date:20190914

In Sabine Hossenfelder's post on Sean Carroll's Many Worlds book

http://backreaction.blogspot.com/2019/09/book-review-something-deeply-hidden-by.html

someone raised conscious beings:

Martien  9:05 AM, September 12, 2019

One of the arguments of Philip Ball against the Many Worlds Interpretation 
is that he believes that the 'self' or 'soul' cannot branch of in different 
multiverses. This doesn't seem to be a good argument to me. Imagine one 
would be able to make a clone of me, kind of twin, in this world. Both 
versions of me would descent from me (Martien) and live on as Martien-a and 
Martien-b. An identicical history and memory upto a point in time, and 
hereafter they live their own lives. In principle the same could be argued 
for splittng universes. It is akin to speciation of life-forms. Maybe 
Ball's objection comes from a (religious) belief in a soul which can exist 
separate from a body, I don't know.

The link: 
https://www.quantamagazine.org/why-the-many-worlds-interpretation-of-quantum-mechanics-has-many-problems-20181018/

Philip Thrift  5:05 AM, September 13, 2019

Actually, Philip Ball's article seems to suggest that MWI leads to 
consciousness being either immaterial or nonexistent (it is some sort of 
illusion, or confusion).
...
"And if consciousness — or mind, call it what you will — were somehow able 
to snake along just one path in the quantum multiverse, then we’d have to 
regard it as some nonphysical entity immune to the laws of (quantum) 
physics. For how can it do that when nothing else does?"

But some of the scientific sort are (when one examines closely their 
"theory") what Galen Strawson calls* "consciousness deniers", so MWI may be 
a type of consciousness denial - the denial that there one has a real 
'self':
https://www.nybooks.com/daily/2018/03/13/the-consciousness-deniers/

Martien 10:18 AM, September 13, 2019

But why along just one path?

Philip Thrift 2:31 AM, September 14, 2019

Selves (unlike "basic" brains) are not considered (very much, if at all) by 
scientists as something to be part of scientific theories. So maybe there 
are (self-less) brains, being split every Planck-time second, and then each 
one independently going on doing what it does. But selves (self-full 
brains) doing that seems to me to create a nightmarish scenario of spit 
personalities.

Galen Strawson - What are Selves?
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qh0qASdSsNY

Martien  9:28 AM, September 14, 2019

Imagine God as creator of the multiverse having to send zillions copies of 
a deceased sinner to hell or purgatory, that is those who did nor repell 
their sins. Assuming of course that God and hell are not part of the 
splitting.

@philipthrift

On Saturday, September 14, 2019 at 5:43:33 PM UTC-5, stathisp wrote:
>
>
>
> On Sun, 15 Sep 2019 at 05:24, Philip Thrift  > wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> I really couldn't follow this paper - many worlds (of QM) vs. multiverse 
>> (of cosmology) seemed all mixed up.
>>
>
> The author essentially disagrees with the idea that a person can be 
> copied, whatever the mechanism.
>
> On Friday, September 13, 2019 at 9:45:10 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote:
>>>
>>> This should be of interest to the list: 
>>>
>>> Refuting Strong AI: Why Consciousness Cannot Be Algorithmic 
>>> Andrew Knight 
>>>
>>> Cite as:arXiv:1906.10177 [physics.hist-ph] 
>>>   (or arXiv:1906.10177v1 [physics.hist-ph] for this version) 
>>>
>>> Brent 
>>>
>>> --
>
>

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Re: Entropy of early universe

On Saturday, September 14, 2019 at 7:12:34 AM UTC-6, Alan Grayson wrote:
>
> If the early universe, say before the emergence of the CMBR, consisted of 
> a random collection of electrons and photons, wouldn't this correspond to a 
> *high*, not low entropy? Wouldn't it be analogous to gas with many 
> possible states? Yet cosmologists seem hard pressed to explain an initial 
> or early state assuming the entropy is low. AG
>

When I was an undergraduate I took a course in Classical Thermodynamics and 
recall being satisfied that entropy was well-defined. I never took a course 
in Classical Statistical Mechanics, but I've seen Boltzmann's equation for 
S and wonder how N, the number of possible states is defined. If we have a 
gas enclosed in a container, we can divide it into occupation cells of 
fixed volume to calcuate S. But why can't we double the number of cells by 
reducing their volume by half? How then is S well defined in the case of 
Classical Statistical Mechanics? TIA, AG

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Re: Another physicist in mental decline (Sean Carroll)



On Saturday, September 14, 2019 at 4:34:28 PM UTC-6, Jason wrote:
>
>
>
> On Sat, Sep 14, 2019 at 3:06 PM Alan Grayson  > wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On Saturday, September 14, 2019 at 7:46:27 AM UTC-6, Jason wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Sat, Sep 14, 2019, 4:36 AM Alan Grayson  wrote:
>>>


 On Saturday, September 14, 2019 at 12:34:18 AM UTC-6, Jason wrote:
>
>
>
> On Friday, September 13, 2019, Alan Grayson  
> wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On Friday, September 13, 2019 at 4:42:00 PM UTC-6, Jason wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Fri, Sep 13, 2019 at 8:25 AM Alan Grayson  
>>> wrote:
>>>


 On Friday, September 13, 2019 at 5:24:11 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal 
 wrote:
>
>
> On 13 Sep 2019, at 04:26, Alan Grayson  
> wrote:
>
>
>
> On Thursday, September 12, 2019 at 11:01:54 AM UTC-6, Alan Grayson 
> wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Thursday, September 12, 2019 at 7:45:22 AM UTC-6, Lawrence 
>> Crowell wrote:
>>>
>>> On Thursday, September 12, 2019 at 4:20:46 AM UTC-5, Philip 
>>> Thrift wrote:



 On Wednesday, September 11, 2019 at 11:45:41 PM UTC-5, Alan 
 Grayson wrote:
>
>
> https://www.wired.com/story/sean-carroll-thinks-we-all-exist-on-multiple-worlds/
>



 Many Worlds is where people go to escape from one world of 
 quantum-stochastic processes. They are like vampires, but instead 
 of 
 running away from sunbeams, are running away from probabilities.

 @philipthrift

>>>
>>> This assessment is not entirely fair. Carroll and Sebens have a 
>>> paper on how supposedly the Born rule can be derived from MWI  I 
>>> have yet 
>>> to read their paper, but given the newsiness of this I might get to 
>>> it. One 
>>> advantage that MWI does have is that it splits the world as a sort 
>>> of 
>>> quantum frame dragging that is nonlocal. This nonlocal property 
>>> might be 
>>> useful for working with quantum gravity,
>>>
>>> I worked a proof of a theorem, which may not be complete 
>>> unfortunately, where the two sets of quantum interpretations that 
>>> are ψ-epistemic and those that are ψ-ontological are not decidable. 
>>> There 
>>> is no decision procedure which can prove QM holds either way. The 
>>> proof is 
>>> set with nonlocal hidden variables over the projective rays of the 
>>> state 
>>> space. In effect there is an uncertainty in whether the hidden 
>>> variables 
>>> localize extant quantities, say with ψ-ontology, or whether 
>>> this localization is the generation of information in a local 
>>> context from 
>>> quantum nonlocality that is not extant, such as with 
>>> ψ-epistemology. Quantum interprertations are then auxiliary 
>>> physical axioms or postulates. MWI and within the framework of what 
>>> Carrol 
>>> and Sebens has done this is a ψ-ontology, and this defines the 
>>> Born rule. If I am right the degree of ψ-epistemontic nature is 
>>> mixed. So the intriguing question we can address is the nature of 
>>> the Born 
>>> rule and its tie into the auxiliary postulates of quantum 
>>> interpretations. 
>>> Can a similar demonstration be made for the Born rule within 
>>> QuBism, which 
>>> is what might be called the dialectic opposite of MWI?
>>>
>>> To take MWI as something literal, as opposed to maybe a working 
>>> system to understand QM foundations, is maybe taking things too 
>>> far. 
>>> However, it is a part of some open questions concerning the 
>>> fundamentals of 
>>> QM. If MWI, and more generally postulates of quantum 
>>> interpretations, are connected to the Born rule it makes for some 
>>> interesting things to think about.
>>>
>>> LC
>>>
>>
>> If you read the link, it's pretty obvious that Carroll believes 
>> the many worlds of the MWI, literally exist. AG 
>>
>
> Carroll also believes that IF the universe is infinite, then there 
> must exist exact copies of universes and ourselves. This is 
> frequently 
> claimed by the MWI true believers, but never, AFAICT, proven, or even 
> plausibly argued.  
>
>
> The idea comes from Tegmark, and I agree with you, it necessitate 
> more than an infinite universe. It requires also some assumption of

Re: Another physicist in mental decline (Sean Carroll)



On Saturday, September 14, 2019 at 3:03:38 PM UTC-6, John Clark wrote:
>
> On Sat, Sep 14, 2019 at 9:33 AM Alan Grayson  > wrote:
>
> >> There is no reason to think physics needs all the real numbers and 
>>> considerable evidence to think it does not. To my mind the strongest 
>>> evidence is that a physical Turing Machine is incapable of even 
>>> approximating most real numbers, I happened to have posted a proof of this 
>>> yesterday on the "Observation versus assumption" thread.
>>>

>> *> Physics doesn't need all the real numbers, just some of them, say any 
>> continuous range of any variable; like the mass of the electron.*
>>
>
> The electron doesn't have a continuous range of mass. 
>

Sure, in OUR universe, but it might be a continuous variable when other 
universes are created. That was my conjecture, and it need not be mass, but 
other properties of other variables. AG
 

> And mass is the force on a object divided by its acceleration, but 
> acceleration 
> is the change in speed per unit of time and speed is the change in 
> positional distance per unit of time, so if neither time or space is 
> continuous then mass can't be either. 
>

Space and time could be continuous. Just because there's a lower limit on 
what we can measure, doesn't guarantee any inherent graininess. AG 

>
> > *Einstein's field equations use PI, and so do Maxwell's equations. *
>
>
> Physics theories may need PI but physics itself probably doesn't. PI has 
> been calculated to 31 trillion digits and even that is only an 
> approximation, but only 8 or 9 digits are needed to explain every physical 
> observation ever made, and the same thing is true for e.
>
> John K Clark
>

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Re: A modest proposal

2019-09-14 Thread 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List

On 9/14/2019 1:27 PM, John Clark wrote:
On Sat, Sep 14, 2019 at 7:28 AM Lawrence Crowell
> wrote:

> t/hat classical probability for a winning ticket is determined by
some quantum superposition of states that give a probability for a
ticket to be printed with some set of numbers, or for some
probability of tickets being distributed in some way./

The Schrodinger wave equation says the ticket is printed in every
possible way and the winning number is picked in every possible way,

It predicts that at some point well before the number is picked, at time
at which quantum level effects can be amplified to different ball
selections. That would not be the case nano-seconds before the pick, or
milliseconds before, and maybe not hours before.

but that's not all you yourself are also a quantum object so you
interact with the ticket in every possible way.

Only if you and the powerball are not influenced by that the same random
quantum events that got amplified to determine the ball AND to determine
your choice of number.

Some interactions result in great wealth, some result in no profit,
and some result in oblivion as in the suicide scenario.

/> In performing this quantum suicide experiment one is forcing
the situation in something similar to a Wheeler delayed choice
experiment./

I don't see the analogy at all. Regardless of if you perform the
quantum suicide experiment or not every possible lottery ticket was
printed, and you bought every possible lottery ticket, and
every possible number was picked as the winning number. The past is
not changed but the future is changed depending on if you performed
the experiment, if you do then in the future there is no universe in
the multiverse where you're looking at a losing ticket, if you don't
do the experiment then there is; but the past is the same in both cases.

So the multiverse contains 2 very general types of "you", universes
where you decide to do the experiment and always end up looking at a
winning ticket (a universe for every possible winning number),
and universes where you decide not to do the experiment and always end
up looking at numbers most of which are losing numbers. But in either
case I don't see why backward causality is needed.

> /with this suicide experiment there is a quantum outcome prior to
the final experimental end that demolishes the appearance of
superposition. How is that localized? /

By just looking at the lottery ticket. Normally there would be far
more versions of you looking at a losing ticket than a winning one,
but in the suicide experiment there are not as many versions of you
but all of them are looking at a winning ticket.

I can think of an interesting variation on the suicide experiment. I
decide to do it but I offer you a side bet and give you a thousand to
one odds that I have the winning ticket; if my ticket loses I will
give you a thousand dollars if I win you only have to give me one
dollar. The logical thing for both of us is to make the bet (if we
make the big assumption that Many Worlds is true), you calculate that
there is only one chance in 80 million of me winning so you know you
are almost certain to win a thousand dollars, and I calculate I will
win an additional dollar with absolute certainty to go with my vast
lottery winnings. Yes in most universes my estate will owe you a
thousand dollars but I no longer exist in them so I have no use for
that money. It's a win win bet.

But as Mallah points out, all you are doing is pruning those of your
future lives in which you don't win the lottery. That's rational if
your life has negative net value in those branches, but it's not
increasing the value of the branches in which you do win the lottery.

Brent

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Re: A modest proposal

On Saturday, September 14, 2019 at 3:27:41 PM UTC-5, John Clark wrote:
>
> On Sat, Sep 14, 2019 at 7:28 AM Lawrence Crowell  > wrote:
>
> > t*hat classical probability for a winning ticket is determined by some 
>> quantum superposition of states that give a probability for a ticket to be 
>> printed with some set of numbers, or for some probability of tickets being 
>> distributed in some way.*
>>
>
> The Schrodinger wave equation says the ticket is printed in every possible 
> way and the winning number is picked in every possible way, but that's not 
> all you yourself are also a quantum object so you interact with the ticket 
> in every possible way. Some interactions result in great wealth, some 
> result in no profit, and some result in oblivion as in the suicide scenario
> .
>

The Schödinger equation says nothing of the sort. It is not a Charlie 
Parker "anything goes" system. It just tells how probability amplitudes 
that define a state or wave in a Fourier sum evolves with time. With large 
scale systems there are massive levels of decoherence and ensuing 
entanglement shifts. It would be argued there are some MWI splittings that 
may play a role in determining the lottery number on the winning ticket, 
but there is no way this can at all be localized or identified.

As for below the Wheeler Delayed Choice experiment in the MWI setting a 
measurement of whether the electron went through a slit is performed after 
it has passed. This would mean that a measurement at time T sets whether 
the electron was in a slit at time t < T. We can say the measurement is 
localized at time T, but in MWI we have to say the splitting of the world 
wave function began at t. 

