emphasize a kind of obsolete notion of natural vs man-made as categories of origin. Why is the distinction between the natural intelligence of a child and the artificial intelligence of a Mars rover obsolete?� The latter is one we create by art, the other is created by nature. If we used simulated instead, the measure of intelligence would be framed more modestly as the degree to which a system meets our expectations (or what we think or assume are our expectations). Rather than assuming a universal index of intelligent qualities which is independent from our own human qualities, But if we measure intelligence strictly relative to human intelligence we will be saying that visual pattern recognition is intelligence but solving Navier-Stokes equations is not.� This is the anthropocentrism that continually demotes whatever computers can do as not really intelligent even when it was regarded a the apothesis of intelligence *before* computers could� do it. we could evaluate the success of a particular Turing emulation purely on its merits as a convincing reflection of intelligence But there is no one-dimensional measure of intelligence - it's just competence in many domains. rather than presuming to have replicated an organic conscious experience mechanically. I don't think that's a presumption.� It's an inference from the incoherence of the idea of a philosophical zombie. The cost of losing the promise of imminently mastering awareness would, I think, be outweighed by the gain of a more scientifically circumspect approach. Putting the Promethean dream on hold, we could guard against the shadow of its confirmation bias. My concern is that without such a precaution, the promise of machine intelligence as a stage 1 simulacrum (a faithful copy of an original, in Baudrillard�s terms), will be diluted to a stage 3 simulacrum (a copy that masks the absence of a profound reality, where the simulacrum pretends to be a faithful copy.) --� The assumption that there is a 'profound reality' is what Stathis showed to be 'magic'. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-li...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everyth...@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . For more options, visit
Re: Simulated Intelligence Mini-Manifesto
On 13 Feb 2013, at 23:51, Stephen P. King wrote: On 2/13/2013 5:40 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote: [SPK wrote} What difference that makes a difference does that make in the grand scheme of things? The point is that we cannot 'prove' that we are not in a gigantic simulation. Yeah, we cannot prove a negative, but we can extract a lot of valuable insights and maybe some predictions from the assumption that 'reality = best possible simulation. I just realized how to translate that into my view: Reality = making the most sense possible. Same thing really. That's why I talk about multisense Realism, with Realism being the quality of maximum unfiltered sense. Since sense is subtractive, the more senses you have overlapping and diverging, the less there is that you are missing. Reality = nothing is missing (i.e. only possible at the Absolute level), Realism = you can't tell that anything is missing from your perceptual capacity/inertial frame/simulation. I don't like the word simulation per se, because I think that anything the idea of a Matrix universe does for us would be negated by the idea that the simulation eventually has to run on something which is not a simulation, otherwise the word has no meaning. Either way, the notion of simulation doesn't make any of the big questions more answerable, even if it is locally true for us. Craig I like the idea of a Matrix universe exactly for that reason; it takes resources to 'run' it. No free lunch, even for universes!!! No free lunch indeed, but the arithmetical lunch becomes enough to explain consciousness and matter, in a sufficient precise way to be tested. Bruno -- Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: How can intelligence be physical ?
Intuitive Understanding Of Euler’s Formula http://betterexplained.com/articles/intuitive-understanding-of-eulers-formula/#comment-190704 =…. On Feb 14, 8:48 am, socra...@bezeqint.net socra...@bezeqint.net wrote: Euler's Equation and the Reality of Nature. =. Mr. Dexter Sinister wrote: ‘ I understand Euler's Identity, and I know what it means, and I know how to prove it, there's nothing particularly mystical about it, it just demonstrates that exponential, trigonometric, and complex functions are related. Given what we know of mathematics it shouldn't surprise anyone that its various bits are connected. It would be much more surprising if they weren't, that would almost certainly mean something was badly wrong somewhere.’ Mr. Gary wrote: Mathematics is NOT science. Science is knowledge of the REAL world. Mathematics is an invention of the mind. Many aspects of mathematics have found application in the real world, but there is no guarantee. Any correlation must meet the ultimate test: does it explain something about the real world? As an electrical engineer I used the generalized Euler's equation all the time in circuit analysis: exp(j*theta) = cos(theta) + j*sin(theta). So it works at that particular level in electricity. Does it work at other levels, too? Logic cannot prove it. It must be determined by experiment, not by philosophizing. .. Thinking about theirs posts I wrote brief article: Euler's Equation and Reality. =. a) Euler's Equation as a mathematical reality. Euler's identity is the gold standard for mathematical beauty'. Euler's identity is the most famous formula in all mathematics. ‘ . . . this equation is the mathematical analogue of Leonardo da Vinci’s Mona Lisa painting or Michelangelo’s statue of David’ ‘It is God’s equation.’, ‘ It is a mathematical icon.’ . . . . etc. b) Euler's Equation as a physical reality. it is absolutely paradoxical; we cannot understand it, and we don't know what it means, . . . . .’ ‘ Euler's Equation reaches down into the very depths of existence’ ‘ Is Euler's Equation about fundamental matters?’ ‘It would be nice to understand Euler's Identity as a physical process using physics.‘ ‘ Is it possible to unite Euler's Identity with physics, quantum physics ?’ ==. My aim is to understand the reality of nature. Can Euler's equation explain me something about reality? To give the answer to this question I need to bind Euler's equation with an object - particle. Can it be math- point or string- particle or triangle-particle? No, Euler's formula has quantity (pi) which says me that the particle must be only a circle . Now I want to understand the behavior of circle - particle and therefore I need to use spatial relativity and quantum theories. These two theories say me that the reason of circle – particle’s movement is its own inner impulse (h) or (h*=h/2pi). a) Using its own inner impulse (h) circle - particle moves ( as a wheel) in a straight line with constant speed c = 1. We call such particle - ‘photon’. From Earth – gravity point of view this speed is maximally. From Vacuum point of view this speed is minimally. In this movement quantum of light behave as a corpuscular (no charge). b) Using its own inner impulse / intrinsic angular momentum ( h* = h / 2pi ) circle - particle rotates around its axis. In such movement particle has charge, produce electric waves ( waves property of particle) and its speed ( frequency) is : c1. We call such particle - ‘ electron’ and its energy is: E=h*f. In this way I (as a peasant ) can understand the reality of nature. ==. I reread my post. My God, that is a naïve peasant's explanation. It is absolutely not scientific, not professor's explanation. Would a learned man adopt such simple and naive explanation? Hmm, . . . problem. In any way, even Mr. Dexter Sinister and Mr. Gary wouldn't agree with me, I want to say them ' Thank you for emails and cooperation’ =. Best wishes. Israel Sadovnik Socratus. =. P.S. ' They would play a greater and greater role in mathematics – and then, with the advent of quantum mechanics in the twentieth century, in physics and engineering and any field that deals with cyclical phenomena such as waves that can be represented by complex numbers. For a complex number allows you to represent two processes such as phase and wavelenght simultaneously – and a complex exponential allows you to map a straight line onto a circle in a complex plane.' / Book: The great equations. Chapter four. The gold standard for mathematical beauty. Euler’s equation. Page 104. / # Euler's e-iPi+1=0 is an amazing equation, not in-and-of itself, but because it sharply points to our utter ignorance of the simplest mathematical and scientific fundamentals. The equation means that in flat Euclidean space, e and Pi happen to have their particular
Re: Does p make sense?
