[PEIRCE-L] Soren Brier and Panentheism

[Edwina Taborsky]

List

Further to the article by Soren Brier on Peirce as a panentheist, it’s a long 
and, I think, well argued paper, but I particularly recommend the notes! As 
Brier says, the argument is vs the ‘watchmaker God’ [ ie, the external 
deterministic agent] but sees the universe as an evolutionary force within the 
three categories and semiosic triads. 

And see note 22 - vs ‘Concord transcendentalism’, or solely transcendentalism. 

I note also, Brier’s comment that Peirce’s views are close to ‘quantum field 
theory’ [ p 35]
And that Peirce believed in ‘creation ex nihilo [out of nothing] p 36. 

Edwina_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] God is an active participant in the semeiotic unfolding of the universe, was, More on Ens necessarium

[Edwina Taborsky]

Gary R, List

I’ll only make this one post - since I’m not going to get into a religious 
discussion.  ButI think that your outline of a panentheism is closer to that 
outlined by Peirce’s semiosis - than Jon’s classical theism.  

That is - I reject ,as do you, the notion of a discrete separate external 
Dynamic Object - external to the universe. That is semiosically- illogical, 
since the DO only becomes a DO within a semiosic interaction. 

Second - I reject the interpretation of ’the whole universe is a sign’ to mean 
that whole universe is merely the mediate term, the representamen.Again, 
semiotically, that’sillogical. The triad is irreducible and a reprsentamen does 
not ‘exist’ or function on its own. Peirce was very explicit about this. 

Third -hhmm..Could your notion of Jesus be the Immediate Object? 

That’s all I’ll say - my only point was that I consider that JAS’s outline of 
this religious framework is NOT similar to that of Peirce. 

Edwina
> On Oct 1, 2024, at 8:12 PM, Gary Richmond  wrote:
> 
> List,
> 
> I think that there is a different, indeed a panentheistic interpretation of 
> this passage which Jon recently commented on.
> CSP: Pragmaticism consists in recognizing all concepts as anthropomorphic; 
> and the more causal a concept is the more anthropomorphic must the 
> pragmaticist apprehend it. As his common sense prevents him from identifying 
> himself with his body, so he will not think of God as immanent in the 
> universe, though he must think that God's fulfillment of His Being in some 
> vague sense required the Creation. [. . .] (Bold and Italic/Bold emphasis 
> added by GR).
> JAS: This seems to be a shorter and less detailed draft of what I quoted 
> previously--affirming the anthropomorphism of all concepts, rejecting the 
> immanence of God, and describing scientific inquiry as worship, even for 
> professing unbelievers. [Emphasis added by GR].
> I do not interpret the passage quoted from Jon's longer quotation as a 
> rejection of the immanence of God. As I see it, while, yes, a person doesn't 
> identify himself with his body, yet the body truly exists, and is real, and 
> not only for that person. No one denies that he has a body; further, the 
> holistic notion of a bodymind was rather highly developed in the 20th century 
> to represent the profound interpenetration of the two in a normal human 
> being. Similarly, the body of God can -- at least in the panentheism which 
> I've been outlining -- be seen as the Body of Christ, perhaps that very 
> spiritual body which Christians in taking communion. I am not suggesting that 
> this is Peirce's view, but I think an argument can be made for it which, 
> further developed, might be appealing beyond Christianity. 
> Jon wrote: "T]he entire universe as one immense sign still requires an 
> overall dynamical object that is external to it, independent of it, and 
> unaffected by it."
> I agree with the first part of this statement, but I disagree with the second 
> part of it while acknowledging that it may in fact be Peirce's position.
> 
> However, before arguing further, I will note that with which I do agree in 
> Jon's explication of Peirce's cosmology. Firstly, there seems little doubt 
> that in Peirce's semeiotic cosmology that the universe can indeed be 
> considered "one vast sign" engaged in an ongoing process of semiosis, that 
> is, interpretation and meaning making, and all that we call 'evolutional'. 
> Further, I agree that everything in the universe -- including matter (its 
> subatomic underpinnings is a separate issue as I see it), ideas, and 
> relations -- everything that can develop or evolve participates in the 
> triadic relationship between the sign, its object, and its tinterpretant. 
> 
> However, in considering whether the dynamic Object of the universe is outside 
> the continuity of the semiosis of our evolving cosmos, I interpret the 
> implications of Peirce's synechism in a way different from Jon's.
> 
> My metaphysical/semiotic perspective suggests that God, if considered the 
> ultimate dynamic Object of the universe, cannot be entirely separate from it, 
> rather can be seen to be both the Creator and the immanent principle (Christ, 
> from a Cosmic Christian perspective), God guiding the evolutionary 
> development of the cosmos through the second and third Persons of the 
> Trinity. This principle (along with much of Peirce's semeiotic) is the basis 
> for my panentheistic view (although, as I previously suggested, a designation 
> other than 'Christic' will need to found or created to allow for other, 
> including possible future viewpoints (hopefully including scientific ones 
> with their own developing metaphysical symbol systems). I have mentioned 
> before that I too look for a rapprochement of science and religion as, of 
> course, did others, including Peirce, Dewey, Teilhard de Chardin, Whitehead, 
> etc.
> 
> So, as I see it, and from a  standpoint which clearly diverges f

