Re: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Different Semeiotic Analyses (was tree-structure)

[Gary Richmond]

Auke, list,

What is funny -- in the sense not of your 'hilarious', but of my 'strange'
-- is that well over a decade ago on this list I used the same
example, an "im[p]ression
of green the moment I look at the trees out of my window," (well, in truth,
my impression(s) occurred as one late Spring afternoon I lay on my back in
a bed of silky soft grass and moss and staring up at tree branches -- their
leaves in particular -- at a scenic spot on top of one of the foothills of
the Catskill Mountains of New York overlooking the Tappan Zee where the
Hudson River becomes as expansive as a 10 mile wide lake).

Rather intent on musing a bit, or even doing some phenomenology, I looked
up at the canopy where the rapidly passing clouds made the myriad leaves
look to be various shades of green, such as olive, lime, emerald, even sage
(which is almost gray), as well as deep yellow, a kind of brown and even a
dark purple nearing black. I thought (very short moments later) something
like "those considerable variations in color are *both* the consequence of
the play of light and clouds and sky and tree leaves in nature 'outside' of
me and *simultaneously* affecting me with 'internal' color impressions" --
again none of those hues and shades were named then, that is, *when *or*
as *experienced, but only in retrospect-- a kind of *double-sided nature*,
both 'there' in 'external' nature as well as within my 'internal'
experience of that nature.

But note: there were only *those*, perhaps hundreds or even thousands, of
possible (1ns) variations of color -- but, for example, *no* blues or pinks
whatsoever. I later thought that *just* those hues and shades (or at least
a, perhaps, rather large range of them) were *possible* for me  (*no*
possibility of, say, cerulean blue -- the color of a clear sky itself -- no
cerulean leaves!) nor perhaps for any person with a normal color sense
(i.e. not color blind, etc.) who might be looking up from such a spot.

I love dark chocolate (which, of course, also is never cerulean (not even
such a deep, dark blue as cobalt blue), but prefer Belgian rather than
Dutch bars of it, if you please, as I find the flavor of most fine Belgian
chocolate somewhat subtler than the Dutch variety (same with beer and
French fries and mayonnaise). :-)

Best,

Gary


   -


"Time is not a renewable resource." gnox

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*







On Sun, May 3, 2020 at 4:29 AM Auke van Breemen 
wrote:

> Gary R,
>
> Don't miss the distinction between qualities like 'hard' and the
> qualisigns. If you do the discussion becomes hilarious indeed.
>
> You earn a box of bars of dark chocolate if you are able to scratch
> anything with the qualities involved in my  imression of green the moment I
> look at the trees out of my window.
>
> best, Auke
>
>
> Op 3 mei 2020 om 4:14 schreef Gary Richmond :
>
> Jon Alan Schmidt concluded:
>
> We have to distinguish the quality  *in itself*  as a real possibility
> (1ns) from both its inherence in something that exists (2ns) and our
> physical sensation of it (also 2ns), as well as our perceptual judgments
> about it (3ns) and any subsequent reasoning about it (also 3ns).
>
>
> From my point of view this is pretty basic trichotomic stuff.
>
> The quality, 'hard', can possibly (1ns) appear in many disparate things
> (2ns) such as diamonds, hammers, and rocks, while my physical sensation
> (2ns), the result of, say, having a rock thrown at and hitting my head
> may result is such perceptual judgments (3ns) as "ouch!" at the experience
> of pain, and such "subsequent reasoning about it" such as, "what direction
> did that rock come from?" and "who the heck threw that rock at me?"
>
> Best,
>
> Gary
>
> "Time is not a renewable resource."  gnox
>
> *Gary Richmond*
> *Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
> *Communication Studies*
> *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> On Sat, May 2, 2020 at 9:29 PM Jon Alan Schmidt < jonalanschm...@gmail.com>
> wrote:
>
> John, Auke, List:
>
> I agree that the conclusions of semeiotic are "eminently fallible," as
> Peirce himself described them.   That is why we are not locked into
> treating *his * speculative grammar as rigid dogma but are free to make
> adjustments that we deem appropriate in accordance with the results of our
> own investigations.  We simply need to be clear about those deviations and
> acknowledge that they *are * deviations, which is what I have tried to
> do.   By the way, according to Peirce, the conclusions of *every *science
> are fallible--including mathematics and formal/mathematical logic.
>
> CSP:  *Theoretically*, I grant you, there is no possibility of error in
> necessary reasoning. But to speak thus "theoretically," is to use language
> in a Pickwickian sense. In practice and in fact, mathematics is not exempt
> from that liability to error that affects everything that man does.

Fwd: Re: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Different Semeiotic Analyses (was tree-structure)

[Auke van Breemen]

Nasty webmail.

Gary R,

With that you do not earn the box. It are not my heat lightnings (see below the 
Hausman quote) you utilized.

The qualisign aspect is a medad or collection of medads brought together by the 
mind in the pure icon, the icon being not caused by the medads themselves, but 
by our habits of interpretation.  

For some fine remarks: Charles S. Peirce's Evolutionary Philosophy By Carl R. 
Hausman

p. 122  

"What then is the relevance of the idea of a medad for the categories? 
Specifically what is its relevance for explaining firstness? This point depends 
on the idea that a medad may be thought of as a charge that is unattachable to 
any atom or any particle. Such a charge, as Peirce suggests in his figurative 
description, would be like a heat charge that has no effect. etc.."

The quality is monadic, involving qualisigns, involving quale:

i) A Rhematic [3.1] Iconic [2.1] Qualisign [1.1] (e.g., a feeling of \red") is 
any
quality in so far as it is a sign. Since a quality is whatever it is positively 
in itself, a
quality can only denote an object by virtue of some common ingredient or 
similarity;
so that a Qualisign is necessarily an Icon. Further, since a quality is a mere 
logical
possibility, it can only be interpreted as a sign of essence, that is, as a 
Rheme

ii) A Rhematic [3.1] Iconic [2.1] Sinsign [1.2] (e.g., an individual diagram) 
is any
object of experience in so far as some quality of it makes it determine the 
idea of an
object. Being an Icon, and thus a sign by likeness purely of whatever it may be 
like,
it can only be interpreted as a sign of essence, or Rheme. It will embody a 
Qualisign.

Taken from CP. 2.254-2.263.