On 2/14/2013 10:40 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 13 Feb 2013, at 23:08, Stephen P. King wrote: On 2/13/2013 2:46 PM, meekerdb wrote: On 2/13/2013 8:04 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 13 Feb 2013, at 03:03, meekerdb wrote: On 2/12/2013 5:28 PM, Russell Standish wrote: On Tue, Feb 12, 2013 at 11:05:37AM -0800, Craig Weinberg wrote: When we talk about a Bp, relating to consciousness is that we are making an assumption about what a proposition is. In fact, if we look closely, a proposition can only be another level of B. p is really nothing but a group of sub-personal Beliefs (logarithmically nested as B^n) which we are arbitrarily considered as a given condition...but there is no given condition in actual experience. All experiences are contingent upon what the experiencer is capable of receiving or interacting with. I don't really follow your remaining comments, but I agree with you that the p in the Theatetical definition of knowledge makes me uncomfortable, post Popper. I'm happy for Bp p to apply to mathematical knowledge, with B semantically equivalent to prove, but when it comes to scientific knowledge, requiring absolute truth in things seems a step too far. But I have no constructive suggestions as to how to modify Theatetus :(. Intuitively Bp p does not define knowledge. Why? It obeys to the classical theory of knowledge (the modal logic S4), and in the comp context, we get the more stronger logic S4Grz1, and it works very well. It even makes the knower unnameable and close to the Plotinus universal soul or inner God. As Edmund Gettier pointed out Bp, where B stands for 'believes' as in non-mathematical discourse, can be accidental. Hence he argued that the belief must be causally connected to the fact of the proposition in order to count as knowledge. We have already discussed this. Edmund Gettier seems to accept a notion of knowledge which makes just no sense, neither in comp, nor in platonism. From http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gettier_problem we read: A Gettier problem is any one of a category of thought experiments in contemporary epistemology that seem to repudiate a definition of knowledge as justified true belief (JTB). The category of problem owes its name to a three-page paper published in 1963, by Edmund Gettier, called Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?. In it, Gettier proposed two scenarios where the three criteria (justification, truth, and belief) seemed to be met, but where the majority of readers would not have felt that the result was knowledge due to the element of luck involved. Bruno's notion involves betting, so luck is a factor! ;-) Not with Bp p. The betting is for observation, not knowledge. Hi Bruno, I don't understand the difference between knowledge and observation when considering 1p. Knowledge isn't just recollection of facts, it is always observation, event if purely internal experience of abstractions. I am aware of that I have knowledge of, especially when I am thinking of it. The betting is handled with Bp Dt p. Somehow, we impose the consistency: that is, for machine talking first person logic, the existence of at least one reality (Dt). (By Gödel's completeness theorem (not incompleteness !) we have that Dt is true iff B has a model (a mathematical reality satisfying his beliefs)). Bp Dt ( p) makes p true in all the accessible realities in the neighborhood, so the p has measure one, and the corresponding logic is the logic of the probability one. Bruno -- Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Simulated Intelligence Mini-Manifesto
On 2/14/2013 10:49 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 13 Feb 2013, at 23:51, Stephen P. King wrote: On 2/13/2013 5:40 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote: [SPK wrote} What difference that makes a difference does that make in the grand scheme of things? The point is that we cannot 'prove' that we are not in a gigantic simulation. Yeah, we cannot prove a negative, but we can extract a lot of valuable insights and maybe some predictions from the assumption that 'reality = best possible simulation. I just realized how to translate that into my view: Reality = making the most sense possible. Same thing really. That's why I talk about multisense Realism, with Realism being the quality of maximum unfiltered sense. Since sense is subtractive, the more senses you have overlapping and diverging, the less there is that you are missing. Reality = nothing is missing (i.e. only possible at the Absolute level), Realism = you can't tell that anything is missing from your perceptual capacity/inertial frame/simulation. I don't like the word simulation per se, because I think that anything the idea of a Matrix universe does for us would be negated by the idea that the simulation eventually has to run on something which is not a simulation, otherwise the word has no meaning. Either way, the notion of simulation doesn't make any of the big questions more answerable, even if it is locally true for us. Craig I like the idea of a Matrix universe exactly for that reason; it takes resources to 'run' it. No free lunch, even for universes!!! No free lunch indeed, but the arithmetical lunch becomes enough to explain consciousness and matter, in a sufficient precise way to be tested. Bruno Hi Bruno, But explanations are not realities, even if people think of them as such. -- Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Simulated Intelligence Mini-Manifesto
On 13 Feb 2013, at 23:37, Stephen P. King wrote, to Craig Weinberg Baudrillard is not talking about consciousness in particular, only the sum of whatever is in the original which is not accessible in the copy. His phrase 'profound reality' is apt though. If you don't experience a profound reality, then you might be a p-zombie already. Right! Right? Here Craig is on the worst slope. It looks almost like if *you* believe that a machine is not a zombie, it means that you are a zombie yourself. They will persecuted the machines and the humans having a different opinion altogether. Craig reassure me. he is willing to offer steak to my sun in law (who get an artificial brain before marriage). But with Baudrillard, not only my sun in law might no more get his steak, but neither my daughter! Brr... Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: How can intelligence be physical ?
On 14 Feb 2013, at 08:48, socra...@bezeqint.net wrote: Euler's Equation and the Reality of Nature. =. Mr. Dexter Sinister wrote: ‘ I understand Euler's Identity, and I know what it means, and I know how to prove it, there's nothing particularly mystical about it, it just demonstrates that exponential, trigonometric, and complex functions are related. Given what we know of mathematics it shouldn't surprise anyone that its various bits are connected. It would be much more surprising if they weren't, that would almost certainly mean something was badly wrong somewhere.’ Mr. Gary wrote: Mathematics is NOT science. Science is knowledge of the REAL world. Mathematics is an invention of the mind. This is of course false in the comp theory. It is also intuitively false for most mathematicians. It is usually asserted by people confusing the mathematical tools, that we invent indeed, and the mathematical reality, which is really a sequence of surprising facts, that we discover. The use of REAL world is dogmatic physicalism. It proposes as a fact what is a theological or metaphysical hypothesis, and this condemns any attempt to be rigorous on the subject. It is as bad as using God as a gap explanation. It is the same mistake. Bruno Many aspects of mathematics have found application in the real world, but there is no guarantee. Any correlation must meet the ultimate test: does it explain something about the real world? As an electrical engineer I used the generalized Euler's equation all the time in circuit analysis: exp(j*theta) = cos(theta) + j*sin(theta). So it works at that particular level in electricity. Does it work at other levels, too? Logic cannot prove it. It must be determined by experiment, not by philosophizing. .. Thinking about theirs posts I wrote brief article: Euler's Equation and Reality. =. a) Euler's Equation as a mathematical reality. Euler's identity is the gold standard for mathematical beauty'. Euler's identity is the most famous formula in all mathematics. ‘ . . . this equation is the mathematical analogue of Leonardo da Vinci’s Mona Lisa painting or Michelangelo’s statue of David’ ‘It is God’s equation.’, ‘ It is a mathematical icon.’ . . . . etc. b) Euler's Equation as a physical reality. it is absolutely paradoxical; we cannot understand it, and we don't know what it means, . . . . .’ ‘ Euler's Equation reaches down into the very depths of existence’ ‘ Is Euler's Equation about fundamental matters?’ ‘It would be nice to understand Euler's Identity as a physical process using physics.‘ ‘ Is it possible to unite Euler's Identity with physics, quantum physics ?’ ==. My aim is to understand the reality of nature. Can Euler's equation explain me something about reality? To give the answer to this question I need to bind Euler's equation with an object - particle. Can it be math- point or string- particle or triangle-particle? No, Euler's formula has quantity (pi) which says me that the particle must be only a circle . Now I want to understand the behavior of circle - particle and therefore I need to use spatial relativity and quantum theories. These two theories say me that the reason of circle – particle’s movement is its own inner impulse (h) or (h*=h/2pi). a) Using its own inner impulse (h) circle - particle moves ( as a wheel) in a straight line with constant speed c = 1. We call such particle - ‘photon’. From Earth – gravity point of view this speed is maximally. From Vacuum point of view this speed is minimally. In this movement quantum of light behave as a corpuscular (no charge). b) Using its own inner impulse / intrinsic angular momentum ( h* = h / 2pi ) circle - particle rotates around its axis. In such movement particle has charge, produce electric waves ( waves property of particle) and its speed ( frequency) is : c1. We call such particle - ‘ electron’ and its energy is: E=h*f. In this way I (as a peasant ) can understand the reality of nature. ==. I reread my post. My God, that is a naïve peasant's explanation. It is absolutely not scientific, not professor's explanation. Would a learned man adopt such simple and naive explanation? Hmm, . . . problem. In any way, even Mr. Dexter Sinister and Mr. Gary wouldn't agree with me, I want to say them ' Thank you for emails and cooperation’ =. Best wishes. Israel Sadovnik Socratus. =. P.S. ' They would play a greater and greater role in mathematics – and then, with the advent of quantum mechanics in the twentieth century, in physics and engineering and any field that deals with cyclical phenomena such as waves that can be represented by complex numbers. For a complex number allows you to represent two processes such as phase and wavelenght simultaneously – and a complex exponential allows you to map a straight line onto a circle in a complex plane.' / Book: The great equations. Chapter four. The gold standard for mathematical beauty. Euler’s equation. Page 104.
