date:20140212


On 2/12/2014 11:41 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 12 Feb 2014, at 18:34, meekerdb wrote:


On 2/12/2014 1:47 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 11 Feb 2014, at 18:20, meekerdb wrote:


On 2/11/2014 8:48 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 11 Feb 2014, at 04:15, meekerdb wrote:




...


Brent
"That which can explain *anything* fails to explain at all."



With physicalism, QM explains everything. At some level at least.


First, that's not true.  QM is apparently inconsistent with our best theory of 
gravity.


Sure, but a bit aside the point.



Second, it has been very successful at explaining what is observed.


Everything that we observe. My point is that with the quoted criteria, this should 
entail that it explains nothing.




That doesn't mean it can explain ghosts, leprechauns, gods and other things *not* 
observed.


Why not "consciousness" and other things that we do not see, but at least 
believe in?




There's a difference between being able to explain anything and explaining 
everything.


That's my point.

Bruno


Then it's not well taken since I used the word "anything" originally and your complaint 
implies I wrote "everything".


All right. I interpreted "anything" by "anything worth to be explained".

If not, for a logician, that which can explain *anything* becomes an inconsistent 
theory, or the set of sentences true in a cul-de-sac world.


If I reported that there was a flying pig, wouldn't comp just explain, "That's the way 
arithmetic looks from inside."?


Brent

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Re: Modal logic 4 (was Re: Suicide Words God and Ideas).

On 2/12/2014 11:37 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Liz, if Brent don't mind, my answer to Brent here contains a bit on modal logic, 
directly related to the machine discourse (and this will be justified later, as it is 
not obvious at all).

On 12 Feb 2014, at 18:28, meekerdb wrote:

On 2/12/2014 1:30 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 11 Feb 2014, at 14:55, meekerdb wrote:

On 2/11/2014 12:42 AM, LizR wrote:
On 11 February 2014 17:21, Russell Standish > wrote:

On Tue, Feb 11, 2014 at 04:57:50PM +1300, LizR wrote:
>
> You wouldn't need to say that if you could show what's wrong with it! :-)
>
> (Sorry!)
>
> I think the chances are a TOE will have to go a looong way before it's
> likely to make predictions rather than retrodictions. Didn't string theory
> retrodict the graviton or something, and everyone said that was a positive
> result? Well, Bruno's got qualia, apparently...
>

I don't see how he does. He does have the existence of incommunicable
facts (the G*\G thing), but that's not the same as qualia ISTM.

I said "apparently" because I have no idea how he does it.

I think a simpler form of the argument is that it must be possible to simulate 
consciousness because (we think) any physical process can be simulated and 
consciousness necessarily accompanies the physical processes of one's brain. This is 
the bet of "saying yes to the doctor".

With comp, I don't think we can simulate matter, nor consciousness. We can only 
simulate the relevant part of the brain so that consciousness is preserved. The price 
to pay is that matter becomes something emergent in the 1p views (1p plural) and 
cannot be simulated or emulated.

But there's a catch.  When we simulate an aircraft flying or a weather system those 
have a reference in the 'real' world and that's why they are simulations. But if we 
simulate a conscious brain the consciousness will be 'real' consciousness. So 
simulating conscious is in a sense impossible; we may be able to produce it but we 
can't simulate it.  Consciousness must be consciousness of something, but it need not 
be anything physical;

It needs to be physical, at least in the FPI sense of physical.

So you're saying that we cannot simulate matter or consciousness.  But I think we can 
still produce consciousness by manipulating matter - we can still build a conscious 
Mars rover.

With comp we can say that, but only as a matter of speaking. Mars Rover is in Heaven, 
and the hard task of computer we send on Mars is to distracted it enough so that it can 
manifest its consciousness to us, notably by sending us interesting data on mars. The 
consciousness of Mars Rover is a 1-view, and it is more "a product" of the infinity of 
computations going through its state in the arithmetical reality) than with a "single" 
machine. Thanks to Everett, and our own entanglement with mars, we can indeed bet that 
little Mars Rover share some history with us.

it could just be consciousness of arithmetical truths.  This explains why aspects of 
consciousness are ineffable.  It's because conscious processes can prove Goedel's 
theorem and so know that some truths are unprovable.  Bruno takes "qualia are 
ineffable" and "some arithmetical truths are unprovable" and postulates 
"ineffable=unprovable".

Not really.
I guess people progress, as this is the new common error in fashion, but some logician 
did it too, and is a confusion between hypostases. Qualia are related to non 
communicable, but only *indirectly* through G*. It happens through Z1* and X1* (and 
S4Grz1),

Don't understand that.

Incompleteness does not just separate the provability/consistency modal logic G into two 
parts: the provable statements, and the true statements, it also makes the logic of the 
differents modalities:

p
[]p
[]p & p
[]p & <>t
[]p & <>t & p

obeying different modal logics, despite G* proves them all equivalent extensionnally 
(they "proves" the same true arithmetical propositions, but they see them differently.

Among them, three logics splits into provable and non provable parts:

[]p   (gives G and G*, by Solovay theorem)
[]p & <>p  (gives Z and Z*-
[]p & <>t & p   (gives X and X*)

That remains true when we restrict p on the sigma_1 arithmetical reality (the 
arithmetical UD, which is a UD, provably).

That changes G into a modal logic G1 (G + p->[]p) and all hypostases get changed by 
this. I change their names by adding a 1. And qualia and quanta appears in S4Grz1, Z1*, X1*.

which translates the UDA. the Gödel provability cannot be used for the UD measure, due 
to the cul-de-sac worlds. That is why we need []p & p, or []p & Dt, or []p & Dt & p.

Brent, do you see this?

Are you OK that in a cul-de-sac world we have []A for all A?

I understand that "W is a cul-de-sac world" means there is no world accessible from W 
(including W itself), so "A is true in all worlds accessible from W" is vacu

Re: Better Than the Chinese Room

2014-02-12 Thread Stathis Papaioannou

On 12 February 2014 23:47, Craig Weinberg  wrote:

>> > I don't think that my experience can be replaced with a copy though.
>>
>> So how would you know you were a copy?
>
>
> It has nothing to do with whether or not I would know, it's because in my
> understanding, copying is not primitively real, but rather is a consequence
> of low level insensitivity. As awareness approaches the limits of its
> sensitivity, everything seems more and more the same. From an absolute
> perspective, awareness cannot be substituted, because substitution is the
> antithesis of awareness.

That's your theory of why you don't think your experience could be
replaced with a copy, but you haven't explained what you think would
happen.

>> Here you are today, incredulous
>> about the story of your destruction last night, but we produce
>> witnesses and videotapes and whatever other proof you need. What are
>> you going to say to that?
>
>
> Your question is "If you were wrong about awareness being non-transferable,
> would you still think you were right?". I'm not even sure what that fallacy
> is called...a loaded non-question?

No, it's a simple question. You could answer something like, "If I
were replaced by a copy last night then my copy would tell you today
that he is not Craig Weinberg".

>> >> If it were possible to have a change in mental state without a change
>> >> in brain state that would be evidence that we don't think with our
>> >> brain.
>> >
>> >
>> > Some claim that NDEs are such changes, and that their experiences have
>> > occurred during periods without brain activity. Certainly there is
>> > evidence
>> > that correlates decreased brain activity with increased perception with
>> > psilocybin uses, which would suggest at the very least that a one-to-one
>> > correspondence of mental to neurological activity is an
>> > oversimplification.
>>
>> Obviously, since maximal brain activity occurs during an epileptic
>> fit, during which there may be no consciousness.
>>
>> > I would not deny that we think with our brain, in the sense that the
>> > human
>> > experience of thought corresponds with the appearance of human brain
>> > activity, but that doesn't mean that our consciousness and experience of
>> > living is part of our brain or can be located through our brain.
>>
>> No, I would not use those terms. But I don't believe that an
>> experience can occur in the absence of all brain activity, for example
>> if the brain is frozen in liquid nitrogen.
>
>
> I don't believe that either, but that doesn't mean that thought and feeling
> can be frozen.

They wouldn't be frozen, they would just stop, at least temporarily if
there were no permanent damage to the brain.

>> The software differences are still encoded as
>> physical differences in the computer, for example different electrical
>> charges at different physical locations on a memory chip. Similarly,
>> language is encoded differently in the fine structure of the synaptic
>> connections even if the brains belong to identical twins raised in
>> different countries.
>
>
> The physical differences are only encoded as software if there is a human
> user who is interpreting it as meaningful. Without the user who cares about
> the difference, and for whom the software is designed to interface with,
> there is only unencoded physical differences in the computer. The same goes
> for the brain. Without us, the brain is just a complex piece of coral,
> storing and repeating meaningless configurations of electrical, molecular,
> and cellular interactions that have nothing to do with human consciousness.

If the "meaningless configurations of of electrical, molecular and
cellular interactions" occur then consciousness also occurs, and they
aren't meaningless any more. That is, we know that these physical
processes are *sufficient* for consciousness, since we know that (a)
we are conscious, and (b) as far as we know there is no additional
ingredient other than these physical processes. This does not mean
that these physical processes are *necessary* for consciousness, and I
believe that consciousness can occur in different substrates. These
processes are meaningful to external observers and they are also
meaningful to the internal observer, the conscious self, to whom they
give rise.

>> >> There are drugs
>> >> which have the same effect on species as far apart as humans and
>> >> bacteria.
>> >
>> >
>> > Which is why I say that it should be the same case for language if it
>> > was a
>> > product of brain change. There should be words with mean the same thing
>> > on
>> > species as far apart as humans and bacteria, or at least as far apart as
>> > humans on the other side of the continent.
>>
>> Not at all.
>
>
> Because?

Because it's a non sequitur.


-- 
Stathis Papaioannou

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Re: Edging closer to nuclear fusion...

About 4 million tons of it per second :-)

Yes. We need to intercept an appreciable amount of that energy to become a
type 1 civilisation...


On 13 February 2014 13:53, Chris de Morsella  wrote:

> The solar flux at earth orbit is on average (because the earth's orbit is
> not circular and the solar output is not constant) more or less 1370 W/m2;
> The Earth's radius is 6.378 X 10^6m; The Earth's albedo is around 0.3. So
> the total incident solar energy that is obstructed by the earth's disk and
> that is not reflected back out into space is solar flux * Area of earth's
> disk *albedo =  1370 W/m * 1.278 * 10^11 m2 * 0.30 albedo
> = 5.2499373183089.4 * 10^14 watts
>
> So according to my quick back of the envelope calculations planet earth
> receives a solar flux on average of well over 500 Terawatts after
> factoring in the energy reflected back into space. And that is just the
> energy that is intersected by our planets disk... imagine how much energy a
> Dyson sphere could harvest.
>
>   --
>  *From:* LizR 
> *To:* everything-list@googlegroups.com
> *Sent:* Wednesday, February 12, 2014 4:25 PM
> *Subject:* Re: Edging closer to nuclear fusion...
>
> On 13 February 2014 12:44, Chris de Morsella wrote:
>
> We all do use it already -- even as we burn the fossil fuel banked in coal
> seams and gas & oil bearing formations, all of which ultimately exists
> because a long time ago some plant had done the work of transforming a
> minuscule portion of the energy of flux put out by our fusion energy source
> in the sky during that long ago era into hydrocarbons with a potential
> chemical oxidation energy stored in them.
>
> Yes, sorry, I should have said exclusively, or more or less so. (I don't
> consider burning hydrocarbons to be a useful way to use sunlight, because
> of the by-products.) The Sun lavishes something like 10,000 times more
> energy on Earth than the entirety of the energy used by human civilisation,
> I believe? Certainly a lot more than we need, even if you knock off the
> amount used for keeping warm and so on (most of it goes back into space
> anyway, I think).
>
>
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Re: Edging closer to nuclear fusion...

2014-02-12 Thread Chris de Morsella

The solar flux at earth orbit is on average (because the earth's orbit is not 
circular and the solar output is not constant) more or less 1370 W/m2; The 
Earth's radius is 6.378 X 10^6m; The Earth's albedo is around 0.3. So the total 
incident solar energy that is obstructed by the earth's disk and that is not 
reflected back out into space is solar flux * Area of earth's disk *albedo =  
1370 W/m * 1.278 * 10^11 m2 * 0.30 albedo = 5.2499373183089.4 * 10^14 watts

So according to my quick back of the envelope calculations planet earth 
receives a solar flux on average of well over500 Terawatts after factoring in 
the energy reflected back into space. And that is just the energy that is 
intersected by our planets disk... imagine how much energy a Dyson sphere could 
harvest.

 From: LizR 
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com 
Sent: Wednesday, February 12, 2014 4:25 PM
Subject: Re: Edging closer to nuclear fusion...

On 13 February 2014 12:44, Chris de Morsella  wrote:

We all do use it already -- even as we burn the fossil fuel banked in coal 
seams and gas & oil bearing formations, all of which ultimately exists because 
a long time ago some plant had done the work of transforming a minuscule 
portion of the energy of flux put out by our fusion energy source in the sky 
during that long ago era into hydrocarbons with a potential chemical oxidation 
energy stored in them.
>Yes, sorry, I should have said exclusively, or more or less so. (I don't 
>consider burning hydrocarbons to be a useful way to use sunlight, because of 
>the by-products.) The Sun lavishes something like 10,000 times more energy on 
>Earth than the entirety of the energy used by human civilisation, I believe? 
>Certainly a lot more than we need, even if you knock off the amount used for 
>keeping warm and so on (most of it goes back into space anyway, I think).

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Re: Edging closer to nuclear fusion...

On 13 February 2014 12:44, Chris de Morsella  wrote:

> We all do use it already -- even as we burn the fossil fuel banked in coal
> seams and gas & oil bearing formations, all of which ultimately exists
> because a long time ago some plant had done the work of transforming a
> minuscule portion of the energy of flux put out by our fusion energy source
> in the sky during that long ago era into hydrocarbons with a potential
> chemical oxidation energy stored in them.
>
> Yes, sorry, I should have said exclusively, or more or less so. (I don't
consider burning hydrocarbons to be a useful way to use sunlight, because
of the by-products.) The Sun lavishes something like 10,000 times more
energy on Earth than the entirety of the energy used by human civilisation,
I believe? Certainly a lot more than we need, even if you knock off the
amount used for keeping warm and so on (most of it goes back into space
anyway, I think).

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Re: Edging closer to nuclear fusion...

2014-02-12 Thread Chris de Morsella

We all do use it already -- even as we burn the fossil fuel banked in coal 
seams and gas & oil bearing formations, all of which ultimately exists because 
a long time ago some plant had done the work of transforming a minuscule 
portion of the energy of flux put out by our fusion energy source in the sky 
during that long ago era into hydrocarbons with a potential chemical oxidation 
energy stored in them.





 From: LizR 
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com 
Sent: Wednesday, February 12, 2014 3:25 PM
Subject: Re: Edging closer to nuclear fusion...
 


Yeah, exactly.

Meanwhile we already have a fusion reactor up and running, should anyone want 
to use it.






On 13 February 2014 12:10, Chris de Morsella  wrote:

Let's check back in 50 years on how that turns out :)
>
>
>
>
>
>
> From: LizR 
>To: everything-list@googlegroups.com 
>Sent: Wednesday, February 12, 2014 2:57 PM
>Subject: Edging closer to nuclear fusion...
> 
>
>
>apparently.
>
>
>http://www.theguardian.com/science/2014/feb/12/nuclear-fusion-breakthrough-green-energy-source
>
>
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Re: Edging closer to nuclear fusion...

Yeah, exactly.

Meanwhile we already have a fusion reactor up and running, should anyone
want to use it.

[image: Inline images 1]


On 13 February 2014 12:10, Chris de Morsella  wrote:

> Let's check back in 50 years on how that turns out :)
>
>
>   --
>  *From:* LizR 
> *To:* everything-list@googlegroups.com
> *Sent:* Wednesday, February 12, 2014 2:57 PM
> *Subject:* Edging closer to nuclear fusion...
>
> apparently.
>
>
> http://www.theguardian.com/science/2014/feb/12/nuclear-fusion-breakthrough-green-energy-source
>
>
> --
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Re: Edging closer to nuclear fusion...

2014-02-12 Thread Chris de Morsella

Let's check back in 50 years on how that turns out :)




 From: LizR 
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com 
Sent: Wednesday, February 12, 2014 2:57 PM
Subject: Edging closer to nuclear fusion...
 


apparently.


http://www.theguardian.com/science/2014/feb/12/nuclear-fusion-breakthrough-green-energy-source



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Edging closer to nuclear fusion...

apparently.

http://www.theguardian.com/science/2014/feb/12/nuclear-fusion-breakthrough-green-energy-source

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Re: Suicide Words God and Ideas

On 13 February 2014 09:18, Bruno Marchal  wrote:

> On 12 Feb 2014, at 18:58, meekerdb wrote:
>
>  That doesn't follow.  If there are disjoint worlds, as contemplated in
> some versions of cosmology, they may have different physics.
>
> Nice, comp predicts that this is impossible, although I can agree this is
> a matter of semantics, as I define a physical laws to be true for all
> universal machines, so disjoint worlds will have only different geographies.
>

So you're saying that only those worlds with observers in exist, according
to comp? So the physics they observe will necessarily be such that it
allows them to exist? (In other words, the "Strong Anthropic Principle" ?)

If so, how do you account for us being able to observe an early universe in
which there were apparently no observers? Or do we as obsverers create it
(somehow) ?

You seem to be making your claim a tautology by saying whatever your theory
> produces is physics, even if it's not any physics we know of.  That makes
> it impossible to test.
>
> Why, the physics we get is non trivial. It is as much testable than
> evolution. It explains where the laws of physics come from, and much more.
> It is extremely testable, given that it gives the laws, and it is enough to
> find one natural phenomenon contradicting Z1* or X1* to refute comp (+
> Theaetetus). But this needs more on "AUDA", so let us not anticipate
> everything too much quickly. You jump from step 3 to step 8, and then to
> AUDA. Well, it is interesting, but like Liz said, we have to do the dinner
> and that kind of things of life, if we want to continue the discussion in
> decent condition.
>
> I must admit I got that impression - thath the answer was something like
"comp predicts whatever physics we've got!"

However I see that isn't so, so I will be interested to know how it's
testable - if I ever make it to understanding AUDA.