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Sunday Musings

[Edwina Taborsky]

II fully agree with you - Darwinism and neo-Darwinism- and Peirce was sceptical 
of Darwinism - most certainly can’t describe altruism, kin selection and even, 
he fact that a species does NOT evolve to ’the best’.  That’s why Peirces’ 
agapism is a deeper analytic path to delve into for  biological truths. 

And yes- I agree that Peirce’s framework  is a ‘fecund’ base for scientific 
advances - but- most  scientists don’t know about his work - and I think that 
many Peircean scholars, with their insistence on using’ only Peirce’s words’ 
..are hindering the use of Peirce in scientific disciplines. That’s why I get 
so upset when I am chastised for using a term [ eg, input/output etc] and told 
that Peirce didn’t’ say that…The Peircean texts are not sacred texts; they are 
incredible analyses of the world..and should be open to such a use.

So- yes, it’s a great pity that current science is ignorant of the Peircean 
framework..

Edwina



> On Sep 29, 2024, at 5:59 PM, Mike Bergman  wrote:
> 
> Hi Edwina, List,
> 
> Your points are all well taken. However, I prefer to look at your rhetorical 
> question in the inverse.
> 
> Our science writ large has been stuck in some very telling ways. The standard 
> model of particle physics has been stymied and has not overcome many 
> perplexing questions for more than 50 years. The standard model of cosmology 
> has been stuck for 30 years since we learned of the universe's increasing 
> expansion. Gravity defies incorporation into a theory of everything. 
> Darwinian evolution and neo-Darwinism have been unable to describe altruism 
> and kin selection. Neither account for the 'finious' or teleological aspects 
> as well. Epigenetics suggest much more is at work than conventional genetic 
> theory. Determinism and reductionism continue (in my opinion) to unduly lock 
> science into inquisitive dead ends.
> 
> The broad framework of Peirce's universal categories and the process of 
> semiosis offer, I think both of us believe, more fecund bases for conducting 
> future science than what is being pursued at present. While it is true that 
> Peirce's work preceded the scientific advances of the early 20th century, 
> they foreshadowed all of them. Furthermore, there are legitimate theories 
> across all current scientific disciplines that can be seen as expressions of 
> these Peircean insights, often without the explicit knowledge of their 
> proponents about possible connections to Peirce. 
> 
> So, to me, the pity is not so much that Peirce was in advance of later valid 
> science but that current science is largely ignorant of Peirce. As you know 
> this has been a passion of mine. What is needed is a re-expression of many 
> current theories consistent with a Peircean interpretation. I think (know) we 
> will see such an approach will help filter amongst competing alternate 
> theories in these areas of open scientific question, which in combination 
> will also reify Peirce's impressive instincts. Getting more researchers to 
> embrace Peirce in their own work will break some of these logjams, and bring 
> additional minds to bear to help further elucidate Peirce's insights.
> 
> We have sufficient knowledge at hand to move this enterprise forward.
> 
> My Sunday musings, Mike
> 
> On 9/29/2024 2:10 PM, Edwina Taborsky wrote:
>> List
>> 
>> I sometimes wonder/wish - what would it have been like - if Peirce had lived 
>> for another 10-15 years?  Would his concepts be validated by the advances in 
>> the scientific world?
>> 
>> 1] What about his outline of the emergence of the universe [1.412; 6.217]- 
>> The idea of an expanding, evolving universe, which emerged from a 
>> singularity of density [potentiality?] as Peirce outlines it in 1.412, can 
>> be compared with the 1920’s and 1930’s scientific proposals [Friedmann, 
>> Lemaitre] of the emergence of the universe from a dense singularity.
>> 
>> 2] His concept that - there was ‘no time’ in this phase - has also been 
>> scientifically shown as valid.
>> 
>> 3] What about the electromagnetic force - one of the four fundamental 
>> forces? I have always defined the Semiotic process of O-R-I 
>> [Object-Representamen-Interpretant ] as comparable to a function, ie, where 
>> F(X)=Y ..or.. Representamen/Sign [Object)=Interpretant.  
>> 
>> But in addition, an analogy can be made with the electromagnetic force, 
>> which is an interaction that occurs between particles with electric charge 
>> via electromagnetic fields.  I’d compare a magnetic field to the semiosic 
>> process, where one vector, B is the magnetic induction [compare with the 
>> Object’s data]; and the other vector , H, is the magnetic fi

[PEIRCE-L] Sunday Musings

[Edwina Taborsky]

List

I sometimes wonder/wish - what would it have been like - if Peirce had lived 
for another 10-15 years?  Would his concepts be validated by the advances in 
the scientific world?

