Re: Branch counting (was: Spin Superposition)
On Wed, Nov 06, 2024 at 04:49:36PM -0500, John Clark wrote: > On Wed, Nov 6, 2024 at 4:42 PM Russell Standish wrote: > > > > So even though there is 1 subset inthe spin up branch, and 2 in the spin > down branch, each subset in the spin down branch has half the measure of > the single branch in the spin up branch. > > > OK, but that's pretty much what I was doing, except that I use the word " > thickness" instead of "measure". > Sounds like it. Our difference, I think, is that we assigned different meanings to the term "branch counting". So when I hear "You can't get the Born rule from branch counting", to me that means you can't get the complex measure from simple considerations of dividing up sets of "descriptions" (naively thought of as bit strings) and counting their elements. I had quite a long discussion with Bruce Kellett about this some time back. We ended in an impasse. There's another fly in the ointment - in my book, I stated that complex measures were the most general type of measure, but it aint so. In fact a quaternionic measure seems to fit the bill: arxiv:hep-th/0110253v2 -- Dr Russell StandishPhone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders hpco...@hpcoders.com.au http://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/ZyvrBLvTEiRQxrv8%40zen.
Re: Branch counting (was: Spin Superposition)
On Wed, Nov 06, 2024 at 08:55:15AM -0500, John Clark wrote: > On Tue, Nov 5, 2024 at 5:57 PM Russell Standish wrote: > > > Me: > Here's why branch counting won't work: I measure the spin of an > electron in the > > vertical direction and both the electron and I split into two, and > there's a > > 50% chance "I" will see spin up and a 50% chance "I" will see spin > down. So far > > branch counting seems to work. But before I started I made up my > mind > that if I > > see spin up I will do nothing, but if I see spin down then I will > wait for 10 > > minutes and then measure the electron spin a second time but this > time along > > the horizontal axis. And so the spin down world splits again into a > spin right > > world and a spin left world. So now there's only one branch in the > spin up line > > BUT three branches in the spin down line. If you use branch counting > you'd have > > to say that in the first measurement the probability was not 50-50 > as > you > > originally thought, instead there was a 25% chance I would see spin > up in a 75% > > chance I would see spin down. But something I do now can't affect > the > > probability of an experiment I performed 10 minutes ago. > > That's why when I draw a diagram of the worlds splitting on a piece > of paper or > > a blackboard even though the lines I draw are two dimensional I like > to think > > of those lines is having a little 3D thickness, the total sum of all > the > > thickness of all the branches in the multiverse remains constant but > each time > > a world split the resulting worlds become more numerous but thinner; > although > > it always remains true that if you're betting on which universe you > are likely > > to be in you should always place your money on being in the thicker > one. > > > > I want to emphasize that this thickness business is not to be taken > literally, > > it's just an analogy that I happen to like, you may not and that's > OK > because > > there's no disputing matters of taste. But disliking branch counting > is not a > > matter of taste because such a dislike is not subjective, branch > counting > > objectively doesn't work. > > > > Maybe we're at cross purposes with what branch counting means. > I always invisaged in branch counting, performing measurements as like > dividing up the unit interval [0,1) into subsets. So if you first > divide the interval into 2 subsets, you'd get [0,0.5) and > [0.5,1). Then at the second step, you'd subdivide [0.5,1) into > [0.5,0.75) and [0.75,1). The measures of the three resultant steps are > 0.5, 0.25, 0.25 using the most naive way of measuring real intervals. > The counting comes from attempting to count the number of subsets of > the real interval. Of course, these are uncountable sets, but if you > restrict yourself always to finite partitions - say all rational > numbers with fewer than n decimal places - and perform counting of the > numbers in the subsets - and then take the limit as n goes to > infinity, the naive measure is what you get in the limit. > > > I think it's valid for you to divide up the continuum of universes into a > finite number of partitions which differ from each other by an arbitrarily > small amount, however if we do that then in my example you'd still have more > subsets in the spin down branch than the spin up branch because you kept > measuring the electron in just one branch. So you'd affect the probability of > an experiment you perform 10 minutes ago. And that can't be right. That's why > I > prefer the thickness analogy, the number of universes increases but their > thickness decreases, so the total thickness always remains constant; thus if > you're betting on which universe you're in you should always bet you're in the > thicker one. > No - because the total measure found by summing up the subset measures remains constant. And it is the set measure that is used for probability in branch counting. So even though there is 1 subset in the spin up branch, and 2 in the spin down branch, each subset in the spin down branch has half the m
Re: Branch counting (was: Spin Superposition)
On Tue, Nov 05, 2024 at 07:33:53AM -0500, John Clark wrote: > On Mon, Nov 4, 2024 at 5:18 PM Brent Meeker wrote: > > > >> Branch counting could never work. > > > > The other advocate of MWI I know insists that it only makes sense for > branch counting. > > > Here's why branch counting won't work: I measure the spin of an electron in > the > vertical direction and both the electron and I split into two, and there's a > 50% chance "I" will see spin up and a 50% chance "I" will see spin down. So > far > branch counting seems to work. But before I started I made up my mind that if > I > see spin up I will do nothing, but if I see spin down then I will wait for 10 > minutes and then measure the electron spin a second time but this time along > the horizontal axis. And so the spin down world splits again into a spin right > world and a spin left world. So now there's only one branch in the spin up > line > BUT three branches in the spin down line. If you use branch counting you'd > have > to say that in the first measurement the probability was not 50-50 as you > originally thought, instead there was a 25% chance I would see spin up in a > 75% > chance I would see spin down. But something I do now can't affect the > probability of an experiment I performed 10 minutes ago. > > That's why when I draw a diagram of the worlds splitting on a piece of paper > or > a blackboard even though the lines I draw are two dimensional I like to think > of those lines is having a little 3D thickness, the total sum of all the > thickness of all the branches in the multiverse remains constant but each time > a world split the resulting worlds become more numerous but thinner; although > it always remains true that if you're betting on which universe you are likely > to be in you should always place your money on being in the thicker one. > > I want to emphasize that this thickness business is not to be taken literally, > it's just an analogy that I happen to like, you may not and that's OK because > there's no disputing matters of taste. But disliking branch counting is not a > matter of taste because such a dislike is not subjective, branch counting > objectively doesn't work. > Maybe we're at cross purposes with what branch counting means. I always invisaged in branch counting, performing measurements as like dividing up the unit interval [0,1) into subsets. So if you first divide the interval into 2 subsets, you'd get [0,0.5) and [0.5,1). Then at the second step, you'd subdivide [0.5,1) into [0.5,0.75) and [0.75,1). The measures of the three resultant steps are 0.5, 0.25, 0.25 using the most naive way of measuring real intervals. The counting comes from attempting to count the number of subsets of the real interval. Of course, these are uncountable sets, but if you restrict yourself always to finite partitions - say all rational numbers with fewer than n decimal places - and perform counting of the numbers in the subsets - and then take the limit as n goes to infinity, the naive measure is what you get in the limit. The analogy doesn't quite work, because in QM one has complex measures, not real ones as per the example. -- Dr Russell StandishPhone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders hpco...@hpcoders.com.au http://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/Zyqi0ZXtycDpH3Oo%40zen.
Re: Spin Superposition
On Tue, Nov 05, 2024 at 01:26:10AM -0800, Alan Grayson wrote: > > > On Tuesday, November 5, 2024 at 12:27:55 AM UTC-7 Russell Standish wrote: > > Sorry Brent - the measured momentum values are still eigenvalues. > > Pick 3 orthogonal directions to measure the momentum, say x, y and z. > > Then the momentum operators are -iℏ∂/∂x, -iℏ∂/∂y and -iℏ∂/∂z, and the 3 > eigenvalues are the 3 components of momentum. > > One could also write it in vector form iℏ∇, in which case the operator > has a vector-valued eigenvalue. > > > I don't think this is correct. Quantum operators are chosen to be Hermitian, > that is, self-adjoint IIRC, so that their eigenvalues will be > real. This is something that can be proven. So the question remains; how can a > real eigenvalue be a measured momentum, which > is a vector? AG You missed my point completely. Momentum is a 3-vector, so the momentum operator is 3-vector of hermitian operators, applied elementwise over the wavefuction. The "eigenvalue" is a 3-vector, applied elementwise over the state vector. This is quantum mechanics 101 - any of the introductory books will tell you the same - Ramamurti Shankar, Leonard Schiff, Emile Durand. I'm surprised Brent made such a howler, but we're all human (for how long, I wonder, give JC's comments), and he's picked up plenty of howlers I've made over the years. Cheers -- Dr Russell StandishPhone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders hpco...@hpcoders.com.au http://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/ZyqdWOBYOiVv05cQ%40zen.
Re: Spin Superposition
On Mon, Nov 04, 2024 at 10:12:39PM -0800, Brent Meeker wrote: > > > > On 11/4/2024 9:47 PM, Alan Grayson wrote: > > > On an unrelated issue, I recall your mention that wrt the S. Cat thought > experiment, there is no > operator which has Alive and Dead as eigenvalues. IMO, this implies that > the S. Cat thought > experiment just doesn't fit into any quantum thought experiment. I then > realized that the P > operator for momentum must have a real value for its eigenvalues since > it's > Hermitian, BUT > how can a real value represent momentum, which is a vector? TY, AG > > The eigenvector would be momentum. > Sorry Brent - the measured momentum values are still eigenvalues. Pick 3 orthogonal directions to measure the momentum, say x, y and z. Then the momentum operators are -iℏ∂/∂x, -iℏ∂/∂y and -iℏ∂/∂z, and the 3 eigenvalues are the 3 components of momentum. One could also write it in vector form iℏ∇, in which case the operator has a vector-valued eigenvalue. -- -------- Dr Russell StandishPhone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders hpco...@hpcoders.com.au http://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/ZynI7yEFdD09drGP%40zen.
Stephen Wolfram's Ruliad
https://writings.stephenwolfram.com/2024/10/on-the-nature-of-time/ Stephen's "Ruliad" looks and smells to me like Bruno's Universal Dovetailer, and quite likely the same object that I call the "Nothing" in my book "Theory of Nothing". He seems to have rediscovered many of the things we've discussed on this list over the years. On the other hand, his concept of "branchial space" being knitted into something like the spacetime described by Einstein's equations seems novel to me, and smells about right, so I think he is worth listening to. Also his comments on computational irreducibility and bounded computational ability of observers is also rarely discussed (I leaned on those notions in my resolution of the White Rabbit problem), and his takes on those matters seem fresh to me. I know Stephen is a controversial figure - the only person I know to have met him personally described him as an arsehole, or words to that effect. My response to her is that he might be an arsehole, but he's a genius level arsehole. That was well before his NKS book. His biggest problem is not acknowledging contributions by others, effectively claiming vast tracts of academic knowledge for himself. -- -------- Dr Russell StandishPhone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders hpco...@hpcoders.com.au http://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/ZyVoZj2fDY3NgTZG%40zen.
Re: Mind Uploading, for a fly at least, is becoming mainstream science
Impressive result indeed. I can see this as a logical extension of work done in the '90s where crayfish brains were plasticised, sliced then imaged under electron microscopes, giving a 3D dataset of the brain structure. Nowhere near as detailed as this, though. Next step is to calculate the complexity of the drosophila brain. I did that a few years back for the C. Elegans brain - although I doubt my algorithms will be up to snuff, as they tend to be combinatorially complex - but who knows, I might get lucky. Cheers On Thu, Oct 03, 2024 at 02:44:45PM -0400, John Clark wrote: > A fly has been uploaded. That's the takeaway I got after reading an article in > yesterday's issue of the journal Nature. Apparently Sebastian Seung, a leader > of the project, had a similar thought because he is quoted as saying: > > “Mind uploading has been science fiction, but now mind uploading — for a fly, > at least — is becoming mainstream science.” > > They put the brain of an adult fly in a bath of liquid plastic which soon > hardened into a solid block. Then they sliced the entire brain into 7,050 > super > thin slices and took 21 million high resolution pictures of it. Then they > wrote > a computer program that could look at all those pictures and trace which > neuron > was connected to which; from that they were able to conclude that the fly > brain > had 139,255 neurons and 50 million connections. Pretty impressive considering > that previously the best neuronal map was that of a worm that only had 385 > neurons, but that's not even the best part. They used the information about > how > those 139,255 neurons were wired up to make a simulated fly brain on a > computer, and they obtained typical fly behavior! Sebastian Seung said: > > "We show that activation of sugar-sensing or water-sensing gustatory neurons > in > the computational model accurately predicts neurons that respond to tastes and > are required for feeding initiation. In addition, using the model to activate > neurons in the feeding region of the Drosophila brain predicts those that > elicit motor neuron firing. Our results demonstrate that modelling brain > circuits using only synapse-level connectivity and predicted neurotransmitter > identity generates experimentally testable hypotheses and can describe > complete > sensorimotor transformations." > > The researchers say their next target is uploading a mouse brain which has > about 1000 times more neurons than a fly brain. > > A Drosophila computational brain model reveals sensorimotor processing > > John K Clark See what's on my new list at Extropolis > vo3 > > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email > to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/ > everything-list/ > CAJPayv0cq_b1%3DxapUvBN7DUtaCQELWAvNmMAL9k16w1HZ2qK%3DQ%40mail.gmail.com. -- Dr Russell StandishPhone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders hpco...@hpcoders.com.au http://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/Zw3ERwpmmyDKJAS0%40zen.
Re: If the universe is infinite in spatial extent, it is uncreated.
On Fri, Sep 20, 2024 at 09:50:46PM -0700, Alan Grayson wrote: > > > On Friday, September 20, 2024 at 10:39:20 PM UTC-6 Russell Standish wrote: > The term comes from an expected step change where technology starts to > advance hyperbolically rather than exponentially like it has been > doing since Ogg smashed rocks together. Hyperbolic growth reaches > infinity in a finite amount of time. > > > That's impossible. AG > It's mathematics! https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hyperbolic_growth -- -------- Dr Russell StandishPhone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders hpco...@hpcoders.com.au http://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/20240921073825.GC2048%40zen.
Re: If the universe is infinite in spatial extent, it is uncreated.
On Fri, Sep 20, 2024 at 04:22:28PM -0400, John Clark wrote: > By the way when people, like me, say that because of AI we're heading towards > a > Singularity they are using poetic license, things in general and society in > particular won't really be changing infinitely fast, just faster than the > human > meat brain can comprehend. The term comes from an expected step change where technology starts to advance hyperbolically rather than exponentially like it has been doing since Ogg smashed rocks together. Hyperbolic growth reaches infinity in a finite amount of time. It is a singularity in exactly the same sense as the beginning of the universe is a singularity or a black hole is a singularity. Of course no actual infinities are expected in any of these situations, but our theories break down well before. -- ---- Dr Russell StandishPhone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders hpco...@hpcoders.com.au http://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/20240921043906.GB2048%40zen.
Re: That's not me!
Even a name like Russell Standish is not unique enough. The other Dr Russell Standish, also Australian, is an minister of the seventh day adventist church, and has published numerous books on creationism (arguing for it, I believe, I've never read any of them :). He first came to my attention as a candidate for the Australian republican convention (as a support of the monarchy, quite to contrast to my political beliefs). I don't think you could get someone more opposite my point of view. We always had a cordial relationship - never engaging in arguing about ecolution or creationism - an mostly via his wife, as he was a complete luddite, and couldn't manage email. When he died in a tragic train accident, an old time friend my university days reconnected and said she was horrified at the news until she realised it wasn't me. I was able to use Mark Twain inimitable quote "The report of my death was an exaggeration." :). Cheers On Mon, Jul 29, 2024 at 08:47:21AM -0400, John Clark wrote: > It's not easy having a ridiculously boring and common name like "John Clark". > I > was reading an article about Trump giving a speech at a right wing evangelical > Christian convention that said John Clark, a 26 year old graphic designer from > Minneapolis attended the convention and said he was going to vote for Trump > but > “I don’t think Trump’s perfect, he’s not Jesus, so best not to idolize him. As > much as he represents conservative values, he also doesn’t, in a lot of ways. > Like, being, let’s say, hateful in some ways.” > > I hope I'm a little more eloquent than that, and I'm not 26, I'm not an > evangelical Christian, I'm not a graphic designer, I've never been to > Minneapolis, and I'm not going to vote for Trump; but I do agree with Mr. > Clark > that Trump is hateful and it's a good idea to not idolize him. > > John K Clark See what's on my new list at Extropolis > hit > > 3ez > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email > to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/ > everything-list/ > CAJPayv0ApYW0o%3DEh85t%2BW_9Lhna4_1VLLkZskrLF3mNz6NkpyQ%40mail.gmail.com. -- Dr Russell StandishPhone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders hpco...@hpcoders.com.au http://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/20240914082107.GA13671%40zen.
Re: Amoeba's Secret openly available under CC-BY license
On Thu, Sep 12, 2024 at 07:48:36PM -0700, Liz R wrote: > On Friday 13 September 2024 at 12:20:01 UTC+12 Russell Standish wrote: > > One of the consequences of the universal dovetailer argument is that > if conciousness is computational, then physics is not. > > > That's interesting. I don't see how that could happen, would you mind > elaborating? (I've read "The Amoeba's Secret" thanks to you but I can't > remember this part). Physics, as in what is observed - phenomenology. The universal dovetailer will run all computations, so at each step where there is a difference of computation, all branches are taken. To a conscious entitity, the result will appear as an intrinsic random process - there is no meaningful statement to say which ameoba is the original one, they all are. The only get out I can think of is if the "foundational reality" (ontological layer) is sufficiently poor that it is incapable of running a universal dovetailer. But in that case, it would show up in observed physics, ie it would be impossible to imlement a universal dovetailer in our reality - or any sort of universal Turing machine or computer. I don't think this consequence is written in Amoeba's Secret, as it came out during discussions on this list which postdated Le secret de l'amibe. It might be in my book, but I don't recall now :). > > > > Intrinsic > randomness arises from the first person view of the operation of the > dovetailer. > > > I can see that, at least, I think it's similar to the idea of apparent > randomness in many-worlds? > Yes. > > Perhaps what you're thinking of is oracles solving computationally > impossible problems, such as delivering the successive digits of the > Chaitin probablility Ω. > > A corrolary of this is that a computational physics à la Konrad Zuse's > Rechnender Raum would rule out computationalism, and consequently > physical supervenience. > > > I can see how that follows from the first paragraph, but as mentioned I can't > think how computational consciousness leads to non-computational physics (or > exactly what that means). > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email > to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/ > everything-list/bb7aa002-e50c-4239-8cef-77f0e3feab8cn%40googlegroups.com. -- Dr Russell StandishPhone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders hpco...@hpcoders.com.au http://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/20240913032315.GF2031%40zen.