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Re: Suicide Words God and Ideas

On 12 February 2014 21:21, Richard Ruquist  wrote:

> On Wed, Feb 12, 2014 at 12:12 AM, LizR  wrote:
>
>> On 12 February 2014 17:16, Richard Ruquist  wrote:
>>
>>> On Tue, Feb 11, 2014 at 10:45 PM, LizR  wrote:
>>>
 On 12 February 2014 16:33, Richard Ruquist  wrote:

> On Tue, Feb 11, 2014 at 10:29 PM, LizR  wrote:
>
>> On 12 February 2014 16:23, Richard Ruquist  wrote:
>>
>>>
>>> Bell's Inequality in my opinion does not explain the mechanism of
>>> EPR. The Einstein-Rosen bridge does. It explains how entangled particles
>>> maintain their connection.
>>>

  I don't understand what you mean. Bell's inequality isn't an
>> explanation, it's a number which is violated in the measured results of 
>> EPR
>> experiments.
>>
>
> You seem to have forgotten my original claim for string theory, that
> using Maldacena's duality it explains the mechanism of EPR. *Bell's
> Inequality does not explain the mechanism. *Seems you trust math more
> than physics or even data as in the other thread.
>

 Shorn of the ad hominem nonsense, that's what I just said.

 What you said was:

 String theory based on Maldacena's conjecture predicted the viscosity
> of the quark-gluon plasma before it was measured and more recently
> explained the mechanism behind EPR based on Einstein-Rosen bridges, which
> is more like a retrodiction.
>

 So you are, or appear to be, saying that string theory predicts the
 viscosity of the quark-gluon plasma based on Maldacena's conjecture, and
 that it also explains the EPR mechanism using ERBs. Or at least that is the
 most reasonable way to parse of your sentence.

>>>
>>> You brought up Bell's Inequality, not me. Happy to see that you now get
>>> it.
>>>
>>
>> You mentioned EPR. The point of EPR is that the results violate Bell's
>> inequality.
>>
>
> You are beginning to sound like Edgar.
>
> Except I'm quoting real scientists talking about real science.

But anyway, you long ago started sounding like Edgar, so I won't be
continuing this conversation. If you work out (or read up on) the relevance
of Bell's inequality to EPR you can email me and tell me, otherwise it's
pointless discussing this subject with you.

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Re: Block Universes

On 13 February 2014 03:00, Edgar L. Owen  wrote:

>
> 5. The easy way is just to pause the experiment at any point and compare
> clocks (that is in effect what the twins do when they meet) because this
> immediately re-synchronizes clock rates enabling the real actual age
> differences up till then to be compared.
>
> What does "at any point" mean for separated observers?

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Re: Block Universes

On 13 February 2014 03:00, Edgar L. Owen  wrote:

> Jesse,
>
> He's another way to understand it which might be clearer. It's from the
> perspective of an arbitrary observer A.
>
> 1. A (me) is always in the current moment of P-time as P-time progresses,
> because that is the only locus of actual reality because it's only in this
> current moment of p-time that the current re-computation of the information
> state of the universe is occurring.
>
> 2. All other observers in the universe are also ALWAYS at/in this same
> current moment of P-time, no matter what their clock times read. This
> includes all observers in the examples below.
>
> So now we come to the $64,000 question - out of all the available choices,
which hyperplane of simultaneity passes through all these observers and
selects out p-time?

I won't hold my breath waiting for an answer.

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Re: Suicide Words God and Ideas



On 12 Feb 2014, at 18:58, meekerdb wrote:


On 2/12/2014 3:27 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 12 Feb 2014, at 02:22, meekerdb wrote:


On 2/11/2014 10:21 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
What Everett did for the quantum universal wave, we can do that  
on any universal system, and comp predicts that this will always  
give the same physics.


How does it predict that?


All universal systems produce the same collection of all  
computations, with exactly the same redundancy.
Physics emerged from that set of all computations. So physics must  
be the same whatever pho_i are chosen for the ontological base.


That doesn't follow.  If there are disjoint worlds, as contemplated  
in some versions of cosmology, they may have different physics.


Nice, comp predicts that this is impossible, although I can agree this  
is a matter of semantics, as I define a physical laws to be true for  
all universal machines, so disjoint worlds will have only different  
geographies.




You seem to be making your claim a tautology by saying whatever your  
theory produces is physics, even if it's not any physics we know  
of.  That makes it impossible to test.


Why, the physics we get is non trivial. It is as much testable than  
evolution. It explains where the laws of physics come from, and much  
more. It is extremely testable, given that it gives the laws, and it  
is enough to find one natural phenomenon contradicting Z1* or X1* to  
refute comp (+ Theaetetus). But this needs more on "AUDA", so let us  
not anticipate everything too much quickly. You jump from step 3 to  
step 8, and then to AUDA. Well, it is interesting, but like Liz said,  
we have to do the dinner and that kind of things of life, if we want  
to continue the discussion in decent condition.


See you,

Bruno







Brent

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Re: Suicide Words God and Ideas



On 12 Feb 2014, at 18:55, meekerdb wrote:


On 2/12/2014 3:34 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 12 Feb 2014, at 02:40, meekerdb wrote:


On 2/11/2014 4:50 PM, Russell Standish wrote:

On Wed, Feb 12, 2014 at 07:46:48AM +1300, LizR wrote:

On 12 February 2014 02:55, meekerdb  wrote:

My problem with this is that I don't believe in arithmetical  
realism in
the sense required for this argument.  I think consciousness  
depends of
consciousness *of* an external world and thoughts just about  
Peano's

arithmetic is not enough to realize consciousness and the
"ineffable=unprovable" identification is gratuitous. There are  
obvious
physical and evolutionary reasons that qualia would be  
ineffable.  That's
why I think step 8 is invalid because it assumes dreams (of  
arithmetic?)
are possible independent of any external world - or looked at  
another way,
I think to make it work would require that the 'inert'  
computation simulate
a whole world in which the consciousness would then exist  
*relative* to

that world.

Well, you have already rejected step 0 - (at least one of) the  
initial

assumptions - so I wouldn't worry about step 8!


I don't see how it rejects step 0. Provided that the artificial
computational brain offered by the doctor is connected to the  
actual

senses, and not just placed in a vat connected to some simulated
reality, it certainly satisfies the Yes Doctor postulate.


Exactly.  One may still say yes to the doctor who give you an  
artificial brain that functions within this world (and cannot be  
the 'inert' brain of step 8).


?







I don't see the relevance of AR or CT to Brent's argument.


If you accept AR *and* the identification of "unprovable  
arithmetical truth"="qualia"


I have never identify qualia and "unprovable arithmetical truth".

Qualia are defined by possible semantics bearing on the logic of  
certain unprovable arithmetical truth". That is very different.

technically, you confuse G* and Z*; Z1*, etc.



?? Don't know what that means.


Tell me if my preceding post (modal logic 4) did help, and I can  
explain more tomorrow, as I will have to go.


Bruno





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Re: What are numbers? What is math?



On Wednesday, February 12, 2014 11:57:11 AM UTC-5, Edgar L. Owen wrote:
>
> Bruno, and Craig,
>
> Computational reality doesn't need any notion of primes, or 17 is a prime. 
> In fact I don't see any reason why reality needs any concept even of 17 to 
> compute its current state. If this is true then individual numbers such as 
> 17 are not necessary for reality to compute the universe. I suspect what 
> reality does is more 1:1 comparisons.
>
> E.g. when reality makes a computation to conserve and redistribute 
> particle properties among the outgoing particles of a particle interaction, 
> it doesn't need to count up 17 of anything, it just has to know they are 
> all distributed which it can do with simple 1;1 comparisons. It can do that 
> by 1:1 comparisons, not by any notion of numbers such as 1, 2, or 17 much 
> less any notion of primes.
>

I suspect that in this regard Bruno may have more insight, but 
superficially I agree with you. Just as an abacus can be used to perform 
H-Math functions, on a physical level, all that is happening is that beads 
are sliding to one side or another (R-Math?). I consider H-Math not to be 
limited to humans, but more along the lines of a Bruno-Platonic set of all 
possible groupings of quantitative patterns. As enormous as that UD is, it 
is still, in my view, only a language of theoretical relations, not a 
concrete presence in the universe. What I see with comp is that, if human 
quality of consciousness were a calendar, comp takes the R-Math of January 
and the H-Math of December and assumes that February through November will 
be filled in automatically. What I see instead is that February through 
November cannot be substituted with low level 1:1 comparisons or high level 
eternal schemas, but instead must be developed in real time through real 
experiences. There can be no skipping experiences, so that even a fish does 
not have the experience of a fish if it does not arise from a context of 
inheriting lifetimes from invertebrate ancestors. I suspect that these 
experiences are not available in any structures to be simulated or modeled.

Craig


> Ordinal and cardinal number, and all their properties such as odd, even or 
> prime are thus characteristic of human H-math, not of the actual R-math of 
> reality that actually computes the current state of the universe, at least 
> so far as I can see.
>
> Edgar
>
>
>
> On Wednesday, February 12, 2014 11:36:29 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 12 Feb 2014, at 13:24, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Wednesday, February 12, 2014 5:18:21 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> On 11 Feb 2014, at 19:58, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Our internal experience is informed directly by opportunities for 
>>> quasi-veridical sensory entanglement from within, without, and beyond our 
>>> neurology. It is the idea of information and numbers which is a 
>>> meta-simulative technology that allows us to project our control beyond our 
>>> physical limitations. Computation accelerates and amplifies existing 
>>> tendencies of individual and collective users, both threatening and 
>>> supporting our survival.  
>>>
>>>
>>> Locally. But to do a scientific (modest and sharbale) theory, we need to 
>>> start from 3p agreement, and usually scientists agree with statements like 
>>> 17 is prime, but not on sense, quasi-veridical, entanglement, etc.
>>>
>>
>> I agree that it is an important political consideration, but I don't 
>> think it is a scientific consideration. At one time the starting point 
>> statements that authorities agree with were found in the book of Genesis.
>>
>>
>>
>> The analogy does not work, because the statement that 17 is a prime 
>> number is everything but political. But if you want start a party on the 
>> idea that 17 is not prime, you are free to make it political. You will need 
>> propaganda, torture, terror, and many things like that to keep power, but 
>> then why not, we are used to this.
>>
>> My point was only that if you want to communicate something to others, 
>> you have to adopt a language they understand, and start your theory from 
>> statement on which they can agree "for the sake of the argument or not" 
>> (that's private for the others).
>>
>> If not, all what you do is already a sort of propaganda. I'm afraid.
>>
>> Bruno
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> Craig
>>
>>
>>> Bruno
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Craig
>>>
>>>
 Edgar


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>>>
>>>
>>> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
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Re: Suicide Words God and Ideas



On 12 Feb 2014, at 18:54, meekerdb wrote:


On 2/12/2014 3:41 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Actually yes, but that is not relevant, as arithmetic simulate all  
digital approximation of all physical universe, (and the real  
physical universe is a non Turing emulable sum on all those  
computations), so arithmetic provides the worlds you need to be  
conscious of.


But in another reply you say that neither matter nor consciousness  
can be emulated.


Yes. But that's the advanced stuff that the people must first grasp by  
themselves.


I say it out of the reasoning, and usually in a context where the  
result is admitted. Not at step 3.





From that I infer that what you mean is they cannot be finitely  
emulated but only emulated as threads in the infinite UD computation.


Not even that. I say that they are the 1p experience of the machines  
infinitely distributed in the UD*.


Take the Helsinki guy and its continuation in M. That simple 1p  
experience cannot be really emulated, without doing the duplication  
again, and in that case, you don't emulate the 1p experience, you  
emulate two 1p experiences. You can emulate it only by duplicating the  
people, as a random oracle is not Turing emulable.





But this implies that in the MGA argument consciousness,


But here you make a gigantic jump.



even dream consciousness, cannot be emulated by the 'inert'  
computation (or any other computation)


Yes, at that part of the MGA, we realize that consciousness is not  
related to any particular computation at all. So we take a  
computationalist supervenience, where the whole indexicalness  
determines all the points of view, and we attach consciousness to the  
"abstract" states and their statistical relations with the neighbors  
(and this assures the meaningfulness of the counterfactuals, so that  
Maudlin's problem is solved in passing).





except as it depends on 'real' matter, matter which is not finitely  
emulable.


In that case, you need the "magic role" of the inert device. But if  
that was true, I am not even sure I would say "yes" to a doctor who  
suggest only that I buy a new toothbrush.


I am OK to talk on step 8, but only when you assess clearly the steps  
1-7 before, as you did once. If not we will mix difficulties and take  
the risk to run in circle.


Bruno






Brent

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Re: Suicide Words God and Ideas

2014-02-12 Thread Richard Ruquist

On Wed, Feb 12, 2014 at 12:58 PM, John Clark  wrote:

> On Tue, Feb 11, 2014 at 10:23 PM, Richard Ruquist wrote:
>
>
>> > Bell's Inequality in my opinion does not explain the mechanism of EPR.
>>
>
> True, Bell couldn't explain it but he did prove that if his inequality is
> violated then there is something that needs to be explained. Bell said that
> if the universe worked in a way that nearly everybody thought was
> intuitively obvious then a inequality that he found could never be
> violated, but quantum mechanics said that it could be. Years later
> experiments were performed to see who was right and it turned out that
> quantum mechanics triumphed over common sense. Today very few physicists
> even claim to have a deep understanding of why that is true, but the
> experimental evidence is now so strong that none can deny that it is in
> fact true.
>
> > The Einstein-Rosen bridge does.
>>
>
> No it does not. In fact, although Einstein never lived to see Bell's work,
> if he had he would have certainly bet that experiments would never find
> that Bell's inequality was ever violated. And Einstein would have lost his
> bet.
>
> > It explains how entangled particles maintain their connection.
>>
>
> Einstein-Rosen bridges may or may not exist, but even if they do neither
> Einstein nor Rosen could explain how their bridge "knows" if a observer
> (whatever that means) is looking at it or not.
>

John, You need to read about the latest developments in string theory. Here
is a link the the original Maldacena-Susskind 48 page paper
http://arxiv.org/abs/1306.0533. But if that is a bit much here is a
seemingly accurate summary
http://news.sciencemag.org/physics/2013/12/link-between-wormholes-and-quantum-entanglementincluding
some follow on work. Most of the popular write-ups describing
ER=EPR by tech writers are plainly inaccurate. Richard


>
>  John K Clark
>
>  --
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Re: Suicide Words God and Ideas



On 12 Feb 2014, at 18:59, meekerdb wrote:


On 2/12/2014 3:17 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 12 Feb 2014, at 01:50, Russell Standish wrote:


On Wed, Feb 12, 2014 at 07:46:48AM +1300, LizR wrote:

On 12 February 2014 02:55, meekerdb  wrote:

My problem with this is that I don't believe in arithmetical  
realism in
the sense required for this argument.  I think consciousness  
depends of
consciousness *of* an external world and thoughts just about  
Peano's

arithmetic is not enough to realize consciousness and the
"ineffable=unprovable" identification is gratuitous.  There are  
obvious
physical and evolutionary reasons that qualia would be  
ineffable.  That's
why I think step 8 is invalid because it assumes dreams (of  
arithmetic?)
are possible independent of any external world - or looked at  
another way,
I think to make it work would require that the 'inert'  
computation simulate
a whole world in which the consciousness would then exist  
*relative* to

that world.



Well, you have already rejected step 0 - (at least one of) the  
initial

assumptions - so I wouldn't worry about step 8!



I don't see how it rejects step 0. Provided that the artificial
computational brain offered by the doctor is connected to the actual
senses, and not just placed in a vat connected to some simulated
reality, it certainly satisfies the Yes Doctor postulate.

I don't see the relevance of AR or CT to Brent's argument.

I'm not yet convinced it is a genuine problem for step 8, or not,  
as I still

don't feel I fully understand what that says yet.


At step seven, the primitive materialist can still invoke a  
physicalist form of ultrafinitism, to prevent the comp reversal  
between physics and arithmetic (or number theology).


Step 8, shows that if that move is done, then we have to attribute  
some non Turing emulable, but also non FPI recoverable properties  
in that primitive matter to instantiate consciousness.


I think the only non FPI property we have to invoke is that  
somethings exist and some don't.


That is the same error as Craig and Edgar: it consists in taking  
reality as the explanation of reality.
But the whole UDA consists in showing that if you take comp seriously  
enough, this makes no sense at all.


Now, you were cautious and said that you *think* that  I suggest  
we progress, and I can only hope that you will grasp why we cannot do  
that (if we are interested in the mind-body problem, as we don't need  
that to find bosons, or go on Mars).


Bruno





Brent


It gives to the primitive materialist a hint to refute comp: 1) to  
define what they mean by primitive matter, and 2) to show that such  
matter relies on non FPI recoverable properties.
But that is equivalent with the test that comp offers, so it cannot  
be a refutation of comp->reversal, but of comp itself.


To be short. We will have opportunities to come back on this. But  
only if most are OK, with the steps 0-7.


Best,

Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/





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Re: What are numbers? What is math?



On Wednesday, February 12, 2014 11:36:29 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 12 Feb 2014, at 13:24, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
>
>
> On Wednesday, February 12, 2014 5:18:21 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 11 Feb 2014, at 19:58, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> Our internal experience is informed directly by opportunities for 
>> quasi-veridical sensory entanglement from within, without, and beyond our 
>> neurology. It is the idea of information and numbers which is a 
>> meta-simulative technology that allows us to project our control beyond our 
>> physical limitations. Computation accelerates and amplifies existing 
>> tendencies of individual and collective users, both threatening and 
>> supporting our survival.  
>>
>>
>> Locally. But to do a scientific (modest and sharbale) theory, we need to 
>> start from 3p agreement, and usually scientists agree with statements like 
>> 17 is prime, but not on sense, quasi-veridical, entanglement, etc.
>>
>
> I agree that it is an important political consideration, but I don't think 
> it is a scientific consideration. At one time the starting point statements 
> that authorities agree with were found in the book of Genesis.
>
>
>
> The analogy does not work, because the statement that 17 is a prime number 
> is everything but political.
>

It's not the concept of prime numbers that is political, its the assumption 
that we must agree that they are important to understanding consciousness. 
"usually scientists agree with" is political. I would be more sympathetic 
with "in spite of what scientists/authorities agree with".
 

> But if you want start a party on the idea that 17 is not prime, you are 
> free to make it political.
>

You're straw manning me. I don't see that anything that I have said has to 
do with the content of arithmetic statements, only that the popularity of 
arithmetic among scientists is no reason to insist that is where we must 
begin in an investigation of consciousness.
 