1] What about his outline of the emergence of the universe [1.412; 6.217]- The 
idea of an expanding, evolving universe, which emerged from a singularity of 
density [potentiality?] as Peirce outlines it in 1.412, can be compared with 
the 1920’s and 1930’s scientific proposals [Friedmann, Lemaitre] of the 
emergence of the universe from a dense singularity.

2] His concept that - there was ‘no time’ in this phase - has also been 
scientifically shown as valid.

3] What about the electromagnetic force - one of the four fundamental forces? I 
have always defined the Semiotic process of O-R-I 
[Object-Representamen-Interpretant ] as comparable to a function, ie, where 
F(X)=Y ..or.. Representamen/Sign [Object)=Interpretant.  

But in addition, an analogy can be made with the electromagnetic force, which 
is an interaction that occurs between particles with electric charge via 
electromagnetic fields.  I’d compare a magnetic field to the semiosic process, 
where one vector, B is the magnetic induction [compare with the Object’s data]; 
and the other vector , H, is the magnetic fields intensity/strength [ ie, the  
strength of the Interpretant’s informational content.

It’s interesting that in a vacuum [ infinity???] B and H are proportional to 
each other, but inside matter, they are different - which fits in with the 
notion of an evolving or different interpretant. 

4] And of course, his concepts of the reality of chance/freedom as well as the 
developments of stable patterns - have also been scientifically validated.

Just another decade or two- would have shown, scientifically, the validity of 
his theories.

Edwina_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] More on Ens necessarium

[Edwina Taborsky]

;Those who express the idea to themselves by 
> saying that the Divine Creator determined so and so may be incautiously 
> clothing the idea in a garb that is open to criticism, but it is, after all, 
> substantially the only philosophical answer to the problem" (CP 6.199, 1898). 
> Note that he calls it a philosophical answer, not a theological answer.
> 
> I have always acknowledged that every sign stands in a genuine triadic 
> relation with its (dynamical) object and its (final) interpretant. It seems 
> that my recent attempts at further clarification of the implications of this 
> within the universe, conceived as a vast semiosic continuum, have been 
> successful--but incorrectly perceived as a change in my position. Moreover, 
> the entire universe as one immense sign still requires an overall dynamical 
> object that is external to it, independent of it, and unaffected by it. As I 
> have said before, this does not in any way entail that the universe is finite 
> or has "boundaries," only that its dynamical object must transcend it.
> 
> When Peirce refers to the sign/object/interpretant as First/Second/Third (CP 
> 2.274, EP 2:272-273, 1903), these are not ordinal terms, they are the results 
> of phaneroscopic analysis. He spells this out when describing them as the 
> First/Second/Third Correlates of a triadic relation (CP 2.235-242, EP 2:290, 
> 1903).
> "The First Correlate is that one of the three which is regarded as of the 
> simplest nature" - there is only the genuine sign.
> "The Second Correlate is that one of the three which is regarded as of 
> middling complexity" - each sign has both genuine (dynamical) and degenerate 
> (immediate) objects.
> "The Third Correlate is that one of the three which is regarded as of the 
> most complex nature" - each sign has genuine (final), degenerate (dynamical), 
> and doubly degenerate (immediate) interpretants.
> However, the logical sequence of semiosis is from the object through the sign 
> toward the interpretant; the object determines the sign to determine the 
> interpretant. "The object and the interpretant are thus merely the two 
> correlates of the sign; the one being antecedent, the other consequent of the 
> sign" (EP 2:410, 1907). "In its relation to the Object, the Sign is passive; 
> that is to say, its correspondence to the Object is brought about by an 
> effect upon the Sign, the Object remaining unaffected. On the other hand, in 
> its relation to the Interpretant the Sign is active, determining the 
> Interpretant without being itself thereby affected" (EP 2:544n22, 1906).
> 
> Regards,
> 
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt 
> <http://www.linkedin.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt> / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt 
> <http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt>
> On Fri, Sep 27, 2024 at 6:11 PM Edwina Taborsky  <mailto:edwina.tabor...@gmail.com>> wrote:
>> JAS, list
>> 
>> You have indeed ‘made your case’ [interpretation] that the 6.490 outline by 
>> Peirce is a reductio ad absurdum argument - but I disagree with your 
>> interpretation of that section. I think Peirce meant exactly what he wrote 
>> about the emergence of the universe from ’nothing’. Peirce, in my view,  did 
>> not write that this was an ‘absurd’ statement, despite your claim that he 
>> did so. [and your use of quotation marks after the word ‘absurd’ - when, 
>> this word was NOT in the  quotation from Peirce’. '. 
>> 
>> I think that you are analyzing Peirce’s argument within a Newtonian 
>> mechanical causality, where indeed, in the world-of-discrete objects [ the 
>> realm of Secondness], these discrete objects do not ‘come from nothing’. But 
>> cosmology isn’t referring to the classical mechanical realm of existent 
>> particles but to the quantum world - and Peirce’s cosmological outline [also 
>> in 1.412 and 6.214-219] fits in with the modern outline of Black Holes and 
>> the ‘Big Bang’. 
>> 
>> There is no need to describe my argument as ‘uncharitable’. Why say such a 
>> thing? 
>> 
>> Your original argument that ‘God’ was the Dynamic Object’ of the 
>> Universe-as-a-Sign [ which you defined as ONLY the Representamen - did 
>> change to one where you instead acknowledged that the first correlate was of 
>> course, connected to the other two correlates - and - within the universe. 
>> That is - you did admit that the Universe was not composed only of the first 
>> Correlate [ the Sign/ Representamen] but also - of the other two …This was 
>> different from your original assertio

