date:20150609

> On 10 Jun 2015, at 2:20 pm, LizR  wrote:
> 
>> On 10 June 2015 at 15:23, Kim Jones  wrote:
>> Both. I'm exploring the concept of solipsism with a positive attitude. What 
>> are the benefits? Your attempts at humour always hit the mark (with me.)
> 
> Thanks! :)
>  
>> So yes, I don't think hurling 'solopsist!' at someone hurts them much. 
> It's basically abusing yourself, if you'll pardon the expression.
>  
>> So, solipsism is a plural phenomenon.
>> 
>> "I don't care if I am a solipsist, I'll always have each other." - Mini Me.
> 
> Contrariwise, does a group mind refer to "ourself" or "myselves" ?
> 

Interesting question. A corporation or an army or a religious sect or some 
other hive-mind entity might realistically refer to itself like this.

Thing is, corporations want us to think of them as individuals and to have 
similar rights. Somehow this is enshrined in corporate law. I am very 
interested in "the group mind". I think this is where humanity's problems 
begin. Solipsism  is real only in the sense that the many minds are really the 
One Mind. But this One Mind exists in an enormous number of versions; 
duplications. The differing perspectives of each of the versions contributes to 
the overall consciousness, the Big Picture. Someone gets it.

Kim

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Re: The scope of physical law and its relationship to the substitution level

On 10 June 2015 at 15:23, Kim Jones  wrote:

> Both. I'm exploring the concept of solipsism with a positive attitude.
> What are the benefits? Your attempts at humour always hit the mark (with
> me.)
>

Thanks! :)


> So yes, I don't think hurling 'solopsist!' at someone hurts them much.
>
> It's basically abusing yourself, if you'll pardon the expression.


> So, solipsism is a plural phenomenon.
>
> "I don't care if I am a solipsist, I'll always have each other." - Mini Me.
>

Contrariwise, does a group mind refer to "ourself" or "myselves" ?

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Re: The scope of physical law and its relationship to the substitution level





> On 10 Jun 2015, at 11:53 am, LizR  wrote:
> 
>> On 10 June 2015 at 13:35, Kim Jones  wrote:
>>> On 10 Jun 2015, at 9:09 am, LizR  wrote:
 On 10 June 2015 at 10:37, Bruce Kellett  wrote:
 Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
> On 09 Jun 2015, at 12:07, Bruce Kellett wrote:
> 
>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
 On 09 Jun 2015, at 07:40, Bruce Kellett wrote:
 
 Given a set of axioms and some agreed rules of inference, the same 
 results always follow, regardless of by whom or at what time the 
 application is made. This is not what is usually referred to as 
 "kicking back". Johnson did not apply some axioms and rules of 
 inference in answer to the idealists, he kicked a stone.
>>> But people can kicked stone in dreams too.
>> 
>> But do they wake up with broken or bruised toes?
> 
> Do they ever wake up?
 
 Solipsist!
>>> Another solipsist? Phew! I was worried I might be the only one. 
>> 
>> Surely it isn't a crime to be a solipsist. What's socially unacceptable 
>> about the belief that you are the only mind and that "all other minds" are 
>> you as well? 
> 
> I'm not sure if you're asnwering my attempt at humour or Bruce's apparent use 
> of "Solipsist!" as an insult.

Both. I'm exploring the concept of solipsism with a positive attitude. What are 
the benefits? Your attempts at humour always hit the mark (with me.) So yes, I 
don't think hurling 'solopsist!' at someone hurts them much. 

So, solipsism is a plural phenomenon.

"I don't care if I am a solipsist, I'll always have each other." - Mini Me.

K

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Re: Notion of (mathematical) reason


Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 09 Jun 2015, at 15:11, Bruce Kellett wrote:

You appear to want to draw this conclusion from FPI. But in a 
discussion with Liz a while back, I challenged this interpretation of 
your teleportation thought experiments leading to FPI. It was readily 
shown that such thought experiments were completely orthogonal to 
quantum mechanics and the MWI.


No, You stopped at step 4 (which is already better than John Clark). You 
need AUDA to get the math of the FPI, and to compare it to physics.


We have answered this, but you come back again on what has already been 
explained in detail: please reread the posts.


As I recall the discussion, you agreed that FPI in the teleportation 
experiments had nothing to do with MWI of quantum mechanics. You said 
that you had only ever raised MWI as an illustration to help those who 
were familiar with Everettian quantum mechanics to understand the 
concept of FPI. FPI in the teleportation scenarios, and later in the 
UDA, have nothing to do with the MWI of quantum mechanics, and one 
cannot be used to support or justify the other.



Similarly for your attempt to bring quantum logic to your cause. 
Quantum logic was devised by von Neumann in the context of the 
collapse interpretation of QM, together with the use of projection 
operators. In Everettian many-worlds interpretations, there are no 
projection operators, and quantum logic does not have a footing. In 
fact, it has been pointed out that there is no such thing as a 
specifically "quantum" logic -- there is just ordinary predicate logic 
and a theory in which some operators do not commute. When you can 
derive the non-commutation of the position and momentum operators from 
comp, I might be a little more impressed.


UDA formulates the problem, and by the way, the non-commutation of some 
observable is already proved.


OK. For what set of quantum operators have you demonstrated non-commutation?

Of course position and momentum are not 
yet derived, and it is not clear if they will be derived.


If they are not, comp fails a crucial test

Bruce

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Re: The scope of physical law and its relationship to the substitution level

On 10 June 2015 at 13:35, Kim Jones  wrote:

> On 10 Jun 2015, at 9:09 am, LizR  wrote:
>
> On 10 June 2015 at 10:37, Bruce Kellett  wrote:
>
>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>>
>>> On 09 Jun 2015, at 12:07, Bruce Kellett wrote:
>>>
>>>  Bruno Marchal wrote:

> On 09 Jun 2015, at 07:40, Bruce Kellett wrote:
>
>>
>> Given a set of axioms and some agreed rules of inference, the same
>> results always follow, regardless of by whom or at what time the
>> application is made. This is not what is usually referred to as "kicking
>> back". Johnson did not apply some axioms and rules of inference in answer
>> to the idealists, he kicked a stone.
>>
> But people can kicked stone in dreams too.
>

 But do they wake up with broken or bruised toes?

>>>
>>> Do they ever wake up?
>>>
>>
>> Solipsist!
>>
>> Another solipsist? Phew! I was worried I might be the only one.
>
>
> Surely it isn't a crime to be a solipsist. What's socially unacceptable
> about the belief that you are the only mind and that "all other minds" are
> you as well?
>

I'm not sure if you're asnwering my attempt at humour or Bruce's apparent
use of "Solipsist!" as an insult.

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Re: The scope of physical law and its relationship to the substitution level




> On 10 Jun 2015, at 9:09 am, LizR  wrote:
> 
>> On 10 June 2015 at 10:37, Bruce Kellett  wrote:
>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>> 
>>> On 09 Jun 2015, at 12:07, Bruce Kellett wrote:
>>> 
 Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> On 09 Jun 2015, at 07:40, Bruce Kellett wrote:
>> 
>> Given a set of axioms and some agreed rules of inference, the same 
>> results always follow, regardless of by whom or at what time the 
>> application is made. This is not what is usually referred to as "kicking 
>> back". Johnson did not apply some axioms and rules of inference in 
>> answer to the idealists, he kicked a stone.
> But people can kicked stone in dreams too.
 
 But do they wake up with broken or bruised toes?
>>> 
>>> Do they ever wake up?
>> 
>> Solipsist!
> Another solipsist? Phew! I was worried I might be the only one. 

Surely it isn't a crime to be a solipsist. What's socially unacceptable about 
the belief that you are the only mind and that "all other minds" are you as 
well? 

Sounds to me like we should make AS IF this is true because it seems to be a 
way to get humans to respect each other more. Solipsism is a useful belief to 
maintain. It emphasises how alike we all are which leads to love of self and 
selves rather than emphsises our cosmetic differences which leads to war.

Kim

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Re: Notion of (mathematical) reason


Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 09 Jun 2015, at 15:11, Bruce Kellett wrote:


Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 09 Jun 2015, at 09:11, Bruce Kellett wrote:


Why not? If it can emulate a specific purpose Turning machine, it 
can emulate a universal Turing machine. I think Putnam's argument 
for unlimited pancomputationalism implies this.
I am not convince by that argument. Show me a rock program computing 
the prime numbers.


Show me a Turing machine that can compute the prime numbers


Easy but tedious, and distracting exercise.

Show me how to emulate just K, that is the function which send (x, y) to 
x. it is not obvious this can be done, because y is eliminated, you need 
a black hole for it, and a proof that it does not evaporate.


You are becoming a physicalist, Bruno!
You seem to be concerned by Landauer's principle, and the difficulty of 
eliminating physical information. This is not a problem for a Turing 
machine. It is a finite state machine, so define one state as (x,y) and 
another as (x). Then the operation when the machine finds itself in the 
state (x,y) is to move to the state (x). Not a problem. Even a rock can 
do it!


Bruce

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Re: Notion of (mathematical) reason


Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 09 Jun 2015, at 15:11, Bruce Kellett wrote:

The details of the operation of the brain, and its effect on 
consciousness, are the realm of study of the neurosciences.
Computer scientists only ever confuse themselves over these quite 
simple matters.


The neuro-science are based on comp. Unless you believe like Penrose 
that the neuron use a non computable ability to reduce the wave packet? 
is that the case? Is your theory Penrose theory?


No, I don't believe that the neuron 'reduces the wave function'. But 
your claim that the neurosicences are based on comp is something of an 
overreach. The neurosciences are based on the study of the physical 
brain. Like most scientists, they do not have any particular 
metaphysical prejudices, and those that they do have seldom get in the 
way of their science.


You seem to be asking me to provide a detailed mechanism for the 
phenomenon of consciousness. That is not my area, so I do not feel 
myself under any obligation to provide such a mechanistic account.


I do feel, however, that I have the reciprocal right to ask you to 
produce the fortran program that instantiates your personal 
consciousness. You claim that it exists, so why not produce it?


Bruce

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Re: super intelligence and self-sampling

I was close :)

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Re: super intelligence and self-sampling

2015-06-09 Thread Russell Standish

On Wed, Jun 10, 2015 at 09:39:37AM +1000, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> On 10 June 2015 at 08:37, LizR  wrote:
> 
> > The normal answer to this is as stated - a superintelligence may form, as
> > per various Arthur C Clark (or Olaf Stapledon, really) stories, by merging
> > lots of non-super intelligences. So the chances of finding yourself
> > non-super is vastly greater, because it takes billions of us to make one of
> > them. However, this could lead to you eventually finding yourself super
> > (especially if quantum immortality operates). Or a subset of super.
> >
> > PS Ants aren't relevant, as Russell explains in "Theory of Nothing".
> >
> 
> 
> OK, but the same argument can easily be made otherwise: why should you find
> yourself living in tiny New Zealand rather than populous China?
> 

I address that as well. Because of a peculiar conspiracy, country
populations follow a near power law, which means it is just as likely
that you will be born in a low population country like New Zealand, as
a high population country like China, simply because there are more
low population countries in just the right number.

Which leads one to suspect that self-sampling is another mechanism for
the ubuquity of power laws in nature.

I had a proof in one version of my paper that
fragmentation/coalescence processes in general lead to power law
distributions in just the right way to solve self-sampling problems
like the above, but referees made me take it out. I suppose I should
try to publish that result in a more mathematical journal at some
point, but I'm getting tired of arguing with referees all the time ):.

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Visiting Professor of Mathematics  hpco...@hpcoders.com.au
University of New South Wales  http://www.hpcoders.com.au

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Re: super intelligence and self-sampling

On 10 June 2015 at 11:39, Stathis Papaioannou  wrote:

> On 10 June 2015 at 08:37, LizR  wrote:
>
>> The normal answer to this is as stated - a superintelligence may form, as
>> per various Arthur C Clark (or Olaf Stapledon, really) stories, by merging
>> lots of non-super intelligences. So the chances of finding yourself
>> non-super is vastly greater, because it takes billions of us to make one of
>> them. However, this could lead to you eventually finding yourself super
>> (especially if quantum immortality operates). Or a subset of super.
>>
>> PS Ants aren't relevant, as Russell explains in "Theory of Nothing".
>>
>
> OK, but the same argument can easily be made otherwise: why should you
> find yourself living in tiny New Zealand rather than populous China?
>
> There is a way to show that you are more likely to find yourself in a
smaller country. I can't remember the details (but I think a power law is
involved :-)

But I will have a go.

I am more likely to find myself not in China than in China, because the
majority of people live outside China. Of the rest of the world, the next
most populous country is India, but more people live outside India than in
it, so I am more likely not to live in India. Next is the USA, but of the
remaining 4 or 5 billion people, most live outside the USA, so...

Repeating the process, I end up living alone on an island in the Pacific.
Or in New Zealand, which is almost the same thing.

(And then the test is given on Tuesday, much to my surprise!)

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Re: Notion of (mathematical) reason


LizR wrote:
On 10 June 2015 at 01:11, Bruce Kellett > wrote:


That is less difficult that you might think. Consciousness
supervenes on the physical brain

So (a) what actually is consciousness?, and (b) what is the answer to 
Maudlin and the MGA?


Consciousness is that which you lose under anaesthesia, or a 
sufficiently severe blow to the head. Like many things, it is defined 
ostensively.