Re: How can intelligence be physical ?
On Wed, Feb 13, 2013 at 6:39 PM, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com wrote: On Tue, Feb 12, 2013 Telmo Menezes te...@telmomenezes.com wrote: So far, nobody has been able to figure out a learning algorithm as generic as the one our brains contains. The developers of Watson have come very close to doing exactly that. What I mean by a generic learning algorithm is one that can program itself using very high-level feedback signals, something equivalent to pleasure/pain. That allows the same algorithm to learn how to drive a car and learn to speak new languages, and even learn new ways to learn. I think it's possible, but I'm not convinced Watson is it. there is definitely room for generalists. Then why don't family doctors recommend that their patient see a generalists when they run into a particular problem they can't handle? Because you don't want brain surgery performed by an amateur, and also to avoid law suits. But if I had to chose just one doctor for the rest of my life, I would chose a generalist. I'm not saying that specialists are not valuable, just that we've gone too far in fetishising them. Or, put another way, there aren't as many brain surgeon-level fields that require maniacal focus for competence as people seem to think. But everyone wants to believe that of their own field because specialisation is currently viewed as high status. Einstein might have been a great scientist in any field. Perhaps Einstein could have been great in ANY field, but he most certainly could not have been great in EVERY field. Agreed, mainly because of lack of time. Immortal Einstein would probably get bored of theoretical physics at some point and explore something else. Watson and Deep Blue cannot change their minds. The great thing about computers is that every time they run a new program they quite literally CHANGE THEIR MINDS. In a sense, but not in the sense I was alluding to. Deep Blue beat the world human chess champion and it required a supercomputer to do so, but that was 16 years ago and Moore's law marches on; Sort of. There is no sort of about it, Moore's law marches on. In 1994 I bought one of the most powerful PC's in the world, it had a one core microprocessor running at 5 *10^7 cycles per second with 8*10^6 bytes of solid state memory and a 2*10^8 byte hard drive and cost me $4000 in expensive 1994 dollars; Today I am using a 4 core microprocessor running at 3.4 *10^9 cycles per second with 1.6 *10^10 bytes of solid state memory and a 2*10^12 byte hard drive and it cost me $2000 in in much cheaper 2012 dollars. The Moore's law marches on if you allow for multi-cores after a certain date and not before a certain date. Now it's progressing due to multi-core architectures, which one could consider cheating If I grew up on a farm and was retarded I might consider that cheating too, but I didn't and I'm not so I don't. Funnily enough you're still vulnerable to basic formal fallacies, as the sentence above illustrates. because algorithm parallelisation is frequently non-trivial. Few things worth doing are trivial, You wanted a touché but settled for a cliché? but fortunately for us most physical processes are inherently parallel as are most algorithms that are of interest such as video and audio processing, playing chess, making quantum mechanical calculations, understanding speech, language translation, weather forecasting, car driving, Higgs particle hunting, and the sort of thinking Watson did on Jeopardy. Yes, and in Nature they run on inherently parallel hardware. With von Neumann class computers we are stitching together sequential machines and trying to make them operate in a parallel way. This leads to very though problems like race conditions and deadlocks. One possible way out is the use of purely functional languages like Haskel, but implementing I/O in a purely functional way is also tough. Also, the CAP theorem imposes a theoretical limit on the capabilities of distributed computers: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/CAP_theorem Most of these difficulties can be surmounted, but at a cost. The higher the number of cores, the higher the cost. To make Moore's law work, people apply simple arithmetics (like adding the number of transistors) and ignore all these problems. I believe you're underestimating the complexity of a good chess program A chess program good enough to beat the best human player could be run on very primitive 1997 hardware, therefore I am not underestimating the complexity of a good chess program. QED. It cannot be achieved with a few tweaks on a completely different program like Watson, which was what you were implying. It's not like the developers of Watson just said: hey, we've created a very intelligent system, let's just throw some grand-master level chess playing capabilities in there. can Watson, for example, introspect on the chess game and update his view of the world
Re: Does p make sense?
On 14 Feb 2013, at 17:01, Stephen P. King wrote: On 2/14/2013 10:40 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 13 Feb 2013, at 23:08, Stephen P. King wrote: On 2/13/2013 2:46 PM, meekerdb wrote: On 2/13/2013 8:04 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 13 Feb 2013, at 03:03, meekerdb wrote: On 2/12/2013 5:28 PM, Russell Standish wrote: On Tue, Feb 12, 2013 at 11:05:37AM -0800, Craig Weinberg wrote: When we talk about a Bp, relating to consciousness is that we are making an assumption about what a proposition is. In fact, if we look closely, a proposition can only be another level of B. p is really nothing but a group of sub-personal Beliefs (logarithmically nested as B^n) which we are arbitrarily considered as a given condition...but there is no given condition in actual experience. All experiences are contingent upon what the experiencer is capable of receiving or interacting with. I don't really follow your remaining comments, but I agree with you that the p in the Theatetical definition of knowledge makes me uncomfortable, post Popper. I'm happy for Bp p to apply to mathematical knowledge, with B semantically equivalent to prove, but when it comes to scientific knowledge, requiring absolute truth in things seems a step too far. But I have no constructive suggestions as to how to modify Theatetus :(. Intuitively Bp p does not define knowledge. Why? It obeys to the classical theory of knowledge (the modal logic S4), and in the comp context, we get the more stronger logic S4Grz1, and it works very well. It even makes the knower unnameable and close to the Plotinus universal soul or inner God. As Edmund Gettier pointed out Bp, where B stands for 'believes' as in non-mathematical discourse, can be accidental. Hence he argued that the belief must be causally connected to the fact of the proposition in order to count as knowledge. We have already discussed this. Edmund Gettier seems to accept a notion of knowledge which makes just no sense, neither in comp, nor in platonism. From http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gettier_problem we read: A Gettier problem is any one of a category of thought experiments in contemporary epistemology that seem torepudiate a definition of knowledge as justified true belief (JTB). The category of problem owes its name to a three-page paper published in 1963, by Edmund Gettier, called Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?. In it, Gettier proposed two scenarios where the three criteria (justification, truth, and belief) seemed to be met, but where the majority of readers would not have felt that the result was knowledge due to the element of luck involved. Bruno's notion involves betting, so luck is a factor! ;-) Not with Bp p. The betting is for observation, not knowledge. Hi Bruno, I don't understand the difference between knowledge and observation when considering 1p. Knowledge isn't just recollection of facts, it is always observation, event if purely internal experience of abstractions. I am aware of that I have knowledge of, especially when I am thinking of it. Knowledge and observation can be related, but it is better to distinguish different notions. With comp and the naive Theaetetus, say, knowledge is given by Bp p, and observation is given by the Bp Dt. And feeling is given by Bp Dt p. This gives an intuitionist epistemic logic for the first person knowledge, with an antisymmetrical knowledge state evolution. Bp Dt ( p) gives, for observation, at the * level, a symmetrical structures, with a quantum like quasi orthomodular structure. It provides steps toward having the arithmetical frame to get a Gleason- like theorem, to solve the measure problem, in the way UDA explains to do. With comp, a physical proposition is a true sigma_1 proposition pondered by the frequence of its proof in the universal dovetailing (UD*), or equivalently, in arithmetic. That follows from the global 1p indeterminacy, on UD*. p is arithmetical truth. You can see it as Dennett intentional stance toward the set of the Gödel numbers of the true proposition, true in the standard model of Peano Arithmetic. Comp will explain notably why we cannot define that standard model. p plays the role of Plotinus' one. Bp is a statement made by some number relatively to some universal number. It plays the role of Plotinus' discursive reasoner, or 'man' (that includes woman, as it is the generic term). Here it is the 3p, finitely describable machine, or its Gödel number, programs, etc. It is the 3p duplicable entity you can bet on. Bp p, is simply the same statement made in the case of p. It restrict the prover or justifier to truth, in a non necessary constructive way. The intensional interpretation of p can be given by the set of worlds, or of computations, satisfying (in some sense) p. Or p can represent some actual truth in this actual world. A lot of
Re: Simulated Intelligence Mini-Manifesto
On 14 Feb 2013, at 17:02, Stephen P. King wrote: On 2/14/2013 10:49 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 13 Feb 2013, at 23:51, Stephen P. King wrote: On 2/13/2013 5:40 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote: [SPK wrote} What difference that makes a difference does that make in the grand scheme of things? The point is that we cannot 'prove' that we are not in a gigantic simulation. Yeah, we cannot prove a negative, but we can extract a lot of valuable insights and maybe some predictions from the assumption that 'reality = best possible simulation. I just realized how to translate that into my view: Reality = making the most sense possible. Same thing really. That's why I talk about multisense Realism, with Realism being the quality of maximum unfiltered sense. Since sense is subtractive, the more senses you have overlapping and diverging, the less there is that you are missing. Reality = nothing is missing (i.e. only possible at the Absolute level), Realism = you can't tell that anything is missing from your perceptual capacity/inertial frame/simulation. I don't like the word simulation per se, because I think that anything the idea of a Matrix universe does for us would be negated by the idea that the simulation eventually has to run on something which is not a simulation, otherwise the word has no meaning. Either way, the notion of simulation doesn't make any of the big questions more answerable, even if it is locally true for us. Craig I like the idea of a Matrix universe exactly for that reason; it takes resources to 'run' it. No free lunch, even for universes!!! No free lunch indeed, but the arithmetical lunch becomes enough to explain consciousness and matter, in a sufficient precise way to be tested. Bruno Hi Bruno, But explanations are not realities, even if people think of them as such. Explanations are like taxes and death, that is part of the arithmetical realities, when seen from inside. Of course explanations of reality are not the reality itself. Bruno -- Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: The duplicators and the restorers