-

You cannot utilize the heat charges that were the occasion for my experience of 
green on a specific occasion. For an early take on the medad:

[...] the immediate (and therefore in itself insusceptible of mediation
-the Unanalyzable, the Inexplicable, the Unintellectual ) runs in a
continuous stream through our lives. W. II, p. 227 (1868)

Best, Auke


Op 3 mei 2020 om 12:31 schreef Gary Richmond : Auke, 
list,


What is funny -- in the sense not of your 'hilarious', but of my 'strange' -- 
is that well over a decade ago on this list I used the same example, an " 
im[p]ression of green the moment I look at the trees out of my window," (well, 
in truth, my impression(s) occurred as one late Spring afternoon I lay on my 
back in a bed of silky soft grass and moss and staring up at tree branches -- 
their leaves in particular -- at a scenic spot on top of one of the foothills 
of the Catskill Mountains of New York overlooking the Tappan Zee where the 
Hudson River becomes as expansive as a 10 mile wide lake).

Rather intent on musing a bit, or even doing some phenomenology, I looked up at 
the canopy where the rapidly passing clouds made the myriad leaves look to be 
various shades of green, such as olive, lime, emerald, even sage (which is 
almost gray), as well as deep yellow, a kind of brown and even a dark purple 
nearing black. I thought (very short moments later) something like "those 
considerable variations in color are both the consequence of the play of light 
and clouds and sky and tree leaves in nature 'outside' of me and simultaneously 
affecting me with 'internal' color impressions" -- again none of those hues and 
shades were named then, that is, when or as experienced, but only in 
retrospect-- a kind of double-sided nature, both 'there' in 'external' nature 
as well as within my 'internal' experience of that nature. 

But note: there were only those, perhaps hundreds or even thousands, of 
possible (1ns) variations of color -- but, for example, no blues or pinks 
whatsoever. I later thought that just those hues and shades (or at least a, 
perhaps, rather large range of them) were possible for me  ( no possibility of, 
say, cerulean blue -- the color of a clear sky itself -- no cerulean leaves!) 
nor perhaps for any person with a normal color sense (i.e. not color blind, 
etc.) who might be looking up from such a spot.

I love dark chocolate (which, of course, also is never cerulean (not even such 
a deep, dark blue as cobalt blue), but prefer Belgian rather than Dutch bars of 
it, if you please, as I find the flavor of most fine Belgian chocolate somewhat 
subtler than the Dutch variety (same with beer and French fries and 
mayonnaise). :-) 

Best,

Gary

* 

"Time is not a renewable resource." gnox



Gary Richmond
Philosophy and Critical Thinking
Communication Studies
LaGuardia College of the City University of New York








On Sun, May 3, 2020 at 4:29 AM Auke van Breemen < a.bree...@upcmail.nl 
mailto:a.bree...@upcmail.nl > wrote:

Gary R,

Don't miss the distinction between qualities like 'hard' and the qualisigns. If 
you do the discussion becomes hilarious indeed.

You earn a box of bars of dark chocolate if you are able to scratch anything 
with the qualities involved in my  imression of green the moment I look at the 
t

Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Different Semeiotic Analyses (was tree-structure)

[Edwina Taborsky]

 

 BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px;
}Gary R - I'm not sure if the point is that one 'is' either focused
on theory OR pragmatics. 

My view is that I don't see how one can be slotted into such an
Either-Or scenario. That is, if one is interested primarily in the
theoretical framework - and I see no problem with that. Indeed,
clarifying theory is an important area of research  - but - if one is
interested in just the theoretical framework, then, that same person
is in a situation where they might have problems with how another
person - who is interested in the pragmatics of the theoretical
framework - applies Peircean theory. And surely that Theorist must be
aware that theories must be put to the test, so to speak and moved
into examining the real world. 

Now - if this is the case, then Person A, the Theorist, might say to
Person B, the Pragmatist: "No, no, Peirce doesn't mean what you say -
here's the text; he wrote this-and-that'.  And the Pragmatist might
reply: 'I disagree with your interpretation - can you give me your
example of what Peirce meant by that text? ….The Theorist might
reply: Sorry- I just do theory...

And we get nowhere. It's a difficult situation. I don't think that
pure theory can stand on its own - just as pure incidents can't
operate without a unifying theory to explain their functions. As
Peirce said - we live in two worlds; fact and fancy or - our world is
made up of matter and mind. He was quite adamant at rejecting the
Cartesian separation of the two - and I think that Peircean research
has to, as he did, involve itself in both worlds.

Edwina
 On Sat 02/05/20 11:46 PM , Gary Richmond gary.richm...@gmail.com
sent:
 Jon Alan Schmidt quoted Gary Fuhrman and then wrote:
 GF:  Maybe I’m just not equipped to think like a mathematician
about semiosis. 
 JAS: And maybe--even probably--I am just not equipped to think like
a special (physical or psychical) scientist about semeiosis.  Inquiry
benefits from both perspectives, and few are as adept at both as
Peirce evidently was. 
 I just don't see what the problem is here. Peirce did a tremendous
amount of abstract theorizing in developing his semeiotic that, from
my perspective, it is principally that and importantly that. How can
any serious Peirce scholar deny the value of Peirce's semeiotic
theorizing? (Btw, I'm not at all suggesting that Gary Fuhrman is one
of those persons who deny the value of semeiotic theory; not at all!
It's just that, as he's remarked, it's not something he's, at least
currently, much interested in.) 
 And let's not forget that Peirce even stated that one truly can't be
an adept servant of both masters, theory and practice as he put it
then. They require different "skill sets" as we might put it today.
That Peirce himself was the exception to his own rule is just more
evidence of his extraordinary genius.
  If someone on the list isn't interested in semeiotic theorizing --
Peirce's or any contemporary scholar's (although I personally don't
see how any serious Peirce scholar can completely ignore those
theoretical underpinnings) -- then let that person merely skip or
delete those posts. But to argue that there is no reason for or right
to such theorizing is simply unreasonable, strictly illogical, and
simply absurd. 
  And those of us who do appreciate the theory -- and, in my view,
the theoretical advances which Robert Marty, for example, has had a
distinguished career making, and which Jon has,in my opinion,
recently been working toward (which, btw, in his intellectual modesty
he's tended to refer to, properly I'd say, as guesses, hypotheses, and
abductions) would wish that those who do not find semeiotic theory,
theoretical grammar, and the like of much or any interest simply
ignore those who  do, stop their pointless criticism on their,
frankly, untenable principles, and get on with their own work. 
 Best,
 Gary  
"TIME IS NOT A RENEWABLE RESOURCE."  GNOX
 Gary Richmond
 Philosophy and Critical ThinkingCommunication StudiesLaGuardia
College of the City University of New York
 On Sat, May 2, 2020 at 8:57 PM Jon Alan Schmidt  wrote:
 Gary F., List:
  GF:  I simply find myself unable to come up with an individual
experience that could be referred to as a “sign token” and has no
context.
 Indeed, all our individual experiences with individual sign tokens
have real contexts.  Speculative grammar abstracts  from those
different experiences and their different contexts to ascertain what
all signs have in common.  We can then say that something lacking any
of those essential characters is not a sign.  That is precisely why I
exclude qualisigns--a quality in itself cannot represent something
else, so it cannot be a sign at all, only an "indefinite significant
character" of a sign token in which it inheres.
 GF:  Maybe I’m just not equipped to think like a mathematician
about semiosis.
 And maybe--even probably--I am just not equipped to think like 

Re: Re: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Different Semeiotic Analyses (was tree-structure)

[John F. Sowa]

Edwina and Jon,
Induction always begins with data -- a set of
observations about some subject.  By finding analogies and commonalities
 among the observations, it derives a probable hypothesis about the
subject matter.  Further testing is necessary to increase the probability
and generalize the hypothesis to a wider range of phenomena.
If the
observations are about nature, the
hypothesis is the starting point for some law of science.  If the
observations are about some text, the hypothesis is a starting point for
 some textual criticism.
ET>  I was saying that developing a
strictly formal and textual argument
about reality...
My suggested continuation of that line: 
"requires data from new observations of reality." 

