Re: Michael Graziano's theory of consciousness
On 14 April 2015 at 16:31, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote: Some sort of dualisms could allow duplication others don't. Saying you can whatever methaphysical axioms is false. Consciousness could be linked for example by an invisible force to your body by an unknown and unknowable and unmeasurable link that cannot ne copied or associated to another body. Starting with if consciousness is duplicable, then letting the if down *is* a metaphysical commitment. As far as real science goes we have never ever duplicated consciousness. I'm not saying it is not possible, because as I recall to you, I mainly believe in computationalism, but right now all options are open and even if one day we can and do make copies, we're still lacking any sharable tests that can without questions prove it or give enough evidences. Certainly some theories of consciousness might not allow copying, but that cannot be a logical requirement. To claim that something is logically impossible is to claim that it is self-contradictory. I don't see why a theory saying like I said in the upper paragraph that consciousness could not be copied would be selfcontradictory... You have to see that when you say consciousness is duplicatable, you assume a lot of things about the reality and how it is working, and that you're making a metaphysical commitment, a leap of faith concerning what you assume the real to be and the reality itself. That's all I'm saying, but clearly if computationalism is true consciousness is obviously duplicatable. I don't see any difference between a metaphysical theory saying consciousness is not duplicable and one saying bananas are not duplicable: it is still coherent and non-contradictory to imagine either entity being duplicated. For consideration of conundrums of personal identity - which is where this discussion started - it is enough merely to consider the logical possibility of duplication. -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Michael Graziano's theory of consciousness
2015-04-14 8:44 GMT+02:00 Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com: On 14 April 2015 at 16:31, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote: Some sort of dualisms could allow duplication others don't. Saying you can whatever methaphysical axioms is false. Consciousness could be linked for example by an invisible force to your body by an unknown and unknowable and unmeasurable link that cannot ne copied or associated to another body. Starting with if consciousness is duplicable, then letting the if down *is* a metaphysical commitment. As far as real science goes we have never ever duplicated consciousness. I'm not saying it is not possible, because as I recall to you, I mainly believe in computationalism, but right now all options are open and even if one day we can and do make copies, we're still lacking any sharable tests that can without questions prove it or give enough evidences. Certainly some theories of consciousness might not allow copying, but that cannot be a logical requirement. To claim that something is logically impossible is to claim that it is self-contradictory. I don't see why a theory saying like I said in the upper paragraph that consciousness could not be copied would be selfcontradictory... You have to see that when you say consciousness is duplicatable, you assume a lot of things about the reality and how it is working, and that you're making a metaphysical commitment, a leap of faith concerning what you assume the real to be and the reality itself. That's all I'm saying, but clearly if computationalism is true consciousness is obviously duplicatable. I don't see any difference between a metaphysical theory saying consciousness is not duplicable and one saying bananas are not duplicable: it is still coherent and non-contradictory to imagine either entity being duplicated. No it is not, you even use a logical fallacy to justify this position... using miracles... a miracle imply *anything* is possible (even logical contradictory thing such as a *miracle*). So I disagree with you on tha point, a theory could assert consciousness is not duplicable (in practice and in theory, like you can't go faster than light) without being self contradictory (and you can use as much miracles as you want to say it is still possible logically, it's still a logical fallacy to do that). Quentin Quentin For consideration of conundrums of personal identity - which is where this discussion started - it is enough merely to consider the logical possibility of duplication. -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. (Roy Batty/Rutger Hauer) -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Michael Graziano's theory of consciousness
On 14 April 2015 at 15:29, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote: Le 14 avr. 2015 03:04, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com a écrit : On 14 April 2015 at 09:52, Bruce Kellett bhkell...@optusnet.com.au wrote: Stathis Papaioannou wrote: My body disintegrates yet I feel that I persist. I say this means personal identity is an illusion; you can disagree about use of the word illusion but the underlying fact is unchanged. I think all you are saying is that you don't believe in Cartesian duality -- there is no separate 'soul' that survives bodily changes and provides the 'true' personal identity. I don't think the Cartesian model is necessary for one to be able to say that personal identity is not just an illusion. It's an illusion even in a dualist model, because dualism does not logically rule out copying. Some sort of dualisms could allow duplication others don't. Saying you can whatever methaphysical axioms is false. Consciousness could be linked for example by an invisible force to your body by an unknown and unknowable and unmeasurable link that cannot ne copied or associated to another body. Starting with if consciousness is duplicable, then letting the if down *is* a metaphysical commitment. As far as real science goes we have never ever duplicated consciousness. I'm not saying it is not possible, because as I recall to you, I mainly believe in computationalism, but right now all options are open and even if one day we can and do make copies, we're still lacking any sharable tests that can without questions prove it or give enough evidences. Certainly some theories of consciousness might not allow copying, but that cannot be a logical requirement. To claim that something is logically impossible is to claim that it is self-contradictory. A married bachelor is an example of this; not even God could create one. -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Michael Graziano's theory of consciousness
Le 14 avr. 2015 08:04, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com a écrit : On 14 April 2015 at 15:29, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote: Le 14 avr. 2015 03:04, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com a écrit : On 14 April 2015 at 09:52, Bruce Kellett bhkell...@optusnet.com.au wrote: Stathis Papaioannou wrote: My body disintegrates yet I feel that I persist. I say this means personal identity is an illusion; you can disagree about use of the word illusion but the underlying fact is unchanged. I think all you are saying is that you don't believe in Cartesian duality -- there is no separate 'soul' that survives bodily changes and provides the 'true' personal identity. I don't think the Cartesian model is necessary for one to be able to say that personal identity is not just an illusion. It's an illusion even in a dualist model, because dualism does not logically rule out copying. Some sort of dualisms could allow duplication others don't. Saying you can whatever methaphysical axioms is false. Consciousness could be linked for example by an invisible force to your body by an unknown and unknowable and unmeasurable link that cannot ne copied or associated to another body. Starting with if consciousness is duplicable, then letting the if down *is* a metaphysical commitment. As far as real science goes we have never ever duplicated consciousness. I'm not saying it is not possible, because as I recall to you, I mainly believe in computationalism, but right now all options are open and even if one day we can and do make copies, we're still lacking any sharable tests that can without questions prove it or give enough evidences. Certainly some theories of consciousness might not allow copying, but that cannot be a logical requirement. To claim that something is logically impossible is to claim that it is self-contradictory. I don't see why a theory saying like I said in the upper paragraph that consciousness could not be copied would be selfcontradictory... You have to see that when you say consciousness is duplicatable, you assume a lot of things about the reality and how it is working, and that you're making a metaphysical commitment, a leap of faith concerning what you assume the real to be and the reality itself. That's all I'm saying, but clearly if computationalism is true consciousness is obviously duplicatable. Quentin A married bachelor is an example of this; not even God could create one. -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Michael Graziano's theory of consciousness
On 13 Apr 2015, at 14:55, Bruce Kellett wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: On 13 Apr 2015, at 05:31, Bruce Kellett wrote: The philosophical literature is full of extended discussions on this, and it is widely understood that ideas such as brain transplants and duplicating machines play merry havoc with our intuitive notions of personal identity. Yes, it simply vanish. Personal identity is an illusion, but the FPI is not, and that result is not used in the reversal, so I prefer to let is for other threads and topics. That seems like a flat contradiction. Personal identity is an illusion but First Person Indeterminacy is not. You can't have first person anything if you do not have a notion of personal identity. You are confusing consciousness, which is needed to have an illusion, and the consciousness content, in this case that we have a personal (absolute) identity. Once you agree that the W-man and the M-man are the same person, then applying this to the first amoeba can be used to explain that we (the animals) are all the same person (first person) just put in different context. Again, this is not relevant for the reasoning we were pursuing in the thread. We can come back on this later.. I am actually very suspicious of any argument which begins, or ends, with X is an illusion. Be X consciousness, personal identity, free will, space, time, or anything else. The theory is supposed to explain our experience of these things. Writing them off as illusions is not an explanation. Of course. It is the object of the whole work to explain that illusion. With comp, the primitive matter, space, time are also illusion, but the work explains precisely where the illusion comes from. The illusion are real and important, no doubt. You wrote also: Bruno Marchal wrote: On 13 Apr 2015, at 05:31, Bruce Kellett wrote: You cannot attack a result in science with philosophy. Of course you can. It happens all the time. True, many scientists (especially physicists) are dismissive of metaphysics. But it is usually those who are most dismissive of philosophy and metaphysics who are most hidebound in their own (unacknowledged) metaphysical prejudices. I meant you cannot attack a result in science with literary philosophy. If philosophy is done scientifically, there is no problem of course. It is the whole point of my doing: to illustrate that with comp we can translate philosophical problem into mathematical problems. Bruno Bruce -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Michael Graziano's theory of consciousness