On 2/14/2013 3:58 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 13 Feb 2013, at 20:36, meekerdb wrote: On 2/13/2013 7:26 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: Experiences cannot be duplicated literally, because I suspect that unique is the only thing that experiences can literally be. I agree with this, in the sense that this follows also from computationalism, and thus 3p-duplicability at some level. An 1p-experience is not duplicable, as it is the unique experience of a unique being. It can still be duplicated relatively to some observer, but not relatively to the experiencer himself. Again what you say concur with comp, making astonishing why you are using those points against the possibility of 3p-duplication, which is so much well illustrated by nature, as life is constant self-body change and duplication (as Stathis argues convincingly). To sum up: with comp, we are 3p-duplicable; the 1p, as attributed by a 3p-person, is relatively duplicable. The 1p, seen from the 1p view, is not duplicable. Like in Everett QM, the 1p can't feel the split in any way. That seems to imply that the 1p view is nothing but a stream of experiences and apart from that sequence of experiences there is no 'person'. Not at all. Both the Bp p, and the UDA-personal-diary definitions relates the first person to a machine in a position of having those experiences, locally. Globally, we might become the same person, and differ only locally by our local experiences, but they still indiduate us relatively to others locally, and so there are locally genuine different persons. There is not only sequence of experiences, but plausible universal bodies and context which relates those experiences, through their self-referential logical and arithmetical (computational) relations. Aren't those relations the ones provided by physics - continuity of bodies, etc. So are you agreeing with my idea that a physical world in necessary for conscious beings to exist IN. Brent Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/%7Emarchal/ No virus found in this message. Checked by AVG - www.avg.com http://www.avg.com Version: 2013.0.2899 / Virus Database: 2639/6103 - Release Date: 02/14/13 -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Simulated Intelligence Mini-Manifesto
On 2/14/2013 11:20 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 13 Feb 2013, at 23:37, Stephen P. King wrote, to Craig Weinberg Baudrillard is not talking about consciousness in particular, only the sum of whatever is in the original which is not accessible in the copy. His phrase 'profound reality' is apt though. If you don't experience a profound reality, then you might be a p-zombie already. Right! Right? Here Craig is on the worst slope. It looks almost like if *you* believe that a machine is not a zombie, it means that you are a zombie yourself. They will persecuted the machines and the humans having a different opinion altogether. Craig reassure me. he is willing to offer steak to my sun in law (who get an artificial brain before marriage). But with Baudrillard, not only my sun in law might no more get his steak, but neither my daughter! Brr... Bruno Dear Bruno, Could you re-write this post. It's wording is unintelligible to me. :_( -- Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: How can intelligence be physical ?
On Thu, Feb 14, 2013 Telmo Menezes te...@telmomenezes.com wrote: there aren't as many brain surgeon-level fields that require maniacal focus for competence as people seem to think. I would maintain that for the last 200 years every major advance in science or mathematics has come from specialists. The Moore's law marches on if you allow for multi-cores after a certain date and not before a certain date. I have no idea what that means, but I do know that the human brain is a multi-core machine, we know there are at least 2 million cortical columns in it and probably more. Also, the CAP theorem imposes a theoretical limit on the capabilities of distributed computers: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/CAP_theorem So what? All parts of the human brain can't see the same data at the same time either, and if one cortical column can send a signal to another cortical column indicating that data has or has not been successfully received nobody has ever found it, probably because it doesn't exist. Most of these difficulties can be surmounted, but at a cost. The higher the number of cores, the higher the cost. Unless the cost per core falls faster than the number of cores increases, so you can double the number of cores every 18 months and keep the cost constant. To make Moore's law work, people apply simple arithmetics (like adding the number of transistors) and ignore all these problems. Yes, but you almost make that sound like a bad thing. A chess program good enough to beat the best human player could be run on very primitive 1997 hardware, therefore I am not underestimating the complexity of a good chess program. QED. It cannot be achieved with a few tweaks on a completely different program like Watson, Now you're just being silly. There are chess playing programs that you could download and run in 2 minutes that would turn the very computer you're reading this message on into a machine that could beat Deep Blue of 1997 at Chess. Are you trying to tell me that mighty Watson couldn't do what your puny little Walmart special can do??! It's not like the developers of Watson just said: hey, we've created a very intelligent system, let's just throw some grand-master level chess playing capabilities in there. You are entirely incorrect, IT IS EXACTLY PRECISELY LIKE THAT! The inability of humans to grasp this basic abillity that computers have that they themselves do not is what causes them to VASTLY underrate the changes that computers will make to society and even changes in what species is at the top of the food chain. Can he read a text about learning strategies and update his own learning strategy accordingly? No Watson can't do that and I can't either, I read a lot but I've never read a learning strategies self help book that was worth a bucket of warm spit. Watson can however learn new algorithms. I'm making a distinction between generic and domain-specific intelligence. Watson can play Chess better than anyone, Watson can diagnose diseases better than most doctors, Watson can solve equations you couldn't dream of solving and Watson is the world champion at Jeopardy which means he's at least as good a conversationalist and can engage in small talk at least as well as a autistic human being like Gregory Perelman and probably a good deal better than one of the principle founders of quantum mechanics Paul Dirac. So exactly what is this grand difference between generic and domain-specific intelligence that you're trying to make? I actually care about the goal of AGI I care about AI but I care little about Adjusted Gross Income or the American Geological Institute. Turns out that autism can really make you focused. Yes. So what? So saying that Watson is autistic is very different from saying Watson is unintelligent. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Simulated Intelligence Mini-Manifesto
On Wednesday, February 13, 2013 10:46:26 PM UTC-5, Stephen Paul King wrote: On 2/13/2013 8:09 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote: [SPK wrote: ]I like the idea of a Matrix universe exactly for that reason; it takes resources to 'run' it. No free lunch, even for universes!!! You can still have the idea of resources if the universe isn't a simulation though. No particular diffraction tree within the supreme monad can last as long as the Absolute diffraction, so the clock is always running and every motive carries risk. Right, but since we do have the resources, why not assume that the Matrix is up and running on them already? I don't see the advantage of a Matrix running on a non-Matrix vs just a non-Matrix totality though. The fun thing is that if we have both then we have a nice solution to both the mind (for matter) and body (for comp) problems. There can be no 'supreme monad' as such would be equivalent to a preferred frame and basis. The totality of all that exists is not a hierarchy, it is a fractal network. The supreme monad is just everything which is undiffracted, i.e. the single thread that the whole tapestry of tapestries is made of...which is itself one giant (or infinitesimally small) tapestry seed. Size isn't relevant because size is part of the tapestry, not the thread. Craig -- Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Simulated Intelligence Mini-Manifesto
On 2/14/2013 5:45 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Wednesday, February 13, 2013 10:46:26 PM UTC-5, Stephen Paul King wrote: On 2/13/2013 8:09 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote: [SPK wrote: ]I like the idea of a Matrix universe exactly for that reason; it takes resources to 'run' it. No free lunch, even for universes!!! You can still have the idea of resources if the universe isn't a simulation though. No particular diffraction tree within the supreme monad can last as long as the Absolute diffraction, so the clock is always running and every motive carries risk. Right, but since we do have the resources, why not assume that the Matrix is up and running on them already? I don't see the advantage of a Matrix running on a non-Matrix vs just a non-Matrix totality though. ACK! https://encrypted-tbn0.gstatic.com/images?q=tbn:ANd9GcS0oSEgcZZVrascuppptCDDVSONLD2DxKE-JGirCvuRag8-LT3o You sound like Dennett, defending material monism! Or, to be more charitable, flattening the infinite levels of the transduction into a single fabric. Don't do that! The 'non-Matrix' is the level for a given 1p that cannot be deformed. It is the point where the model of the system is the system. The fun thing is that if we have both then we have a nice solution to both the mind (for matter) and body (for comp) problems. There can be no 'supreme monad' as such would be equivalent to a preferred frame and basis. The totality of all that exists is not a hierarchy, it is a fractal network. The supreme monad is just everything which is undiffracted, i.e. the single thread that the whole tapestry of tapestries is made of...which is itself one giant (or infinitesimally small) tapestry seed. Size isn't relevant because size is part of the tapestry, not the thread. Craig OK, but can you see that what you are talking about (the Supreme Monad) is a giant monism? We need to cover both sides, the dual aspects. As I see it, when we jump up to a Supreme Monad we are required to fuzz out all distinctions that are relevant at the 1p level. The Sense of the Supreme monad is an undistinguished Nothing. It cannot have any particular features of properties. -- Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Simulated Intelligence Mini-Manifesto