> You will need propaganda, torture, terror, and many things like that to 
> keep power, but then why not, we are used to this.
>

Really laying on thick there. It doesn't bode well for the argument if any 
hint of a peek behind the curtain of arithmetic supremacy brings an 
evocation of cataclysmic consequences.
 

>
> My point was only that if you want to communicate something to others, you 
> have to adopt a language they understand, and start your theory from 
> statement on which they can agree "for the sake of the argument or not" 
> (that's private for the others).
>

I don't have a problem with that principle in general, but in this case, 
you are asking me to begin the conversation about insects by blanketing the 
garden with insecticide. You aren't factoring in the possibility that the 
framing of the discussion itself is a key component of what can be 
discussed. Once we agree to enter the silk flower greenhouse of 
mathematics, we have already lost the living meadow.


> If not, all what you do is already a sort of propaganda. I'm afraid.
>

I'm afraid that is more projection than you will admit.

Craig
 

>
> Bruno
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> Craig
>
>
>> Bruno
>>
>>
>>
>> Craig
>>
>>
>>> Edgar
>>>
>>>
>> -- 
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Re: Better Than the Chinese Room



On 12 Feb 2014, at 18:34, meekerdb wrote:


On 2/12/2014 1:47 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 11 Feb 2014, at 18:20, meekerdb wrote:


On 2/11/2014 8:48 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 11 Feb 2014, at 04:15, meekerdb wrote:




...


Brent
"That which can explain anything fails to explain at all."



With physicalism, QM explains everything. At some level at least.


First, that's not true.  QM is apparently inconsistent with our  
best theory of gravity.


Sure, but a bit aside the point.



Second, it has been very successful at explaining what is observed.


Everything that we observe. My point is that with the quoted  
criteria, this should entail that it explains nothing.




That doesn't mean it can explain ghosts, leprechauns, gods and  
other things *not* observed.


Why not "consciousness" and other things that we do not see, but at  
least believe in?




There's a difference between being able to explain anything and  
explaining everything.


That's my point.

Bruno


Then it's not well taken since I used the word "anything" originally  
and your complaint implies I wrote "everything".


All right. I interpreted "anything" by "anything worth to be explained".

If not, for a logician, that which can explain anything becomes an  
inconsistent theory, or the set of sentences true in a cul-de-sac world.


Bruno





Brent


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Modal logic 4 (was Re: Suicide Words God and Ideas).

Liz, if Brent don't mind, my answer to Brent here contains a bit on  
modal logic, directly related to the machine discourse (and this will  
be justified later, as it is not obvious at all).

On 12 Feb 2014, at 18:28, meekerdb wrote:

On 2/12/2014 1:30 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 11 Feb 2014, at 14:55, meekerdb wrote:

On 2/11/2014 12:42 AM, LizR wrote:
On 11 February 2014 17:21, Russell Standish  
 wrote:

On Tue, Feb 11, 2014 at 04:57:50PM +1300, LizR wrote:
>
> You wouldn't need to say that if you could show what's wrong  
with it! :-)

>
> (Sorry!)
>
> I think the chances are a TOE will have to go a looong way  
before it's
> likely to make predictions rather than retrodictions. Didn't  
string theory
> retrodict the graviton or something, and everyone said that was  
a positive

> result? Well, Bruno's got qualia, apparently...
>

I don't see how he does. He does have the existence of  
incommunicable

facts (the G*\G thing), but that's not the same as qualia ISTM.

I said "apparently" because I have no idea how he does it.

I think a simpler form of the argument is that it must be possible  
to simulate consciousness because (we think) any physical process  
can be simulated and consciousness necessarily accompanies the  
physical processes of one's brain. This is the bet of "saying yes  
to the doctor".

With comp, I don't think we can simulate matter, nor consciousness.  
We can only simulate the relevant part of the brain so that  
consciousness is preserved. The price to pay is that matter becomes  
something emergent in the 1p views (1p plural) and cannot be  
simulated or emulated.

But there's a catch.  When we simulate an aircraft flying or a  
weather system those have a reference in the 'real' world and  
that's why they are simulations.  But if we simulate a conscious  
brain the consciousness will be 'real' consciousness. So  
simulating conscious is in a sense impossible; we may be able to  
produce it but we can't simulate it.  Consciousness must be  
consciousness of something, but it need not be anything physical;

It needs to be physical, at least in the FPI sense of physical.

So you're saying that we cannot simulate matter or consciousness.   
But I think we can still produce consciousness by manipulating  
matter - we can still build a conscious Mars rover.

With comp we can say that, but only as a matter of speaking. Mars  
Rover is in Heaven, and the hard task of computer we send on Mars is  
to distracted it enough so that it can manifest its consciousness to  
us, notably by sending us interesting data on mars. The consciousness  
of Mars Rover is a 1-view, and it is more "a product" of the infinity  
of computations going through its state in the arithmetical reality)  
than with a "single" machine. Thanks to Everett, and our own  
entanglement with mars, we can indeed bet that little Mars Rover share  
some history with us.

it could just be consciousness of arithmetical truths.  This  
explains why aspects of consciousness are ineffable.  It's because  
conscious processes can prove Goedel's theorem and so know that  
some truths are unprovable.  Bruno takes "qualia are ineffable"  
and "some arithmetical truths are unprovable" and postulates  
"ineffable=unprovable".

Not really.
I guess people progress, as this is the new common error in  
fashion, but some logician did it too, and is a confusion between  
hypostases. Qualia are related to non communicable, but only  
*indirectly* through G*. It happens through Z1* and X1* (and S4Grz1),

Don't understand that.

Incompleteness does not just separate the provability/consistency  
modal logic G into two parts: the provable statements, and the true  
statements, it also makes the logic of the differents modalities:

p
[]p
[]p & p
[]p & <>t
[]p & <>t & p

obeying different modal logics, despite G* proves them all equivalent  
extensionnally (they "proves" the same true arithmetical propositions,  
but they see them differently.

Among them, three logics splits into provable and non provable parts:

[]p   (gives G and G*, by Solovay theorem)
[]p & <>p  (gives Z and Z*-
[]p & <>t & p   (gives X and X*)

That remains true when we restrict p on the sigma_1 arithmetical  
reality (the arithmetical UD, which is a UD, provably).

That changes G into a modal logic G1 (G + p->[]p) and all hypostases  
get changed by this. I change their names by adding a 1. And qualia  
and quanta appears in S4Grz1, Z1*, X1*.

which translates the UDA. the Gödel provability cannot be used for  
the UD measure, due to the cul-de-sac worlds. That is why we need  
[]p & p, or []p & Dt, or []p & Dt & p.

Brent, do you see this?

Are you OK that in a cul-de-sac world we have []A for all A?

I repeat two arguments.

I recall first Kripke semantics:

All the worlds obeys CPL. And there is some fixed binary relation R on  
that set of worlds (called "accessibility").

Then,

[]p is true in a world alpha if p is tru

Re: Nagel on Explanation



On Wednesday, February 12, 2014 12:32:20 PM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 12 Feb 2014, at 17:55, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
>
>
> On Wednesday, February 12, 2014 11:23:14 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 12 Feb 2014, at 13:18, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Wednesday, February 12, 2014 5:19:38 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> On 11 Feb 2014, at 22:13, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>>>
>>> "Explanation, unlike causation is not just of an event but of an event 
 under a description. An explanation must show why it was likely than an 
 event *of that type* occurred." - Thomas Nagel

>>>
>>> This quote applies to my rejection of Comp since Comp does not explain 
>>> why there is any such type of thing as qualities which are felt, seen, 
>>> heard, etc, only that there are gaps in what can be understood about how 
>>> machines logically operate.
>>>
>>>
>>> This alludes to the gap G* minus G, but not Z* minus Z, which is the one 
>>> corresponding to the UDA FPI.
>>>
>>
>> I think that it alludes to the gap between all conceptual expressions 
>> (including G*, G, Z*, Z, and all other letters of the alphabet) and actual 
>> experienced qualia.
>>
>>
>>
>> But that is exactly the error that you are doing. You confuse the machine 
>> fingers (G*, Z*, etc.) toward the moon (sense, observation, etc.) with the 
>> moon.  
>>
>
> I'm saying that the machine fingers are just pointing at each other's 
> blind spot, 
>
>
> Yes. But that's your perpetual begging of the question.
>

By saying that I'm confusing the pointer with the moon, you are also 
begging the question. When you frame my view in the context of the 
assumption that comp could be true, then by definition any objection to 
your assumption is going to seem like begging the question. Since I don't 
assume that comp is possible, I'm going to cite the fact that the 
assumption that machine blind spots refer to consciousness is not a logical 
or functional assumption, but only a convenient one.


and you're calling it the moon because it can't be proved that it isn't.
>

No. I call it the moon because it concerns varieties of things that the 
machine tell me about her, and that she is already aware that she cannot 
justify them to me, and the logic of those are already close to logic 
already proposed to describe qualia, and quanta.


But they can just as easily both be a quantitative skeleton of qualia, and 
it makes more sense to me that it would be the case that it is, given that 
I see all forms and functions as destructive reductions of the appreciation 
and participation behind them.





> You confuse a theory (part of the machine discourse), and what the theory 
> is about. You don't listen, and your prejudice that they don't think a 
> priori explains probably why.
>

I don't think that the theory is about anything but itself.







Craig
 

>
> Bruno
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> Craig
>  
>
>>
>> Bruno
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
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>>
>> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
>>
>>
>>
>>
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> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
>
>
>
>

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Re: Suicide Words God and Ideas

2014-02-12 Thread Quentin Anciaux

2014-02-12 19:54 GMT+01:00 John Clark :

>
> On Tue, Feb 11, 2014 at 7:17 PM, chris peck wrote:
>
> > I will say though that I find it astonishing if people work their way
>> through Bruno's steps and claim to understand them and then maintain that
>> Clark's erudite and ofttimes witty criticisms are in some way obtuse or
>> difficult to follow.
>>
>
> Thank you.
>
>
> > There is some fuss about Clark's reluctance to apply his argument to
>> MWI. Like some others I think Clark possibly makes a misstep when (if?) he
>> defends the notion of 1p in-determinism within an MWI context.
>
>
> In the MWI John Clark doesn't have to worry about who "I" or "you" is
> because however many copies of "I" or "you" there may or may not be they
> will never meet.
>

That changes absolutely nothing... just put the reconstruction of the W guy
200 years later than the M guy, they will never meet...

Quentin


> But in Bruno's thought experiment that is no longer true, so pronouns like
> "you" and "I" cause endless trouble. The MWI is about explaining why
> Quantum Mechanics is able to make such good predictions, and it does so
> without making use of the concept of a "observer" so it has no need to
> explain exactly what that is, and that's why I like MWI.
>
> But Bruno's "proof" is supposed to do something entirely different,
> explain the continuous subjective feeling of self,  and yet he talks
> constantly about probability and probability implies prediction and
> prediction has absolutely positively nothing to do with a sense of self.
> If when you pressed the button on the teleportation chamber you were 99%
> certain, hell even if you were 100% certain that you would end up in
> Washington and there was not the tiniest particle of doubt in your mind and
> one second later you found yourself in Moscow your sense of self would not
> be diminished one bit, you'd just figure that you made a bad prediction,
> and it wouldn't be for the first time.
>
> Bruno is going about it backward and is trying to push on a string, he's
> trying to uniquely establish identity from the present to the future and
> that can't be done, you can only go from the past to the present. The fact
> that you feel like Chris Peck today has nothing to do with probability or
> prediction or if the Many World's Interpretation is correct or not; you
> feel like Chris Peck because you remember being Chris Peck yesterday and
> for no other reason.
>
>   John K Clark
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>> I can see though that in Comp people are duplicated within worlds whereas
>> in MWI they are duplicated between worlds, and there possibly are some
>> repercussions vis a vis the proper use of pro-nouns because of that. Im not
>> sure it matters much, because Clark could be right about Comp and just
>> inconsistent about MWI. So this complaint, loudly pursued by Quentin, has
>> always seemed impotent to me and not worth bothering about.
>>
>> Im reluctant to get involved in the step 3 discussions because,
>> mentioning no names Quentin and PGC, people can get very emotional and arm
>> wavey about people criticizing Bruno's metaphysics. So for now at least,
>> I'll limit myself to recommending the odd sci-fi movie on the film thread.
>> The Quiet Earth (1985) is a little known gem, btw.
>>
>> All the best
>> Chris.
>>
>> --
>> Date: Wed, 12 Feb 2014 12:00:42 +1300
>> Subject: Re: Suicide Words God and Ideas
>> From: lizj...@gmail.com
>> To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
>>
>>
>> On 12 February 2014 10:55, Richard Ruquist  wrote:
>>
>> On Tue, Feb 11, 2014 at 4:10 PM, LizR  wrote:
>>
>> On 12 February 2014 08:50, Richard Ruquist  wrote:
>>
>> On Tue, Feb 11, 2014 at 1:42 PM, LizR  wrote:
>>
>> On 12 February 2014 00:41, Richard Ruquist  wrote:
>>
>> On Tue, Feb 11, 2014 at 3:45 AM, LizR  wrote:
>>
>> On 11 February 2014 18:40, Richard Ruquist  wrote:
>>
>>
>> String theory based on Maldacena's conjecture predicted the viscosity of
>> the quark-gluon plasma before it was measured
>>
>>
>> Correctly, I assume.
>>
>>
>>  and more recently explained the mechanism behind EPR based on
>> Einstein-Rosen bridges, which is more like a retrodiction.
>>
>>
>> That seems like a sledgehammer to crack a nut, although the initials have
>> a nice near-symmetry. Why would one need to have ERBs - that presumably
>> have to be kept open by some exotic mechanicsm - to explain EPR when you
>> can do it very simply anyway?
>>
>>
>> And how can it be done very simply?
>>
>> By dropping Bell's assumption that time is fundamentally asymmetric (for
>> the particles used in an EPR experiment, which are generally photons).
>>
>>
>> Please explain how dropping asymmetric time explains EPR.
>>
>>
>> It makes it logically possible. I will have to ask a physicist for the
>> details, but it is a mechanism whereby the state of the measuring apparatus
>> can influence the state of the entire system. If we assume the emitter
>> creates a pair of entangled photons and the

Re: Suicide Words God and Ideas

On Tue, Feb 11, 2014 at 7:17 PM, chris peck wrote:

> I will say though that I find it astonishing if people work their way
> through Bruno's steps and claim to understand them and then maintain that
> Clark's erudite and ofttimes witty criticisms are in some way obtuse or
> difficult to follow.
>

Thank you.

> There is some fuss about Clark's reluctance to apply his argument to MWI.
> Like some others I think Clark possibly makes a misstep when (if?) he
> defends the notion of 1p in-determinism within an MWI context.

In the MWI John Clark doesn't have to worry about who "I" or "you" is
because however many copies of "I" or "you" there may or may not be they
will never meet.  But in Bruno's thought experiment that is no longer true,
so pronouns like "you" and "I" cause endless trouble. The MWI is about
explaining why Quantum Mechanics is able to make such good predictions, and
it does so without making use of the concept of a "observer" so it has no
need to explain exactly what that is, and that's why I like MWI.

But Bruno's "proof" is supposed to do something entirely different, explain
the continuous subjective feeling of self,  and yet he talks constantly
about probability and probability implies prediction and prediction has
absolutely positively nothing to do with a sense of self.  If when you
pressed the button on the teleportation chamber you were 99% certain, hell
even if you were 100% certain that you would end up in Washington and there
was not the tiniest particle of doubt in your mind and one second later you
found yourself in Moscow your sense of self would not be diminished one
bit, you'd just figure that you made a bad prediction, and it wouldn't be
for the first time.

Bruno is going about it backward and is trying to push on a string, he's
trying to uniquely establish identity from the present to the future and
that can't be done, you can only go from the past to the present. The fact
that you feel like Chris Peck today has nothing to do with probability or
prediction or if the Many World's Interpretation is correct or not; you
feel like Chris Peck because you remember being Chris Peck yesterday and
for no other reason.

  John K Clark

> I can see though that in Comp people are duplicated within worlds whereas
> in MWI they are duplicated between worlds, and there possibly are some
> repercussions vis a vis the proper use of pro-nouns because of that. Im not
> sure it matters much, because Clark could be right about Comp and just
> inconsistent about MWI. So this complaint, loudly pursued by Quentin, has
> always seemed impotent to me and not worth bothering about.
>
> Im reluctant to get involved in the step 3 discussions because, mentioning
> no names Quentin and PGC, people can get very emotional and arm wavey about
> people criticizing Bruno's metaphysics. So for now at least, I'll limit
> myself to recommending the odd sci-fi movie on the film thread. The Quiet
> Earth (1985) is a little known gem, btw.
>
> All the best
> Chris.
>
> --
> Date: Wed, 12 Feb 2014 12:00:42 +1300
> Subject: Re: Suicide Words God and Ideas
> From: lizj...@gmail.com
> To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
>
>
> On 12 February 2014 10:55, Richard Ruquist  wrote:
>
> On Tue, Feb 11, 2014 at 4:10 PM, LizR  wrote:
>
> On 12 February 2014 08:50, Richard Ruquist  wrote:
>
> On Tue, Feb 11, 2014 at 1:42 PM, LizR  wrote:
>
> On 12 February 2014 00:41, Richard Ruquist  wrote:
>
> On Tue, Feb 11, 2014 at 3:45 AM, LizR  wrote:
>
> On 11 February 2014 18:40, Richard Ruquist  wrote:
>
>
> String theory based on Maldacena's conjecture predicted the viscosity of
> the quark-gluon plasma before it was measured
>
>
> Correctly, I assume.
>
>
>  and more recently explained the mechanism behind EPR based on
> Einstein-Rosen bridges, which is more like a retrodiction.
>
>
> That seems like a sledgehammer to crack a nut, although the initials have
> a nice near-symmetry. Why would one need to have ERBs - that presumably
> have to be kept open by some exotic mechanicsm - to explain EPR when you
> can do it very simply anyway?
>
>
> And how can it be done very simply?
>
> By dropping Bell's assumption that time is fundamentally asymmetric (for
> the particles used in an EPR experiment, which are generally photons).
>
>
> Please explain how dropping asymmetric time explains EPR.
>
>
> It makes it logically possible. I will have to ask a physicist for the
> details, but it is a mechanism whereby the state of the measuring apparatus
> can influence the state of the entire system. If we assume the emitter
> creates a pair of entangled photons and their polarisation is measured at
> two spacelike-separated locations, then the polarisers can act as a
> constraint on the state of the photons and hence of the system, and that
> the setting of one polariser can therefore influence the polarisation
> measured in the other branch of the experiment (without any FTL signals /
> non-locality).
>
>

3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room)


John, I add a comment to my preview post.