On 14 Apr 2015, at 03:26, Bruce Kellett wrote: Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On 14 April 2015 at 09:52, Bruce Kellett bhkell...@optusnet.com.au wrote: Stathis Papaioannou wrote: My body disintegrates yet I feel that I persist. I say this means personal identity is an illusion; you can disagree about use of the word illusion but the underlying fact is unchanged. I think all you are saying is that you don't believe in Cartesian duality -- there is no separate 'soul' that survives bodily changes and provides the 'true' personal identity. I don't think the Cartesian model is necessary for one to be able to say that personal identity is not just an illusion. It's an illusion even in a dualist model, because dualism does not logically rule out copying. The illusion, to spell it out further, is that I am a unique entity persisting through time. That is what I feel to be personal identity at the visceral level, and even though intellectually I know better, I can't shake the feeling. It's stubborn, even if an illusion, eh? If you were duplicated, would you be prepared to kill your duplicate? Who would you kill? It can be shown that, indeed, killing someone with comp is equivalent with an amnesia. Dying is forgetting or refreshing memories. If you decide to kill a copy, you have to cautiously agree (with yourself) on the procedure (and who will be killed) before the duplication. After the duplication, it is preferable to treat the copy as a new person, for all practical and ethical purposes. Bruno Bruce -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Michael Graziano's theory of consciousness
On 13 Apr 2015, at 22:16, meekerdb wrote: On 4/13/2015 7:39 AM, Telmo Menezes wrote: Comp does not specify a substitution level. Maybe it's the brain, maybe the whole body or the entire planet. The duplication machines assume the body, but then this restriction is removed. If no substitution level exists, then comp is false. What if the substitution level, or more precisely scope, requires and environment with physics extending even to all the past light cone. The comp may be true but almost vacuous. Yes, comp with extremely low level looks like non-comp, but the reasoning still go through, as the UD emulates all computations. We have still to solve the measure problem, and derive physics from intensional arithmetic. Bruno Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Michael Graziano's theory of consciousness
On 14 Apr 2015, at 02:48, meekerdb wrote: On 4/13/2015 2:56 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On Tuesday, April 14, 2015, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote: 2015-04-13 23:08 GMT+02:00 Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com: On Tuesday, April 14, 2015, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote: 2015-04-13 19:50 GMT+02:00 Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com: On Tuesday, April 14, 2015, 'Chris de Morsella' via Everything List everything-list@googlegroups.com wrote: From: everything-list@googlegroups.com [mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com ] On Behalf Of Telmo Menezes Sent: Monday, April 13, 2015 7:49 AM To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Subject: Re: Michael Graziano's theory of consciousness On Mon, Apr 13, 2015 at 2:55 PM, Bruce Kellett bhkell...@optusnet.com.au wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: On 13 Apr 2015, at 05:31, Bruce Kellett wrote: The philosophical literature is full of extended discussions on this, and it is widely understood that ideas such as brain transplants and duplicating machines play merry havoc with our intuitive notions of personal identity. Yes, it simply vanish. Personal identity is an illusion, but the FPI is not, and that result is not used in the reversal, so I prefer to let is for other threads and topics. That seems like a flat contradiction. Personal identity is an illusion but First Person Indeterminacy is not. You can't have first person anything if you do not have a notion of personal identity. I am actually very suspicious of any argument which begins, or ends, with X is an illusion. Be X consciousness, personal identity, free will, space, time, or anything else. The theory is supposed to explain our experience of these things. Writing them off as illusions is not an explanation. Only if the theory fails to explain how the illusion arises. For example, there was a persistent illusion that the universe revolves around the earth. Astronomy eventually showed that not to be the case, also explaining why it looks that way. Telmo – I agree with you. An argument for something being an illusion needs to show how the illusion emerges out of the underlying reality; it needs to demonstrate the mechanisms that drive the illusion and how they work to transform the actual real events/experiences/etc. into whatever is subsequently perceived as experienced or real. Simply saying that something is an illusion is not adequate; I agree with that. And I think your example of the Aristotelian earth centric universe, is a good one. The mechanism by which it produced the illusion was demonstrated in that case. Here's the mechanism: my body is destroyed, and another similar body is created. Because it's similar, it thinks it's me. If two were created, both would think they were me. It would, if functionalism/computationalism is true... but it could be for example, that causaly linked matter till birth (or before...) is necessary (why not...) for being that particular individual... as my current body even if all its matter is continuously replaced, it is not replaced in one go, it is as said continuous, all matter composing my body is causaly linked... I'm not saying it is like that and that computationalism/functionalism is false (well I believe in computationalism), but currently, as we're nowhere near to have the ability to make copies of ourselves... it's hard to say, and as we have no 3rd persons reproduceable and sharable test to be convinced that the copy would really be us (we only have a metaphysical believe and a theory to say it should be)... even if that copy was made of flesh and blood and that a super high res scan would show that it has the exact same atoms with the exact same properties as the living body it was copied from... we would still have no proof it would be the same person... we would have a theory that if we succeed to copy a person and if the resulting copied person was alive and well and claimed to be the same as the original that indeed the copy and the copied would be the same person... but that is not a proof... (but that is what I believe it would have to be). We would have evidences that it must be (like the copy claiming he is the same as the original), but that's all we would have, only the copy would really *knows* it... like in a quantum suicide experiment, only the experimenter staying alive would have more and more confidence, quantum suicide is true. Physics is irrelevant to the philosophical problem of personal identity. It is only required that consciousness be logically duplicable. If my body is destroyed and another similar body is created, perhaps by miraculous means If miracles come into play... yeah, anything is possible. But I disagree, it's not *only* a logical problem. Avec des si, on mettrait Paris en bouteille. What you're saying is tautological and can be summarized by
Re: Michael Graziano's theory of consciousness
On 14 Apr 2015, at 00:21, Telmo Menezes wrote: Even if some protocol is used to keep both copies experiencing exactly the same stimuli, there are still two first person views. I don't think that a first person view and a personal identity are the same thing. In the math part, the 3-self is handled by []A, and the 1-self is handled by []A A. G* proves that they are equivalent, they grasp the same A, but G does not, which means that from the 1 and 3 p views of the machine they look different. Indeed they obey quite different logic, and also []A can be defined by the machine, but []A A cannot be defined. In fact the machine which introspect itself cannot give a name or any 3p description of its 1-self. Note that the 1-self is real. The illusion is real. What is unreal is that we are different first person. That is a relative indexical, on the same par as here and now ... Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Michael Graziano's theory of consciousness
On 14 April 2015 at 17:05, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote: I don't see any difference between a metaphysical theory saying consciousness is not duplicable and one saying bananas are not duplicable: it is still coherent and non-contradictory to imagine either entity being duplicated. No it is not, you even use a logical fallacy to justify this position... using miracles... a miracle imply *anything* is possible (even logical contradictory thing such as a *miracle*). No, a miracle cannot be logically contradictory. God cannot make a married bachelor. So I disagree with you on tha point, a theory could assert consciousness is not duplicable (in practice and in theory, like you can't go faster than light) without being self contradictory (and you can use as much miracles as you want to say it is still possible logically, it's still a logical fallacy to do that). You seem to be talking about physical possibility, whereas for the purpose of showing that there is a conceptual problem with the idea of personal identity only logical possibility is needed. The first person indeterminacy does not go away if it turns out matter duplicators are impossible, the concept of matter duplicators is merely used to make a philosophical point. -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Michael Graziano's theory of consciousness
On 14 Apr 2015, at 05:03, Bruce Kellett wrote: Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On 14 April 2015 at 12:18, Bruce Kellett bhkell...@optusnet.com.au wrote: Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On 14 April 2015 at 11:26, Bruce Kellett bhkell...@optusnet.com.au wrote: It's an illusion even in a dualist model, because dualism does not logically rule out copying. The illusion, to spell it out further, is that I am a unique entity persisting through time. That is what I feel to be personal identity at the visceral level, and even though intellectually I know better, I can't shake the feeling. It's stubborn, even if an illusion, eh? If you were duplicated, would you be prepared to kill your duplicate? Who would you kill? If it came to a fight over the last place in a lifeboat I might be prepared to kill my duplicate and he would be prepared to kill me (I can say this since I know how he thinks). I would feel bad about killing him because he can then anticipate no future experiences: there will be no future entity that remembers being him so the illusion of being a person persisting through time would end. I would not worry about destructive copying of myself or someone else because then the illusion would persist. This is a rough answer and it is not difficult to think of situations that cause problems. For example, taking a drug such as midazolam which causes amnesia could be seen as equivalent to killing your copy. Wouldn't it be easier just to commit suicide? You are still killing the same person on your account. If I commit suicide the illusion of persisting through time is destroyed. If I kill my copy or if I enter a destructive duplicator the illusion is maintained. So the illusion really is important, then. If you commit suicide, you do continue through time because your duplicate survives. Or is that different? Yes, for idealist, and magician, the illusions are important. illusion does not mean that we have to dismiss them. Sometimes I use dream, or hallucination, but those word have also dismissive connotation. With computationalism, we can say that the only non- illusion are 0, s(0), s(s(0) ... and our consciousness of this, and elementary relations between: all the rest is an illusion. It is the same as the way Einstein conceived time, an illusion, but a persistent one. With comp, primitive matter, and primitive consciousness does not exist, but of course, matter and consciousness exist and play a key and most fundamental role. Bruno Bruce -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Michael Graziano's theory of consciousness