On Thursday, February 14, 2013 6:03:51 PM UTC-5, Stephen Paul King wrote: On 2/14/2013 5:45 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Wednesday, February 13, 2013 10:46:26 PM UTC-5, Stephen Paul King wrote: On 2/13/2013 8:09 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote: [SPK wrote: ]I like the idea of a Matrix universe exactly for that reason; it takes resources to 'run' it. No free lunch, even for universes!!! You can still have the idea of resources if the universe isn't a simulation though. No particular diffraction tree within the supreme monad can last as long as the Absolute diffraction, so the clock is always running and every motive carries risk. Right, but since we do have the resources, why not assume that the Matrix is up and running on them already? I don't see the advantage of a Matrix running on a non-Matrix vs just a non-Matrix totality though. ACK!https://encrypted-tbn0.gstatic.com/images?q=tbn:ANd9GcS0oSEgcZZVrascuppptCDDVSONLD2DxKE-JGirCvuRag8-LT3o You sound like Dennett, defending material monism! Not material, experience. Or, to be more charitable, flattening the infinite levels of the transduction into a single fabric. Don't do that! The fabric is figurative - i'm just talking about the unity of all sense being more primordial than space or time. The 'non-Matrix' is the level for a given 1p that cannot be deformed. It is the point where the model of the system is the system. I don't think there are any models or systems at all. Not physically. There are only presentations and re-presentations. Habits and inertia. Craig The fun thing is that if we have both then we have a nice solution to both the mind (for matter) and body (for comp) problems. There can be no 'supreme monad' as such would be equivalent to a preferred frame and basis. The totality of all that exists is not a hierarchy, it is a fractal network. The supreme monad is just everything which is undiffracted, i.e. the single thread that the whole tapestry of tapestries is made of...which is itself one giant (or infinitesimally small) tapestry seed. Size isn't relevant because size is part of the tapestry, not the thread. Craig OK, but can you see that what you are talking about (the Supreme Monad) is a giant monism? We need to cover both sides, the dual aspects. As I see it, when we jump up to a Supreme Monad we are required to fuzz out all distinctions that are relevant at the 1p level. The Sense of the Supreme monad is an undistinguished Nothing. It cannot have any particular features of properties. -- Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Simulated Intelligence Mini-Manifesto
On Fri, Feb 15, 2013 at 1:08 AM, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote: I think you're conflating intelligence with consciousness. Funny, someone else accused me of the same thing already today: You've conflating 'real intelligence' with conscious experience. Real or literal intelligence is a conscious experience as far as we know. Metaphorically, we can say that something which is not the result of a conscious experience (like evolutionary adaptations in a species) is intelligent, but what we mean is that it impresses us as something that seems like it could have been the result of intelligent motives. To fail to note that intelligence supervenes on consciousness is, in my opinion, clearly a Pathetic Fallacy assumption. If I move my arm, that is a behaviour. The behaviour has an associated experience. The behaviour and the experience are not the same thing, even if it turns out that you can't have one without the other. It's a question of correct use of the English language. If the table talks to you and helps you solve a difficult problem, then by definition the table is intelligent. No, you are using your intelligence to turn what comes out of the tables mouth into a solution to a difficult problem. If look at the answers to a crossword puzzle in a book, and it helps me solve the crossword puzzle, that doesn't mean that the book is intelligent, or that answers are intelligent, it just means that something which is intelligent has made formations available which my intelligence uses to inform itself. I meant if the table talks to you just like a person does, giving you consistently interesting conversation and useful advice on a wide variety of subjects. Unless it's a trick and there's a hidden speaker somewhere, you would then have to say that the table is intelligent. You might speculate as to how the table does it and whether the table is conscious, but those are separate questions. How the table pulls this off and whether it is conscious or not are separate questions. I think that assumption and any deep understanding of either consciousness or intelligence are mutually exclusive. Understanding begins when you doubt what you have assumed. I think you're using the word intelligent in a non-standard way, leading to confusion. The first thing to do in any debate is agree on the definition of the words. -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Simulated Intelligence Mini-Manifesto
On 2/14/2013 6:08 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote: I don't think there are any models or systems at all. Not physically. There are only presentations and re-presentations. Habits and inertia. I agree, they cannot be physical at all, they are representations not things-in-themselves (objects). The trick is to see the difference between the general properties of representations and objects while not thinking of they as separable. For any object there exist at least one representation and for every representation there exists at least one object. This sets up the isomorphism of the Stone duality. -- Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Simulated Intelligence Mini-Manifesto
On Thursday, February 14, 2013 6:52:21 PM UTC-5, Stephen Paul King wrote: On 2/14/2013 6:08 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote: I don't think there are any models or systems at all. Not physically. There are only presentations and re-presentations. Habits and inertia. I agree, they cannot be physical at all, they are representations not things-in-themselves (objects). The trick is to see the difference between the general properties of representations and objects while not thinking of they as separable. For any object there exist at least one representation and for every representation there exists at least one object. This sets up the isomorphism of the Stone duality. I'm on board with that, but I think to complete the picture, both the subjective representations (models) and objective representations (objects) should be understood to exist only through subjective presentations (sense). The isomorphism of the Stone duality requires sense to relate topologies to algebras, i.e. they don't relate to each other directly and independently of an observer. The duality is a reflection of the observer's capacity to observe. Craig -- Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Simulated Intelligence Mini-Manifesto
On Thursday, February 14, 2013 6:45:27 PM UTC-5, stathisp wrote: On Fri, Feb 15, 2013 at 1:08 AM, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.comjavascript: wrote: I think you're conflating intelligence with consciousness. Funny, someone else accused me of the same thing already today: You've conflating 'real intelligence' with conscious experience. Real or literal intelligence is a conscious experience as far as we know. Metaphorically, we can say that something which is not the result of a conscious experience (like evolutionary adaptations in a species) is intelligent, but what we mean is that it impresses us as something that seems like it could have been the result of intelligent motives. To fail to note that intelligence supervenes on consciousness is, in my opinion, clearly a Pathetic Fallacy assumption. If I move my arm, that is a behaviour. The behaviour has an associated experience. The behaviour and the experience are not the same thing, even if it turns out that you can't have one without the other. It's a question of correct use of the English language. They are both the same thing and not the same thing. Moving your arm is exactly what it is before being linguistically deconstructed - a united private-public physical participation. If the table talks to you and helps you solve a difficult problem, then by definition the table is intelligent. No, you are using your intelligence to turn what comes out of the tables mouth into a solution to a difficult problem. If look at the answers to a crossword puzzle in a book, and it helps me solve the crossword puzzle, that doesn't mean that the book is intelligent, or that answers are intelligent, it just means that something which is intelligent has made formations available which my intelligence uses to inform itself. I meant if the table talks to you just like a person does, giving you consistently interesting conversation and useful advice on a wide variety of subjects. Why would it matter how convincing the simulation seems? Unless it's a trick and there's a hidden speaker somewhere, you would then have to say that the table is intelligent. It's not a hidden speaker, it is a collection of modular recordings which are strung together to match the criteria of canned algorithms. We do not at all have to say the table is intelligent. To the contrary, computers are literally less intelligent than a rock. You might speculate as to how the table does it and whether the table is conscious, but those are separate questions. The only thing to speculate on is whether there is reason to suspect that the table has been designed specifically to convince you into believing it is intelligent, or feeling comfortable pretending that it is intelligent. How the table pulls this off and whether it is conscious or not are separate questions. I think that assumption and any deep understanding of either consciousness or intelligence are mutually exclusive. Understanding begins when you doubt what you have assumed. I think you're using the word intelligent in a non-standard way, leading to confusion. The first thing to do in any debate is agree on the definition of the words. I think that any debate that even considers word definitions to be real is a waste of time. Craig -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Simulated Intelligence Mini-Manifesto