Re: Fwd: Contra DeBoer On Temporal Copernicanism
late the number that mattered. > > 6 > > Some of these numbers depend on how you’re thinking of “lifespan” vs. > “lifespan so far” and how much of your actually-existing foreknowledge about > the part of your life you’ve already lived you’re using. I’m just going to > handwave all of that away since it depends on how you’re framing the question > and doesn’t change results by more than a factor of two or three. > > 7 > > Realistically the Agricultural and Industrial Revolutions were long processes > instead of point events. I think the singularity will be shorter (just as the > Industrial Revolution was shorter than the Agricultural), but if this bothers > you, imagine we’re talking about the start (or peak) of each. > Thanks for the post John. For the most part, I agree with the points you're making. My comments/criticisms above are really just minor nits. -- Dr Russell StandishPhone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders hpco...@hpcoders.com.au http://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/20240913010419.GE2031%40zen.
Re: Amoeba's Secret openly available under CC-BY license
One of the consequences of the universal dovetailer argument is that if conciousness is computational, then physics is not. Intrinsic randomness arises from the first person view of the operation of the dovetailer. Perhaps what you're thinking of is oracles solving computationally impossible problems, such as delivering the successive digits of the Chaitin probablility Ω. A corrolary of this is that a computational physics à la Konrad Zuse's Rechnender Raum would rule out computationalism, and consequently physical supervenience. Cheers On Fri, Sep 13, 2024 at 09:47:17AM +1000, Bruce Kellett wrote: > On Fri, Sep 13, 2024 at 9:28 AM Liz R wrote: > > Yes I wondered about that, but it's possible that physics isn't > intrinsically random. > > > No, that isn't possible. Randomness is intrinsic, and not derivable from > anything else. > > > It could be based on something computable, and only appear random from our > perspective - presumbly some versions of many-worlds would fit the bill. > > > No, many-worlds is a decided failure as far as randomness is concerned. You > cannot get intrinsic randomness as exhibited by quantum phenomena from a > deterministic theory such as many-worlds. > > > Also, although various attempts to show hidden variables have fallen down, > it's always possible something of that sort might be involved that we > haven't thought of yet. > > > That is just a cheap let-out: "It could be something we haven't thought of > yet. > There are very good reason to think that intrinsic randomness cannot arise > from > a deterministic theory. You can get randomness from ignorance, as in classic > statistical mechanics, but that is not intrinsic -- things are still > deterministic if you have complete knowledge. Which is not the case in QM. > > Bruce > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email > to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/ > everything-list/ > CAFxXSLQ6r0rCsji2AaE1NMH3%2BkEfBSzseDUi%3DxkGC7VHbhXOQQ%40mail.gmail.com. -- Dr Russell StandishPhone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders hpco...@hpcoders.com.au http://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/20240913001947.GD2031%40zen.
Re: Amoeba's Secret openly available under CC-BY license
On Wed, Sep 11, 2024 at 11:48:02PM -0700, Liz R wrote: > Thanks, Russell. Bruno tried to explain this to me a while ago but I probably > didn't take it all in. Am I right in thinking this has something to do with > "no > oracles" - that is, reality contains no sources of infinite unpredictable > data? > A naked signularity would presumably count as an oracle, while it appears any > area of space-time contains finite data (the Deckenstein bound?) - does that > make it Turing complete, in principle? Or am I talking nonsense? It sounds vaguely plausible, but could well be the latter :). At least its not egregious nonsense like immigrants eating you pets :P. Cheers -- -------- Dr Russell StandishPhone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders hpco...@hpcoders.com.au http://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/20240912071044.GC2031%40zen.
Re: Amoeba's Secret openly available under CC-BY license
On Thu, Sep 12, 2024 at 08:51:16AM +0200, Giulio Prisco wrote: > Interesting! How about an .epub version? .epub version is available for a small fee from Amazon Kindle Direct. > I see there's a .pdf of the original in French: search "Le secret de > l'amibe" - is this the version of the document that the translation is > based on? Indeed it is! -- ---- Dr Russell StandishPhone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders hpco...@hpcoders.com.au http://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/20240912070759.GB2031%40zen.
Re: Amoeba's Secret openly available under CC-BY license
On Wed, Sep 11, 2024 at 09:40:32PM -0700, Liz R wrote: > Well, exactly. It's Peano or whatever, so a small subset. Bruno and Tegmark > have this idea - I find Tegmark easier to follow personally - that because > physics is possibly isomorphic to some set of equations that describe reality, > Occam suggests that we don't actually need reality to exist, only the > equations. > It is more that whatever foundational basis of reality is, so long as it is Turing complete, a computationlist mind cannot distinguish it from any other Turing complete substrate. It is almost assuredly not the reality we see. In another sense, our reality supervenes on all possible universal Turing machines. The question of what is the foundational reality has no answer - epistemologically equivalent to asking how many angels can dance on the head of a pin. -- ---- Dr Russell StandishPhone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders hpco...@hpcoders.com.au http://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/20240912063919.GA2031%40zen.
Re: Amoeba's Secret openly available under CC-BY license
On Sun, Sep 08, 2024 at 07:34:55AM -0400, John Clark wrote: > On Sat, Sep 7, 2024 at 11:16 PM Alan Grayson wrote: > > > > I've been reading Marchal's de facto autobiography. It's hugely > impressive, leading me to be more open to his main conclusion, IIUC, that > arithmetic is at the core of reality, yes, physical reality. AG > > > If a mathematical sphere is the fundamental reality and a physical billiard > ball is just an approximation of one, then why is a billiard ball > astronomically more complex than the sphere? Wouldn't you expect an > approximation (or a simulation) to be simpler than the real thing? I think it > would be more accurate to say that a meteorologist's mathematical model is an > approximation of a physical hurricane, and a physical hurricane is NOT an > approximation of a meteorologist's mathematical model. > > Mathematics is the language of physics but mathematics is not physics. That's > why Physics is more fundamental than mathematics, and that's why you can't get > milk out of the English language word "COW". > That's not Marchal's idea at all. Most of the complexity of a billiard ball is accidental anyway. The idea is that if consciousness is a computational thing (ie mathematical), then phenomena (ie physics) is entirely due to random splitting of the trace of the universal dovetailer (which is also a mathematical thing). So either physics is arithemetic, with true randomness built in, or consciousness is not computational. I would go further that this conclusion follows if computationalism was weakened to functionalism, but the logic is not quite so clear cut in that case. -- Dr Russell StandishPhone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders hpco...@hpcoders.com.au http://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/20240908231044.GN2040%40zen.
Re: Are Philosophical Zombies possible?
On Mon, Jul 08, 2024 at 04:34:56PM -0400, Jason Resch wrote: > > > On Mon, Jul 8, 2024, 4:04 PM John Clark wrote: > > > On Mon, Jul 8, 2024 at 2:12 PM Jason Resch wrote: > > > >Consciousness is a prerequisite of intelligence. > > > I think you've got that backwards, intelligence is a prerequisite of > consciousness. And the possibility of intelligent ACTIONS is a > prerequisite for Darwinian natural selection to have evolved it. > > > I disagree, but will explain below. > > > > > > One can be conscious without being intelligent, > > > Sure. > > > I define intelligence by something capable of intelligent action. > > Intelligent action requires non random choice: choice informed by information > from the environment. > > Having information about the environment (i.e. perceptions) is consciousness. > You cannot have perceptions without there being some process or thing to > perceive them. > > Therefore perceptions (i.e. consciousness) is a requirement and precondition > of > being able to perform intelligent actions. > > Jason By this definition, thermostats are conscious. This could be a definitional debate, but I do disagree. For me, a consious entity is aware if its place in the world. At a minimum, it must have a self/other distinction (does that mean immune systems are conscious?), but I strongly suspect it involves some notion of self-awareness. I struggle to come with an example of a non-self-aware consciousness. OTOH, consciousness needn't necessarily imply intelligence, but perhaps it does. -- Dr Russell StandishPhone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders hpco...@hpcoders.com.au http://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/20240808011804.GA12703%40zen.
Re: Are Philosophical Zombies possible?
On Sat, Jul 13, 2024 at 06:21:58PM -0400, John Clark wrote: > On Sat, Jul 13, 2024 at 4:29 PM Brent Meeker wrote: > > > > All Turing machines have the same computational capability. > > > Well that certainly is not true! There is a Turing Machine for any computable > task, but any PARTICULAR Turing Machine has a finite number of internal > states > and can only do one thing. If you want something else done then you are going > to have to use a Turing Machine with a different set of internal states. > Hi Brent - you're just being a bit sloppy with terminology. All universal Turing machines are equivalent computationally, but not all Turing machines are universal. It's a moot point about whether a human can be considered a universal Turing machine - a human's finite lifetime is a problem, so you'd really need to consider something like a society of humans whose organisation extends beyond the finite lifetime of an individual human. Even then, there may well be limits to the amount of computation physically possible in the universe, depending on the universe's geometry (which gets us into Tipler's Omega point theory, for example). Cheers -- -------- Dr Russell StandishPhone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders hpco...@hpcoders.com.au http://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/20240720024930.GB15533%40zen.
Re: Are Philosophical Zombies possible?
On Wed, Jul 10, 2024 at 10:24:52AM -0400, Jason Resch wrote: > > There was a study done in the 1950s on probabilistic Turing machines ( > https:// > www.degruyter.com/document/doi/10.1515/9781400882618-010/html?lang=en ) that > found what they could compute is no different than what a deterministic Turing > machine can compute. But it would appear that computational complexity classes do differ. I seemed to remember that P=NP for Turing machines with random oracles, but it would seem (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Random_oracle) that whilst there does exist an oracle for which P=NP (Baker-Gill-Solovay theorem), for random oracles generally, P≠NP with probability 1, ie P=NP is only true on a set of measure zero of random oracles. Let me know if I've misinterpreted that stuff... Seems important, as evolution is a computational process with a random oracle, and it does appear to be remarkably effective at solving (at least heuristically) computationally hard problems. Cheers -- -------- Dr Russell StandishPhone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders hpco...@hpcoders.com.au http://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/20240720023944.GA15533%40zen.
Re: Amoeba's Secret openly available under CC-BY license
I did get a response from him when I suggested making Amoeba's Secret open access. According to Kim Jones, who visited him 2022, he is well and taking a break from the Everything List. Cheers On Mon, Apr 29, 2024 at 03:09:22PM +1200, LizR wrote: > Hi Russell, > > Do you have any news of Bruno? I see his last contribution here was a > couple of years ago. > > Best wishes, > Liz > > On Sat, 12 Aug 2023 at 22:15, Russell Standish wrote: > > > > Hi guys, > > > > I finally got around to doing something I meant to do years ago - I > > have released the English translation of "Amoeba's Secret" as a freely > > downloadable PDF under the Creative Commons CC-BY license at > > https://www.hpcoders.com.au/docs/amoebassecret.pdf . > > > > Bruno Marchal was a long time contributer to this list, and this > > semi-autobiography is also one of the clearest explanations of his > > ideas. > > > > Enjoy, > > > > -- > > > > > > Dr Russell StandishPhone 0425 253119 (mobile) > > Principal, High Performance Coders hpco...@hpcoders.com.au > > http://www.hpcoders.com.au > > > > > > -- > > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > > "Everything List" group. > > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > > email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > > To view this discussion on the web visit > > https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/20230812101516.GF17399%40zen. > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAKzbsNfSjoRtyM4gFtUz8_7DAxbdJYor7_ZbXsB9q3kH4htLaA%40mail.gmail.com. -- Dr Russell StandishPhone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders hpco...@hpcoders.com.au http://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/20240429050401.GO4152%40zen.
Re: LLAMA3
> On Sunday, April 21, 2024 at 03:19:37 PM EDT, Brent Meeker > wrote: > > > So far some human has to provide motivation in the form of prompts. Has > anymore tried a feedback loop in which AI's responses are returned at prompts? > > Brent > Yes - I believe that experiment was done, and it works quite well. Maybe several times. Possibly with a different AI doing the prompt evolution, Red Queen style. Sorry - I can point you at a report, it was amongst the flurry of articles about AI that have come out in the last 12 months. Cheers -- ---- Dr Russell StandishPhone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders hpco...@hpcoders.com.au http://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/2024040359.GH10432%40zen.
Re: [Extropolis] NYTimes.com: Did One Guy Just Stop a Huge Cyberattack?
I'd be surprised if it hadn't been done so already. This story has been in the mainstream media news for the past weekend at least. I agree its an amazing story - we collectively dodged a bullet, but worryingly have little to prevent its reoccurrence. On Fri, Apr 05, 2024 at 08:51:32AM -0400, John Clark wrote: > > On Thu, Apr 4, 2024 at 10:59 PM Keith Henson wrote: > > > "That's one of the most amazing stories I have ever heard." > > > Anyone should feel free to forward it to the Extropy List. I can't. > > John K Clark > > > > > > On Thu, Apr 4, 2024 at 5:15 AM John Clark wrote: > > > > Explore this gift article from The New York Times. You can read it for > free without a subscription. > > > > Did One Guy Just Stop a Huge Cyberattack? > > > > A Microsoft engineer noticed something was off on a piece of software he > worked on. He soon discovered someone was probably trying to gain access > to > computers all over the world. > > > > https://www.nytimes.com/2024/04/03/technology/ > prevent-cyberattack-linux.html?unlocked_article_code= > 1.h00.SM26.A41shONSS_wE&smid=em-share > > > > > Open-source software is normally secure, but not against this kind of > attack. Whoever did it spent years working their way into a position > of trust. > > Keith > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "extropolis" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to extropolis+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/ > extropolis/ > CAPiwVB5q4VKROcv5htznJA_irhe1xRN%2BPLGBWFGRqv%2B9V44K0A%40mail.gmail.com. > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email > to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/ > everything-list/ > CAJPayv2sEjAiNdS_teRxV%2Bk%3Dp2A9UWrUaSKVHyEbFn1oPLw4zA%40mail.gmail.com. -- Dr Russell StandishPhone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders hpco...@hpcoders.com.au http://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/20240408060739.GA28200%40zen.
Re: Environmentalists are not serious people
On Sun, Mar 31, 2024 at 12:09:25PM -0400, John Clark wrote: > On Sun, Mar 31, 2024 at 10:05 AM William Flynn Wallace > wrote: > > > > John, you are judging all environmentalists by a tiny group of > extremists. > > > > Tiny? I didn't see a larger group of environmentalists lobbying in favor of > SCoPEx or The Thirty Meter Telescope! I am judging environmentalists by those > who manage to get things done, or rather those who are successful in making > sure that nothing ever gets done. They'd rather cry about global warming than > do anything to try to fix the problem, unless of course the solution > involves > a vast amount of suffering, then fixing it would be OK. Otherwise they'd > prefer > the problem remain unsolved. > "Environmentalists" are not one united group of people. Probably one of the biggest movements is Avaaz, which takes on environmental concerns as well as humanitarian ones. I'm subscribed to that group, but SCoPEx didn't rate a mention. So this most likely was a small group opposing it, and nobody else knew about it. But... The most compelling argument to opposing geoengineering is that it is a distraction from the real task, which is to reduce CO2 emissions. Some people (I don't think anyone in this company would be that stupid) seem to think it is OK to continue burning fossil fuels if the effects can be mitagated by climate geoengineering, or carbon capture sequestration. Some in the environmental movement are suspicious that fossil fuel companies will hold out mitigations methods as a "get out of gaol free" card, to allow business as usual. This is all entirely political, and as far as I'm concerned total bullshit. We need all and every possible means to counteract climate change. That means decarbonise the economy as soon as possible, it also means geoengineering to mitigate the worst effects, and it also means adapting to the changing climate by, for example developing drought resistent crops. It was already too late for just doing massively decarbonisation when I first became aware of the issue in the 1980s, let alone getting started now some 30+ years later with more than a decade of ostrich-like behaviour by the conservative mob (that's in Australia, to say nothing of the rest of the world). Nothing should be off the table, at least as far as researching different options to figure out what interventions work and how cost efective they will be. Humanity is already locked in for a very bumpy century - there will be mass migration, plagues, famine, infrastructure - what we need to focus on is what we need to do to save civilisation. -- Dr Russell StandishPhone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders hpco...@hpcoders.com.au http://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/20240331214408.GA13053%40zen.