This quantum suicide experiment might be argued to do something similar. If 
I choose to go through with it I then select a world path I observe at a 
time after the actual splitting happens. This leads to an ambiguity over 
where one defines the localization of states in a measurement. The 
advantage of MWI is that it is not local and this nonlocality may work well 
in quantum gravity.

LC
 

>
>  
>
>> * > In performing this quantum suicide experiment one is forcing the 
>> situation in something similar to a Wheeler delayed choice experiment.*
>>
>
> I don't see the analogy at all. Regardless of if you perform the quantum 
> suicide experiment or not every possible lottery ticket was printed, and 
> you bought every possible lottery ticket, and every possible number was 
> picked as the winning number. The past is not changed but the future is 
> changed depending on if you performed the experiment, if you do then in the 
> future there is no universe in the multiverse where you're looking at a 
> losing ticket, if you don't do the experiment then there is; but the past 
> is the same in both cases. 
>
> So the multiverse contains 2 very general types of "you", universes where 
> you decide to do the experiment and always end up looking at a winning 
> ticket (a universe for every possible winning number), and universes where 
> you decide not to do the experiment and always end up looking at numbers 
> most of which are losing numbers. But in either case I don't see why backward 
> causality is needed.
>
> > *with this suicide experiment there is a quantum outcome prior to the 
>> final experimental end that demolishes the appearance of superposition. How 
>> is that localized?  *
>>
>
> By just looking at the lottery ticket. Normally there would be far more 
> versions of you looking at a losing ticket than a winning one, but in the 
> suicide experiment there are not as many versions of you but all of them 
> are looking at a winning ticket. 
>
> I can think of an interesting variation on the suicide experiment. I 
> decide to do it but I offer you a side bet and give you a thousand to one 
> odds that I have the winning ticket; if my ticket loses I will give you a 
> thousand dollars if I win you only have to give me one dollar. The logical 
> thing for both of us is to make the bet (if we make the big assumption that 
> Many Worlds is true), you calculate that there is only one chance in 80 
> million of me winning so you know you are almost certain to win a thousand 
> dollars, and I calculate I will win an additional dollar with 
> absolute certainty to go with my vast lottery winnings. Yes in most 
> universes my estate will owe you a thousand dollars but I no longer exist 
> in them so I have no use for that money. It's a win win bet.
>
>  John K Clark
>
>

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Re: Why Consciousness Cannot Be Algorithmic

2019-09-14 Thread Stathis Papaioannou

On Sun, 15 Sep 2019 at 05:24, Philip Thrift  wrote:

>
>
> I really couldn't follow this paper - many worlds (of QM) vs. multiverse
> (of cosmology) seemed all mixed up.
>

The author essentially disagrees with the idea that a person can be copied,
whatever the mechanism.

On Friday, September 13, 2019 at 9:45:10 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote:
>>
>> This should be of interest to the list:
>>
>> Refuting Strong AI: Why Consciousness Cannot Be Algorithmic
>> Andrew Knight
>> (Submitted on 11 Jun 2019)
>> While physicalism requires only that a conscious state depends entirely
>> on an underlying physical state, it is often assumed that consciousness
>> is algorithmic and that conscious states can be copied, such as by
>> copying or digitizing the human brain. In an effort to further elucidate
>> the physical nature of consciousness, I challenge these assumptions and
>> attempt to prove the Single Stream of Consciousness Theorem (SSCT): that
>> a conscious entity cannot experience more than one stream of
>> consciousness from a given conscious state. Assuming only that
>> consciousness is a purely physical phenomenon, it is shown that both
>> Special Relativity and Multiverse theory independently imply SSCT and
>> that the Many Worlds Interpretation of quantum mechanics is inadequate
>> to counter it. Then, SSCT is shown to be incompatible with Strong
>> Artificial Intelligence, implying that consciousness cannot be created
>> or simulated by a computer. Finally, SSCT is shown to imply that a
>> conscious state cannot be physically reset to an earlier conscious state
>> nor can it be duplicated by any physical means. The profound but
>> counterintuitive implications of these conclusions are briefly discussed.
>> Subjects:History and Philosophy of Physics (physics.hist-ph);
>> Artificial Intelligence (cs.AI)
>> Cite as:arXiv:1906.10177 [physics.hist-ph]
>>   (or arXiv:1906.10177v1 [physics.hist-ph] for this version)
>>
>> Brent
>>
>> --
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> .
>
-- 
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Re: Another physicist in mental decline (Sean Carroll)

On Sat, Sep 14, 2019 at 3:06 PM Alan Grayson  wrote:

>
>
> On Saturday, September 14, 2019 at 7:46:27 AM UTC-6, Jason wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Sat, Sep 14, 2019, 4:36 AM Alan Grayson  wrote:
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Saturday, September 14, 2019 at 12:34:18 AM UTC-6, Jason wrote:



 On Friday, September 13, 2019, Alan Grayson 
 wrote:

>
>
> On Friday, September 13, 2019 at 4:42:00 PM UTC-6, Jason wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Fri, Sep 13, 2019 at 8:25 AM Alan Grayson 
>> wrote:
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Friday, September 13, 2019 at 5:24:11 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal
>>> wrote:


 On 13 Sep 2019, at 04:26, Alan Grayson  wrote:



 On Thursday, September 12, 2019 at 11:01:54 AM UTC-6, Alan Grayson
 wrote:
>
>
>
> On Thursday, September 12, 2019 at 7:45:22 AM UTC-6, Lawrence
> Crowell wrote:
>>
>> On Thursday, September 12, 2019 at 4:20:46 AM UTC-5, Philip
>> Thrift wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Wednesday, September 11, 2019 at 11:45:41 PM UTC-5, Alan
>>> Grayson wrote:


 https://www.wired.com/story/sean-carroll-thinks-we-all-exist-on-multiple-worlds/

>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Many Worlds is where people go to escape from one world of
>>> quantum-stochastic processes. They are like vampires, but instead of
>>> running away from sunbeams, are running away from probabilities.
>>>
>>> @philipthrift
>>>
>>
>> This assessment is not entirely fair. Carroll and Sebens have a
>> paper on how supposedly the Born rule can be derived from MWI  I 
>> have yet
>> to read their paper, but given the newsiness of this I might get to 
>> it. One
>> advantage that MWI does have is that it splits the world as a sort of
>> quantum frame dragging that is nonlocal. This nonlocal property 
>> might be
>> useful for working with quantum gravity,
>>
>> I worked a proof of a theorem, which may not be complete
>> unfortunately, where the two sets of quantum interpretations that
>> are ψ-epistemic and those that are ψ-ontological are not decidable. 
>> There
>> is no decision procedure which can prove QM holds either way. The 
>> proof is
>> set with nonlocal hidden variables over the projective rays of the 
>> state
>> space. In effect there is an uncertainty in whether the hidden 
>> variables
>> localize extant quantities, say with ψ-ontology, or whether this
>> localization is the generation of information in a local context from
>> quantum nonlocality that is not extant, such as with
>> ψ-epistemology. Quantum interprertations are then auxiliary
>> physical axioms or postulates. MWI and within the framework of what 
>> Carrol
>> and Sebens has done this is a ψ-ontology, and this defines the
>> Born rule. If I am right the degree of ψ-epistemontic nature is
>> mixed. So the intriguing question we can address is the nature of 
>> the Born
>> rule and its tie into the auxiliary postulates of quantum 
>> interpretations.
>> Can a similar demonstration be made for the Born rule within QuBism, 
>> which
>> is what might be called the dialectic opposite of MWI?
>>
>> To take MWI as something literal, as opposed to maybe a working
>> system to understand QM foundations, is maybe taking things too far.
>> However, it is a part of some open questions concerning the 
>> fundamentals of
>> QM. If MWI, and more generally postulates of quantum
>> interpretations, are connected to the Born rule it makes for some
>> interesting things to think about.
>>
>> LC
>>
>
> If you read the link, it's pretty obvious that Carroll believes
> the many worlds of the MWI, literally exist. AG
>

 Carroll also believes that IF the universe is infinite, then there
 must exist exact copies of universes and ourselves. This is frequently
 claimed by the MWI true believers, but never, AFAICT, proven, or even
 plausibly argued.


 The idea comes from Tegmark, and I agree with you, it necessitate
 more than an infinite universe. It requires also some assumption of
 homogeneity.

>>>
>>> Our universe is, on a large scale, homogeneous. But it can't be
>>> infinite since it has only been expanding for finite time, 13.8 BY. I 
>>> had a
>>> discussion with Brent about this some time ago, and he claimed finite in
>>> time doesn't preclude

Re: Another physicist in mental decline (Sean Carroll)

On Sat, Sep 14, 2019 at 9:33 AM Alan Grayson  wrote:

>> There is no reason to think physics needs all the real numbers and
>> considerable evidence to think it does not. To my mind the strongest
>> evidence is that a physical Turing Machine is incapable of even
>> approximating most real numbers, I happened to have posted a proof of this
>> yesterday on the "Observation versus assumption" thread.
>>
>>>
> *> Physics doesn't need all the real numbers, just some of them, say any
> continuous range of any variable; like the mass of the electron.*
>

The electron doesn't have a continuous range of mass. And mass is the force
on a object divided by its acceleration, but acceleration is the change in
speed per unit of time and speed is the change in positional distance per
unit of time, so if neither time or space is continuous then mass can't be
either.

> *Einstein's field equations use PI, and so do Maxwell's equations. *

Physics theories may need PI but physics itself probably doesn't. PI has
been calculated to 31 trillion digits and even that is only an
approximation, but only 8 or 9 digits are needed to explain every physical
observation ever made, and the same thing is true for e.

John K Clark

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Re: A modest proposal

On Sat, Sep 14, 2019 at 7:28 AM Lawrence Crowell <
goldenfieldquaterni...@gmail.com> wrote:

> t*hat classical probability for a winning ticket is determined by some
> quantum superposition of states that give a probability for a ticket to be
> printed with some set of numbers, or for some probability of tickets being
> distributed in some way.*
>

The Schrodinger wave equation says the ticket is printed in every possible
way and the winning number is picked in every possible way, but that's not
all you yourself are also a quantum object so you interact with the ticket
in every possible way. Some interactions result in great wealth, some
result in no profit, and some result in oblivion as in the suicide scenario.

> * > In performing this quantum suicide experiment one is forcing the
> situation in something similar to a Wheeler delayed choice experiment.*
>

I don't see the analogy at all. Regardless of if you perform the quantum
suicide experiment or not every possible lottery ticket was printed, and
you bought every possible lottery ticket, and every possible number was
picked as the winning number. The past is not changed but the future is
changed depending on if you performed the experiment, if you do then in the
future there is no universe in the multiverse where you're looking at a
losing ticket, if you don't do the experiment then there is; but the past
is the same in both cases.

So the multiverse contains 2 very general types of "you", universes where
you decide to do the experiment and always end up looking at a winning
ticket (a universe for every possible winning number), and universes where
you decide not to do the experiment and always end up looking at numbers
most of which are losing numbers. But in either case I don't see why backward
causality is needed.

> *with this suicide experiment there is a quantum outcome prior to the
> final experimental end that demolishes the appearance of superposition. How
> is that localized?  *
>

By just looking at the lottery ticket. Normally there would be far more
versions of you looking at a losing ticket than a winning one, but in the
suicide experiment there are not as many versions of you but all of them
are looking at a winning ticket.

I can think of an interesting variation on the suicide experiment. I decide
to do it but I offer you a side bet and give you a thousand to one odds
that I have the winning ticket; if my ticket loses I will give you a
thousand dollars if I win you only have to give me one dollar. The logical
thing for both of us is to make the bet (if we make the big assumption that
Many Worlds is true), you calculate that there is only one chance in 80
million of me winning so you know you are almost certain to win a thousand
dollars, and I calculate I will win an additional dollar with
absolute certainty to go with my vast lottery winnings. Yes in most
universes my estate will owe you a thousand dollars but I no longer exist
in them so I have no use for that money. It's a win win bet.

 John K Clark

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Re: Another physicist in mental decline (Sean Carroll)



On Saturday, September 14, 2019 at 7:18:40 AM UTC-6, John Clark wrote:
>
> On Fri, Sep 13, 2019 at 11:22 PM Alan Grayson  > wrote:
>
> *> What I think you're missing (and Tegmark) is the possibility of 
>> UNcountable universes. In such case, one could imagine new universes coming 
>> into existence forever and ever, without any repeats.  Think of the number 
>> of points between 0 and 1 on the real line, each point associated with a 
>> different universe. AG*
>>
>
> There is no reason to think physics needs all the real numbers and 
> considerable evidence to think it does not. 
>

Einstein's field equations use PI, and so do Maxwell's equations. And I 
think some of the laws of physics use the natural logarithm. As I 
previously postulated, all one needs is some *continuous* range of some 
variable to determine new universes in which no copies emerge. I find the 
hypothesis of infinite copies of anything highly repugant, like the MWI, 
which I don't claim is a proof of anything. But a univere with zero copies 
seem more elegant than the opposite. AG
 

> To my mind the strongest evidence is that a physical Turing Machine is 
> incapable of even approximating most real numbers, I happened to have 
> posted a proof of this yesterday on the "Observation versus assumption" 
> thread.
>
> Actually, physics might not even need all the rational numbers as there is 
> probably a grainy structure to both space and time. Distances can't get 
> smaller than the Planck Length and time shorter than the Planck Time. Maybe.
>  
>
>> >> true regardless of if the Many Worlds Interpretation of Quantum 
>>> Mechanics is correct or not, it only depends on the universe being 
>>> spatially infinite.
>>>
>>
>> *> But our universe is NOT spatially infinite if its been expanding for 
>> finite time,*
>>
>
> Sure it can, space could have started out infinitely large 13.8 billion 
> years ago and still be expanding today, it could even be accelerating. The 
> radius of the observable universe is 45.5 billion light years ( the light 
> from the most distant galaxies took 13.8 billion years to reach us but 
> during that time the galaxies have been accelerating away from us) but that 
> doesn't mean there aren't galaxies much more distant than 45.5 billion 
> light years.
>
>  John K Clark
>

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Re: Another physicist in mental decline (Sean Carroll)



On Saturday, September 14, 2019 at 7:46:27 AM UTC-6, Jason wrote:
>
>
>
> On Sat, Sep 14, 2019, 4:36 AM Alan Grayson  > wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On Saturday, September 14, 2019 at 12:34:18 AM UTC-6, Jason wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Friday, September 13, 2019, Alan Grayson  wrote:
>>>