On 2/14/2013 6:45 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On Fri, Feb 15, 2013 at 1:08 AM, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote: I think you're conflating intelligence with consciousness. Funny, someone else accused me of the same thing already today: You've conflating 'real intelligence' with conscious experience. Real or literal intelligence is a conscious experience as far as we know. Metaphorically, we can say that something which is not the result of a conscious experience (like evolutionary adaptations in a species) is intelligent, but what we mean is that it impresses us as something that seems like it could have been the result of intelligent motives. To fail to note that intelligence supervenes on consciousness is, in my opinion, clearly a Pathetic Fallacy assumption. If I move my arm, that is a behaviour. The behaviour has an associated experience. The behaviour and the experience are not the same thing, even if it turns out that you can't have one without the other. It's a question of correct use of the English language. If the table talks to you and helps you solve a difficult problem, then by definition the table is intelligent. No, you are using your intelligence to turn what comes out of the tables mouth into a solution to a difficult problem. If look at the answers to a crossword puzzle in a book, and it helps me solve the crossword puzzle, that doesn't mean that the book is intelligent, or that answers are intelligent, it just means that something which is intelligent has made formations available which my intelligence uses to inform itself. I meant if the table talks to you just like a person does, giving you consistently interesting conversation and useful advice on a wide variety of subjects. Unless it's a trick and there's a hidden speaker somewhere, you would then have to say that the table is intelligent. You might speculate as to how the table does it and whether the table is conscious, but those are separate questions. Who is to say that that table was actually a TV set in the shape of a table or a table that had some other means to transmit what would satisfy a speech-only Turing test? This goes nowhere, Stathis. How the table pulls this off and whether it is conscious or not are separate questions. I think that assumption and any deep understanding of either consciousness or intelligence are mutually exclusive. Understanding begins when you doubt what you have assumed. I think you're using the word intelligent in a non-standard way, leading to confusion. The first thing to do in any debate is agree on the definition of the words. Could you define intelligence for us in unambiguous terms? I don't recall Craig trying to do that... -- Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Simulated Intelligence Mini-Manifesto
On 2/14/2013 9:43 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Thursday, February 14, 2013 6:52:21 PM UTC-5, Stephen Paul King wrote: On 2/14/2013 6:08 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote: I don't think there are any models or systems at all. Not physically. There are only presentations and re-presentations. Habits and inertia. I agree, they cannot be physical at all, they are representations not things-in-themselves (objects). The trick is to see the difference between the general properties of representations and objects while not thinking of they as separable. For any object there exist at least one representation and for every representation there exists at least one object. This sets up the isomorphism of the Stone duality. I'm on board with that, but I think to complete the picture, both the subjective representations (models) and objective representations (objects) should be understood to exist only through subjective presentations (sense). The isomorphism of the Stone duality requires sense to relate topologies to algebras, i.e. they don't relate to each other directly and independently of an observer. The duality is a reflection of the observer's capacity to observe. Craig OK, let's take it to the next step. Let us agree that they don't relate to each other directly and independently of an observer, they being represented as X and Y. Does this require that there does not exist an observer Z than can see both of X's and Y's total world lines simultaneously? If the world line of Z is longer than that of X and Y by some number then they would be able to communicate directly (well you know what I mean) and thus be able to come to some complete agreement that Z knows all about X and Y. Could Z be said to 'know' a representation of the life and times of X and Y? -- Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Does p make sense?
Dear Bruno, I would like to know what 'doxastic models of consciousness' means, as well as what means S4Grz - I know Craig was the one who originally used the term 'doxastic models' but you seemed to know right away what that meant, so I'd like to know from your perspective what it means; moreover, I want to know S4Grz or be pointed towards an advanced level logic book so I can understand what that means. Finally, as a simple confirmation, I do assume that when you guys talk about Bp p you mean the literal proposition someone believes p it is the case that it is p -- if I don't get at least that, I should hang up my hat around here! Cheers, Dan On Wednesday, February 13, 2013 10:56:05 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 12 Feb 2013, at 20:05, Craig Weinberg wrote: When we talk about a Bp, relating to consciousness is that we are making an assumption about what a proposition is. In fact, if we look closely, a proposition can only be another level of B. p is really nothing but a group of sub-personal Beliefs (logarithmically nested as B^n) ? which we are arbitrarily considered as a given condition...but there is no given condition in actual experience. That's why we put Bp p. To get the condition of 1p experience. It works as we get a non nameable, and non formalisable notion of knowledge. S4 and S4Grz do succeed in meta-formalizing a thoroughly non formalisable notion. All experiences are contingent upon what the experiencer is capable of receiving or interacting with. Any proposition that can be named relies on some pre-existing context (which is sensed or makes sense). The problem with applying Doxastic models to consciousness is not only that it amputates the foundations of awareness, It does not for the reason above. Note that even Bp p can lead to falsity, in principle. Things get more complex when you add the non monotonic layers, that we need for natural languages and for the mundane type of belief or knowledge. Here, of course, with the goal of deriving the correct physical laws; it is simpler to consider the case of ideally correct machine, for which us, but not the machine itself can know the equivalence. Bruno but that the fact of the amputation will be hidden by the results. In Baudrillard's terms, this is a stage 3 simulacrum, (stage one = a true reflection, stage two = a perversion of the truth, stage three = a perversion which pretends not to be a perversion). The third stage masks the absence of a profound reality, where the simulacrum *pretends* to be a faithful copy, but it is a copy with no original. Signs and images claim to represent something real, but no representation is taking place and arbitrary images are merely suggested as things which they have no relationship to. Baudrillard calls this the order of sorcery, a regime of semantichttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Semanticsalgebra where all human meaning is conjured artificially to appear as a reference to the (increasingly) hermetic truth. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Simulacra_and_Simulation This is made more important by the understanding that sense or awareness is the source of authenticity itself. This means that there can be no tolerance for any stage of simulation beyond 1. In my hypotheses, I am always trying to get at the 1 stage for that reason, because consciousness or experience, by definition, has no substitute. Craig -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-li...@googlegroups.com javascript:. To post to this group, send email to everyth...@googlegroups.comjavascript: . Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Simulated Intelligence Mini-Manifesto
On Thursday, February 14, 2013 11:17:08 PM UTC-5, Stephen Paul King wrote: On 2/14/2013 9:43 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Thursday, February 14, 2013 6:52:21 PM UTC-5, Stephen Paul King wrote: On 2/14/2013 6:08 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote: I don't think there are any models or systems at all. Not physically. There are only presentations and re-presentations. Habits and inertia. I agree, they cannot be physical at all, they are representations not things-in-themselves (objects). The trick is to see the difference between the general properties of representations and objects while not thinking of they as separable. For any object there exist at least one representation and for every representation there exists at least one object. This sets up the isomorphism of the Stone duality. I'm on board with that, but I think to complete the picture, both the subjective representations (models) and objective representations (objects) should be understood to exist only through subjective presentations (sense). The isomorphism of the Stone duality requires sense to relate topologies to algebras, i.e. they don't relate to each other directly and independently of an observer. The duality is a reflection of the observer's capacity to observe. Craig OK, let's take it to the next step. Let us agree that they don't relate to each other directly and independently of an observer, they being represented as X and Y. Does this require that there does not exist an observer Z than can see both of X's and Y's total world lines simultaneously? If the world line of Z is longer than that of X and Y by some number then they would be able to communicate directly (well you know what I mean) and thus be able to come to some complete agreement that Z knows all about X and Y. Could Z be said to 'know' a representation of the life and times of X and Y? Like to you (Z), I am histories of experiences which are associated with me (Y) and I am a body which is located right now in a house in North Carolina (X). Your Y is private, but your X is much more public - I am a body in a house in NC to any Z who is a person, dog, cat, etc. Not to a plant really, or a molecule, to those distant kinds of Z, I don't exist at all. Everyone's XY for me put together adds up to basically (Absolute minus Z). My Z is what is being borrowed from the Absolute inertial frame temporarily, and my XY is the like shadow that it casts. It's complicated of course, because all of the X, Y, and Z feedback multiple loops on each other too. Very pretzely. Craig -- Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: How can intelligence be physical ?