2015-04-14 9:40 GMT+02:00 Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com: On 14 April 2015 at 17:05, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote: I don't see any difference between a metaphysical theory saying consciousness is not duplicable and one saying bananas are not duplicable: it is still coherent and non-contradictory to imagine either entity being duplicated. No it is not, you even use a logical fallacy to justify this position... using miracles... a miracle imply *anything* is possible (even logical contradictory thing such as a *miracle*). No, a miracle cannot be logically contradictory. God cannot make a married bachelor. Yes it can.. that's the whole point of what is a miracle and God. God is not bound to logic, what you can't conceive is your prejudice... and using miracles to justify your thinking is a logical fallacy... you can with that same argument *justify anything*. So I disagree with you on tha point, a theory could assert consciousness is not duplicable (in practice and in theory, like you can't go faster than light) without being self contradictory (and you can use as much miracles as you want to say it is still possible logically, it's still a logical fallacy to do that). You seem to be talking about physical possibility, whereas for the purpose of showing that there is a conceptual problem with the idea of personal identity only logical possibility is needed. As I said, it is you who're not seeing you're making a metaphysical commitment on the idea, and your idea is sumarrized by consciousness is duplicable... you start with an *if* then you make it like it was never there in the first place to conclude what you want, it's begging the question... Yes ***IF*** consciousness is duplicable, it is duplicable... you've not shown that *IT IS*. Quentin The first person indeterminacy does not go away if it turns out matter duplicators are impossible, the concept of matter duplicators is merely used to make a philosophical point. -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. (Roy Batty/Rutger Hauer) -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Life in the Islamic State for women
John, here is a grammatical explanation of why God is referred to as He: Why Does the Quran Refer to Allah as “He”? by Nouman Ali Khan https://www.facebook.com/video.php?v=626545717478174set=vb.185523868247030type=2theater Samiya On Wed, Apr 8, 2015 at 12:05 PM, Samiya Illias samiyaill...@gmail.com wrote: John, please see my answers below your questions. On Wed, Apr 8, 2015 at 1:08 AM, John Mikes jami...@gmail.com wrote: Samiya, please allow me one (two?) little questions: -- How can you tell a 'real' interpreter of God's words from a pretender? -- and I do not only refer to the 'publication' of the entire Script, there may be VAST differences between practical interpretations of the rightfully published details, whatever is included in the authentic total. (Look at e.g. the political variations as 'religious' prescriptions, law systems, state-formats, stuff to learn about the world etc.) A real messenger/prophet/interpreter does not ask for any personal benefit or remuneration. The pretenders seek worldly benefits. Following are quotes from the preachings of some messengers: Quoting Messenger Noah: http://quran.com/26/109 Sahih International And I do not ask you for it any payment. My payment is only from the Lord of the worlds. Quoting Messenger Hud: http://quran.com/26/127 Sahih International And I do not ask you for it any payment. My payment is only from the Lord of the worlds. Quoting Messenger Saleh: http://quran.com/26/145 Sahih International And I do not ask you for it any payment. My payment is only from the Lord of the worlds. Quoting Messenger Lot: http://quran.com/26/164 Sahih International And I do not ask you for it any payment. My payment is only from the Lord of the worlds. Quoting Messenger Shu'ayb: http://quran.com/26/180 Sahih International And I do not ask you for it any payment. My payment is only from the Lord of the worlds. --Is there a reson to call HIM and not HER? 1) We believe that God is above gender, but since God is referred to in the Quran with the masculine pronouns, so we follow the Quran's preference of pronouns for God. 2) Though http://quran.com/4/1 states that we should revere the wombs, but it clarifies in other places that worship is only for the ONLY God and that the worship of female deities Satan-worship http://quran.com/4/117 . http://quran.com/4/1 Sahih International O mankind, fear your Lord, who created you from one soul and created from it its mate and dispersed from both of them many men and women. And fear Allah , through whom you ask one another, and the wombs. Indeed Allah is ever, over you, an Observer. http://quran.com/4/116-120 Sahih International Indeed, Allah does not forgive association with Him, but He forgives what is less than that for whom He wills. And he who associates others with Allah has certainly gone far astray. They call upon instead of Him none but female [deities], and they [actually] call upon none but a rebellious Satan. Whom Allah has cursed. For he had said, I will surely take from among Your servants a specific portion. And I will mislead them, and I will arouse in them [sinful] desires, and I will command them so they will slit the ears of cattle, and I will command them so they will change the creation of Allah . And whoever takes Satan as an ally instead of Allah has certainly sustained a clear loss. Satan promises them and arouses desire in them. But Satan does not promise them except delusion. As I learned (from you), there is no gender differentiation in Heavens, what I found VERY emlightening. Note: The Quran uses the term Heaven(s) [sama; pl:samawat] for sky/space/cosmos. For the Hereafter, though the Heaven(s) and Earth will be recreated, the term for the place of reward is Garden(s) [jannat], and the term for the place of punishment is Fire [naar]. I speculate, but I do not know if there will or will not be any gender differentiation in the Hereafter. Following is the basis of my speculation: 1) Human male and female pair has been created from a single entity [ http://signsandscience.blogspot.com/2014/12/the-first-humans.html ]. http://quran.com/4/1 Sahih International O mankind, fear your Lord, who created you from one soul and created from it its mate and dispersed from both of them many men and women. And fear Allah , through whom you ask one another, and the wombs. Indeed Allah is ever, over you, an Observer. http://quran.com/6/98 Sahih International And it is He who produced you from one soul and [gave you] a place of dwelling and of storage. We have detailed the signs for a people who understand. http://quran.com/7/189 Sahih International It is He who created you from one soul and created from it its mate that he might dwell in security with her. And when he covers her, she carries a light burden and continues therein. And when it becomes heavy, they both invoke Allah , their Lord, If You should give us a good [child],
Re: It's possible dark energy isn't as powerful as we thought
Yes, but the WMAP nobelists in 1997 claimed that it proved an increased acceleration. My head is flat so based on that... -Original Message- From: LizR lizj...@gmail.com To: everything-list everything-list@googlegroups.com Sent: Mon, Apr 13, 2015 7:25 pm Subject: Re: It's possible dark energy isn't as powerful as we thought I have been given the impression that the universe is flat - I assume this means in the sense of having no (or at least too small to measure) overall curvature. Hence, if there is no acceleration, whether it's open or closed is, as it were, an open question! On 14 April 2015 at 10:42, spudboy100 via Everything List everything-list@googlegroups.com wrote: Or not powerful enough to keep the universe expanding unto dissipation? -Original Message- From: LizR lizj...@gmail.com To: everything-list everything-list@googlegroups.com Sent: Mon, Apr 13, 2015 6:40 pm Subject: It's possible dark energy isn't as powerful as we thought ...or maybe nonexistent, even??? http://motherboard.vice.com/read/the-universe-might-be-expanding-a-lot-slower-than-we-thought -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Michael Graziano's theory of consciousness
2015-04-14 12:55 GMT+02:00 Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com: On 14 April 2015 at 17:48, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote: 2015-04-14 9:40 GMT+02:00 Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com: On 14 April 2015 at 17:05, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote: I don't see any difference between a metaphysical theory saying consciousness is not duplicable and one saying bananas are not duplicable: it is still coherent and non-contradictory to imagine either entity being duplicated. No it is not, you even use a logical fallacy to justify this position... using miracles... a miracle imply *anything* is possible (even logical contradictory thing such as a *miracle*). No, a miracle cannot be logically contradictory. God cannot make a married bachelor. Yes it can.. that's the whole point of what is a miracle and God. God is not bound to logic, what you can't conceive is your prejudice... and using miracles to justify your thinking is a logical fallacy... you can with that same argument *justify anything*. So I disagree with you on tha point, a theory could assert consciousness is not duplicable (in practice and in theory, like you can't go faster than light) without being self contradictory (and you can use as much miracles as you want to say it is still possible logically, it's still a logical fallacy to do that). You seem to be talking about physical possibility, whereas for the purpose of showing that there is a conceptual problem with the idea of personal identity only logical possibility is needed. As I said, it is you who're not seeing you're making a metaphysical commitment on the idea, and your idea is sumarrized by consciousness is duplicable... you start with an *if* then you make it like it was never there in the first place to conclude what you want, it's begging the question... Yes ***IF*** consciousness is duplicable, it is duplicable... you've not shown that *IT IS*. OK, I did say at one point if consciousness is duplicable. That does not necessarily imply anything about its truth; for example, I could say if all bachelors are unmarried men and then go on to assert that it is in fact the case because it's analytically true. There is a substantive issue to discuss if we are asking whether it is physically possible to duplicate consciousness, because it depends on the particular theory of consciousness, whether physicalist or dualist or whatever, as well as certain other facts about the world, such as whether the physics in the brain is Turing emulable. But whether consciousness is LOGICALLY duplicable is a separate question, which has a bearing on the problem of physical identity. I think it is obvious that consciousness is logically duplicable, Not it is not... it bears on the foundation of reality... so depending on the metaphysical stance you have, it can or cannot *logically* be duplicated. I don't see how logic *alone* can entails that consciousness is duplicable or not... you have not demonstrated such thing. Logically means it follows logical laws and rules of inference... if you start with the axiom that consciousness is unique and cannot be duplicated by its essence of being unique, then it is unique and cannot be duplicated in that theory... and it contradicts absolutely no logic... Statement about consciousness duplication are true or not depending on the theory of consciousness you use... so the *IF* is necessary and cannot be dismissed *without* specifying in the first place the theory(ies) of consciousnes you're using. because try as I might I cannot find any contradiction in the idea, Like I said, if you start from the assumption that consciousness is *not* duplicable, then it contradicts your statement. nor have you demonstrated any. I just did, consider that it can't be duplicable, then your statement doesn't follow and is in direct contradiction to the assumption. You have not demonstrated that taking that consciousness is not duplicable as axiom leads to logical contradiction (and we don't have to go as far as taking it as axiom to show that ontology where consciousness is not duplicable are *logically* conceivable)... I don't know why we're arguing so much about this, because as far as I'm aware the possibility of duplicating consciousness isn't something even hard core religious types worry too much about. I'm just pointing out that the statement consciousness is duplicable is a commitment on some metaphysics defining what consciousness is. I believe in computationalism, so yes I do believe consciousness (or should I say 1st person point of view or personal identity) is duplicable, because it follows it is from the theory... but without a theory about consciousness and what it is, you can't dismiss the *if*. Quentin They would claim that a soul cannot be duplicated by physical means, not that it can't
Re: For Bruce