JAS> As with
any scientific inquiry, in speculative grammar we employ retroduction to
 formulate hypotheses, deduction to explicate them, and induction to
evaluate them.
That is a worthy goal.  But the data
required for any theory of speculative grammar must ultimately come from
experiences in the phaneron.  If the only source of data is from texts by
Peirce, your theory cannot go beyond what Peirce said.
JAS> "Constant references
to the text" are a valid inductive method for testing hypotheses
about the text itself, as well as
hypotheses about the views of the author as expressed in
 the text.

That is a project in textual criticism.   It
can be used to clarify what Peirce was saying, but it cannot go beyond
what Peirce said.  In order to develop a version of speculative grammar
that adds something new, it's essential to find new data.  You must do
your own phaneroscopy --  you must analyze experiences in your own
phaneron according to  the methodology that Peirce defined.
If you
don't do that, you cannot claim to have added anything beyond what Peirce
said.  If your conclusion differs from his in any way, you are claiming
to be a better semeiotican than Peirce was.  And frankly, I don't believe
that you are.
John



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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Ethics of terminology (was Different Semeiotic Analyses

[John F. Sowa]

Gary R and Jon AS,
Peirce's ethics of terminology is important. 
But he made an important distinction:  If an author's term is adopted and
used by other authors, then the person who coined that term has an
obligation to continue using it in the same sense in which it is being
used.  But if nobody else is using the term, the original author is free
to revise or replace it.
In the half century of his writings, the
meanings of many of his terms evolved, and he sometimes changed his
terminology without stating exactly how the new terms were related to the
old ones.  Since most of his MSS were not intended for publication, he was
under no obligation to preserve the terms.
CSP as quoted by JAS:
"a general agreement concerning the use of terms and of
notations,--not too rigid, yet prevailing with most of the co-workers in
regard to most of the symbols, to such a degree that there shall be some
small number of different systems of expression that have to be
mastered" (CP 2.220, EP 2:263).
GR> I couldn't agree more;
it is my view as well.
Yes, I would also agree.  But note the
qualifications:  (1) "prevailing with most of the co-workers",
and (2) "there shall be some small number of different systems of
expression that have to be mastered".
After 1903, when it
became obvious that Russell's terminology for logic was becoming more
widely used, he avoided some of the terms in his earlier publications, and
he adopted some of the terms that were becoming more widely
used.
When we're writing textual criticism of Peirce's writings,
it's essential to preserve the exact terms that occur in each quoted
passage.  But when we're writing for a 21st. audience, we're obligated to
consider what is  "prevailing with most of the
co-workers".
But there is much more to say about these
issues.
John

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Ethics of terminology (was Different Semeiotic Analyses

[Mary Libertin]

John and list,

You wrote: "Peirce's ethics of terminology is important.  But he made an 
important distinction:  If an author's term is adopted and used by other 
authors, then the person who coined that term has an obligation to continue 
using it in the same sense in which it is being used.  But if nobody else is 
using the term, the original author is free to revise or replace it.”

One glaring exception is Peirce’s change from the word “pragmatism” to the word 
“pragmaticism.” It came after FCS Schiller, not the musician, warped the 
meaning in his collection of essays on pragmatism that he titled “humanism.” In 
that collection he relegated Peirce to a footnote but attacked him ad hominin. 
 
Except for this, I’ll stay out this interesting discussion on terminology.

Mary Libertin
Professor Emerita of English
Shippensburg University

> On May 3, 2020, at 11:35 AM, John F. Sowa  wrote:
> 
> Gary R and Jon AS,
> 
> Peirce's ethics of terminology is important.  But he made an important 
> distinction:  If an author's term is adopted and used by other authors, then 
> the person who coined that term has an obligation to continue using it in the 
> same sense in which it is being used.  But if nobody else is using the term, 
> the original author is free to revise or replace it.
> 
> In the half century of his writings, the meanings of many of his terms 
> evolved, and he sometimes changed his terminology without stating exactly how 
> the new terms were related to the old ones.  Since most of his MSS were not 
> intended for publication, he was under no obligation to preserve the terms.
> 
> CSP as quoted by JAS: "a general agreement concerning the use of terms and of 
> notations,--not too rigid, yet prevailing with most of the co-workers in 
> regard to most of the symbols, to such a degree that there shall be some 
> small number of different systems of expression that have to be mastered" (CP 
> 2.220, EP 2:263).
> 
> GR> I couldn't agree more; it is my view as well.
> 
> Yes, I would also agree.  But note the qualifications:  (1) "prevailing with 
> most of the co-workers", and (2) "there shall be some small number of 
> different systems of expression that have to be mastered".
> 
> After 1903, when it became obvious that Russell's terminology for logic was 
> becoming more widely used, he avoided some of the terms in his earlier 
> publications, and he adopted some of the terms that were becoming more widely 
> used.
> 
> When we're writing textual criticism of Peirce's writings, it's essential to 
> preserve the exact terms that occur in each quoted passage.  But when we're 
> writing for a 21st. audience, we're obligated to consider what is "prevailing 
> with most of the co-workers".
> 
> But there is much more to say about these issues.
> 
> John
> 
> 
> -
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> 
> 
> 
> 


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[PEIRCE-L] Nicotine, a semiotic confrontation between life and death

[robert marty]

List, John,Gary, Jon, Jon Allan

Preamble of
https://www.academia.edu/42930701/Nicotine_a_semiotic_confrontation_between_life_and_death


"This study is the third moment in a scientific approach of "knowledge by
models" that perfectly suits Peirce's designs in this field. Indeed, Peirce
classifies science in the following way (see C.S. Peirce, 1976: NEM, vol.
IV, 1122]:

 *- mathematics, the study of ideal constructions without reference to
their real existence**,*

Here are my constructions:  I consider two abstract categories

X àYàZ on the one hand

A1 àA2 àA3 …… àAn on the other hand (with all axioms checked for the
composition of the arrows)

It is found that there are exactly (n + 2)*(n +1)/2 covariant functors from
the first to the second categories and that, moreover, this set of functors
is naturally organized in a lattice structure by the natural
transformations of functors that we know how to define on this set.