On 11 Feb 2014, at 19:47, John Clark wrote:

Then "the 1p" is of no use to anyone and neither is "the 3-1 view"  
whatever the hell that is supposed to be.


It is a bit unfair, as I introduced that "3-1" notation exactly to  
reply to your first attempt of refutation.


But I will explain, may be for the benefits of others, the 3-1 view.

Tell me what you don't understand in the following.

We are at step 3, that is in Helsinki. I am there with you, and you  
will undergo the duplication. That is, you will be read, that is  
scanned, then annihilated, and "pasted" in W and M.
Then you might both come back to Helsinki, and we can reiterate the  
experience.


By definition, here, actually at the start of the UDA, the 1p  
statements are the content written in the diary that the experiencer  
take with her/him.


So, of course, as you have often mentioned yourself, you are  
duplicated, and this means obviously that the 1p diary, contrarily to  
the 3p diary, is duplicated itself.


The 3-1 view is the 3p view on the 1p views, note the plural, after  
the duplication. A typical observation will be "the diary of the guy  
in W assess that he is in W, and (perhaps) that he could not have  
predicted that, and that the diary of the guy in M assess that he is  
in M and (perhaps) that he could not have predicted that".


A "3-1" view is just a description made by the observer of the  
experience, the one who does not enter in the box, of the experiences,  
and the evolution of the contents in the multiplying diaries.


The 1-view are unique, and remains unique *from* each of their points  
of 1p-view, as in all duplications, the guy is forced to write either  
W *or* M, after self-localizing himself after the localization. It is  
the comp equivalent of Everett's observer inability to feel the split.


So the prediction you have often made, and never clearly retracted,  
that you will find yourself in W and M, is a correct prediction for  
the 3-1 view, but that is not what is asked in Helsinki, which  
concerns the 1-views, or as I said the 1-1-views (the 1-view on the 1- 
view).


Then again, you can consult only the math part. The 3p view is  
axiomatized by the modal logic G, the 1-views are axiomatized by  
S4Grz. For example, the fact that the 1-views are equivalent with the  
1-1 views can be expressed by the fact that S4Grz proves [°]p <-> [°] 
[°]p   (with [°]p defined by []p & p, p arithmetical, and "[]" =  
Gödel's beweisbar).


There the 3-1 view can be handled in the bimodal logic of G and S4Grz,  
which is easily simulated by G, so you can handle mixture of the  
points of view, like for example, the 3-view: [][°]p.


But content of diary entering or not into duplication boxes is usually  
easier to understand than bimodal self-referential logic.


Hope this helps.

Bruno




http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: Suicide Words God and Ideas


On 2/12/2014 3:27 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 12 Feb 2014, at 02:22, meekerdb wrote:


On 2/11/2014 10:21 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
What Everett did for the quantum universal wave, we can do that on any universal 
system, and comp predicts that this will always give the same physics. 


How does it predict that?


All universal systems produce the same collection of all computations, with exactly the 
same redundancy.
Physics emerged from that set of all computations. So physics must be the same whatever 
pho_i are chosen for the ontological base.


That doesn't follow.  If there are disjoint worlds, as contemplated in some versions of 
cosmology, they may have different physics.  You seem to be making your claim a tautology 
by saying whatever your theory produces is physics, even if it's not any physics we know 
of.  That makes it impossible to test.


Brent

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Re: Suicide Words God and Ideas


On 2/12/2014 3:17 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 12 Feb 2014, at 01:50, Russell Standish wrote:


On Wed, Feb 12, 2014 at 07:46:48AM +1300, LizR wrote:

On 12 February 2014 02:55, meekerdb  wrote:


My problem with this is that I don't believe in arithmetical realism in
the sense required for this argument.  I think consciousness depends of
consciousness *of* an external world and thoughts just about Peano's
arithmetic is not enough to realize consciousness and the
"ineffable=unprovable" identification is gratuitous.  There are obvious
physical and evolutionary reasons that qualia would be ineffable.  That's
why I think step 8 is invalid because it assumes dreams (of arithmetic?)
are possible independent of any external world - or looked at another way,
I think to make it work would require that the 'inert' computation simulate
a whole world in which the consciousness would then exist *relative* to
that world.



Well, you have already rejected step 0 - (at least one of) the initial
assumptions - so I wouldn't worry about step 8!



I don't see how it rejects step 0. Provided that the artificial
computational brain offered by the doctor is connected to the actual
senses, and not just placed in a vat connected to some simulated
reality, it certainly satisfies the Yes Doctor postulate.

I don't see the relevance of AR or CT to Brent's argument.

I'm not yet convinced it is a genuine problem for step 8, or not, as I still
don't feel I fully understand what that says yet.


At step seven, the primitive materialist can still invoke a physicalist form of 
ultrafinitism, to prevent the comp reversal between physics and arithmetic (or number 
theology).


Step 8, shows that if that move is done, then we have to attribute some non Turing 
emulable, but also non FPI recoverable properties in that primitive matter to 
instantiate consciousness. 


I think the only non FPI property we have to invoke is that somethings exist 
and some don't.

Brent


It gives to the primitive materialist a hint to refute comp: 1) to define what they mean 
by primitive matter, and 2) to show that such matter relies on non FPI recoverable 
properties.
But that is equivalent with the test that comp offers, so it cannot be a refutation of 
comp->reversal, but of comp itself.


To be short. We will have opportunities to come back on this. But only if most are OK, 
with the steps 0-7.


Best,

Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/





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Re: Suicide Words God and Ideas

On Tue, Feb 11, 2014 at 10:23 PM, Richard Ruquist  wrote:

> > Bell's Inequality in my opinion does not explain the mechanism of EPR.
>

True, Bell couldn't explain it but he did prove that if his inequality is
violated then there is something that needs to be explained. Bell said that
if the universe worked in a way that nearly everybody thought was
intuitively obvious then a inequality that he found could never be
violated, but quantum mechanics said that it could be. Years later
experiments were performed to see who was right and it turned out that
quantum mechanics triumphed over common sense. Today very few physicists
even claim to have a deep understanding of why that is true, but the
experimental evidence is now so strong that none can deny that it is in
fact true.

> The Einstein-Rosen bridge does.
>

No it does not. In fact, although Einstein never lived to see Bell's work,
if he had he would have certainly bet that experiments would never find
that Bell's inequality was ever violated. And Einstein would have lost his
bet.

> It explains how entangled particles maintain their connection.
>

Einstein-Rosen bridges may or may not exist, but even if they do neither
Einstein nor Rosen could explain how their bridge "knows" if a observer
(whatever that means) is looking at it or not.

 John K Clark

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Re: Suicide Words God and Ideas


On 2/12/2014 3:34 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 12 Feb 2014, at 02:40, meekerdb wrote:


On 2/11/2014 4:50 PM, Russell Standish wrote:

On Wed, Feb 12, 2014 at 07:46:48AM +1300, LizR wrote:

On 12 February 2014 02:55, meekerdb  wrote:


My problem with this is that I don't believe in arithmetical realism in
the sense required for this argument.  I think consciousness depends of
consciousness *of* an external world and thoughts just about Peano's
arithmetic is not enough to realize consciousness and the
"ineffable=unprovable" identification is gratuitous. There are obvious
physical and evolutionary reasons that qualia would be ineffable.  That's
why I think step 8 is invalid because it assumes dreams (of arithmetic?)
are possible independent of any external world - or looked at another way,
I think to make it work would require that the 'inert' computation simulate
a whole world in which the consciousness would then exist *relative* to
that world.


Well, you have already rejected step 0 - (at least one of) the initial
assumptions - so I wouldn't worry about step 8!


I don't see how it rejects step 0. Provided that the artificial
computational brain offered by the doctor is connected to the actual
senses, and not just placed in a vat connected to some simulated
reality, it certainly satisfies the Yes Doctor postulate.


Exactly.  One may still say yes to the doctor who give you an artificial brain that 
functions within this world (and cannot be the 'inert' brain of step 8).


?







I don't see the relevance of AR or CT to Brent's argument.


If you accept AR *and* the identification of "unprovable arithmetical 
truth"="qualia"


I have never identify qualia and "unprovable arithmetical truth".

Qualia are defined by possible semantics bearing on the logic of certain unprovable 
arithmetical truth". That is very different.

technically, you confuse G* and Z*; Z1*, etc.



?? Don't know what that means.

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Re: Suicide Words God and Ideas


On 2/12/2014 3:41 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Actually yes, but that is not relevant, as arithmetic simulate all digital approximation 
of all physical universe, (and the real physical universe is a non Turing emulable sum 
on all those computations), so arithmetic provides the worlds you need to be conscious of.


But in another reply you say that neither matter nor consciousness can be emulated. From 
that I infer that what you mean is they cannot be finitely emulated but only emulated as 
threads in the infinite UD computation.  But this implies that in the MGA argument 
consciousness, even dream consciousness, cannot be emulated by the 'inert' computation (or 
any other computation) except as it depends on 'real' matter, matter which is not finitely 
emulable.


Brent

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Re: Better Than the Chinese Room


On 2/12/2014 1:47 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 11 Feb 2014, at 18:20, meekerdb wrote:


On 2/11/2014 8:48 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 11 Feb 2014, at 04:15, meekerdb wrote:




...


Brent
"That which can explain *anything* fails to explain at all."



With physicalism, QM explains everything. At some level at least.


First, that's not true.  QM is apparently inconsistent with our best theory of 
gravity.


Sure, but a bit aside the point.



Second, it has been very successful at explaining what is observed.


Everything that we observe. My point is that with the quoted criteria, this should 
entail that it explains nothing.




That doesn't mean it can explain ghosts, leprechauns, gods and other things *not* 
observed.


Why not "consciousness" and other things that we do not see, but at least 
believe in?




There's a difference between being able to explain anything and explaining 
everything.


That's my point.

Bruno


Then it's not well taken since I used the word "anything" originally and your complaint 
implies I wrote "everything".


Brent

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Re: Nagel on Explanation



On 12 Feb 2014, at 17:55, Craig Weinberg wrote:




On Wednesday, February 12, 2014 11:23:14 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal  
wrote:


On 12 Feb 2014, at 13:18, Craig Weinberg wrote:




On Wednesday, February 12, 2014 5:19:38 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal  
wrote:


On 11 Feb 2014, at 22:13, Craig Weinberg wrote:

"Explanation, unlike causation is not just of an event but of an  
event under a description. An explanation must show why it was  
likely than an event of that type occurred." - Thomas Nagel


This quote applies to my rejection of Comp since Comp does not  
explain why there is any such type of thing as qualities which are  
felt, seen, heard, etc, only that there are gaps in what can be  
understood about how machines logically operate.


This alludes to the gap G* minus G, but not Z* minus Z, which is  
the one corresponding to the UDA FPI.


I think that it alludes to the gap between all conceptual  
expressions (including G*, G, Z*, Z, and all other letters of the  
alphabet) and actual experienced qualia.



But that is exactly the error that you are doing. You confuse the  
machine fingers (G*, Z*, etc.) toward the moon (sense, observation,  
etc.) with the moon.


I'm saying that the machine fingers are just pointing at each  
other's blind spot,


Yes. But that's your perpetual begging of the question.




and you're calling it the moon because it can't be proved that it  
isn't.


No. I call it the moon because it concerns varieties of things that  
the machine tell me about her, and that she is already aware that she  
cannot justify them to me, and the logic of those are already close to  
logic already proposed to describe qualia, and quanta.







You confuse a theory (part of the machine discourse), and what the  
theory is about. You don't listen, and your prejudice that they  
don't think a priori explains probably why.


I don't think that the theory is about anything but itself.








Craig


Bruno









Craig


Bruno






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Re: Suicide Words God and Ideas

On Tue, Feb 11, 2014 at 1:42 PM, LizR  wrote:

 > Bell's assumption that time is fundamentally asymmetric
>

If Bell had made the opposite assumption then Bell would have been a fool.
Bell was not a fool.

 John K Clark

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Re: Suicide Words God and Ideas

On 2/12/2014 1:30 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 11 Feb 2014, at 14:55, meekerdb wrote:

On 2/11/2014 12:42 AM, LizR wrote:
On 11 February 2014 17:21, Russell Standish > wrote:

On Tue, Feb 11, 2014 at 04:57:50PM +1300, LizR wrote:
>
> You wouldn't need to say that if you could show what's wrong with it! :-)
>
> (Sorry!)
>
> I think the chances are a TOE will have to go a looong way before it's
> likely to make predictions rather than retrodictions. Didn't string theory
> retrodict the graviton or something, and everyone said that was a positive
> result? Well, Bruno's got qualia, apparently...
>

I don't see how he does. He does have the existence of incommunicable
facts (the G*\G thing), but that's not the same as qualia ISTM.

I said "apparently" because I have no idea how he does it.

I think a simpler form of the argument is that it must be possible to simulate
consciousness because (we think) any physical process can be simulated and
consciousness necessarily accompanies the physical processes of one's brain. This is
the bet of "saying yes to the doctor".

With comp, I don't think we can simulate matter, nor consciousness. We can only simulate
the relevant part of the brain so that consciousness is preserved. The price to pay is
that matter becomes something emergent in the 1p views (1p plural) and cannot be
simulated or emulated.

But there's a catch. When we simulate an aircraft flying or a weather system those have
a reference in the 'real' world and that's why they are simulations. But if we
simulate a conscious brain the consciousness will be 'real' consciousness. So
simulating conscious is in a sense impossible; we may be able to produce it but we
can't simulate it. Consciousness must be consciousness of something, but it need not
be anything physical;

It needs to be physical, at least in the FPI sense of physical.

So you're saying that we cannot simulate matter or consciousness. But I think we can still
produce consciousness by manipulating matter - we can still build a conscious Mars rover.

it could just be consciousness of arithmetical truths. This explains why aspects of
consciousness are ineffable. It's because conscious processes can prove Goedel's
theorem and so know that some truths are unprovable. Bruno takes "qualia are
ineffable" and "some arithmetical truths are unprovable" and postulates
"ineffable=unprovable".

Not really.
I guess people progress, as this is the new common error in fashion, but some logician
did it too, and is a confusion between hypostases. Qualia are related to non
communicable, but only *indirectly* through G*. It happens through Z1* and X1* (and
S4Grz1),

Don't understand that.

which translates the UDA. the Gödel provability cannot be used for the UD measure, due
to the cul-de-sac worlds. That is why we need []p & p, or []p & Dt, or []p & Dt & p.

This allows him to identify specifically what makes some computer program conscious:
it's the ability to do induction and diagnoalization and prove Goedel's theorems.

OK. But it is not a computable identification. We cannot recognize, neither from code,
nor from computational activity, is an entity is Löbian or not.

I think you mean "we cannot *prove*". We can recognize intelligent behavior
and infer Lobian.

We can just prove non constructively that such programs and computations exists in a non
computable distribution.

My problem with this is that I don't believe in arithmetical realism in the sense
required for this argument.

Then you have to find me two numbers a and b contradicting the axioms of RA.

I think consciousness depends of consciousness *of* an external world and thoughts just
about Peano's arithmetic is not enough to realize consciousness and the
"ineffable=unprovable" identification is gratuitous.

This lowers the level only, unless you add something non computable in the local
environment.

There are obvious physical and evolutionary reasons that qualia would be ineffable.
That's why I think step 8 is invalid because it assumes dreams (of arithmetic?)

Once you accept comp, it is standard computer science to show that *all* dreams are
emulated in Arithmetic.

?? But the argument proposes emulating dreams by a physical (but inert) computer - not
Arithmetic.

are possible independent of any external world - or looked at another way, I think to
make it work would require that the 'inert' computation simulate a whole world in which
the consciousness would then exist *relative* to that world.

I guess we will need to come back on step 8, soon or later. Not sure what you mean by
"inert computation"? re you alluding to the "inert" device in Maudlin and MGA,

Yes.

Brent

or to the static computations which exist in arithmetic. In that case it is the usual
argument against block-time or block-universe, and this has been debunked

Re: What are numbers? What is math?


Edgar,


On 12 Feb 2014, at 17:57, Edgar L. Owen wrote:


Bruno, and Craig,

Computational reality doesn't need any notion of primes, or 17 is a  
prime.



Which confirms that you are using "computational" in a mysterious  
idiosyncratic personal sense, and I recall you that you have never  
answered my question: what do you mean by "computational", "reality",  
and in this case "needs".






In fact I don't see any reason why reality needs any concept even of  
17 to compute its current state. If this is true then individual  
numbers such as 17 are not necessary for reality to compute the  
universe. I suspect what reality does is more 1:1 comparisons.


E.g. when reality makes a computation to conserve and redistribute  
particle properties among the outgoing particles of a particle  
interaction, it doesn't need to count up 17 of anything, it just has  
to know they are all distributed which it can do with simple 1;1  
comparisons. It can do that by 1:1 comparisons, not by any notion of  
numbers such as 1, 2, or 17 much less any notion of primes.


Ordinal and cardinal number, and all their properties such as odd,  
even or prime are thus characteristic of human H-math, not of the  
actual R-math of reality that actually computes the current state of  
the universe, at least so far as I can see.


In the theory according to which my brain (or more general) is Turing  
emulable, there is no such universe.
We don't need, and worst, cannot use, the 1p-plural evidence, for its  
existence, but we can find the stable logic of the observable (and  
normally all physical *laws*).


In my franc opinion, if you don't mind, you do a similar mistake than  
Craig, reifying your own 1p intuition. Yu have not learn how to  
communicate in the scientific matter. You seem unable to make clear  
your assumption, and you miss the opportunity to test your theory by  
comparing it with the one based on the standard definition of  
computation.


You do bad philosophy of science if you mistreat the basic definitions  
everyone agree on.


Bruno






Edgar



On Wednesday, February 12, 2014 11:36:29 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal  
wrote:


On 12 Feb 2014, at 13:24, Craig Weinberg wrote:




On Wednesday, February 12, 2014 5:18:21 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal  
wrote:


On 11 Feb 2014, at 19:58, Craig Weinberg wrote:




Our internal experience is informed directly by opportunities for  
quasi-veridical sensory entanglement from within, without, and  
beyond our neurology. It is the idea of information and numbers  
which is a meta-simulative technology that allows us to project  
our control beyond our physical limitations. Computation  
accelerates and amplifies existing tendencies of individual and  
collective users, both threatening and supporting our survival.