The learned men confuse the mathematical tools with the physical reality and therefore we have math-physical fairy-tales. =. On Feb 14, 5:39 pm, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 14 Feb 2013, at 08:48, socra...@bezeqint.net wrote: Euler's Equation and the Reality of Nature. =. Mr. Dexter Sinister wrote: ‘ I understand Euler's Identity, and I know what it means, and I know how to prove it, there's nothing particularly mystical about it, it just demonstrates that exponential, trigonometric, and complex functions are related. Given what we know of mathematics it shouldn't surprise anyone that its various bits are connected. It would be much more surprising if they weren't, that would almost certainly mean something was badly wrong somewhere.’ Mr. Gary wrote: Mathematics is NOT science. Science is knowledge of the REAL world. Mathematics is an invention of the mind. This is of course false in the comp theory. It is also intuitively false for most mathematicians. It is usually asserted by people confusing the mathematical tools, that we invent indeed, and the mathematical reality, which is really a sequence of surprising facts, that we discover. The use of REAL world is dogmatic physicalism. It proposes as a fact what is a theological or metaphysical hypothesis, and this condemns any attempt to be rigorous on the subject. It is as bad as using God as a gap explanation. It is the same mistake. Bruno Many aspects of mathematics have found application in the real world, but there is no guarantee. Any correlation must meet the ultimate test: does it explain something about the real world? As an electrical engineer I used the generalized Euler's equation all the time in circuit analysis: exp(j*theta) = cos(theta) + j*sin(theta). So it works at that particular level in electricity. Does it work at other levels, too? Logic cannot prove it. It must be determined by experiment, not by philosophizing. .. Thinking about theirs posts I wrote brief article: Euler's Equation and Reality. =. a) Euler's Equation as a mathematical reality. Euler's identity is the gold standard for mathematical beauty'. Euler's identity is the most famous formula in all mathematics. ‘ . . . this equation is the mathematical analogue of Leonardo da Vinci’s Mona Lisa painting or Michelangelo’s statue of David’ ‘It is God’s equation.’, ‘ It is a mathematical icon.’ . . . . etc. b) Euler's Equation as a physical reality. it is absolutely paradoxical; we cannot understand it, and we don't know what it means, . . . . .’ ‘ Euler's Equation reaches down into the very depths of existence’ ‘ Is Euler's Equation about fundamental matters?’ ‘It would be nice to understand Euler's Identity as a physical process using physics.‘ ‘ Is it possible to unite Euler's Identity with physics, quantum physics ?’ ==. My aim is to understand the reality of nature. Can Euler's equation explain me something about reality? To give the answer to this question I need to bind Euler's equation with an object - particle. Can it be math- point or string- particle or triangle-particle? No, Euler's formula has quantity (pi) which says me that the particle must be only a circle . Now I want to understand the behavior of circle - particle and therefore I need to use spatial relativity and quantum theories. These two theories say me that the reason of circle – particle’s movement is its own inner impulse (h) or (h*=h/2pi). a) Using its own inner impulse (h) circle - particle moves ( as a wheel) in a straight line with constant speed c = 1. We call such particle - ‘photon’. From Earth – gravity point of view this speed is maximally. From Vacuum point of view this speed is minimally. In this movement quantum of light behave as a corpuscular (no charge). b) Using its own inner impulse / intrinsic angular momentum ( h* = h / 2pi ) circle - particle rotates around its axis. In such movement particle has charge, produce electric waves ( waves property of particle) and its speed ( frequency) is : c1. We call such particle - ‘ electron’ and its energy is: E=h*f. In this way I (as a peasant ) can understand the reality of nature. ==. I reread my post. My God, that is a naïve peasant's explanation. It is absolutely not scientific, not professor's explanation. Would a learned man adopt such simple and naive explanation? Hmm, . . . problem. In any way, even Mr. Dexter Sinister and Mr. Gary wouldn't agree with me, I want to say them ' Thank you for emails and cooperation’ =. Best wishes. Israel Sadovnik Socratus. =. P.S. ' They would play a greater and greater role in mathematics – and then, with the advent of quantum mechanics in the twentieth century, in physics and engineering and any field that deals with cyclical phenomena such as
Re: Simulated Intelligence Mini-Manifesto
On 2/14/2013 11:34 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Thursday, February 14, 2013 11:17:08 PM UTC-5, Stephen Paul King wrote: On 2/14/2013 9:43 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Thursday, February 14, 2013 6:52:21 PM UTC-5, Stephen Paul King wrote: On 2/14/2013 6:08 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote: I don't think there are any models or systems at all. Not physically. There are only presentations and re-presentations. Habits and inertia. I agree, they cannot be physical at all, they are representations not things-in-themselves (objects). The trick is to see the difference between the general properties of representations and objects while not thinking of they as separable. For any object there exist at least one representation and for every representation there exists at least one object. This sets up the isomorphism of the Stone duality. I'm on board with that, but I think to complete the picture, both the subjective representations (models) and objective representations (objects) should be understood to exist only through subjective presentations (sense). The isomorphism of the Stone duality requires sense to relate topologies to algebras, i.e. they don't relate to each other directly and independently of an observer. The duality is a reflection of the observer's capacity to observe. Craig OK, let's take it to the next step. Let us agree that they don't relate to each other directly and independently of an observer, they being represented as X and Y. Does this require that there does not exist an observer Z than can see both of X's and Y's total world lines simultaneously? If the world line of Z is longer than that of X and Y by some number then they would be able to communicate directly (well you know what I mean) and thus be able to come to some complete agreement that Z knows all about X and Y. Could Z be said to 'know' a representation of the life and times of X and Y? Like to you (Z), I am histories of experiences which are associated with me (Y) and I am a body which is located right now in a house in North Carolina (X). Your Y is private, but your X is much more public - I am a body in a house in NC to any Z who is a person, dog, cat, etc. Not to a plant really, or a molecule, to those distant kinds of Z, I don't exist at all. Craig, Right, exactly right! From Z and X, Y is a p-zombie, a physical mindless robot. What does X see of Z and Y? The same kinda thing. And Y, what does it see? Seeing is within Sense... Everyone's XY for me put together adds up to basically (Absolute minus Z). Only if I stipulate that only X, Y and Z exist would I agree. If there are, say, 10^23 witnesses, like Z and X are of Y's physical acts, what difference would that make? None! So long as all of this witnesses could back up each others narratives. My Z is what is being borrowed from the Absolute inertial frame temporarily, and my XY is the like shadow that it casts. It's complicated of course, because all of the X, Y, and Z feedback multiple loops on each other too. Very pretzely. You assuming that one of those p's is absolute in some way. None are, all cast shadows equivalently on each other or they would not co-exist at all. Craig -- Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Chosen-ness