Re: Coming Singularity
On Fri, Mar 29, 2024 at 09:55:28AM -0400, John Clark wrote: > On Thu, Mar 28, 2024 at 9:27 PM Russell Standish > wrote: > > > >"So to compare apples with apples - the human brain contains around 700 > trillion (7E14) synapses" > > > I believe 700 trillion is a more than generous estimate of the number of > synapses in the human brain, but I'll let it go. > > > > >"which would roughly correpond to an AI's parameter count > > > > NO! Comparing the human brain's synapses to the number of parameters that an > AI > program like GPT-4 has is NOT comparing apples to apples, it's comparing > apples > to oranges because the brain is hardware but GPT-4 is software. So let's > compare the brain hardware that human intelligence is running on with the > brain > hardware that GPT-4 is running on, that is to say let's compare synapses to > transistors. I'll use your very generous estimate and say the human brain has > 7*10^14 synapses, but the largest supercomputer in the world, the Frontier > Computer at Oakridge, has about 2.5*10^15 transistors, over three times as > many. And we know from experiments that a typical synapse in the human brain > "fires" between 5 and 50 times per second, but a typical transistor in a > computer "fires" about 4 billion times a second (4*10^9). That's why the > Frontier Computer can perform 1.1 *10^18 floating point calculations per > second > and why the human brain can not. There is a big difference between the way transistors are wired in a CPU and the way neurons are wired up in a brain. The brain is not optimised at all to do floating point calculations, which is why even the most competent "computer" (in the old fashioned sense) can only manage sub 1 flops. Conversely, using floating point operations to perform neural network computations is not exactly efficient either. We're using GPUs today, because they can perform these very fast, and its a massively parallel operation, and GPUs are cheap, for what they are. In the future, I would expect we'd have dedicate neural processing units, based on memristors, or whatever. Indeed Intel is now flogging chips with "NPU"s, but how much of that is real and how much is marketing spin I can't say. The comparing synapses with ANN parameters is only relevant for the statement "we can simulate a human brain sized ANN by X date". Kurzweil didn't say that (for some reason I thought he did), he said human intelligence parity (which I supose could be taken to be avergae intelligence, or an IQ of 100). In a human brain, a lot of neurons are handling body operations - controlling muscles, interoception, proprioception, endocrine control etc, so the actual figure related to language processing is likely to be far smaller than the figure given. But only by an order of magnitude, I would say. > > I should add that although there have been significant improvements in the > field of AI in recent years, the most important being the "Attention Is All > You > Need" paper, I believe that even if transformers had never been discovered the > AI explosion that we are currently observing would only have been delayed by a > few years because the most important thing driving it forward is the brute > force enormous increase in raw computing speed. > > > > "He [Ray Kurzweil] was predicting 2029 to be the time when AI will > attain human level intelligence." > > > It now looks like Ray was being too conservative and 2024 or 2025 would be > closer to the Mark, and 2029 would be the time when an AI is smarter than the > entire human race combined. > 2025 should see the release of GPT5. It is still at least two orders of magnitude short of the mark IMHO. It is faster though - training GPT5 will have taken about 2 years, whereas it takes nearly 20 years to train a human. > > > > "I would still say that creativity (which is an essential prerequisite) > is still mysterious" > > > It doesn't matter if humans find creativity to be mysterious because we have > an > existence proof that a lack of understanding of creativity does not prevent > humans from making a machine that is creative. That may be the case, but understanding something does accelerate process dramatically over blind "trial and error". It is the main reason for the explosion in technical prowess over the last 400 years. > Back in 2016 when a computer > beat Lee Sedol, the top human champion at the game of GO, the thing that > everybody was talking about was move 37 of the second game of the five game > tournament. When the computer made that move the live expert c
Coming Singularity
Been thinking about the timing of the singularity a bit, given progress in generative AI recently, partly as a result of attending NVidia's annual GTC conference. I first heard about GPT3 two years ago, which impressed me with their 150 billion parameter neural net, because I compared that against the human brain's 100 billion neuron count (that is an incorrect comparison, though, which I'll mention below). As you are well aware, GPT3 exploded into public awareness a year ago with the launch of ChatGPT. For some reason I had in my mind that Ray Kurzweil was predicting human brain level simulation by 2020. Turns out that was not quite correct - he was predicting human-like AI assistants by 2019, which I would say arrived a little late last year in 2023. He was predicting 2029 to be the time when AI will attain human level intelligence. So to compare apples with apples - the human brain contains around 700 trillion (7E14) synapses, which would roughly correpond to an AI's parameter count. GPT5 (due to be released sometime next year) will have around 2E12 parameters, still 2-3 orders of magnitude to go. Assuming continuation of current rates of AI improvement GPT3->GPT5 (4 years) is one order of magnitude increase in parameter count, it will take to 2033 for AI to achieve human parity. So I would say Kurzweil's singularity is a little delayed, to perhaps 2050, provided ecological collapse doesn't happen sooner. I would still say that creativity (which is an essential prerequisite) is still mysterious, in spite of glimmering of creativity shown by Gen AI. But singularity requires that machines design themselves - this means that semiconductor companies need to be run by AI, fabs need to be 3D printed, as well as the chips as well. It'll be a while before the cost of fabs comes down to the point where hyperexponential technological will happen. We will see these prerequisite technological changes years before the singularity really kicks off. Anyway my 2c - I know John is keen to promote the idea of singularity this decade - but I don't see it myself. Cheers -- -------- Dr Russell StandishPhone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders hpco...@hpcoders.com.au http://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/20240329012651.GE2357%40zen.
Re: On The Origin Of Time
I'd never heard of that called the Poincare effect either. Nor it seems does Wikipedia nor Google. IIUC, it is the phenomenon that after working fruitless on some problem for a while, taking a break, sleeping on it, etc might suddenly produce the solution. As I've often said - the 10 minutes walk from my desk to the cafe to get my cup of coffee is often the most productive time of my day. Cheers On Fri, Feb 02, 2024 at 03:17:59PM -0800, Brent Meeker wrote: > I'm surprised. All mathematicians have experienced it, but it's named after > Poincare' because of this essay. It's well worth reading all of it, but the > relevant part is pp 326-329. > > https://archive.org/details/jstor-27900262/page/n9/mode/2up > > Brent > > On 2/2/2024 11:47 AM, John Clark wrote: > > On Fri, Feb 2, 2024 at 2:34 PM Brent Meeker wrote: > > > > You must know about the Poincaire' effect > > > Nope, never heard of it. Do you mean the Poincaré conjecture? Or the > Poincaré recurrence? Or do you mean something else entirely, the man did a > lot of stuff. > > John K Clark See what's on my new list at Extropolis > mpl > > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/ > everything-list/ > CAJPayv2kdHN7iXg7Pr_Pr9tu%3DYEw2ONhoF95MC%2BFY0vFuYBwRg%40mail.gmail.com. > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email > to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/ > everything-list/e3868a6b-c499-4dc7-b075-38119a465606%40gmail.com. -- Dr Russell StandishPhone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders hpco...@hpcoders.com.au http://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/20240205221251.GA4342%40zen.
Amoeba's Secret openly available under CC-BY license
Hi guys, I finally got around to doing something I meant to do years ago - I have released the English translation of "Amoeba's Secret" as a freely downloadable PDF under the Creative Commons CC-BY license at https://www.hpcoders.com.au/docs/amoebassecret.pdf . Bruno Marchal was a long time contributer to this list, and this semi-autobiography is also one of the clearest explanations of his ideas. Enjoy, -- -------- Dr Russell StandishPhone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders hpco...@hpcoders.com.au http://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/20230812101516.GF17399%40zen.
Re: DeepMind AI Discovers Better Algorithms for Foundational Computing
I haven't read the original article, but given the timing, I believe this was the application of AI in a competitive environment to optimise sorting algorithms of short sequences (<8 items, IIUC). Which reminds of work done by Danny Hillis (of Thinking Machines fame) in the late 1980s who set up a coevolutionary genetic algorithm to evolve sorting algorithms that beat classic sorting algorithms. ISTM - they've just rediscovered his work. Danny has a paper in the ALifeII proceedings describing that work. On Sun, Jun 11, 2023 at 02:52:01PM -0700, Brent Meeker wrote: > The next level will be when an AI makes itself smarter. > > Brent > > On 6/11/2023 7:34 AM, John Clark wrote: > > If this is not an example of an AI helping to develop a smarter AI then I > don't know what is. People are gonna be having a very hard time trying to > convince themselves this is just a glorified autocomplete program. > > AlphaDev - DeepMind AI Discovers Better Algorithms for Foundational > Computing > > John K Clark See what's on my new list at Extropolis > pui > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/ > everything-list/ > CAJPayv3Tn98n4yZL61z0Ry__BNvf9WJ25VZOXrrtLAn_fYt0FQ%40mail.gmail.com. > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email > to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/ > everything-list/46449833-251f-cdee-5129-84a7e83f17c5%40gmail.com. -- Dr Russell StandishPhone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders hpco...@hpcoders.com.au http://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/20230611231447.GA15947%40zen.
Re: It's too late to stop GPT4 now
On Sat, Apr 08, 2023 at 03:11:47PM -0400, John Clark wrote: > On Sat, Apr 8, 2023 at 8:19 AM Russell Standish wrote: > > > > Don't forget it requires a society of hundreds of millions of human > level intelligences to make a GPT-4. And it take a human level > intelligence > some 20 years in order to make > meaningful contributions to something like GPT-4. > Progress will therefore continue to be be exponential for some time to > come. Only when super human intelligence is able to design itself will > hyperbolic progress begin. > > > Although certainly extremely helpful most areas of science require more than > just a brilliant theoretician, they need experimental evidence, and so new > knowledge in those fields will not grow at the same explosive rate as computer > intelligence does; however there are two fields that do not require experiment > evidence and so should grow as rapidly as intelligence does, mathematics and > software development, including smart software they can write even smarter > software. And there are mountains of data on physics and biology that already > exist and they're almost certainly unknown gems hiding in there that nobody > has > spotted, but with new mathematical techniques and better software they could > be > found. > Sure - I was trying to proffer some suggestions as to why Ray Kurzweil suggested 25 years between attaining human level computational ability and the singularity. I haven't read his book, just summaries - maybe someone who has could enlightent us. BTW - I still think we haven't cracked the problem of open-ended creativity, which is essential for something like the singularity to occur, but recent developments have lead me to believe it might be achieved sooner rather than later. Ten years ago, I'd have said the singularity wouldn't appear before 2070 (probably did say, though not publicly). Now, I've brought that forward to 2050s > > > It will also need to better the energy efficiency of human brains, and > it > is still orders of magnitude away from that. > > > Take a look at this video, it talks about Nvidia's new chip, with a data > center > using it an AI system that had required 35 MW to run will only need 5 MW to do > the same thing. > > Nvidia's HUGE AI Breakthrough is Bigger Than ChatGPT That is a seven fold improvement, not quite one order of magnitude. My understanding is that about 4-5 orders of magnitude are required before machines can really take over the world. It will happen, but on present exponential progress (classic Moore's law) that will take 2-3 decades. Current AI systems like GPT-4 require the resources of a small town of several thousand people for training. GPT-4 is about 800 billion parameters IIUC. A human brain has over a trillion synapses, so its certainly getting close. > > By the way, I think mathematicians and software developers will be the first > to > lose their jobs, perhaps they could be retrained as coal miners. > I don't think they'll be the first :). ATM, GPT systems seem to have an enormous propensity to make shit up, but less skill in making shit up that is correct. ISTM the creative arts might be the area to lose their jobs first. > John K Clark See what's on my new list at Extropolis > 8fi > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email > to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/ > everything-list/ > CAJPayv15B0KuA4vUUid4YGex_H9uqwTnbKT9EU_64mqjNioXcw%40mail.gmail.com. -- Dr Russell StandishPhone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders hpco...@hpcoders.com.au http://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/20230409000824.GB1379%40zen.
Re: It's too late to stop GPT4 now
Don't forget it requires a society of hundreds of millions of human level intelligences to make a GPT-4. And it take a human level intelligence some 20 years in order to make meaningful contributions to something like GPT-4. Progress will therefore continue to be be exponential for some time to come. Only when super human intelligence is able to design itself will hyperbolic progress begin. It will also need to better the energy efficiency of human brains, and it is still orders of magnitude away from that. In saying 25 years to singularity, I was simply taking Kurzweil's timeline, and adding the 5 years he was out by. On Sat, Apr 08, 2023 at 07:46:05AM -0400, John Clark wrote: > > On Sat, Apr 8, 2023 at 7:31 AM Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > > > > Why such a long gap between gaining human level intelligence and the > singularity? > > > That is a very good question but I don't have a very good answer so I don't > think there will be a long gap. Fasten your seatbelts, we're in for a bumpy > ride. > > John K Clark See what's on my new list at Extropolis > > jwx > > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email > to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/ > everything-list/ > CAJPayv1BhQQ4visgvVPTZTH9ZqiMJYcabARAnY_g37c-dUOUkA%40mail.gmail.com. -- Dr Russell StandishPhone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders hpco...@hpcoders.com.au http://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/20230408121750.GA1379%40zen.
Re: It's too late to stop GPT4 now
What struck me when watching this video is the uncanny similarity of this mechanism to the Steven Pinker's proposed "mind's big bang", which took place in human minds about 40,000 years ago. It all came down to using language for the disparate modules of the human brain to talk to each other, likened to individual chapels uniting to form a cathedral. I would predict that human level intelligence may be matched in 2025 with GPT-5, only 5 years later than Ray Kurzweil's prediction, which might mean the singularity is on course for some time in the 2050s... Cheers On Sun, Apr 02, 2023 at 03:35:03PM -0400, John Clark wrote: > This video is a summary of several technical papers that have come out in the > last 72 hours, apparently GPT4 can now improve itself without human help by > self-reflecting on its errors and can even design better hardware for itself. > > GPT 4 Can Improve Itself by self reflection > > John K Clark See what's on my new list at Extropolis > 3zi > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email > to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/ > everything-list/ > CAJPayv1Zdxw4fhV7Vq%3DWHDL5SOUNbnyCNgFmjuEo8%3DqOAC%2Busg%40mail.gmail.com. -- ---- Dr Russell StandishPhone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders hpco...@hpcoders.com.au http://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/20230408063942.GA6671%40zen.
Re: Why Does the Universe Exist? Some Perspectives from Our Physics Project—Stephen Wolfram Writings
On Sun, Aug 21, 2022 at 03:14:50PM +0200, Telmo Menezes wrote: > > I guess we need some sort of everything list Alife hacakthon :) Russell is > very > quiet, but I know that he also likes this stuff. Indeed. But I need to retire first to be able to have the time to do some real work! I tried last year, but got sucked back into my old contract due to labour shortages. Hopefully next year. -- ---- Dr Russell StandishPhone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders hpco...@hpcoders.com.au http://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/20220831042237.GA13394%40zen.
Re: The collapse of bitcoin
On Sun, Jul 31, 2022 at 07:22:28AM -0400, John Clark wrote: > > That won't help because the energy cost involved in making a bitcoin is also > increasing and it's increasing exponentially; there will never be more than 21 > million bitcoins in the world because if there are 21 million of them the > energy needed to make another one is infinite. Bitcoin is inherently energy > inefficient and its inefficiency can only increase. > > Other than it's inventor Satoshi Nakamoto the very first person to ever mint a > bitcoin was Hal Finney in 2009, back then a typical home computer could make a > bitcoin in just a few minutes, I remember he said on the Extropian mailing > list > I was on at the time that on a whim he once left his computer on overnight > minting bitcoins. He claims that after that he forgot all about it but soon > after he was faced with huge medical bills because he was diagnosed with ALS, > the same disease Stephen Hawkings had, and about the same time he started > reading about the huge increase in the price of Bitcoins. Finney no longer > used > that old obsolete computer but he still had it at the back of his closet, and > the Bitcoins were still on the hard drive, they were more than enough to pay > for his medical expenses. > > Finney died in 2014 and to this day some people think he actually was Satoshi > Nakamoto. It may be a coincidence that Nakamoto stopped posting and > disappeared > about the same time Finney got sick, or it may not be, but it would explain > why > although he owns billions of dollars worth of bitcoins not a single one has > ever been spent by somebody who controls the Bitcoin account of "Satoshi > Nakamoto". Even after this recent price collapse Nakamoto is still one of the > richest men in the world, and yet he doesn't seem to have ever spent a single > nickel of his vast fortune. It's weird. > Interesting. I did not know that. Of course, some of us old-timers remember that Hal was a member of this list. -- Dr Russell StandishPhone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders hpco...@hpcoders.com.au http://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/20220805020856.GA4834%40zen.
Re: The Nature of Contingency: Quantum Physics as Modal Realism
On Wed, Apr 27, 2022 at 05:14:41PM -0700, Brent Meeker wrote: > > If there are probabilities attached to the branches, then Gleason's theorem > shows that the probabilities must satisfy the Born rule. So I don't seen any > inconsistency in simply saying they are probabilities of measurement results, > that's Copenhagen. But if they are probabilities of results that implies that > some things happen and others don't...other wise what does "probability" mean > and what use is it as an empirical concept? That brings back the original > problem of CI, where and how is this happening defined? > Doesn't this just hinge on what I call in my book the semantic-syntactic distinction, aka the 1-3 distinction (long debates between Bruno and JC on this), or the subjective-objective distinction, or even discrete-continuous distinction. Without this cut, the very concept of information makes no sense, and without information, Darwinian evolution doesn't happen. ISTM, no-collapse QM is a continuous theory, it lacks this cut, which must be added in as an extra axiom. -- -------- Dr Russell StandishPhone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders hpco...@hpcoders.com.au http://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/20220507024952.GA2667%40zen.
Re: Is Artificial Life Conscious?
On Mon, May 02, 2022 at 08:03:21AM -0400, Jason Resch wrote: > Hi Russell, > > Thanks for sharing. I had read this argument before, I believe in your book, > and reread it again just now. It is compelling and a quite novel approach to > the question. > > However, I do not see it as bullet proof. For example: > > The reasoning could be applied equally as an argument that we are living in a > computer simulation where simulating minds of higher level organisms is more > common than simulating simpler creatures, and so common as to outclass simpler > minds. Why would this be? The Solomonoff-Levin theorem would indicate simpler programs would be exponentially more common than more complex ones, so the same scaling would apply to minds. > > It could be used as an argument for Unificationism (the idea that > instantiating > same mind more than once does not ascribe more measure to the experience). > Then > the power law would reflect unique possible conscious states across reality, > and human and higher level minds would dominate in that there are more ways > for > a human brain to create unique conscious states. > Interesting line of attack, but I think it fails due to the expectation that you should be maximally complex (and probably maximally old). There's no reason to think that human beings are the most complex consciousnesses possible in the multiverse. > It could also be that simple conscious states can jump or shift to equivalent > conscious states until they stabilize on an experience that is less likely to > stabilize. For instance, the question is sometimes asked "What is it like to > be > a thermostat?" One answer could be that it is like a person waking up in the > morning. (Where the conscious state of a waking person intersects the state of > a thermostat, and a thermostat's mind is equivalent to a wide class of many > minds, it is not really like anything to be a thermostat). I don't know that > insect consciousness is simple enough for this argument to apply though. > > Then there's the question of whether it is correct to divide minds, or whether > something like universalism is true, which states there is only one mind, and > all experiences belong to it. Then any experience is one I am 100% likely to > experience. > > I am not sure what to think, but "why are we not ants?" is indeed a mystery > that calls for an explanation. > Indeed. Of course, you are right that the argument is not bullet proof. But as is typical of doomsday arguments, peoples reactions are "WTF?", and there's no engagement. On Google Scholar, there is precisely 1 citation to that paper, and admittedly I haven't read it, but based on the abstract, I think the citation was just of similar example of anthropic reasoning, rather than engaging with the argument itself. Arguments against this argument have to date been unconvincing, just like the ones against the DA. Personally, I think it is interesting that we can provide some hard numbers around the nature of the "hard question", contra John Clark's assertion that nothing can be said about consciousness. Cheers -- Dr Russell StandishPhone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders hpco...@hpcoders.com.au http://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/20220502233956.GQ2399%40zen.