 On Friday, September 13, 2019 at 4:42:00 PM UTC-6, Jason wrote:
>
>
>
> On Fri, Sep 13, 2019 at 8:25 AM Alan Grayson  
> wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On Friday, September 13, 2019 at 5:24:11 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal 
>> wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> On 13 Sep 2019, at 04:26, Alan Grayson  wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Thursday, September 12, 2019 at 11:01:54 AM UTC-6, Alan Grayson 
>>> wrote:



 On Thursday, September 12, 2019 at 7:45:22 AM UTC-6, Lawrence 
 Crowell wrote:
>
> On Thursday, September 12, 2019 at 4:20:46 AM UTC-5, Philip Thrift 
> wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Wednesday, September 11, 2019 at 11:45:41 PM UTC-5, Alan 
>> Grayson wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> https://www.wired.com/story/sean-carroll-thinks-we-all-exist-on-multiple-worlds/
>>>
>>
>>
>>
>> Many Worlds is where people go to escape from one world of 
>> quantum-stochastic processes. They are like vampires, but instead of 
>> running away from sunbeams, are running away from probabilities.
>>
>> @philipthrift
>>
>
> This assessment is not entirely fair. Carroll and Sebens have a 
> paper on how supposedly the Born rule can be derived from MWI  I have 
> yet 
> to read their paper, but given the newsiness of this I might get to 
> it. One 
> advantage that MWI does have is that it splits the world as a sort of 
> quantum frame dragging that is nonlocal. This nonlocal property might 
> be 
> useful for working with quantum gravity,
>
> I worked a proof of a theorem, which may not be complete 
> unfortunately, where the two sets of quantum interpretations that 
> are ψ-epistemic and those that are ψ-ontological are not decidable. 
> There 
> is no decision procedure which can prove QM holds either way. The 
> proof is 
> set with nonlocal hidden variables over the projective rays of the 
> state 
> space. In effect there is an uncertainty in whether the hidden 
> variables 
> localize extant quantities, say with ψ-ontology, or whether this 
> localization is the generation of information in a local context from 
> quantum nonlocality that is not extant, such as with 
> ψ-epistemology. Quantum interprertations are then auxiliary 
> physical axioms or postulates. MWI and within the framework of what 
> Carrol 
> and Sebens has done this is a ψ-ontology, and this defines the 
> Born rule. If I am right the degree of ψ-epistemontic nature is 
> mixed. So the intriguing question we can address is the nature of the 
> Born 
> rule and its tie into the auxiliary postulates of quantum 
> interpretations. 
> Can a similar demonstration be made for the Born rule within QuBism, 
> which 
> is what might be called the dialectic opposite of MWI?
>
> To take MWI as something literal, as opposed to maybe a working 
> system to understand QM foundations, is maybe taking things too far. 
> However, it is a part of some open questions concerning the 
> fundamentals of 
> QM. If MWI, and more generally postulates of quantum 
> interpretations, are connected to the Born rule it makes for some 
> interesting things to think about.
>
> LC
>

 If you read the link, it's pretty obvious that Carroll believes the 
 many worlds of the MWI, literally exist. AG 

>>>
>>> Carroll also believes that IF the universe is infinite, then there 
>>> must exist exact copies of universes and ourselves. This is frequently 
>>> claimed by the MWI true believers, but never, AFAICT, proven, or even 
>>> plausibly argued.  
>>>
>>>
>>> The idea comes from Tegmark, and I agree with you, it necessitate 
>>> more than an infinite universe. It requires also some assumption of 
>>> homogeneity.
>>>
>>
>> Our universe is, on a large scale, homogeneous. But it can't be 
>> infinite since it has only been expanding for finite time, 13.8 BY. I 
>> had a 
>> discussion with Brent about this some time ago, and he claimed finite in 
>> time doesn't preclude infinite in space. I strongly disagree. Perhaps I 
>> am 
>> missing something. Wouldn't be the first time. AG 
>>
>
> I think

Re: Another physicist in mental decline (Sean Carroll)



On Saturday, September 14, 2019 at 11:19:47 AM UTC-6, stathisp wrote:
>
>
>
> On Sat, 14 Sep 2019 at 22:57, Jason Resch  > wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On Sat, Sep 14, 2019, 2:44 AM Alan Grayson > > wrote:
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Saturday, September 14, 2019 at 12:34:18 AM UTC-6, Jason wrote:



 On Friday, September 13, 2019, Alan Grayson  
 wrote:

>
>
> On Friday, September 13, 2019 at 4:42:00 PM UTC-6, Jason wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Fri, Sep 13, 2019 at 8:25 AM Alan Grayson  
>> wrote:
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Friday, September 13, 2019 at 5:24:11 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal 
>>> wrote:


 On 13 Sep 2019, at 04:26, Alan Grayson  wrote:



 On Thursday, September 12, 2019 at 11:01:54 AM UTC-6, Alan Grayson 
 wrote:
>
>
>
> On Thursday, September 12, 2019 at 7:45:22 AM UTC-6, Lawrence 
> Crowell wrote:
>>
>> On Thursday, September 12, 2019 at 4:20:46 AM UTC-5, Philip 
>> Thrift wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Wednesday, September 11, 2019 at 11:45:41 PM UTC-5, Alan 
>>> Grayson wrote:


 https://www.wired.com/story/sean-carroll-thinks-we-all-exist-on-multiple-worlds/

>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Many Worlds is where people go to escape from one world of 
>>> quantum-stochastic processes. They are like vampires, but instead 
>>> of 
>>> running away from sunbeams, are running away from probabilities.
>>>
>>> @philipthrift
>>>
>>
>> This assessment is not entirely fair. Carroll and Sebens have a 
>> paper on how supposedly the Born rule can be derived from MWI  I 
>> have yet 
>> to read their paper, but given the newsiness of this I might get to 
>> it. One 
>> advantage that MWI does have is that it splits the world as a sort 
>> of 
>> quantum frame dragging that is nonlocal. This nonlocal property 
>> might be 
>> useful for working with quantum gravity,
>>
>> I worked a proof of a theorem, which may not be complete 
>> unfortunately, where the two sets of quantum interpretations that 
>> are ψ-epistemic and those that are ψ-ontological are not decidable. 
>> There 
>> is no decision procedure which can prove QM holds either way. The 
>> proof is 
>> set with nonlocal hidden variables over the projective rays of the 
>> state 
>> space. In effect there is an uncertainty in whether the hidden 
>> variables 
>> localize extant quantities, say with ψ-ontology, or whether this 
>> localization is the generation of information in a local context 
>> from 
>> quantum nonlocality that is not extant, such as with 
>> ψ-epistemology. Quantum interprertations are then auxiliary 
>> physical axioms or postulates. MWI and within the framework of what 
>> Carrol 
>> and Sebens has done this is a ψ-ontology, and this defines the 
>> Born rule. If I am right the degree of ψ-epistemontic nature is 
>> mixed. So the intriguing question we can address is the nature of 
>> the Born 
>> rule and its tie into the auxiliary postulates of quantum 
>> interpretations. 
>> Can a similar demonstration be made for the Born rule within QuBism, 
>> which 
>> is what might be called the dialectic opposite of MWI?
>>
>> To take MWI as something literal, as opposed to maybe a working 
>> system to understand QM foundations, is maybe taking things too far. 
>> However, it is a part of some open questions concerning the 
>> fundamentals of 
>> QM. If MWI, and more generally postulates of quantum 
>> interpretations, are connected to the Born rule it makes for some 
>> interesting things to think about.
>>
>> LC
>>
>
> If you read the link, it's pretty obvious that Carroll believes 
> the many worlds of the MWI, literally exist. AG 
>

 Carroll also believes that IF the universe is infinite, then there 
 must exist exact copies of universes and ourselves. This is frequently 
 claimed by the MWI true believers, but never, AFAICT, proven, or even 
 plausibly argued.  


 The idea comes from Tegmark, and I agree with you, it necessitate 
 more than an infinite universe. It requires also some assumption of 
 homogeneity.

>>>
>>> Our universe is, on a large scale, homogeneous. But it can't be 
>>> infinite since it has only been expanding for finite time, 13.8 BY. I 
>>> had a 
>>> discussion with

Re: Why Consciousness Cannot Be Algorithmic



I really couldn't follow this paper - many worlds (of QM) vs. multiverse 
(of cosmology) seemed all mixed up.

@philipthrift

On Friday, September 13, 2019 at 9:45:10 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote:
>
> This should be of interest to the list: 
>
> Refuting Strong AI: Why Consciousness Cannot Be Algorithmic 
> Andrew Knight 
> (Submitted on 11 Jun 2019) 
> While physicalism requires only that a conscious state depends entirely 
> on an underlying physical state, it is often assumed that consciousness 
> is algorithmic and that conscious states can be copied, such as by 
> copying or digitizing the human brain. In an effort to further elucidate 
> the physical nature of consciousness, I challenge these assumptions and 
> attempt to prove the Single Stream of Consciousness Theorem (SSCT): that 
> a conscious entity cannot experience more than one stream of 
> consciousness from a given conscious state. Assuming only that 
> consciousness is a purely physical phenomenon, it is shown that both 
> Special Relativity and Multiverse theory independently imply SSCT and 
> that the Many Worlds Interpretation of quantum mechanics is inadequate 
> to counter it. Then, SSCT is shown to be incompatible with Strong 
> Artificial Intelligence, implying that consciousness cannot be created 
> or simulated by a computer. Finally, SSCT is shown to imply that a 
> conscious state cannot be physically reset to an earlier conscious state 
> nor can it be duplicated by any physical means. The profound but 
> counterintuitive implications of these conclusions are briefly discussed. 
> Subjects:History and Philosophy of Physics (physics.hist-ph); 
> Artificial Intelligence (cs.AI) 
> Cite as:arXiv:1906.10177 [physics.hist-ph] 
>   (or arXiv:1906.10177v1 [physics.hist-ph] for this version) 
>
> Brent 
>
>

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Re: A modest proposal



On Saturday, September 14, 2019 at 11:08:31 AM UTC-5, Brent wrote:
>
>
>
> On 9/13/2019 11:53 PM, Philip Thrift wrote:
>
>
>
> Gerard ’t Hooft on the future of quantum mechanics
> https://physicstoday.scitation.org/do/10.1063/PT.6.4.20170711a/full/
>
> T HOOFT: I do not believe that we have to live with the many-worlds 
> interpretation. Indeed, it would be a stupendous number of parallel worlds, 
> which are only there because physicists couldn’t decide which of them is 
> real.
>
> In practice, quantum mechanics merely gives predictions with probabilities 
> attached. This should be considered as a normal and quite acceptable 
> feature of predictions made by science: different possible outcomes with 
> different probabilities. In the world that is familiar to us, we always 
> have such a situation when we make predictions. 
>
>
> That's the position of Roland Omnes'.   He says QM is a probabilistic 
> theory, so it predicts probabilities. What did we expect?
>
>
> Thus the question remains: What is the reality described by quantum 
> theories? I claim that we can attribute the fact that our predictions come 
> with probability distributions to the fact that not all relevant data for 
> the predictions are known to us, in particular important features of the 
> initial state.
>
>
> The trouble with that is it's a hidden variable theory, so it has to be 
> non-local.  That leads to t'Hooft's super-determinism.
>
> Brent
>
 


There is a "stochastic processes / probability theory" for QM experimental 
observations, but it is of an "extended" kind, e.g.

*Quantum Mechanical versus Stochastic Processes in Path Integration*
https://arxiv.org/abs/1801.00510

*By using path integrals, the stochastic process associated to the time 
evolution of the quantum probability density is formally rewritten in terms 
of a stochastic differential equation, given by Newton's equation of motion 
with an additional multiplicative stochastic force. However, the term 
playing the role of the stochastic force is defined by a 
non-positive-definite probability functional, providing a clear example of 
the negative* (or "extended") probabilities characteristic of quantum 
mechanics.*

* https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Negative_probability
   https://arxiv.org/abs/0912.4767


cf. *Quantum Dynamics without the Wave Function* - 
https://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0610204

@philipthrift
Sean Carroll and Gerard ’t Hooft are probability (extended or not) 
eliminativists.

MWI is really a superdeterministic theory. Every branch in the MW branching 
- if followed - is deterministic.

@philipthrift

 

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Re: Why Consciousness Cannot Be Algorithmic

2019-09-14 Thread Stathis Papaioannou

On Sat, 14 Sep 2019 at 12:45, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List <
everything-list@googlegroups.com> wrote:

> This should be of interest to the list:
>
> Refuting Strong AI: Why Consciousness Cannot Be Algorithmic
> Andrew Knight
> (Submitted on 11 Jun 2019)
> While physicalism requires only that a conscious state depends entirely
> on an underlying physical state, it is often assumed that consciousness
> is algorithmic and that conscious states can be copied, such as by
> copying or digitizing the human brain. In an effort to further elucidate
> the physical nature of consciousness, I challenge these assumptions and
> attempt to prove the Single Stream of Consciousness Theorem (SSCT): that
> a conscious entity cannot experience more than one stream of
> consciousness from a given conscious state. Assuming only that
> consciousness is a purely physical phenomenon, it is shown that both
> Special Relativity and Multiverse theory independently imply SSCT and
> that the Many Worlds Interpretation of quantum mechanics is inadequate
> to counter it. Then, SSCT is shown to be incompatible with Strong
> Artificial Intelligence, implying that consciousness cannot be created
> or simulated by a computer. Finally, SSCT is shown to imply that a
> conscious state cannot be physically reset to an earlier conscious state
> nor can it be duplicated by any physical means. The profound but
> counterintuitive implications of these conclusions are briefly discussed.
> Subjects:History and Philosophy of Physics (physics.hist-ph);
> Artificial Intelligence (cs.AI)
> Cite as:arXiv:1906.10177 [physics.hist-ph]
>   (or arXiv:1906.10177v1 [physics.hist-ph] for this version)


The argument is that if consciousness is algorithmic then it can run in two
parallel processes which can at some point diverge, which the author thinks
would create the problem of two different streams of consciousnesses
coexisting in the one mind, which he considers absurd.
-- 
Stathis Papaioannou

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Re: Entropy of early universe

On Sat, Sep 14, 2019, 1:35 PM Jason Resch  wrote:

>
>
> On Sat, Sep 14, 2019, 10:07 AM Alan Grayson 
> wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On Saturday, September 14, 2019 at 7:12:34 AM UTC-6, Alan Grayson wrote:
>>>
>>> If the early universe, say before the emergence of the CMBR, consisted
>>> of a random collection of electrons and photons, wouldn't this correspond
>>> to a *high*, not low entropy? Wouldn't it be analogous to gas with many
>>> possible states? Yet cosmologists seem hard pressed to explain an initial
>>> or early state assuming the entropy is low. AG
>>>
>>
>> Here's an easier question: when Boltzmann defined entropy as S = k * log
>> N, why the log; why not just k*N? AG
>>
>
>
> I don't know the relationship between heat and information, I think it is
> relevant to the Bekenstein bound and black hole information, and also the
> Landauer limit, but there's another definition of entropy in information
> theory: https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Entropy_(information_theory)
>
> The information theoretical definition of entropy is measured in bits
> (binary digits).  The reason for the logarithm is it takes Log2(N) bits to
> represent N states.  There's nothing special about the base you can also
> say it takes Log10(N) decimal digits to encode a number N.
>
> Jason
>


I found this article which adds more detail:

https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Entropy_in_thermodynamics_and_information_theory

Jason

>

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Re: Entropy of early universe

On Sat, Sep 14, 2019, 10:07 AM Alan Grayson  wrote:

>
>
> On Saturday, September 14, 2019 at 7:12:34 AM UTC-6, Alan Grayson wrote:
>>
>> If the early universe, say before the emergence of the CMBR, consisted of
>> a random collection of electrons and photons, wouldn't this correspond to a
>> *high*, not low entropy? Wouldn't it be analogous to gas with many
>> possible states? Yet cosmologists seem hard pressed to explain an initial
>> or early state assuming the entropy is low. AG
>>
>
> Here's an easier question: when Boltzmann defined entropy as S = k * log
> N, why the log; why not just k*N? AG
>


I don't know the relationship between heat and information, I think it is
relevant to the Bekenstein bound and black hole information, and also the
Landauer limit, but there's another definition of entropy in information
theory: https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Entropy_(information_theory)

The information theoretical definition of entropy is measured in bits
(binary digits).  The reason for the logarithm is it takes Log2(N) bits to
represent N states.  There's nothing special about the base you can also
say it takes Log10(N) decimal digits to encode a number N.