On 14 Apr 2015, at 11:24 am, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote: This makes quanta into a particular case of qualia, being somehow sharable, and making physical reality a first person plural reality So what would happen if everyone died in some cataclysm, except for one person? Then that person would no longer be able to know whether they were mad or sane. Consciousness would in all probability lose its faculty of discrimination. Indeed we only discriminate on the basis of descriptions made by those before us so if those others were no longer around why would we even bother to discriminate anything anymore? Or if one person travelled through a wormhole to some distant region of space? But in this case others still exist back home despite the weird local geography so consciousness is still pluralised. Or fell into a black hole? No one knows what happens if you fall into a black hole. Probably you come out covered in black or something Or otherwise found themselves in a situation where there was no plural ? It is an interesting situation. There are many scenarios that come close to it (sensory deprivation tanks, being marooned at sea or lost in an environment with no living things etc.) that are probable, but the actual scenario itself - of being the only consciousness in existence to have purchase on a particular observation - seems quite improbable. I mean, given that in some other universes you are not the last person on Earth, so extinction is only local anyway. K -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Michael Graziano's theory of consciousness
On 14 April 2015 at 17:48, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com javascript:; wrote: 2015-04-14 9:40 GMT+02:00 Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com javascript:;: On 14 April 2015 at 17:05, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com javascript:; wrote: I don't see any difference between a metaphysical theory saying consciousness is not duplicable and one saying bananas are not duplicable: it is still coherent and non-contradictory to imagine either entity being duplicated. No it is not, you even use a logical fallacy to justify this position... using miracles... a miracle imply *anything* is possible (even logical contradictory thing such as a *miracle*). No, a miracle cannot be logically contradictory. God cannot make a married bachelor. Yes it can.. that's the whole point of what is a miracle and God. God is not bound to logic, what you can't conceive is your prejudice... and using miracles to justify your thinking is a logical fallacy... you can with that same argument *justify anything*. So I disagree with you on tha point, a theory could assert consciousness is not duplicable (in practice and in theory, like you can't go faster than light) without being self contradictory (and you can use as much miracles as you want to say it is still possible logically, it's still a logical fallacy to do that). You seem to be talking about physical possibility, whereas for the purpose of showing that there is a conceptual problem with the idea of personal identity only logical possibility is needed. As I said, it is you who're not seeing you're making a metaphysical commitment on the idea, and your idea is sumarrized by consciousness is duplicable... you start with an *if* then you make it like it was never there in the first place to conclude what you want, it's begging the question... Yes ***IF*** consciousness is duplicable, it is duplicable... you've not shown that *IT IS*. OK, I did say at one point if consciousness is duplicable. That does not necessarily imply anything about its truth; for example, I could say if all bachelors are unmarried men and then go on to assert that it is in fact the case because it's analytically true. There is a substantive issue to discuss if we are asking whether it is physically possible to duplicate consciousness, because it depends on the particular theory of consciousness, whether physicalist or dualist or whatever, as well as certain other facts about the world, such as whether the physics in the brain is Turing emulable. But whether consciousness is LOGICALLY duplicable is a separate question, which has a bearing on the problem of physical identity. I think it is obvious that consciousness is logically duplicable, because try as I might I cannot find any contradiction in the idea, nor have you demonstrated any. I don't know why we're arguing so much about this, because as far as I'm aware the possibility of duplicating consciousness isn't something even hard core religious types worry too much about. They would claim that a soul cannot be duplicated by physical means, not that it can't be duplicated at all. -- Stathis Papaioannou -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Michael Graziano's theory of consciousness
2015-04-14 18:40 GMT+02:00 meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net: On 4/13/2015 11:31 PM, Quentin Anciaux wrote: Le 14 avr. 2015 08:04, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com a écrit : Certainly some theories of consciousness might not allow copying, but that cannot be a logical requirement. To claim that something is logically impossible is to claim that it is self-contradictory. I don't see why a theory saying like I said in the upper paragraph that consciousness could not be copied would be selfcontradictory... You have to see that when you say consciousness is duplicatable, you assume a lot of things about the reality and how it is working, and that you're making a metaphysical commitment, a leap of faith concerning what you assume the real to be and the reality itself. That's all I'm saying, but clearly if computationalism is true consciousness is obviously duplicatable. Quentin In order to say what duplication of consciousness is and whether it is non-contradictory you need some propositional definition of it. Not just, an instrospective well everybody knows what it is. It seems that's what I was explaining... or are you answering to Stathis ? Quentin Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. (Roy Batty/Rutger Hauer) -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Michael Graziano's theory of consciousness
Hi Liz, Ok. I have an idea about that, it is probably not original. Tell me what you think: The universe was not created. All possible states just exist. The moment of the big bang is one of the many possible states. What we call the past is a sequence of steps in the state graph that are coherent predecessor of each other, in the sense that they contain less and less information. Given that the moment of the big bang is the lowest entropy state conceivable, all history lines will originate there. My problem with any view based on entropy is that entropy doesn't appear to be fundamental to physics; it is the statistically likely result when objects are put in a certain configuration and allowed to evolve randomly. There is, however, an interesting parallel to be made with Shannon's entropy, which is a measure of information content and not just a statistical effect. Once in the realm of digital physics, it becomes questionable if physical entropy and information entropy are separate things. However the laws of physics are (mainly) time-symmetric, with the definite exception of neutral kaon decay and the possible exception of wave-function collapse, and an ordered state could evolve to become more disordered towards the past (although that would make the past appear the future for any beings created within that ordered state). Yet we never see that happening, and there is an elephant in the cosmic room, namely the expansion of the universe, which (istm) must always proceed in the direction of the AOT. What if the AOT is a purely 1p phenomena? Hence the appeal to boundary conditions. If something forces the universe to have zero (or very low) radius at one time extremity but not at the other, this asymmetry could be sufficient to drive the arrow of time in a particular direction. I've (as it were) expanded on this idea before, however, so I won't go on at length about it again. I'll search the archives when I have a bit of time. Telmo. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Michael Graziano's theory of consciousness
On Tue, Apr 14, 2015 Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote: God is not bound to logic Yes I've noticed, or to say the same thing with different words, God is stupid. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Michael Graziano's theory of consciousness
On Tue, Apr 14, 2015 at 12:39 PM, Telmo Menezes te...@telmomenezes.com wrote: My problem with any view based on entropy is that entropy doesn't appear to be fundamental to physics; it is the statistically likely result when objects are put in a certain configuration and allowed to evolve randomly. There is, however, an interesting parallel to be made with Shannon's entropy, which is a measure of information content and not just a statistical effect. Once in the realm of digital physics, it becomes questionable if physical entropy and information entropy are separate things. I think the second law of thermodynamics is the most fundamental law of physics, in fact it's almost a law of logic rather than physics; entropy will always increase just says that there are more ways to be complicated than simple, so any change in a system will probably make it more complicated and not simpler. Or to put it in Shannon's language, it takes more information to describe a complicated thing than a simple thing. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Michael Graziano's theory of consciousness
On Sun, Apr 12, 2015 at 12:44 AM, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com wrote: On Sat, Apr 11, 2015 , Telmo Menezes te...@telmomenezes.com wrote: I have this crazy idea to remove the supposed ambiguity: ask a specific Telmo if his prediction was correct or not. If Telmo were logical then that would be a good idea, a randomly picked Telmo would say I heard Telmo over there say that he saw X1 so I conclude that the prediction that Telmo would see X1 was correct. I predict that I will win 1 million dollar by tomorrow. I know my prediction is correct because this will happen in one of the branches of the multiverse. Do you agree with this statement? You are trying to play a game that is absurd, which is to deny the first person view. You use your crusade against pronouns to make the first person view disappear when it's convenient to you. You don't need exotic matter duplicating machines for this thought experiment because it's all just old fashioned conventional subjective uncertainty not the newer objective uncertainty found in Quantum Mechanics. The copies are uncertain about what they will see only because you have kept some information from them. This is false. Both the original and the copies know everything that the experimenter knows about the experiment's protocol. Please tell me what information could be provided to the copies that would change the outcome of the experiment. Monty Hall knows that when the Helsinki Man in the sealed box in Moscow opens the door and sees Moscow the Moscow Man will be born from the ashes of the Helsinki Man, The Helsinki Man in the sealed box in Moscow knows that too. He was fully informed of the protocol of the experiment. But here we are talking about the third person view of things. but the Helsinki Man in the sealed box in Moscow does not know if he will see Moscow or Washington when he opens the door. And the same goes for the Washington Man. And here we are talking about the first person view, where the indeterminacy arises. Monty Hall has his own first person view, but he's not going through the duplication machine. In Let's Make a Deal, the host doesn't know which door the contestant will choose. It doesn't matter because regardless of what door the contestant picks Monty will always show them a door that doesn't have a car behind it. How is this relevant to the discussion? Yes the Monty Hall problem is very clever and shows that information can be disclosed in non-obvious ways, but nothing like that happens with the duplicators. Verb tenses also become problematic if you introduce time machines. Douglas Adams had something to say about this in The Hitchhikers Guide to the Galaxy: Yes, I love it too. Doesn't it worry you a bit that your grammatical argument is so similar to one found in an absurdist work of fiction? The major problem [with time travel] is simply one of grammar, and the main work to consult in this matter is Dr. Dan Streetmentioner's Time Traveler's Handbook of 1001 Tense Formations. It will tell you, for instance, how to describe something that was about to happen to you in the past before you avoided it by time-jumping forward two days in order to avoid it. The event will be descibed differently according to whether you are talking about it from the standpoint of your own natural time, from a time in the further future, or a time in the further past and is futher complicated by the possibility of conducting conversations while you are actually traveling from one time to another with the intention of becoming your own mother or father. Most readers get as far as the Future Semiconditionally Modified Subinverted Plagal Past Subjunctive Intentional before giving up; and in fact in later aditions of the book all pages beyond this point have been left blank to save on printing costs. Show me how to do it. Describe quantum uncertainty according to the MWI without personal pronouns. I know you will be able to do it because: a) you like the MWI b) you hate personal pronouns CASE #1 Telmo Menezes shoots one photon at 2 slits with a photographic plate behind the slits. As the photon approaches the slits the entire universe splits into 2 with the photon going through the left slit in one universe and the right slit in the other universe. Being part of the universe Telmo Menezes splits too although neither of the Telmos knows which slit the photon went through. When the photons hit the photographic plate the photon no longer exists in either universe so the universes are identical again and the universes merge back together. When Telmo Menezes develops the plate the beginnings of a interference pattern is seen which is consistent with a single photon going through both slits. CASE #2 The experiment is the same except that this time there is a sensor next to each slit so that Telmo Menezes known what slit the photon went through. As the