Re: Is Artificial Life Conscious?
Hi John, always a pleasure to cross swords with your brain :). However, your quibbles below are easy to address - see below. On Mon, May 02, 2022 at 06:03:47AM -0400, John Clark wrote: > On Mon, May 2, 2022 at 5:30 AM Russell Standish wrote: > > > > Most insects can't be consious (see my paper "Ants are not conscious"). > > > I just read the abstract, and its very first sentence is: > > "Anthropic reasoning is a form of statistical reasoning based upon finding > oneself a member of a particular reference class of conscious beings." > > My question to you is, how do you know for a fact you are a member of a "class > of conscious beings"? How do you even know that rocks aren't conscious? I DO > know for a fact that I'm conscious, but I don't know for a fact that you are. > The second sentence is: > I know that I am conscious. Therefore I must be a member of the set of consious entities. It is true I don't know what else is in the set. I do assume that all humans are conscious (at least at some point in their lives), but if you assume the opposite, then the argument is even stronger. > "By considering empirical distribution functions defined over animal life on > Earth, we can deduce that the vast bulk of animal life is unlikely to be > conscious." > > This is a classic example of assuming what you're trying to prove. > No - it is a deduction. You're reading the abstract. It is usual to state the conclusion in the abstract so you know whether it is worth digging into the paper body to see to proof. -- Dr Russell StandishPhone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders hpco...@hpcoders.com.au http://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/20220502230637.GP2399%40zen.
Re: Is Artificial Life Conscious?
On Fri, Apr 22, 2022 at 09:38:40PM -0500, Jason Resch wrote: > Artificial Life such as these organisms: > https://www.youtube.com/playlist?list=PLq_mdJjNRPT11IF4NFyLcIWJ1C0Z3hTAX > ( https://github.com/jasonkresch/bots ) > > Have neural networks that evolved through natural selection, can adapt to a > changing environment, and can learn to distinguish between "food" and "poison" > in their environment. > > If simple creatures like worms or insects are conscious, (because they have > brains, and evolved), then wouldn't these artificial life forms be conscious > for the same reasons? > > Why or why not? Most insects can't be consious (see my paper "Ants are not conscious"). Most ALife forms created to date are simpler than insects, and probably even worms, so are unlikely to be consious either. -- -------- Dr Russell StandishPhone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders hpco...@hpcoders.com.au http://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/20220502093004.GA16990%40zen.
Re: A gravitational wave rocket
On Sat, Jan 22, 2022 at 07:08:29AM -0500, John Clark wrote: > On Sat, Jan 22, 2022 at 3:07 AM Russell Standish > wrote: > > > >> even with your frugal ways solar cells aren't enough to make you > energ independent, you still have to hook up with the power company. > > > > > Of course. We'd need a battery as well. But that's not the point. > > > I think it is the point because it illustrates one of the 2 most important > shortcomings of solar energy, it's unreliable. It is not the point, because the aim is not energy self-sufficiency. The aims are to produce the energy needed at the most economical cost, and also to do so in a carbon neutral fashion. Rooftop solar is a massive low-hanging fruit in that regard. Batteries, not quite so much, but they're getting there. Some of our friends have invested in batteries, perhaps because they value carbon-neutrality higher than we do. > The other is that it takes up > too much area because it's too dilute; even Dyson spheres have that problem, > they produce a huge amount of power but they need a gargantuan area to do so. > > > > You have warm mild bits too, like Florida, or southern California. > > > I know from personal experience that if it wasn't for Willis Carrier's > invention of the air conditioner there is no way Florida would be the third > most populous of the 50 states, even in mid winter it's not unusual for the > temperature to be in the upper 80s (fahrenheit) with very high humidity. > Everybody has air conditioners, the state should be renamed "Carrier". As for > Southern California, it's not unusual for the temperature to get into the > triple digits. By triple digits, I think you mean over 36 degrees. It's not unusual for it to be that here too. But only for a few days in the warmest month of the year. I have visited SoCal and NoCal many times - the temperature range is pretty similar to here actually. We're lucky that we live by the see: close the doors and blinds during the day when it is hot, open them in the evening when there is a cool sea breeze. Yes - in the western parts of our city, aircons are more essential. but again, only for a few days a years. And without Carrier I don't think Texas would be the second most > populous state, and Arizona wouldn't be the fastest growing. Perhaps so - but running the aircons when solar generation is at its peak, and temperature are at their peak works well. Solar makes a lot of sense for those states. > > John K Clark See what's on my new list at Extropolis > wca > > eex > > > > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email > to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/ > everything-list/ > CAJPayv2deya%3DE_kRwtcbsHi9ie_yrUTGSpH-uKmmz8YAW9Cu9Q%40mail.gmail.com. -- Dr Russell StandishPhone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders hpco...@hpcoders.com.au http://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/2022010133.GA5474%40zen.
Re: A gravitational wave rocket
On Fri, Jan 21, 2022 at 07:29:55AM -0500, John Clark wrote: > On Fri, Jan 21, 2022 at 4:26 AM Russell Standish > wrote: > > > > We have solar panels on half our roof (the difficult half, because of > aesthetics, we didn't want to cover the western half that faces the > street). So about 16kW of installed capacity. Average production year > round > is about 1kW. > > > Average production is only 1/16 of installed capacity? That's even worse > than > I thought. Sorry my mistake - we have 16 panels, each of which have peak output 330W = 5.28 kW. > > > > Our usage is about half that, > > > Wow only 500 watts, you must live frugally. Not especially - we do turn out lights when not in use, of course. > I take it you have a gas stove or > do most of your cooking with a microwave. Gas stove, and use the microwave a lot, but the electric oven only sometimes (there is a distinct bump of about 200W average in consumption at 6pm). Our biggest consumption is a spa (or jacuzzi as they say in the US). This consumes about 2.5kW, but is only on for 2 hours in the day, and we turn it off over the winter season (too bloody cold getting out of the spa midwinter). Then come fridges. When we got "smart meters", we did end up turning off one of the fridges, and just not buying quite as much frozen goods. Smart meters make a huge difference by making it clear just how much power each device uses. The come computers and internet. Recent upgrades have dropped typical desktop computer consumption from 100W to around 25W (eg Intel NUC), and computers do get turned off when not in use, After that - not much else of significance. > I also assume if you have an electric > car you don't charge it up at home. Yeah - no electric car. Australia has such backward policies on electric cars that I expect we'll be the dumping ground of petrol guzzling CO2 belchers for some years. > > > > so we end up selling quite a bit of electricity to the grid (at about a > third of the cost to buy it). Its > a 4 bedroom house, but just the two of us live here now. > > > But even with your frugal ways solar cells aren't enough to make you energy > independent, you still have to hook up with the power company. > Of course. We'd need a battery as well. But that's not the point. > > > We're lucky, we don't need air conditioning, and rarely even use a > heater. > > > You are lucky, most people don't live in a climate that is as mild as yours. > Sure. But 10kW 24x7 still seems very extreme for an average house, even in the US. You have warm mild bits too, like Florida, or southern California. > John K Clark See what's on my new list at Extropolis > epr > > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email > to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/ > everything-list/ > CAJPayv2W%2BkYAY3S3BEbBKavTgBtTQnhdtcCmeMJgni5uwxEaxg%40mail.gmail.com. -- Dr Russell StandishPhone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders hpco...@hpcoders.com.au http://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/20220122080646.GA12863%40zen.
Re: Tonga Volcano Explodes, Detected by Himawari Satellite
Closest I saw on the day (I live on a beach on the east coast of Australia) was the water level going from roughly the mid-tide mark (full beach exposed) to the full tide mark and back again over about a 10 second interval. Otherwise, things seemed very gentle. On Sun, Jan 16, 2022 at 08:12:24PM +, spudboy100 via Everything List wrote: > Indeed! The wave effect close up. > https://twitter.com/i/status/1482218429121802240 > > In Monterrey Bay in Cal. > https://twitter.com/i/status/1482671587518148612 > > > > > -Original Message- > From: Brent Meeker > To: everything-list@googlegroups.com > Sent: Sun, Jan 16, 2022 2:17 pm > Subject: Re: Tonga Volcano Explodes, Detected by Himawari Satellite > > My son-in-law, an avid surfer, went down to the beach to see the surge. It > was > noticeable, but not impressive...until you reflected on how far it came. > > Brent > > On 1/15/2022 8:52 PM, spudboy100 via Everything List wrote: > > There are some very clear phone videos of the insurging tide that's coming in > around Tonga and also there is a title surgeon California not nearly as bad > caused by the eruption. It's easy to find on Twitter, if you do a search on > any > search engine and it will take you directly there with better photos so to > speak vids, then you will usually see on the news. > > > ━━━ > On Saturday, January 15, 2022 John Clark > wrote: > > This happened just a few hours ago: > > Tonga Volcano Explodes, Detected by Himawari Satellite > > John K ClarkSee what's on my new list at Extropolis > tev > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email > to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/ > everything-list/ > CAJPayv1O73VXNJqnax21-KFJ%2BqaKUHBk%3DzPokeDbFgCbi7hHNw%40mail.gmail.com. > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email > to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/ > everything-list/90757051.310925.1642308741772%40mail.yahoo.com. > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email > to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/ > everything-list/64d530d2-a634-af1f-bf02-a60b3c6af39f%40gmail.com. > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email > to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/ > everything-list/408450385.442640.1642363944962%40mail.yahoo.com. -- Dr Russell StandishPhone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders hpco...@hpcoders.com.au http://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/20220121092832.GE16768%40zen.
Re: A gravitational wave rocket
> to expect that an intelligence vastly greater than our own will always place > human well-being above its own. > > > > Mr. Robot might simply like enough electricity. > > > If Mr. Robot likes electricity then Mr. Robot has emotions and Mr. Robot will > be unhappy if you try to take electricity away from him and take appropriate > actions to prevent that unhappy event from occurring. Mr. Human may not be > pleased with those actions but Mr. Human will no longer be the one calling the > shots. > > John K Clark See what's on my new list at Extropolis > mrh > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email > to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/ > everything-list/ > CAJPayv2kMC-QsWQSZ5Xv4RuLNqoJR%2B72_57ypWNrK4T73EDLBw%40mail.gmail.com. -- Dr Russell StandishPhone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders hpco...@hpcoders.com.au http://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/20220121092615.GD16768%40zen.
Re: Superdeterminism And Sabine Hossenfelder
On Sun, Dec 26, 2021 at 02:57:51PM +1100, Bruce Kellett wrote: > > > If the measure function (normalisable to probability) is a bilinear > function (which you almost get from the axioms of probability), then > the state space must be a hilbert space, and the probability of A->B > is given by the Born rule. But for the MWI, you already > start with a Hibert space, so even this linearity issue isn't a > difficulty. > > > > I don't understand what you are talking about. If a trial has two possible > outcomes, and every outcome is realized in every trial, then after N trials > there are 2^N possible sequences of outcomes. These cover all possible binary > strings of length N, independent of the probabilities for individual outcomes > on any single trial. The binomial theorem (or the law of large numbers) then > implies that as N becomes large, in the large majority of sequences you will > have approximately equal numbers of each result. If these sequences are used > to > estimate the probabilities, then most sequences will give p = 0.5 for each > result. This is a well-known result. Consider a fair dice, and the two outcomes: a six, and the numbers 1-5. According to your argument, the probability of each outcome is 1/2. Clearly something has gone wrong. What I'm saying is that the probability must depend on both the anterior and posterior states. In this thought experiment, the anterior state is one of maximum ignorance, but the posterior states have uneven weights. -- ---- Dr Russell StandishPhone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders hpco...@hpcoders.com.au http://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/20211226073828.GB7780%40zen.
Re: Superdeterminism And Sabine Hossenfelder
On Sat, Dec 25, 2021 at 09:07:30AM +1100, Bruce Kellett wrote: > On Sat, Dec 25, 2021 at 7:53 AM Dirk Van Niekerk wrote: > > > > Imagine one physicist starts a series of quantum experiments. Each > experiment has two outcomes with predicted probabilities of A=p1 and > B=p2. > In MWI, after doing an arbitrarily large number of these experiments the > end observer in each branch now tabulates their observations and find that > they have measured outcome A p1 times and outcome B p2 times. Each > observer therefore must have followed a branching path that lead to this > outcome. What in the MWI and the Schroedinger equation determined that > each observer would find those probabilities (other than arbitrarily > invoking the Born rule). What in MWI prevents that a large number of > observers will report a probability for either A or B as 100%. > > > The characteristic of MWI is that every outcome occurs in its own branch for > every trial. If there are just two outcomes, A and B in your case, then after > N > trials there will be 2^N copies of the observer -- each with an individual > sequence of A B results, covering all possible 2^N sequences for N trials. > According to the binomial theorem, for large N the relative proportions of A > and B in these sequences will peak around 50/50. In other words, the majority > of the copies at the end of this experiment will find data suggesting a > probability of 0.5 for A, and 0.5 for B. There will, of course, be a number of > outliers with discrepant statistics, such as sequences dominated by As or by > Bs. But these form a vanishing proportion in the limit of large N. > > The obvious trouble with this is that the majority find a 50/50 ratio, > regardless of the actual specified probabilities of A=p1 and B=p2. There is, > in > fact, no way in which unmodified MWI can get data that reflects the actual > probabilities when these differ significantly from p1=p2=0.5. This is one of > main main objections to MWI -- direct confrontation with the data clearly > falsifies the theory. > > Of course, people have come up with various fixes to MWI to overcome this. One > popular way is to simply add additional branches on each trial so that the > proportions reflect the required probabilities. Zurek and Carroll have > varieties of this approach. The trouble here is that this is completely ad > hoc. > and it also turns out to be circular, because the only way in which one can > know how many additional branches to add to each outcome is to look to the > Born > probabilities -- probabilities that are not available in the raw Schrodinger > equation. > > Other possible fixes have been tried, but none can actually overcome the basic > problem that MWI is inconsistent with real-world data. > The probability of an observer seeing state B given they're in state A must depend on both A and B. So what you say about a split into B and ¬B giving rise to probabilities of 1/2 cannot be the case in general, as there would be no dependence on either A or B. If the measure function (normalisable to probability) is a bilinear function (which you almost get from the axioms of probability), then the state space must be a hilbert space, and the probability of A->B is given by the Born rule. But for the MWI, you already start with a Hibert space, so even this linearity issue isn't a difficulty. -- Dr Russell StandishPhone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders hpco...@hpcoders.com.au http://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/20211226032909.GA7780%40zen.
Re: Why Does Anything Exist?
On Wed, Mar 10, 2021 at 09:00:38AM +1100, Bruce Kellett wrote: > On Wed, Mar 10, 2021 at 6:00 AM Jason Resch wrote: > > On Tue, Mar 9, 2021 at 9:41 AM Lawrence Crowell < > goldenfieldquaterni...@gmail.com> wrote: > > Nothingness is a paradoxical thing. Does nothingness exist? If so, > then > by having existential properties it is not pure nothingness. If > nothingness does not exist then there must exist something. In a sense > God is the antithesis of nothingness and in a sense shares the same > paradoxical issue. > > > There is a strange and paradoxical sort of identity between nothing and > everything, particularly as it relates to information theory. Insofar as > the total set of all possibilities has zero information content. > > > > A random message string can contain zero information, but still exist -- > written on a piece of paper, for example. To be fair, I usually talk of descriptions that are sets of infinite strings equivalent under some observer's notion of classification. Strings sharing a suitable common prefix are usually equivalent. Information is a property of these descriptions. I never claimed that a random description has zero information, just that it is low information. From my point of view, a string consisting of the works of Willam Shakespeare, followed by an arbitrarily long sequence of random bits is not a random string, even though it would be considered as such by AIT. By excluding such sequences as non random, actual random string will still have non-zero information. > This idea that zero information > equates to 'nothing' is just an elementary confusion of categories. > I think I said that nothing and everything are duals, in the same way the empty set and the full set are duals. I never said zero information equates to nothing. The full set of strings, corresponding to the zero length description has zero information. This is what I'm identifying as the Everything. How is this a confusion of categories? > > This is the main subject of Russell Standish's book: Theory of Nothing: > https://www.hpcoders.com.au/nothing.html > > > > That is why Russell got so many things wrong in this book. > You need to engage with the work rather than making sweeping statements like this. Perhaps it is you who got so many things wrong in the book. > Bruce > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email > to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/ > everything-list/ > CAFxXSLTXSHt%3DASkdBiA%2Bh_-4d3FCAHMX7puXWq9_1tG%3DnjbXSg%40mail.gmail.com. -- Dr Russell StandishPhone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders hpco...@hpcoders.com.au http://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/YEnRLHDvM6KEHngZ%40zen.
Re: For the love of God can someone please unsubscribe me from this gobshite list?
Just follow the instructions below. On Mon, Nov 16, 2020 at 06:08:28AM +, chris peck wrote: > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email > to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/ > everything-list/ > AM6PR07MB499300ED9D5D848106569F1EDEE30%40AM6PR07MB4993.eurprd07.prod.outlook.com > . -- -------- Dr Russell StandishPhone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders hpco...@hpcoders.com.au http://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/20201116072246.GF9860%40zen.