Jason

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Re: Entropy of early universe

On Saturday, September 14, 2019 at 8:12:34 AM UTC-5, Alan Grayson wrote:
>
> If the early universe, say before the emergence of the CMBR, consisted of 
> a random collection of electrons and photons, wouldn't this correspond to a 
> *high*, not low entropy? Wouldn't it be analogous to gas with many 
> possible states? Yet cosmologists seem hard pressed to explain an initial 
> or early state assuming the entropy is low. AG
>

The inflationary manifold has a cosmological constant Λ ≈ (1/cℓ_p)^2, where 
c is a number c < 1 and with a value of around 10^{-3}  This means Λ ≈ 
10^{64}m^{-2}, which is to be compared to today's value of Λ ≈ 
10^{-52}m^{-2}. What is still studied is the process by which this false 
vacuum, or false cosmological constant, transitioned to the value today. If 
we take the scenario that inflation started at 10^{-36} sec this would mean 
there was a transition of sorts from Λ ≈ 10^{64}m^{-2} → 10^{56}m^{-2} and 
in one scenario this transitions in a slow role to a lower value and 
transitions again to the low value known. 

The amount of information in a region bounded by a cosmological horizon 
with area A is S ≈  kA/( cℓ_p)^2 = k/c^2 by the Bousso bound. This means a 
tiny region bounded by this cosmological horizon only about 10^{-32}m 
across had a total entropy of S ≈ k×10^{6} for k = 1.38×10^{-23}j/K. With 
this transition this was some 8 orders of magnitude larger. So as a result 
the entropy of the earliest universe was quite small.

LC

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Re: Another physicist in mental decline (Sean Carroll)

2019-09-14 Thread Stathis Papaioannou

On Sat, 14 Sep 2019 at 22:57, Jason Resch  wrote:

>
>
> On Sat, Sep 14, 2019, 2:44 AM Alan Grayson  wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On Saturday, September 14, 2019 at 12:34:18 AM UTC-6, Jason wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Friday, September 13, 2019, Alan Grayson  wrote:
>>>


 On Friday, September 13, 2019 at 4:42:00 PM UTC-6, Jason wrote:
>
>
>
> On Fri, Sep 13, 2019 at 8:25 AM Alan Grayson 
> wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On Friday, September 13, 2019 at 5:24:11 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal
>> wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> On 13 Sep 2019, at 04:26, Alan Grayson  wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Thursday, September 12, 2019 at 11:01:54 AM UTC-6, Alan Grayson
>>> wrote:



 On Thursday, September 12, 2019 at 7:45:22 AM UTC-6, Lawrence
 Crowell wrote:
>
> On Thursday, September 12, 2019 at 4:20:46 AM UTC-5, Philip Thrift
> wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Wednesday, September 11, 2019 at 11:45:41 PM UTC-5, Alan
>> Grayson wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> https://www.wired.com/story/sean-carroll-thinks-we-all-exist-on-multiple-worlds/
>>>
>>
>>
>>
>> Many Worlds is where people go to escape from one world of
>> quantum-stochastic processes. They are like vampires, but instead of
>> running away from sunbeams, are running away from probabilities.
>>
>> @philipthrift
>>
>
> This assessment is not entirely fair. Carroll and Sebens have a
> paper on how supposedly the Born rule can be derived from MWI  I have 
> yet
> to read their paper, but given the newsiness of this I might get to 
> it. One
> advantage that MWI does have is that it splits the world as a sort of
> quantum frame dragging that is nonlocal. This nonlocal property might 
> be
> useful for working with quantum gravity,
>
> I worked a proof of a theorem, which may not be complete
> unfortunately, where the two sets of quantum interpretations that
> are ψ-epistemic and those that are ψ-ontological are not decidable. 
> There
> is no decision procedure which can prove QM holds either way. The 
> proof is
> set with nonlocal hidden variables over the projective rays of the 
> state
> space. In effect there is an uncertainty in whether the hidden 
> variables
> localize extant quantities, say with ψ-ontology, or whether this
> localization is the generation of information in a local context from
> quantum nonlocality that is not extant, such as with
> ψ-epistemology. Quantum interprertations are then auxiliary
> physical axioms or postulates. MWI and within the framework of what 
> Carrol
> and Sebens has done this is a ψ-ontology, and this defines the
> Born rule. If I am right the degree of ψ-epistemontic nature is
> mixed. So the intriguing question we can address is the nature of the 
> Born
> rule and its tie into the auxiliary postulates of quantum 
> interpretations.
> Can a similar demonstration be made for the Born rule within QuBism, 
> which
> is what might be called the dialectic opposite of MWI?
>
> To take MWI as something literal, as opposed to maybe a working
> system to understand QM foundations, is maybe taking things too far.
> However, it is a part of some open questions concerning the 
> fundamentals of
> QM. If MWI, and more generally postulates of quantum
> interpretations, are connected to the Born rule it makes for some
> interesting things to think about.
>
> LC
>

 If you read the link, it's pretty obvious that Carroll believes the
 many worlds of the MWI, literally exist. AG

>>>
>>> Carroll also believes that IF the universe is infinite, then there
>>> must exist exact copies of universes and ourselves. This is frequently
>>> claimed by the MWI true believers, but never, AFAICT, proven, or even
>>> plausibly argued.
>>>
>>>
>>> The idea comes from Tegmark, and I agree with you, it necessitate
>>> more than an infinite universe. It requires also some assumption of
>>> homogeneity.
>>>
>>
>> Our universe is, on a large scale, homogeneous. But it can't be
>> infinite since it has only been expanding for finite time, 13.8 BY. I 
>> had a
>> discussion with Brent about this some time ago, and he claimed finite in
>> time doesn't preclude infinite in space. I strongly disagree. Perhaps I 
>> am
>> missing something. Wouldn't be the first time. AG
>>
>
> I think what you may be missing is that in popular (but misleading)
>

Re: A modest proposal

2019-09-14 Thread 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List

On 9/13/2019 11:53 PM, Philip Thrift wrote:

Gerard ’t Hooft on the future of quantum mechanics
https://physicstoday.scitation.org/do/10.1063/PT.6.4.20170711a/full/

T HOOFT: I do not believe that we have to live with the many-worlds
interpretation. Indeed, it would be a stupendous number of parallel
worlds, which are only there because physicists couldn’t decide which
of them is real.

In practice, quantum mechanics merely gives predictions with
probabilities attached. This should be considered as a normal and
quite acceptable feature of predictions made by science: different
possible outcomes with different probabilities. In the world that is
familiar to us, we always have such a situation when we make predictions.

That's the position of Roland Omnes'. He says QM is a probabilistic
theory, so it predicts probabilities. What did we expect?

Thus the question remains: What is the reality described by quantum
theories? I claim that we can attribute the fact that our predictions
come with probability distributions to the fact that not all relevant
data for the predictions are known to us, in particular important
features of the initial state.

The trouble with that is it's a hidden variable theory, so it has to be
non-local. That leads to t'Hooft's super-determinism.

Brent

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Re: Entropy of early universe



On Saturday, September 14, 2019 at 7:12:34 AM UTC-6, Alan Grayson wrote:
>
> If the early universe, say before the emergence of the CMBR, consisted of 
> a random collection of electrons and photons, wouldn't this correspond to a 
> *high*, not low entropy? Wouldn't it be analogous to gas with many 
> possible states? Yet cosmologists seem hard pressed to explain an initial 
> or early state assuming the entropy is low. AG
>

Here's an easier question: when Boltzmann defined entropy as S = k * log N, 
why the log; why not just k*N? AG

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Re: Entropy of early universe

Lazer says the expansion of the universe creates an increased difference
between the current entropy and the maximum possible entropy:
https://www.informationphilosopher.com/solutions/scientists/layzer/growth_of_order/

Thereby introducing room for entropy to increase further, and giving the
appearance of low entropy initial conditions.

Jason

On Sat, Sep 14, 2019, 8:12 AM Alan Grayson  wrote:

> If the early universe, say before the emergence of the CMBR, consisted of
> a random collection of electrons and photons, wouldn't this correspond to a
> *high*, not low entropy? Wouldn't it be analogous to gas with many
> possible states? Yet cosmologists seem hard pressed to explain an initial
> or early state assuming the entropy is low. AG
>
> --
> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
> "Everything List" group.
> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an
> email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
> To view this discussion on the web visit
> https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/121e0021-ebf2-4f04-a720-72e18ba0a6aa%40googlegroups.com
> 
> .
>

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Re: Another physicist in mental decline (Sean Carroll)

On Sat, Sep 14, 2019, 4:36 AM Alan Grayson  wrote:

>
>
> On Saturday, September 14, 2019 at 12:34:18 AM UTC-6, Jason wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Friday, September 13, 2019, Alan Grayson  wrote:
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Friday, September 13, 2019 at 4:42:00 PM UTC-6, Jason wrote:

 On Fri, Sep 13, 2019 at 8:25 AM Alan Grayson 
 wrote:

>
>
> On Friday, September 13, 2019 at 5:24:11 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 13 Sep 2019, at 04:26, Alan Grayson  wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Thursday, September 12, 2019 at 11:01:54 AM UTC-6, Alan Grayson
>> wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Thursday, September 12, 2019 at 7:45:22 AM UTC-6, Lawrence
>>> Crowell wrote:

 On Thursday, September 12, 2019 at 4:20:46 AM UTC-5, Philip Thrift
 wrote:
>
>
>
> On Wednesday, September 11, 2019 at 11:45:41 PM UTC-5, Alan
> Grayson wrote:
>>
>>
>> https://www.wired.com/story/sean-carroll-thinks-we-all-exist-on-multiple-worlds/
>>
>
>
>
> Many Worlds is where people go to escape from one world of
> quantum-stochastic processes. They are like vampires, but instead of
> running away from sunbeams, are running away from probabilities.
>
> @philipthrift
>

 This assessment is not entirely fair. Carroll and Sebens have a
 paper on how supposedly the Born rule can be derived from MWI  I have 
 yet
 to read their paper, but given the newsiness of this I might get to 
 it. One
 advantage that MWI does have is that it splits the world as a sort of
 quantum frame dragging that is nonlocal. This nonlocal property might 
 be
 useful for working with quantum gravity,

 I worked a proof of a theorem, which may not be complete
 unfortunately, where the two sets of quantum interpretations that
 are ψ-epistemic and those that are ψ-ontological are not decidable. 
 There
 is no decision procedure which can prove QM holds either way. The 
 proof is
 set with nonlocal hidden variables over the projective rays of the 
 state
 space. In effect there is an uncertainty in whether the hidden 
 variables
 localize extant quantities, say with ψ-ontology, or whether this
 localization is the generation of information in a local context from
 quantum nonlocality that is not extant, such as with ψ-epistemology.
 Quantum interprertations are then auxiliary physical axioms or 
 postulates.
 MWI and within the framework of what Carrol and Sebens has done this 
 is a
 ψ-ontology, and this defines the Born rule. If I am right the
 degree of ψ-epistemontic nature is mixed. So the intriguing
 question we can address is the nature of the Born rule and its tie 
 into the
 auxiliary postulates of quantum interpretations. Can a similar
 demonstration be made for the Born rule within QuBism, which is what 
 might
 be called the dialectic opposite of MWI?

 To take MWI as something literal, as opposed to maybe a working
 system to understand QM foundations, is maybe taking things too far.
 However, it is a part of some open questions concerning the 
 fundamentals of
 QM. If MWI, and more generally postulates of quantum
 interpretations, are connected to the Born rule it makes for some
 interesting things to think about.