Re: [PEIRCE-L] More on Ens necessarium

[Edwina Taborsky]

quot;The Second Correlate is that one of the three which is regarded as of 
> middling complexity" - each sign has both genuine (dynamical) and degenerate 
> (immediate) objects.
> "The Third Correlate is that one of the three which is regarded as of the 
> most complex nature" - each sign has genuine (final), degenerate (dynamical), 
> and doubly degenerate (immediate) interpretants.
> However, the logical sequence of semiosis is from the object through the sign 
> toward the interpretant; the object determines the sign to determine the 
> interpretant. "The object and the interpretant are thus merely the two 
> correlates of the sign; the one being antecedent, the other consequent of the 
> sign" (EP 2:410, 1907). "In its relation to the Object, the Sign is passive; 
> that is to say, its correspondence to the Object is brought about by an 
> effect upon the Sign, the Object remaining unaffected. On the other hand, in 
> its relation to the Interpretant the Sign is active, determining the 
> Interpretant without being itself thereby affected" (EP 2:544n22, 1906).
> 
> Regards,
> 
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt 
> <http://www.linkedin.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt> / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt 
> <http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt>
> On Fri, Sep 27, 2024 at 6:11 PM Edwina Taborsky  <mailto:edwina.tabor...@gmail.com>> wrote:
>> JAS, list
>> 
>> You have indeed ‘made your case’ [interpretation] that the 6.490 outline by 
>> Peirce is a reductio ad absurdum argument - but I disagree with your 
>> interpretation of that section. I think Peirce meant exactly what he wrote 
>> about the emergence of the universe from ’nothing’. Peirce, in my view,  did 
>> not write that this was an ‘absurd’ statement, despite your claim that he 
>> did so. [and your use of quotation marks after the word ‘absurd’ - when, 
>> this word was NOT in the  quotation from Peirce’. '. 
>> 
>> I think that you are analyzing Peirce’s argument within a Newtonian 
>> mechanical causality, where indeed, in the world-of-discrete objects [ the 
>> realm of Secondness], these discrete objects do not ‘come from nothing’. But 
>> cosmology isn’t referring to the classical mechanical realm of existent 
>> particles but to the quantum world - and Peirce’s cosmological outline [also 
>> in 1.412 and 6.214-219] fits in with the modern outline of Black Holes and 
>> the ‘Big Bang’. 
>> 
>> There is no need to describe my argument as ‘uncharitable’. Why say such a 
>> thing? 
>> 
>> Your original argument that ‘God’ was the Dynamic Object’ of the 
>> Universe-as-a-Sign [ which you defined as ONLY the Representamen - did 
>> change to one where you instead acknowledged that the first correlate was of 
>> course, connected to the other two correlates - and - within the universe. 
>> That is - you did admit that the Universe was not composed only of the first 
>> Correlate [ the Sign/ Representamen] but also - of the other two …This was 
>> different from your original assertion that the Universe was only the 
>> Representamen - and God was the DO external to the universe. Now you are 
>> acknowledging that other correlates - which are connected to the DOs of the 
>> universe, function within the universe.  [Andn I also don’t agree with a 
>> finite universe where a DO functions external to it…]
>> 
>>  BUT - I reject your assertion that all semiosis proceeds from the Dynamic 
>> Object.  The information contained in the DO does indeed ‘determine’ the 
>> nature of the information processed within the other correlates, BUT, the 
>> initiation of the semiosic action is not by the DO - but by the 
>> Representamen, as the first correlate. After all- an object or external 
>> stimulus doesn’t even become a DO until it is ‘connected’ to that mediatory 
>> Repesentamen/Sign. And that is why the Representamen/Sign is defined by 
>> Peirce as the First correlate, because, in the semiosic act, that process 
>> begins with the Representamen. 
>> 
>> “A Sign or Representamen is a First which stands in such a genuine triadic 
>> relation to a Second, called its Object, as to be capable of determining a 
>> Third, called its Interpretant” 2.274.
>> 
>> And these terms of First, Second, and Third, are NOT references to the 
>> categories of Firstness, Secondness and Thirdness [ as some on this list 
>> have previously asserted] but are ordinal terms, which refer to the order of 
>> the semiosic process.
>> 
>> Edwina
> _ _ _