*This part can be controlled by a mathematician no semiotician**.*

 A computer tool can do that very well : see
patrick-benazet.chez-alice.fr/treillis_en_ligne/lattices

This lattices are  compounds mathematical objects, not very complex if n
not too large ... Indeed for n = 3 there are 10 functors, 28 for n = 10, 66
for n = 10 ...

 -*empirics, the study of phenomena with the purpose of identifying their
forms with those mathematics has studied,*

 Peirce is proposing after years of studying the functioning of:

-   *phenomena*  (phanerons) in human minds that he reduces to 3 major
categories (corroborated by a reduction theorem: Herzberger, Burch,
Marty),  between which he recognizes relationships of involution



-   and also *signs* in social life, starting with three-item signs
that he calls Object, Sign and Interpretant, and that he classifies them
into ten classes, and then when the sign expands to six elements with 28
classes, ...



-   and even that it highlight*s affinities* between the triadic signs
that direct attention to relationships between classes of signs by triplets
between these elements

This justifies that the forms I have built are suitable to fulfil this
condition.

*This part can be controlled by a semiotician no mathematician**.*

The third Peirce's classes is:

 - *Pragmatics, the study of how we ought to behave in the ligth of the
truths of empirics."*

This is what is proposed in the following analysis. It follows Peirce's
recommendations but is fallible and asks to be criticized."

Be waiting and best regards,

Robert Marty

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[PEIRCE-L] Ethics of terminology

[Edwina Taborsky]

 

 BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px;
}John, Gary, list

I think that's an important point: John wrote:

"When we're writing textual criticism of Peirce's writings, it's
essential to preserve the exact terms that occur in each quoted
passage.  But when we're writing for a 21st. audience, we're
obligated to consider what is  "prevailing with most of the
co-workers"."

I agree - when one is critiquing the actual Peircean tests - yes,
one uses the exact terms. But- we still have to consider that we
might interpret these terms differently - and it is extremely
difficult to come to a final conclusion about which meaning is
'right'.

But - it's not merely when we are writing for a 21st audience that
we have to consider what is 'prevailing with most of the co-workers'.
I think we have to expand the numbers and types of who we admit to the
group of 'co-workers'. If we reject the use of the Peircean analytic
framework in disciplines other than philosophy, /speculative grammar,
..such as physics, biology, artificial intelligence, economics and
societal research - and reject the terms that prevail in those
disciplines [such as input, output, node,  attractor, entropy,
dissipative etc]..because Peirce-did-not-use-them...then, I think we
are rejecting all the years and effort that he put into his work. I
think that Peirce did not spend all his life in developing and
working on such a massive project - if he intended it to be confined
to what is essentially literary criticism. 

Edwina
 On Sun 03/05/20 11:35 AM , "John F. Sowa" s...@bestweb.net sent:
Gary R and Jon AS,

Peirce's ethics of terminology is important.  But he made an
important distinction:  If an author's term is adopted and used by
other authors, then the person who coined that term has an obligation
to continue using it in the same sense in which it is being used.  But
if nobody else is using the term, the original author is free to
revise or replace it.

In the half century of his writings, the meanings of many of his
terms evolved, and he sometimes changed his terminology without
stating exactly how the new terms were related to the old ones. 
Since most of his MSS were not intended for publication, he was under
no obligation to preserve the terms.

CSP as quoted by JAS: "a general agreement concerning the use of
terms and of notations,--not too rigid, yet prevailing with most of
the co-workers in regard to most of the symbols, to such a degree
that there shall be some small number of different systems of
expression that have to be mastered" (CP 2.220, EP 2:263).

GR> I couldn't agree more; it is my view as well.

Yes, I would also agree.  But note the qualifications:  (1)
"prevailing with most of the co-workers", and (2) "there shall be
some small number of different systems of expression that have to be
mastered".

After 1903, when it became obvious that Russell's terminology for
logic was becoming more widely used, he avoided some of the terms in
his earlier publications, and he adopted some of the terms that were
becoming more widely used.

When we're writing textual criticism of Peirce's writings, it's
essential to preserve the exact terms that occur in each quoted
passage.  But when we're writing for a 21st. audience, we're
obligated to consider what is  "prevailing with most of the
co-workers".

But there is much more to say about these issues.

John 

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[PEIRCE-L] Fwd: CFP: Peirce Essay Prize 2020–21

[Gary Richmond]

FYI GR
CFP: Peirce Essay Prize 2020–21
Peirce Essay Prize 2020–21: First Call for Papers
View this email in your browser

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Dear Gary,

Please find the call for papers for the 2020–21 Peirce Essay Prize below.
We kindly request that you share the announcement and encourage scholars to
submit.

Thank you,
The Charles S. Peirce Society Executive Committee


*The 2020–2021 Charles S. Peirce Society Essay Prize*

*Topic:* Any topic on or related to the work of Charles Sanders Peirce.

*Awards:* $1000 cash prize; presentation at the Society's next annual
meeting, held in conjunction with the Eastern APA (in New York, NY, USA,
Jan. 4–7, 2021); possible publication, subject to editorial revision, in
the *Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society.*

*Submission Deadline:* August 1, 2020

*Length:* Because the winning essay may be published in the *Transactions*,
the length of contest submissions should be about the length of an average
journal article.  The maximum acceptable length is 10,000 words, including
notes.  The presentation of the winning submission at the annual meeting
cannot exceed 30 minutes reading time.

*Open to:* Graduate students and persons who have held a Ph.D. or its
equivalent for no more than seven years.  Entries from students who have
not yet begun their graduate training will not be considered.  Past winners
of the contest are ineligible.  Joint submissions are allowed provided that
all authors satisfy the eligibility requirements.  The essay may be in any
language, provided a 1,000-word summary of the paper’s argument, written in
English, is supplied.  The winner will be required to present the paper in
English and to translate it into English for publication in the
*Transactions*.

*Advice to Essay Prize Entrants: *The winning entry will make a genuine
contribution to the literature on Peirce.  Therefore, entrants should
become familiar with the major currents of work on Peirce to date and take
care to locate their views in relation to published material that bears
directly on their topic.

Entrants should note that scholarly work on Peirce frequently benefits from
the explicit consideration of the historical development of his views.
Even a submission that focuses on a single stage in that development can
benefit from noting the stage on which it focuses in reference to other
phases of Peirce's treatment of the topic under consideration.  (This
advice is not intended to reflect a bias toward chronological studies, but
merely to express a strong preference for a chronologically informed
understanding of Peirce's philosophy.)