It is not clear what you mean when you as what it actually is? Do you 
want a fully mechanistic account? Or a philosophical account? Or a 
neurological account? Or a personal account?


What is the question of Maudlin and the MGA? Is a recording conscious? 
Produce one of the required type (a complete and accurate recording of 
normal conscious brain activity) and ask it.


Bruce

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Re: super intelligence and self-sampling

On 10 June 2015 at 11:38, meekerdb  wrote:

>  On 6/9/2015 2:25 PM, Telmo Menezes wrote:
>
> On Tue, Jun 9, 2015 at 10:15 PM, John Clark  wrote:
>
>>  On Tue, Jun 9, 2015 Telmo Menezes  wrote:
>>
>>  > Super-intelligence is more resilient than human intelligence, so it
>>> is likely to last longer
>>>
>>
>>  Maybe, but I note that smarter than average humans seem to have higher
>> than average rates of suicide too.
>>
>
>  I wonder if this is because intelligence leads to depression or because
> it makes one more likely to research and correctly execute a viable method
> of suicide. Do you know if the rates are also higher on failed attempts?
>
> According to most people on this list, they are ALL failed attempts.
>

Heehee.

(Or at least most people are willnig to entertain the possibility.)

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Re: super intelligence and self-sampling

2015-06-09 Thread Stathis Papaioannou

On 10 June 2015 at 08:37, LizR  wrote:

> The normal answer to this is as stated - a superintelligence may form, as
> per various Arthur C Clark (or Olaf Stapledon, really) stories, by merging
> lots of non-super intelligences. So the chances of finding yourself
> non-super is vastly greater, because it takes billions of us to make one of
> them. However, this could lead to you eventually finding yourself super
> (especially if quantum immortality operates). Or a subset of super.
>
> PS Ants aren't relevant, as Russell explains in "Theory of Nothing".
>


OK, but the same argument can easily be made otherwise: why should you find
yourself living in tiny New Zealand rather than populous China?

 --
Stathis Papaioannou

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Re: super intelligence and self-sampling


On 6/9/2015 2:25 PM, Telmo Menezes wrote:



On Tue, Jun 9, 2015 at 10:15 PM, John Clark > wrote:


On Tue, Jun 9, 2015 Telmo Menezes mailto:te...@telmomenezes.com>> wrote:

> Super-intelligence is more resilient than human intelligence, so it 
is likely to last longer


Maybe, but I note that smarter than average humans seem to have higher than 
average
rates of suicide too.


I wonder if this is because intelligence leads to depression or because it makes one 
more likely to research and correctly execute a viable method of suicide. Do you know if 
the rates are also higher on failed attempts?


According to most people on this list, they are ALL failed attempts.

Brent

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Re: super intelligence and self-sampling

On Tue, Jun 9, 2015 at 7:33 PM, LizR  wrote:

> On 10 June 2015 at 11:15, Terren Suydam  wrote:
>
>> From a quantum immortality perspective, I think if a superintelligence
>> was merging lots of intelligences, including yours, you find yourself in
>> increasingly unlikely situations where you were able to escape being merged
>> with the superintelligence. Eventually, against all odds, you might be the
>> only non-integrated intelligence left.
>>
>> Yes, that does seem possible. It would imply that closest continuers of
> you could never be the versions within the "Cloud" - an alternative might
> be that the superintelligence starts off new arrivals with full autonomy
> inside a virtual world indistinguishable from their previous existence, and
> only gradually allow them to merge into the Overmind ... maybe giving them
> tests to check if they are ready to do so yet.
>
>
But that would be a cul-de-sac if eventually the superintelligence reaps
all individual consciousnesses.


> (Which may or may not involve being able to recite the Quran :-)
>
>
lol, the religious parallels are many. The superintelligence is a sort of
ego dissolution into the Void.

Terren

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Re: super intelligence and self-sampling

On 10 June 2015 at 11:15, Terren Suydam  wrote:

> From a quantum immortality perspective, I think if a superintelligence was
> merging lots of intelligences, including yours, you find yourself in
> increasingly unlikely situations where you were able to escape being merged
> with the superintelligence. Eventually, against all odds, you might be the
> only non-integrated intelligence left.
>
> Yes, that does seem possible. It would imply that closest continuers of
you could never be the versions within the "Cloud" - an alternative might
be that the superintelligence starts off new arrivals with full autonomy
inside a virtual world indistinguishable from their previous existence, and
only gradually allow them to merge into the Overmind ... maybe giving them
tests to check if they are ready to do so yet.

(Which may or may not involve being able to recite the Quran :-)

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Re: Notion of (mathematical) reason


On 6/9/2015 11:10 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
We might defined nomological inconsistency by [i] p & [i] ~p, for [i] being a 
material hypostase. 


?? What role does i play in the above?  Are you assuming i implies p?

Brent

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Re: super intelligence and self-sampling

>From a quantum immortality perspective, I think if a superintelligence was
merging lots of intelligences, including yours, you find yourself in
increasingly unlikely situations where you were able to escape being merged
with the superintelligence. Eventually, against all odds, you might be the
only non-integrated intelligence left.

Terren

On Tue, Jun 9, 2015 at 6:37 PM, LizR  wrote:

> The normal answer to this is as stated - a superintelligence may form, as
> per various Arthur C Clark (or Olaf Stapledon, really) stories, by merging
> lots of non-super intelligences. So the chances of finding yourself
> non-super is vastly greater, because it takes billions of us to make one of
> them. However, this could lead to you eventually finding yourself super
> (especially if quantum immortality operates). Or a subset of super.
>
> PS Ants aren't relevant, as Russell explains in "Theory of Nothing".
>
> On 10 June 2015 at 09:41, Terren Suydam  wrote:
>
>>
>> On Tue, Jun 9, 2015 at 5:31 PM, Telmo Menezes 
>> wrote:
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Tue, Jun 9, 2015 at 8:19 PM, Terren Suydam 
>>> wrote:
>>>

 On Tue, Jun 9, 2015 at 1:48 PM, Telmo Menezes 
 wrote:

>
>
> On Tue, Jun 9, 2015 at 7:28 PM, Terren Suydam  > wrote:
>
>> Perhaps most superintelligences end up merging into one super-ego, so
>> that their measure effectively becomes zero.
>>
>
> Perhaps, but I'm not convinced that this would reduce its measure.
> Consider the fact that you are no an ant, even though there are apparently
> 100 trillion of them compared to 7 billion humans.
>
> Telmo.
>
>

 The way I resolve that one is to assume that self-sampling requires a
 high enough level intelligence to have an ego (the 'self' in
 self-sampling). This is required to differentiate the computational
 histories we identify with as identity & memory.

 Let's say the entirety of humanity uploaded into a simulated
 environment, and that one day the simulated separation between minds was
 eradicated, giving rise to a super-intelligence (just one path of many to a
 superintelligence). From that moment on it would be impossible to
 differentiate computational histories in terms of personal identity/memory,
 so the measure goes to zero.

>>>
>>> Why zero? There is still one conscious entity. Why wouldn't it remember
>>> the great unification and the multitude of humans events before that?
>>>
>>> Telmo.
>>>
>>
>> When I say "goes to zero" I mean it as in, approaches the limit of zero
>> in the relative measure.
>>
>> I think it would remember the great multitude of human events, but it
>> would remember all of them as a single entity, as a single undifferentiated
>> identity. It effectively collapses the measure from billions to one.
>>
>> Terren
>>
>>
>>
>>>
>>>

 T

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Re: Notion of (mathematical) reason


On 6/9/2015 11:04 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


You say that comp is useless, but what is your theory of mind. What is not Turing 
emulable in the brain? 


Its interaction with the universe.  Of course that may be Turing emulable too, if the 
universe is.  But in that case you've just emulated everything, and emulated consciousness 
supervenes on emulated brains.


Brent

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Re: The scope of physical law and its relationship to the substitution level

On 10 June 2015 at 10:37, Bruce Kellett  wrote:

> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>>
>> On 09 Jun 2015, at 12:07, Bruce Kellett wrote:
>>
>>  Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
 On 09 Jun 2015, at 07:40, Bruce Kellett wrote:

>
> Given a set of axioms and some agreed rules of inference, the same
> results always follow, regardless of by whom or at what time the
> application is made. This is not what is usually referred to as "kicking
> back". Johnson did not apply some axioms and rules of inference in answer
> to the idealists, he kicked a stone.
>
 But people can kicked stone in dreams too.

>>>
>>> But do they wake up with broken or bruised toes?
>>>
>>
>> Do they ever wake up?
>>
>
> Solipsist!
>
> Another solipsist? Phew! I was worried I might be the only one.

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Re: Notion of (mathematical) reason


Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 09 Jun 2015, at 12:55, Bruce Kellett wrote:


As Brent has suggested. You simply contradict yourself here.
You say "It [comp] does not change physics", and "If comp change the 
content of physics, and nature follows physics, it will be comp which 
has to be abandoned."
The you say "I show that comp has testable consequence in the content 
of the physical theories..."


I see how you make appear a contradiction. As I said, comp is true and 
then is confirmed by physics, or comp is refuted by physics, and on both 
case comp does not change physics. Just that comp is testable.


These statements are mutually contradictory. If comp does not change 
the content of physical theories, then it will have no testable 
consequences.


In *that*sense, comp change so much physics that it makes it into a 
branch of machine theology. Sure.


OK. So your claim is that physics is recoverable from the computations 
of the dovetailer, and that if any of the physics so recovered 
contradicts physics as developed by the usual methods of science -- and 
tested by observation and experiment -- then that disproves comp.


But then, later we have



Comp makes physics NOT emulable by any machine a priori.


Now if physics is not emulable by any machine, how is it to be recovered 
from the computations of the dovetailer?


I am not at all clear what you mean by physics not being Turing 
emulable. Is this simply to do with the fact that Turing machines are 
digital, and physics assumes continuous variables -- real and complex 
numbers? Or is it, as you have said somewhere, that a machine cannot 
predict what result you will see when you perform a quantum experiment?


As things stand, you do have a conflict here.

Bruce

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Re: Pigeons offend Islam

The answer is, pigeon breeders have to make little sets of underwear for
their pigeons.

Simple, really.

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Re: Notion of (mathematical) reason

On 10 June 2015 at 01:11, Bruce Kellett  wrote:

>
> That is less difficult that you might think. Consciousness supervenes on
> the physical brain


So (a) what actually is consciousness?, and (b) what is the answer to
Maudlin and the MGA?

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Re: The scope of physical law and its relationship to the substitution level


Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 09 Jun 2015, at 12:07, Bruce Kellett wrote:


Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 09 Jun 2015, at 07:40, Bruce Kellett wrote:


Given a set of axioms and some agreed rules of inference, the same 
results always follow, regardless of by whom or at what time the 
application is made. This is not what is usually referred to as 
"kicking back". Johnson did not apply some axioms and rules of 
inference in answer to the idealists, he kicked a stone.

But people can kicked stone in dreams too.


But do they wake up with broken or bruised toes?


Do they ever wake up?


Solipsist!

Bruce

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Re: super intelligence and self-sampling

The normal answer to this is as stated - a superintelligence may form, as
per various Arthur C Clark (or Olaf Stapledon, really) stories, by merging
lots of non-super intelligences. So the chances of finding yourself
non-super is vastly greater, because it takes billions of us to make one of
them. However, this could lead to you eventually finding yourself super
(especially if quantum immortality operates). Or a subset of super.

PS Ants aren't relevant, as Russell explains in "Theory of Nothing".

On 10 June 2015 at 09:41, Terren Suydam  wrote:

>
> On Tue, Jun 9, 2015 at 5:31 PM, Telmo Menezes 
> wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On Tue, Jun 9, 2015 at 8:19 PM, Terren Suydam 
>> wrote:
>>
>>>
>>> On Tue, Jun 9, 2015 at 1:48 PM, Telmo Menezes 
>>> wrote:
>>>


 On Tue, Jun 9, 2015 at 7:28 PM, Terren Suydam 
 wrote:

> Perhaps most superintelligences end up merging into one super-ego, so
> that their measure effectively becomes zero.
>

 Perhaps, but I'm not convinced that this would reduce its measure.
 Consider the fact that you are no an ant, even though there are apparently
 100 trillion of them compared to 7 billion humans.

 Telmo.


>>>
>>> The way I resolve that one is to assume that self-sampling requires a
>>> high enough level intelligence to have an ego (the 'self' in
>>> self-sampling). This is required to differentiate the computational
>>> histories we identify with as identity & memory.
>>>
>>> Let's say the entirety of humanity uploaded into a simulated
>>> environment, and that one day the simulated separation between minds was
>>> eradicated, giving rise to a super-intelligence (just one path of many to a
>>> superintelligence). From that moment on it would be impossible to
>>> differentiate computational histories in terms of personal identity/memory,
>>> so the measure goes to zero.
>>>
>>
>> Why zero? There is still one conscious entity. Why wouldn't it remember
>> the great unification and the multitude of humans events before that?
>>
>> Telmo.
>>
>
> When I say "goes to zero" I mean it as in, approaches the limit of zero in
> the relative measure.
>
> I think it would remember the great multitude of human events, but it
> would remember all of them as a single entity, as a single undifferentiated
> identity. It effectively collapses the measure from billions to one.
>
> Terren
>
>
>
>>
>>
>>>
>>> T
>>>
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Re: super intelligence and self-sampling

On Tue, Jun 9, 2015 at 5:31 PM, Telmo Menezes 
wrote:

>
>
> On Tue, Jun 9, 2015 at 8:19 PM, Terren Suydam 
> wrote:
>
>>
>> On Tue, Jun 9, 2015 at 1:48 PM, Telmo Menezes 
>> wrote:
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Tue, Jun 9, 2015 at 7:28 PM, Terren Suydam 
>>> wrote:
>>>
 Perhaps most superintelligences end up merging into one super-ego, so
 that their measure effectively becomes zero.