Re: [PEIRCE-L] More on Ens necessarium

[Edwina Taborsky]

cedent 
> state. But their Phenomena are all the phenomena there are. The task of 
> Cosmology is therefore to show how all phenomena were produced from a state 
> of absolute absence of any; and logic requires that this problem [is] to be 
> solved. But it must suppose something to be in that antecedent state, and 
> this must be that which would Really be in any possible state of things 
> whatever, that is, an Ens Necessarium. This Ens necessarium being, then, the 
> Principle of all Phenomena, must be the author and creator of all that could 
> ever be observed of Ideas, Occurrences, or Logoi. (R 339:[295r], 1908 Aug 28; 
> bold added)
> 
> Claiming otherwise implausibly (and uncharitably) ascribes blatant 
> self-contradiction to Peirce, especially since he wrote the Logic Notebook 
> entry at almost exactly the same time as CP 6.490.
> 
> I have already acknowledged several times now that the universe being 
> perfused with first correlates (signs) of triadic relations of mediation 
> entails that it is also perfused with second correlates (objects) and third 
> correlates (interpretants) of such relations, but these are also first 
> correlates (signs) of other triadic relations of mediation with their own 
> second correlates (objects) and third correlates (interpretants), and so on 
> in both directions. All semiosis proceeds from the (dynamical) object through 
> the sign toward the (final) interpretant; hence, the semiosic continuum as a 
> whole proceeds from God the Creator in the infinite past, through every state 
> of the universe at a measurable point in time, toward God completely revealed 
> in the infinite future (see CP 1.362, EP 1:251, 1887-8; note that this is in 
> the very same manuscript as CP 1.412).
> 
> None of this is theology; it is cosmology, a branch of metaphysics, which 
> "consists in the results of the absolute acceptance of logical [i.e., 
> semeiotic] principles not merely as regulatively valid, but as truths of 
> being. Accordingly, it is to be assumed that the universe has an explanation, 
> the function of which, like that of every logical explanation, is to unify 
> its observed variety. It follows that the root of all being is One; and so 
> far as different subjects have a common character they partake of an 
> identical being" (CP 1.487, c. 1896).
> 
> Regards,
> 
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt 
> <http://www.linkedin.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt> / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt 
> <http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt>
> On Thu, Sep 26, 2024 at 6:55 PM Edwina Taborsky  <mailto:edwina.tabor...@gmail.com>> wrote:
>> JAS, List
>> 
>> 1]. You wrote: [informing us that the quotes were from 6.490] 
>>> This confirms what I have been suggesting for years--Peirce's statement in 
>>> CP 6.490 (1908) that "the three universes must actually be absolutely 
>>> necessary results of a state of utter nothingness" is part of a reductio ad 
>>> absurdum. As he states plainly here, any claim that three-category reality 
>>> somehow came into being on its own, as "a necessary consequence ... of 
>>> utter nothing ... is absurd" because "nothing is self-contradictory and 
>>> impossible."
>> Would you please explain why this section is meant, by Peirce, to be a 
>> reduction ad absurdum? He doesn’t write: …that the ’three category reality 
>> somehow came into being on its own, as a ’necessary consequence..of utter 
>> nothing..is absurd”.  Where does he state this?
>> 
>> Instead, he clearly states that ’The three universes must actually be 
>> absolutely necessary results of a state of utter nothingness”
>> 
>> This whole long section [6.490] doesn’t seem to have any hint of ‘absurdum 
>> in it; but a clearly argued analysis of the emergence of the three 
>> categories/ universes. 
>> 
>> And of course - your next quotation fits right in. With his categorical 
>> concepts of freedom, reaction and habit: 
>>> "Now the question arises, what necessarily resulted from that [initial] 
>>> state of things? But the only sane answer is that where freedom was 
>>> boundless nothing in particular necessarily resulted. ... I say that 
>>> nothing necessarily resulted from the Nothing of boundless freedom" (CP 
>>> 6.218-219, 1898).
>> 
>> That is - nothing necessarily resulted; ie, the universe is not 
>> predetermined to be the way it is - because of the reality of Firstness [ 
>> freedom] - and the reality of habit-taking..which is a process engaged in by 
&g

Re: [PEIRCE-L] More on Ens necessarium

[Edwina Taborsky]

JAS, List

1]. You wrote: [informing us that the quotes were from 6.490] 

> This confirms what I have been suggesting for years--Peirce's statement in CP 
> 6.490 (1908) that "the three universes must actually be absolutely necessary 
> results of a state of utter nothingness" is part of a reductio ad absurdum. 
> As he states plainly here, any claim that three-category reality somehow came 
> into being on its own, as "a necessary consequence ... of utter nothing ... 
> is absurd" because "nothing is self-contradictory and impossible."