We do not require but strongly encourage, where appropriate, citation of
the *Writings of Charles S. Peirce: A Chronological Edition*.  Ideally,
citation of texts found in both the *Collected Papers* and the *Writings*
should be to both CP and W.

Submissions should be prepared for anonymous evaluation.  Authors who
submit their entry electronically should be sure to remove any identifying
information from their document properties/metadata.  Entries must not be
under consideration for publication elsewhere.

Cover letter or email should include complete contact information,
including mailing address and phone numbers, and a statement that the
entrant meets the eligibility requirements of the contest.

Electronic submissions are preferred.  Submissions should be sent as email
attachments (Microsoft Word documents, RTF files, or PDF files only) to
Richard Kenneth Atkins, Executive Director of the C.S. Peirce Society:
peircesoci...@gmail.com. Please include "Peirce Essay Prize Submission" in
the subject line of your email.

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Ethics of terminology (was Different Semeiotic Analyses

[Gary Richmond]

Mary, List,

This appeared on my Facebook page (Charles S. Peirce Society) shortly after
I read your message today and I thought you might find it of interest:

The question being responded to below was, why did Peirce's  "theory of
semiotics . . . go unnoticed in James's radical empiricism"?

Eric Tate wrote: probably the reason it goes 'unnoticed', or more likely
ignored, by James. James was a brilliant guy but had no patience for what
he saw as the pedantry of logical study, and Peirce described him as
exhibiting an "almost unexampled incapacity for mathematical thought,
combined with intense hatred for logic".
Peirce's Semeiotic is a naturalistic theory of mind, so is much more
broadly applicable than Saussurean Semiology. Peirce's complex, sign-based
theory of logical inference led him to distance his 'pragmaticism' from
what he saw as the vulgar kind of verificationism he saw James' and other
pragmatists' theories veering toward.

And in the same thread, Aaron Wilson commented: As far as I remember, I
don’t think James makes any distinctions like between the immediate object
and the dynamical object, or between various types of interpretants.

Best,

Gary


"Time is not a renewable resource." gnox

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*







On Sun, May 3, 2020 at 12:08 PM Mary Libertin 
wrote:

> John and list,
>
> You wrote: "Peirce's ethics of terminology is important.  But he made an
> important distinction:  If an author's term is adopted and used by other
> authors, then the person who coined that term has an obligation to continue
> using it in the same sense in which it is being used.  But if nobody else
> is using the term, the original author is free to revise or replace it.”
>
> One glaring exception is Peirce’s change from the word “pragmatism” to the
> word “pragmaticism.” It came after FCS Schiller, not the musician, warped
> the meaning in his collection of essays on pragmatism that he titled
> “humanism.” In that collection he relegated Peirce to a footnote but
> attacked him ad hominin.
>
> Except for this, I’ll stay out this interesting discussion on terminology.
>
> Mary Libertin
> Professor Emerita of English
> Shippensburg University
>
> On May 3, 2020, at 11:35 AM, John F. Sowa  wrote:
>
> Gary R and Jon AS,
>
> Peirce's ethics of terminology is important.  But he made an important
> distinction:  If an author's term is adopted and used by other authors,
> then the person who coined that term has an obligation to continue using it
> in the same sense in which it is being used.  But if nobody else is using
> the term, the original author is free to revise or replace it.
>
> In the half century of his writings, the meanings of many of his terms
> evolved, and he sometimes changed his terminology without stating exactly
> how the new terms were related to the old ones.  Since most of his MSS were
> not intended for publication, he was under no obligation to preserve the
> terms.
>
> CSP as quoted by JAS: "a general agreement concerning the use of terms and
> of notations,--not too rigid, yet prevailing with most of the co-workers in
> regard to most of the symbols, to such a degree that there shall be some
> small number of different systems of expression that have to be mastered"
> (CP 2.220, EP 2:263).
>
> GR> I couldn't agree more; it is my view as well.
>
> Yes, I would also agree.  But note the qualifications:  (1) "prevailing
> with most of the co-workers", and (2) "there shall be some small number of
> different systems of expression that have to be mastered".
>
> After 1903, when it became obvious that Russell's terminology for logic
> was becoming more widely used, he avoided some of the terms in his earlier
> publications, and he adopted some of the terms that were becoming more
> widely used.
>
> When we're writing textual criticism of Peirce's writings, it's essential
> to preserve the exact terms that occur in each quoted passage.  But when
> we're writing for a 21st. audience, we're obligated to consider what is
> "prevailing with most of the co-workers".
>
> But there is much more to say about these issues.
>
> John
>
> -
> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON
> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to
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> BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm
> .
>
>
>
>
>
>

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Ethics of terminology

[John F. Sowa]

Edwina and Mary L,

I agree with the points that both of you
have made.
ET> It is extremely difficult to come to a final
conclusion about which meaning is 'right'.
For an essay or book
about Peirce, it's important to discuss his original terminology and not
claim that any of the 21st c. terms are identical to Peirce's.  But
mathematics is an exception.  Any terms that are defined with formally
equivalent definitions are indeed exactly equivalent.  That is also true
of the first-order subset of formal (mathematical) logic.  But there are
some areas of mathematics and logic, where Peirce was exploring new
territory, and there is room for doubt.
ET> But - it's not
merely when we are writing for a 21st audience that we have to consider
what is 'prevailing with most of the co-workers'... in disciplines such as
physics, biology, artificial intelligence, economics and societal
research.
Yes.  In those areas, we should not claim that any of the
new terms are identical to any of the terms that Peirce used.
ML>
One glaring exception is Peirce’s change from the word “pragmatism” to
the word “pragmaticism.” It came after FCS Schiller, not the musician,
warped the meaning in his collection of essays on pragmatism that he
titled “humanism.” In that collection he relegated Peirce to a footnote
but attacked him ad hominin. 
I agree.  But Peirce considered the
definition by William James to "broaden" his original
definition.  See the definition of 'pragmatism' by CSP and WJ in Baldwin's
dictionary: https://www.gnusystems.ca/BaldwinPeirce.htm#Pragmatism

In effect, Peirce admitted the definition by James to be accepted
as the broader definition, and his own term 'pragmaticism' to be a
specialization of it.
John

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Re: Re: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Different Semeiotic Analyses (was tree-structure)

[Gary Richmond]

Auke,

I apologize for appearing to be 'nasty' in my recent post addressed to you.
I didn't mean to be while, admittedly, meaning to "pull your leg" a bit as
the English idiom would have it. I should have learned long ago that it's
near impossible to get humor across in an email and clearly my smiley face
didn't do it for you.