 LC

>>>
>>> If you read the link, it's pretty obvious that Carroll believes the
>>> many worlds of the MWI, literally exist. AG
>>>
>>
>> Carroll also believes that IF the universe is infinite, then there
>> must exist exact copies of universes and ourselves. This is frequently
>> claimed by the MWI true believers, but never, AFAICT, proven, or even
>> plausibly argued.
>>
>>
>> The idea comes from Tegmark, and I agree with you, it necessitate
>> more than an infinite universe. It requires also some assumption of
>> homogeneity.
>>
>
> Our universe is, on a large scale, homogeneous. But it can't be
> infinite since it has only been expanding for finite time, 13.8 BY. I had 
> a
> discussion with Brent about this some time ago, and he claimed finite in
> time doesn't preclude infinite in space. I strongly disagree. Perhaps I am
> missing something. Wouldn't be the first time. AG
>

 I think what you may be missing is that in popular (but misleading)
 accounts of the BB they often say everything originated from a point,
 rather than everywhere at once.  To say "everything came from a point" is
 at best only valid for describing the observable

Re: Another physicist in mental decline (Sean Carroll)



On Saturday, September 14, 2019 at 7:29:33 AM UTC-6, Alan Grayson wrote:
>
>
>
> On Saturday, September 14, 2019 at 7:18:40 AM UTC-6, John Clark wrote:
>>
>> On Fri, Sep 13, 2019 at 11:22 PM Alan Grayson  
>> wrote:
>>
>> *> What I think you're missing (and Tegmark) is the possibility of 
>>> UNcountable universes. In such case, one could imagine new universes coming 
>>> into existence forever and ever, without any repeats.  Think of the number 
>>> of points between 0 and 1 on the real line, each point associated with a 
>>> different universe. AG*
>>>
>>
>> There is no reason to think physics needs all the real numbers and 
>> considerable evidence to think it does not. To my mind the strongest 
>> evidence is that a physical Turing Machine is incapable of even 
>> approximating most real numbers, I happened to have posted a proof of this 
>> yesterday on the "Observation versus assumption" thread.
>>
>
Physics doesn't need *all* the real numbers, just some of them, say any 
continuous range of any variable; like the mass of the electron. FWIW, I am 
convinced there are no exact copies of any universes or ourselves. AG 

>
>> Actually, physics might not even need all the rational numbers as there 
>> is probably a grainy structure to both space and time. Distances can't get 
>> smaller than the Planck Length and time shorter than the Planck Time. Maybe.
>>  
>>
>>> >> true regardless of if the Many Worlds Interpretation of Quantum 
 Mechanics is correct or not, it only depends on the universe being 
 spatially infinite.

>>>
>>> *> But our universe is NOT spatially infinite if its been expanding for 
>>> finite time,*
>>>
>>
>> Sure it can, space could have started out infinitely large 13.8 billion 
>> years ago and still be expanding today, it could even be accelerating. The 
>> radius of the observable universe is 45.5 billion light years ( the light 
>> from the most distant galaxies took 13.8 billion years to reach us but 
>> during that time the galaxies have been accelerating away from us) but that 
>> doesn't mean there aren't galaxies much more distant than 45.5 billion 
>> light years.
>>
>>  John K Clark
>>
>
> If the universe was infinite in spatial extent at the time of, or 
> immediately after the BB, the various parts wouldn't have been causally 
> connected and we wouldn't need inflation to preserve (a non existent) 
> homogeneity. It's because it was small at the time of, or just after the 
> BB, that inflation was imagined to preserve the original homogeneity. FWIW, 
> I'm convinced our bubble is a finite hypersphere, almost but not flat, due 
> to its huge size. AG
>

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Re: Another physicist in mental decline (Sean Carroll)



On Saturday, September 14, 2019 at 7:18:40 AM UTC-6, John Clark wrote:
>
> On Fri, Sep 13, 2019 at 11:22 PM Alan Grayson  > wrote:
>
> *> What I think you're missing (and Tegmark) is the possibility of 
>> UNcountable universes. In such case, one could imagine new universes coming 
>> into existence forever and ever, without any repeats.  Think of the number 
>> of points between 0 and 1 on the real line, each point associated with a 
>> different universe. AG*
>>
>
> There is no reason to think physics needs all the real numbers and 
> considerable evidence to think it does not. To my mind the strongest 
> evidence is that a physical Turing Machine is incapable of even 
> approximating most real numbers, I happened to have posted a proof of this 
> yesterday on the "Observation versus assumption" thread.
>
> Actually, physics might not even need all the rational numbers as there is 
> probably a grainy structure to both space and time. Distances can't get 
> smaller than the Planck Length and time shorter than the Planck Time. Maybe.
>  
>
>> >> true regardless of if the Many Worlds Interpretation of Quantum 
>>> Mechanics is correct or not, it only depends on the universe being 
>>> spatially infinite.
>>>
>>
>> *> But our universe is NOT spatially infinite if its been expanding for 
>> finite time,*
>>
>
> Sure it can, space could have started out infinitely large 13.8 billion 
> years ago and still be expanding today, it could even be accelerating. The 
> radius of the observable universe is 45.5 billion light years ( the light 
> from the most distant galaxies took 13.8 billion years to reach us but 
> during that time the galaxies have been accelerating away from us) but that 
> doesn't mean there aren't galaxies much more distant than 45.5 billion 
> light years.
>
>  John K Clark
>

If the universe was infinite in spatial extent at the time of, or 
immediately after the BB, the various parts wouldn't have been causally 
connected and we wouldn't need inflation to preserve (a non existent) 
homogeneity. It's because it was small at the time of, or just after the 
BB, that inflation was imagined to preserve the original homogeneity. FWIW, 
I'm convinced our bubble is a finite hypersphere, almost but not flat, due 
to its huge size. AG

-- 
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Re: Another physicist in mental decline (Sean Carroll)

On Fri, Sep 13, 2019 at 11:22 PM Alan Grayson 
wrote:

*> What I think you're missing (and Tegmark) is the possibility of
> UNcountable universes. In such case, one could imagine new universes coming
> into existence forever and ever, without any repeats.  Think of the number
> of points between 0 and 1 on the real line, each point associated with a
> different universe. AG*
>

There is no reason to think physics needs all the real numbers and
considerable evidence to think it does not. To my mind the strongest
evidence is that a physical Turing Machine is incapable of even
approximating most real numbers, I happened to have posted a proof of this
yesterday on the "Observation versus assumption" thread.

Actually, physics might not even need all the rational numbers as there is
probably a grainy structure to both space and time. Distances can't get
smaller than the Planck Length and time shorter than the Planck Time. Maybe.

> >> true regardless of if the Many Worlds Interpretation of Quantum
>> Mechanics is correct or not, it only depends on the universe being
>> spatially infinite.
>>
>
> *> But our universe is NOT spatially infinite if its been expanding for
> finite time,*
>

Sure it can, space could have started out infinitely large 13.8 billion
years ago and still be expanding today, it could even be accelerating. The
radius of the observable universe is 45.5 billion light years ( the light
from the most distant galaxies took 13.8 billion years to reach us but
during that time the galaxies have been accelerating away from us) but that
doesn't mean there aren't galaxies much more distant than 45.5 billion
light years.

 John K Clark

-- 
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Entropy of early universe

If the early universe, say before the emergence of the CMBR, consisted of a 
random collection of electrons and photons, wouldn't this correspond to a 
*high*, not low entropy? Wouldn't it be analogous to gas with many possible 
states? Yet cosmologists seem hard pressed to explain an initial or early 
state assuming the entropy is low. AG

-- 
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Re: Another physicist in mental decline (Sean Carroll)

On Sat, Sep 14, 2019, 3:00 AM Alan Grayson  wrote:

>
>
> On Saturday, September 14, 2019 at 1:55:36 AM UTC-6, Alan Grayson wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Saturday, September 14, 2019 at 12:34:18 AM UTC-6, Jason wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Friday, September 13, 2019, Alan Grayson  wrote:
>>>


 On Friday, September 13, 2019 at 4:42:00 PM UTC-6, Jason wrote:
>
>
>
> On Fri, Sep 13, 2019 at 8:25 AM Alan Grayson 
> wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On Friday, September 13, 2019 at 5:24:11 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal
>> wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> On 13 Sep 2019, at 04:26, Alan Grayson  wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Thursday, September 12, 2019 at 11:01:54 AM UTC-6, Alan Grayson
>>> wrote:



 On Thursday, September 12, 2019 at 7:45:22 AM UTC-6, Lawrence
 Crowell wrote:
>
> On Thursday, September 12, 2019 at 4:20:46 AM UTC-5, Philip Thrift
> wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Wednesday, September 11, 2019 at 11:45:41 PM UTC-5, Alan
>> Grayson wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> https://www.wired.com/story/sean-carroll-thinks-we-all-exist-on-multiple-worlds/
>>>
>>
>>
>>
>> Many Worlds is where people go to escape from one world of
>> quantum-stochastic processes. They are like vampires, but instead of
>> running away from sunbeams, are running away from probabilities.
>>
>> @philipthrift
>>
>
> This assessment is not entirely fair. Carroll and Sebens have a
> paper on how supposedly the Born rule can be derived from MWI  I have 
> yet
> to read their paper, but given the newsiness of this I might get to 
> it. One
> advantage that MWI does have is that it splits the world as a sort of
> quantum frame dragging that is nonlocal. This nonlocal property might 
> be
> useful for working with quantum gravity,
>
> I worked a proof of a theorem, which may not be complete
> unfortunately, where the two sets of quantum interpretations that
> are ψ-epistemic and those that are ψ-ontological are not decidable. 
> There
> is no decision procedure which can prove QM holds either way. The 
> proof is
> set with nonlocal hidden variables over the projective rays of the 
> state
> space. In effect there is an uncertainty in whether the hidden 
> variables
> localize extant quantities, say with ψ-ontology, or whether this
> localization is the generation of information in a local context from
> quantum nonlocality that is not extant, such as with
> ψ-epistemology. Quantum interprertations are then auxiliary
> physical axioms or postulates. MWI and within the framework of what 
> Carrol
> and Sebens has done this is a ψ-ontology, and this defines the
> Born rule. If I am right the degree of ψ-epistemontic nature is
> mixed. So the intriguing question we can address is the nature of the 
> Born
> rule and its tie into the auxiliary postulates of quantum 
> interpretations.
> Can a similar demonstration be made for the Born rule within QuBism, 
> which
> is what might be called the dialectic opposite of MWI?
>
> To take MWI as something literal, as opposed to maybe a working
> system to understand QM foundations, is maybe taking things too far.
> However, it is a part of some open questions concerning the 
> fundamentals of
> QM. If MWI, and more generally postulates of quantum
> interpretations, are connected to the Born rule it makes for some
> interesting things to think about.
>
> LC
>

 If you read the link, it's pretty obvious that Carroll believes the
 many worlds of the MWI, literally exist. AG

>>>
>>> Carroll also believes that IF the universe is infinite, then there
>>> must exist exact copies of universes and ourselves. This is frequently
>>> claimed by the MWI true believers, but never, AFAICT, proven, or even
>>> plausibly argued.
>>>
>>>
>>> The idea comes from Tegmark, and I agree with you, it necessitate
>>> more than an infinite universe. It requires also some assumption of
>>> homogeneity.
>>>
>>
>> Our universe is, on a large scale, homogeneous. But it can't be
>> infinite since it has only been expanding for finite time, 13.8 BY. I 
>> had a
>> discussion with Brent about this some time ago, and he claimed finite in
>> time doesn't preclude infinite in space. I strongly disagree. Perhaps I 
>> am
>> missing something. Wouldn't be the first time. AG
>>
>
> I think what you may be missing is that in popular

Re: Another physicist in mental decline (Sean Carroll)

On Sat, Sep 14, 2019, 2:55 AM Alan Grayson  wrote:

>
>
> On Saturday, September 14, 2019 at 12:34:18 AM UTC-6, Jason wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Friday, September 13, 2019, Alan Grayson  wrote:
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Friday, September 13, 2019 at 4:42:00 PM UTC-6, Jason wrote:

 On Fri, Sep 13, 2019 at 8:25 AM Alan Grayson 
 wrote:

>
>
> On Friday, September 13, 2019 at 5:24:11 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 13 Sep 2019, at 04:26, Alan Grayson  wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Thursday, September 12, 2019 at 11:01:54 AM UTC-6, Alan Grayson
>> wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Thursday, September 12, 2019 at 7:45:22 AM UTC-6, Lawrence
>>> Crowell wrote:

 On Thursday, September 12, 2019 at 4:20:46 AM UTC-5, Philip Thrift
 wrote:
>
>
>
> On Wednesday, September 11, 2019 at 11:45:41 PM UTC-5, Alan
> Grayson wrote:
>>
>>
>> https://www.wired.com/story/sean-carroll-thinks-we-all-exist-on-multiple-worlds/
>>
>
>
>
> Many Worlds is where people go to escape from one world of
> quantum-stochastic processes. They are like vampires, but instead of
> running away from sunbeams, are running away from probabilities.
>
> @philipthrift
>

 This assessment is not entirely fair. Carroll and Sebens have a
 paper on how supposedly the Born rule can be derived from MWI  I have 
 yet
 to read their paper, but given the newsiness of this I might get to 
 it. One
 advantage that MWI does have is that it splits the world as a sort of
 quantum frame dragging that is nonlocal. This nonlocal property might 
 be
 useful for working with quantum gravity,

 I worked a proof of a theorem, which may not be complete
 unfortunately, where the two sets of quantum interpretations that
 are ψ-epistemic and those that are ψ-ontological are not decidable. 
 There
 is no decision procedure which can prove QM holds either way. The 
 proof is
 set with nonlocal hidden variables over the projective rays of the 
 state
 space. In effect there is an uncertainty in whether the hidden 
 variables
 localize extant quantities, say with ψ-ontology, or whether this
 localization is the generation of information in a local context from
 quantum nonlocality that is not extant, such as with ψ-epistemology.
 Quantum interprertations are then auxiliary physical axioms or 
 postulates.
 MWI and within the framework of what Carrol and Sebens has done this 
 is a
 ψ-ontology, and this defines the Born rule. If I am right the
 degree of ψ-epistemontic nature is mixed. So the intriguing
 question we can address is the nature of the Born rule and its tie 
 into the
 auxiliary postulates of quantum interpretations. Can a similar
 demonstration be made for the Born rule within QuBism, which is what 
 might
 be called the dialectic opposite of MWI?

 To take MWI as something literal, as opposed to maybe a working
 system to understand QM foundations, is maybe taking things too far.
 However, it is a part of some open questions concerning the 
 fundamentals of
 QM. If MWI, and more generally postulates of quantum
 interpretations, are connected to the Born rule it makes for some
 interesting things to think about.