Locally. But to do a scientific (modest and sharbale) theory, we  
need to start from 3p agreement, and usually scientists agree with  
statements like 17 is prime, but not on sense, quasi-veridical,  
entanglement, etc.


I agree that it is an important political consideration, but I  
don't think it is a scientific consideration. At one time the  
starting point statements that authorities agree with were found in  
the book of Genesis.





The analogy does not work, because the statement that 17 is a prime  
number is everything but political. But if you want start a party on  
the idea that 17 is not prime, you are free to make it political.  
You will need propaganda, torture, terror, and many things like that  
to keep power, but then why not, we are used to this.


My point was only that if you want to communicate something to  
others, you have to adopt a language they understand, and start your  
theory from statement on which they can agree "for the sake of the  
argument or not" (that's private for the others).


If not, all what you do is already a sort of propaganda. I'm afraid.

Bruno








Craig


Bruno




Craig


Edgar


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Re: Suicide Words God and Ideas

On Mon, Feb 10, 2014 at 5:43 PM, LizR  wrote:

> I'm assured a sackful of doorknobs can be used as a computer...
>

Yes but to do that you'd need to arrange the doorknobs so that they
interacted with each other in a way that Turing would approve of, and to
make such an arrangement you'd need information.

 John K Clark

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Re: What are numbers? What is math?

Bruno, and Craig,

Computational reality doesn't need any notion of primes, or 17 is a prime. 
In fact I don't see any reason why reality needs any concept even of 17 to 
compute its current state. If this is true then individual numbers such as 
17 are not necessary for reality to compute the universe. I suspect what 
reality does is more 1:1 comparisons.

E.g. when reality makes a computation to conserve and redistribute particle 
properties among the outgoing particles of a particle interaction, it 
doesn't need to count up 17 of anything, it just has to know they are all 
distributed which it can do with simple 1;1 comparisons. It can do that by 
1:1 comparisons, not by any notion of numbers such as 1, 2, or 17 much less 
any notion of primes.

Ordinal and cardinal number, and all their properties such as odd, even or 
prime are thus characteristic of human H-math, not of the actual R-math of 
reality that actually computes the current state of the universe, at least 
so far as I can see.

Edgar



On Wednesday, February 12, 2014 11:36:29 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 12 Feb 2014, at 13:24, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
>
>
> On Wednesday, February 12, 2014 5:18:21 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 11 Feb 2014, at 19:58, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> Our internal experience is informed directly by opportunities for 
>> quasi-veridical sensory entanglement from within, without, and beyond our 
>> neurology. It is the idea of information and numbers which is a 
>> meta-simulative technology that allows us to project our control beyond our 
>> physical limitations. Computation accelerates and amplifies existing 
>> tendencies of individual and collective users, both threatening and 
>> supporting our survival.  
>>
>>
>> Locally. But to do a scientific (modest and sharbale) theory, we need to 
>> start from 3p agreement, and usually scientists agree with statements like 
>> 17 is prime, but not on sense, quasi-veridical, entanglement, etc.
>>
>
> I agree that it is an important political consideration, but I don't think 
> it is a scientific consideration. At one time the starting point statements 
> that authorities agree with were found in the book of Genesis.
>
>
>
> The analogy does not work, because the statement that 17 is a prime number 
> is everything but political. But if you want start a party on the idea that 
> 17 is not prime, you are free to make it political. You will need 
> propaganda, torture, terror, and many things like that to keep power, but 
> then why not, we are used to this.
>
> My point was only that if you want to communicate something to others, you 
> have to adopt a language they understand, and start your theory from 
> statement on which they can agree "for the sake of the argument or not" 
> (that's private for the others).
>
> If not, all what you do is already a sort of propaganda. I'm afraid.
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> Craig
>
>
>> Bruno
>>
>>
>>
>> Craig
>>
>>
>>> Edgar
>>>
>>>
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>>
>>
>> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
>>
>>
>>
>>
> -- 
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Re: Nagel on Explanation



On Wednesday, February 12, 2014 11:23:14 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 12 Feb 2014, at 13:18, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
>
>
> On Wednesday, February 12, 2014 5:19:38 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 11 Feb 2014, at 22:13, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>>
>> "Explanation, unlike causation is not just of an event but of an event 
>>> under a description. An explanation must show why it was likely than an 
>>> event *of that type* occurred." - Thomas Nagel
>>>
>>
>> This quote applies to my rejection of Comp since Comp does not explain 
>> why there is any such type of thing as qualities which are felt, seen, 
>> heard, etc, only that there are gaps in what can be understood about how 
>> machines logically operate.
>>
>>
>> This alludes to the gap G* minus G, but not Z* minus Z, which is the one 
>> corresponding to the UDA FPI.
>>
>
> I think that it alludes to the gap between all conceptual expressions 
> (including G*, G, Z*, Z, and all other letters of the alphabet) and actual 
> experienced qualia.
>
>
>
> But that is exactly the error that you are doing. You confuse the machine 
> fingers (G*, Z*, etc.) toward the moon (sense, observation, etc.) with the 
> moon.  
>

I'm saying that the machine fingers are just pointing at each other's blind 
spot, and you're calling it the moon because it can't be proved that it 
isn't.


> You confuse a theory (part of the machine discourse), and what the theory 
> is about. You don't listen, and your prejudice that they don't think a 
> priori explains probably why.
>

I don't think that the theory is about anything but itself.

Craig
 

>
> Bruno
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> Craig
>  
>
>>
>> Bruno
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
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Re: What are numbers? What is math?



On 12 Feb 2014, at 13:24, Craig Weinberg wrote:




On Wednesday, February 12, 2014 5:18:21 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 11 Feb 2014, at 19:58, Craig Weinberg wrote:




Our internal experience is informed directly by opportunities for  
quasi-veridical sensory entanglement from within, without, and  
beyond our neurology. It is the idea of information and numbers  
which is a meta-simulative technology that allows us to project our  
control beyond our physical limitations. Computation accelerates  
and amplifies existing tendencies of individual and collective  
users, both threatening and supporting our survival.


Locally. But to do a scientific (modest and sharbale) theory, we  
need to start from 3p agreement, and usually scientists agree with  
statements like 17 is prime, but not on sense, quasi-veridical,  
entanglement, etc.


I agree that it is an important political consideration, but I don't  
think it is a scientific consideration. At one time the starting  
point statements that authorities agree with were found in the book  
of Genesis.





The analogy does not work, because the statement that 17 is a prime  
number is everything but political. But if you want start a party on  
the idea that 17 is not prime, you are free to make it political. You  
will need propaganda, torture, terror, and many things like that to  
keep power, but then why not, we are used to this.


My point was only that if you want to communicate something to others,  
you have to adopt a language they understand, and start your theory  
from statement on which they can agree "for the sake of the argument  
or not" (that's private for the others).


If not, all what you do is already a sort of propaganda. I'm afraid.

Bruno








Craig


Bruno




Craig


Edgar


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Re: Nagel on Explanation



On 12 Feb 2014, at 13:18, Craig Weinberg wrote:




On Wednesday, February 12, 2014 5:19:38 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 11 Feb 2014, at 22:13, Craig Weinberg wrote:

"Explanation, unlike causation is not just of an event but of an  
event under a description. An explanation must show why it was  
likely than an event of that type occurred." - Thomas Nagel


This quote applies to my rejection of Comp since Comp does not  
explain why there is any such type of thing as qualities which are  
felt, seen, heard, etc, only that there are gaps in what can be  
understood about how machines logically operate.


This alludes to the gap G* minus G, but not Z* minus Z, which is the  
one corresponding to the UDA FPI.


I think that it alludes to the gap between all conceptual  
expressions (including G*, G, Z*, Z, and all other letters of the  
alphabet) and actual experienced qualia.



But that is exactly the error that you are doing. You confuse the  
machine fingers (G*, Z*, etc.) toward the moon (sense, observation,  
etc.) with the moon.


You confuse a theory (part of the machine discourse), and what the  
theory is about. You don't listen, and your prejudice that they don't  
think a priori explains probably why.


Bruno









Craig


Bruno






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Re: Block Universes

Jesse,

He's another way to understand it which might be clearer. It's from the 
perspective of an arbitrary observer A.

1. A (me) is always in the current moment of P-time as P-time progresses, 
because that is the only locus of actual reality because it's only in this 
current moment of p-time that the current re-computation of the information 
state of the universe is occurring.

2. All other observers in the universe are also ALWAYS at/in this same 
current moment of P-time, no matter what their clock times read. This 
includes all observers in the examples below. 

So all observers are always in the same p-time moment. Now it's just a 
matter of correlating their clock times to see which clock times occurred 
in any particular current moment of p-time.

3. Given initially synchronized clocks, all observers in the universe, 
either in the same inertial frame, or only in NON-accelerated relative 
motion will have clocks that read exactly the same to THEMSELVES as my 
(A's) clock reads to me. All these clocks will have the same reading to 
their owners. So we can know that whenever these clocks read the same in 
the past those observers were then in the same instant of P-time.

4. For all other observers with clocks with different accelerations or 
gravitations than mine, their own clock times are ACTUALLY running at 
different rates so we must determine the conversion factor to determine 
which of their own clock times occurred at any of my clock times.

5. The easy way is just to pause the experiment at any point and compare 
clocks (that is in effect what the twins do when they meet) because this 
immediately re-synchronizes clock rates enabling the real actual age 
differences up till then to be compared.

6. This can also be calculated by the method I explained earlier.

Edgar

On Wednesday, February 12, 2014 8:36:01 AM UTC-5, Edgar L. Owen wrote:
>
> Jesse,
>
> But I just pointed out in my previous reply that your example is NOT even 
> correct relativity. Non-accelerated relative motion does NOT cause any 
> actual age differences because it's symmetric. A and B are in the exact 
> same relative motion with respect to each other so the effect has to be 
> completely symmetric, it is equal and opposite. Both A and B observe each 
> other's clock running slower by the same amount but their own clocks are 
> running at the exact same rate.
>
> And, in this case, there two clocks are in synch with p-time as well. 
> Whenever t = t' (their times on their OWN clocks) which is ALWAYS they are 
> in the same p-time current moment.
>
> Edgar
>
> On Tuesday, February 11, 2014 8:27:11 PM UTC-5, jessem wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Tue, Feb 11, 2014 at 7:46 PM, Jesse Mazer  wrote:
>>>
>>> "Instantaneously pause" has no frame-independent meaning in relativity, 
>>> do you disagree? If A and B are in relative motion, and unlike my example 
>>> above, B is *not* at the same point in spacetime as A when A turns some age 
>>> (say 60), then different frames disagree on what age B is "at the same 
>>> instant" that B turns 60. So if one frame said B was 48 at the same instant 
>>> A turned 50, and another frame said B was 75 at the same instant A turned 
>>> 50, then at what age should B's motion relative to A be "paused"? We don't 
>>> have an "objective instantaneous pause machine" that can settle the 
>>> question empirically, it has to be *our choice* when to subject B to a 
>>> sudden acceleration to instantaneously bring him to rest relative to A. 
>>> Again, do you disagree?
>>>
>>
>>
>> Sorry, I got the numbers and letters a little mixed up here, the 
>> paragraph should read:
>>
>>
>> "Instantaneously pause" has no frame-independent meaning in relativity, 
>> do you disagree? If A and B are in relative motion, and unlike my example 
>> above, B is *not* at the same point in spacetime as A when A turns some age 
>> (say 60), then different frames disagree on what age B is "at the same 
>> instant" that A turns 60. So if one frame said B was 48 at the same instant 
>> A turned 60, and another frame said B was 75 at the same instant A turned 
>> 60, then at what age should B's motion relative to A be "paused"? We don't 
>> have an "objective instantaneous pause machine" that can settle the 
>> question empirically, it has to be *our choice* when to subject B to a 
>> sudden acceleration to instantaneously bring him to rest relative to A. 
>> Again, do you disagree?
>>  
>

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Re: Block Universes

2014-02-12 Thread Jesse Mazer

On Wed, Feb 12, 2014 at 8:28 AM, Edgar L. Owen  wrote:

> Jesse,
>
> Not at all. I pointed out maybe a week ago with examples why your notion
> of "a same point in SPACEtime" is not the same as a same point in p-TIME.
> They are the same is true only when A and B are at the same point in SPACE,
>

Ah, it's clear you've misunderstood me then. My definition of "same point
in spacetime" ALWAYS means that the events happen at the same point in
space, no exceptions. Not sure how you could possibly imagine otherwise
given my operational definition(s), and given that I specifically explained
that all spatial coordinates of the two events are the same as well as
their time coordinates if they occur at the same point in spacetime. But
now that I've made that clear, do you agree that events that occur at the
same point in spacetime must occur at the same point in p-time?

> but every observer is ALWAYS at the same point in p-TIME because there is
> ONLY one current point in p-time across the entire universe.
>

I never talked about whether "observers" are at the same point in p-time,
only "events". And as I've told you before, I'm asking about deciding in
retrospect whether two events occurred at the same point in p-time, so I'm
not just talking about currently happening events (which are the only ones
you'd say actually "exist" I assume).

>
> Also you have a basic misunderstanding of relativity theory in your
> example. In NON-accelerated relative motion there is no actual age
> difference or time dilation between the comoving (OWN) clocks of the two
> observers. A's OWN clock and B's OWN clock both read exactly the same t
> values. A's t = B's t', and there are no actual age differences.
>

No relativity textbook will agree with you on that, time dilation is
perfectly well-defined for purely inertial observers. And the phrase
"actual age difference" is just meaningless unless the observers get
together and compare clocks at the same point in spacetime--for observers
separated in space there *is* no "actual" age difference in relativity
theory, only the age difference as judged in different frames, which use
different definitions of simultaneity. You seem to be confusing your own
theories about p-time for mainstream relativity theory.

> This is basic relativity theory. It is only the OTHER clock that APPEARS
> to be running slow to both A and B, but their own clocks are running at the
> exact same rate.
>

In each one's rest frame the other is running slow, and neither frame is
more correct than the other. But there is no objective truth that the are
"running at the exact same rate", nor is there any objective truth that
they "run at different rates" in examples involving acceleration; a
comparison of "rates" is simply an intrinsically frame-dependent notion,
there is no well-defined way to define a frame-independent truth of the
matter in relativity theory.

> This other clock view is an illusion of relative motion that ceases with
> the relative motion with NO actual age differences.
>

Huh? If two twins are moving apart inertially, then if either twin
accelerates instantaneously to instantly come to rest relative to the other
twin, there WILL be an age difference in the frame where the two twins are
now at rest. For example, if twin B is moving apart from twin A at 0.8c,
and twin B suddenly comes to rest with respect to twin A when twin B's
clock shows 6 years have passed since departure, then immediately
afterwards in the frame where they are now both at rest, twin B's clock
will show 6 years have passed since departure while twin A's clock will
show 10 years have passed since departure. These two readings were
simultaneous in A's rest frame immediately before B accelerated, and B's
instantaneous acceleration doesn't cause any sudden change in B's clock
reading in this frame, so they are still simultaneous immediately after B
comes to rest in this frame.

Also, if A was the one who accelerated to come to rest relative to B, and A
did this when her own clock showed 6 years since departure, the situation
would be exactly reversed; in their new mutual rest frame immediately after
the acceleration, A's clock would show 6 years since departure, while B's
would show 10 years departure. So there is a symmetry in the sense that
either one can do the sudden acceleration to come to rest relative to the
other, and that will be the one who will have aged less in their new mutual
rest frame after the acceleration.

If you disagree with my numbers above, you are misunderstanding something
really basic about elementary SR calculations. I can try to find some
similar textbook examples like this if you don't believe me, or you could
ask about this specific scenario (twins moving apart inertially, one twin
makes an instantaneous acceleration to come to rest relative to the other,
immediately after coming to rest their ages are compared in their mutual
rest frame) in the physics forum at
http://www.physicsforums.com/

Re: Block Universes

Jesse,

But I just pointed out in my previous reply that your example is NOT even 
correct relativity. Non-accelerated relative motion does NOT cause any 
actual age differences because it's symmetric. A and B are in the exact 
same relative motion with respect to each other so the effect has to be 
completely symmetric, it is equal and opposite. Both A and B observe each 
other's clock running slower by the same amount but their own clocks are 
running at the exact same rate.

And, in this case, there two clocks are in synch with p-time as well. 
Whenever t = t' (their times on their OWN clocks) which is ALWAYS they are 
in the same p-time current moment.

Edgar

On Tuesday, February 11, 2014 8:27:11 PM UTC-5, jessem wrote:
>
>
>
> On Tue, Feb 11, 2014 at 7:46 PM, Jesse Mazer 
> > wrote:
>>
>> "Instantaneously pause" has no frame-independent meaning in relativity, 
>> do you disagree? If A and B are in relative motion, and unlike my example 
>> above, B is *not* at the same point in spacetime as A when A turns some age 
>> (say 60), then different frames disagree on what age B is "at the same 
>> instant" that B turns 60. So if one frame said B was 48 at the same instant 
>> A turned 50, and another frame said B was 75 at the same instant A turned 
>> 50, then at what age should B's motion relative to A be "paused"? We don't 
>> have an "objective instantaneous pause machine" that can settle the 
>> question empirically, it has to be *our choice* when to subject B to a 
>> sudden acceleration to instantaneously bring him to rest relative to A. 
>> Again, do you disagree?
>>
>
>
> Sorry, I got the numbers and letters a little mixed up here, the paragraph 
> should read:
>
>
> "Instantaneously pause" has no frame-independent meaning in relativity, do 
> you disagree? If A and B are in relative motion, and unlike my example 
> above, B is *not* at the same point in spacetime as A when A turns some age 
> (say 60), then different frames disagree on what age B is "at the same 
> instant" that A turns 60. So if one frame said B was 48 at the same instant 
> A turned 60, and another frame said B was 75 at the same instant A turned 
> 60, then at what age should B's motion relative to A be "paused"? We don't 
> have an "objective instantaneous pause machine" that can settle the 
> question empirically, it has to be *our choice* when to subject B to a 
> sudden acceleration to instantaneously bring him to rest relative to A. 
> Again, do you disagree?
>  

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Re: Block Universes

Jesse,

Not at all. I pointed out maybe a week ago with examples why your notion of 
"a same point in SPACEtime" is not the same as a same point in p-TIME. They 
are the same is true only when A and B are at the same point in SPACE, but 
every observer is ALWAYS at the same point in p-TIME because there is ONLY 
one current point in p-time across the entire universe.