In truth, I haven't had Dutch beer since I visited my Dutch friend, Aldo,
in Tilburg many years ago (I'm not much of a beer drinker) when we went to
a monastery where the monks make beer. We thoroughly enjoyed ourselves and
the beer! Another Dutch friend, Merel, who lives in Gouda has brought me
tasty samples not only of the cheese famously named after her town, but
also delicious chocolates as well. I must admit that the very best
chocolate I've had was hand made in small amounts in a town near Brussels,
but for the most part I couldn't tell Belgian from Dutch chocolate if you
paid me! As for pommes de terre, I like both the Belgian and the Dutch
varieties. I should note parenthetically that one of my very favorite
spirits is Genever which I was introduced to in Holland and, btw, the
Belgian variety doesn't come close.

I see that I should have stuck to my original thought for a concluding
paragraph. Still meaning to have some fun with the chocolate idea, I was
going to make the thought experiment of deciding to paint my den. I go to
my local paint store and the proprietor asks, "What color are you planning
to paint your den?" I say definitively, "Chocolate!" He brings out a swatch
of color and says, "OK here's our most popular chocolate paint; what do you
think?" I say, "Well I think it's rather too light" at which point he
laughs and says, "Ah, so I take it that you prefer dark chocolate to milk
chocolate."

In any event, I certainly didn't mean to offend. I love Holland, have
several beloved Dutch friends there, enjoy the cozy bars in Amsterdam,
eating delicious Dutch food in outdoor restaurants, especially those in the
center of Tilburg, and you can be certain that when in Holland I top off
many a night clinking glasses of Genever and toasting "Proost!"

Well, I'm disappointed that I didn't win the chocolate. But perhaps I can
keep trying?

Again, take this message to be a heartfelt apology as I never meant to
offend, just to play a little game that, sadly, went bad.

Best,

Gary


"Time is not a renewable resource." gnox

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*







On Sun, May 3, 2020 at 7:41 AM Auke van Breemen  wrote:

> Nasty webmail.
>
> Gary R,
>
> With that you do not earn the box. It are not my heat lightnings (see
> below the Hausman quote) you utilized.
>
> *The qualisign aspect is a medad* or collection of medads brought
> together *by the mind* in the pure icon, the icon being not caused by the
> medads themselves, but by our habits of interpretation.
>
> For some fine remarks: Charles S. Peirce's Evolutionary Philosophy By Carl
> R. Hausman
>
> p. 122
>
> "What then is the relevance of the idea of a medad for the categories?
> Specifically what is its relevance for explaining firstness? This point
> depends on the idea that a medad may be thought of as a charge that is
> unattachable to any atom or any particle. Such a charge, as Peirce suggests
> in his figurative description, would be like a heat charge that has no
> effect. etc.."
>
> *The quality is monadic*, involving qualisigns, involving quale:
>
> i) A Rhematic [3.1] Iconic [2.1] Qualisign [1.1] (e.g., a feeling of
> \red") is any
> quality in so far as it is a sign. Since a quality is whatever it is
> positively in itself, a
> quality can only denote an object by virtue of some common ingredient or
> similarity;
> so that a Qualisign is necessarily an Icon. Further, since a quality is a
> mere logical
> possibility, it can only be interpreted as a sign of essence, that is, as
> a Rheme
>
> ii) A Rhematic [3.1] Iconic [2.1] Sinsign [1.2] (e.g., an individual
> diagram) is any
> object of experience in so far as some quality of it makes it determine
> the idea of an
> object. Being an Icon, and thus a sign by likeness purely of whatever it
> may be like,
> it can only be interpreted as a sign of essence, or Rheme. It will embody
> a Qualisign.
>
> Taken from CP. 2.254-2.263.
>
> -
>
> You cannot utilize the heat charges that were the occasion for my
> experience of green on a specific occasion. For an early take on the medad:
>
> [...] the immediate (and therefore in itself insusceptible of mediation
> -the Unanalyzable, the Inexplicable, the Unintellectual ) runs in a
> continuous stream through our lives. W. II, p. 227 (1868)
>
> Best, Auke
>
>
> Op 3 mei 2020 om 12:31 schreef Gary Richmond :
> Auke, list,
>
> What is funny -- in the sense not of your 'hilarious', but of my 'strange'
> -- is that well over a decade ago on this list I used the same example, an
> " im[p]ression of green the moment I look at the trees

Re: Re: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Different Semeiotic Analyses (was tree-structure)

[Auke van Breemen]

Gary R,

First of all, no offence taken.

This is a nice example of a intentional and a effectual representant standing 
asunder. I did not write 'nasty webmail' in response to the content of your 
mail. Always nice to see a native writer toying around with words. Jon Awbry is 
a master at it. I did write it because I was fed up with my webmail that has an 
inclination to pick a mailadres that is not recognized by the list. The mail 
you responded to on list was not send to the list, so listers might be 
surprised. And when I replied on your mail, again the adress went wrong the 
first time. 