 LC

>>>
>>> If you read the link, it's pretty obvious that Carroll believes the
>>> many worlds of the MWI, literally exist. AG
>>>
>>
>> Carroll also believes that IF the universe is infinite, then there
>> must exist exact copies of universes and ourselves. This is frequently
>> claimed by the MWI true believers, but never, AFAICT, proven, or even
>> plausibly argued.
>>
>>
>> The idea comes from Tegmark, and I agree with you, it necessitate
>> more than an infinite universe. It requires also some assumption of
>> homogeneity.
>>
>
> Our universe is, on a large scale, homogeneous. But it can't be
> infinite since it has only been expanding for finite time, 13.8 BY. I had 
> a
> discussion with Brent about this some time ago, and he claimed finite in
> time doesn't preclude infinite in space. I strongly disagree. Perhaps I am
> missing something. Wouldn't be the first time. AG
>

 I think what you may be missing is that in popular (but misleading)
 accounts of the BB they often say everything originated from a point,
 rather than everywhere at once.  To say "everything came from a point" is
 at best only valid for describing the observable

Re: Another physicist in mental decline (Sean Carroll)

On Saturday, September 14, 2019 at 5:31:12 AM UTC-6, Lawrence Crowell wrote:
>
> On Saturday, September 14, 2019 at 6:02:13 AM UTC-5, Alan Grayson wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Saturday, September 14, 2019 at 3:56:42 AM UTC-6, Lawrence Crowell 
>> wrote:
>>>
>>> On Friday, September 13, 2019 at 10:22:38 PM UTC-5, Alan Grayson wrote:

 On Friday, September 13, 2019 at 4:08:23 PM UTC-6, John Clark wrote:
>
> On Thu, Sep 12, 2019 at 10:26 PM Alan Grayson  
> wrote:
>  
>
>> *> Carroll also believes that IF the universe is infinite, then there 
>> must exist exact copies of universes and ourselves. This is frequently 
>> claimed by the MWI true believers, but never, AFAICT, proven, or even 
>> plausibly argued.  What's the argument for such a claim?*
>>
>
> Of course it's been proven! It's simple math, there are only a finite 
> number of ways the atoms in your body, or even the entire OBSERVABLE 
> universe, can be arranged so obviously if the entire universe is infinite 
> then there is going to have to be copies, an infinite number of them in 
> fact. Max Tegmark has even calculated how far you'd have to go to see 
> such a thing. 
>

 What I think you're missing (and Tegmark) is the possibility of 
 UNcountable universes. In such case, one could imagine new universes 
 coming 
 into existence forever and ever, without any repeats.  Think of the number 
 of points between 0 and 1 on the real line, each point associated with a 
 different universe. AG

>
> Your closest identical copy is 10^12 light years away. About 10^76 
> light years away there is a sphere of radius 100 light-years identical to 
> the one centered here, so everything we see here during the next century 
> will be identical to those of our counterparts over there. And 10^102 
> light 
> years away the is a exact copy of our entire observable universe. And all 
> this is true regardless of if the Many Worlds Interpretation of Quantum 
> Mechanics is correct or not, it only depends on the universe being 
> spatially infinite.
>

 But our universe is NOT spatially infinite if its been expanding for 
 finite time, starting very small, as can be inferred from the temperature 
 of the CMBR. AG 

>>>
>>> This is wrong. The CMB is at a distance of 46 billion light years while 
>>> it was also generated 13.8 billion years ago. The more distant things are 
>>> the more it is frame dragged by the accelerated expansion, in a sense a 
>>> "soft inflationary" expansion. If this were not the case the CMB would have 
>>> markedly different characteristics. 
>>>
>>> LC
>>>
>>
>> Doesn't the high temperature and density at BB +380,000 years imply the 
>> universe was small at that time? AG 
>>
>
> It implies that matter and radiation had a higher density. Whether the 
> space of this cosmology was smaller is problematic. If the space is R^3 
> without bounds it makes no sense to say it was smaller. The same if the 
> space is the Poincare dodecahedron space.
>
> LC 
>

To reiterate:  I've never read a description of inflation where the 
universe is described as very large spatially when it initiates. It's 
always claimed inflation begins a few Planck durations (10^-43 seconds) 
after the BB, at which time the spatial diameter is many orders of 
magnitudes smaller than the diameter of a proton. Inflation then expands 
the universe to the diameter of the Earth or the Solar System before 
terminating, all this occuring within the first second after the BB. The 
idea behind inflation is to preserve the original homogeneity of a universe 
presumed be very small, and therefore causally connected.This entire model 
breaks down if one insists on a large universe immediately after the BB. As 
I understand it, present models have the expansion continuing until 
present, and even at 380,000 it's still relatively small but homogeneous. AG

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Re: Another physicist in mental decline (Sean Carroll)

On Sat, Sep 14, 2019, 2:44 AM Alan Grayson  wrote:

>
>
> On Saturday, September 14, 2019 at 12:34:18 AM UTC-6, Jason wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Friday, September 13, 2019, Alan Grayson  wrote:
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Friday, September 13, 2019 at 4:42:00 PM UTC-6, Jason wrote:

 On Fri, Sep 13, 2019 at 8:25 AM Alan Grayson 
 wrote:

>
>
> On Friday, September 13, 2019 at 5:24:11 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 13 Sep 2019, at 04:26, Alan Grayson  wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Thursday, September 12, 2019 at 11:01:54 AM UTC-6, Alan Grayson
>> wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Thursday, September 12, 2019 at 7:45:22 AM UTC-6, Lawrence
>>> Crowell wrote:

 On Thursday, September 12, 2019 at 4:20:46 AM UTC-5, Philip Thrift
 wrote:
>
>
>
> On Wednesday, September 11, 2019 at 11:45:41 PM UTC-5, Alan
> Grayson wrote:
>>
>>
>> https://www.wired.com/story/sean-carroll-thinks-we-all-exist-on-multiple-worlds/
>>
>
>
>
> Many Worlds is where people go to escape from one world of
> quantum-stochastic processes. They are like vampires, but instead of
> running away from sunbeams, are running away from probabilities.
>
> @philipthrift
>

 This assessment is not entirely fair. Carroll and Sebens have a
 paper on how supposedly the Born rule can be derived from MWI  I have 
 yet
 to read their paper, but given the newsiness of this I might get to 
 it. One
 advantage that MWI does have is that it splits the world as a sort of
 quantum frame dragging that is nonlocal. This nonlocal property might 
 be
 useful for working with quantum gravity,

 I worked a proof of a theorem, which may not be complete
 unfortunately, where the two sets of quantum interpretations that
 are ψ-epistemic and those that are ψ-ontological are not decidable. 
 There
 is no decision procedure which can prove QM holds either way. The 
 proof is
 set with nonlocal hidden variables over the projective rays of the 
 state
 space. In effect there is an uncertainty in whether the hidden 
 variables
 localize extant quantities, say with ψ-ontology, or whether this
 localization is the generation of information in a local context from
 quantum nonlocality that is not extant, such as with ψ-epistemology.
 Quantum interprertations are then auxiliary physical axioms or 
 postulates.
 MWI and within the framework of what Carrol and Sebens has done this 
 is a
 ψ-ontology, and this defines the Born rule. If I am right the
 degree of ψ-epistemontic nature is mixed. So the intriguing
 question we can address is the nature of the Born rule and its tie 
 into the
 auxiliary postulates of quantum interpretations. Can a similar
 demonstration be made for the Born rule within QuBism, which is what 
 might
 be called the dialectic opposite of MWI?

 To take MWI as something literal, as opposed to maybe a working
 system to understand QM foundations, is maybe taking things too far.
 However, it is a part of some open questions concerning the 
 fundamentals of
 QM. If MWI, and more generally postulates of quantum
 interpretations, are connected to the Born rule it makes for some
 interesting things to think about.

 LC

>>>
>>> If you read the link, it's pretty obvious that Carroll believes the
>>> many worlds of the MWI, literally exist. AG
>>>
>>
>> Carroll also believes that IF the universe is infinite, then there
>> must exist exact copies of universes and ourselves. This is frequently
>> claimed by the MWI true believers, but never, AFAICT, proven, or even
>> plausibly argued.
>>
>>
>> The idea comes from Tegmark, and I agree with you, it necessitate
>> more than an infinite universe. It requires also some assumption of
>> homogeneity.
>>
>
> Our universe is, on a large scale, homogeneous. But it can't be
> infinite since it has only been expanding for finite time, 13.8 BY. I had 
> a
> discussion with Brent about this some time ago, and he claimed finite in
> time doesn't preclude infinite in space. I strongly disagree. Perhaps I am
> missing something. Wouldn't be the first time. AG
>

 I think what you may be missing is that in popular (but misleading)
 accounts of the BB they often say everything originated from a point,
 rather than everywhere at once.  To say "everything came from a point" is
 at best only valid for describing the observable

Re: Another physicist in mental decline (Sean Carroll)

On Fri, Sep 13, 2019 at 7:27 PM Bruce Kellett  wrote:

>> Your closest identical copy is 10^12 light years away. About 10^76 light
>> years away there is a sphere of radius 100 light-years identical to the one
>> centered here, so everything we see here during the next century will be
>> identical to those of our counterparts over there. And 10^102 light years
>> away the is a exact copy of our entire observable universe. And all this is
>> true regardless of if the Many Worlds Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics
>> is correct or not, it only depends on the universe being spatially infinite.
>>
>
> *> The trouble with all such arguments is that they miss the fact that our
> initial conditions might have been very special, of measure zero.*
>

I assume you mean the overall spacetime curvature of the universe should be
zero, but if Inflation Theory is correct it would explain why it is if not
zero at least very very small, small enough that even if it's not infinite
the entire universe would be large enough to be able to travel 10^102 light
years and find a exact copy of our observable universe.

John K Clark

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Re: Another physicist in mental decline (Sean Carroll)

On Saturday, September 14, 2019 at 6:02:13 AM UTC-5, Alan Grayson wrote:
>
>
>
> On Saturday, September 14, 2019 at 3:56:42 AM UTC-6, Lawrence Crowell 
> wrote:
>>
>> On Friday, September 13, 2019 at 10:22:38 PM UTC-5, Alan Grayson wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Friday, September 13, 2019 at 4:08:23 PM UTC-6, John Clark wrote:

 On Thu, Sep 12, 2019 at 10:26 PM Alan Grayson  
 wrote:

> *> Carroll also believes that IF the universe is infinite, then there 
> must exist exact copies of universes and ourselves. This is frequently 
> claimed by the MWI true believers, but never, AFAICT, proven, or even 
> plausibly argued.  What's the argument for such a claim?*
>

 Of course it's been proven! It's simple math, there are only a finite 
 number of ways the atoms in your body, or even the entire OBSERVABLE 
 universe, can be arranged so obviously if the entire universe is infinite 
 then there is going to have to be copies, an infinite number of them in 
 fact. Max Tegmark has even calculated how far you'd have to go to see 
 such a thing. 

>>>
>>> What I think you're missing (and Tegmark) is the possibility of 
>>> UNcountable universes. In such case, one could imagine new universes coming 
>>> into existence forever and ever, without any repeats.  Think of the number 
>>> of points between 0 and 1 on the real line, each point associated with a 
>>> different universe. AG
>>>

 Your closest identical copy is 10^12 light years away. About 10^76 
 light years away there is a sphere of radius 100 light-years identical to 
 the one centered here, so everything we see here during the next century 
 will be identical to those of our counterparts over there. And 10^102 
 light 
 years away the is a exact copy of our entire observable universe. And all 
 this is true regardless of if the Many Worlds Interpretation of Quantum 
 Mechanics is correct or not, it only depends on the universe being 
 spatially infinite.

>>>
>>> But our universe is NOT spatially infinite if its been expanding for 
>>> finite time, starting very small, as can be inferred from the temperature 
>>> of the CMBR. AG 
>>>
>>
>> This is wrong. The CMB is at a distance of 46 billion light years while 
>> it was also generated 13.8 billion years ago. The more distant things are 
>> the more it is frame dragged by the accelerated expansion, in a sense a 
>> "soft inflationary" expansion. If this were not the case the CMB would have 
>> markedly different characteristics. 
>>
>> LC
>>
>
> Doesn't the high temperature and density at BB +380,000 years imply the 
> universe was small at that time? AG 
>

It implies that matter and radiation had a higher density. Whether the 
space of this cosmology was smaller is problematic. If the space is R^3 
without bounds it makes no sense to say it was smaller. The same if the 
space is the Poincare dodecahedron space.

LC 

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Re: A modest proposal

On Saturday, September 14, 2019 at 5:36:45 AM UTC-5, John Clark wrote:
>
> On Sat, Sep 14, 2019 at 5:51 AM Lawrence Crowell  > wrote:
>
> > This points to an objection to MWI. Quantum superpositions splitting in 
>> MWI, or somewhat equivalently the fluctuation/localization of a decoherent 
>> event, can be amplified. In the case of this quantum suicide argument the 
>> lottery ticket numbers assigned may have a quantum basis going back in 
>> time. Within MWI this means the world split long before the winning ticket 
>> was announced. 
>
>
> I don't see how that follows. All observers in the multiverse will say the 
> odds you will win the lottery tomorrow are one in 80 million, but if you 
> won today all observers in the multiverse will say that the odds you will 
> win the lottery were one in 80 million but somebody had to win and it 
> happened to be you. Most observers in the multiverse are looking at a 
> losing ticket today but you are not because you arranged things so that a 
> losing ticket causes you to stop existing, so you only exist in universes 
> where you're filthy rich. The universes where you didn't win still exist 
> but you are no longer in them. No backward causality is needed.  
>
> As for me... I think Many Worlds is probably more or less correct, but I 
> wouldn't stake my life on it.  
>
>  John K Clark
>

Yet, that classical probability for a winning ticket is determined by some 
quantum superposition of states that give a probability for a ticket to be 
printed with some set of numbers, or for some probability of tickets being 
distributed in some way. So this rather strict classical probability is due 
to some single or maybe multiple quantum probabilities for various 
outcomes. In performing this quantum suicide experiment one is forcing the 
situation in something similar to a Wheeler delayed choice experiment. The 
question is then how is this classical probability for a winning lottery 
ticket tied to an outcome of a quantum decoherence, or maybe a multiple set 
of them? Also as with the Wheeler delayed choice experiment, there is a 
reduction of states prior to the occurrence of the particle on a screen, 
and with this suicide experiment there is a quantum outcome prior to the 
final experimental end that demolishes the appearance of superposition. How 
is that localized?  Or is it localized in some way? 

LC

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Re: A modest proposal



On Saturday, September 14, 2019 at 5:36:45 AM UTC-5, John Clark wrote:
>
>  
>
> As for me... I think Many Worlds is probably more or less correct, 
>
>  John K Clark
>


More (or less) correct than correct that what?