On Wednesday, February 13, 2013 10:15:53 PM UTC-5, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Wednesday, February 13, 2013 7:05:39 PM UTC-5, freqflyer07281972 wrote: Hi Craig, Thank you for your very well considered point of view on my original post. I have some interjections that I would enjoy hearing a response to: Thanks Dan, I'll try my best. On Sunday, January 27, 2013 9:37:03 PM UTC-5, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Sunday, January 27, 2013 5:35:22 PM UTC-5, freqflyer07281972 wrote: Hey everyone, I've been following this group a lot. I read it everyday and enjoy all of the wonderful stuff that comes up, even if some of it tends towards ad hominem, argument from authority, and petitio principi. Hey, we're humans, right? That means we get to make these fallacies, in good conscience or bad. Anyway, I wondered about what anyone/everyone thought about the notion of 'chosenness' as a way to understand where we are here in the world. It seems to me that concepts like MWI, Bruno's comp/mech hypothesis and the 'dreams of numbers' ideas of subjectivity, and even Leibniz's 'best of all possible worlds' don't actually do something like flee away from our everyday responsibility to accept the basic fact that we have been CHOSEN -- and when I say this, please don't immediately put a bunch of theological baggage on it. I'm not saying God chose this reality as opposed to another, although this might be a convenient shorthand. But what I am saying is that, out of all the staggering possibilities that we know exist with regards to our universe, our galaxy, our solar system, our planet, our society, and even our individual selves, things could have very easily turned out to be different than they were. The fact that they have turned out in just this way and not another indicates this kind of chosenness, and along with it, comes a certain degree of responsibility, I guess? It seems to me that all the various 'everything' hypotheses (MWI, comp, Leibniz, and others) try to apply the Copernican principle to its breaking point. True enough, there is from a purely 3p point of view nothing special about our cosmic situation re: our planet and our sun. BUT, from an existential 1p point of view there is a huge privilege that we have, i.e. we are sentient observers, who love, feel pain, feel desire, and long for transcendence. Moreover, the 3p point of view is a pure abstraction, kind of like eating the picture of a meal rather than the actual meal. How do we know what any kind of 3p account of truth would be? What would it even look like? A universe with no observers. A falling tree without a hearer/listener. This, to me, is nonsense. Aren't things like MWI of quantum physics and comp hypothesis of universal dovetailer trying to, at a fundamental and existential level, an attempt to try to run away from the concreteness and absolute 'givenness' (gift) of the world as we find it? And isn't our role, in creation, as freely choosing beings (sorry, John Clark, free will is more than just a noise) to choose what will make other people with us now and in the future feel more love and less pain? And isn't this why we were chosen? I'll go back to lurking now, but I'd appreciate any thoughts you might have on this reflection of mine. Cheers, Dan What I propose is that a complete description of the universe must include: 1. The experience of significance. This speaks to the idea of chosen-ness, of choice, of free will, of improbability as a quality as the subject of appreciation. There is a difference between choosing and being chosen. The former takes place on the level of the agent -- it is where 'free will' is exercised. The latter has no free will associated with it Sure, but they are ontological conjugates, i.e. you can be chosen locally without having the ability to make choices yourself (theoretically anyways), but you can't be chosen without the presence of some choosing agency in the universe. BINGO - here's a smuggled premise, the premise of 'choosing agency' - why would there be agency to any choosing force? this is like making the same mistake as eager adaptationist versions of evolution that import 'just so' stories to explain what are, in essence, really quite blind and arbitrary design decisions that propagate from one generation to the next (spandrels- steven j. gould), for the simple reason that they a) didn't die before they had more offspring and b) had offspring to propagate that feature...I would say, on the contrary, that is is quite easy to be chosen without the presence of a choosing agency, and the fact of natural selection proves this (as far as i am aware, no one has ever said natural selection is an 'agent', complete with all of the free will ramifications that this term implies) -- if you are chosen to go to war by your government, then you go, regardless of
Re: Simulated Intelligence Mini-Manifesto
On Wed, Feb 13, 2013 Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote: * *Wouldn’t Simulated Intelligence be a more appropriate term than Artificial Intelligence? Yes that euphemism could have advantages, it might make the last human being feel a little better about himself just before the Jupiter Brain outsmarted him and sent him into oblivion forever. By calling it artificial, we also emphasize a kind of obsolete notion of natural vs man-made as categories of origin. What on earth is obsolete about the natural verses man-made dichotomy? The Jupiter brain really was the product of a intelligent designer while the human being was not. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Chosen-ness
On 2/15/2013 12:05 AM, freqflyer07281972 wrote: Sure, but they are ontological conjugates, i.e. you can be chosen locally without having the ability to make choices yourself (theoretically anyways), but you can't be chosen without the presence of some choosing agency in the universe. BINGO - here's a smuggled premise, the premise of 'choosing agency' - why would there be agency to any choosing force? this is like making the same mistake as eager adaptationist versions of evolution that import 'just so' stories to explain what are, in essence, really quite blind and arbitrary design decisions that propagate from one generation to the next (spandrels- steven j. gould), for the simple reason that they a) didn't die before they had more offspring and b) had offspring to propagate that feature...I would say, on the contrary, that is is quite easy to be chosen without the presence of a choosing agency, and the fact of natural selection proves this (as far as i am aware, no one has ever said natural selection is an 'agent', complete with all of the free will ramifications that this term implies) Hi, Wait, what? Flyer, you didn't define the symmetry that made agency vanish! y offspring are not perfect copies of me! Thus their choices are different from my choices. So how do I get credit for the appearance of agency of my off-spring? If there is no agency, how the heck does it seem to me that I have agency to the point of experiencing it's 'agency-ness' directly 1p? Spandrels must be all exactly isomorphic to Gould's reasoning to be sound. I am saying that natural selection is an 'agent'! Any act of selection implies an agent of some kind unless that act is forced. -- Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Simulated Intelligence Mini-Manifesto
On 2/15/2013 12:23 AM, John Clark wrote: On Wed, Feb 13, 2013 Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com mailto:whatsons...@gmail.com wrote: * *Wouldn’t Simulated Intelligence be a more appropriate term than Artificial Intelligence? Yes that euphemism could have advantages, it might make the last human being feel a little better about himself just before the Jupiter Brain outsmarted him and sent him into oblivion forever. By calling it artificial, we also emphasize a kind of obsolete notion of natural vs man-made as categories of origin. What on earth is obsolete about the natural verses man-made dichotomy? The Jupiter brain really was the product of a intelligent designer while the human being was not. Hi John, The Jupiter brain really was the product of a intelligent designer while the human being was not. How could you know for sure? -- Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Chosen-ness
On 2/15/2013 12:38 AM, Stephen P. King wrote: On 2/15/2013 12:05 AM, freqflyer07281972 wrote: Sure, but they are ontological conjugates, i.e. you can be chosen locally without having the ability to make choices yourself (theoretically anyways), but you can't be chosen without the presence of some choosing agency in the universe. BINGO - here's a smuggled premise, the premise of 'choosing agency' - why would there be agency to any choosing force? this is like making the same mistake as eager adaptationist versions of evolution that import 'just so' stories to explain what are, in essence, really quite blind and arbitrary design decisions that propagate from one generation to the next (spandrels- steven j. gould), for the simple reason that they a) didn't die before they had more offspring and b) had offspring to propagate that feature...I would say, on the contrary, that is is quite easy to be chosen without the presence of a choosing agency, and the fact of natural selection proves this (as far as i am aware, no one has ever said natural selection is an 'agent', complete with all of the free will ramifications that this term implies) Hi, Wait, what? Flyer, you didn't define the symmetry that made agency vanish! My offspring are not perfect copies of me! Thus their choices are different from my choices. So how do I get credit for the appearance of agency of my off-spring? If there is no agency, how the heck does it seem to me that I have agency to the point of experiencing it's 'agency-ness' directly 1p? Spandrels must be all exactly isomorphic to Gould's reasoning to be sound. I am saying that natural selection is an 'agent'! Any act of selection implies an agent of some kind unless that act is forced. Essentially, Flyer, I am asking: What makes the feature of 'agency' special? -- Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