Best,

Auke



> Op 3 mei 2020 om 22:38 schreef Gary Richmond :
> 
> Auke,
> 
> I apologize for appearing to be 'nasty' in my recent post addressed to 
> you. I didn't mean to be while, admittedly, meaning to "pull your leg" a bit 
> as the English idiom would have it. I should have learned long ago that it's 
> near impossible to get humor across in an email and clearly my smiley face 
> didn't do it for you. 
> 
> In truth, I haven't had Dutch beer since I visited my Dutch friend, Aldo, 
> in Tilburg many years ago (I'm not much of a beer drinker) when we went to a 
> monastery where the monks make beer. We thoroughly enjoyed ourselves and the 
> beer! Another Dutch friend, Merel, who lives in Gouda has brought me tasty 
> samples not only of the cheese famously named after her town, but also 
> delicious chocolates as well. I must admit that the very best chocolate I've 
> had was hand made in small amounts in a town near Brussels, but for the most 
> part I couldn't tell Belgian from Dutch chocolate if you paid me! As for 
> pommes de terre, I like both the Belgian and the Dutch varieties. I should 
> note parenthetically that one of my very favorite spirits is Genever which I 
> was introduced to in Holland and, btw, the Belgian variety doesn't come close.
> 
> I see that I should have stuck to my original thought for a concluding 
> paragraph. Still meaning to have some fun with the chocolate idea, I was 
> going to make the thought experiment of deciding to paint my den. I go to my 
> local paint store and the proprietor asks, "What color are you planning to 
> paint your den?" I say definitively, "Chocolate!" He brings out a swatch of 
> color and says, "OK here's our most popular chocolate paint; what do you 
> think?" I say, "Well I think it's rather too light" at which point he laughs 
> and says, "Ah, so I take it that you prefer dark chocolate to milk chocolate."
> 
> In any event, I certainly didn't mean to offend. I love Holland, have 
> several beloved Dutch friends there, enjoy the cozy bars in Amsterdam, eating 
> delicious Dutch food in outdoor restaurants, especially those in the center 
> of Tilburg, and you can be certain that when in Holland I top off many a 
> night clinking glasses of Genever and toasting "Proost!"
> 
> Well, I'm disappointed that I didn't win the chocolate. But perhaps I can 
> keep trying? 
> 
> Again, take this message to be a heartfelt apology as I never meant to 
> offend, just to play a little game that, sadly, went bad.
> 
> Best,
> 
> Gary
> 
> 
> 
> 
> "Time is not a renewable resource." gnox
> 
> 
> 
> Gary Richmond
> Philosophy and Critical Thinking
> Communication Studies
> LaGuardia College of the City University of New York
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> On Sun, May 3, 2020 at 7:41 AM Auke van Breemen < a.bree...@chello.nl 
> mailto:a.bree...@chello.nl > wrote:
> 
> > > 
> > Nasty webmail.
> > 
> > Gary R,
> > 
> > With that you do not earn the box. It are not my heat lightnings 
> > (see below the Hausman quote) you utilized.
> > 
> > The qualisign aspect is a medad or collection of medads brought 
> > together by the mind in the pure icon, the icon being not caused by the 
> > medads themselves, but by our habits of interpretation.  
> > 
> > For some fine remarks: Charles S. Peirce's Evolutionary Philosophy 
> > By Carl R. Hausman
> > 
> > p. 122  
> > 
> > "What then is the relevance of the idea of a medad for the 
> > categories? Specifically what is its relevance for explaining firstness? 
> > This point depends on the idea that a medad may be thought of as a charge 
> > that is unattachable to any atom or any particle. Such a charge, as Peirce 
> > suggests in his figurative description, would be like a heat charge that 
> > has no effect. etc.."
> > 
> > The quality is monadic, involving qualisigns, involving quale:
> > 
> > i) A Rhematic [3.1] Iconic [2.1] Qualisign [1.1] (e.g., a feeling 
> > of \red") is any
> > quality in so far as it is a sign. Since a quality is whatever it 
> > is positively in itself, a
> > quality can only denote an object by virtue of some common 
> > ingredient or similarity;
> > so that a Qualisign is necessarily an Icon. Further, since a 
> > quality is a mere logical
> >

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Different Semeiotic Analyses (was tree-structure)

[John F. Sowa]

Jon,
When Peirce called a theory 'fallible, he did not mean
"free to make adjustments".  There is a huge difference between
"free to apply to new areas" and "free to adjust (i.e.
change) the theory itself"',  The first (new applications) is
"normal science" in Kuhn's terms.  But the second is a
"paradigm shift" caused by some serious error in the foundations
of the theory.  
JAS> I agree that
the conclusions of semeiotic are "eminently fallible," as Peirce
himself described them.  That is why we are not locked into treating his 
speculative
 grammar as rigid dogma but are free to make adjustments that we deem
appropriate in accordance with the results of our own investigations. 
We simply need to be clear about those deviations and acknowledge that
they are deviations,

Question:  What flaws, errors, or discrepancies have you found in
Peirce's semeiotic?
If you found some areas that Peirce did not
cover, then doing further research to cover those areas is "normal
science".  That would require new data about aspects that Peirce did
not address in his writings.
But changing the theory (even
"adjustments") is a very serious matter.  That would only be
justified if you found some serious contradictions that couldn't be
covered by "normal science" -- i.e., making new observations and
adding some methods for adapting Peirce's theories to the new
data.
What are your reasons for the adjustments?
John



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Re: Re: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Different Semeiotic Analyses (was tree-structure)

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

John, List:

I appreciate the frank recognition in the last sentence below that I am *not
*"claiming to be a better semeiotician than Peirce was," simply by virtue
of reaching a few different conclusions about semeiotic than he did.
Likewise, I would never suggest that someone was claiming to be a better
logician than Peirce was, simply by virtue of reaching a few different
conclusions about logic than he did.  After all, we agree that Peirce
considered *every *theory of *every *science to be fallible, and
scrupulously applied that principle to his own ideas; all the more so in
semeiotic, where he explicitly described himself as "a pioneer, or rather a
backwoodsman, in the work of clearing and opening up" that field (CP 5.488,
EP 2:413, 1907).

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Sun, May 3, 2020 at 9:21 AM John F. Sowa  wrote:

> Edwina and Jon,
>
> Induction always begins with data -- a set of observations about some
> subject.  By finding analogies and commonalities among the observations, it
> derives a probable hypothesis about the subject matter.  Further testing is
> necessary to increase the probability and generalize the hypothesis to a
> wider range of phenomena.
>
> If the observations are about nature, the hypothesis is the starting point
> for some law of science.  If the observations are about some text, the
> hypothesis is a starting point for some textual criticism.
>
> ET>  I was saying that developing a strictly formal and textual argument
> about reality...
>
> My suggested continuation of that line:  "requires data from new
> observations of reality."
>
> JAS> As with any scientific inquiry, in speculative grammar we employ
> retroduction to formulate hypotheses, deduction to explicate them, and
> induction to evaluate them.
>
> That is a worthy goal.  But the data required for any theory of
> speculative grammar must ultimately come from experiences in the phaneron.
> If the only source of data is from texts by Peirce, your theory cannot go
> beyond what Peirce said.
>
> JAS> "Constant references to the text" are a valid inductive method for
> testing hypotheses about the text itself, as well as hypotheses about the
> views of the author as expressed in the text.
>
> That is a project in textual criticism.   It can be used to clarify what
> Peirce was saying, but it cannot go beyond what Peirce said.  In order to
> develop a version of speculative grammar that adds something new, it's
> essential to find new data.  You must do your own phaneroscopy --  you must
> analyze experiences in your own phaneron according to  the methodology that
> Peirce defined.
>
> If you don't do that, you cannot claim to have added anything beyond what
> Peirce said.  If your conclusion differs from his in any way, you are
> claiming to be a better semeiotican than Peirce was.  And frankly, I don't
> believe that you are.
>
> John
>

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Different Semeiotic Analyses (was tree-structure)

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

John, List:

I seem to recall a recent on-List assertion that "Peirce would cringe at
most, if not all attempts to paraphrase his thoughts."  That is exactly
what the first sentence below constitutes, unless it can be supported by a
direct quotation from Peirce in which he explicitly states that a theory
being "fallible" does not mean that we are "free to make adjustments" to it.

I seem to recall another recent on-List assertion that Peirce "would be
horrified at the thought that anybody would attempt to pick and choose some
rigid set of quotations as a definitive formulation of his thought."
Besides being another (presumably cringe-worthy) attempt to paraphrase his
thoughts, this statement apparently prohibits us from taking his writings
about semeiotic (or anything else) as a definitive formulation of his
theory.