Also you have a basic misunderstanding of relativity theory in your 
example. In NON-accelerated relative motion there is no actual age 
difference or time dilation between the comoving (OWN) clocks of the two 
observers. A's OWN clock and B's OWN clock both read exactly the same t 
values. A's t = B's t', and there are no actual age differences.

This is basic relativity theory. It is only the OTHER clock that APPEARS to 
be running slow to both A and B, but their own clocks are running at the 
exact same rate. This other clock view is an illusion of relative motion 
that ceases with the relative motion with NO actual age differences. Pure 
non-accelerated relative motion causes NO actual age differences.

You need to understand the basic difference I keep pointing out between the 
two kinds of relativistic time effects, the permanent which A and B do 
agree upon (effects of gravity or acceleration), and the transient which A 
and B do not agree upon (effects of relative motion only).

Edgar

 

On Tuesday, February 11, 2014 7:46:30 PM UTC-5, jessem wrote:
>
>
>
> On Tue, Feb 11, 2014 at 7:08 PM, Edgar L. Owen 
> > wrote:
>
> Jesse,
>
> Your example does NOT establish any inconsistency. I NEVER said "I'm 
> pretty sure you've said before that you agree that if SR predicts two 
> clocks meet at a single point in spacetime, their two readings at that 
> point must be simultaneous in p-time)." That is NOT true. Only if there is 
> no relative motion or acceleration is it true. I really wish you could just 
> get the basics of the theory straight.
>
>
> I thought you agreed on my operational definition of "same point in 
> spacetime", and that events that satisfied this definition would also occur 
> at the same point in p-time. I wonder if you actually are correctly 
> understanding what I say in the quoted sentence, because I find it hard to 
> believe you would deny it if you understood it correctly.
>
> Let's say we have two twins moving towards each other at some nonzero 
> velocity, and they pass right next to each other without either one 
> accelerating. Relativity can be used to predict their respective ages at 
> the moment they pass (if we idealize them as pointlike observers, the 
> "moment they pass" can refer to their worldlines passing through precisely 
> the same position and time coordinates). To use my usual numbers, 
> relativity might say that twin A is turning 30 and twin B is turning 40 at 
> the moment they pass. In terms of my operational definition, if A was 
> sending a continual stream of light signals to B and seeing how long it 
> took to receive the reflected signal, the time interval on A's clock 
> between sending a signal and receiving the reflection would approach zero 
> as his own age clock approached 30, and the age he would see on B's age 
> clock in the reflected light would approach 40 as he approached 30. 
> Likewise, if there was a camera at the point in space they passed, and it 
> took a photo just as they passed, the photo would show A's age clock 
> reading 30 and B's age clock reading 40. And if A had a bomb that would 
> destroy anything in his immediate local vicinity but would leave anything 
> at a distance from him unharmed, then if A set it to go off when he turned 
> 30, B would be killed at age 40, but if A set it to go off at any other 
> age, B would survive unharmed.
>
> Given that relativity would predict all these things, are you saying these 
> predictions could all be correct, but that A turning 30 and B turning 40 
> would *not* be simultaneous in p-time, not even approximately so? Or are 
> you actually saying relativity would be *wrong* in the predictions above 
> when it predicts the event of A turning 30 will have the same x,y,z,t 
> coordinates as the event of B turning 40? Or did you just misunderstand 
> what I meant when I said "two clocks meet at a single point in spacetime, 
> their two readings at that point [A turning 30 and B turning 40 in this 
> example] must be simultaneous in p-time"? Or would you say "none of the 
> above"? Please give a clear answer to this question.
>
>
>
>
> The method is trivially simple. I'll give two approaches:
>
>
> 1. Instantaneously pause all relativistic effects at any time t on A's 
> clock and read the time t' on B's clock. These clock times are a point when 
> A and B were/are in the same p-time current moment.
>
>
>
> "Instantaneously pause" has no frame-independent meaning in relativity, do 
> you disagree? If A and B are in relative motion, and unlike my example 
> above, B is *not* at the same point in spacetime as A when A turns

Re: Better Than the Chinese Room



On Tuesday, February 11, 2014 10:26:51 PM UTC-5, stathisp wrote:
>
> On 12 February 2014 05:21, Craig Weinberg > 
> wrote: 
> > 
> > 
> > On Monday, February 10, 2014 7:51:58 PM UTC-5, stathisp wrote: 
> >> 
> >> On 11 February 2014 11:23, Craig Weinberg  wrote: 
> >> 
> >> >> Continuity and the idea that physical laws will be consistent in 
> >> >> different times and places are definitely assumptions. They could 
> turn 
> >> >> out to be false tomorrow. 
> >> > 
> >> > 
> >> > The possibility of continuity seems like it is implicit in almost 
> every 
> >> > kind 
> >> > of experience. A mouse has an expectation of continuity. The idea of 
> >> > physical laws though is a much more sophisticated intellectual 
> >> > construct. 
> >> 
> >> Arguably psychological continuity isn't real for either mice or 
> >> people. If you were destroyed last night and replaced with a copy the 
> >> today version of you would declare that he was continuous with the 
> >> yesterday version. I would say that's correct, the two versions are a 
> >> continuation of the same person, while you would presumably say that 
> >> it was a delusion. 
> > 
> > 
> > I don't think that my experience can be replaced with a copy though. 
>
> So how would you know you were a copy?


It has nothing to do with whether or not I would know, it's because in my 
understanding, copying is not primitively real, but rather is a consequence 
of low level insensitivity. As awareness approaches the limits of its 
sensitivity, everything seems more and more the same. From an absolute 
perspective, awareness cannot be substituted, because substitution is the 
antithesis of awareness.
 

> Here you are today, incredulous 
> about the story of your destruction last night, but we produce 
> witnesses and videotapes and whatever other proof you need. What are 
> you going to say to that? 
>

Your question is "If you were wrong about awareness being non-transferable, 
would you still think you were right?". I'm not even sure what that fallacy 
is called...a loaded non-question?
 

>
> >> If it were possible to have a change in mental state without a change 
> >> in brain state that would be evidence that we don't think with our 
> >> brain. 
> > 
> > 
> > Some claim that NDEs are such changes, and that their experiences have 
> > occurred during periods without brain activity. Certainly there is 
> evidence 
> > that correlates decreased brain activity with increased perception with 
> > psilocybin uses, which would suggest at the very least that a one-to-one 
> > correspondence of mental to neurological activity is an 
> oversimplification. 
>
> Obviously, since maximal brain activity occurs during an epileptic 
> fit, during which there may be no consciousness. 
>
> > I would not deny that we think with our brain, in the sense that the 
> human 
> > experience of thought corresponds with the appearance of human brain 
> > activity, but that doesn't mean that our consciousness and experience of 
> > living is part of our brain or can be located through our brain. 
>
> No, I would not use those terms. But I don't believe that an 
> experience can occur in the absence of all brain activity, for example 
> if the brain is frozen in liquid nitrogen. 
>

I don't believe that either, but that doesn't mean that thought and feeling 
can be frozen.
 

>
> >> Why should different languages be comprehensible to different 
> >> cultures? 
> > 
> > 
> > Why should there be different languages? If neurons use the same 
> language to 
> > signal each other, why not humans also? 
>
> Why are lakes different in shape if they all contain water? 
>

The different shapes don't stop them from all being potentially connected.
 

>
> >> Different computer languages run on identical hardware and 
> >> are mutually incomprehensible. 
> > 
> > 
> > That's because we are designing the computer languages, not the 
> hardware. We 
> > want to use the hardware for different purposes, but if the hardware 
> itself 
> > were designing its own language, why would we expect multiple 
> incompatible 
> > designs? 
>
> If computers developed in isolated groups and chose words randomly or 
> on the basis of environmental sounds, they would have different 
> languages. It would be incredible if they did not, like finding an 
> alien civilization where people spoke English. 
>

Yet every human culture we find has DNA which speak the common language of 
human reproduction, despite all of the random regional mutations. Why not 
carry language on the genome?


> >> And why should food and drugs have a 
> >> differential effect depending on native language? 
> > 
> > 
> > Because you are saying that language is identical to brain changes. Food 
> and 
> > drugs cause brain changes too, so we should expect conflicts. Drinking 
> > alcohol should have different effects for speakers of different 
> languages, 
> > and speaking different languages should alter the effects of different 
> > drugs. 
>

Re: What are numbers? What is math?



On Wednesday, February 12, 2014 5:18:21 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 11 Feb 2014, at 19:58, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
>
>
> Our internal experience is informed directly by opportunities for 
> quasi-veridical sensory entanglement from within, without, and beyond our 
> neurology. It is the idea of information and numbers which is a 
> meta-simulative technology that allows us to project our control beyond our 
> physical limitations. Computation accelerates and amplifies existing 
> tendencies of individual and collective users, both threatening and 
> supporting our survival.  
>
>
> Locally. But to do a scientific (modest and sharbale) theory, we need to 
> start from 3p agreement, and usually scientists agree with statements like 
> 17 is prime, but not on sense, quasi-veridical, entanglement, etc.
>

I agree that it is an important political consideration, but I don't think 
it is a scientific consideration. At one time the starting point statements 
that authorities agree with were found in the book of Genesis.

Craig


> Bruno
>
>
>
> Craig
>
>
>> Edgar
>>
>>
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Re: Nagel on Explanation



On Wednesday, February 12, 2014 5:19:38 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 11 Feb 2014, at 22:13, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
> "Explanation, unlike causation is not just of an event but of an event 
>> under a description. An explanation must show why it was likely than an 
>> event *of that type* occurred." - Thomas Nagel
>>
>
> This quote applies to my rejection of Comp since Comp does not explain why 
> there is any such type of thing as qualities which are felt, seen, heard, 
> etc, only that there are gaps in what can be understood about how machines 
> logically operate.
>
>
> This alludes to the gap G* minus G, but not Z* minus Z, which is the one 
> corresponding to the UDA FPI.
>

I think that it alludes to the gap between all conceptual expressions 
(including G*, G, Z*, Z, and all other letters of the alphabet) and actual 
experienced qualia.

Craig
 

>
> Bruno
>
>
>
>
>
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>
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Re: Suicide Words God and Ideas

On 12 Feb 2014, at 04:12, LizR wrote:

On 12 February 2014 14:43, meekerdb  wrote:
On 2/11/2014 4:56 PM, LizR wrote:
On 12 February 2014 13:50, Russell Standish   
wrote:

On Wed, Feb 12, 2014 at 07:46:48AM +1300, LizR wrote:
> On 12 February 2014 02:55, meekerdb  wrote:
>
> > My problem with this is that I don't believe in arithmetical  
realism in
> > the sense required for this argument.  I think consciousness  
depends of
> > consciousness *of* an external world and thoughts just about  
Peano's

> > arithmetic is not enough to realize consciousness and the
> > "ineffable=unprovable" identification is gratuitous.  There are  
obvious
> > physical and evolutionary reasons that qualia would be  
ineffable.  That's
> > why I think step 8 is invalid because it assumes dreams (of  
arithmetic?)
> > are possible independent of any external world - or looked at  
another way,
> > I think to make it work would require that the 'inert'  
computation simulate
> > a whole world in which the consciousness would then exist  
*relative* to

> > that world.
> >
>
> Well, you have already rejected step 0 - (at least one of) the  
initial

> assumptions - so I wouldn't worry about step 8!
>

I don't see how it rejects step 0. Provided that the artificial
computational brain offered by the doctor is connected to the actual
senses, and not just placed in a vat connected to some simulated
reality, it certainly satisfies the Yes Doctor postulate.

I don't see the relevance of AR or CT to Brent's argument.

Well, Brent seems to think it does (it was the AR bit he was  
rejecting, or the Peano subset thereof I think?).

However, I agree that "I think consciousness depends of (sic)  
consciousness *of* an external world" is simply an opinion,

Is it?  Can you be conscious without being conscious of something?

Not without being conscious of something, no, but you specified an  
external world. Dreaming is arguably a case where you aren't  
conscious of an external world.
and the other related objections seem to be "arguing from  
incredulity".

Yes, I am incredulous that "arithmetical provability" = "knowledge"  
and "unprovable arithmetical truth" = "qualia".  Are you credulous  
on those two points?

I'm agnostic,

I am not. Brent attributes me things I have never said. AUDA would  
gives classical logic for physics, if that was the case.

Brent evacuates all the modal nuances made in AUDA.

at least pending (a lot of) further investigation. But it sounded to  
me as though you were incredulous that "dreams (of arithmetic?) are  
possible independent of any external world". i.e. the whole "UDA  
being able to exist in Platonia" thing.

I guess you mean the whole UD*.

Which I have to admit seems a fairly incredible idea to me most of  
the time, especially when I stub my toe.

Yes, it incredible, indeed. But the points will be that qualia are  
indeed non justifiable by the machine itself. Not because they belong  
to G*, but to Z* or X* (or with comp, Z1* or X1*).

But I guess we have to progress on modal logic, and self-reference  
logic before. OK. No rush.

Bruno

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Re: Suicide Words God and Ideas

On 12 Feb 2014, at 02:43, meekerdb wrote:

On 2/11/2014 4:56 PM, LizR wrote:

On 12 February 2014 13:50, Russell Standish   
wrote:

On Wed, Feb 12, 2014 at 07:46:48AM +1300, LizR wrote:
> On 12 February 2014 02:55, meekerdb  wrote:
>
> > My problem with this is that I don't believe in arithmetical  
realism in
> > the sense required for this argument.  I think consciousness  
depends of
> > consciousness *of* an external world and thoughts just about  
Peano's

> > arithmetic is not enough to realize consciousness and the
> > "ineffable=unprovable" identification is gratuitous.  There are  
obvious
> > physical and evolutionary reasons that qualia would be  
ineffable.  That's
> > why I think step 8 is invalid because it assumes dreams (of  
arithmetic?)
> > are possible independent of any external world - or looked at  
another way,
> > I think to make it work would require that the 'inert'  
computation simulate
> > a whole world in which the consciousness would then exist  
*relative* to

> > that world.
> >
>
> Well, you have already rejected step 0 - (at least one of) the  
initial

> assumptions - so I wouldn't worry about step 8!
>

I don't see how it rejects step 0. Provided that the artificial
computational brain offered by the doctor is connected to the actual
senses, and not just placed in a vat connected to some simulated
reality, it certainly satisfies the Yes Doctor postulate.

I don't see the relevance of AR or CT to Brent's argument.

Well, Brent seems to think it does (it was the AR bit he was  
rejecting, or the Peano subset thereof I think?).

However, I agree that "I think consciousness depends of (sic)  
consciousness *of* an external world" is simply an opinion,

Is it?  Can you be conscious without being conscious of something?

Actually yes, but that is not relevant, as arithmetic simulate all  
digital approximation of all physical universe, (and the real physical  
universe is a non Turing emulable sum on all those computations), so  
arithmetic provides the worlds you need to be conscious of.

and the other related objections seem to be "arguing from  
incredulity".

Yes, I am incredulous that "arithmetical provability" = "knowledge"

Arithmetic provability CANNOT model knowledge at all. Gödel saw this  
in 1933(*)

(*) GÖDEL K., 1933, Eine Interpretation des Intuitionistischen  
Aussagenkalküls, Ergebnisse
eines Mathematischen Kolloquiums, Vol 4, pp. 39-40, also in FEFERMAN &  
Al. 1986.

That is the starting point of AUDA.

and "unprovable arithmetical truth" = "qualia".  Are you credulous  
on those two points?

It does not make sense, and I insist on this. G* is not a logic of  
qualia. You need the intensional nuances.

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

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Re: Suicide Words God and Ideas



On 12 Feb 2014, at 02:40, meekerdb wrote:


On 2/11/2014 4:50 PM, Russell Standish wrote:

On Wed, Feb 12, 2014 at 07:46:48AM +1300, LizR wrote:

On 12 February 2014 02:55, meekerdb  wrote:

My problem with this is that I don't believe in arithmetical  
realism in
the sense required for this argument.  I think consciousness  
depends of
consciousness *of* an external world and thoughts just about  
Peano's

arithmetic is not enough to realize consciousness and the
"ineffable=unprovable" identification is gratuitous.  There are  
obvious
physical and evolutionary reasons that qualia would be  
ineffable.  That's
why I think step 8 is invalid because it assumes dreams (of  
arithmetic?)
are possible independent of any external world - or looked at  
another way,
I think to make it work would require that the 'inert'  
computation simulate
a whole world in which the consciousness would then exist  
*relative* to

that world.

Well, you have already rejected step 0 - (at least one of) the  
initial

assumptions - so I wouldn't worry about step 8!


I don't see how it rejects step 0. Provided that the artificial
computational brain offered by the doctor is connected to the actual
senses, and not just placed in a vat connected to some simulated
reality, it certainly satisfies the Yes Doctor postulate.


Exactly.  One may still say yes to the doctor who give you an  
artificial brain that functions within this world (and cannot be the  
'inert' brain of step 8).


?







I don't see the relevance of AR or CT to Brent's argument.


If you accept AR *and* the identification of "unprovable  
arithmetical truth"="qualia"


I have never identify qualia and "unprovable arithmetical truth".

Qualia are defined by possible semantics bearing on the logic of  
certain unprovable arithmetical truth". That is very different.

technically, you confuse G* and Z*; Z1*, etc.




then it is relevant because a computer can, with the right program,  
recognize unprovable truths and therefore have ineffabel qualia.   
But I see no reason to accept this identification.


It follows from UDA. Then AUDA isolated the logic, by studying the  
logic of the "probability one".


Bruno


The only thing they have in common is that they are inexpressible in  
their respective domains.


Brent



I'm not yet convinced it is a genuine problem for step 8, or not,  
as I still

don't feel I fully understand what that says yet.


Cheers


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Re: Suicide Words God and Ideas



On 12 Feb 2014, at 02:28, meekerdb wrote:


On 2/11/2014 10:21 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
But I think what is shown is that there can be a world including  
conscious beings which does not require physical events in our  
world, i.e. they can be merely arithmetical or Turing machince  
"events".  In other words it is possible to simulate a world with  
conscious beings.


OK, but their consciousness is not simulated, as the consciousness  
of the being is in all arithmetical simulations. The machine you  
build makes only that consciousness manifestable relatively to you.


But that assumes what you are trying to argue, that consciousness is  
a purely arithmetical  phenomenon.


I was slightly making your point more precise, using the UDA's  
consequence. I was not in the course of arguing on UDA.