>>>
>>> Perhaps, but I'm not convinced that this would reduce its measure.
>>> Consider the fact that you are no an ant, even though there are apparently
>>> 100 trillion of them compared to 7 billion humans.
>>>
>>> Telmo.
>>>
>>>
>>
>> The way I resolve that one is to assume that self-sampling requires a
>> high enough level intelligence to have an ego (the 'self' in
>> self-sampling). This is required to differentiate the computational
>> histories we identify with as identity & memory.
>>
>> Let's say the entirety of humanity uploaded into a simulated environment,
>> and that one day the simulated separation between minds was eradicated,
>> giving rise to a super-intelligence (just one path of many to a
>> superintelligence). From that moment on it would be impossible to
>> differentiate computational histories in terms of personal identity/memory,
>> so the measure goes to zero.
>>
>
> Why zero? There is still one conscious entity. Why wouldn't it remember
> the great unification and the multitude of humans events before that?
>
> Telmo.
>

When I say "goes to zero" I mean it as in, approaches the limit of zero in
the relative measure.

I think it would remember the great multitude of human events, but it would
remember all of them as a single entity, as a single undifferentiated
identity. It effectively collapses the measure from billions to one.

Terren



>
>
>>
>> T
>>
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Re: super intelligence and self-sampling

On Tue, Jun 9, 2015 at 8:19 PM, Terren Suydam 
wrote:

>
> On Tue, Jun 9, 2015 at 1:48 PM, Telmo Menezes 
> wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On Tue, Jun 9, 2015 at 7:28 PM, Terren Suydam 
>> wrote:
>>
>>> Perhaps most superintelligences end up merging into one super-ego, so
>>> that their measure effectively becomes zero.
>>>
>>
>> Perhaps, but I'm not convinced that this would reduce its measure.
>> Consider the fact that you are no an ant, even though there are apparently
>> 100 trillion of them compared to 7 billion humans.
>>
>> Telmo.
>>
>>
>
> The way I resolve that one is to assume that self-sampling requires a high
> enough level intelligence to have an ego (the 'self' in self-sampling).
> This is required to differentiate the computational histories we identify
> with as identity & memory.
>
> Let's say the entirety of humanity uploaded into a simulated environment,
> and that one day the simulated separation between minds was eradicated,
> giving rise to a super-intelligence (just one path of many to a
> superintelligence). From that moment on it would be impossible to
> differentiate computational histories in terms of personal identity/memory,
> so the measure goes to zero.
>

Why zero? There is still one conscious entity. Why wouldn't it remember the
great unification and the multitude of humans events before that?

Telmo.


>
> T
>
> --
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Re: super intelligence and self-sampling

On Tue, Jun 9, 2015 at 10:15 PM, John Clark  wrote:

> On Tue, Jun 9, 2015 Telmo Menezes  wrote:
>
> > Super-intelligence is more resilient than human intelligence, so it is
>> likely to last longer
>>
>
> Maybe, but I note that smarter than average humans seem to have higher
> than average rates of suicide too.
>

I wonder if this is because intelligence leads to depression or because it
makes one more likely to research and correctly execute a viable method of
suicide. Do you know if the rates are also higher on failed attempts?


> Mathematicians kill themselves at a rate 1.8 times higher than the general
> population, but they're not as bad as dentists, they kill themselves 5.6
> times as often.
>
>   John K Clark
>
>
>
>
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Re: super intelligence and self-sampling

2015-06-09 Thread John Clark

On Tue, Jun 9, 2015 Telmo Menezes  wrote:

> Super-intelligence is more resilient than human intelligence, so it is
> likely to last longer
>

Maybe, but I note that smarter than average humans seem to have higher than
average rates of suicide too. Mathematicians kill themselves at a rate 1.8
times higher than the general population, but they're not as bad as
dentists, they kill themselves 5.6 times as often.

  John K Clark

>

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Re: super intelligence and self-sampling

On Tue, Jun 9, 2015 at 1:48 PM, Telmo Menezes 
wrote:

>
>
> On Tue, Jun 9, 2015 at 7:28 PM, Terren Suydam 
> wrote:
>
>> Perhaps most superintelligences end up merging into one super-ego, so
>> that their measure effectively becomes zero.
>>
>
> Perhaps, but I'm not convinced that this would reduce its measure.
> Consider the fact that you are no an ant, even though there are apparently
> 100 trillion of them compared to 7 billion humans.
>
> Telmo.
>
>

The way I resolve that one is to assume that self-sampling requires a high
enough level intelligence to have an ego (the 'self' in self-sampling).
This is required to differentiate the computational histories we identify
with as identity & memory.

Let's say the entirety of humanity uploaded into a simulated environment,
and that one day the simulated separation between minds was eradicated,
giving rise to a super-intelligence (just one path of many to a
superintelligence). From that moment on it would be impossible to
differentiate computational histories in terms of personal identity/memory,
so the measure goes to zero.

T

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Re: Notion of (mathematical) reason



On 09 Jun 2015, at 18:53, meekerdb wrote:


On 6/9/2015 12:51 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 08 Jun 2015, at 19:45, meekerdb wrote:


On 6/8/2015 3:24 AM, Bruce Kellett wrote:

LizR wrote:
On 8 June 2015 at 13:30, Bruce Kellett  
mailto:bhkell...@optusnet.com.au>>  
wrote:


  If not, there is no possibility for a time variable in  
arithmetic
  per se, and consequently nothing can 'emerge' from arithmetic,  
since

  emergence is a temporal concept.
No it isn't, not in the sense being used here. The concept that  
is relevant in this case is ontological priority. If you think  
emergence is temporal then you will get very confused by  
discussions of the MUH (or even of how the universe arises as a  
4D manifold from the laws of physics)


Which law of physics gives rise to the 4D manifold? It is my  
understanding that a 4D pseudo-Riemannian manifold was a basic  
postulate underlying general relativity -- if that hypothesis  
emerged from anything, then it came from the fact that space-time  
was observed to be a 4 dimensional structure. So the 4D manifold  
is not actually derived from anything other than observation.


Kant made the mistake of thinking that Euclidean space was a  
necessary law of thought. Observation proved him wrong. Maybe  
observation also proves the MUH wrong?


Observation can't prove anything wrong about a theory that says  
everything happens in some universe. ;-)


Everything (consistent) happens in the mind of some machines, but  
the laws are in the relative measure, provided notably by the  
logical intensional nuance brought by incompleteness.


By "consistent" do you mean logically consistent; thus implying that  
no event can be nomologically inconsistent?  That is the same as  
denying there is any such thing as "laws of physics".


A set of beliefs is consistent if it does not lead to a proof of a  
statement and its negation. By completeness we can say that a set of  
belief is consistent if there is a world satisfying those beliefs.


It can be nomonological or not. And it has a different semantics  
according to which theory, or which intensional nuance of a  
provability predicate it is applied.


We might defined nomological inconsistency by [i] p & [i] ~p,  
for [i] being a material hypostase.


Bruno





Brent

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http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: Pigeons offend Islam

On Tue, Jun 9, 2015 at 7:30 PM, meekerdb  wrote:

>  On 6/9/2015 2:01 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
>  On 09 Jun 2015, at 04:08, meekerdb wrote:
>
>  This is stupid on so many levels, even on the most basic factual one:
> You can't see the genitals of a pigeon.  They're covered by feathers.  You
> have to poke them to get them even expose their genitals.
>
>
>  They confused it with the "feet" of the pigeon, perhaps. I think they
> fear pigeons, because they can be used to send messages, even where there
> is no electricity. The germans have also forbid breeding pigeons, in my
> country, some time ago, as they were used by the resistance.
>
>
> Yes, I suspected that was the real reason for the ban.  But it is even
> more stupid to invent a religious reason for the ban which every one will
> see as idiotic.
>

I think it's fairly common for repressive regimes to prefer to avoid
acknowledging their people's desires to escape or communicate with the
outside. I suspect that part of it is because people feel more powerless if
they don't realise that they are far from alone in their dislike of the
society they live in.

Telmo.


>
> Brent
>
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Re: Notion of (mathematical) reason



On 09 Jun 2015, at 15:11, Bruce Kellett wrote:


Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 09 Jun 2015, at 09:11, Bruce Kellett wrote:


Why not? If it can emulate a specific purpose Turning machine, it  
can emulate a universal Turing machine. I think Putnam's argument  
for unlimited pancomputationalism implies this.
I am not convince by that argument. Show me a rock program  
computing the prime numbers.


Show me a Turing machine that can compute the prime numbers


Easy but tedious, and distracting exercise.

Show me how to emulate just K, that is the function which send (x, y)  
to x. it is not obvious this can be done, because y is eliminated, you  
need a black hole for it, and a proof that it does not evaporate.





and I can emulate that with a rock.


Like with the pebble.



For that matter, show me an arithmetical computer in Platonia  
computing the prime numbers.









..

much less give any useful results for physics.
No new one should be expected soon, but that was not the purpose at  
all.

You can't blame a coffee machine for not doing tea.


Well, if I drink only tea then I would consider a coffee machine  
totally useless and discard it without further thought! So for comp!



?

You say that comp is useless, but what is your theory of mind. What is  
not Turing emulable in the brain?









You can do things with all the rigour you want, but if you can't  
extract any useful results, you are wasting your time. Perhaps  
this is the irreconcilable difference between the physicist and  
the mathematician.
Yes, I am interested in a theory of "everything", which means to me  
mainly a theory which does not eliminate consciousness. I saw that  
physicists avoid the question, but a bridge is born between math  
and cognitive science, thanks to theoretical computer science (a  
branch of math).
I am not sure I see your point. Comp is not useless, comp is the  
actual theory of the materialists, and I show that contrary to a  
widespread belief: materialism and computationalism are  
incompatible (without adding non-comp magic).
Comp is not presented as a solution, but as a problem. In the  
second part, I show the propositional solution, but you need to  
understand the problem before. Actually, I think that you have seen  
the problem, but want to conclude to much quickly that comp is  
false. The math part shows that this is premature, especially that  
QM confirms both the comp many-worlds/dreams, but also the quantum  
tautologies (until now).


Comp does not confirm the many-worlds interpretation of QM.


Exact.

Comp implies trivially the many-dreams. It is QM which confirms the  
many dreams aspect, and so use of it to get the measure right.





You appear to want to draw this conclusion from FPI. But in a  
discussion with Liz a while back, I challenged this interpretation  
of your teleportation thought experiments leading to FPI. It was  
readily shown that such thought experiments were completely  
orthogonal to quantum mechanics and the MWI.


No, You stopped at step 4 (which is already better than John Clark).  
You need AUDA to get the math of the FPI, and to compare it to physics.


We have answered this, but you come back again on what has already  
been explained in detail: please reread the posts.







Similarly for your attempt to bring quantum logic to your cause.  
Quantum logic was devised by von Neumann in the context of the  
collapse interpretation of QM, together with the use of projection  
operators. In Everettian many-worlds interpretations, there are no  
projection operators, and quantum logic does not have a footing. In  
fact, it has been pointed out that there is no such thing as a  
specifically "quantum" logic -- there is just ordinary predicate  
logic and a theory in which some operators do not commute. When you  
can derive the non-commutation of the position and momentum  
operators from comp, I might be a little more impressed.


UDA formulates the problem, and by the way, the non-commutation of  
some observable is already proved. Of course position and momentum are  
not yet derived, and it is not clear if they will be derived.


Again, I am not proposing a new theory, I show that two old antic  
theories, often confused or used simultaneously are incompatible. Then  
I show that appearance of matter is already justified at the  
propositional level, so comp is not yet refuted.






My feeling is that you are not interested in the mind-body problem,  
but for some reason want to keep physics as *the* fundamental  
science. If that is the case, you have to produce a non-comp theory  
of mind.


That is less difficult that you might think. Consciousness  
supervenes on the physical brain,


Only if you add some amount of magic in both the brain and matter:  
which one. I ask the theory, the math, not religious mantra like  
consciousness supervenes on the physical brain. Today materialist  
believe that consciousness sueprvenes on the rbain *becaus

Re: super intelligence and self-sampling

On Tue, Jun 9, 2015 at 7:28 PM, Terren Suydam 
wrote:

> Perhaps most superintelligences end up merging into one super-ego, so that
> their measure effectively becomes zero.
>

Perhaps, but I'm not convinced that this would reduce its measure. Consider
the fact that you are no an ant, even though there are apparently 100
trillion of them compared to 7 billion humans.

Telmo.