Would you please explain why this section is meant, by Peirce, to be a 
reduction ad absurdum? He doesn’t write: …that the ’three category reality 
somehow came into being on its own, as a ’necessary consequence..of utter 
nothing..is absurd”.  Where does he state this?

Instead, he clearly states that ’The three universes must actually be 
absolutely necessary results of a state of utter nothingness”

This whole long section [6.490] doesn’t seem to have any hint of ‘absurdum in 
it; but a clearly argued analysis of the emergence of the three categories/ 
universes. 

And of course - your next quotation fits right in. With his categorical 
concepts of freedom, reaction and habit: 
> "Now the question arises, what necessarily resulted from that [initial] state 
> of things? But the only sane answer is that where freedom was boundless 
> nothing in particular necessarily resulted. ... I say that nothing 
> necessarily resulted from the Nothing of boundless freedom" (CP 6.218-219, 
> 1898).


That is - nothing necessarily resulted; ie, the universe is not predetermined 
to be the way it is - because of the reality of Firstness [ freedom] - and the 
reality of habit-taking..which is a process engaged in by adaptation and 
evolution, ie, habits change. 

And after all- this argument of the emergence of the universe from ’nothing’ 
and the developing complexity of habits has been argued, by him, before - 
1.412. ..and also- see all his analysis of Thirdness, as an evolving, 
developing increasing complex mode. 

2] As for the universe as ‘one immense sign’ or “the entire universe…all this 
universe is perfused with signs, if it is not composed exclusively of signs” 
[5.448ff]..the strange thing about your interpretation of these quotes from 
Peirce - is that, since you insist that the the term ’sign’ refers ONLY to the 
Representamen - then, this means, as I’ve pointed out before, that your claim 
is that Peirce means that ’the entire universe is ONLY the first correlate/is 
filled with first correlates. And- as you’ve told us before, that this means 
that God is the Dynamic Object. But apart from my reading that there is no such 
thing as an isolate correlate in the triadic Sign of O-R-I - what your analysis 
sets up is that, since the FIRST semiosic action rests with the Representamen - 
then, this puts God as the SECOND action What a strange theology.

Edwina



> On Sep 26, 2024, at 6:07 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt  
> wrote:
> 
> List:
> 
> An aspect of Peirce's writings that presents both challenges and 
> opportunities for scholars of his thought is the fact that so many of his 
> texts remain unpublished. Yesterday, I came across a passage in one such 
> manuscript that is highly relevant to our recent discussions about how God as 
> Ens necessarium fulfills the logical requirement for a rational explanation 
> of the co-realty of the three universes. It is in one of the drafts for his 
> series of articles on pragmaticism in The Monist.
> 
> CSP: Unless we were to think reason in general futile, which neither you 
> reader nor I can, we have the problem before us to explain the sum total of 
> the real, however vaguely. To explain anything is to show it to be a 
> necessary consequence. To say that the total real is a consequence of utter 
> nothing without substance or appearance is absurd. The only alternative is to 
> suppose a necessary something whose mode of being transcends reality. This is 
> vague enough. 'Necessary being' is the equivalent of 'something,' since 
> nothing is self-contradictory and impossible. But a necessary being adequate 
> to account for the sum total of reality, however inscrutable, is not in all 
> respects entirely vague.
> The exact logician with his bare mathematical apparatus finds it impossible 
> to give any thoroughgoing formal analysis of thought without regarding it as 
> the product of a thinking activity; and he thus sees more clearly than 
> another man, perhaps, the ineluctability of the conception of creative 
> thought. An immanent God will not answer the purpose, although it would seem 
> that creation must in some vague sense be needed for the fulfillment of His 
> being. But our idea of Him and of the mode of His being must remain vague in 
> the extreme (though not utterly so); and as vague, self-contradictory. But 
> pragmaticism is inseparable from the doctrine that all human thought and 
> meaning must carry the anthro

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Panentheism: A framework for reconciling diverse perspectives on God, was, A logical problem, was: Cosmic Christi Theology, was, A Scientific Religion, was, Semiosic Synechism: A Peirce

[Edwina Taborsky]

JAS, list

What you are ignoring, is that Peirce was quite specific about his references 
to the fact that Mind operates as ’Thirdness’ and that Thirdness never operates 
alone, but only with the other two modal categories. Therefore - there is no 
such thing as a separate detached Mind.

Yes - examining the facts vs beliefs is tiresome. And it does seem fruitless. 