Bruno





Brent

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Re: Suicide Words God and Ideas



On 12 Feb 2014, at 02:22, meekerdb wrote:


On 2/11/2014 10:21 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
What Everett did for the quantum universal wave, we can do that on  
any universal system, and comp predicts that this will always give  
the same physics.


How does it predict that?


All universal systems produce the same collection of all computations,  
with exactly the same redundancy.
Physics emerged from that set of all computations. So physics must be  
the same whatever pho_i are chosen for the ontological base.


Bruno





Brent

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Re: Suicide Words God and Ideas

2014-02-12 Thread Quentin Anciaux

2014-02-12 12:17 GMT+01:00 Bruno Marchal :

>
> On 12 Feb 2014, at 01:50, Russell Standish wrote:
>
>  On Wed, Feb 12, 2014 at 07:46:48AM +1300, LizR wrote:
>>
>>> On 12 February 2014 02:55, meekerdb  wrote:
>>>
>>>  My problem with this is that I don't believe in arithmetical realism in
 the sense required for this argument.  I think consciousness depends of
 consciousness *of* an external world and thoughts just about Peano's
 arithmetic is not enough to realize consciousness and the
 "ineffable=unprovable" identification is gratuitous.  There are obvious
 physical and evolutionary reasons that qualia would be ineffable.
  That's
 why I think step 8 is invalid because it assumes dreams (of arithmetic?)
 are possible independent of any external world - or looked at another
 way,
 I think to make it work would require that the 'inert' computation
 simulate
 a whole world in which the consciousness would then exist *relative* to
 that world.


>>> Well, you have already rejected step 0 - (at least one of) the initial
>>> assumptions - so I wouldn't worry about step 8!
>>>
>>>
>> I don't see how it rejects step 0. Provided that the artificial
>> computational brain offered by the doctor is connected to the actual
>> senses, and not just placed in a vat connected to some simulated
>> reality, it certainly satisfies the Yes Doctor postulate.
>>
>> I don't see the relevance of AR or CT to Brent's argument.
>>
>> I'm not yet convinced it is a genuine problem for step 8, or not, as I
>> still
>> don't feel I fully understand what that says yet.
>>
>
> At step seven, the primitive materialist can still invoke a physicalist
> form of ultrafinitism, to prevent the comp reversal between physics and
> arithmetic (or number theology).
>
> Step 8, shows that if that move is done, then we have to attribute some
> non Turing emulable, but also non FPI recoverable properties in that
> primitive matter to instantiate consciousness. It gives to the primitive
> materialist a hint to refute comp: 1) to define what they mean by primitive
> matter,


It could be as Peter Jones said the thing that renders it real... only
computations implemented in matter are real... AR as such would be false, a
mathematical statement not implemented in matter is indeterminate, the
truth value only come from implementation. Computationalism + realness
ingredient could still be possible and evade UDA conclusion... at the costs
of some "magical" property.

Quentin


> and 2) to show that such matter relies on non FPI recoverable properties.
> But that is equivalent with the test that comp offers, so it cannot be a
> refutation of comp->reversal, but of comp itself.
>
> To be short. We will have opportunities to come back on this. But only if
> most are OK, with the steps 0-7.
>
> Best,
>
> Bruno
>
>
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
>
>
>
>
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Re: Suicide Words God and Ideas



On 12 Feb 2014, at 02:02, Russell Standish wrote:


On Tue, Feb 11, 2014 at 07:31:24PM +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote:


You are right, the qualia are in X1* \  X1, like we get quanta in
S4Grz1, Z1*, X1*.


The only thing you can say is that qualia ought to obey the axioms of
X1*\X1, (and even that supposes that Z captures all observations,
which I think is debatable),


By UDA, "p" to refer to a "physical certainty" needs to

1) UD generated (= sigma_1 arithmetical and true).
2) provable (true in all consistent extensions)
3) and non "trivially" provable (= there must be at least one  
consistent extension)


This give the []p & <>t, with p sigma_1.

So the logic of observable certainty should be given by the Z1* logic.




not that your model generates qualia, as
Liz was suggesting.
There may well be other things in X1*\X1 that are not qualia.

This is not a critique of you - I don't recall you ever claiming your
model "got qualia", I was mainly responding to Liz's comment of  
11/2/14.



I think you might have taken Liz a bit too much literally. Perhaps.

Bruno





Cheers
--


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Principal, High Performance Coders
Visiting Professor of Mathematics  hpco...@hpcoders.com.au
University of New South Wales  http://www.hpcoders.com.au


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Re: Suicide Words God and Ideas



On 12 Feb 2014, at 01:50, Russell Standish wrote:


On Wed, Feb 12, 2014 at 07:46:48AM +1300, LizR wrote:

On 12 February 2014 02:55, meekerdb  wrote:

My problem with this is that I don't believe in arithmetical  
realism in
the sense required for this argument.  I think consciousness  
depends of

consciousness *of* an external world and thoughts just about Peano's
arithmetic is not enough to realize consciousness and the
"ineffable=unprovable" identification is gratuitous.  There are  
obvious
physical and evolutionary reasons that qualia would be ineffable.   
That's
why I think step 8 is invalid because it assumes dreams (of  
arithmetic?)
are possible independent of any external world - or looked at  
another way,
I think to make it work would require that the 'inert' computation  
simulate
a whole world in which the consciousness would then exist  
*relative* to

that world.



Well, you have already rejected step 0 - (at least one of) the  
initial

assumptions - so I wouldn't worry about step 8!



I don't see how it rejects step 0. Provided that the artificial
computational brain offered by the doctor is connected to the actual
senses, and not just placed in a vat connected to some simulated
reality, it certainly satisfies the Yes Doctor postulate.

I don't see the relevance of AR or CT to Brent's argument.

I'm not yet convinced it is a genuine problem for step 8, or not, as  
I still

don't feel I fully understand what that says yet.


At step seven, the primitive materialist can still invoke a  
physicalist form of ultrafinitism, to prevent the comp reversal  
between physics and arithmetic (or number theology).


Step 8, shows that if that move is done, then we have to attribute  
some non Turing emulable, but also non FPI recoverable properties in  
that primitive matter to instantiate consciousness. It gives to the  
primitive materialist a hint to refute comp: 1) to define what they  
mean by primitive matter, and 2) to show that such matter relies on  
non FPI recoverable properties.
But that is equivalent with the test that comp offers, so it cannot be  
a refutation of comp->reversal, but of comp itself.


To be short. We will have opportunities to come back on this. But only  
if most are OK, with the steps 0-7.


Best,

Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: Suicide Words God and Ideas

2014-02-12 Thread Richard Ruquist

On Wed, Feb 12, 2014 at 6:01 AM, Bruno Marchal  wrote:

>
> On 12 Feb 2014, at 01:17, chris peck wrote:
>
> Hi Chris dM and Bruno etc
>
> >> Once, Chris Peck said that he was convinced by Clark's argument) and I
> invited him to elaborate, as that might give possible lightening. He did
> not comply, and I was beginning that UDA was problematical for people named
> "Chris".
>
> I think Clark should elaborate on his arguments rather than me, firstly
> because he'll do it better than I ever could and secondly it will save me
> the embarrassment if I have him wrong.
>
>
>
> Come on, the poor guy tried hard since two years, and has convinced only
> him. But you said you do understood him, so it would be interesting you try
> to explain (except that it is rather easy to see that he is incoherent, as
> all replies to him have shown. He just stop the reasoning in the middle, or
> change the definitions).
>
>
>
>
>
> I've elaborated at length on my own criticisms of step 3 and stand by them.
>
>
>
> It was not a refutation, as I have explained.
>
>
>
>
>
> I will say though that I find it astonishing if people work their way
> through Bruno's steps and claim to understand them and then maintain that
> Clark's erudite and ofttimes witty criticisms are in some way obtuse or
> difficult to follow.
>
>
> Really? What do you understand in Clark's argument?
>
>
>
>
>
> That the person who actually devised the steps themselves remains confused
> about Clark's comments almost beggars belief. There;s something very odd
> about that.
>
>
>
> The argument just shows that you cannot program a robot so that it can
> predicts a specific happening, which must exist if we assume comp.
>
> Can you show us that algorithm? Or explain how it could exist?
>
>
>
>
>
> There is some fuss about Clark's reluctance to apply his argument to MWI.
> Like some others I think Clark possibly makes a misstep when (if?) he
> defends the notion of 1p in-determinism within an MWI context. I can see
> though that in Comp people are duplicated within worlds whereas in MWI they
> are duplicated between worlds, and there possibly are some repercussions
> vis a vis the proper use of pro-nouns because of that.
>
>
> The 1p and 3p definitions shows this to be irrelevant. or use that to
> refute step 3. Clark has not succeeded in this task, and his argument
> confuse 3-1 view with 1-views, systematically.
>
>
>
>
> Im not sure it matters much, because Clark could be right about Comp and
> just inconsistent about MWI. So this complaint, loudly pursued by Quentin,
> has always seemed impotent to me and not worth bothering about.
>
> Im reluctant to get involved in the step 3 discussions because, mentioning
> no names Quentin and PGC, people can get very emotional and arm wavey about
> people criticizing Bruno's metaphysics.
>
>
> Which metaphysics? It is a reasoning, simply. the assumption is that you
> can survive with a digital brain. Are you, like Clark, OK with step 0, 1,
> and 2?
>
> And, if you are not OK with step 3 for a genuine reason, just tell it to
> us. of course, if it is just literary philosophical hand waving, which I
> suspect (to be franc, due to you absence of doubt on the question), then
> some people can get emotional, as we are used and sometimes tired with that
> kind of pseudo-philosophical non-arguments.
>
> If step 3 is false, just provide the needed algorithm to prove this.
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
>
>
> So for now at least, I'll limit myself to recommending the odd sci-fi
> movie on the film thread. The Quiet Earth (1985) is a little known gem, btw.
>
> All the best
> Chris.
>
> --
> Date: Wed, 12 Feb 2014 12:00:42 +1300
> Subject: Re: Suicide Words God and Ideas
> From: lizj...@gmail.com
> To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
>
> On 12 February 2014 10:55, Richard Ruquist  wrote:
>
> On Tue, Feb 11, 2014 at 4:10 PM, LizR  wrote:
>
> On 12 February 2014 08:50, Richard Ruquist  wrote:
>
> On Tue, Feb 11, 2014 at 1:42 PM, LizR  wrote:
>
> On 12 February 2014 00:41, Richard Ruquist  wrote:
>
> On Tue, Feb 11, 2014 at 3:45 AM, LizR  wrote:
>
> On 11 February 2014 18:40, Richard Ruquist wrote:
>
>
> String theory based on Maldacena's conjecture predicted the viscosity of
> the quark-gluon plasma before it was measured
>
>
> Correctly, I assume.
>
>
> and more recently explained the mechanism behind EPR based on
> Einstein-Rosen bridges, which is more like a retrodiction.
>
>
> That seems like a sledgehammer to crack a nut, although the initials have
> a nice near-symmetry. Why would one need to have ERBs - that presumably
> have to be kept open by some exotic mechanicsm - to explain EPR when you
> can do it very simply anyway?
>
>
> And how can it be done very simply?
>
> By dropping Bell's assumption that time is fundamentally asymmetric (for
> the particles used in an EPR experiment, which are generally photons).
>
>
> Please explain how dropping asymmetric time explains EPR.
>
>
> It makes it logically possible. I w

Re: Suicide Words God and Ideas



On 12 Feb 2014, at 01:17, chris peck wrote:


Hi Chris dM and Bruno etc

>> Once, Chris Peck said that he was convinced by Clark's argument)  
and I invited him to elaborate, as that might give possible  
lightening. He did not comply, and I was beginning that UDA was  
problematical for people named "Chris".


I think Clark should elaborate on his arguments rather than me,  
firstly because he'll do it better than I ever could and secondly it  
will save me the embarrassment if I have him wrong.



Come on, the poor guy tried hard since two years, and has convinced  
only him. But you said you do understood him, so it would be  
interesting you try to explain (except that it is rather easy to see  
that he is incoherent, as all replies to him have shown. He just stop  
the reasoning in the middle, or change the definitions).






I've elaborated at length on my own criticisms of step 3 and stand  
by them.


It was not a refutation, as I have explained.






I will say though that I find it astonishing if people work their  
way through Bruno's steps and claim to understand them and then  
maintain that Clark's erudite and ofttimes witty criticisms are in  
some way obtuse or difficult to follow.


Really? What do you understand in Clark's argument?





That the person who actually devised the steps themselves remains  
confused about Clark's comments almost beggars belief. There;s  
something very odd about that.



The argument just shows that you cannot program a robot so that it can  
predicts a specific happening, which must exist if we assume comp.


Can you show us that algorithm? Or explain how it could exist?






There is some fuss about Clark's reluctance to apply his argument to  
MWI. Like some others I think Clark possibly makes a misstep when  
(if?) he defends the notion of 1p in-determinism within an MWI  
context. I can see though that in Comp people are duplicated within  
worlds whereas in MWI they are duplicated between worlds, and there  
possibly are some repercussions vis a vis the proper use of pro- 
nouns because of that.


The 1p and 3p definitions shows this to be irrelevant. or use that to  
refute step 3. Clark has not succeeded in this task, and his argument  
confuse 3-1 view with 1-views, systematically.





Im not sure it matters much, because Clark could be right about Comp  
and just inconsistent about MWI. So this complaint, loudly pursued  
by Quentin, has always seemed impotent to me and not worth bothering  
about.


Im reluctant to get involved in the step 3 discussions because,  
mentioning no names Quentin and PGC, people can get very emotional  
and arm wavey about people criticizing Bruno's metaphysics.


Which metaphysics? It is a reasoning, simply. the assumption is that  
you can survive with a digital brain. Are you, like Clark, OK with  
step 0, 1, and 2?


And, if you are not OK with step 3 for a genuine reason, just tell it  
to us. of course, if it is just literary philosophical hand waving,  
which I suspect (to be franc, due to you absence of doubt on the  
question), then some people can get emotional, as we are used and  
sometimes tired with that kind of pseudo-philosophical non-arguments.


If step 3 is false, just provide the needed algorithm to prove this.

Bruno





So for now at least, I'll limit myself to recommending the odd sci- 
fi movie on the film thread. The Quiet Earth (1985) is a little  
known gem, btw.


All the best
Chris.

Date: Wed, 12 Feb 2014 12:00:42 +1300
Subject: Re: Suicide Words God and Ideas
From: lizj...@gmail.com
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com

On 12 February 2014 10:55, Richard Ruquist  wrote:
On Tue, Feb 11, 2014 at 4:10 PM, LizR  wrote:
On 12 February 2014 08:50, Richard Ruquist  wrote:
On Tue, Feb 11, 2014 at 1:42 PM, LizR  wrote:
On 12 February 2014 00:41, Richard Ruquist  wrote:
On Tue, Feb 11, 2014 at 3:45 AM, LizR  wrote:
On 11 February 2014 18:40, Richard Ruquist wrote:

String theory based on Maldacena's conjecture predicted the  
viscosity of the quark-gluon plasma before it was measured


Correctly, I assume.

and more recently explained the mechanism behind EPR based on  
Einstein-Rosen bridges, which is more like a retrodiction.


That seems like a sledgehammer to crack a nut, although the initials  
have a nice near-symmetry. Why would one need to have ERBs - that  
presumably have to be kept open by some exotic mechanicsm - to  
explain EPR when you can do it very simply anyway?


And how can it be done very simply?

By dropping Bell's assumption that time is fundamentally asymmetric  
(for the particles used in an EPR experiment, which are generally  
photons).


Please explain how dropping asymmetric time explains EPR.

It makes it logically possible. I will have to ask a physicist for  
the details, but it is a mechanism whereby the state of the  
measuring apparatus can influence the state of the entire system. If  
we assume the emitter creates a pair of entangled photons and their  
p

Re: Human brain artificially created in laboratory



On 11 Feb 2014, at 22:52, Richard Ruquist wrote:

"ASK A PHYSICIAN". I went to med school until I was too sick to  
continue.

But I learned enough to never ASK A PHYSICIAN.


I agree. To be sick is bad, but to be sick and meet a doctor can be  
real bad, very often. Few doctor are well prepared to say "I don't  
know", and can do quite absurd experimentations. Never say "yes" to a  
doctor too much quickly.


Bruno





On Tue, Feb 11, 2014 at 4:42 PM, John Mikes  wrote:
Richard:
I salute every step forward, trhey may (or may not) further our  
cognitive and operative advancement. This work is in the line of a  
positive trend - maybe overestimated in its efficiency - as most  
are. If they wll be able to 'evolve' smarter individuals, I place  
all my blessings on their heads.


The "brain" is a great mystery, we measure some physical -  
physiological data upon it's function and assign them to factors -  
(also assigned to brainfubction) furthering bodily and/or mental  
activity. What do we know indeed? (Don't ask an agnostic!)
There are no specially marked physical (or physiological) data  
indicating the domain of mental activity they belong to. No 'green'  
mAmps for emotional, no 'orange' mAmps for scientific, no 'blue'  
ones for sports, or 'square' ones for love.
 Not even differentiated blood-flow measurements indicate domains  
they are said to indicate. Bodily activation is easier to follow,  
although ASK A PHYSICIAN...
There is some early try to decipher(?) the different connectivity of  
brain-parts into topical differentiation - a good try, but far from  
touching the complexity of what we assign to brainfunction - and  
even that is a limited model of what may be.


I confess: I consider the human brain a relay station from source  
unknown into human activity and am happy when they find medicament  
(material, or treatment) to eliminate (reduce?) pathological  
consequences.

Of course it is hard to dampen the enthusiasm of the inventor...

There are so many dimensions etc. we know nothing about and all of  
them may influence our 'technology'.

Agnostically yours
John Mikes


On Tue, Feb 11, 2014 at 10:18 AM, Richard Ruquist  
 wrote:

The title of this article is a bit of a reach.
But these lab results regarding self-organizing
may be of interest to this list. Richard


Human brain artificially created in laboratory
Published on Mon, Feb 10, 2014 by livia rusu

Post filled in: Genetics, Mind & Brain


Human embryonic stem cells can be induced into forming a developing  
brain tissue. The brain development process represents one of the  
most specific processes; during it, neuroepithelium, formed as a  
flat sheet by the nervous system, grows on the exterior layer of the  
embryo, after which it folds in to create a neural tube giving rise  
to the brain and the spinal cord. The process implicates the  
migration and proliferation of undeveloped nerve cells from the  
brain at one end and the spinal cord at the other.