>
> Terren
>
> On Tue, Jun 9, 2015 at 1:03 PM, Telmo Menezes 
> wrote:
>
>> Hi everyone,
>>
>> Something I have been thinking about. I start with two assumptions:
>>
>> - Super-intelligence is more resilient than human intelligence, so it is
>> likely to last longer (e.g. it is more likely to be able to anticipate
>> existencial threats and prepare accordingly; it is more likely to spread
>> throughout the galaxy);
>>
>> - A super-intelligence is necessarily conscious (I think both
>> computacionalists and emergentists can agree here).
>>
>> If a super-intelligence is created at some point in time, then we can
>> expect there to exists much more of it in an entire timeline than human
>> intelligence. By self-sampling, it is therefore unlikely that I exist as a
>> human and not as a super-intelligence.
>>
>> I can think of three options:
>>
>> 1) We are outliers -- it is hard to estimate the likelihood of this, but
>> it would be tempting to assume that it is very very low if we imagine a
>> galaxy-spanning AI civilisation;
>>
>> 2) No super-intelligence will ever be created;
>>
>> 3) We are already super-intelligences, having an experience in a
>> simulation for some reason.
>>
>> What do you think?
>>
>> Cheers
>> Telmo.
>>
>> --
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>> "Everything List" group.
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Re: Notion of (mathematical) reason



On 09 Jun 2015, at 12:55, Bruce Kellett wrote:


Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 09 Jun 2015, at 07:06, meekerdb wrote:

   Bruno Marchal wrote:

   On 08 Jun 2015, at 03:30, Bruce Kellett wrote:


   Note that it is important to distinguish between
   structures that can be described mathematically and the
   structure of arithmetic or mathematics themselves.

   Yes. Quite important. Even after the reversal, although
   physics is made purely arithmetical, it is only through
   machine's psychology and theology that this happens, and the
   science physics are explained to be different from the
   mathematical science. For example mathematical  
(arithmetical)

   existence is some thing like ExP(x), but physical existence
   is [2]<2>Ex [2]<2>P(x). Physics remains untouched by comp.,
   except it is put on logico-arithmetical grounds. What change
   is physicalism in metaphysics. It becomes testable, and  
false

   if comp is true.

That last seems incoherent.  If comp leaves physics untouched that  
implies that comp makes no difference to physics and so there can  
be no test of comp.
I meant, IF comp is true. Indeed, the test of comp is done by  
physics! If comp change the content of physics, and nature follows  
physics, it will be comp which has to be abandoned.


Instead you seem to imply that physicalism, a metaphysical  
hypothesis, is testable - but how if not via an empirical  
prediction?
It is via an empirical prediction. I was in the frame of supposing  
comp true. It does not change physics, guven that it is at the  
origin of physics (IF true)..

You say it is false if comp is true; but that's not a test.
I say that the idea that we need to assume a physical reality is  
false.
That's like the creationists who, when asked what evidence  
supports creationism, cite deficiencies in evolution.
?  (you lost me). I show that comp has testable consequence in the  
content of the physical theories, so let us do the test, or work  
toward it (like optimizing G*, the Z and X logics, etc.).


As Brent has suggested. You simply contradict yourself here.
You say "It [comp] does not change physics", and "If comp change the  
content of physics, and nature follows physics, it will be comp  
which has to be abandoned."
The you say "I show that comp has testable consequence in the  
content of the physical theories..."


I see how you make appear a contradiction. As I said, comp is true and  
then is confirmed by physics, or comp is refuted by physics, and on  
both case comp does not change physics. Just that comp is testable.






These statements are mutually contradictory. If comp does not change  
the content of physical theories, then it will have no testable  
consequences.



In *that*sense, comp change so much physics that it makes it into a  
branch of machine theology. Sure.




If comp does change the content of physical theories, then it might  
become testable, but so far you have given no hint as to what  
physical content might be changed, or what theories might be in  
question, you merely note that physics will take precedence over comp.


Well that is the result. Then the logic of the observable has been  
derived, and tested.






Merely talking about metaphysics does not lead to testable  
consequences for physical theories.


Unless that metaphysics is derived from comp, which leads to a  
theology which include physics, and so get testable.

Anyway, I derive this from comp.





I think we have previously argued at length about the MGA. Because  
that argument does not address metaphysics, but the actual physics  
of brain processes, it does not refute some metaphysical hypothesis  
-- it actually refutes comp itself.


?



This, as has been pointed out, is because the movie graph argument  
applies equally to physics as emulated by comp and physics as  
investigated by the physicists, independent of any metaphysical  
overtones.


Comp makes physics NOT emulable by any machine a priori.






I think that you will find that metaphysical assumptions are not  
amenable to either verification or falsification by empirical means.  
Some metaphysics might be more useful and productive than others,  
but none is empirically testable.


Good, so let us not doing metaphysics, but only cognitive science.  
Then a theorem is that if the brain is Turing emulable then physics is  
a branch of machine theology, and the physical reality is recovered  
through a notion of persistent and stable appearances.


Thanks to Gödel, Löb and Solovay, we can axiomatize completely the  
propositional part of the theology, including the propositional part  
of physics, and compare it to the logic of the observable. Up to now,  
it fits (at a place where many have thought this cannot happen,  
because this marry symmetry and antisymmetry at a deep level, without  
collapsing the logic.


Bruno








Bruce

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Re: Pigeons offend Islam


On 6/9/2015 2:01 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 09 Jun 2015, at 04:08, meekerdb wrote:

This is stupid on so many levels, even on the most basic factual one: You can't see the 
genitals of a pigeon.  They're covered by feathers. You have to poke them to get them 
even expose their genitals.


They confused it with the "feet" of the pigeon, perhaps. I think they fear pigeons, 
because they can be used to send messages, even where there is no electricity. The 
germans have also forbid breeding pigeons, in my country, some time ago, as they were 
used by the resistance.


Yes, I suspected that was the real reason for the ban.  But it is even more stupid to 
invent a religious reason for the ban which every one will see as idiotic.


Brent

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Re: super intelligence and self-sampling

Perhaps most superintelligences end up merging into one super-ego, so that
their measure effectively becomes zero.

Terren

On Tue, Jun 9, 2015 at 1:03 PM, Telmo Menezes 
wrote:

> Hi everyone,
>
> Something I have been thinking about. I start with two assumptions:
>
> - Super-intelligence is more resilient than human intelligence, so it is
> likely to last longer (e.g. it is more likely to be able to anticipate
> existencial threats and prepare accordingly; it is more likely to spread
> throughout the galaxy);
>
> - A super-intelligence is necessarily conscious (I think both
> computacionalists and emergentists can agree here).
>
> If a super-intelligence is created at some point in time, then we can
> expect there to exists much more of it in an entire timeline than human
> intelligence. By self-sampling, it is therefore unlikely that I exist as a
> human and not as a super-intelligence.
>
> I can think of three options:
>
> 1) We are outliers -- it is hard to estimate the likelihood of this, but
> it would be tempting to assume that it is very very low if we imagine a
> galaxy-spanning AI civilisation;
>
> 2) No super-intelligence will ever be created;
>
> 3) We are already super-intelligences, having an experience in a
> simulation for some reason.
>
> What do you think?
>
> Cheers
> Telmo.
>
> --
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Re: The scope of physical law and its relationship to the substitution level


On 6/9/2015 1:26 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


...

That can be useful in AI, and for natural language. But not in QED, string theory or 
theoretical computer science.


A rocket using water instead of hydrogen gas will not work. That does not refute that 
rockets can work.




Brent :)

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Re: The scope of physical law and its relationship to the substitution level



On 09 Jun 2015, at 12:07, Bruce Kellett wrote:


Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 09 Jun 2015, at 07:40, Bruce Kellett wrote:


Given a set of axioms and some agreed rules of inference, the same  
results always follow, regardless of by whom or at what time the  
application is made. This is not what is usually referred to as  
"kicking back". Johnson did not apply some axioms and rules of  
inference in answer to the idealists, he kicked a stone.

But people can kicked stone in dreams too.


But do they wake up with broken or bruised toes?


Do they ever wake up?

Bruno




Bruce

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Re: The scope of physical law and its relationship to the substitution level

On 09 Jun 2015, at 18:59, John Clark wrote:

On Mon, Jun 8, 2015  Bruce Kellett  wrote:

> What axioms led to arithmetic?

The Peano axioms.

Or the Robinson axiom, or many other systems. but they don't disagree  
on any formula. Even the theories having weird axioms like "PA is  
inconsistent" will not disagree on what they say for the standard  
natural numbers. They disagree only on religion, somehow.

They were chosen because they are very simple and self evident. You  
need to be very conservative when picking axioms, for example we  
could just add the Goldbach Conjecture as an axiom, but then if a  
computer found a even number that was NOT the sum of 2 primes it  
would render all mathematical work done after the addition of the  
Goldbach axiom gibberish.   Or take Zermelo–Fraenkel set theory  
(ZFC)

Well, that is Zermelo–Fraenkel set theory + the axiom of choice.

and the Continuum Hypothesis which says that there is no infinite  
number greater than the number of integers but less than the number  
of Real Numbers;  in 1940 Godel showed that ZFC cannot prove the  
Continuum Hypothesis to be incorrect, and in 1963 Paul Cohen showed  
that ZFC cannot prove the Continuum Hypothesis to be correct either.  
So ZFC has nothing to say about the Continuum Hypothesis one way or  
the other. You could just add an axiom to ZFC saying "the Continuum  
Hypothesis is true"  but you could just as easily add  "the  
Continuum Hypothesis is NOT true", so which one do you add? The   
problem is that neither of these axioms are simple and neither are  
self evident.

> Could one have chosen different axioms?

It's never a good idea to change axioms unless somebody finds a set  
of axioms that are even simpler and even more self evident.

It depends what we need. RA is interesting because it is the simple  
essentially undecidable theory. Take any of its axioms,

0 ≠ s(x)
s(x) = s(y) -> x = y
x = 0 v Ey(x = s(y))
x+0 = x
x+s(y) = s(x+y)
x*0=0
x*s(y)=(x*y)+x

and remove it. You get a theory which is undecidable, but not  
*essentially* undecidable. It means you can extend those subtheories  
into decidable theories, like the theory of real numbers. But RA is  
already essentially undecidable: all its consistent effective (RE)  
extensions are undecidable and incomplete (with respect to  
arithmetical truth).

But RA cannot prove many things. It is simple to see that 0 + x = x is  
undecidable in RA. And RA is not Löbian. It is Turing universal, but  
cannot prove it, unlike PA, ZF, ZFC, ZF+kappa, etc.

Once Löbian, they get the same theology, and the same testable "comp"  
physics.

Note that ZF and ZFC proves the same formula of arithmetic.

Bruno

 John K Clark

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Re: The scope of physical law and its relationship to the substitution level

On 6/9/2015 12:46 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 08 Jun 2015, at 19:31, meekerdb wrote:

On 6/8/2015 1:03 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

or that maths exists independently of mathematicians.

That even just arithmetical truth is independent of mathematician. This is important
because everyone agree with any axiomatic of the numbers, but that is not the case for
analysis, real numbers, etc.

Everyone agrees on ZFC in the same sense.

Not at all. There are many non isomorphic approach to set theory and analysis. For the
natural numbers, this does not occur. All theories have a clear standard model on which
we all agree. As Gödel saw, even intuitionist arithmetic is isomorphic to classical
arithmetic: it changes only the vocabulary.

So does that make set theory and its consequences real?

It is a theory which explain too much. It is interesting for logicians. Nobody use it,
really. people refers to it when confronted with possible paradoxes, but mathematicians
avoid the paradoxes naturally, and the "modern" one will use some category or elementary
toposes to fix the thing.

Read books on the subject. Arithmetic has a solidity status not obtained by analysis, or
even geometry.Some use ZF + ~AC, ZF + kappa, or other will use NF (a very different set
theory), or intuitionist ZF (quite different from ZF), or NBG, etc.

So what? That just makes my point that Platonia implies many different "realities". First
order predicate logic is also "a clear standard model". So it must be as "real" as
arithmetic. And arithmetic isn't so complete as you imply - that's why negative numbers
and fractions and reals were invented.

Brent

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Re: The scope of physical law and its relationship to the substitution level


On 6/9/2015 12:34 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 08 Jun 2015, at 19:27, meekerdb wrote:


On 6/8/2015 1:03 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Hence what I've called comp1 is the default materialist hypothesis (also known as the 
strong AI thesis, I think)


Comp1 is not comp, even if it is "comp" for a materialist: but that position is proved 
to be nonsense.


Comp is just "I am a digitalizable machine".
String AI is the thesis that machine can think (be conscious). It does not logically 
entail comp. Machine can think, but does not need to be the only thinking entities. 
Gods and goddesses might be able to think too.


But in saying "I am a digitalizable machine" you implicitly assume that machine exists 
in the environment that you exist in.


That is not a problem. In arithmetic I will exist in infinities of environments, played 
by UMs (with and without oracles). Such existence are relative, and phenomenological.




 It is this environment and your potential interaction with it that provides meaning to 
the "digital thoughts" of the machine.


I can agree with this. What does it change in the reasoning? 


It undermines the MGA because it shows that whether a physical process instantiates a 
computation is a wholistic question, one whose answer is relative to the environment and 
interaction with that environment.  This means that isolating the movie graph and then 
showing that it is absurd to regard it as a computation is not a legitimate move.


Brent

The point is that your generalized brain, as long as it is digital, cannot singularize 
your soul. If you don't add non Turing emulable magic in matter, the argument shows that 
matter has to arise from a statistics on all computations going through the current 
state. If not, could you say precisely when the proof go wrong?