Re: Michael Graziano's theory of consciousness
On Mon, Apr 13, 2015 Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com wrote: If I commit suicide the illusion of persisting through time is destroyed. Whenever somebody says X is an illusion the first question that should be asked is how would things be different if X were not an illusion; so how would things be different if persisting through time were not an illusion? If the copies are running in lockstep then I would say there is only one stream of consciousness, and nothing is lost by terminating one of the copies. I agree, that is the only logical conclusion. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Michael Graziano's theory of consciousness
On 4/13/2015 11:31 PM, Quentin Anciaux wrote: Le 14 avr. 2015 08:04, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com mailto:stath...@gmail.com a écrit : Certainly some theories of consciousness might not allow copying, but that cannot be a logical requirement. To claim that something is logically impossible is to claim that it is self-contradictory. I don't see why a theory saying like I said in the upper paragraph that consciousness could not be copied would be selfcontradictory... You have to see that when you say consciousness is duplicatable, you assume a lot of things about the reality and how it is working, and that you're making a metaphysical commitment, a leap of faith concerning what you assume the real to be and the reality itself. That's all I'm saying, but clearly if computationalism is true consciousness is obviously duplicatable. Quentin In order to say what duplication of consciousness is and whether it is non-contradictory you need some propositional definition of it. Not just, an instrospective well everybody knows what it is. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Michael Graziano's theory of consciousness
On Tue, Apr 14, 2015 Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote: Consciousness could be linked for example by an invisible force to your body by an unknown and unknowable and unmeasurable link But we know for a fact that the link between matter and consciousness, including the matter in your body, is not unknown unknowable or unmeasurable. We know for a fact that a change in the arrangement of matter in your brain changes your consciousness, and a change in your consciousness changes the matter in your body, and that can effect other matter too. that cannot ne copied or associated to another body. And we know for a fact that consciousness can be copied to other atoms because we're all last years mashed potatoes. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Michael Graziano's theory of consciousness
Bruno Marchal wrote: On 14 Apr 2015, at 03:26, Bruce Kellett wrote: It's stubborn, even if an illusion, eh? If you were duplicated, would you be prepared to kill your duplicate? Who would you kill? It can be shown that, indeed, killing someone with comp is equivalent with an amnesia. Dying is forgetting or refreshing memories. If you decide to kill a copy, you have to cautiously agree (with yourself) on the procedure (and who will be killed) before the duplication. After the duplication, it is preferable to treat the copy as a new person, for all practical and ethical purposes. I think there are even stronger reasons for treating copies as new persons. In practical terms, if it came to ethical and legal matters, the law is currently no able to recognize the existence of two separate bodies as the same person. And physically, I think the divergence necessitated by different physical bodies in different spatial locations is going to lead to significant divergence sufficiently rapidly for the concept of 'the same person' to cease to be applicable after an extremely short time. The effects of simple thermal noise would be sufficient for the 'persons' to decohere within milliseconds. Bruce -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Michael Graziano's theory of consciousness
On 4/14/2015 12:48 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote: No, a miracle cannot be logically contradictory. God cannot make a married bachelor. Yes it can.. that's the whole point of what is a miracle and God. God is not bound to logic, what you can't conceive is your prejudice... and using miracles to justify your thinking is a logical fallacy... you can with that same argument *justify anything*. That makes no sense. Even theologians can't bring themselves to say that God can do something self-contradictory. Suppose God did Y=(X and not-X), what would Y consist of? Logical contradiction is a matter of language; it can't refer because it has no meaning. A miracle is ordinarily understood as an occurrence which is *nomologically* impossible. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Michael Graziano's theory of consciousness
On 4/14/2015 3:55 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On 14 April 2015 at 17:48, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com javascript:; wrote: 2015-04-14 9:40 GMT+02:00 Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com javascript:;: On 14 April 2015 at 17:05, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com javascript:; wrote: I don't see any difference between a metaphysical theory saying consciousness is not duplicable and one saying bananas are not duplicable: it is still coherent and non-contradictory to imagine either entity being duplicated. No it is not, you even use a logical fallacy to justify this position... using miracles... a miracle imply *anything* is possible (even logical contradictory thing such as a *miracle*). No, a miracle cannot be logically contradictory. God cannot make a married bachelor. Yes it can.. that's the whole point of what is a miracle and God. God is not bound to logic, what you can't conceive is your prejudice... and using miracles to justify your thinking is a logical fallacy... you can with that same argument *justify anything*. So I disagree with you on tha point, a theory could assert consciousness is not duplicable (in practice and in theory, like you can't go faster than light) without being self contradictory (and you can use as much miracles as you want to say it is still possible logically, it's still a logical fallacy to do that). You seem to be talking about physical possibility, whereas for the purpose of showing that there is a conceptual problem with the idea of personal identity only logical possibility is needed. As I said, it is you who're not seeing you're making a metaphysical commitment on the idea, and your idea is sumarrized by consciousness is duplicable... you start with an *if* then you make it like it was never there in the first place to conclude what you want, it's begging the question... Yes ***IF*** consciousness is duplicable, it is duplicable... you've not shown that *IT IS*. OK, I did say at one point if consciousness is duplicable. That does not necessarily imply anything about its truth; for example, I could say if all bachelors are unmarried men and then go on to assert that it is in fact the case because it's analytically true. There is a substantive issue to discuss if we are asking whether it is physically possible to duplicate consciousness, because it depends on the particular theory of consciousness, whether physicalist or dualist or whatever, as well as certain other facts about the world, such as whether the physics in the brain is Turing emulable. But whether consciousness is LOGICALLY duplicable is a separate question, which has a bearing on the problem of physical identity. I think it is obvious that consciousness is logically duplicable, because try as I might I cannot find any contradiction in the idea, nor have you demonstrated any. Depending on how it is defined, I think an individual's consciousness may not be duplicable. Suppose I define my consciousness as my stream of thoughts, including perceptions, and I also define me as that stream of thoughts. Then there cannot be a duplicate. If x=(Brent's consciousness) and y=(Brent's consciousness) then that entails x=y. It would be like asking if one can duplicate the number 5. I don't know why we're arguing so much about this, because as far as I'm aware the possibility of duplicating consciousness isn't something even hard core religious types worry too much about. They would claim that a soul cannot be duplicated by physical means, not that it can't be duplicated at all. But what would it mean to duplicate consciousness. It doesn't have a location in spacetime, so any two instances will be identical and hence only one by Leibniz's identity of indiscernables. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Michael Graziano's theory of consciousness
On Tue, Apr 14, 2015 Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com wrote: Whenever somebody says X is an illusion the first question that should be asked is how would things be different if X were not an illusion; so how would things be different if persisting through time were not an illusion? If being a unique entity persisting through time were not an illusion then in the case of duplication experiments we could definitely say that you would persist as one of the copies rather than the other. If there were more than one Mr.You that persisted through time you would still persist through time, but looking into the past there is indeed a unique linear sequence of individuals culminating in the Mr. You of today. But there a difference between the past and the future and if Many Worlds is correct then unlike the past there is nothing linear and nothing unique about Mr.You's future. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: It's possible dark energy isn't as powerful as we thought
On Mon, Apr 13, 2015 LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote: I have been given the impression that the universe is flat - I assume this means in the sense of having no (or at least too small to measure) overall curvature. Hence, if there is no acceleration, whether it's open or closed is, as it were, an open question! Nobody is saying that the universe isn't accelerating, if these new results hold up it just means that it isn't accelerating quite as fast as previously thought. John K Clark On 14 April 2015 at 10:42, spudboy100 via Everything List everything-list@googlegroups.com wrote: Or not powerful enough to keep the universe expanding unto dissipation? -Original Message- From: LizR lizj...@gmail.com To: everything-list everything-list@googlegroups.com Sent: Mon, Apr 13, 2015 6:40 pm Subject: It's possible dark energy isn't as powerful as we thought ...or maybe nonexistent, even??? http://motherboard.vice.com/read/the-universe-might-be-expanding-a-lot-slower-than-we-thought -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Michael Graziano's theory of consciousness
On 4/14/2015 9:39 AM, Telmo Menezes wrote: There is, however, an interesting parallel to be made with Shannon's entropy, which is a measure of information content and not just a statistical effect. Once in the realm of digital physics, it becomes questionable if physical entropy and information entropy are separate things. Shannon's entropy is statistical. It's the potential reduction in uncertainty that message can provide. It's the entropy of the channel. It's calculated from the probability of the possible messages. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Michael Graziano's theory of consciousness