@philipthrift 

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Re: Another physicist in mental decline (Sean Carroll)



On Saturday, September 14, 2019 at 3:56:42 AM UTC-6, Lawrence Crowell wrote:
>
> On Friday, September 13, 2019 at 10:22:38 PM UTC-5, Alan Grayson wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Friday, September 13, 2019 at 4:08:23 PM UTC-6, John Clark wrote:
>>>
>>> On Thu, Sep 12, 2019 at 10:26 PM Alan Grayson  
>>> wrote:
>>>  
>>>
 *> Carroll also believes that IF the universe is infinite, then there 
 must exist exact copies of universes and ourselves. This is frequently 
 claimed by the MWI true believers, but never, AFAICT, proven, or even 
 plausibly argued.  What's the argument for such a claim?*

>>>
>>> Of course it's been proven! It's simple math, there are only a finite 
>>> number of ways the atoms in your body, or even the entire OBSERVABLE 
>>> universe, can be arranged so obviously if the entire universe is infinite 
>>> then there is going to have to be copies, an infinite number of them in 
>>> fact. Max Tegmark has even calculated how far you'd have to go to see 
>>> such a thing. 
>>>
>>
>> What I think you're missing (and Tegmark) is the possibility of 
>> UNcountable universes. In such case, one could imagine new universes coming 
>> into existence forever and ever, without any repeats.  Think of the number 
>> of points between 0 and 1 on the real line, each point associated with a 
>> different universe. AG
>>
>>>
>>> Your closest identical copy is 10^12 light years away. About 10^76 light 
>>> years away there is a sphere of radius 100 light-years identical to the one 
>>> centered here, so everything we see here during the next century will be 
>>> identical to those of our counterparts over there. And 10^102 light years 
>>> away the is a exact copy of our entire observable universe. And all this is 
>>> true regardless of if the Many Worlds Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics 
>>> is correct or not, it only depends on the universe being spatially infinite.
>>>
>>
>> But our universe is NOT spatially infinite if its been expanding for 
>> finite time, starting very small, as can be inferred from the temperature 
>> of the CMBR. AG 
>>
>
> This is wrong. The CMB is at a distance of 46 billion light years while it 
> was also generated 13.8 billion years ago. The more distant things are the 
> more it is frame dragged by the accelerated expansion, in a sense a "soft 
> inflationary" expansion. If this were not the case the CMB would have 
> markedly different characteristics. 
>
> LC
>

Doesn't the high temperature and density at BB +380,000 years imply the 
universe was small at that time? AG 

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Re: A modest proposal

On Sat, Sep 14, 2019 at 5:51 AM Lawrence Crowell <
goldenfieldquaterni...@gmail.com> wrote:

> This points to an objection to MWI. Quantum superpositions splitting in
> MWI, or somewhat equivalently the fluctuation/localization of a decoherent
> event, can be amplified. In the case of this quantum suicide argument the
> lottery ticket numbers assigned may have a quantum basis going back in
> time. Within MWI this means the world split long before the winning ticket
> was announced.

I don't see how that follows. All observers in the multiverse will say the
odds you will win the lottery tomorrow are one in 80 million, but if you
won today all observers in the multiverse will say that the odds you will
win the lottery were one in 80 million but somebody had to win and it
happened to be you. Most observers in the multiverse are looking at a
losing ticket today but you are not because you arranged things so that a
losing ticket causes you to stop existing, so you only exist in universes
where you're filthy rich. The universes where you didn't win still exist
but you are no longer in them. No backward causality is needed.

As for me... I think Many Worlds is probably more or less correct, but I
wouldn't stake my life on it.

 John K Clark

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Re: Another physicist in mental decline (Sean Carroll)

On Friday, September 13, 2019 at 10:22:38 PM UTC-5, Alan Grayson wrote:
>
>
>
> On Friday, September 13, 2019 at 4:08:23 PM UTC-6, John Clark wrote:
>>
>> On Thu, Sep 12, 2019 at 10:26 PM Alan Grayson  
>> wrote:
>>  
>>
>>> *> Carroll also believes that IF the universe is infinite, then there 
>>> must exist exact copies of universes and ourselves. This is frequently 
>>> claimed by the MWI true believers, but never, AFAICT, proven, or even 
>>> plausibly argued.  What's the argument for such a claim?*
>>>
>>
>> Of course it's been proven! It's simple math, there are only a finite 
>> number of ways the atoms in your body, or even the entire OBSERVABLE 
>> universe, can be arranged so obviously if the entire universe is infinite 
>> then there is going to have to be copies, an infinite number of them in 
>> fact. Max Tegmark has even calculated how far you'd have to go to see 
>> such a thing. 
>>
>
> What I think you're missing (and Tegmark) is the possibility of 
> UNcountable universes. In such case, one could imagine new universes coming 
> into existence forever and ever, without any repeats.  Think of the number 
> of points between 0 and 1 on the real line, each point associated with a 
> different universe. AG
>
>>
>> Your closest identical copy is 10^12 light years away. About 10^76 light 
>> years away there is a sphere of radius 100 light-years identical to the one 
>> centered here, so everything we see here during the next century will be 
>> identical to those of our counterparts over there. And 10^102 light years 
>> away the is a exact copy of our entire observable universe. And all this is 
>> true regardless of if the Many Worlds Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics 
>> is correct or not, it only depends on the universe being spatially infinite.
>>
>
> But our universe is NOT spatially infinite if its been expanding for 
> finite time, starting very small, as can be inferred from the temperature 
> of the CMBR. AG 
>

This is wrong. The CMB is at a distance of 46 billion light years while it 
was also generated 13.8 billion years ago. The more distant things are the 
more it is frame dragged by the accelerated expansion, in a sense a "soft 
inflationary" expansion. If this were not the case the CMB would have 
markedly different characteristics. 

LC

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Re: A modest proposal

On Friday, September 13, 2019 at 11:19:43 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote:
>
> That's the plot of one of the stories in Colin Bruce's book 
> "Schroedinger's Rabbits".  
>
> One of the problems is that the way the Poweball numbers come up is not 
> directly quantum randomness.  It may be determined by the amplification of 
> some random quantum events in the past.  But how far in the past.  You 
> don't want it to be so far in the past that it can be causally correlated 
> with your decision to set up the suicide machine. Of course t'Hooft claims 
> they are all causally determined.
>
> Brent
>
>
This points to an objection to MWI. Quantum superpositions splitting in 
MWI, or somewhat equivalently the fluctuation/localization of a decoherent 
event, can be amplified. In the case of this quantum suicide argument the 
lottery ticket numbers assigned may have a quantum basis going back in 
time. Within MWI this means the world split long before the winning ticket 
was announced. This has some similarity to Wheeler's delayed choice 
experiment. This means the splitting of the world is not a local process 
and we then have a question as to what are the prior probabilities for this 
splitting if we can't localize this event? 

There is some sort of duality I think between local quantum fields and 
causal physics vs the nonlocality of quantum states. The only causal 
quantum field that may be intrinsically nonlocal is gravitation. 
Gravitation as emergent from quantum entanglements is likely a nonlocal 
quantum field. This duality then maybe be expressed as

UV quantum gravity states = IR quantum field states

which is a way of stating the Einstein field equation. UV means high energy 
near the Planck scale and IR means much lower energy say a billion times 
LHC energy and lower. The UV quantum gravity states are nonlocal while the 
IR quantum field states are local, or should it be said localizable. 

LC
 

> On 9/13/2019 2:27 PM, John Clark wrote:
>
> I have a modest proposal, it's a low tech way to find out once and for all 
> if the Many Worlds Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics is correct, and as 
> a side effect make you rich. First you buy one Powerball lottery ticket, 
> the next drawing of the winning number is at 11pm tonight. Then make a 
> simple machine that will monitor the internet and pull the trigger on a 44 
> magnum aimed at your head at exactly 11.01pm UNLESS yours is the winning 
> ticket. If Many Worlds is correct your subjective experience can only be 
> that at 11.01pm, despite 80 million to one odds stacked against you, a 
> miracle occurs and the gun does not go off and you're rich beyond the 
> dreams of avarice. After that as you fly on your private jet to your 
> private island you can contemplate the fact that you are the only person in 
> the world who knows the true nature of reality and knows it with absolute 
> certainty. And it only cost you a few hundred dollars to make the machine, 
> the most expensive part being the gun itself. 
>
> Of course for every universe you're rich in there are 80 million in which 
> your friends watch your head explode, but that's a minor point,  your 
> consciousness no longer exists in any of those worlds so you never have to 
> see the mess; somebody else will have to clean up the thousands of itty 
> bitty bits of brain splattered all over the room, it's their problem not 
> yours. 
>
> John K Clark
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>  
> 
> .
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>
>

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Re: Another physicist in mental decline (Sean Carroll)



On Saturday, September 14, 2019 at 12:34:18 AM UTC-6, Jason wrote:
>
>
>
> On Friday, September 13, 2019, Alan Grayson  > wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On Friday, September 13, 2019 at 4:42:00 PM UTC-6, Jason wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Fri, Sep 13, 2019 at 8:25 AM Alan Grayson  
>>> wrote:
>>>


 On Friday, September 13, 2019 at 5:24:11 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 13 Sep 2019, at 04:26, Alan Grayson  wrote:
>
>
>
> On Thursday, September 12, 2019 at 11:01:54 AM UTC-6, Alan Grayson 
> wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Thursday, September 12, 2019 at 7:45:22 AM UTC-6, Lawrence Crowell 
>> wrote:
>>>
>>> On Thursday, September 12, 2019 at 4:20:46 AM UTC-5, Philip Thrift 
>>> wrote:



 On Wednesday, September 11, 2019 at 11:45:41 PM UTC-5, Alan Grayson 
 wrote:
>
>
> https://www.wired.com/story/sean-carroll-thinks-we-all-exist-on-multiple-worlds/
>



 Many Worlds is where people go to escape from one world of 
 quantum-stochastic processes. They are like vampires, but instead of 
 running away from sunbeams, are running away from probabilities.

 @philipthrift

>>>
>>> This assessment is not entirely fair. Carroll and Sebens have a 
>>> paper on how supposedly the Born rule can be derived from MWI  I have 
>>> yet 
>>> to read their paper, but given the newsiness of this I might get to it. 
>>> One 
>>> advantage that MWI does have is that it splits the world as a sort of 
>>> quantum frame dragging that is nonlocal. This nonlocal property might 
>>> be 
>>> useful for working with quantum gravity,
>>>
>>> I worked a proof of a theorem, which may not be complete 
>>> unfortunately, where the two sets of quantum interpretations that 
>>> are ψ-epistemic and those that are ψ-ontological are not decidable. 
>>> There 
>>> is no decision procedure which can prove QM holds either way. The proof 
>>> is 
>>> set with nonlocal hidden variables over the projective rays of the 
>>> state 
>>> space. In effect there is an uncertainty in whether the hidden 
>>> variables 
>>> localize extant quantities, say with ψ-ontology, or whether this 
>>> localization is the generation of information in a local context from 
>>> quantum nonlocality that is not extant, such as with ψ-epistemology. 
>>> Quantum interprertations are then auxiliary physical axioms or 
>>> postulates. 
>>> MWI and within the framework of what Carrol and Sebens has done this is 
>>> a 
>>> ψ-ontology, and this defines the Born rule. If I am right the 
>>> degree of ψ-epistemontic nature is mixed. So the intriguing 
>>> question we can address is the nature of the Born rule and its tie into 
>>> the 
>>> auxiliary postulates of quantum interpretations. Can a similar 
>>> demonstration be made for the Born rule within QuBism, which is what 
>>> might 
>>> be called the dialectic opposite of MWI?
>>>
>>> To take MWI as something literal, as opposed to maybe a working 
>>> system to understand QM foundations, is maybe taking things too far. 
>>> However, it is a part of some open questions concerning the 
>>> fundamentals of 
>>> QM. If MWI, and more generally postulates of quantum 
>>> interpretations, are connected to the Born rule it makes for some 
>>> interesting things to think about.
>>>
>>> LC
>>>
>>
>> If you read the link, it's pretty obvious that Carroll believes the 
>> many worlds of the MWI, literally exist. AG 
>>
>
> Carroll also believes that IF the universe is infinite, then there 
> must exist exact copies of universes and ourselves. This is frequently 
> claimed by the MWI true believers, but never, AFAICT, proven, or even 
> plausibly argued.  
>
>
> The idea comes from Tegmark, and I agree with you, it necessitate more 
> than an infinite universe. It requires also some assumption of 
> homogeneity.
>

 Our universe is, on a large scale, homogeneous. But it can't be 
 infinite since it has only been expanding for finite time, 13.8 BY. I had 
 a 
 discussion with Brent about this some time ago, and he claimed finite in 
 time doesn't preclude infinite in space. I strongly disagree. Perhaps I am 
 missing something. Wouldn't be the first time. AG 

>>>
>>> I think what you may be missing is that in popular (but misleading) 
>>> accounts of the BB they often say everything originated from a point, 
>>> rather than everywhere at once.  To say "everything came from a point" is 
>>> at best only valid for describing the observable universe (or any finite 
>>> portion of the universe) but is invalid to extrapolate it to the whole 
>>> universe, which may be

Re: Another physicist in mental decline (Sean Carroll)

On Saturday, September 14, 2019 at 1:55:36 AM UTC-6, Alan Grayson wrote:
>
>
>
> On Saturday, September 14, 2019 at 12:34:18 AM UTC-6, Jason wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Friday, September 13, 2019, Alan Grayson  wrote:
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Friday, September 13, 2019 at 4:42:00 PM UTC-6, Jason wrote:

 On Fri, Sep 13, 2019 at 8:25 AM Alan Grayson  
 wrote:

>
>
> On Friday, September 13, 2019 at 5:24:11 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 13 Sep 2019, at 04:26, Alan Grayson  wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Thursday, September 12, 2019 at 11:01:54 AM UTC-6, Alan Grayson 
>> wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Thursday, September 12, 2019 at 7:45:22 AM UTC-6, Lawrence 
>>> Crowell wrote:

 On Thursday, September 12, 2019 at 4:20:46 AM UTC-5, Philip Thrift 
 wrote:
>
>
>
> On Wednesday, September 11, 2019 at 11:45:41 PM UTC-5, Alan 
> Grayson wrote:
>>
>>
>> https://www.wired.com/story/sean-carroll-thinks-we-all-exist-on-multiple-worlds/
>>
>
>
>
> Many Worlds is where people go to escape from one world of 
> quantum-stochastic processes. They are like vampires, but instead of 
> running away from sunbeams, are running away from probabilities.
>
> @philipthrift
>

 This assessment is not entirely fair. Carroll and Sebens have a 
 paper on how supposedly the Born rule can be derived from MWI  I have 
 yet 
 to read their paper, but given the newsiness of this I might get to 
 it. One 
 advantage that MWI does have is that it splits the world as a sort of 
 quantum frame dragging that is nonlocal. This nonlocal property might 
 be 
 useful for working with quantum gravity,

 I worked a proof of a theorem, which may not be complete 
 unfortunately, where the two sets of quantum interpretations that 
 are ψ-epistemic and those that are ψ-ontological are not decidable. 
 There 
 is no decision procedure which can prove QM holds either way. The 
 proof is 
 set with nonlocal hidden variables over the projective rays of the 
 state 
 space. In effect there is an uncertainty in whether the hidden 
 variables 
 localize extant quantities, say with ψ-ontology, or whether this 
 localization is the generation of information in a local context from 
 quantum nonlocality that is not extant, such as with ψ-epistemology. 
 Quantum interprertations are then auxiliary physical axioms or 
 postulates. 
 MWI and within the framework of what Carrol and Sebens has done this 
 is a 
 ψ-ontology, and this defines the Born rule. If I am right the 
 degree of ψ-epistemontic nature is mixed. So the intriguing 
 question we can address is the nature of the Born rule and its tie 
 into the 
 auxiliary postulates of quantum interpretations. Can a similar 
 demonstration be made for the Born rule within QuBism, which is what 
 might 
 be called the dialectic opposite of MWI?