Bruno





Brent

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super intelligence and self-sampling

Hi everyone,

Something I have been thinking about. I start with two assumptions:

- Super-intelligence is more resilient than human intelligence, so it is
likely to last longer (e.g. it is more likely to be able to anticipate
existencial threats and prepare accordingly; it is more likely to spread
throughout the galaxy);

- A super-intelligence is necessarily conscious (I think both
computacionalists and emergentists can agree here).

If a super-intelligence is created at some point in time, then we can
expect there to exists much more of it in an entire timeline than human
intelligence. By self-sampling, it is therefore unlikely that I exist as a
human and not as a super-intelligence.

I can think of three options:

1) We are outliers -- it is hard to estimate the likelihood of this, but it
would be tempting to assume that it is very very low if we imagine a
galaxy-spanning AI civilisation;

2) No super-intelligence will ever be created;

3) We are already super-intelligences, having an experience in a simulation
for some reason.

What do you think?

Cheers
Telmo.

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Re: The scope of physical law and its relationship to the substitution level

2015-06-09 Thread John Clark

On Mon, Jun 8, 2015  Bruce Kellett  wrote:

> What axioms led to arithmetic?

The Peano axioms. They were chosen because they are very simple and self
evident. You need to be very conservative when picking axioms, for example
we could just add the Goldbach Conjecture as an axiom, but then if a
computer found a even number that was NOT the sum of 2 primes it would
render all mathematical work done after the addition of the Goldbach axiom
gibberish.   Or take Zermelo–Fraenkel set theory (ZFC) and the Continuum
Hypothesis which says that there is no infinite number greater than the
number of integers but less than the number of Real Numbers;  in 1940 Godel
showed that ZFC cannot prove the Continuum Hypothesis to be incorrect, and
in 1963 Paul Cohen showed that ZFC cannot prove the Continuum Hypothesis to
be correct either. So ZFC has nothing to say about the Continuum Hypothesis
one way or the other. You could just add an axiom to ZFC saying "the
Continuum Hypothesis is true"  but you could just as easily add  "the
Continuum Hypothesis is NOT true", so which one do you add? The  problem is
that neither of these axioms are simple and neither are self evident.

> > Could one have chosen different axioms?

It's never a good idea to change axioms unless somebody finds a set of
axioms that are even simpler and even more self evident.

 John K Clark

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Re: Notion of (mathematical) reason


On 6/9/2015 12:51 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 08 Jun 2015, at 19:45, meekerdb wrote:


On 6/8/2015 3:24 AM, Bruce Kellett wrote:

LizR wrote:
On 8 June 2015 at 13:30, Bruce Kellett > wrote:


   If not, there is no possibility for a time variable in arithmetic
   per se, and consequently nothing can 'emerge' from arithmetic, since
   emergence is a temporal concept.
No it isn't, not in the sense being used here. The concept that is relevant in this 
case is ontological priority. If you think emergence is temporal then you will get 
very confused by discussions of the MUH (or even of how the universe arises as a 4D 
manifold from the laws of physics)


Which law of physics gives rise to the 4D manifold? It is my understanding that a 4D 
pseudo-Riemannian manifold was a basic postulate underlying general relativity -- if 
that hypothesis emerged from anything, then it came from the fact that space-time was 
observed to be a 4 dimensional structure. So the 4D manifold is not actually derived 
from anything other than observation.


Kant made the mistake of thinking that Euclidean space was a necessary law of thought. 
Observation proved him wrong. Maybe observation also proves the MUH wrong?


Observation can't prove anything wrong about a theory that says everything happens in 
some universe. ;-)


Everything (consistent) happens in the mind of some machines, but the laws are in the 
relative measure, provided notably by the logical intensional nuance brought by 
incompleteness.


By "consistent" do you mean logically consistent; thus implying that no event can be 
nomologically inconsistent?  That is the same as denying there is any such thing as "laws 
of physics".


Brent

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Re: Pigeons offend Islam

2015-06-09 Thread John Clark

On Mon, Jun 8, 2015 at 10:08 PM, meekerdb  wrote:

 > This is stupid on so many levels, even on the most basic factual one:
> You can't see the genitals of a pigeon.  They're covered by feathers.  You
> have to poke them to get them even expose their genitals.
>

That's logic, but we were talking about something completely different,
religion. With religion the stupider something you believe in is the better
as it demonstrates more faith and faith, that is to say believing in
something when there is absolutely no reason to do so, is the greatest
virtue there is.

 John K Clark

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Re: Quran Audio

2015-06-09 Thread Samiya Illias

I suppose you can call it that :) 
People on this list have different assumptions, prejudices, misgivings, queries 
and (dis)interest level in Islam and the practice of Muslims. Just presenting 
the original document for any who might want to check for themselves. 
Actually I was a bit hesitant sharing but then I thought that some will object 
anyway. 

Samiya 

> On 09-Jun-2015, at 6:56 pm, spudboy100 via Everything List 
>  wrote:
> 
> Doing Dawa? Interesting. 
> 
> 
> 
> -Original Message-
> From: Samiya Illias 
> To: everything-list 
> Sent: Mon, Jun 8, 2015 10:09 pm
> Subject: Quran Audio
> 
> A good resource for listening to Quran Recitation in Arabic plus Translation 
> for anyone interested in listening to he Quran:  
> http://www.quranexplorer.com/quran/ 
> 
> Samiya 
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Re: Quran Audio

2015-06-09 Thread spudboy100 via Everything List

Doing Dawa? Interesting. 
 

 

 

-Original Message-
From: Samiya Illias 
To: everything-list 
Sent: Mon, Jun 8, 2015 10:09 pm
Subject: Quran Audio


 
A good resource for listening to Quran Recitation in Arabic plus Translation 
for anyone interested in listening to he Quran:   
http://www.quranexplorer.com/quran/   
   
  
  
Samiya   
 
  
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Re: Pigeons offend Islam

2015-06-09 Thread spudboy100 via Everything List

What if they were, like, a really, really, big pigeons, then you'd spot them 
real easy! Think about that, Mister! Sakes!
 

 

 

-Original Message-
From: meekerdb 
To: everything-list 
Sent: Mon, Jun 8, 2015 10:08 pm
Subject: Re: Pigeons offend Islam


  
This is stupid on so many levels, even on the most basic factual one: You can't 
see the genitals of a pigeon.  They're covered by feathers.  You have to poke 
them to get them even expose their genitals.  
   
 Brent  
   
 On 6/8/2015 4:52 PM, LizR wrote:  
  
  
   
Support for this is (ahem) dropping...  
   
   

On 9 June 2015 at 07:35, spudboy100 via Everything List 
 wrote:
 

A Coo-Coo Fatwa   
   

 
 
 
-Original Message- 
 From: John Clark < johnkcl...@gmail.com> 
 To: everything-list < everything-list@googlegroups.com> 
 Sent: Sat, Jun 6, 2015 12:15 pm 
 Subject: Pigeons offend Islam 
  
  
   
 ISIS recently banned pigeon breeding because when the birds fly overhead they 
expose their genitals and that is a sin against Islam. Violators will be 
publicly flogged.

 


 http://rt.com/news/264673-isis-breeding-birds-islam/ 


 


  John K Clark

   
  
 

   
 

   
  
  
  
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Re: Notion of (mathematical) reason


Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 09 Jun 2015, at 09:11, Bruce Kellett wrote:


Why not? If it can emulate a specific purpose Turning machine, it can 
emulate a universal Turing machine. I think Putnam's argument for 
unlimited pancomputationalism implies this.


I am not convince by that argument. Show me a rock program computing the 
prime numbers.


Show me a Turing machine that can compute the prime numbers and I can 
emulate that with a rock. For that matter, show me an arithmetical 
computer in Platonia computing the prime numbers.


..

much less give any useful results for physics.


No new one should be expected soon, but that was not the purpose at all.
You can't blame a coffee machine for not doing tea.


Well, if I drink only tea then I would consider a coffee machine totally 
useless and discard it without further thought! So for comp!



You can do things with all the rigour you want, but if you can't 
extract any useful results, you are wasting your time. Perhaps this is 
the irreconcilable difference between the physicist and the 
mathematician.


Yes, I am interested in a theory of "everything", which means to me 
mainly a theory which does not eliminate consciousness. I saw that 
physicists avoid the question, but a bridge is born between math and 
cognitive science, thanks to theoretical computer science (a branch of 
math).


I am not sure I see your point. Comp is not useless, comp is the actual 
theory of the materialists, and I show that contrary to a widespread 
belief: materialism and computationalism are incompatible (without 
adding non-comp magic).


Comp is not presented as a solution, but as a problem. In the second 
part, I show the propositional solution, but you need to understand the 
problem before. Actually, I think that you have seen the problem, but 
want to conclude to much quickly that comp is false. The math part shows 
that this is premature, especially that QM confirms both the comp 
many-worlds/dreams, but also the quantum tautologies (until now).


Comp does not confirm the many-worlds interpretation of QM. You appear 
to want to draw this conclusion from FPI. But in a discussion with Liz a 
while back, I challenged this interpretation of your teleportation 
thought experiments leading to FPI. It was readily shown that such 
thought experiments were completely orthogonal to quantum mechanics and 
the MWI. Similarly for your attempt to bring quantum logic to your 
cause. Quantum logic was devised by von Neumann in the context of the 
collapse interpretation of QM, together with the use of projection 
operators. In Everettian many-worlds interpretations, there are no 
projection operators, and quantum logic does not have a footing. In 
fact, it has been pointed out that there is no such thing as a 
specifically "quantum" logic -- there is just ordinary predicate logic 
and a theory in which some operators do not commute. When you can derive 
the non-commutation of the position and momentum operators from comp, I 
might be a little more impressed.



My feeling is that you are not interested in the mind-body problem, but 
for some reason want to keep physics as *the* fundamental science. If 
that is the case, you have to produce a non-comp theory of mind.


That is less difficult that you might think. Consciousness supervenes on 
the physical brain, and was produced by evolution over the course of 
time by completely natural processes. The details of the operation of 
the brain, and its effect on consciousness, are the realm of study of 
the neurosciences. Computer scientists only ever confuse themselves over 
these quite simple matters.


Bruce

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Re: The scope of physical law and its relationship to the substitution level

> On 9 Jun 2015, at 8:07 pm, Bruce Kellett  wrote:
> 
> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> On 09 Jun 2015, at 07:40, Bruce Kellett wrote:
>>> 
>>> Given a set of axioms and some agreed rules of inference, the same results 
>>> always follow, regardless of by whom or at what time the application is 
>>> made. This is not what is usually referred to as "kicking back". Johnson 
>>> did not apply some axioms and rules of inference in answer to the 
>>> idealists, he kicked a stone.
>> But people can kicked stone in dreams too.
> 
> But do they wake up with broken or bruised toes?
> 
> Bruce
> 

Often, yes. Dial up a few YouTube clips of people doing embarrassing and, yes, 
injurious things while under the influence of the “mistaken belief system we 
call sleep” aka sleepwalking or nocturnal ambulatory syndrome or whatever.

Afer that you can watch the clip of the dog running while asleep and taking off 
into a bloody brick wall after which it “wakes up to the real world”.

You only have to believe that you are awake or asleep. You will always believe 
what you tell yourself.

The point of Bruno’s “people can kick stones in dreams too” is to acknowledge 
that consciousness cannot be extinguished with cheap excuses like being asleep 
or dead.

Kim

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Re: Notion of (mathematical) reason


Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 09 Jun 2015, at 07:06, meekerdb wrote:

Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 08 Jun 2015, at 03:30, Bruce Kellett wrote:


Note that it is important to distinguish between
structures that can be described mathematically and the
structure of arithmetic or mathematics themselves.

Yes. Quite important. Even after the reversal, although
physics is made purely arithmetical, it is only through
machine's psychology and theology that this happens, and the
science physics are explained to be different from the
mathematical science. For example mathematical (arithmetical)
existence is some thing like ExP(x), but physical existence
is [2]<2>Ex [2]<2>P(x). Physics remains untouched by comp.,
except it is put on logico-arithmetical grounds. What change
is physicalism in metaphysics. It becomes testable, and false
if comp is true.

That last seems incoherent.  If comp leaves physics untouched that 
implies that comp makes no difference to physics and so there can be 
no test of comp. 


I meant, IF comp is true. Indeed, the test of comp is done by physics! 
If comp change the content of physics, and nature follows physics, it 
will be comp which has to be abandoned.


Instead you seem to imply that physicalism, a metaphysical hypothesis, 
is testable - but how if not via an empirical prediction? 


It is via an empirical prediction. I was in the frame of supposing comp 
true. It does not change physics, guven that it is at the origin of 
physics (IF true)..


You say it is false if comp is true; but that's not a test.  


I say that the idea that we need to assume a physical reality is false.

That's like the creationists who, when asked what evidence supports 
creationism, cite deficiencies in evolution.


?  (you lost me). I show that comp has testable consequence in the 
content of the physical theories, so let us do the test, or work toward 
it (like optimizing G*, the Z and X logics, etc.).


As Brent has suggested. You simply contradict yourself here.
You say "It [comp] does not change physics", and "If comp change the 
content of physics, and nature follows physics, it will be comp which 
has to be abandoned."
The you say "I show that comp has testable consequence in the content of 
the physical theories..."


These statements are mutually contradictory. If comp does not change the 
content of physical theories, then it will have no testable 
consequences. If comp does change the content of physical theories, then 
it might become testable, but so far you have given no hint as to what 
physical content might be changed, or what theories might be in 
question, you merely note that physics will take precedence over comp.