On 4/14/2015 6:22 PM, John Clark wrote: On Tue, Apr 14, 2015 Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com mailto:stath...@gmail.com wrote: Whenever somebody says X is an illusion the first question that should be asked is how would things be different if X were not an illusion; so how would things be different if persisting through time were not an illusion? If being a unique entity persisting through time were not an illusion then in the case of duplication experiments we could definitely say that you would persist as one of the copies rather than the other. If there were more than one Mr.You that persisted through time you would still persist through time, but looking into the past there is indeed a unique linear sequence of individuals culminating in the Mr. You of today. But there a difference between the past and the future and if Many Worlds is correct then unlike the past there is nothing linear and nothing unique about Mr.You's future. Except the disciples of MWI insist that the SWE (without collapse) includes the totality of physical evolution. Since the SWE is time reversible this implies that the past is just as branching as the future. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Michael Graziano's theory of consciousness
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On 15 April 2015 at 02:36, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com wrote: Whenever somebody says X is an illusion the first question that should be asked is how would things be different if X were not an illusion; so how would things be different if persisting through time were not an illusion? If being a unique entity persisting through time were not an illusion then in the case of duplication experiments we could definitely say that you would persist as one of the copies rather than the other. I think that thought experiments can only take one so far in this duplication scenario. Suppose you had a fully functional AI, with an appropriate physical body through which the consciousness could receive normal sense stimuli inputs, and through which the consciousness could interact with the world in physical ways. In other words, functionally equivalent to flesh-and-blood creatures like you and me. I use AI in order that copying is unproblematic -- we have equivalent functional bodies ready to accept the uploaded mental state; consciousness, memories, emotional characteristics, values system, and whatever else one considers goes towards the makeup of a person. We then create two such copies from one individual and then remove the original from the scene (turn it off, or whatever). If we now put these two copies together in a comfortable setting for a chat, what is likely to be the direction of the conversation? Are they going to start arguing: I'm him! No, I'm him! while they gesture towards the absent original? Or are they going to talk, and find that they have a lot in common. They can prompt each other towards shared memories, political opinions, life-style preferences, and so on. Unless they are informed about their common origin, there is no real reason that they would ever suppose that they were closer than two siblings or twins brought up closely together who had a lot of shared experiences in life. In other words, I am suggesting that if this happened, then for all practical purposes you would have created two new persons who happened to share a lot of personal characteristics and memories. Nothing is really gained by claiming that they are still the *same* person. We know that, inevitably, because they occupy distinct bodies in different volumes of space, they are rapidly going to diverge -- even during the supposed period of initial conversation (in MWI terms, the copies rapidly decohere). They are not both going to end up saying exactly the same things at the same time as each other. The copies are independent, not lock-stepped, and just as you don't have *all* your memories and *all* your views on things to the fore at the same time, these two copies are not going to appear identical to each other, despite all the similarities. Bruce -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: It's possible dark energy isn't as powerful as we thought
On Tue, Apr 14, 2015 spudboy100 via Everything List everything-list@googlegroups.com wrote: Yes, but the WMAP nobelists in 1997 claimed that it proved an increased acceleration. In 2003 Adam Riess presented observational evidence that although the universe is 13.8 billion years old for most of that time it was actually decelerating, it only started to accelerate 5 billion years ago. This makes sense because long ago the matter density of the universe was greater than now so matter's gravity would tend to slow the expansion, and Dark Energy which works in the opposite direction with a sort of anti-gravity effect comes from space itself, and long ago there was less space than now. The technical term for a change in acceleration is a jerk; in 2003 The New York Times ran a headline COSMIC JERK DISCOVERED, underneath that was a large picture of Adam Riess. His colleagues have never let him forget it. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Michael Graziano's theory of consciousness
On 4/14/2015 6:56 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On Tuesday, April 14, 2015, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com mailto:allco...@gmail.com wrote: 2015-04-14 12:55 GMT+02:00 Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','stath...@gmail.com');: On 14 April 2015 at 17:48, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote: 2015-04-14 9:40 GMT+02:00 Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com: On 14 April 2015 at 17:05, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote: I don't see any difference between a metaphysical theory saying consciousness is not duplicable and one saying bananas are not duplicable: it is still coherent and non-contradictory to imagine either entity being duplicated. No it is not, you even use a logical fallacy to justify this position... using miracles... a miracle imply *anything* is possible (even logical contradictory thing such as a *miracle*). No, a miracle cannot be logically contradictory. God cannot make a married bachelor. Yes it can.. that's the whole point of what is a miracle and God. God is not bound to logic, what you can't conceive is your prejudice... and using miracles to justify your thinking is a logical fallacy... you can with that same argument *justify anything*. So I disagree with you on tha point, a theory could assert consciousness is not duplicable (in practice and in theory, like you can't go faster than light) without being self contradictory (and you can use as much miracles as you want to say it is still possible logically, it's still a logical fallacy to do that). You seem to be talking about physical possibility, whereas for the purpose of showing that there is a conceptual problem with the idea of personal identity only logical possibility is needed. As I said, it is you who're not seeing you're making a metaphysical commitment on the idea, and your idea is sumarrized by consciousness is duplicable... you start with an *if* then you make it like it was never there in the first place to conclude what you want, it's begging the question... Yes ***IF*** consciousness is duplicable, it is duplicable... you've not shown that *IT IS*. OK, I did say at one point if consciousness is duplicable. That does not necessarily imply anything about its truth; for example, I could say if all bachelors are unmarried men and then go on to assert that it is in fact the case because it's analytically true. There is a substantive issue to discuss if we are asking whether it is physically possible to duplicate consciousness, because it depends on the particular theory of consciousness, whether physicalist or dualist or whatever, as well as certain other facts about the world, such as whether the physics in the brain is Turing emulable. But whether consciousness is LOGICALLY duplicable is a separate question, which has a bearing on the problem of physical identity. I think it is obvious that consciousness is logically duplicable, Not it is not... it bears on the foundation of reality... so depending on the metaphysical stance you have, it can or cannot *logically* be duplicated. I don't see how logic *alone* can entails that consciousness is duplicable or not... you have not demonstrated such thing. Logically means it follows logical laws and rules of inference... if you start with the axiom that consciousness is unique and cannot be duplicated by its essence of being unique, then it is unique and cannot be duplicated in that theory... and it contradicts absolutely no logic... Statement about consciousness duplication are true or not depending on the theory of consciousness you use... so the *IF* is necessary and cannot be dismissed *without* specifying in the first place the theory(ies) of consciousnes you're using. I imagine a copy that thinks just like me, feels just like me, remembers what I remember, bears the same relationship to me as I bear to my self of a moment ago. Are you saying the copy may have diverged from you a moment ago? Thought a different thought? Seen from a different point of view? Sure, there's no logical contradiction in a diverging consciousness - but it's no longer a duplicate. It may be a duplicate of Stathis, but Stathis is only roughly defined and there's lots of room for differences between two beings that are nominally Stathis. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
Re: Michael Graziano's theory of consciousness
On 4/14/2015 9:47 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote: 2015-04-14 18:40 GMT+02:00 meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net mailto:meeke...@verizon.net: On 4/13/2015 11:31 PM, Quentin Anciaux wrote: Le 14 avr. 2015 08:04, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com mailto:stath...@gmail.com a écrit : Certainly some theories of consciousness might not allow copying, but that cannot be a logical requirement. To claim that something is logically impossible is to claim that it is self-contradictory. I don't see why a theory saying like I said in the upper paragraph that consciousness could not be copied would be selfcontradictory... You have to see that when you say consciousness is duplicatable, you assume a lot of things about the reality and how it is working, and that you're making a metaphysical commitment, a leap of faith concerning what you assume the real to be and the reality itself. That's all I'm saying, but clearly if computationalism is true consciousness is obviously duplicatable. Quentin In order to say what duplication of consciousness is and whether it is non-contradictory you need some propositional definition of it. Not just, an instrospective well everybody knows what it is. It seems that's what I was explaining... or are you answering to Stathis ? No, it's not clear to me what definition of consciousness you're using. Are you supposing that two streams of thought which are identical would constitute two different consciousness'es? Computationalism would say that a brain is duplicable, but as soon as the copy had a different thought there would be two different consciousnesses. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Michael Graziano's theory of consciousness