Re: This is the man who says he found Hunter Biden's laptop
On Fri, Oct 23, 2020 at 03:13:39PM -0700, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List wrote: > > > On 10/23/2020 10:49 AM, John Clark wrote: > > > Odd that there is nothing on that list about discussion about what is > allowed on the list. It seems that the EVERYTHING list is misnamed. The rationale for the list can be found at http://www.weidai.com/everything.html -- -------- Dr Russell StandishPhone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders hpco...@hpcoders.com.au http://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/20201024032804.GA12316%40zen.
Re: Stenger on Initial Low Entropy
On Fri, Oct 16, 2020 at 04:49:35PM +1100, Bruce Kellett wrote: > On Fri, Oct 16, 2020 at 3:38 PM Russell Standish > wrote: > > On Fri, Oct 16, 2020 at 10:07:32AM +1100, Bruce Kellett wrote: > > > > It is refuted by the idea of unitary evolution in QM. Unitary evolution > means > > that everything is reversible, If new microstates are created as the > universe > > expands, then this expansion cannot be reversed: the creation of such > > microstates gives an absolute arrow of time. This is generally rejected, > > because physicists tend to believe in unitary dynamics. If dynamics are > not > > unitary, then the universe is not governed by the Schrodinger equation, > and > > arguments for the multiverse collapse. > > I'm not sure the last point follows, perhaps you can expand on it. But > it is an interesting argument that the Layzer style "increase in > microstates" > should be enough to prevent a Hawking style "wavefunction of the > universe". > > > I was talking about the Everett-style quantum many worlds. Other types of > multiverse (such as the existence of other cosmological Hubble volumes) are > not > necessarily affected. Hawking's "wave function of the universe" is a definite > casualty if unitary evolution is denied. > > > > Could the ideas be made compatible by have the number of accessible > microstates increasing over time, due to the expansion of the > universe, but that the total number remains constant, or is even > infinite? Or does that place us right back at the original problem of > having a low entropy initial state. > > > I don't really understand this. An infinite number of microstates makes little > sense in standard thermodynamics. > Quite true. It would have to involve some sort of limiting process, which would definitely be non-standard thermodynamics. But that's never stopped anyone before :). I was more speculating along the lines of the usual way of reconciling irreversible processes with a reversible multiverse. Where the interesting stuff happens in a finite dimensional subspace of an infinite dimensional Hilbert space, but that dimensionality grows in time due to "splitting", or "decoherence" or what have you. -- Dr Russell StandishPhone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders hpco...@hpcoders.com.au http://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/20201016060333.GH6315%40zen.
Re: Stenger on Initial Low Entropy
On Fri, Oct 16, 2020 at 10:07:32AM +1100, Bruce Kellett wrote: > > It is refuted by the idea of unitary evolution in QM. Unitary evolution means > that everything is reversible, If new microstates are created as the universe > expands, then this expansion cannot be reversed: the creation of such > microstates gives an absolute arrow of time. This is generally rejected, > because physicists tend to believe in unitary dynamics. If dynamics are not > unitary, then the universe is not governed by the Schrodinger equation, and > arguments for the multiverse collapse. I'm not sure the last point follows, perhaps you can expand on it. But it is an interesting argument that the Layzer style "increase in microstates" should be enough to prevent a Hawking style "wavefunction of the universe". Could the ideas be made compatible by have the number of accessible microstates increasing over time, due to the expansion of the universe, but that the total number remains constant, or is even infinite? Or does that place us right back at the original problem of having a low entropy initial state. -- -------- Dr Russell StandishPhone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders hpco...@hpcoders.com.au http://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/20201016043814.GA4042%40zen.
Re: The Handmaid's Tale
On Thu, Oct 01, 2020 at 07:06:44AM +1000, Kim Jones wrote: > How come nobody talks about ToEs anymore on this list? The genre of > conversation and exchanges I daily read here now are no different to Facebook. > A once-great science discussion list - now a pathetic shadow of its former > self. You must all be a bunch of sad and lonely types. Well, at least be > HONEST > : change the name to the "Anything List" > > Kim Jones B.Mus GDTL > 'Twas ever thus - a madness descends on these lists every four years for around 6 months or so. -- -------- Dr Russell StandishPhone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders hpco...@hpcoders.com.au http://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/20201001031805.GA11872%40zen.
Re: Ex Machina, the film, about the Turing Test
Alas not available on Netflix Australia. It'll have to wait until if/when I subscribe to Amazon Prime briefly. I'm also not really prepared to purchase a VPN just to watch other countries' Netflix connections, for much the same reason as I only subscribe to one streamer - so it might have to wait until if/when I do live in a country that has it in the Netflix catalogue. The tangled web of movie copyright arrangements... Bah! On Sat, Aug 15, 2020 at 02:23:52PM -0700, Alan Grayson wrote: > If you haven't viewed it, please do so. It's about the Turing Test, science > fiction, but the "special effects" aren't primarily photographic bells and > whistles, but the dialogue. the text, the logic of the script. Recently, we > have argued about consciousness, what it is, and how we can test for it in the > context of AI. I claimed that we could do some superficial surgery to > determine > whether the subject of the test was a robot or a conscious entity. But this is > completely mistaken. All that that would reveal is whether the subject was > artificial, not whether it was "conscious". The subject could have been a > black > box, and still showing signs of what we can't really define; consciousness. I > think Ex Machina provides an answer of what we need to look for. Please view > it > and report back. But do NOT read the plot, say in Wiki. It's a spoiler. AG > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email > to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/ > everything-list/6c3c8eba-542c-45a6-a79f-ca54202fdcc8o%40googlegroups.com. -- Dr Russell StandishPhone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders hpco...@hpcoders.com.au http://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/20200816012618.GA5850%40zen.
Re: Trump suggests delaying the election
On Sun, Aug 02, 2020 at 11:16:00AM +1000, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > > I think we started congratulating ourselves too early. As you know, things are > not so great in Victoria. Indeed, we're not out of the woods yet. -- -------- Dr Russell StandishPhone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders hpco...@hpcoders.com.au http://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/20200802032710.GP3461%40zen.
Re: Trump suggests delaying the election
On Fri, Jul 31, 2020 at 07:42:28PM +, spudboy100 via Everything List wrote: > Yeah, I am sure the competent hand of Joe Biden will solve everything... You > haven't cited what Germany and Australia are doing differently than the US > either. Can you please list what these lands are doing so well? I think in Australia's case, our "Trump mini-me" government finally grew a brain and listened to the health experts, after their total mishandling of the bushfire debacle over summer. It also helps that we're a little more likely accept restrictions for the sake of the common good than our American friends. Not as much as some Asian cultures, though. And finally, being an "island continent" makes it easier to shut our borders and control who comes into the country. Cheers -- ---- Dr Russell StandishPhone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders hpco...@hpcoders.com.au http://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/20200731231632.GA17238%40zen.
Re: The size of the universe
On Sun, May 24, 2020 at 01:21:38PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > On 24 May 2020, at 01:37, Russell Standish wrote: > > > > However, I would think that ultrafinitism would change COMP's > > predictions, and in a sense be incompatibe with it. Some programs will > > not exist, because one would need to wait too long > > “Too long” is still finite. > > The biggest natural number is of course “infinite”, but the ultrafinitist > cannot know that. > > That is why a “real ultrafinitiste” will never say that he is ultrafinitist. > He has no means to explains why ultra-finitism means. Only a finitists can > prove that ultra-finitsime is consistent (indeed PA can prove that RA is > consistent). > > > > > for them to be > > executed by the UD. In fact, the choice of reference universal machine > > would be significant in ultrafinitism, IIUC. > > Why? As long as the theory is Turing complete, all programs are run (in all > interpretation of the theory), including all finite segment of the executions > of all non terminating programs, and this with the usual redundancy. > For an ultrafinitist, there is a biggest number (perhaps unknowable), and consequently computer programs that don't get run (because they take more steps than that biggest number. The CT thesis is strictly false in such a case, but could possibly apply in an approximate sense. > Bruno > > > > > > > > > -- > > > > > > Dr Russell StandishPhone 0425 253119 (mobile) > > Principal, High Performance Coders hpco...@hpcoders.com.au > > http://www.hpcoders.com.au > > > > > > -- > > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > > "Everything List" group. > > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > > email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > > To view this discussion on the web visit > > https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/20200523233705.GC27696%40zen. > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/596AD8C2-0628-4F05-926E-0BDEF0767A46%40ulb.ac.be. -- Dr Russell StandishPhone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders hpco...@hpcoders.com.au http://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/20200531075033.GB25940%40zen.
Re: The size of the universe
On Sat, May 23, 2020 at 12:05:08PM -0700, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List wrote: > > > On 5/23/2020 4:42 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > > Well, those are theorem provable in very weak theories. It is more a > > question of grasping the proof than subscribing to a philosophical idea. > > That arithmetic executes all programs is a theorem similar to Euclid’s > > theorem that there is no biggest prima numbers. It is more a fact, than > > an idea which could be debated. I insist on this as I realise this is > > less known by the general scientists than 20 years ago. We knew this > > implicitly since Gödel 1931, and explicitly since Church, Turing and > > Kleene 1936. > > Recently you have said that your theory is consistent with finitism, even > ultrafinitism. But the idea that arithemtic exectues all programs certainly > requires infinities. Only potential infinities, not actual infinities. For the UD (a finite object) to execute any given program, one only needs to wait a finite amount of time. However, I would think that ultrafinitism would change COMP's predictions, and in a sense be incompatibe with it. Some programs will not exist, because one would need to wait too long for them to be executed by the UD. In fact, the choice of reference universal machine would be significant in ultrafinitism, IIUC. -- ---- Dr Russell StandishPhone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders hpco...@hpcoders.com.au http://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/20200523233705.GC27696%40zen.
Re: The size of the universe
On Thu, May 21, 2020 at 08:33:03PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > Is it correct to say that almost surely any sequence can be found? > > > Hmm… “almost” has already a technical meaning in computer science. It means > for > all but a finite number exceptions. It existential dual is “there is > infinitely many …”. > > Then, I don’t want to look like pick nicking, but “almost” and “sure” seems a > bit antinomic. Not to pick nits, but it actually means the exceptions are of measure zero. There may well still be an infinite number of them. After all, the set of rational numbers (which is infinite) is of measure zero. -- -------- Dr Russell StandishPhone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders hpco...@hpcoders.com.au http://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/20200523230215.GB27696%40zen.
Re: EinsteinPy
On Tue, May 05, 2020 at 10:47:15AM +0200, smitra wrote: > Isn't Python too slow for such simulation work? The heavy lifting is done in C++, with full HPC support (OpenMP and MPI). EcoLab naturally embeds an interpreter, which is currently TCL, enabling rapid setting up of different experiements. Thinki of it like Tensorflow, not "everything done in Python". -- -------- Dr Russell StandishPhone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders hpco...@hpcoders.com.au http://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/20200506022534.GA26429%40zen.
Re: EinsteinPy
Yes - Python is the duck's nuts right now. I want to switch TCL out for Python in my EcoLab platform, which I use for ALife research. It'll probably have a to wait a few years until I "retire", though, and I hope that the scientific community hasn't jumped on another bandwagon by that time :). On Mon, May 04, 2020 at 05:02:23PM -0700, Philip Thrift wrote: > > > Latest release: > > https://twitter.com/EinsteinPy/status/1257452756413165568 > > @philipthrift > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/e97522ce-5c96-4459-af0c-fb790517e4d6%40googlegroups.com. -- ---- Dr Russell StandishPhone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders hpco...@hpcoders.com.au http://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/20200505012527.GB7959%40zen.
Universe as a simulated strange loop
Not sure if this paper has been mentioned here, but it seems quite apt to our discussions. It appears concordant with my ideas in "Theory of Nothing", also Bruno's AUDA and Brent's virtuous circles. https://www.mdpi.com/1099-4300/22/2/247/htm I haven't yet read the article in full - just the summary writeup here: https://bigthink.com/surprising-science/new-hypothesis-argues-the-universe-simulates-itself-into-existence?rebelltitem=6#rebelltitem6 Cheers -- -------- Dr Russell StandishPhone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders hpco...@hpcoders.com.au http://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/20200503030239.GB29442%40zen.
Re: John Conway is dead
Trubutes: https://xkcd.com/2293/ There was another tribute of similar ilk, but I can't find it now. On Mon, Apr 20, 2020 at 05:29:06PM -0400, John Clark wrote: > John Conway, the inventor of the Game Of Life and one of the greatest > mathematicians in the world has died of COVID-19. > > John Conway Solved Mathematical Problems With His Bare Hands > > John K Clark > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email > to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/ > everything-list/ > CAJPayv1Yhf_jyCu3kywvg2cnTd1%3DL4UWRODv7ODP7hZQu0Ms_g%40mail.gmail.com. -- -------- Dr Russell StandishPhone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders hpco...@hpcoders.com.au http://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/20200420221929.GA5993%40zen.
Re: Does time flow?
Thanks for this. I've downloaded this, and will get to it soon. It sounds like an interesting approach. On Thu, Apr 09, 2020 at 02:43:41AM +, 'Chris de Morsella' via Everything List wrote: > Read a thought provoking hypothesis proposed by Swiss physicist Nicolas Gisin > in four papers he authored that questions the widely accepted block universe > model of Relativity on a mathematical basis, centered on the proposition that > infinitely precise real numbers do not exist in nature. > > Mathematics assumes the existence of infinitely precise real numbers as a > given; Nicolas Gisin questions that assumption. Instead Grisin argues that a > hundred year old branch of mathematics called Intuitionust Mathematics that > rejects the existence of numbers with infinite digitsvof precision is used to > describe the evolution of physical systems, it becomes clear that time really > passes and that new information is being created. > > The block universe model of spacetime argues for a static -- pre-ordained -- > universe in which past, present and future are illusions and all that is > always > has been. > > Modern information theory however shows that information is physical, it > requires both energy and space. He questions how a block universe hypothesis > could contain -- essentially infinite -- all the information encoded in the > block universe in the initial state at the moment of the big bang. > > Intuitionist mathematics accepts the reality of irrational values such as say > pi that have an infinite series of digits of precision because a formula > exists > that can in theory calculate its value to any degree of precision. > > But say we have an arbitrary value x that is initially measured to some point > of precision of x=0.4 (the example given) and that this value unfurls to > greater and greater degrees of precision. Perhaps the series of 9s continues > forever and thus x is exactly equal to 1/2, but if at any point a digit of > lower value is encountered this quantity will forever be less than 1/2. > Before > that happens we cannot know what x is equal to, our knowledge depends on this > unfolding sequence. > > "But before that happens, when all we know is 0.4999, “we don’t know whether > or > not a digit other than 9 will ever show up,” explained Carl Posy, a > philosopher > of mathematics at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and a leading expert on > intuitionist math. “At the time we consider this x, we cannot say that x is > less than ½, nor can we say that x equals ½.” The proposition “x is equal to > ½” > is not true, and neither is its negation. The law of the excluded middle > doesn’t hold." > > "In other words, the world is indeterministic; the future is open. Time, Gisin > said, “is not unfolding like a movie in the cinema. It is really a creative > unfolding. The new digits really get created as time passes.”" > > Here is the link to the article, for those interested: https:// > www.quantamagazine.org/ > does-time-really-flow-new-clues-come-from-a-century-old-approach-to-math-20200407 > / > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email > to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/ > everything-list/1883724681.2957102.1586400221647%40mail.yahoo.com. -- Dr Russell StandishPhone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders hpco...@hpcoders.com.au http://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/20200413091932.GA3306%40zen.
Re: Pauli's Exclusion Principle
I thought the principle came from antisymmetry of fermionic pairwise wavefunctions. If two fermions occupied the same state, then antisymmetry is impossible. Bosons have symmetric pairwise wavefunctions (you can swap two bosons, and nothing changes), hence it is possible to have more than one boson in the same state. I'd have to go back to my class notes of QM to check this of course, just speaking from 35+ years ago when I last studied this. On Fri, Apr 03, 2020 at 08:16:51AM -0700, Lawrence Crowell wrote: > It is reasonable to state the Pauli exclusion principle is a postulate on its > own. There are though other possibilities. With supersymmetry, parafermions, > bosonization and now fermionization of bosons the role of the PEP is not > entirely certain. > > LC > > On Thursday, April 2, 2020 at 8:09:23 PM UTC-5, Alan Grayson wrote: > > Does the Pauli's Exclusion Principle have a similar status in QM as Born's > rule; namely, an empirical fact not derivable from the postulates of QM? > TIA, AG > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email > to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/ > everything-list/3996ad4e-cd70-474f-94d6-8e6b7bf310ce%40googlegroups.com. -- Dr Russell StandishPhone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders hpco...@hpcoders.com.au http://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/20200404083558.GA2556%40zen.
Re: Postulate: Everything that CAN happen, MUST happen.
On Mon, Mar 09, 2020 at 08:41:01PM -0700, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List wro> > It may seem counter intuitive, but as the sample length goes up the > probability of each possible proportion goes down, including that of the > true value. It goes down because there are more possible exact values. > > Brent > Yes, but that is not really related either. When talking about all proportions that lie within (say) 1% of 50/50, the number of such distinct proportions grows faster than the probability of each possible proportion. -- -------- Dr Russell StandishPhone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders hpco...@hpcoders.com.au http://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/20200311053037.GA30360%40zen.
Re: Postulate: Everything that CAN happen, MUST happen.
On Sun, Mar 08, 2020 at 10:10:23PM +1100, Bruce Kellett wrote: > > > > In order to infer a probability of p = 0.5, your branch data must > have > > > approximately equal numbers of zeros and ones. The number of > branches > > with > > > equal numbers of zeros and ones is given by the binomial > coefficient. For > > large > > > even N = 2M trials, this coefficient is N!/M!*M!. Using the > Stirling > > > approximation to the factorial for large N, this goes as 2^N/sqrt > (N) > > (within > > > factors of order one). Since there are 2^N sequences, the > proportion with > > n_0 = > > > n_1 vanishes as 1/sqrt(N) for N large. > > > > This is the nub of the proof you wanted. No - it is simply irrelevant. The statement I made was about the proportion of strings whose bit ratio lies within certain percentage of the expected value. After all when making a measurement, you are are interested in the value and its error bounds, eg 10mm +/- 0.1%, or 10mm +/- 0.01mm. We can never know its exact value. -- Dr Russell StandishPhone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders hpco...@hpcoders.com.au http://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/20200309215348.GH2903%40zen.