Merely talking about metaphysics does not lead to testable consequences 
for physical theories. I think we have previously argued at length about 
the MGA. Because that argument does not address metaphysics, but the 
actual physics of brain processes, it does not refute some metaphysical 
hypothesis -- it actually refutes comp itself. This, as has been pointed 
out, is because the movie graph argument applies equally to physics as 
emulated by comp and physics as investigated by the physicists, 
independent of any metaphysical overtones.


I think that you will find that metaphysical assumptions are not 
amenable to either verification or falsification by empirical means. 
Some metaphysics might be more useful and productive than others, but 
none is empirically testable.


Bruce

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Re: The scope of physical law and its relationship to the substitution level


Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 09 Jun 2015, at 07:40, Bruce Kellett wrote:


Given a set of axioms and some agreed rules of inference, the same 
results always follow, regardless of by whom or at what time the 
application is made. This is not what is usually referred to as 
"kicking back". Johnson did not apply some axioms and rules of 
inference in answer to the idealists, he kicked a stone.


But people can kicked stone in dreams too.


But do they wake up with broken or bruised toes?

Bruce

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Re: The scope of physical law and its relationship to the substitution level



On 09 Jun 2015, at 01:26, Bruce Kellett wrote:


LizR wrote:
On 9 June 2015 at 05:31, meekerdb mailto:meeke...@verizon.net 
>> wrote:

   On 6/8/2015 1:03 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

   or that maths exists independently of mathematicians.
   That even just arithmetical truth is independent of  
mathematician.
   This is important because everyone agree with any axiomatic of  
the
   numbers, but that is not the case for analysis, real numbers,  
etc.

   Everyone agrees on ZFC in the same sense.  So does that make set
   theory and its consequences real? Reality isn't defined by what  
everyone agrees on. What makes ZFC (or whatever) real, or not, is  
whether it kicks back. Is it something that was invented, and could  
equally well have been invented differently, or was it discovered  
as a result of following a chain of logical reasoning from certain  
axioms?


Why do not those same arguments apply equally to arithmetic? What  
axioms led to arithmetic? Could one have chosen different axioms?


Take RA, PA, PA+con(PA), PA + con(PA + con PA), etc.  (con PA = "PA is  
consistent"), DA, etc.


All those theories leads to the same arithmetical truth. Each theory  
is just included in the next theory, but if one of them say that a  
proposition is a theorem, the negation of it will not be a theorem in  
any of them.


So there are many different theories of arithmetic, but they all  
describes the same structure.


That's not the case in set theory, where many different theories leads  
to different theorems.


Of course, by incompleteness, you could take the theory PA + ~con(PA).  
That theory will lead to new theorem, which are false in the standard  
model, but arithmetical truth is defined using the standard model. Non  
standard models have some interest, but not for comp or for number  
theory; unless when use indirectly, to make some argument non valid.


Bruno

I recall that RA = Robinson arithmetic: it has the following axioms  
(on the top of predicate calculus):


0 ≠ s(x) (= 0 is not the successor of a number)
s(x) = s(y) -> x = y (different numbers have different successors)
x = 0 v Ey(x = s(y))(except for 0, all numbers have a predecessor)
x+0 = x  (if you add zero to a number, you get  
that number)
x+s(y) = s(x+y)  (if you add a number x to a successor of a number y,  
you get the successor of x added to y)

x*0=0   (if you multiply a number by 0, you get 0)
x*s(y)=(x*y)+x(exercise)

PA is RA + the induction axiom (on first order sentence).

DA is Dedekind Arithmetic: it is like PA, except you can throw out  
most axioms, as it has the very powerful second order full induction  
axioms (on all set of numbers). DA defines categorically the standard  
model, but is not an effective theory (you can't check all proofs, as  
the notion of set is too vague).


Bruno




Bruce

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http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: Notion of (mathematical) reason



On 09 Jun 2015, at 09:11, Bruce Kellett wrote:


Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 08 Jun 2015, at 15:13, Bruce Kellett wrote:

But comp is false, as has been demonstrated by many observations.

What?
Reference?
You mean the brain is not Turing emulable?
Strong AI, or the possibility that part or all of your brain can  
be emulated by a computer does not entail that consciousness is  
only a computation.

Consciousness is not a computation, when we assume computationalism.


So what is it then?


A mental, subjective, state. A first person view. Indeed the one at  
the base of all the others that we can be aware of.



Consciousness supervenes of the physical brain, and if that brain is  
replaced by a computer, then it supervenes on that physical  
computer. If consciousness is not a computation, does it merely  
supervene on a computation? Or is the whole theory hopelessly  
confused?


The theory is that a (generalized) brain is Turing emulable, at a  
level such that I remain conscious (and feel no difference by  
introspection).
You can say in that case that it "merely" supervene on the activity of  
the brain, but not necessarily on the physical activity of the brain,  
which can be shown arbitrarily variate. It is only contingently  
related to consciousness.











Nor does it entail that only computations can be conscious.
A computation cannot be conscious. Only a (first) person can be  
conscious.
It is a category error to believe that something 1p can be  
identified with some 3p thing.


So a physical person with a physical brain is not conscious?  
Consciousness is something that has intersubjective aspects -- we  
can all agree that x, y, and z are conscious. We do not have direct  
first-person experience of anyone's consciousness other than our  
own, but that does not mean that we cannot know that another person  
is conscious. To say otherwise is simple solipsism.


We cannot know as such, or for sure,, but this does not entail that e  
cannot know in the larger Theaetetus' sense indeed. We can believe  
that others are conscious, and they might be conscious. But then it is  
the person in Platonia which is conscious, not the one we see (in our  
indexical time) as this one is a construction of our brain: it does  
not exist "literally". That is counter-intuitive, but not more than SR.







In fact, it is quite difficult to come up with a definition of  
computation such that only computers and brains perform  
computations. The structure of a Turing machine can be emulated by  
a rock, for instance.
With toilet papers, and pebbles, yes. You still need to play the  
role of the processor. Now, a rock does not emulate an arbitrary  
turing machine.


Why not? If it can emulate a specific purpose Turning machine, it  
can emulate a universal Turing machine. I think Putnam's argument  
for unlimited pancomputationalism implies this.


I am not convince by that argument. Show me a rock program computing  
the prime numbers.








With comp, rock are not even object, but map of accessible  
continuations.
I expose only the mind body problem, and show that the machine's  
solution fits QM and neoplatonism. I don't defend any truth or  
religion, just the right to do those things with some rigor.


But computationalism does not even give any new insights into the  
nature of consciousness,


I think AUDA shows on the contrary a lot of new insight. We get a  
complete theory of qualia, and explanation of souls which fits with  
both QM and all neoplatonist researchers. In the seventies it  
predicted the rise of Artificial Intelligence and ... the possibility  
of quantum computing. It explains easily why physics is based on math,  
and it gives some light on the possible "after-life" etc.





much less give any useful results for physics.


No new one should be expected soon, but that was not the purpose at all.
You can't blame a coffee machine for not doing tea.


You can do things with all the rigour you want, but if you can't  
extract any useful results, you are wasting your time. Perhaps this  
is the irreconcilable difference between the physicist and the  
mathematician.


Yes, I am interested in a theory of "everything", which means to me  
mainly a theory which does not eliminate consciousness. I saw that  
physicists avoid the question, but a bridge is born between math and  
cognitive science, thanks to theoretical computer science (a branch of  
math).


I am not sure I see your point. Comp is not useless, comp is the  
actual theory of the materialists, and I show that contrary to a  
widespread belief: materialism and computationalism are incompatible  
(without adding non-comp magic).


Comp is not presented as a solution, but as a problem. In the second  
part, I show the propositional solution, but you need to understand  
the problem before. Actually, I think that you have seen the problem,  
but want to conclude to much quickly that comp is false. The math part  
shows that

Re: Pigeons offend Islam



On 09 Jun 2015, at 04:08, meekerdb wrote:

This is stupid on so many levels, even on the most basic factual  
one: You can't see the genitals of a pigeon.  They're covered by  
feathers.  You have to poke them to get them even expose their  
genitals.


They confused it with the "feet" of the pigeon, perhaps. I think they  
fear pigeons, because they can be used to send messages, even where  
there is no electricity. The germans have also forbid breeding  
pigeons, in my country, some time ago, as they were used by the  
resistance.


Bruno




Brent

On 6/8/2015 4:52 PM, LizR wrote:

Support for this is (ahem) dropping...

On 9 June 2015 at 07:35, spudboy100 via Everything List > wrote:

A Coo-Coo Fatwa

-Original Message-
From: John Clark 
To: everything-list 
Sent: Sat, Jun 6, 2015 12:15 pm
Subject: Pigeons offend Islam

ISIS recently banned pigeon breeding because when the birds fly  
overhead they expose theirgenitals and that  
is a sin against Islam. Violators will be publicly flogged.


http://rt.com/news/264673-isis-breeding-birds-islam/

 John K Clark



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Re: Notion of (mathematical) reason



On 09 Jun 2015, at 07:06, meekerdb wrote:





Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 08 Jun 2015, at 03:30, Bruce Kellett wrote:

Note that it is important to distinguish between structures that  
can be described mathematically and the structure of arithmetic or  
mathematics themselves.


Yes. Quite important. Even after the reversal, although physics is  
made purely arithmetical, it is only through machine's psychology  
and theology that this happens, and the science physics are  
explained to be different from the mathematical science. For  
example mathematical (arithmetical)  existence is some  
thing like ExP(x), but physical existence is [2]<2>Ex [2]<2>P(x).  
Physics remains untouched by comp., except it is put on logico- 
arithmetical grounds. What change is physicalism in metaphysics. It  
becomes testable, and false if comp is true.


That last seems incoherent.  If comp leaves physics untouched that  
implies that comp makes no difference to physics and so there can be  
no test of comp.


I meant, IF comp is true. Indeed, the test of comp is done by physics!  
If comp change the content of physics, and nature follows physics, it  
will be comp which has to be abandoned.




Instead you seem to imply that physicalism, a metaphysical  
hypothesis, is testable - but how if not via anempirical  
prediction?


It is via an empirical prediction. I was in the frame of supposing  
comp true. It does not change physics, guven that it is at the origin  
of physics (IF true)..





You say it is false if comp is true; but that's not a test.


I say that the idea that we need to assume a physical reality is false.


That's like the creationists who, when asked what evidence supports  
creationism, cite deficiencies in evolution.


?  (you lost me). I show that comp has testable consequence in the  
content of the physical theories, so let us do the test, or work  
toward it (like optimizing G*, the Z and X logics, etc.).


Bruno





Brent


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Re: Notion of (mathematical) reason



On 09 Jun 2015, at 02:15, LizR wrote:

What comp - or any theory of physics - has to show is that observers  
will experience the passage of time. SR for example posits a block  
universe, which at first sight might not seem to allow for us to  
experience time. But of course it does, even though the whole 4D  
structure is "already there" in some sense. Not because we "crawl up  
world-lines" as Weyl poetically put it, but because each moment  
along our world-line contains a capsule memory of earlier moments,  
but not later ones. (The later ones are just as "already there" as  
the earlier ones, according to the theory, but the laws of physics  
are structured in a way that means they aren't accessible.)


Similarly, comp needs to show that "observer moments" will contain  
memories of other observer moments, but only those that existed  
earlier in the sequences of computations that gave rise to the  
current moment. This isn't physical time, whatever that is, but it  
does involve that certain laws apply to computation.


None of this is known, or proven, of course, but the concept is well  
understood (as fro example in "October the First is too Late")


It is proved in the frame of comp, and we don't have there any problem  
with time and memory, as we get them easily from computer science. See  
the book of Matiyasevich to see how a diophantine number polynomial  
relation can simulate a conventional Turing machine. It can simulate a  
Von Neuman type of computer, with register memory, etc.


In my opinion, comp is the *only* satisfactory explanation of why the  
reality looks quantum, and why there is a difference between quanta  
and qualia. Physicists take the physical reality for granted, because  
their goal is to do physics; not cognitive science. Physics fails to  
explain the origin of matter, without assuming matter of course, and  
physics does not address the problem of consciousness, afterlife, etc.


The problem is only for the aristotelian believers who want a  
primitive matter, and physicalism. But, if they find a non-comp theory  
of mind, and if it works, why not. But such theory does not even exist  
today. So it might be premature. Let us test comp, and see. Up to now,  
we get starling quantization exactly where UDA shows them to be  
necessary. So comp is not only not yet refuted, but it really does  
seem to explain both consciousness and matter, and I don't know any  
theory which does that (without adding magic or fairy tales).


Bruno







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Re: Notion of (mathematical) reason



On 09 Jun 2015, at 07:24, Bruce Kellett wrote:


LizR wrote:
What comp - or any theory of physics - has to show is that  
observers will experience the passage of time. SR for example  
posits a block universe, which at first sight might not seem to  
allow for us to experience time. But of course it does, even though  
the whole 4D structure is "already there" in some sense.


The block universe idea is just a picturesque way of describing the  
way space and time are 'mixed up' (within the bounds of the light  
cone) by Lorentz transformations in special relativity. As I have  
said before, the important feature of the SR structure is that there  
is an absolute separation between spacelike and timelike surfaces or  
world lines. The subjective experience of time is not part of the  
relativistic model -- time is given by the behaviour of clocks, and  
specifically, clocks are physical systems that obey the laws of  
physics. The oscillations of certain defined transitions in the  
caesium atom are used to define the standard for physical time.