On 4/14/2015 4:19 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On 15 April 2015 at 02:47, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote: 2015-04-14 18:40 GMT+02:00 meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net: On 4/13/2015 11:31 PM, Quentin Anciaux wrote: Le 14 avr. 2015 08:04, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com a écrit : Certainly some theories of consciousness might not allow copying, but that cannot be a logical requirement. To claim that something is logically impossible is to claim that it is self-contradictory. I don't see why a theory saying like I said in the upper paragraph that consciousness could not be copied would be selfcontradictory... You have to see that when you say consciousness is duplicatable, you assume a lot of things about the reality and how it is working, and that you're making a metaphysical commitment, a leap of faith concerning what you assume the real to be and the reality itself. That's all I'm saying, but clearly if computationalism is true consciousness is obviously duplicatable. Quentin In order to say what duplication of consciousness is and whether it is non-contradictory you need some propositional definition of it. Not just, an instrospective well everybody knows what it is. It seems that's what I was explaining... or are you answering to Stathis ? Brent might be addressing me, so I'll answer both. Duplicating consciousness means that another entity can be made that thinks and feels just like me. Logically, that seems possible. But that's not clear enough. What does like me mean? Does it mean Good enough to fool my friends, in which case I'd say, sure that's duplicable. Or does it a sequence of exactly the same thoughts, in which case I'd say it's not duplicable; by Leibniz's identity of indiscernables it's no more duplicable than the natural numbers. By logically possible I mean that it can happen in a possible world; it is not contradictory; an omnipotent being could do it. Of course, if you have a theory saying that duplication is impossible then if the theory is true consciousness can't be duplicated - but the theory would have to be *necessarily* true in order to make duplication *logically* impossible. But a duplicate that is identical in *every* respect is impossible. By duplicate, we usually mean a copy that is identical except for its place in spacetime. But thoughts aren't in spacetime. So the copy is the same as the original: they are one. Brent The logical possibility of duplication perhaps does not count for much, but it does allow duplication thought experiments which show the problematic nature of personal identity, and that is all that I am claiming for it. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Michael Graziano's theory of consciousness
On Tuesday, April 14, 2015, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote: 2015-04-14 12:55 GMT+02:00 Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','stath...@gmail.com');: On 14 April 2015 at 17:48, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote: 2015-04-14 9:40 GMT+02:00 Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com: On 14 April 2015 at 17:05, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote: I don't see any difference between a metaphysical theory saying consciousness is not duplicable and one saying bananas are not duplicable: it is still coherent and non-contradictory to imagine either entity being duplicated. No it is not, you even use a logical fallacy to justify this position... using miracles... a miracle imply *anything* is possible (even logical contradictory thing such as a *miracle*). No, a miracle cannot be logically contradictory. God cannot make a married bachelor. Yes it can.. that's the whole point of what is a miracle and God. God is not bound to logic, what you can't conceive is your prejudice... and using miracles to justify your thinking is a logical fallacy... you can with that same argument *justify anything*. So I disagree with you on tha point, a theory could assert consciousness is not duplicable (in practice and in theory, like you can't go faster than light) without being self contradictory (and you can use as much miracles as you want to say it is still possible logically, it's still a logical fallacy to do that). You seem to be talking about physical possibility, whereas for the purpose of showing that there is a conceptual problem with the idea of personal identity only logical possibility is needed. As I said, it is you who're not seeing you're making a metaphysical commitment on the idea, and your idea is sumarrized by consciousness is duplicable... you start with an *if* then you make it like it was never there in the first place to conclude what you want, it's begging the question... Yes ***IF*** consciousness is duplicable, it is duplicable... you've not shown that *IT IS*. OK, I did say at one point if consciousness is duplicable. That does not necessarily imply anything about its truth; for example, I could say if all bachelors are unmarried men and then go on to assert that it is in fact the case because it's analytically true. There is a substantive issue to discuss if we are asking whether it is physically possible to duplicate consciousness, because it depends on the particular theory of consciousness, whether physicalist or dualist or whatever, as well as certain other facts about the world, such as whether the physics in the brain is Turing emulable. But whether consciousness is LOGICALLY duplicable is a separate question, which has a bearing on the problem of physical identity. I think it is obvious that consciousness is logically duplicable, Not it is not... it bears on the foundation of reality... so depending on the metaphysical stance you have, it can or cannot *logically* be duplicated. I don't see how logic *alone* can entails that consciousness is duplicable or not... you have not demonstrated such thing. Logically means it follows logical laws and rules of inference... if you start with the axiom that consciousness is unique and cannot be duplicated by its essence of being unique, then it is unique and cannot be duplicated in that theory... and it contradicts absolutely no logic... Statement about consciousness duplication are true or not depending on the theory of consciousness you use... so the *IF* is necessary and cannot be dismissed *without* specifying in the first place the theory(ies) of consciousnes you're using. I imagine a copy that thinks just like me, feels just like me, remembers what I remember, bears the same relationship to me as I bear to my self of a moment ago. Perhaps this can't actually be created depending on what theory of consciousness you subscribe to, but I can imagine it - it is not incoherent, and it can't be uni-imagined. If you then say, yes, but that copy you imagine would not really be a copy, because by assumption consciousness is non-duplicable, that then makes the notion of continuity of consciousness incoherent. For it would mean that there is a special quality conferring continuity which makes no objective and no subjective difference - which is no difference at all. because try as I might I cannot find any contradiction in the idea, Like I said, if you start from the assumption that consciousness is *not* duplicable, then it contradicts your statement. nor have you demonstrated any. I just did, consider that it can't be duplicable, then your statement doesn't follow and is in direct contradiction to the assumption. You have not demonstrated that taking that consciousness is not duplicable as axiom leads to logical contradiction (and we don't
Re: Michael Graziano's theory of consciousness
2015-04-14 15:56 GMT+02:00 Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com: On Tuesday, April 14, 2015, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote: 2015-04-14 12:55 GMT+02:00 Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com: On 14 April 2015 at 17:48, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote: 2015-04-14 9:40 GMT+02:00 Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com: On 14 April 2015 at 17:05, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote: I don't see any difference between a metaphysical theory saying consciousness is not duplicable and one saying bananas are not duplicable: it is still coherent and non-contradictory to imagine either entity being duplicated. No it is not, you even use a logical fallacy to justify this position... using miracles... a miracle imply *anything* is possible (even logical contradictory thing such as a *miracle*). No, a miracle cannot be logically contradictory. God cannot make a married bachelor. Yes it can.. that's the whole point of what is a miracle and God. God is not bound to logic, what you can't conceive is your prejudice... and using miracles to justify your thinking is a logical fallacy... you can with that same argument *justify anything*. So I disagree with you on tha point, a theory could assert consciousness is not duplicable (in practice and in theory, like you can't go faster than light) without being self contradictory (and you can use as much miracles as you want to say it is still possible logically, it's still a logical fallacy to do that). You seem to be talking about physical possibility, whereas for the purpose of showing that there is a conceptual problem with the idea of personal identity only logical possibility is needed. As I said, it is you who're not seeing you're making a metaphysical commitment on the idea, and your idea is sumarrized by consciousness is duplicable... you start with an *if* then you make it like it was never there in the first place to conclude what you want, it's begging the question... Yes ***IF*** consciousness is duplicable, it is duplicable... you've not shown that *IT IS*. OK, I did say at one point if consciousness is duplicable. That does not necessarily imply anything about its truth; for example, I could say if all bachelors are unmarried men and then go on to assert that it is in fact the case because it's analytically true. There is a substantive issue to discuss if we are asking whether it is physically possible to duplicate consciousness, because it depends on the particular theory of consciousness, whether physicalist or dualist or whatever, as well as certain other facts about the world, such as whether the physics in the brain is Turing emulable. But whether consciousness is LOGICALLY duplicable is a separate question, which has a bearing on the problem of physical identity. I think it is obvious that consciousness is logically duplicable, Not it is not... it bears on the foundation of reality... so depending on the metaphysical stance you have, it can or cannot *logically* be duplicated. I don't see how logic *alone* can entails that consciousness is duplicable or not... you have not demonstrated such thing. Logically means it follows logical laws and rules of inference... if you start with the axiom that consciousness is unique and cannot be duplicated by its essence of being unique, then it is unique and cannot be duplicated in that theory... and it contradicts absolutely no logic... Statement about consciousness duplication are true or not depending on the theory of consciousness you use... so the *IF* is necessary and cannot be dismissed *without* specifying in the first place the theory(ies) of consciousnes you're using. I imagine a copy that thinks just like me, feels just like me, remembers what I remember, bears the same relationship to me as I bear to my self of a moment ago. I can too, and I can imagine, that the copy think it is me but is missing something the original would have noticed but not the copy. Perhaps this can't actually be created depending on what theory of consciousness you subscribe to, but I can imagine it - it is not incoherent, I didn't say it was incoherent, what I say, is that it is rooted in a metaphysical commitment and is not an absolute truth. and it can't be uni-imagined. If you then say, yes, but that copy you imagine would not really be a copy, because by assumption consciousness is non-duplicable, that then makes the notion of continuity of consciousness incoherent. But who said that it has to be ? If the reality is inconsistent, it is inconsistent even if you wished it must not be, if it is, it is and that's all. Also, it seems vaccuous to say that you can do a copy if in theory of reality you have, you'll never been able to do it even in principle. Like the theory I've said earlier, where consciousness is linked to the
Re: Michael Graziano's theory of consciousness