Re: Postulate: Everything that CAN happen, MUST happen.
On Sun, Mar 08, 2020 at 07:08:25PM +1100, Bruce Kellett wrote: > On Sun, Mar 8, 2020 at 6:14 PM Russell Standish wrote: > > On Thu, Mar 05, 2020 at 09:45:38PM +1100, Bruce Kellett wrote: > > On Thu, Mar 5, 2020 at 5:26 PM Russell Standish > wrote: > > > > But a very large proportion of them (→1 as N→∞) will report being > > within ε (called a confidence interval) of 50% for any given ε>0 > > chosen at the outset of the experiment. This is simply the law of > > large numbers theorem. You can't focus on the vanishingly small > > population that lie outside the confidence interval. > > > > > > This is wrong. > > Them's fighting words. Prove it! > > > I have, in other posts and below. You didn't do it below, that's why I said prove it. What you wrote below had little bearing on what I wrote. > > > > In the binary situation where both outcomes occur for every > > trial, there are 2^N binary sequences for N repetitions of the > experiment. This > > set of binary sequences exhausts the possibilities, so the same sequence > is > > obtained for any two-component initial state -- regardless of the > amplitudes. > > > You appear to assume that the natural probability in this situation is p > = 0.5 > > and, what is more, your appeal to the law of large numbers applies only > for > > single-world probabilities, in which there is only one outcome on each > trial. > > I didn't mention proability once in the above paragraph, not even > implicitly. I used the term "proportion". That the proportion will be > equal to the probability in a single universe case is a frequentist > assumption, and should be uncontroversial, but goes beyond what I > stated above. > > > Sure. But the proportion of the 2^N sequences that exhibit any particular p > value (proportion of 1's) decreases with N. > So what? > > > In order to infer a probability of p = 0.5, your branch data must have > > approximately equal numbers of zeros and ones. The number of branches > with > > equal numbers of zeros and ones is given by the binomial coefficient. > For > large > > even N = 2M trials, this coefficient is N!/M!*M!. Using the Stirling > > approximation to the factorial for large N, this goes as 2^N/sqrt(N) > (within > > factors of order one). Since there are 2^N sequences, the proportion > with > n_0 = > > n_1 vanishes as 1/sqrt(N) for N large. > > I wasn't talking about that. I was talking about the proportion of > sequences whose ratio of 0 bits to 1 bits lie within ε of 0.5, rather > than the proportion of sequences that have exactly equal 0 or 1 > bits. That proportion grows as sqrt N. > > > > No, it falls as 1/sqrt(N). Remember, the confidence interval depends on the > standard deviation, and that falls as 1/sqrt(n). Consequently deviations from > equal numbers of zeros and ones for p to be within the CI of 0.5 must decline > as n becomes large > The value ε defined above is fixed at the outset. It is independent of N. Maybe I incorrectly called it a confidence interval, although it is surely related. The number of bitstrings having a ratio of 0 to 1 within ε of 0.5 grows as √N. IIRC, a confidence interval is the interval of a fixed proportion, ie we can be 95% confident that strings will have a ratio between 49.5% and 51.5%. That interval (49.5% and 51.5%) will decrease as √N for fixed confidence level (95%). > > > > Now sequences with small departures from equal numbers will still give > > probabilities within the confidence interval of p = 0.5. But this > confidence > > interval also shrinks as 1/sqrt(N) as N increases, so these additional > > sequences do not contribute a growing number of cases giving p ~ 0.5 as > N > > increases. > > The confidence interval ε is fixed. > > > No, it is not. The width of, say the 95% CI, decreases with N since the > standard deviation falls as 1/sqrt(N). Which only demonstrates my point. An increasing number of strings will lie in the fixed interval ε. I apologise if I used the term "confidence interval" in a nonstandard way. -- Dr Russell StandishPhone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders hpco...@hpcoders.com.au http://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/20200308085904.GE2903%40zen.
Re: Postulate: Everything that CAN happen, MUST happen.
On Sun, Mar 08, 2020 at 06:50:52PM +1100, Bruce Kellett wrote:
> On Sun, Mar 8, 2020 at 5:32 PM Russell Standish wrote:
>
> On Fri, Mar 06, 2020 at 10:44:37AM +1100, Bruce Kellett wrote:
>
> > That is, in fact, false. It does not generate the same strings as
> flipping a
> > coin in single world. Sure, each of the strings in Everett could have
> been
> > obtained from coin flips -- but then the probability of a sequence of
> 10,000
> > heads is very low, whereas in many-worlds you are guaranteed that one
> observer
> > will obtain this sequence. There is a profound difference between the
> two
> > cases.
>
> You have made this statement multiple times, and it appears to be at
> the heart of our disagreement. I don't see what the profound
> difference is.
>
> If I select a subset from the set of all strings of length N, for example
> all strings with exactly N/3 1s, then I get a quite specific value for the
> proportion of the whole that match it:
>
> / N \
> | | 2^{-N} = p.
> \N/3/
>
> Now this number p will also equal the probability of seeing exactly
> N/3 coins land head up when N coins are tossed.
>
> What is the profound difference?
>
>
>
> Take a more extreme case. The probability of getting 1000 heads on 1000 coin
> tosses is 1/2^1000.
> If you measure the spin components of an ensemble of identical spin-half
> particles, there will certainly be one observer who sees 1000 spin-up results.
> That is the difference -- the difference between probability of 1/2^1000 and a
> probability of one.
>
> In fact in a recent podcast by Sean Carroll (that has been discussed on the
> list previously), he makes the statement that this rare event (with
> probability
> p = 1/2^1000) certainly occurs. In other words, he is claiming that the
> probability is both 1/2^1000 and one. That this is a flat contradiction
> appears
> to escape him. The difference in probabilities between coin tosses and
> Everettian measurements couldn't be more stark.
That is because you're talking about different things. The rare event
that 1 in 2^1000 observers see certainly occurs. In this case
certainty does not refer to probability 1, as no probabilities are
applicable in that 3p picture. Probabilities in the MWI sense refers
to what an observer will see next, it is a 1p concept.
And that 1p context, I do not see any difference in how probabilities
are interpreted, nor in their numerical values.
Perhaps Caroll is being sloppy. If so, I would think that could be forgiven.
--
Dr Russell StandishPhone 0425 253119 (mobile)
Principal, High Performance Coders hpco...@hpcoders.com.au
http://www.hpcoders.com.au
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Re: Postulate: Everything that CAN happen, MUST happen.
On Thu, Mar 05, 2020 at 09:45:38PM +1100, Bruce Kellett wrote: > On Thu, Mar 5, 2020 at 5:26 PM Russell Standish wrote: > > > But a very large proportion of them (→1 as N→∞) will report being > within ε (called a confidence interval) of 50% for any given ε>0 > chosen at the outset of the experiment. This is simply the law of > large numbers theorem. You can't focus on the vanishingly small > population that lie outside the confidence interval. > > > This is wrong. Them's fighting words. Prove it! > In the binary situation where both outcomes occur for every > trial, there are 2^N binary sequences for N repetitions of the experiment. > This > set of binary sequences exhausts the possibilities, so the same sequence is > obtained for any two-component initial state -- regardless of the amplitudes. > You appear to assume that the natural probability in this situation is p = 0.5 > and, what is more, your appeal to the law of large numbers applies only for > single-world probabilities, in which there is only one outcome on each trial. I didn't mention proability once in the above paragraph, not even implicitly. I used the term "proportion". That the proportion will be equal to the probability in a single universe case is a frequentist assumption, and should be uncontroversial, but goes beyond what I stated above. > > In order to infer a probability of p = 0.5, your branch data must have > approximately equal numbers of zeros and ones. The number of branches with > equal numbers of zeros and ones is given by the binomial coefficient. For > large > even N = 2M trials, this coefficient is N!/M!*M!. Using the Stirling > approximation to the factorial for large N, this goes as 2^N/sqrt(N) (within > factors of order one). Since there are 2^N sequences, the proportion with n_0 > = > n_1 vanishes as 1/sqrt(N) for N large. I wasn't talking about that. I was talking about the proportion of sequences whose ratio of 0 bits to 1 bits lie within ε of 0.5, rather than the proportion of sequences that have exactly equal 0 or 1 bits. That proportion grows as sqrt N. > > Now sequences with small departures from equal numbers will still give > probabilities within the confidence interval of p = 0.5. But this confidence > interval also shrinks as 1/sqrt(N) as N increases, so these additional > sequences do not contribute a growing number of cases giving p ~ 0.5 as N > increases. The confidence interval ε is fixed. So, again within factors of order unity, the proportion of sequences > consistent with p = 0.5 decreases without limit as N increases. So it is not > the case that a very large proportion of the binary strings will report p = > 0.5. The proportion lying outside the confidence interval of p = 0.5 is not > vanishingly small -- it grows with N. > > > > > The crux of the matter is that all branches are equivalent when both > outcomes > > occur on every trial, so all observers will infer that their observed > relative > > frequencies reflect the actual probabilities. Since there are observers > for all > > possibilities for p in the range [0,1], and not all can be correct, no > sensible > > probability value can be assigned to such duplication experiments. > > I don't see why not. Faced with a coin flip toss, I would assume a > 50/50 chance of seeing heads or tails. Faced with a history of 100 > heads, I might start to investigate the coin for bias, and perhaps by > Bayesian arguments give the biased coin theory greater weight than the > theory that I've just experience a 1 in 2^100 event, but in any case > it is just statistics, and it is the same whether all oputcomes have > been realised or not. > > > The trouble with this analogy is that coin tosses are single-world events -- > there is only one outcome for each toss. Consequently, any intuitions about > probabilities based on such comparisons are not relevant to the Everettian > case > in which every outcome occurs for every toss. Your intuition that it is the > same whether all outcomes are realised or not is simply mistaken. > > > > The problem is even worse in quantum mechanics, where you measure a > state > such > > as > > > > |psi> = a|0> + b|1>. > > > > When both outcomes occur on every trial, the result of a sequence of N > trials > > is all possible binary strings of length N, (all 2^N of them). You then > notice > > that this set of all possible strings is obtained whatever non-zero > values of a > > and b you assume. The assignment of some propbability r
Re: Postulate: Everything that CAN happen, MUST happen.
On Fri, Mar 06, 2020 at 10:44:37AM +1100, Bruce Kellett wrote:
>
>
> That is, in fact, false. It does not generate the same strings as flipping a
> coin in single world. Sure, each of the strings in Everett could have been
> obtained from coin flips -- but then the probability of a sequence of 10,000
> heads is very low, whereas in many-worlds you are guaranteed that one observer
> will obtain this sequence. There is a profound difference between the two
> cases.
You have made this statement multiple times, and it appears to be at
the heart of our disagreement. I don't see what the profound
difference is.
If I select a subset from the set of all strings of length N, for example all
strings with exactly N/3 1s, then I get a quite specific value for the
proportion of the whole that match it:
/ N \
|| 2^{-N} = p.
\N/3/
Now this number p will also equal the probability of seeing exactly
N/3 coins land head up when N coins are tossed.
What is the profound difference?
--
--------
Dr Russell StandishPhone 0425 253119 (mobile)
Principal, High Performance Coders hpco...@hpcoders.com.au
http://www.hpcoders.com.au
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Re: Postulate: Everything that CAN happen, MUST happen.
On Thu, Mar 05, 2020 at 11:34:55AM +1100, Bruce Kellett wrote: > On Thu, Mar 5, 2020 at 10:39 AM Russell Standish > wrote: > > On Thu, Mar 05, 2020 at 09:46:34AM +1100, Bruce Kellett wrote: > > > The greater problem is that any idea of probability founders when all > outcomes > > occur for any measurement. Or have you not followed the arguments I have > been > > making that shows this to be the case? > > > > I must admit I haven't followed the arguments either - admittedly, I > haven't read your cited material. > > ISTM - probability is all about what an observer observes. Since the > observer cannot see all outcomes, an objection based on all outcomes > occurring seems moot to me. > > > The fact that the observer cannot see all outcomes is actually central to the > argument. If, in the person-duplication scenario, the participant naively > assumes a probability p = 0.5 for each outcome, such an intuition can only be > tested by repeating the duplication a number of times and inferring a > probability value from the observed outcomes. Since each observer can see only > the outcomes along his or her particular branch (and, ipso facto, is unaware > of > the outcomes on other branches), as the number of trials N becomes very large, > only a vanishingly small proportion of observers will confirm their 50/50 > prediction . This is a trivial calculation involving only the binomial > coefficient -- Brent and I discussed this a while ago, and Brent could not > fault the maths. But a very large proportion of them (→1 as N→∞) will report being within ε (called a confidence interval) of 50% for any given ε>0 chosen at the outset of the experiment. This is simply the law of large numbers theorem. You can't focus on the vanishingly small population that lie outside the confidence interval. > > The crux of the matter is that all branches are equivalent when both outcomes > occur on every trial, so all observers will infer that their observed relative > frequencies reflect the actual probabilities. Since there are observers for > all > possibilities for p in the range [0,1], and not all can be correct, no > sensible > probability value can be assigned to such duplication experiments. I don't see why not. Faced with a coin flip toss, I would assume a 50/50 chance of seeing heads or tails. Faced with a history of 100 heads, I might start to investigate the coin for bias, and perhaps by Bayesian arguments give the biased coin theory greater weight than the theory that I've just experience a 1 in 2^100 event, but in any case it is just statistics, and it is the same whether all oputcomes have been realised or not. > > The problem is even worse in quantum mechanics, where you measure a state such > as > > |psi> = a|0> + b|1>. > > When both outcomes occur on every trial, the result of a sequence of N trials > is all possible binary strings of length N, (all 2^N of them). You then notice > that this set of all possible strings is obtained whatever non-zero values of > a > and b you assume. The assignment of some propbability relation to the > coefficients is thus seen to be meaningless -- all probabilities occur equal > for any non-zero choices of a and b. > For the outcome of any particular binary string, sure. But if we classify the outcome strings - say ones with a recognisable pattern, or when replayed through a CD player reproduce the sounds of Beethoven's ninth, we find that the overwhelming majority are simply gobbledegook, random data. And the overwhelming majority of those will have a roughly equal number of 0s and 1s. For each of these categories, there will be a definite probability value, and not all will be 2^-N. For instance, with Beethoven's ninth, that the tenor has a cold in the 4th movement doesn't render the music not the ninth. So there will be set of bitstrings that are recognisably the ninth symphony, and a quite definite probability value. > > > > You may counter that the assumption that an observer cannot see all > outcomes is an extra thing "put in by hand", and you would be right, > of course. It is not part of the Schroedinger equation. But I would > strongly suspect that this assumption will be a natural outcome of a > proper theory of consciousness, if/when we have one. Indeed, I > highlight it in my book with the name "PROJECTION postulate". > > This is, of course, at the heart of the 1p/3p distinction - and of > course the classic taunts and misunderstandings between BM and JC > (1p-3p confusion). > > > I know that it is a factor of the 1p/3p distinction. My complaint has > frequently
Re: Postulate: Everything that CAN happen, MUST happen.
On Thu, Mar 05, 2020 at 09:46:34AM +1100, Bruce Kellett wrote: > > The greater problem is that any idea of probability founders when all outcomes > occur for any measurement. Or have you not followed the arguments I have been > making that shows this to be the case? > I must admit I haven't followed the arguments either - admittedly, I haven't read your cited material. ISTM - probability is all about what an observer observes. Since the observer cannot see all outcomes, an objection based on all outcomes occurring seems moot to me. You may counter that the assumption that an observer cannot see all outcomes is an extra thing "put in by hand", and you would be right, of course. It is not part of the Schroedinger equation. But I would strongly suspect that this assumption will be a natural outcome of a proper theory of consciousness, if/when we have one. Indeed, I highlight it in my book with the name "PROJECTION postulate". This is, of course, at the heart of the 1p/3p distinction - and of course the classic taunts and misunderstandings between BM and JC (1p-3p confusion). Incidently, I've started reading Colin Hales's "Revolution of Scientific Structure", a fellow Melburnian and member of this list. The interesting proposition about this is Colin is proposing we're on the verge of a Kuhnian paradigm shift in relation to the role of the observer in science, and the that this sort of misunderstanding is a classic symptom of such a shift. Cheers -- -------- Dr Russell StandishPhone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders hpco...@hpcoders.com.au http://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/20200304233927.GE7315%40zen.
Re: Connectional physics
On Sat, Feb 08, 2020 at 06:44:16AM -0800, Philip Thrift wrote: > > Connectional physics > > Some have written on how the connectional (neural network) approach will not > rival the traditional equational ( https://inews.co.uk/news/science/ > this-is-the-equation-stephen-hawking-wanted-on-his-tombstone-323699 ) > approach, > but then why should nature necessarily be expressed in simple language. Both equations and connectionist models rely on finding and expoiting patterns in nature. Why these patterns exist is really Wigner's hoary old question of the "unreasonable effectiveness of mathematics". To which, I would answer because of the Solomonoff-Levin theorem, sometimes called the Occams Razor theorem. The equation approach is remarkably effective for some situations (eg celestial mechanics), and before we had decent computers, we focussed on domains where these models were effective. Now we find that some models (think weather models, for example), where the computational cost of the equation approach exceeds the computational cost of throwing a neural network at it, allowing considerable speedup of computing the model using a connectionist shortcut. I think it is interesting from a having another tool in the toolbox, but probably not interesting philosophically. -- -------- Dr Russell StandishPhone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders hpco...@hpcoders.com.au http://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/20200209003648.GO31496%40zen.