In any case, Kuhn's concept of "normal science" is by no means limited to
finding new applications of an established theory.  If every theory is
fallible, then every theory is susceptible of further theoretical
adjustments, which need not overturn the *entire *theory.  In other words,
there is a huge difference between proposing changes to some of the *details
*of the theory--which is all that I am doing--and advocating a fundamental
paradigm shift.

I have said several times now that one of the ways in which my speculative
grammar deviates from Peirce's is by rejecting qualisigns, and I have given
my primary reason for this each time--a quality *in itself* cannot
represent something else, it can only present itself; and therefore, a
quality *in itself *cannot be a sign.  So far no one has actually
*argued *against
this position or offered any example of a quality that is a sign *in itself*,
rather than a tone that inheres in a token.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Sun, May 3, 2020 at 4:50 PM John F. Sowa  wrote:

> Jon,
>
> When Peirce called a theory 'fallible, he did not mean "free to make
> adjustments".  There is a huge difference between "free to apply to new
> areas" and "free to adjust (i.e. change) the theory itself"',  The first
> (new applications) is "normal science" in Kuhn's terms.  But the second is
> a "paradigm shift" caused by some serious error in the foundations of the
> theory.
>
> JAS> I agree that the conclusions of semeiotic are "eminently fallible,"
> as Peirce himself described them.  That is why we are not locked into
> treating *his *speculative grammar as rigid dogma but are free to make
> adjustments that we deem appropriate in accordance with the results of our
> own investigations.  We simply need to be clear about those deviations and
> acknowledge that they *are *deviations,
>
> Question:  What flaws, errors, or discrepancies have you found in Peirce's
> semeiotic?
>
> If you found some areas that Peirce did not cover, then doing further
> research to cover those areas is "normal science".  That would require new
> data about aspects that Peirce did not address in his writings.
>
> But changing the theory (even "adjustments") is a very serious matter.
> That would only be justified if you found some serious contradictions that
> couldn't be covered by "normal science" -- i.e., making new observations
> and adding some methods for adapting Peirce's theories to the new data.
>
> What are your reasons for the adjustments?
>
> John
>

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Re: Re: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Different Semeiotic Analyses (was tree-structure)

[Gary Richmond]

Auke, List,

AvG: First of all, no offence taken.

Glad to hear it as, of course, none was intended.

AvB: This is a nice example of a intentional and a effectual representant
standing asunder. I did not write 'nasty webmail' in response to the
content of your mail.

I would tend to agree with you that it was an "intentional and a effectual
representant standing asunder."  I am glad to hear that the comment "nasty
webmail" had nothing whatsoever to do with my post. Of course not knowing
the details of your webmail issue, I at first thought that my attempt at
humor had been misinterpreted.

AvB Always nice to see a native writer toying around with words. Jon Awbry
is a master at it

Jon Awbrey is indeed a master -- and, indeed, past master at playing with
words, often quite delightfully and creatively. Tha\t for decades now he's
done some rather interesting work in logic is to his credit as well!

AvB  I did write it because I was fed up with my webmail that has an
inclination to pick a mailadres that is not recognized by the list. The
mail you responded to on list was not send to the list, so listers might be
surprised. And when I replied on your mail, again the adress went wrong the
first time.

I'm glad that the 'nastiness' had nothing to do with me, and I hope you've
resolved your webmail issue.

I continue to find your semeiotic point of view both interesting and
challenging.

Best,

Gary

"Time is not a renewable resource." gnox

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*







On Sun, May 3, 2020 at 5:46 PM Auke van Breemen  wrote:

> Gary R,
>
> First of all, no offence taken.
>
> This is a nice example of a intentional and a effectual representant
> standing asunder. I did not write 'nasty webmail' in response to the
> content of your mail. Always nice to see a native writer toying around with
> words. Jon Awbry is a master at it. I did write it because I was fed up
> with my webmail that has an inclination to pick a mailadres that is not
> recognized by the list. The mail you responded to on list was not send to
> the list, so listers might be surprised. And when I replied on your mail,
> again the adress went wrong the first time.
>
> Best,
>
> Auke
>
>
>
> Op 3 mei 2020 om 22:38 schreef Gary Richmond :
>
> Auke,
>
> I apologize for appearing to be 'nasty' in my recent post addressed to
> you. I didn't mean to be while, admittedly, meaning to "pull your leg" a
> bit as the English idiom would have it. I should have learned long ago that
> it's near impossible to get humor across in an email and clearly my smiley
> face didn't do it for you.
>
> In truth, I haven't had Dutch beer since I visited my Dutch friend, Aldo,
> in Tilburg many years ago (I'm not much of a beer drinker) when we went to
> a monastery where the monks make beer. We thoroughly enjoyed ourselves and
> the beer! Another Dutch friend, Merel, who lives in Gouda has brought me
> tasty samples not only of the cheese famously named after her town, but
> also delicious chocolates as well. I must admit that the very best
> chocolate I've had was hand made in small amounts in a town near Brussels,
> but for the most part I couldn't tell Belgian from Dutch chocolate if you
> paid me! As for pommes de terre, I like both the Belgian and the Dutch
> varieties. I should note parenthetically that one of my very favorite
> spirits is Genever which I was introduced to in Holland and, btw, the
> Belgian variety doesn't come close.
>
> I see that I should have stuck to my original thought for a concluding
> paragraph. Still meaning to have some fun with the chocolate idea, I was
> going to make the thought experiment of deciding to paint my den. I go to
> my local paint store and the proprietor asks, "What color are you planning
> to paint your den?" I say definitively, "Chocolate!" He brings out a swatch
> of color and says, "OK here's our most popular chocolate paint; what do you
> think?" I say, "Well I think it's rather too light" at which point he
> laughs and says, "Ah, so I take it that you prefer dark chocolate to milk
> chocolate."
>
> In any event, I certainly didn't mean to offend. I love Holland, have
> several beloved Dutch friends there, enjoy the cozy bars in Amsterdam,
> eating delicious Dutch food in outdoor restaurants, especially those in the
> center of Tilburg, and you can be certain that when in Holland I top off
> many a night clinking glasses of Genever and toasting "Proost!"
>
> Well, I'm disappointed that I didn't win the chocolate. But perhaps I can
> keep trying?
>
> Again, take this message to be a heartfelt apology as I never meant to
> offend, just to play a little game that, sadly, went bad.
>
> Best,
>
> Gary
>
>
> "Time is not a renewable resource." gnox
>
> *Gary Richmond*
> *Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
> *Communication Studies*
> *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> On Sun, May 3, 2020