 To take MWI as something literal, as opposed to maybe a working 
 system to understand QM foundations, is maybe taking things too far. 
 However, it is a part of some open questions concerning the 
 fundamentals of 
 QM. If MWI, and more generally postulates of quantum 
 interpretations, are connected to the Born rule it makes for some 
 interesting things to think about.

 LC

>>>
>>> If you read the link, it's pretty obvious that Carroll believes the 
>>> many worlds of the MWI, literally exist. AG 
>>>
>>
>> Carroll also believes that IF the universe is infinite, then there 
>> must exist exact copies of universes and ourselves. This is frequently 
>> claimed by the MWI true believers, but never, AFAICT, proven, or even 
>> plausibly argued.  
>>
>>
>> The idea comes from Tegmark, and I agree with you, it necessitate 
>> more than an infinite universe. It requires also some assumption of 
>> homogeneity.
>>
>
> Our universe is, on a large scale, homogeneous. But it can't be 
> infinite since it has only been expanding for finite time, 13.8 BY. I had 
> a 
> discussion with Brent about this some time ago, and he claimed finite in 
> time doesn't preclude infinite in space. I strongly disagree. Perhaps I 
> am 
> missing something. Wouldn't be the first time. AG 
>

 I think what you may be missing is that in popular (but misleading) 
 accounts of the BB they often say everything originated from a point, 
 rather than everywhere at once.  To say

Re: Another physicist in mental decline (Sean Carroll)



On Saturday, September 14, 2019 at 12:34:18 AM UTC-6, Jason wrote:
>
>
>
> On Friday, September 13, 2019, Alan Grayson  > wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On Friday, September 13, 2019 at 4:42:00 PM UTC-6, Jason wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Fri, Sep 13, 2019 at 8:25 AM Alan Grayson  
>>> wrote:
>>>


 On Friday, September 13, 2019 at 5:24:11 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 13 Sep 2019, at 04:26, Alan Grayson  wrote:
>
>
>
> On Thursday, September 12, 2019 at 11:01:54 AM UTC-6, Alan Grayson 
> wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Thursday, September 12, 2019 at 7:45:22 AM UTC-6, Lawrence Crowell 
>> wrote:
>>>
>>> On Thursday, September 12, 2019 at 4:20:46 AM UTC-5, Philip Thrift 
>>> wrote:



 On Wednesday, September 11, 2019 at 11:45:41 PM UTC-5, Alan Grayson 
 wrote:
>
>
> https://www.wired.com/story/sean-carroll-thinks-we-all-exist-on-multiple-worlds/
>



 Many Worlds is where people go to escape from one world of 
 quantum-stochastic processes. They are like vampires, but instead of 
 running away from sunbeams, are running away from probabilities.

 @philipthrift

>>>
>>> This assessment is not entirely fair. Carroll and Sebens have a 
>>> paper on how supposedly the Born rule can be derived from MWI  I have 
>>> yet 
>>> to read their paper, but given the newsiness of this I might get to it. 
>>> One 
>>> advantage that MWI does have is that it splits the world as a sort of 
>>> quantum frame dragging that is nonlocal. This nonlocal property might 
>>> be 
>>> useful for working with quantum gravity,
>>>
>>> I worked a proof of a theorem, which may not be complete 
>>> unfortunately, where the two sets of quantum interpretations that 
>>> are ψ-epistemic and those that are ψ-ontological are not decidable. 
>>> There 
>>> is no decision procedure which can prove QM holds either way. The proof 
>>> is 
>>> set with nonlocal hidden variables over the projective rays of the 
>>> state 
>>> space. In effect there is an uncertainty in whether the hidden 
>>> variables 
>>> localize extant quantities, say with ψ-ontology, or whether this 
>>> localization is the generation of information in a local context from 
>>> quantum nonlocality that is not extant, such as with ψ-epistemology. 
>>> Quantum interprertations are then auxiliary physical axioms or 
>>> postulates. 
>>> MWI and within the framework of what Carrol and Sebens has done this is 
>>> a 
>>> ψ-ontology, and this defines the Born rule. If I am right the 
>>> degree of ψ-epistemontic nature is mixed. So the intriguing 
>>> question we can address is the nature of the Born rule and its tie into 
>>> the 
>>> auxiliary postulates of quantum interpretations. Can a similar 
>>> demonstration be made for the Born rule within QuBism, which is what 
>>> might 
>>> be called the dialectic opposite of MWI?
>>>
>>> To take MWI as something literal, as opposed to maybe a working 
>>> system to understand QM foundations, is maybe taking things too far. 
>>> However, it is a part of some open questions concerning the 
>>> fundamentals of 
>>> QM. If MWI, and more generally postulates of quantum 
>>> interpretations, are connected to the Born rule it makes for some 
>>> interesting things to think about.
>>>
>>> LC
>>>
>>
>> If you read the link, it's pretty obvious that Carroll believes the 
>> many worlds of the MWI, literally exist. AG 
>>
>
> Carroll also believes that IF the universe is infinite, then there 
> must exist exact copies of universes and ourselves. This is frequently 
> claimed by the MWI true believers, but never, AFAICT, proven, or even 
> plausibly argued.  
>
>
> The idea comes from Tegmark, and I agree with you, it necessitate more 
> than an infinite universe. It requires also some assumption of 
> homogeneity.
>

 Our universe is, on a large scale, homogeneous. But it can't be 
 infinite since it has only been expanding for finite time, 13.8 BY. I had 
 a 
 discussion with Brent about this some time ago, and he claimed finite in 
 time doesn't preclude infinite in space. I strongly disagree. Perhaps I am 
 missing something. Wouldn't be the first time. AG 

>>>
>>> I think what you may be missing is that in popular (but misleading) 
>>> accounts of the BB they often say everything originated from a point, 
>>> rather than everywhere at once.  To say "everything came from a point" is 
>>> at best only valid for describing the observable universe (or any finite 
>>> portion of the universe) but is invalid to extrapolate it to the whole 
>>> universe, which may be

Re: Another physicist in mental decline (Sean Carroll)



On Saturday, September 14, 2019 at 12:34:18 AM UTC-6, Jason wrote:
>
>
>
> On Friday, September 13, 2019, Alan Grayson  > wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On Friday, September 13, 2019 at 4:42:00 PM UTC-6, Jason wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Fri, Sep 13, 2019 at 8:25 AM Alan Grayson  
>>> wrote:
>>>


 On Friday, September 13, 2019 at 5:24:11 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 13 Sep 2019, at 04:26, Alan Grayson  wrote:
>
>
>
> On Thursday, September 12, 2019 at 11:01:54 AM UTC-6, Alan Grayson 
> wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Thursday, September 12, 2019 at 7:45:22 AM UTC-6, Lawrence Crowell 
>> wrote:
>>>
>>> On Thursday, September 12, 2019 at 4:20:46 AM UTC-5, Philip Thrift 
>>> wrote:



 On Wednesday, September 11, 2019 at 11:45:41 PM UTC-5, Alan Grayson 
 wrote:
>
>
> https://www.wired.com/story/sean-carroll-thinks-we-all-exist-on-multiple-worlds/
>



 Many Worlds is where people go to escape from one world of 
 quantum-stochastic processes. They are like vampires, but instead of 
 running away from sunbeams, are running away from probabilities.

 @philipthrift

>>>
>>> This assessment is not entirely fair. Carroll and Sebens have a 
>>> paper on how supposedly the Born rule can be derived from MWI  I have 
>>> yet 
>>> to read their paper, but given the newsiness of this I might get to it. 
>>> One 
>>> advantage that MWI does have is that it splits the world as a sort of 
>>> quantum frame dragging that is nonlocal. This nonlocal property might 
>>> be 
>>> useful for working with quantum gravity,
>>>
>>> I worked a proof of a theorem, which may not be complete 
>>> unfortunately, where the two sets of quantum interpretations that 
>>> are ψ-epistemic and those that are ψ-ontological are not decidable. 
>>> There 
>>> is no decision procedure which can prove QM holds either way. The proof 
>>> is 
>>> set with nonlocal hidden variables over the projective rays of the 
>>> state 
>>> space. In effect there is an uncertainty in whether the hidden 
>>> variables 
>>> localize extant quantities, say with ψ-ontology, or whether this 
>>> localization is the generation of information in a local context from 
>>> quantum nonlocality that is not extant, such as with ψ-epistemology. 
>>> Quantum interprertations are then auxiliary physical axioms or 
>>> postulates. 
>>> MWI and within the framework of what Carrol and Sebens has done this is 
>>> a 
>>> ψ-ontology, and this defines the Born rule. If I am right the 
>>> degree of ψ-epistemontic nature is mixed. So the intriguing 
>>> question we can address is the nature of the Born rule and its tie into 
>>> the 
>>> auxiliary postulates of quantum interpretations. Can a similar 
>>> demonstration be made for the Born rule within QuBism, which is what 
>>> might 
>>> be called the dialectic opposite of MWI?
>>>
>>> To take MWI as something literal, as opposed to maybe a working 
>>> system to understand QM foundations, is maybe taking things too far. 
>>> However, it is a part of some open questions concerning the 
>>> fundamentals of 
>>> QM. If MWI, and more generally postulates of quantum 
>>> interpretations, are connected to the Born rule it makes for some 
>>> interesting things to think about.
>>>
>>> LC
>>>
>>
>> If you read the link, it's pretty obvious that Carroll believes the 
>> many worlds of the MWI, literally exist. AG 
>>
>
> Carroll also believes that IF the universe is infinite, then there 
> must exist exact copies of universes and ourselves. This is frequently 
> claimed by the MWI true believers, but never, AFAICT, proven, or even 
> plausibly argued.  
>
>
> The idea comes from Tegmark, and I agree with you, it necessitate more 
> than an infinite universe. It requires also some assumption of 
> homogeneity.
>

 Our universe is, on a large scale, homogeneous. But it can't be 
 infinite since it has only been expanding for finite time, 13.8 BY. I had 
 a 
 discussion with Brent about this some time ago, and he claimed finite in 
 time doesn't preclude infinite in space. I strongly disagree. Perhaps I am 
 missing something. Wouldn't be the first time. AG 

>>>
>>> I think what you may be missing is that in popular (but misleading) 
>>> accounts of the BB they often say everything originated from a point, 
>>> rather than everywhere at once.  To say "everything came from a point" is 
>>> at best only valid for describing the observable universe (or any finite 
>>> portion of the universe) but is invalid to extrapolate it to the whole 
>>> universe, which may be

Re: A modest proposal



Gerard ’t Hooft on the future of quantum mechanics
https://physicstoday.scitation.org/do/10.1063/PT.6.4.20170711a/full/

T HOOFT: I do not believe that we have to live with the many-worlds 
interpretation. Indeed, it would be a stupendous number of parallel worlds, 
which are only there because physicists couldn’t decide which of them is 
real.

In practice, quantum mechanics merely gives predictions with probabilities 
attached. This should be considered as a normal and quite acceptable 
feature of predictions made by science: different possible outcomes with 
different probabilities. In the world that is familiar to us, we always 
have such a situation when we make predictions. Thus the question remains: 
What is the reality described by quantum theories? I claim that we can 
attribute the fact that our predictions come with probability distributions 
to the fact that not all relevant data for the predictions are known to us, 
in particular important features of the initial state.

@philipthrift


On Friday, September 13, 2019 at 11:19:43 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote:
>
> That's the plot of one of the stories in Colin Bruce's book 
> "Schroedinger's Rabbits".  
>
> One of the problems is that the way the Poweball numbers come up is not 
> directly quantum randomness.  It may be determined by the amplification of 
> some random quantum events in the past.  But how far in the past.  You 
> don't want it to be so far in the past that it can be causally correlated 
> with your decision to set up the suicide machine. Of course t'Hooft claims 
> they are all causally determined.
>
> Brent
>
> On 9/13/2019 2:27 PM, John Clark wrote:
>
> I have a modest proposal, it's a low tech way to find out once and for all 
> if the Many Worlds Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics is correct, and as 
> a side effect make you rich. First you buy one Powerball lottery ticket, 
> the next drawing of the winning number is at 11pm tonight. Then make a 
> simple machine that will monitor the internet and pull the trigger on a 44 
> magnum aimed at your head at exactly 11.01pm UNLESS yours is the winning 
> ticket. If Many Worlds is correct your subjective experience can only be 
> that at 11.01pm, despite 80 million to one odds stacked against you, a 
> miracle occurs and the gun does not go off and you're rich beyond the 
> dreams of avarice. After that as you fly on your private jet to your 
> private island you can contemplate the fact that you are the only person in 
> the world who knows the true nature of reality and knows it with absolute 
> certainty. And it only cost you a few hundred dollars to make the machine, 
> the most expensive part being the gun itself. 
>
> Of course for every universe you're rich in there are 80 million in which 
> your friends watch your head explode, but that's a minor point,  your 
> consciousness no longer exists in any of those worlds so you never have to 
> see the mess; somebody else will have to clean up the thousands of itty 
> bitty bits of brain splattered all over the room, it's their problem not 
> yours. 
>
> John K Clark
>
>
>

-- 
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Re: Another physicist in mental decline (Sean Carroll)