Re: Inept leadership
The answer is yes. The enormity of the situation can be brought home by noting that more than half of Australia's population is affected by these fires, including myself; about five times the area of the recent California fires have been burnt in the last three months and about 2/3rds of Australia's annual CO2 emissions have just gone up in smoke. This same "no policies" PM - "she'll be right, no worries" actively refused to meet with the fire chiefs back in April of this year to discuss what to do about the impending fire season (yes - it was known back then things were going to be bad). That for me is the height of ineptitude - probably worse than Bush Jr's handling of Katrina. A lot of us Aussies feel the same way right about now. Pity they didn't when they elected him earlier this year. Cheers On Fri, Jan 03, 2020 at 02:16:34PM -0800, Alan Grayson wrote: > > > On Friday, January 3, 2020 at 2:30:08 PM UTC-7, Bruce wrote: > > The bush fires in Australia have shown up a serious deficit of > leadership in Australia's Prime Minister -- who holidays in Hawaii while > Australia burns > > People are asking for NZ to take over.. > > https://www.rt.com/news/477394-aussies-plead-nz-pm-takeover/ > > Bruce > > > Is your residence near any fires? What city? AG > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email > to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/ > everything-list/e6b759e5-148e-4cc0-81ef-b60a9b91cddf%40googlegroups.com. -- Dr Russell StandishPhone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders hpco...@hpcoders.com.au http://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/20200103232002.GE16240%40zen.
Re: There is no mind-body problem
On Sat, Oct 26, 2019 at 05:25:39PM -0700, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List wrote: > > > On 10/26/2019 5:05 PM, Russell Standish wrote: > > On Sat, Oct 26, 2019 at 12:50:10PM -0700, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything > > List wrote: > > > I'm glad you recognize there's a difference between "potential" and > > > "real"; > > > a distinction this list is founded to obfuscate. > > > > > > Brent > > I don't know about that. The everything is "all finite things" is a > > perfectly rational starting point for an ensemble theory. > > > > Even though Max's original "all mathematical objects" theory is > > ambivalent on the point, I've always interpreted that as "all finite > > axiomatic systems", even in my first paper on the subject: "Why Occams > > Razor". > > Peano arithmetic is not a finite axiomatic system. It has infinitely many > axioms of the form (s...(s(s(s)))...). > So I'm not sure what your refer to. I doubt that "all finite things" is > well defined. Is the set of all finite things finite? > It was a way of characterising a type of theory, such as "all finite axiomatic systems", or "all turing machines". Peano arithmetic is a finite axiomatic system. However, the integers is not - as shown by Goedel's incompleteness theorem. Cheers -- Dr Russell StandishPhone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders Visiting Senior Research Fellowhpco...@hpcoders.com.au Economics, Kingston University http://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/20191027003338.GI12720%40zen.
Re: There is no mind-body problem
On Sat, Oct 26, 2019 at 12:50:10PM -0700, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List wrote: > > I'm glad you recognize there's a difference between "potential" and "real"; > a distinction this list is founded to obfuscate. > > Brent I don't know about that. The everything is "all finite things" is a perfectly rational starting point for an ensemble theory. Even though Max's original "all mathematical objects" theory is ambivalent on the point, I've always interpreted that as "all finite axiomatic systems", even in my first paper on the subject: "Why Occams Razor". Cheers -- Dr Russell StandishPhone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders Visiting Senior Research Fellowhpco...@hpcoders.com.au Economics, Kingston University http://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/20191027000238.GG12720%40zen.
Re: Sean Carroll: Universe a 'tiny sliver' of all there is
On Sat, Oct 05, 2019 at 09:05:49PM +1000, Bruce Kellett wrote: > On Sat, Oct 5, 2019 at 7:15 PM Bruno Marchal wrote: > > On 5 Oct 2019, at 07:14, Bruce Kellett wrote: > > > On Sat, Oct 5, 2019 at 1:10 AM Bruno Marchal > wrote: > > According to the above non-separable wave function, that means that > Bob > gets only the ket |->, > > > That is vague. It means that Alice will access to the Bobs who get that > state, and never access to the Bobs who did not got it. > > > Exactly. And this is what you are required to explain. Just stating it as a > fact is not an explanation. ISTM that this follows from the Born rule - the probability of both Alice and Bob seeing the same spin is strictly zero. I understand that there are problems in deriving the Born rule from the MWI, and that derivations that purport to do so (such as mine) are contentious (to put it politely :)). So it doesn't exactly solve the problem, but maybe directs us toward where the solution lies. What I do get is Bruno's point that a single world assumption turns a nonlocal state into FTL "influence", the mechanism of which is quite unimaginable as you point out. An argument by incredulity, as it were, for the MWI. -- ---- Dr Russell StandishPhone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders Visiting Senior Research Fellowhpco...@hpcoders.com.au Economics, Kingston University http://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/20191006005045.GX14811%40zen.
Re: Sean Carroll: Universe a 'tiny sliver' of all there is
On Sun, Sep 29, 2019 at 03:27:51PM -0700, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List wrote: > > > On 9/29/2019 3:15 PM, Russell Standish wrote: > > On Fri, Sep 27, 2019 at 06:27:16PM -0700, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything > List wrote: > > When I wrote "lowest" I was assuming the context of MWI...not a single > universe. The Bekenstein bound implies that the Hubble volume has an > upper > bound for information capacity of it's surface area in Planck units. > This > number is around 2.4e106. So as I read Zurek, he thinks this > provides a kind > of probability cutoff and branches less probable than 0.4e-106 have > zero > probability. And, more to the point, in the limit of large N, where > N is the > number of degrees of freedom in the environment the off diagonal > terms of the > reduced density matrix go to zero; but this cutoff makes them exactly > zero for > N>2.41e106. I haven't figured out many branchings it would take to > reach this > number, but with some 1e98 particles it wouldn't take very many. > > Brent > > Its an interesting idea, and a plausible mechanism for denying the > "no cul-de-sac conjecture" and quantum immortality. > > However, I do have to wonder the significance of a 2.4x10^106 planck > distance quare hubble volume. This surely is a geographical factoid > rather than of fundamental significance. > > > It's not just geographical. The Bekenstein bound on the information that can > be contained within a the Hubble sphere depends on how big the sphere is which > in turn depends on the expansion rate of the universe. The expansion rate of > the universe might be a fundamental constant. > > Brent > Wouldn't it also depend on when you are observing the universe? -- Dr Russell StandishPhone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders Visiting Senior Research Fellowhpco...@hpcoders.com.au Economics, Kingston University http://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/20190930011334.GD31717%40zen.
Re: Sean Carroll: Universe a 'tiny sliver' of all there is
On Fri, Sep 27, 2019 at 06:27:16PM -0700, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List wrote: > > When I wrote "lowest" I was assuming the context of MWI...not a single > universe. The Bekenstein bound implies that the Hubble volume has an upper > bound for information capacity of it's surface area in Planck units. This > number is around 2.4e106. So as I read Zurek, he thinks this provides a kind > of probability cutoff and branches less probable than 0.4e-106 have zero > probability. And, more to the point, in the limit of large N, where N is the > number of degrees of freedom in the environment the off diagonal terms of the > reduced density matrix go to zero; but this cutoff makes them exactly zero for > N>2.41e106. I haven't figured out many branchings it would take to reach this > number, but with some 1e98 particles it wouldn't take very many. > > Brent Its an interesting idea, and a plausible mechanism for denying the "no cul-de-sac conjecture" and quantum immortality. However, I do have to wonder the significance of a 2.4x10^106 planck distance quare hubble volume. This surely is a geographical factoid rather than of fundamental significance. -- ---- Dr Russell StandishPhone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders Visiting Senior Research Fellowhpco...@hpcoders.com.au Economics, Kingston University http://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/20190929221524.GC31717%40zen.
Re: Quantum Supremacy
On Sat, Sep 21, 2019 at 08:22:40AM -0400, John Clark wrote: > There is a rumor that a team of researchers at Google led by John Martinis > have > performed a calculation on a Quantum Computer in three minutes and 20 seconds > that would have taken Summit, the most powerful conventional supercomputer in > the world, 10,000 years to perform. The rumor started when a paper stating > that > was posted by the Google team, apparently accidentally, on a NASA website and > then quickly taken down. It's not clear exactly what the calculation was > about, > they just said it “marks the first computation that can only be performed on a > quantum processor". My guess is it was probably a weird function of some sort > that would not be of much use to a scientist or engineer, but even so if true > it would be a first proof of concept and be earthsharing. I suppose they want > to check and recheck their work before they make a official announcement this > important and that's why they took the article down. > > John K Clark > It is rather easy to say that one's optimised algorithm using special purpose hardware performs better than some naive implementation running on a conventional computer. It is not so easy to show that it beats the pants off all possible algorithm running on the conventional computer. For example, it is often the case that some simple algorithm can be parallelised, and run many times faster on a parallel computer, however that there is also a more complicated algorithm that is inherently serial, but actually runs faster than the paralellised one. I have a feeling that may have happened here. But I look forward to a proper demonstration of quantum supremacy. -- -------- Dr Russell StandishPhone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders Visiting Senior Research Fellowhpco...@hpcoders.com.au Economics, Kingston University http://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/20190921213209.GA3498%40zen.
Re: Quantum immortality
On Wed, Sep 11, 2019 at 10:01:42PM +1000, Bruce Kellett wrote: > On Wed, Sep 11, 2019 at 4:57 PM Quentin Anciaux wrote: > > The argument of the measure is based on ASSA and that's why it is flawed, > moments are not random sampled from all possible moments, with this > argument and without QI, you should have never find yourself young... But > somewhere just before your death. > > > ASSA is not a law of physics. I am not assuming random sampling from anything. > It is just that you spend more time old than young given quantum immortality. > That is not to say that you are never young -- of course you have to pass > through all the years since your birth, one year at a time. It is just that > there are more years after any given age than before that age. Yes, and I'm still passing through those younger moments. That is the RSSA position. If you want to say you are randomly sampled from all your life's observer moments (ASSA), you have to take account the nonuniform measure as a function of age over observer moments. -- -------- Dr Russell StandishPhone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders Visiting Senior Research Fellowhpco...@hpcoders.com.au Economics, Kingston University http://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/20190918050814.GE2417%40zen.
Re: Quantum immortality
On Wed, Sep 11, 2019 at 12:00:04PM +1000, Bruce Kellett wrote: > On Wed, Sep 11, 2019 at 10:18 AM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List < > everything-list@googlegroups.com> wrote: > > On 9/10/2019 4:30 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote: > > Another argument that has been given here before is that if quantum > > immortality is true, then we should expect to see a number of people > > who are considerably older than the normal life expectancy -- and we > > do not see people who are two or three hundred years old. Even if the > > probabilities are very low, there have been an awful lot of people > > born within the last 500 or so years -- some must have survived on our > > branch if this scenario is true. > > My argument was that each of us should find ourselves to be much older > than even the oldest people we know. > > > That is probably the best single argument against quantum immortality: if QI > is > true, then the measure of our lifetime after one reaches a normal lifetime is > infinitely greater than the measure before age , say, 120 yr. So if one finds > oneself younger than 120 years, QI is false, and if MWI is still considered to > be true, there must be another argument why MWI does not imply QI. > Once I tried to use this argument against the ASSA in a debate with Jacques Mallah. I lost. This line of argument fails. -- Dr Russell StandishPhone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders Visiting Senior Research Fellowhpco...@hpcoders.com.au Economics, Kingston University http://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/20190918050411.GD2417%40zen.
Re: Quantum immortality
On Tue, Sep 10, 2019 at 05:18:51PM -0700, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List wrote: > > > On 9/10/2019 4:30 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote: > > Another argument that has been given here before is that if quantum > > immortality is true, then we should expect to see a number of people who > > are considerably older than the normal life expectancy -- and we do not > > see people who are two or three hundred years old. Even if the > > probabilities are very low, there have been an awful lot of people born > > within the last 500 or so years -- some must have survived on our branch > > if this scenario is true. > > My argument was that each of us should find ourselves to be much older than > even the oldest people we know. Only if the ASSA is true, not the RSSA. But even if the ASSA is true, the total measure of very old observer moments may well be insignificant compared with those of moderate age, so no, your argument fails. The latter was my mistake in an argument I had with Jacques Mallah once. -- -------- Dr Russell StandishPhone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders Visiting Senior Research Fellowhpco...@hpcoders.com.au Economics, Kingston University http://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/20190918050120.GC2417%40zen.
Re: Another physicist in mental decline (Sean Carroll)
On Mon, Sep 16, 2019 at 07:42:18PM -0700, Alan Grayson wrote: > > > On Monday, September 16, 2019 at 7:20:57 PM UTC-6, Russell Standish wrote: > > On Fri, Sep 13, 2019 at 08:25:06PM -0700, Alan Grayson wrote: > > > > Whether they're boring or not is irrelevant. As I previously posted, an > > uncountable infinity of universes is possible without any repeats. AG > > > > Incorrect. Each world has a finite amount of information that defines > it, and consequently nonzero measure. If these worlds are drawn from > an uncountable infinite set, then there must be an uncountable number > of copies of each world. > > > This argument breaks down if worlds are infinite. To prove any of this, > we need to do some real mathematics. So far I see it as conjectural. AG > I just don't see how it could be possible for a world to contain an infinite amount of information. But as people have noted here, the word "world" is ambiguous. -- ---- Dr Russell StandishPhone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders Visiting Senior Research Fellowhpco...@hpcoders.com.au Economics, Kingston University http://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/20190917051323.GF5030%40zen.
Re: Another physicist in mental decline (Sean Carroll)
On Fri, Sep 13, 2019 at 08:25:06PM -0700, Alan Grayson wrote: > > Whether they're boring or not is irrelevant. As I previously posted, an > uncountable infinity of universes is possible without any repeats. AG > Incorrect. Each world has a finite amount of information that defines it, and consequently nonzero measure. If these worlds are drawn from an uncountable infinite set, then there must be an uncountable number of copies of each world. -- -------- Dr Russell StandishPhone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders Visiting Senior Research Fellowhpco...@hpcoders.com.au Economics, Kingston University http://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/20190917010724.GD5030%40zen.
Re: Entropy of early universe
On Sat, Sep 14, 2019 at 10:13:27PM -0700, Alan Grayson wrote: > > > On Saturday, September 14, 2019 at 7:12:34 AM UTC-6, Alan Grayson wrote: > > If the early universe, say before the emergence of the CMBR, consisted of > a > random collection of electrons and photons, wouldn't this correspond to a > high, not low entropy? Wouldn't it be analogous to gas with many possible > states? Yet cosmologists seem hard pressed to explain an initial or early > state assuming the entropy is low. AG > > > When I was an undergraduate I took a course in Classical Thermodynamics and > recall being satisfied that entropy was well-defined. I never took a course in > Classical Statistical Mechanics, but I've seen Boltzmann's equation for S and > wonder how N, the number of possible states is defined. If we have a gas > enclosed in a container, we can divide it into occupation cells of fixed > volume > to calcuate S. But why can't we double the number of cells by reducing their > volume by half? How then is S well defined in the case of Classical > Statistical > Mechanics? TIA, AG It actually isn't. The point bothered me too. The number of states is basically V/h, where V is the volume of phase space occupied by the system, and h a cell size. Therefore, entropy is klog V - klog h For a large range of values of h, the second term is just a negligible constant offset to the total entropy. However, as h→0, entropy blows up. And that what classical statistical mechanics tells you. Enter quantum mechanics. Heisenberg's uncertainty relation tells us that ΔxΔp ≥ ℏ, so in the above entropy formula, h is constrained to be larger than ℏ³. Quantum mechanics saves classical statistical physics' bacon. Nothing blows up. -- Dr Russell StandishPhone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders Visiting Senior Research Fellowhpco...@hpcoders.com.au Economics, Kingston University http://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/20190916072249.GC5030%40zen.
Re: The Neuroscience of Reality
On Mon, Sep 02, 2019 at 01:56:48AM -0700, Philip Thrift wrote: > > > > Reality is constructed by the brain, and no two brains are exactly alike > > By Anil K. Seth (@anilkseth) | Scientific American September 2019 Issue > > https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/the-neuroscience-of-reality/ > Interesting article. I might just forward this onto another correspondent of mine :) -- -------- Dr Russell StandishPhone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders Visiting Senior Research Fellowhpco...@hpcoders.com.au Economics, Kingston University http://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/20190903061221.GS2402%40zen.
Re: Observation versus assumption
On Sun, Aug 25, 2019 at 05:08:42AM -0400, John Clark wrote: > On Sun, Aug 25, 2019 at 12:14 AM Russell Standish > wrote: > > > > This is all different from John Clark's argument that something must > exist to breathe fire into all the computations. He calls that > something "matter", and strongly disavows the ability of arithmetic to > do this. Bruno Marchal claims the opposite - that arithmetic, or in > fact any abstract system capable of universal computation, is > sufficient for the job. To be quite frank, I'm a fence sitter in this > debate, as I've yet to see any physically realisable experiment that > can settle the matter. > > > I have. Add 2 +2 on your computer. Observe the output. Hit your computer as > hard as you can with the hammer. Add 2 +2 on your computer again. Observe if > the output has changed. Note that a hammer can change physical things but > can't > change arithmetic. You could be observing a simulation of a hammer breaking a simulated computer, which if faithful, should prevent the computation from taking place. It does not demonstrate ontological existence of the computer. -- ---- Dr Russell StandishPhone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders Visiting Senior Research Fellowhpco...@hpcoders.com.au Economics, Kingston University http://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/20190826000419.GJ2402%40zen.