Edwina


> On Sep 20, 2024, at 11:24 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt  
> wrote:
> 
> List:
> 
> Please see my post below. I suppose that someone might quibble with 
> "disembodied spirit" vs. "disembodied mind," but in one of those two 
> quotations that I already provided, Peirce explicitly equates "disembodied 
> spirit" with "pure mind."
> 
> I could also point out his multiple statements to the effect that mind is 
> primordial while matter is derived and special, which obviously entails that 
> mind is possible without matter (but not vice versa). However, I know from 
> experience that it would just prompt another series of tiresome and fruitless 
> debates about whether his objective idealism is a version of idealism or 
> something different altogether. I have no desire to go down that road yet 
> again.
> 
> Regards,
> 
> Jon
> 
> On Fri, Sep 20, 2024 at 9:32 PM Edwina Taborsky  <mailto:edwina.tabor...@gmail.com>> wrote:
>> JAS< list
>> 
>> Would you please show us where Peirce says that Mind can function without 
>> embodiment? My understanding of Peirce is that he was not a Platonist - and 
>> therefore there are no ‘pure or immaterial forms’; ie, no separate Mind; 
>> instead, matter and mind are correlates. 
>> 
>> See 6.78; 6.158 [where matter is Mind hidebound with habits’’ ; and ’the 
>> universe of mind which coincides with the universe of matter’ 6.501. see 
>> also 4.551 where thought doesn’t function only via a brain ..
>> 
>> That is, my understanding is that there is no ‘Pure or disembodied Mind’ . 
>> Mind requires embodiment. And most certainly, consciousness is not an 
>> attribute of Mind. [Note: Peirce talks about plants and biological organisms 
>> operating with the actions of ‘Mind’. - which actions can also be understood 
>> as the Mode of Thirdness. 
>> 
>> Edwina
>>> On Sep 20, 2024, at 9:49 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt >> <mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com>> wrote:
>>> 
>>> Jeff, List:
>>> 
>>> Again, it is highly misleading to characterize theism as conceiving God to 
>>> be "entirely separate from the evolving cosmos."
>>> 
>>> As for your specific question, the classical theistic arguments for the 
>>> reality of God typically include, as one of their deductive conclusions, 
>>> that God must be immaterial. Peirce himself says that God as Ens 
>>> necessarium is a "disembodied spirit, or pure mind" (CP 6.490, 1908); and 
>>> as I have emphasized repeatedly, by his own testimony, when he refers to 
>>> God as "mind" he is using that term vaguely, figuratively, loosely, and 
>>> analogously. Moreover ...
>>> 
>>> CSP: Since God, in His essential character of Ens necessarium, is a 
>>> disembodied spirit, and since there is strong reason to hold that what we 
>>> call consciousness is either merely the general sensation of the brain or 
>>> some part of it, or at all events some visceral or bodily sensation, God 
>>> probably has no consciousness. (CP 6.489)
>>> 
>>> So, Peirce seems to hold that embodiment is necessary for consciousness, 
>>> but not for mind; and he complains elsewhere (at some length) about 
>>> psychologists routinely confusing the two (CP 7.364-367, 1902).
>>> 
>>> Regards,
>>> 
>>> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
>>> Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
>>> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt 
>>> <http://www.linkedin.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt> / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt 
>>> <http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt>
>>> On Fri, Sep 20, 2024 at 5:25 PM Jeffrey Brian Downard 
>>> mailto:jeffrey.down...@nau.edu>> wrote:
>>>> Colleagues,
>>>> 
>>>>  
>>>> 
>>>> If I step back from the philosophical inquiries and think about questions 
>>>> concerning the nature of the divine in a more commonsense manner, the 
>>>> following question comes to mind. Normally, I think minds, thoughts and 
>>>> representations need—in some sense—to be embodied to have the power to 
>>>> govern, create, etc.
>>

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Panentheism: A framework for reconciling diverse perspectives on God, was, A logical problem, was: Cosmic Christi Theology, was, A Scientific Religion, was, Semiosic Synechism: A Peirce

[Edwina Taborsky]

JAS< list

Would you please show us where Peirce says that Mind can function without 
embodiment? My understanding of Peirce is that he was not a Platonist - and 
therefore there are no ‘pure or immaterial forms’; ie, no separate Mind; 
instead, matter and mind are correlates. 

See 6.78; 6.158 [where matter is Mind hidebound with habits’’ ; and ’the 
universe of mind which coincides with the universe of matter’ 6.501. see also 
4.551 where thought doesn’t function only via a brain ..

That is, my understanding is that there is no ‘Pure or disembodied Mind’ . Mind 
requires embodiment. And most certainly, consciousness is not an attribute of 
Mind. [Note: Peirce talks about plants and biological organisms operating with 
the actions of ‘Mind’. - which actions can also be understood as the Mode of 
Thirdness. 