Human embryonic stem cells spontaneously organize into  
neuroepithelial tissue containing multiple zones after growing for  
70 days in culture. Via RIKEN.


The discovery made by Yoshiki Sasai, Taisuke KAdoshima and their  
colleagues from RIKEN Center for Developmental Biology consisted in  
treating human embryonic stem (ES) cells by the use of a system with  
signaling molecules inducing the formation of nervous tissue from  
the outer embryonic layer. The thesis of their scientific project  
was that the cells have the capacity of spontaneously organizing  
into cerebral cortical tissues - forming at the front of the  
developing neural tube.


The previous research of Sasai's team had proven that a new culture  
technique could involve growing ES cells in suspension, showing this  
way that the cells are capable of self-organizing into complex three- 
dimensional structures. The finding served as a methodology  
throughout which pieces of cerebral cortex and embryonic eyes from  
mouse ES cells were grown. Another more recent study has shown that  
there is a complete compatibility with human embryonic stem cells  
that can also organize into embryonic eyes that contain retinal  
tissue and light-sensitive cells.


The last study of Sasai's team showed that the formation of nervous  
tissue from the outer embryonic layer can be induced by treating  
human ES cells to grow using the cell culture system with signaling  
molecules. This was doubled by the finding that the cells  
spontaneously organize into neuroepithelial tissue which folds up  
immediately after this, to give a multilayered cortex.


During the thickening of the front end of the neural tube that  
happens along with the embryonic development at both ends, waves of  
cells migrate outward to mold the layered cerebral cortex as well as  
other parts of the brain. What this study correlates along with this  
scientific fact is that the reason for which the front end of the  
neural tube's thickening

Re: Nagel on Explanation



On 11 Feb 2014, at 22:13, Craig Weinberg wrote:

"Explanation, unlike causation is not just of an event but of an  
event under a description. An explanation must show why it was  
likely than an event of that type occurred." - Thomas Nagel


This quote applies to my rejection of Comp since Comp does not  
explain why there is any such type of thing as qualities which are  
felt, seen, heard, etc, only that there are gaps in what can be  
understood about how machines logically operate.


This alludes to the gap G* minus G, but not Z* minus Z, which is the  
one corresponding to the UDA FPI.


Bruno






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Re: What are numbers? What is math?



On 11 Feb 2014, at 19:58, Craig Weinberg wrote:

I think that the opposite of everything that you are saying makes  
more sense.:


On Tuesday, February 11, 2014 11:07:07 AM UTC-5, Edgar L. Owen wrote:


So the take away is that :

1. The universe, and everything in it, consists of information only.  
And that information consists only of different arrangements of  
elemental R-bits. And these elemental R-bits are the actual numbers  
on the basis of which R-math continually computes the current state  
of the universe.


The universe, and everything in it, consists of no information, but  
only experiences which are informed through aesthetic acquaintance.  
Information consists of no elemental structures at all, but rather  
is distributed metaphorically in gaps between experiences using a  
variety quantitative shortcuts.


That makes sense with comp.





2. Thus everything in the universe is made up of numbers and only  
numbers.


Thus nothing in the universe is made up of "numbers", which is why  
we have developed mathematics to enumerate what has no number itself.


Correct with comp.





3. All the things in the universe are just various arrangements and  
relationships between these numbers.


Nothing in the universe is merely an arrangement or relationship  
between "numbers".


OK. (Nothing in the physical and mental universe is merely an ...)






4. These are continually being recomputed by all the interactive  
programs (all just aspects of a single universal program) that make  
up all the processes in the universe.


There are no processes in the universe which are only computations.  
Nothing in the universe depends on a continuous computation and  
nothing that interacts can be purely a "program".


OK.





5. These processes follow fundamental logico-mathematical rules  
which are part of what I call the extended fine tuning (the set of   
every non-reducible aspect of reality including the rules of logic  
it follows). These are analogous to the basic machine operations of  
silicon computers.


Logico-mathematical rules are abstracted from approximation and  
insensitivity, and are appropriate only for controlling forms and  
functions from the outside in.


Correct.






6. The programs of reality are complex sequences of these elemental  
operations acting on R-numbers which are just R-bits. In general  
these sequences incorporate standard routines such as the particle  
property conservation routine.



The reality of programs is simple logical elements operating on each  
other with no profoundly meaningful application to the actual  
presence of the universe or ourselves.


Here you depart from comp.






The aggregate result is the universe we exist within which consists  
entirely of different types of information, a fact  which can be  
verified by direct objective observation.


The result is that the concepts we call number and information  
consist entirely of the same type of reductive expectations, a fact  
which can be verified by direct subjective participation.


Self-referentially relative numbers agree with you.






Our minds each internally simulate this information universe as the  
physical, dimensional universe in which mind tells us we live. These  
simulations are a convenient evolutionary illusion that enables us,  
as programs within a universe of programs, to more effectively  
compute our lives and function more successfully. They enable our  
survival as individuals and as a species. That is why they have  
evolved, even as they conceal the true underlying information nature  
of reality.



Our internal experience is informed directly by opportunities for  
quasi-veridical sensory entanglement from within, without, and  
beyond our neurology. It is the idea of information and numbers  
which is a meta-simulative technology that allows us to project our  
control beyond our physical limitations. Computation accelerates and  
amplifies existing tendencies of individual and collective users,  
both threatening and supporting our survival.


Locally. But to do a scientific (modest and sharbale) theory, we need  
to start from 3p agreement, and usually scientists agree with  
statements like 17 is prime, but not on sense, quasi-veridical,  
entanglement, etc.


Bruno




Craig


Edgar


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Re: Better Than the Chinese Room

On 11 Feb 2014, at 19:47, John Clark wrote:

On Mon, Feb 10, 2014 at 1:40 PM, Bruno Marchal   
wrote:

 >> My question was "what is the unique consistent definition of  
"the 1p" after the duplication has been performed?".

> In the 3-1 view, that does not exist,

Then "the 1p" is of no use to anyone

Why?

and neither is "the 3-1 view" whatever the hell that is supposed to  
be.

So you declare something is not useful, before grasping what we talk  
about?

> There are posts which illustrates that you did understand this.

You're goddamn right!

So ... reread them, if you doubt the meaning of "3-1" view, which I  
have indeed explained more than once.

>>> For the guy in W, it is the same definition, but obviously, the  
content is different.

>> So the definition is the same but its different.

> The definition is "content of the diary which go in the box". It  
is duplicated. After each copy self-localizes themselves, they write  
their unique result and compare with the prediction already written  
in the diary.

That is a great answer, too bad its not the answer to the question  
that I asked. My question was "what is the unique consistent  
definition of "the 1p" after the duplication has been performed?".

1p = the content of a personal diary (taken in the tele-box).  The  
definition does not change before and after the experience. The 1p is  
unique from the 1p view, but is not in the 3-1 view (that is for an  
external observer willing to attribute consciousness to other people).

> The definition of "dog" is the same for the different dogs Medor  
and Ralph.

Yes, the definition of "dog" remains the same regardless of what   
Medor or Ralph write in their diary.

That's the point!

> The guy is Helsinki knows, by comp, that he will survive

Well good for "comp".

>>If consciousness helps the predator then it must effect behavior  
and if it effects behavior then the Turing Test works for  
consciousness as well as intelligence.

> That does not follow.

Like hell it doesn't! If it changes objective external behavior then  
the Turing Test can see it

"see it" in some sense, but this does not necessarily make it  
recognizable as such.

and so can Evolution. Please explain how Evolution can select for  
consciousness, or anything else for that matter, if it makes no  
change in some objective external attribute.

My points is that it makes some change. But the criteria are not  
algorithmically testable. may be the presence of atomic bombs on a  
planet witness the experience of fear, but that issue cannot be  
settled in a constructive way. A God can put atomic bombs on a planet  
to fail us, for example.

> Consciousness helps the predator in a long range

No! "the long range" is not nearly good enough. Evolution has no  
foresight,

That is not implied by what I said. I agree with you.

it doesn't understand one step backward 2 steps forward; if a change  
doesn't provide an immediate advantage to an animal right NOW it  
will not be selected for regardless of how advantageous that  
attribute may turn out to be sometime down the road. This is one of  
the great weaknesses of Evolution and is why designers do a much  
better job;

Which helps us, but designers are also a product of evolution, and  
this contradict your point. Designers' consciousness has a role. If  
not, you would not say that designers are better than evolution.

but until Evolution, after 3 billion years of fumbling, finally got  
around to making brains it was the only way complex things could get  
assembled.

> the Turing test does not make much sense to me. Some machine can  
already pass it relatively to some human, and some human does not  
succeed in it.

Yes, but what is nonsensical in that?

To use it as a criterion for consciousness.

> Zombie can exist in the sense that someday it will be relatively  
easy to make a machine imitating perfectly drunk people, or a  
fanatics or something.

But why do you believe they'd be zombies? You're not infected with  
the popular but silly Mr. Spock/Star Trek syndrome are you, the idea  
that consciousness is harder to achieve than intelligence?

Consciousness is simple to achieve, but hard to recognize. But  
zombihood is even simpler to achieve, when simulating human deprived  
of their sanity.

>>> Consciousness is needed for making sense of pleasant and  
unpleasant,

>> Evolution has no need of that,

> I cannot make sense of evolution needing something.

Don't be an ass.  My iMac needs electricity to work and Evolution  
needs heredity, mutation, and external objective attributes for  
natural selection to select for or against for it to work.

>> So if animals can nevertheless at least sometimes manage to make  
sense out of things then that ability can only be the byproduct of  
something else that Evolution does care about, like intelligent  
behavior that lets the animals genes get into the next ge

Re: Better Than the Chinese Room

On 11 Feb 2014, at 18:20, meekerdb wrote:

On 2/11/2014 8:48 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 11 Feb 2014, at 04:15, meekerdb wrote:

On 2/10/2014 3:18 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
The laws of physics or arithmetic makes it possible for you to  
express your
> point, but the content of your post is explained by your  
awareness of the
> questions, your taste for the field, your pleasure to argue  
rationally, your
> personality, etc. It is not explained by QM, as this explains  
all posts on
> all lists in all forums in an empty way. Your answer can be  
supported by the
> laws, but the laws does not explain your answer at the level  
where your

> answer can make sense to me.

That's a funny answer from a guy who proposed to explain  
everything as traces in all possible computations.

Just to sum up, as you mention "everything"

With comp+Theaetetus:

God is explained by the Arithmetical Truth
The Intelligible is explained by Number-Provability (Gödel's  
beweisbar)
The Soul is explained by the conjunction of Number-Provability and  
Truth
Intelligible Matter is explained by a probability calculus (called  
"bastard calculus by Plato and Plotinus) on the traces  of  
all computations.
Sensible matter is explained by a intensional variant of  
Intelligible matter, again its conjunction with Truth.

Brent
"That which can explain anything fails to explain at all."

With physicalism, QM explains everything. At some level at least.

First, that's not true.  QM is apparently inconsistent with our best  
theory of gravity.

Sure, but a bit aside the point.

Second, it has been very successful at explaining what is observed.

Everything that we observe. My point is that with the quoted criteria,  
this should entail that it explains nothing.

That doesn't mean it can explain ghosts, leprechauns, gods and other  
things *not* observed.

Why not "consciousness" and other things that we do not see, but at  
least believe in?

There's a difference between being able to explain anything and  
explaining everything.

That's my point.

Bruno

Brent

Would you say it fails?

I say that it fails only by its ambiguity on the observer, it uses  
comp (in Everett) but fail to justify its measure. And then it  
fails to address God, Intelligible, Soul and, well, the whole  
theological matter, which concerns life, but also possible others  
lives, other reality realms, and the other billions of very  
difficult question coming from the arithmetical reality (or its  
intensional variants).

Bruno

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Re: Discovery of quantum vibrations in brain microtubules confirms Hameroff/Penrose consciousness theory basis

On 11 Feb 2014, at 17:35, ghib...@gmail.com wrote:

On Sunday, February 2, 2014 6:36:24 PM UTC, John Clark wrote:

On Sun, Feb 2, 2014 at 4:29 AM, Bruno Marchal   
wrote:

 Although it doesn't necessarily follow the digital  
transformation of consciousness is perfectly consistent with the  
matter in the desk I'm pounding my hand on right now as simply being  
a subroutine in the johnkclak program, and the same is true of the  
matter in my hand.

>>> Only by a confusion 1p and 3p,

>> OK now were getting to the heart of the matter (no pun  
indented).  Explain exactly why my statement above is confused and  
or wrong and you will have won this year old debate.

> UDA is the explanation of this.

You're going to have to more than just type 3 letters to convince me!

> You agreed also that consciousness is not localized

Yes I agree, in fact it was me not you who first mentioned it.

> but you talk like if the object on your desk are localized.

Are you claiming that a computer can emulate a intelligent conscious  
being but can't emulate a desk?  If my consciousness is caused by a  
computer processing information then the world that consciousness  
interacts with is also cause by information. And information like  
consciousness has no unique position.

> If your consciousness is not localized, and perhaps supported by  
many other computations (in a physical universe or in arithmetic)  
you need to explain why the object of your desk appear to be made of  
local matter

Because the desk subprogram was written to appear that way to the  
John Clark subprogram; the desk could appear however the master  
programer (or evolution) wished it to appear, he could even ignore  
the laws of physics if he wished and use Aristotelian physics, or  
road runner cartoon physics.

>> it's been over a year and to be honest I don't even remember what  
the first 2 steps were, they may have been just as silly as step 3.

> This shows the complete non seriousness of your attitude.

 I promise to give your ideas all the seriousness they deserve.

> it means that you have judged from rumors and not personal study.

You and I have never met so the only thing I have to judge you by is  
by studying the ASCII sequence you have produced.  And I have never  
heard any rumors about you but now you've got me curious, what are  
they?

> You are an obscurantist religious bigot

Wow, calling a guy known for disliking religion religious, never  
heard that one before, at least I never heard it before I was 12.

> and parrot

Stop using the exact same ridiculous insult and I'll stop using the  
exact same rubber stamp reply.

 John K Clark
probably the kiss of death since I'm a known lunatic , but I vouch  
for John here but would probably say comp itself as stated in Chuch/ 
say-yes-to-doctor thesis, already drops the consciousness issue  
betweee n the cracks. Nothing wrong with the UDA after that, but  
consciousness wasn't being 'carried' to begin with.

I do not understand. The definition of comp is in term of  
consciousness preservation for some brain transformation.

May be you can elaborate.  John Clark agrees on this making your  
remark still more bizarre.

Bruno

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Re: What are numbers? What is math?



On 11 Feb 2014, at 17:07, Edgar L. Owen wrote:


All,

In a computational reality everything consists of information in the  
computational space of reality/existence, whose presence within it  
gives it its reality. By taking place within reality these  
computations produce real universe results.


All this information is ultimately quantized into a basic unit I  
call an R-bit. Thus all of reality is constructed of different  
arrangements of R-bits.


Now the basic insight is that R-bits are actually just numbers,  
let's call them R-numbers to distinguish from the H-numbers of human  
mathematics which are quite different.


This means that the actual numbers of reality are actually the real  
elemental constituents OF reality. Numbers make up reality, and  
everything in reality is constructed only of these R-numbers. R- 
numbers = R-bits.


This neatly addresses the problem of how there can be abstract  
concepts such as number that describe but aren't an actual part of  
reality. In this view there can't be, since the actual numbers of  
reality are the actual constituents of everything in reality.


As Pythagoros claimed, "all is number", in the realest sense possible.


That begin to looks like comp. But still, by the FPI, the physical  
cannot appears to be "made of numbers" (and they are not). Physics is  
an inside view.


If you use computational reality in the standard sense, all you need  
to postulate is elementary arithmetic, but you have to retrieve both  
mind and matter from only the arithmetical relation.


Reading UDA would save a lot of time, if, like here, you seem to agree  
with the computationalist hypothesis in the cognitive science.







Now what do these R-numbers look like?

1. Every R-number is exactly the same as every other R-number. They  
are fungible or interchangeable. They do not exist in any sequences  
such as 1, 2, 3 ... They don't have ordinal or cardinal 'tags'  
attached to distinguish them. There are not different numbers, or  
different kinds of number. All numbers are exactly the same.


But this looks like nonsense to me. You are using "number" in a non  
standard sense, like computation.






What human H-math calls ordinal or cardinal characteristics of  
number are not intrinsic to R-numbers themselves, but are  
relationships between R-number groups and sets. These concepts are  
part of R-math, not characteristics of R-numbers.


2. R-numbers are finite. The universe contains only some finite  
number of basic R-bits, and since R-bits are themselves numbers, the  
number of numbers in the computational universe is finite. There are  
no R-number infinities.


That is ultrafinitism, probably of the physicalist type. Why not, but  
there will be difficulties with step 8.







3. The only R-numbers that exist correspond to what human H-math  
would try to think of as the non-zero positive integers up to the  
finite limit of R-bits in existence. There is no R-number 0, no  
negative R-numbers, no fractional or irrational R-numbers. These are  
examples of how human H-math generalizes and tries to extend the  
basic relational concepts of R-math to H-numbers. It is by making  
these kind of extensions and generalizations that H-math diverges  
from R-math and thus has real problems in accurately describing  
reality.


If comp is true, both physics and consciousness are independent of  
such detail.







What does R-math look like?

1. R-math is the actual computations that compute actual reality  
that compute the real empirical objective state of the information  
universe. H-math, while originally modeled on R-math has greatly  
expanded beyond that to enormous complexities which though they  
sometimes can accurately describe aspects of reality, do NOT  
actually COMPUTE it. R-math is what actually actively COMPUTES  
reality, and only what is necessary to do that.


That is magical thinking. You must avoid uses of "real", "reality",  
etc. This beg the entire discussion.






2. R-math is probably a rather small set of logico-mathematical  
rules, just what is necessary to actually compute reality at the  
elemental level.


You will need a universal machine or number, and you can't define what  
that means without some infinity, at least at the epistemological level.




It will include active routines such as those that compute the  
conservation of the small set of particle properties that make up  
all elemental particles, and the rules that govern the binding of  
particle properties in atomic and molecular matter.


Where do such particles come from? What are they?





3. Thus R-math consists of the logical operators of the active  
routines that actively compute reality, rather than the static  
equations and principles of H-math.



So the take away is that :

1. The universe, and everything in it, consists of information only.


What does that mean?



And that information consists only of different arrangements of  
elemental R-bi

Re: Suicide Words God and Ideas