Re: Models of arithmetic
On Fri, Aug 23, 2019 at 10:24:47PM -0700, Philip Thrift wrote: > > > On Friday, August 23, 2019 at 5:54:17 PM UTC-5, Russell Standish wrote: > > On Wed, Aug 21, 2019 at 10:28:39AM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > > On 20 Aug 2019, at 19:38, Philip Thrift wrote: > > > > > > > > The reason to suspect that arithmetic comes from matter (M→A) vs. > matter > > comes from arithmetic (A→M) is that with A→M there many Ms. > > > > > > On the contrary: Arithmetic (A) explains why there is many geographies > and > > history, but only one physics, the same fr all universal machine. That > is > due > > to the fact that Physics (Matter, M) emerges from the first person > > indeterminacy on *all* computations. > > So A explains why there is only one M possible, and why the physical > reality is > > the same for all universal machine/number. > > With A, the physical laws are justified being laws, and we get some > criteria > > (lacking in physics+physicalism) to distinguish physics and geography. > > This answer is a bit glib IMHO. In some ways it echos the statements I > give in section 9.3 of my book "Theory of Nothing", but which I freely > admitted I felt were provisional and too hand-wavy. However, I believe > that Markus Mueller has since provided an answer in the form of a > theorem (Thm 2.3 "Emergence of an Objective Reality") in his paper > arXiv: 1712.01816. > > That paper to me is probably the most significant result in this area > since I published my book. > > Cheers > > -- > > > > Dr Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) > Principal, High Performance Coders > Visiting Senior Research Fellow hpc...@hpcoders.com.au > Economics, Kingston University http://www.hpcoders.com.au > > > > So how does one get from (simple) > > https://arxiv.org/pdf/1712.01816v1.pdf > > to (complex) > > > https://www.sciencealert.com/images/Screen_Shot_2016-08-03_at_3.20.12_pm.png > (the Lagrangian Standard Model equation) > > ? > > @philipthrift > A partial answer is explored in Stenger's "Comprehensible Cosmos". In brief, its a combination of symmetries and symmetry breaking. But, as they say, the devil is in the details. Cheers -- Dr Russell StandishPhone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders Visiting Senior Research Fellowhpco...@hpcoders.com.au Economics, Kingston University http://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/20190825042635.GG2402%40zen.
Re: Observation versus assumption
On Sun, Aug 25, 2019 at 01:15:38PM +1000, Bruce Kellett wrote: > On Sun, Aug 25, 2019 at 1:01 PM Russell Standish > wrote: > > On Sat, Aug 24, 2019 at 07:34:26PM -0700, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything > List wrote: > > > > > > On 8/24/2019 6:31 PM, Russell Standish wrote: > > > On Sun, Aug 25, 2019 at 10:06:38AM +1000, Bruce Kellett wrote: > > > > On Sun, Aug 25, 2019 at 9:45 AM Russell Standish < > li...@hpcoders.com.au> wrote: > > > > > > > > On Sat, Aug 24, 2019 at 05:18:47PM -0400, John Clark wrote: > > > > > > > > > > >> OK so 0=1, that's fine. > > > > > > > > > > > No, that is not fine. If 0=1, pigs have wings. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Yes but that's OK too, if nothing physical exists then pigs > and wings > > > > can't > > > > > cause problems because they don't exist. And there are no > minds that > > > > might be > > > > > upset by paradoxes. > > > > > > > > > > > > > That's kind of the point, though. Minds are nonphysical things, > and > > > > there is no apriori reason why physical things need to exist > for > minds > > > > to exist. > > > > > > > > > > > > You have evidence for disembodied minds? > > > That's not an apriori reason. Assuming you're in principle OK with the > > > concept of a brain in a vat (which is a disembodied mind), then the > > > you too do not have an apriori reason for the existence of physical > > > things. > > > > > > > > > > I don't see that a brain in a vat counts as a disembodied mind. Do you > mean > > a brain that has no environment to perceive or act on? I would deny > that > > such an isolated brain instantiates a mind. On the other hand, if the > brain > > has sensors and actuators operating, say a Mars Rover, then it isn't > > disembodied. > > > > Brent > > > > Yes - I know your argument. In the BIV scenario, the environment could > be simulated. Basically Descartes' evil daemon (malin genie) > scenario. Nothing about the observed physics (bodies and whatnot) > exists in any fundamental sense. > > > Presumably the vat is a physical object that provides nutrients, power, etc to > the BIV. That does not count as disembodied in my book. > Neither the brain, nor the vat is a body. The body is actually simulated by the evil daemon, and doesn't exist ontologically. Hence disembodied. Now Brent makes good arguments (and I echo simular arguments in my book) that a body must exist phenomenally (ie exist as an experience of the mind), but nowhere does there appear to be a requirement for the body to exist ontologically (in the same reality as the brain and the vat in this example). This is all different from John Clark's argument that something must exist to breathe fire into all the computations. He calls that something "matter", and strongly disavows the ability of arithmetic to do this. Bruno Marchal claims the opposite - that arithmetic, or in fact any abstract system capable of universal computation, is sufficient for the job. To be quite frank, I'm a fence sitter in this debate, as I've yet to see any physically realisable experiment that can settle the matter. -- Dr Russell StandishPhone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders Visiting Senior Research Fellowhpco...@hpcoders.com.au Economics, Kingston University http://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/20190825041431.GF2402%40zen.
Re: Observation versus assumption
On Sat, Aug 24, 2019 at 07:34:26PM -0700, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List wrote: > > > On 8/24/2019 6:31 PM, Russell Standish wrote: > > On Sun, Aug 25, 2019 at 10:06:38AM +1000, Bruce Kellett wrote: > > > On Sun, Aug 25, 2019 at 9:45 AM Russell Standish > > > wrote: > > > > > > On Sat, Aug 24, 2019 at 05:18:47PM -0400, John Clark wrote: > > > > > > > > >> OK so 0=1, that's fine. > > > > > > > > > No, that is not fine. If 0=1, pigs have wings. > > > > > > > > > > > > Yes but that's OK too, if nothing physical exists then pigs and > > > wings > > > can't > > > > cause problems because they don't exist. And there are no minds > > > that > > > might be > > > > upset by paradoxes. > > > > > > > > > > That's kind of the point, though. Minds are nonphysical things, and > > > there is no apriori reason why physical things need to exist for > > > minds > > > to exist. > > > > > > > > > You have evidence for disembodied minds? > > That's not an apriori reason. Assuming you're in principle OK with the > > concept of a brain in a vat (which is a disembodied mind), then the > > you too do not have an apriori reason for the existence of physical > > things. > > > > > > I don't see that a brain in a vat counts as a disembodied mind. Do you mean > a brain that has no environment to perceive or act on? I would deny that > such an isolated brain instantiates a mind. On the other hand, if the brain > has sensors and actuators operating, say a Mars Rover, then it isn't > disembodied. > > Brent > Yes - I know your argument. In the BIV scenario, the environment could be simulated. Basically Descartes' evil daemon (malin genie) scenario. Nothing about the observed physics (bodies and whatnot) exists in any fundamental sense. -- Dr Russell StandishPhone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders Visiting Senior Research Fellowhpco...@hpcoders.com.au Economics, Kingston University http://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/20190825030137.GE2402%40zen.
Re: Observation versus assumption
On Sun, Aug 25, 2019 at 10:06:38AM +1000, Bruce Kellett wrote: > On Sun, Aug 25, 2019 at 9:45 AM Russell Standish > wrote: > > On Sat, Aug 24, 2019 at 05:18:47PM -0400, John Clark wrote: > > > > >> OK so 0=1, that's fine. > > > > > No, that is not fine. If 0=1, pigs have wings. > > > > > > Yes but that's OK too, if nothing physical exists then pigs and wings > can't > > cause problems because they don't exist. And there are no minds that > might be > > upset by paradoxes. > > > > That's kind of the point, though. Minds are nonphysical things, and > there is no apriori reason why physical things need to exist for minds > to exist. > > > You have evidence for disembodied minds? That's not an apriori reason. Assuming you're in principle OK with the concept of a brain in a vat (which is a disembodied mind), then the you too do not have an apriori reason for the existence of physical things. -- Dr Russell StandishPhone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders Visiting Senior Research Fellowhpco...@hpcoders.com.au Economics, Kingston University http://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/20190825013144.GD2402%40zen.
Re: Observation versus assumption
On Sat, Aug 24, 2019 at 05:18:47PM -0400, John Clark wrote: > > >> OK so 0=1, that's fine. > > > No, that is not fine. If 0=1, pigs have wings. > > > Yes but that's OK too, if nothing physical exists then pigs and wings can't > cause problems because they don't exist. And there are no minds that might be > upset by paradoxes. > That's kind of the point, though. Minds are nonphysical things, and there is no apriori reason why physical things need to exist for minds to exist. -- ---- Dr Russell StandishPhone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders Visiting Senior Research Fellowhpco...@hpcoders.com.au Economics, Kingston University http://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/20190824234532.GB2402%40zen.
Re: Models of arithmetic
On Wed, Aug 21, 2019 at 10:28:39AM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > On 20 Aug 2019, at 19:38, Philip Thrift wrote: > > > > The reason to suspect that arithmetic comes from matter (M→A) vs. matter > comes from arithmetic (A→M) is that with A→M there many Ms. > > > On the contrary: Arithmetic (A) explains why there is many geographies and > history, but only one physics, the same fr all universal machine. That is due > to the fact that Physics (Matter, M) emerges from the first person > indeterminacy on *all* computations. > So A explains why there is only one M possible, and why the physical reality > is > the same for all universal machine/number. > With A, the physical laws are justified being laws, and we get some criteria > (lacking in physics+physicalism) to distinguish physics and geography. This answer is a bit glib IMHO. In some ways it echos the statements I give in section 9.3 of my book "Theory of Nothing", but which I freely admitted I felt were provisional and too hand-wavy. However, I believe that Markus Mueller has since provided an answer in the form of a theorem (Thm 2.3 "Emergence of an Objective Reality") in his paper arXiv: 1712.01816. That paper to me is probably the most significant result in this area since I published my book. Cheers -- -------- Dr Russell StandishPhone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders Visiting Senior Research Fellowhpco...@hpcoders.com.au Economics, Kingston University http://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/20190823225404.GE2271%40zen.
Re: Are proofs equivalent to dovetailing computations?
On Sat, Aug 17, 2019 at 12:17:38PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > You cannot identify a computation and a representation of that computation. So > the answer is no: the blockhead or the infinite look-up table does not process > a computation. That is incorrect. Lookup tables _are_ computations, and the algorithms go by the name "memoisation", and are a form of optimisation where space and time are traded. -- -------- Dr Russell StandishPhone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders Visiting Senior Research Fellowhpco...@hpcoders.com.au Economics, Kingston University http://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/20190819012547.GD20075%40zen.
Re: Are proofs equivalent to dovetailing computations?
On Fri, Aug 16, 2019 at 12:06:32PM -0500, Jason Resch wrote: > > Thanks for the background and explanation. Is it the case then that any > undecidable (creative?) set is a compact description of universal > dovetailing? > Would Chaitin's constant also qualify as a compact description of the > universal > dovetailing (though being a single real number, rather than a set of rational > complex points)? > Related to this, on page 218 of Li and Vitanyi's "Introduction to Kolmogorov Complexity and it Applications", right under corollary 3.6.2 is the statement: "Moreover, for all axiomatic mathematical theories that can be extressed compactly enough to be conceivably interesting to human beings, say in fewer than 10,000 bits, [the first 10,000 bits of the Chatin probability Ω] can be used to decide for every statement in the theory whether it is the true, false or independent. ... Thus Ω is truly the number of Wisdom, and 'can be known of, but not known, through human reason' [C.H Bennett and M. Gardner, Sci Am. 241:11(1979),20-34]". Cheers -- -------- Dr Russell StandishPhone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders Visiting Senior Research Fellowhpco...@hpcoders.com.au Economics, Kingston University http://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/20190816233116.GX20075%40zen.
Re: Are proofs equivalent to dovetailing computations?
On Tue, Aug 13, 2019 at 02:41:09AM -0700, Philip Thrift wrote: > > If only there were a dovetailer to multiplex all one's duties. :) They made a movie about that, starring Tom Hanks IIRC. Can't tremeber the title, though... -- ---- Dr Russell StandishPhone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders Visiting Senior Research Fellowhpco...@hpcoders.com.au Economics, Kingston University http://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/20190814021139.GM20075%40zen.
Re: STEP 3
On Sat, Aug 10, 2019 at 08:53:39AM +1000, Bruce Kellett wrote: > On Sat, Aug 10, 2019 at 3:22 AM Jason Resch wrote: > > On Friday, August 9, 2019, Bruce Kellett wrote: > > On Fri, Aug 9, 2019 at 8:59 PM Jason Resch > wrote: > > > What role do you see decoherence playing in consciousness? In > other words, could you explain why shedding IR photons into an > external environment necessary for the mind to be conscious? > > > Consciousness is a classical phenomenon since the brain is a classical > object (not in a state of quantum coherence). So decoherence, and the > emergence of the classical from the quantum, is essential for > consciousness. Just as to be conscious is to be conscious of > something, > such as the external world. > > > > You appear to be extrapolating a causation from the appearance of a > correlation: > "The brain is classical, and the brain is conscious, therefore all > consciousness must be classical." > > The conclusion doesn't follow from the premise. > > > Show me consciousness that does not involve decohered classical matter, such > as > in a brain. > > > Also, is a brain really conscious of the external world, or is it > conscious > of it's internal states? The redness of a red apple does not exist > physically. Redness is an invention of the brain, which cannot be found in > the external world of colorless particles. > > > But the physical world does contain photons of various wavelengths -- which > correspond to different colours. Correlation does not necessarily indicate > causation, but scientific study does reveal the underlying relations between > things. > > Bruce > Riffing further on this theme, conscious must be intimately tied up with a process for deriving meaning from data. Given a continuous ontology (eg ontic-ψ), this must involve a discretisation process - decoherence pretty much fits the bill here, and so Brent's often posed-insight that consciousness must involve an interaction between an observer system, and an environment that is traced over makes a lot of sense. Going the other way, computationalism entails via the UDA that the physical world has this continuous character. So computationalism must ultimately address Brent's insight. This comes to the fore with the MGA - the argument breaks down when an environment is included that adds essential stocasticity to subsequent runs of the machine (ie only the original run of Klara is conscious, the recording reruns of Olympia are not, nor might any accidental recordings either). -- Dr Russell StandishPhone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders Visiting Senior Research Fellowhpco...@hpcoders.com.au Economics, Kingston University http://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/20190810012533.GB2223%40zen.
Re: STEP 3
On Thu, Jul 25, 2019 at 11:44:23AM -0500, Jason Resch wrote: > > Closest continuer theory is the "Copenhagen Interpretation" of personal > identity theory. A stop gap to preserve common sense notions in light of > paradoxes that imply the old way if thinking is untenable. > > As with quantum mechanics, common sense personal identity theories are forced > to either abandon any connection linking observer moments (like the zero > universe interpretation) or to a universalism that links all observers to a > single person (like many worlds). > I never accepted that argument. Why couldn't there be islands in the space of observer moments separated by states of unconsiousness? In the classic thought experiment by Parfitt, what's to say that consciousness doesn't blink out after a certain number of neurons have been swapped for Napoleon's, and doesn't blink back into existence once Napoleon's brain is nearly complete? -- -------- Dr Russell StandishPhone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders Visiting Senior Research Fellowhpco...@hpcoders.com.au Economics, Kingston University http://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/20190726060732.GA17287%40zen.
Re: We Are Legion We Are Bob Bobiverse Book 1
On Thu, Jul 25, 2019 at 10:47:46PM -0400, John Clark wrote: > > The only other novel I can think of that treats the subject of uploading with > equal intelligence is "The Silicon Man". > > The Silicon Man by Charles Platt > There's a movie "Abre los oyos" (Open your eyes) that deals with this subject that I thought was quite good. -- -------- Dr Russell StandishPhone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders Visiting Senior Research Fellowhpco...@hpcoders.com.au Economics, Kingston University http://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/20190726044526.GB8230%40zen.
Re: Observation versus assumption
On Wed, Jul 24, 2019 at 03:57:14AM -0700, Philip Thrift wrote: > > > On Wednesday, July 24, 2019 at 5:34:38 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > The concept of “Matter” is never used in any paper in physics, only in > materialist philosophy. > > > > https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-019-02062-0 > > Strange topological materials are popping up everywhere physicists look > > ‘Fragile topology’ is the latest addition to a group of quantum phenomena that > give materials exotic — and exciting — properties. > > "The mathematics hidden in materials keeps getting more exotic. Topological > states of matter — which derive exotic properties from their electrons’ > ‘knotty’ quantum states — have shot from rare curiosity to one of the hottest > fields in physics. Now, theorists are finding that topology is ubiquitous — > and > recognizing it as one of the most significant ways in which solid matter can > behave." > > @philipthrift > I suspect that all of matter (eg the zoo of elementary particles) might be related to the topology of the underlying spacetime. Sadly, my mathematical chops are not strong enough to make headway on this insight... -- ---- Dr Russell StandishPhone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders Visiting Senior Research Fellowhpco...@hpcoders.com.au Economics, Kingston University http://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/20190725012412.GC1964%40zen.
Re: Eternal return
On Fri, Jun 21, 2019 at 09:27:49AM -0700, Eva wrote: > Given that time is irreversible, and global entropy always increase: > > 1. In principle, sooner or later, every living system such as human being, or > humanity will be annihilated? > > 2. In principle, if system is annihilated then it is irreversible - a system > with the same internal structure may be created, but it will not be the very > same system, it may be (at most) perfectly isomorphic, but it will not share > the same identity? > > So, for example, if I die, and hypothetically, in the distant future, an > exact copy of my body will be made than it will be an exact copy of my body > and consciousness, but not my current identity, so my consciousness will not > reappear after my death like from deep sleep. > > > I would like to ask you - in your opinion, my two above conclusions are > correct? > If functionalism were true (a popular position here, and implied by computationalism), then the exact copy (even near enough copy) will be identical to you, and your conclusion would be incorrect. If this new copy follows a slightly different path (perhaps because of a sightly different environment, or just instrinsic randomness), then your life continues. Of course this means an eternal return. But it is nothing to fear - you will not experience your life over again - each time you will experience you life as having been lived once, albeit most likely immortally. -- -------- Dr Russell StandishPhone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders Visiting Senior Research Fellowhpco...@hpcoders.com.au Economics, Kingston University http://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/20190623135218.GA24600%40zen.