Not because we "crawl up world-lines" as Weyl poetically put it,  
but because each moment along our world-line contains a capsule  
memory of earlier moments, but not later ones.


The 'time capsule' idea is a recent proposal by Julian Barbour.  
Special relativity says nothing about such things. SR is, in fact,  
completely indifferent to the direction of time -- the equations are  
time symmetric.


(The later ones are just as "already there" as the earlier ones,  
according to the theory, but the laws of physics are structured in  
a way that means they aren't accessible.)
Similarly, comp needs to show that "observer moments" will contain  
memories of other observer moments, but only those that existed  
earlier in the sequences of computations that gave rise to the  
current moment. This isn't physical time, whatever that is, but it  
does involve that certain laws apply to computation.


Well, maybe comp can do this, but it seems to me that it is more  
important to extract the behaviour of caesium atoms (physical  
clocks). The 1p experience of time comes from the fact that we are  
physical creatures embedded in a physical world that has a well- 
defined concept of time, given in terms of dynamical physical  
processes. Either comp can give this, or comp is totally useless.



Comp is just the statement that there is no magic operating in the  
brain. If you have a different theory of mind, please give it to us.  
What, in the brain, would be not Turing emulable. Matter? Then we  
agree, but you need to abandon all known theory of matter, except the  
collapse of the wave, which does not make sense to me.
But my point was not more than that: comp entails a MWI, and we can  
test it by comparing it with the "MWI" of nature.




The 1p experience has to relate to intersubjective agreement (the 3p  
picture), or it cannot reproduce physics.


Of course.





None of this is known, or proven, of course, but the concept is  
well understood (as fro example in "October the First is too Late")


You should not get your physics from science fiction stories -- they  
are seldom a reliable source.


The validity of a reasoning does not depend on the paper on which it  
is written.


Bruno





Bruce

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Re: The scope of physical law and its relationship to the substitution level



On 09 Jun 2015, at 07:40, Bruce Kellett wrote:


LizR wrote:
On 9 June 2015 at 11:26, Bruce Kellett mailto:bhkell...@optusnet.com.au 
>> wrote:

   LizR wrote:
   Reality isn't defined by what everyone agrees on. What makes  
ZFC

   (or whatever) real, or not, is whether it kicks back. Is it
   something that was invented, and could equally well have been
   invented differently, or was it discovered as a result of
   following a chain of logical reasoning from certain axioms?
   Why do not those same arguments apply equally to arithmetic? What
   axioms led to arithmetic? Could one have chosen different axioms?
The arguments do apply. The point is that once the axioms are  
chosen, the results that follow are not a matter of choice.  
Arithmetical truths appear to take the form "if A, then  
(necessarily) B".
However, some of the elementary axioms (or even perhaps axions! :-)  
do appear to be demonstrated by nature - certain numerical  
quantities are (apparently) conserved in fundamental particle  
interactions, quantum fluctuations can only occur in ways that  
balance energy budgets, etc.


Yes, exactly. That is why I would say that arithmetic is invented as  
a codification of our experience of the physical world. If we had  
chosen a set of axioms that did not reproduce the results of simple  
addition -- add two pebbles to the two already there, to give four  
in total -- then we would have abandoned that set of axioms long  
ago. Axiom systems are evaluated in terms of their utility, nothing  
else. In more advanced mathematics, utility might be measured in  
terms of simplicity and fruitfulness for further applications. But  
in the beginning, as with arithmetic and simple geometry/ 
trigonometry and so on, utility is measured entirely in terms of the  
applicability to the experienced physical world, and of the utility  
of the system in helping us live in that world.


But that concerns the way human discovered arithmetic, not its  
fundamental or not status.
Anyway, comp makes no sense if we have doubt about 2+2=4, or about the  
less trivial fact that there are universal diophantine polynomials, or  
that all natural numbers can be written as the sum of four squared  
integers, etc.






So one could say that for anyone of a materialist persuasion, the  
assumptions of elementary arithmetic aren't unreasonable, at least  
(Bruno often mentions that comp only assumes some very simple  
arithmetical axioms - the existence of numbers and the correctness  
of addition and multiplication, I think)
So if you choose Peano arithmetic, then such-and-such follows,  
while if you choose modular arithmetic, something else follows. The  
"kicking back" part is simply the fact that the same result always  
follows from a given set of assumptions.


Given a set of axioms and some agreed rules of inference, the same  
results always follow, regardless of by whom or at what time the  
application is made. This is not what is usually referred to as  
"kicking back". Johnson did not apply some axioms and rules of  
inference in answer to the idealists, he kicked a stone.


But people can kicked stone in dreams too.






To put it a bit more dramatically, an alien being in a different  
galaxy, or even in another universe, would still get the same  
results. Nature is telling us that given A, we always get B.


Nature doesn't particularly tell us that. Rigorous application of  
the rules of inference to certain axioms tells us that. The physics  
might, after all, be different in a different universe, but using  
the same rules of inference on the same axioms will give the same  
result, regardless of the local physical laws.


Yes. Then with comp, physics is the same for all universal machine,  
and this can be proved in all (Turing complete) theories. Physics is  
made theory independent, except for assuming at least one universal  
system. Physics is very well grounded in arithmetic or Turing  
equivalent. It is made more solid that the extraoplation that we can  
do from observation. Of course comp might be wrong, and that is why it  
is nice that it becomes testable.


Bruno




Bruce

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Re: The scope of physical law and its relationship to the substitution level



On 09 Jun 2015, at 07:21, meekerdb wrote:


On 6/8/2015 7:30 PM, LizR wrote:

On 9 June 2015 at 14:00, meekerdb  wrote:
On 6/8/2015 4:16 PM, LizR wrote:

On 9 June 2015 at 05:31, meekerdb  wrote:
On 6/8/2015 1:03 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

or that maths exists independently of mathematicians.
That even just arithmetical truth is independent of  
mathematician. This is important because everyone agree with any  
axiomatic of the numbers, but that is not the case for analysis,  
real numbers, etc.
Everyone agrees on ZFC in the same sense.  So does that make set  
theory and its consequences real?


Reality isn't defined by what everyone agrees on.


Tell it to Bruno, I was just following him.

If it was then the religious majority throughout history would have  
been right.

What makes ZFC (or whatever) real, or not, is whether it kicks back.

Mathematics doesn't kick back - except metaphorically.

Are you claiming an alien in another galaxy wouldn't find that  
arithmetic works?


No.  Is that what you mean by "kicks back"?

I'm not making any metaphysical claims about the status of maths,  
merely saying that most mathematicians would, I think, agree that  
two people working independently can make the same mathematical  
discovery by different routes, and that some maths has real-world  
applications, and that  when it does, it works.


Arithmetic is a hard example to discuss because it is so simple and  
probably even hardwired into our thinking by evolution (crows can  
supposedly add and subtract up to six), but it's not really so  
inevitable as it seems. In order to count you have to discern  
distinct objects and group them in imagination into a whole: So you  
count the players on a college football team (U.S.) and you get  
105.  Then you count the number on the basketball team of the same  
school, 35, and you add them to the football team you get 140 - but  
that may well be wrong.  Of course you will say that's just a  
misapplication; but that's the point, that arithmetic is an  
abstraction that is invented to apply to certain cases and it is no  
more "out there" than other aspects of language.  I agree that it's  
hard to imagine an intelligent species that doesn't perceive  
discrete countable objects and didn't invent arithmetic to describe  
them; maybe some plasma being on the surface of the the Sun that  
thinks only in continua.


We need the natural number to just define computationalism, Church  
thesis, etc. Once you believe in different natural numbers, then you  
must explain them, and see if the existence of your notion is  
threatening comp, and how. If not, you can imagine anything to avoid  
any consequences of any theory.






(But I'm not sure how much kicking back you need from something,  
maybe being independently discoverable and working isn't enough?)
Is it something that was invented, and could equally well have  
been invented differently, or was it discovered as a result of  
following a chain of logical reasoning from certain axioms?
I'd say ZFC and arithmetic were both invented and then an  
axiomatization was invented for each of them.  I'm not sure what  
"invented differently" means?...getting to the same axiomatization  
by a different historical path?  Or inventing something similar,  
but not identical, as ZF is different from ZFC.


It means that two people starting from the same axioms and using  
the same system of logic came up with two different results (and  
neither made a mistake).


That would mean either the axiom system was inconsistent or there  
was a mistake in logic.  Note that Graham Priest has written several  
books on para-consistent logics, ones in which there can be  
contradictions but don't support ex falso quodlibet.


That can be useful in AI, and for natural language. But not in QED,  
string theory or theoretical computer science.


A rocket using water instead of hydrogen gas will not work. That does  
not refute that rockets can work.


Bruno




If within a given system A always leads to B, then it's reasonable  
to say B is discovered - like, for example, a certain endgame in  
chess leading to a particular set of possible conclusions.


?? At first reading I thought you meant A logically implies B, which  
means B is implicit in A. And so I thought the example was a chess  
endgame in which every move is forced (except resignation), A  
wouldbe the board position and B the sequence of endgame moves.   
But then you say B is a set of possible conclusions.  Since chess is  
a finite game the starting position already leads to a set of  
possible conclusions.


But if within a system A can lead to B, C, D etc then it's  
reasonable to say it's invented,


So does the fact that Peano arithmetic lead to many different  
theorems mean it's invented?  Does the fact that it's incomplete and  
can have infinitely many new axioms added to it mean it's invented?


I don't think your criterion for distinguishing invented

Re: The scope of physical law and its relationship to the substitution level



On 09 Jun 2015, at 04:10, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:




On Tuesday, June 9, 2015, LizR  wrote:
On 8 June 2015 at 16:22, Stathis Papaioannou   
wrote:
It seems here that you've snuck an extra assumption into comp1. We  
know that brains can be conscious, and we assume that computations  
can also be conscious. But that doesn't mean that only computations  
can be conscious, nor does it mean that brains are computations.  
These two latter statements might be true, but they are not  
necessarily true, even given computationalism.


I may not have phrased it very well, but comp1 is the assumption  
that consciousness is based on computation, and can't be created by  
anything else (at least that's comp1 in a simple form - actually, I  
believe it's the assumption that at some level physics is Turing  
emulable). On that basis, a brain must do computation (at some  
level), since it's conscious, and an AI could be conscious given the  
correct programme.


There are two good justifications for computationalism that I can  
think of. One is the evolutionary one: that consciousness produces  
no effects of its own, so must be a side-effect of intelligent  
behaviour. The other is Chalmers' fading qualia argument. Neither of  
these justifications make a case for computation *exclusively* being  
responsible for consciousness. That is an added assumption, and at  
least in the first instance seems unnecessary.


In science we use the axiom available, and here, comp loses its  
meaning if the survival is not supposed to be due to the computation.  
If not, even step one does no more follow. I might surivive with an  
artificial brain thanks to the Virgin Mary, but she might dislike the  
use of classical transportation, and so would not survive it. I sum  
this by the "qua computatio" condition. You can see it as linking the  
survival to only the computation. My definition of comp is already  
very weak, compared to most of thoise use in the literature. Without  
"qua computatio", comp becomes so weak that it becomes trivial.


Bruno



(And what's wrong with "sneaked" ?)

I was trying to be faintly amusing, but I see that "snuck" may have  
sneaked into the language:


 http://dictionary.reference.com/help/faq/language/g08.html

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Re: The scope of physical law and its relationship to the substitution level



On 09 Jun 2015, at 04:00, meekerdb wrote:


On 6/8/2015 4:16 PM, LizR wrote:

On 9 June 2015 at 05:31, meekerdb  wrote:
On 6/8/2015 1:03 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

or that maths exists independently of mathematicians.
That even just arithmetical truth is independent of mathematician.  
This is important because everyone agree with any axiomatic of the  
numbers, but that is not the case for analysis, real numbers, etc.
Everyone agrees on ZFC in the same sense.  So does that make set  
theory and its consequences real?


Reality isn't defined by what everyone agrees on.


Tell it to Bruno, I was just following him.


I don't define "reality" at all, but I do show that with comp,  
arithmetical truth is enough, ontologically.







What makes ZFC (or whatever) real, or not, is whether it kicks back.


Mathematics doesn't kick back - except metaphorically.


Well, then it is an open problem if physics kick back in any non  
metaphorical sense.
With computationalism, math kick back by leading mathematical entity  
toi believe in non mathematical kicking back stuff.







Is it something that was invented, and could equally well have been  
invented differently, or was it discovered as a result of following  
a chain of logical reasoning from certain axioms?


I'd say ZFC and arithmetic were both invented and then an  
axiomatization was invented for each of them.  I'm not sure what  
"invented differently" means?...getting to the same axiomatization  
by a different historical path?  Or inventing something similar, but  
not identical, as ZF is different from ZFC.


There is only one standard model of arithmetic. There are no well  
defined standard models of ZF. The notion is controversial.
You said all computations explain too much, which is NOT the case (it  
leads may be to a too much big problem). But set theory explains too  
much, and flatten the higher order notion too strongly.