On Tue, Apr 14, 2015 Telmo Menezes te...@telmomenezes.com wrote: I predict that I will win 1 million dollar by tomorrow. I know my prediction is correct because this will happen in one of the branches of the multiverse. Do you agree with this statement? No I do not agree because matter duplicating machines do not exist yet so if I check tomorrow the laws of physics will allow me to find only one chunk of matter that fits the description of Mr. I (that is a chunk of matter that behaves in a Telmomenezesian way), and that particular chunk of matter does not appear to have a million dollars. However if the prediction was tomorrow Telmo Menezes will win a million dollars then I would agree, provided of course that the Many Worlds interpretation of Quantum Mechanics is true. You are trying to play a game that is absurd, which is to deny the first person view. That is ridiculous, only a fool would deny the first person view and John Clark is not a fool. Mr.I can always look to the past and see one unique linear sequence of Mr.I's leading up to him, and Mr. I can remember being every one of them. But things are very different looking to the future, nothing is unique and far from being linear things could hardly be more parallel with a astronomical and possibly infinite number of branching, and Mr. I can't remember being any of them. And that is why the sense of first person identity has nothing to do with our expectations of the future but is only a function of our memories of the past. You use your crusade against pronouns If Telmo Menezes thinks that any objection in the use of personal pronouns in thought experiments designed to illuminate the fundamental nature of personal identity is absurd then call John Clark's bluff and simply stop using them; then if Telmo Menezes can still express ideas on this subject clearly and without circularity it would prove that John Clark's concern that people who used such pronouns were implicitly stating what they were trying to prove were indeed absurd. Monty Hall knows that when the Helsinki Man in the sealed box in Moscow opens the door and sees Moscow the Moscow Man will be born from the ashes of the Helsinki Man, The Helsinki Man in the sealed box in Moscow knows that too. He was fully informed of the protocol of the experiment. OK but it doesn't matter if he knows the protocol of the experiment or not, regardless of where he is until The Helsinki Man sees Moscow or Moscow the Helsinki Man will remain The Helsinki Man. So who will become the Moscow Man? The one who sees Moscow will become the Moscow Man. Oh well, the good thing about tautologies is that they're always true. Verb tenses also become problematic if you introduce time machines. Douglas Adams had something to say about this in The Hitchhikers Guide to the Galaxy: Yes, I love it too. Doesn't it worry you a bit that your grammatical argument is so similar to one found in an absurdist work of fiction? No because if time machines actually existed then it wouldn't be absurd at all, the English language really would need a major overhaul in the way it uses verb tenses. And if matter duplicating machines existed the English language really would need a major overhaul about the way it uses personal pronouns. The only difference is that if the laws of physics are what we think they are then time machines are NOT possible, but if the laws of physics are what we think they are then matter duplicating machines ARE possible. Show me how to do it. Describe quantum uncertainty according to the MWI without personal pronouns. I know you will be able to do it because: a) you like the MWI b) you hate personal pronouns CASE #1 Telmo Menezes shoots one photon at 2 slits with a photographic plate behind the slits. As the photon approaches the slits the entire universe splits into 2 with the photon going through the left slit in one universe and the right slit in the other universe. Being part of the universe Telmo Menezes splits too although neither of the Telmos knows which slit the photon went through. When the photons hit the photographic plate the photon no longer exists in either universe so the universes are identical again and the universes merge back together. When Telmo Menezes develops the plate the beginnings of a interference pattern is seen which is consistent with a single photon going through both slits. CASE #2 The experiment is the same except that this time there is a sensor next to each slit so that Telmo Menezes known what slit the photon went through. As the photon approaches the slits the universe splits in two and Mr.Telmo Menezes Left Slit sees the photon go through the left slit and Mr.Telmo Menezes Right Slit sees the photon go through the right slit. When the photons hit the photographic plate the photons no longer exist in either universe but the 2 universes are still not identical because Mr.Telmo Menezes Left Slit
Re: The MGA revisited
On 14 Apr 2015, at 04:05, meekerdb wrote: On 4/13/2015 4:35 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote: LizR wrote: On 14 April 2015 at 00:42, Bruce Kellett bhkell...@optusnet.com.au mailto:bhkell...@optusnet.com.au wrote: The expansion of the wave function in the einselected basis of the measurement operator has certain coefficients. The probabilities are the absolute magnitudes of these squared. That is the Born Rule. MWI advocates try hard to derive the Born Rule from MWI, but they have failed to date. I think they always will fail because, as has been pointed out, the separate worlds of the MWI that are required before you can derive a probability measure already assume the Born Rule. The argument is at best circular, and probably even incoherent. In an article published in the 60s (I think) Larry Niven pointed out that the MWI lead to the following situation - if you throw a dice you have 6 outcomes, i.e. 6 branches. But a loaded dice should favour (say) the branch where it lands on 6. Hence the MWI doesn't work. My reaction to this (when I first read it, probably several decades ago now) was that you only have 6 MACROSCOPIC outcomes - like derivations of the second law of thermodynamics, Niven's description of the system relies on microstates being indistinguishable /to us/. But once you take this into account there are more microstates ending with a 6 uppermost - and hence a lot more than 6 branches - the MWI again makes sense using branch counting, at least for non-quantum dice (I may not have known terms like microstates at the time, nor was it called the MWI, but that was basically what I thought). I do not think that classical analogies can ever get to the heart of quantum probabilities. Can't the same be true of any quantum event? The essential requirement is that any quantum event leads to results which can be assigned a rational number, rather than an irrational one. This gives us a finite number of branches, and counting to get the probability. Or do quantum events lead to results with irrational numbered probabilities? Quantum probabilities are not required to be rational: any real value between 0 and 1 is possible. For example, if you prepare a Silver atom in a spin up state then pass it through another S-G magnet oriented at an angle alpha to the original, the probability that the atom will pass the second magnet in the up channel is cos^2(alpha/2). This can take on any real value in the range. One argument against branch counting is that if you have two equally likely outcomes (which can be judged by symmetry) there are two branches; but if a small perturbation is added then there must be many branches to achieve probabilities (0.5-epsilon) and (0.5+epsilon) and the smaller the perturbation the larger the number required. Of course the number required is bounded by our ability to resolve small differences in probability, but in principle it goes as 1/epsilon. I think Bruno's answer to this is that for every such experiment there are arbitrarily many threads of the UD going throught at experiment and this provides the order 1/epsilon ensemble. But this somewhat begs the question of why we should consider the probabilities of all those threads to be equal We better should not. I am making a pause café right now. The UD does simulate a computation going through my actual state, but with a continuation where I hallucinate that my coffee becomes tea. Well, I hope that the measure of such computations is less than the one in which my coffee gently appears to taste coffee and not tea. since we have lost the justification of symmetry. Yes, that is why we should not consider all those threads as having the same probability. In fact, by the rule Y = II, only those getting highly relatively multiplied have some chance of having a normal and stable measure. I think this is the measure problem. OK. Ah! My coffee tastes coffee! It would not I would bet that I am dreaming in some normal reality, not that computationalism is false. Bruno Brent I know that a branch counting approach to quantum probabilities is disfavoured, though I can't at the moment recall the standard argument. Clearly, the existence of real-valued probabilities, not restricted to rational values, is a strong factor. But there is also the fact that in the two-dimensional Hilbert space associated with spin 1/2 projections, one only ever has two possible outcomes for an experiment -- why should the number of branches one must consider depend on the angle of the magnet? Bruce -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to
Re: Klara and Olimpia!
On 14 Apr 2015, at 00:41, LizR wrote: http://www.lostateminor.com/2015/04/10/these-18th-century-dolls-may-be-the-worlds-oldest-examples-of-the-modern-computer/ Not sure if they're really computers in the modern sense, as claimed. Any thoughts? Those are superb constructions, but most plausibly not Turing universal, and so they are not general purpose computer. I agree with Russell. Babbage conceived a clock-like mechanism which is Turing universal, and somehow I think he understood this point, and even got Church's thesis when he realized that its functional notation system, that he will invent to describe his machine, mimics his machine perfectly. He will say that he was more sad that people did not understand the importance of his notation than of his machine. His universal machine will never been build. It would have been quite a huge machine. Even with electronic valves, the first universal machines where gigantic. It is quantum mechanics, actually, which has made possible the transistor, the miniaturization, the Moore law, ... Bruno -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Michael Graziano's theory of consciousness
On 15 April 2015 at 02:47, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote: 2015-04-14 18:40 GMT+02:00 meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net: On 4/13/2015 11:31 PM, Quentin Anciaux wrote: Le 14 avr. 2015 08:04, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com a écrit : Certainly some theories of consciousness might not allow copying, but that cannot be a logical requirement. To claim that something is logically impossible is to claim that it is self-contradictory. I don't see why a theory saying like I said in the upper paragraph that consciousness could not be copied would be selfcontradictory... You have to see that when you say consciousness is duplicatable, you assume a lot of things about the reality and how it is working, and that you're making a metaphysical commitment, a leap of faith concerning what you assume the real to be and the reality itself. That's all I'm saying, but clearly if computationalism is true consciousness is obviously duplicatable. Quentin In order to say what duplication of consciousness is and whether it is non-contradictory you need some propositional definition of it. Not just, an instrospective well everybody knows what it is. It seems that's what I was explaining... or are you answering to Stathis ? Brent might be addressing me, so I'll answer both. Duplicating consciousness means that another entity can be made that thinks and feels just like me. Logically, that seems possible. By logically possible I mean that it can happen in a possible world; it is not contradictory; an omnipotent being could do it. Of course, if you have a theory saying that duplication is impossible then if the theory is true consciousness can't be duplicated - but the theory would have to be *necessarily* true in order to make duplication *logically* impossible. The logical possibility of duplication perhaps does not count for much, but it does allow duplication thought experiments which show the problematic nature of personal identity, and that is all that I am claiming for it. -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Michael Graziano's theory of consciousness
On 15 April 2015 at 02:36, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com wrote: On Mon, Apr 13, 2015 Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com wrote: If I commit suicide the illusion of persisting through time is destroyed. Whenever somebody says X is an illusion the first question that should be asked is how would things be different if X were not an illusion; so how would things be different if persisting through time were not an illusion? If being a unique entity persisting through time were not an illusion then in the case of duplication experiments we could definitely say that you would persist as one of the copies rather than the other. If the copies are running in lockstep then I would say there is only one stream of consciousness, and nothing is lost by terminating one of the copies. I agree, that is the only logical conclusion. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