Bruno








Brent

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Re: The scope of physical law and its relationship to the substitution level



On 09 Jun 2015, at 02:37, LizR wrote:

On 9 June 2015 at 11:26, Bruce Kellett   
wrote:

LizR wrote:
Reality isn't defined by what everyone agrees on. What makes ZFC (or  
whatever) real, or not, is whether it kicks back. Is it something  
that was invented, and could equally well have been invented  
differently, or was it discovered as a result of following a chain  
of logical reasoning from certain axioms?


Why do not those same arguments apply equally to arithmetic? What  
axioms led to arithmetic? Could one have chosen different axioms?


The arguments do apply. The point is that once the axioms are  
chosen, the results that follow are not a matter of choice.  
Arithmetical truths appear to take the form "if A, then  
(necessarily) B".


However, some of the elementary axioms (or even perhaps axions! :-)  
do appear to be demonstrated by nature - certain numerical  
quantities are (apparently) conserved in fundamental particle  
interactions, quantum fluctuations can only occur in ways that  
balance energy budgets, etc. So one could say that for anyone of a  
materialist persuasion, the assumptions of elementary arithmetic  
aren't unreasonable, at least (Bruno often mentions that comp only  
assumes some very simple arithmetical axioms - the existence of  
numbers and the correctness of addition and multiplication, I think)


So if you choose Peano arithmetic, then such-and-such follows, while  
if you choose modular arithmetic, something else follows. The  
"kicking back" part is simply the fact that the same result always  
follows from a given set of assumptions. To put it a bit more  
dramatically, an alien being in a different galaxy, or even in  
another universe, would still get the same results. Nature is  
telling us that given A, we always get B.



The difference is that for arithmetic (non modular arithmetic of the  
natural numbers), although there are many different axioms systems  
possible, either they have all the same theorems, or they are included  
in each other (one theory being just more powerful than another), but  
they all get the same theorems, when they get them. That is not true  
for set theory, where the theories can overlap, but also have  
different incompatible theorems.


For the comp TOE, we need only to assume a (Turing) universal theory:  
we get the same physics, the same consciousness, etc. The kicking back  
is done at the elementary finite combinatorial level. For set theory,  
you need transfinite induction, which is philosophically much more  
demanding.


Bruno








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Re: The scope of physical law and its relationship to the substitution level



On 09 Jun 2015, at 01:24, meekerdb wrote:


On 6/8/2015 4:13 PM, LizR wrote:

On 9 June 2015 at 05:29, meekerdb  wrote:
On 6/8/2015 1:03 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


Hmm Let us be precise. That the computation take place in  
arithmetic is a mathematical fact that nobody doubt today. UDA  
explains only that we cannot use a notion of primitive matter for  
making  "more real" some computations in place  
of others. It makes the physics supervening on "all computations  
in arithmetic".
But my computer does some computations and not others.  So there  
must be some sense in which some computations are real and others  
aren't.  Handwaving that they're all there in arithmetic proves too  
much.


I don't see that. Surely the problem is that it doesn't prove  
enough - assuming all computations exist (in some sense) in  
arithmetic, which I believe is "trivially" true to most  
mathematicians, how does this produce physics?


If you're going to use a comp style explanation, your computer  
isn't defining which computations are real, it's somehow being  
generated by all those abstract computations.


And all those abstract computations are also generating all possible  
instances of my computer computing all possible computations, plus  
many others which are not nomologically possible.  So when Bruno  
says we cannot "use a notion of primitive matter for making "more  
real" some computations in place of others" my question becomes,  
"Ok, what can we use, because some computations ARE more real than  
others."


Some computations are more real relatively to some computations. But,  
each computations, like each number relation is as much real than any  
others.


Bruno





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Re: The scope of physical law and its relationship to the substitution level



On 09 Jun 2015, at 00:21, LizR wrote:

On 8 June 2015 at 16:22, Stathis Papaioannou   
wrote:
It seems here that you've snuck an extra assumption into comp1. We  
know that brains can be conscious, and we assume that computations  
can also be conscious. But that doesn't mean that only computations  
can be conscious, nor does it mean that brains are computations.  
These two latter statements might be true, but they are not  
necessarily true, even given computationalism.


I may not have phrased it very well, but comp1 is the assumption  
that consciousness is based on computation, and can't be created by  
anything else (at least that's comp1 in a simple form - actually, I  
believe it's the assumption that at some level physics is Turing  
emulable).


At some level, the physics *required* for my consciousness will be.  
But comp predicts that physics is not Turing emulable. Physics is  
given by the FPI on the computations, and that is not computable (like  
the question: will i find up or down when looking at this  
superposition is also non computable).




On that basis, a brain must do computation (at some level), since  
it's conscious, and an AI could be conscious given the correct  
programme.


Yes, and more importantly, a recording is not conscious, as, if it is,  
you can no more say yes to a doctor for computation reason. If a  
recording can be conscious, why not a physical neuron? In thjat cse  
comp is false. We say "yes" to the doctor *qua computatio* (if not  
comp became spurious: we could say yes because we believe in the  
Virgin Mary power to resurrect us).


Bruno




(And what's wrong with "sneaked" ?)


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Re: Notion of (mathematical) reason



On 08 Jun 2015, at 19:45, meekerdb wrote:


On 6/8/2015 3:24 AM, Bruce Kellett wrote:

LizR wrote:
On 8 June 2015 at 13:30, Bruce Kellett mailto:bhkell...@optusnet.com.au 
>> wrote:


   If not, there is no possibility for a time variable in arithmetic
   per se, and consequently nothing can 'emerge' from arithmetic,  
since

   emergence is a temporal concept.
No it isn't, not in the sense being used here. The concept that is  
relevant in this case is ontological priority. If you think  
emergence is temporal then you will get very confused by  
discussions of the MUH (or even of how the universe arises as a 4D  
manifold from the laws of physics)


Which law of physics gives rise to the 4D manifold? It is my  
understanding that a 4D pseudo-Riemannian manifold was a basic  
postulate underlying general relativity -- if that hypothesis  
emerged from anything, then it came from the fact that space-time  
was observed to be a 4 dimensional structure. So the 4D manifold is  
not actually derived from anything other than observation.


Kant made the mistake of thinking that Euclidean space was a  
necessary law of thought. Observation proved him wrong. Maybe  
observation also proves the MUH wrong?


Observation can't prove anything wrong about a theory that says  
everything happens in some universe. ;-)


Everything (consistent) happens in the mind of some machines, but the  
laws are in the relative measure, provided notably by the logical  
intensional nuance brought by incompleteness.


Bruno





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Re: The scope of physical law and its relationship to the substitution level



On 08 Jun 2015, at 19:37, meekerdb wrote:


On 6/8/2015 1:24 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 08 Jun 2015, at 06:31, LizR wrote (to Brent)

Note that Bruno rejects the conditioning on "justified".  Plato's  
Theaetetus dialogue defines "knowledge" as "true belief".  I think  
that's a deficiency in modal logic insofar as it's supposed to  
formalize good informal reasoning.  But I can see why it's done;  
it's difficult if not impossible to give formal definition of  
"justified".


Yes.



See my answer to brent. The whole AUDA is made possible because we  
do have an excellent axiomatisation of justification.


It's an excellent axiomatization that relies on inference from  
axioms.  To say it formalizes good reasoning would mean that I would  
have to axiomatize vision before I could see anything.


It formalize any correct deduction that a system (like the guy talking  
with its digital doctors) can or cannot prove about itself in the 3p  
way.


We want to explain physics, and consciousness. We are not doing  
artificial intelligence. We try just to formulate the problem, and  
solve some part of it.


Bruno




Brent

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Re: The scope of physical law and its relationship to the substitution level



On 08 Jun 2015, at 19:31, meekerdb wrote:


On 6/8/2015 1:03 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

or that maths exists independently of mathematicians.


That even just arithmetical truth is independent of mathematician.  
This is important because everyone agree with any axiomatic of the  
numbers, but that is not the case for analysis, real numbers, etc.


Everyone agrees on ZFC in the same sense.


Not at all. There are many non isomorphic approach to set theory and  
analysis. For the natural numbers, this does not occur. All theories  
have a clear standard model on which we all agree. As Gödel saw, even  
intuitionist arithmetic is isomorphic to classical arithmetic: it  
changes only the vocabulary.






  So does that make set theory and its consequences real?


It is a theory which explain too much. It is interesting for  
logicians. Nobody use it, really. people refers to it when confronted  
with possible paradoxes, but mathematicians avoid the paradoxes  
naturally, and the "modern" one will use some category or elementary  
toposes to fix the thing.


Read books on the subject. Arithmetic has a solidity status not  
obtained by analysis, or even geometry.Some use ZF + ~AC, ZF + kappa,  
or other will use NF (a very different set theory), or intuitionist ZF  
(quite different from ZF), or NBG, etc.


Bruno




Brent

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Re: The scope of physical law and its relationship to the substitution level



On 08 Jun 2015, at 19:29, meekerdb wrote:


On 6/8/2015 1:03 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


Hmm Let us be precise. That the computation take place in  
arithmetic is a mathematical fact that nobody doubt today. UDA  
explains only that we cannot use a notion of primitive matter for  
making "more real" some computations in place of others. It makes  
the physics supervening on "all computations in arithmetic".


But my computer does some computations and not others.


Not just yours. Mine too, and all those existing in arithmetic do - 
some computations and not others.




So there must be some sense in which some computations are real and  
others aren't.


It is the indexical sense, like in a block universe.



Handwaving that they're all there in arithmetic proves too much.


This is not proposed as an explanation, but as a mathematical fact  
that we have to deal with. Then it is welcome as it explains, without  
using observation, why nature looks like the MWI. This predicts  
Everett QM, both intuitively (UDA) and formally (AUDA).


Bruno






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Re: The scope of physical law and its relationship to the substitution level



On 08 Jun 2015, at 19:27, meekerdb wrote:


On 6/8/2015 1:03 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Hence what I've called comp1 is the default materialist hypothesis  
(also known as the strong AI thesis, I think)


Comp1 is not comp, even if it is "comp" for a materialist: but that  
position is proved to be nonsense.


Comp is just "I am a digitalizable machine".
String AI is the thesis that machine can think (be conscious). It  
does not logically entail comp. Machine can think, but does not  
need to be the only thinking entities. Gods and goddesses might be  
able to think too.


But in saying "I am a digitalizable machine" you implicitly assume  
that machine exists in the environment that you exist in.


That is not a problem. In arithmetic I will exist in infinities of  
environments, played by UMs (with and without oracles). Such existence  
are relative, and phenomenological.




 It is this environment and your potential interaction with it that  
provides meaning to the "digital thoughts" of the machine.


I can agree with this. What does it change in the reasoning? The point  
is that your generalized brain, as long as it is digital, cannot  
singularize your soul. If you don't add non Turing emulable magic in  
matter, the argument shows that matter has to arise from a statistics  
on all computations going through the current state. If not, could you  
say precisely when the proof go wrong?


Bruno





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Re: The scope of physical law and its relationship to the substitution level

On 08 Jun 2015, at 18:40, John Clark wrote:

On Mon, Jun 8, 2015  Bruno Marchal  wrote:
>>> that is enough to conceive the set of the Gödel number of true  
sentences of arithmetic, and prove theorems about that set. That  
set can be defined in standard set theory

>> YOU CAN'T MAKE A COMPUTATION WITH A DEFINITION!

> I can do better.

You can't do better than a demonstration! Just make one calculation  
without using matter that obeys the laws of physics and you've won  
and this debate is over.

To make it physically is impossible, but I have already explain that  
it is not relevant. The point is that those computations exist in  
arithmetic, with the relevant redundancies and quantum quantization.
Your argument, if valid, would forbid any notion of block universe.  
You would ask show me a working clock capable of giveing me the time  
right now with a block universe. The solution is of course that time  
and space, here and now, are treated by the self-referential  
indexical. This has been explained, so you should quote the  
explanation if you don't grasp them.

> I can prove their existence in arithmetic.

Nobody denies that true statements exist in arithmetic,

But the I was not saying that. I was saying that "computations exist"  
is a true statement in the language of pure arithmetic, and that such  
statement are independent of the physical laws.

but the trouble is false ones do too, and the only way known to sort  
one from the other is to use matter that obeys the laws of physics  
to make a calculation.

We don't have to sort them. We have to separate them, and as you agree  
with the excluded middle problem, this is simple math.

> You forget to put yourself at the place of each continuators, and  
analyse their first person discourses.

And "you" forgot that when creating thought experiments designed to  
illuminate aspects of personal identity

I think that you have repeated this lie more than ten times. The  
personal identity aspect needed is in the definition of the 1p and 3p  
views given with the diaries. The thought experiements are used to  
explain that physics becomes a branch of machine theology, not to add  
anything that we don't know already on personal identity.

"you" can't talk about "yourself" and use personal pronouns in a  
casual willy nilly manner as "you" do in everyday life!

That is why I have introduced the key notion of 1p, 3p, 31p, in UDA,  
and that I tranbslate them with the intensional variants in the  
translation in arithmetic. That has been done, verified, and it works.  
Only you are using fuzzy pronouns here, in an argument easily refuted.  
You deny this, but nobody grasp why.

Bruno

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Re: Quran Audio



> On 9 Jun 2015, at 12:09 pm, Samiya Illias  wrote:
> 
> A good resource for listening to Quran Recitation in Arabic plus Translation 
> for anyone interested in listening to he Quran: 
> http://www.quranexplorer.com/quran/ 
> 
> Samiya 

YOU WISH

Kim

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Re: Notion of (mathematical) reason