Edwina

> On Sep 20, 2024, at 9:49 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt  
> wrote:
> 
> Jeff, List:
> 
> Again, it is highly misleading to characterize theism as conceiving God to be 
> "entirely separate from the evolving cosmos."
> 
> As for your specific question, the classical theistic arguments for the 
> reality of God typically include, as one of their deductive conclusions, that 
> God must be immaterial. Peirce himself says that God as Ens necessarium is a 
> "disembodied spirit, or pure mind" (CP 6.490, 1908); and as I have emphasized 
> repeatedly, by his own testimony, when he refers to God as "mind" he is using 
> that term vaguely, figuratively, loosely, and analogously. Moreover ...
> 
> CSP: Since God, in His essential character of Ens necessarium, is a 
> disembodied spirit, and since there is strong reason to hold that what we 
> call consciousness is either merely the general sensation of the brain or 
> some part of it, or at all events some visceral or bodily sensation, God 
> probably has no consciousness. (CP 6.489)
> 
> So, Peirce seems to hold that embodiment is necessary for consciousness, but 
> not for mind; and he complains elsewhere (at some length) about psychologists 
> routinely confusing the two (CP 7.364-367, 1902).
> 
> Regards,
> 
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt 
>  / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt 
> 
> On Fri, Sep 20, 2024 at 5:25 PM Jeffrey Brian Downard 
> mailto:jeffrey.down...@nau.edu>> wrote:
>> Colleagues,
>> 
>>  
>> 
>> If I step back from the philosophical inquiries and think about questions 
>> concerning the nature of the divine in a more commonsense manner, the 
>> following question comes to mind. Normally, I think minds, thoughts and 
>> representations need—in some sense—to be embodied to have the power to 
>> govern, create, etc.
>> 
>>  
>> 
>> Does the same apply to the conception of a Divine Mind that is infinite and 
>> perfect? I suspect those who are attracted to some form of pantheism or 
>> panentheism may think this is one consideration in favor of conceiving of 
>> the Mind of God as being embodied the universe, which is its body.
>> 
>>  
>> 
>> Do theists who hold God is entirely separate from the evolving cosmos hold 
>> that the Mind of God is embodied in something else, or do they think such a 
>> perfect mind needs no embodiment?
>> 
>>  
>> 
>> Yours,
>> 
>>  
>> 
>> Jeff
>> 
> _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
> ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at 
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_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
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► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON 
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Panentheism: A framework for reconciling diverse perspectives on God, was, A logical problem, was: Cosmic Christi Theology, was, A Scientific Religion, was, Semiosic Synechism: A Peirce

[Edwina Taborsky]

JAS, list

We’ve been arguing for years about these issues - what is a ’sign’- which I 
maintain is the triad, and which you maintain is only the first correlate;  the 
origins of the universe - which I maintain is from ’nothing’ and which you 
maintain is via God; the nature of the Dynamic Object..and so on., etc’. 

The resuit? You have YOUR interpretation of Peirce and I have MY interpretation 
of Peirce. I think we’ll have to leave it at that.

Edwina

> On Sep 20, 2024, at 12:59 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt  
> wrote:
> 
> List:
> 
> I am not "now admitting" anything that I have not already acknowledged many 
> times before. In fact, the first two paragraphs of my post below are copied 
> almost word-for-word from one of my posts last week 
> (https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2024-09/msg00057.html).
> 
> If the sign, object, and interpretant were not distinct correlates, then they 
> could not be in a genuine triadic relation with each other. Where we should 
> be able to agree is that something is not a sign unless it stands in the 
> genuine triadic relation of mediating between an object an interpretant, 
> something is not an object unless it determines a sign relatively to an 
> interpretant, and something is not an interpretant unless it is determined by 
> a sign in reference to an object (see Robert Marty's definition #40f, 
> https://cspeirce.com/rsources/76defs/76defs.htm). Again, when Peirce says 
> that the universe is "perfused with signs," he means precisely that it is 
> perfused with first correlates of triadic relations (signs) that are 
> mediating between second correlates (objects) and third correlates 
> (interpretants). This indeed entails that the universe is also perfused with 
> objects and interpretants, but those are also signs with their own objects 
> and interpretants, and so on in both directions because all such individual 
> signs/objects/interpretants are artifacts of analysis prescinded from the 
> continuous process of semiosis.
> 
> That the entire universe is one immense sign is not just my claim, it is also 
> Peirce's explicit claim. "[T]he Universe is a vast representamen, a great 
> symbol of God's purpose, working out its conclusions in living realities. Now 
> every symbol must have, organically attached to it, its Indices of Reactions 
> and its Icons of Qualities; and such part as these reactions and these 
> qualities play in an argument, that they of course play in the Universe, that 
> Universe being precisely an argument" (CP 5.119, EP 2:193-194, 1903). The 
> universe is one sign (a symbol, an argument, 3ns) that involves many signs 
> (indices and icons, propositions and names, 2ns and 1ns) because "if any 
> signs are connected, no matter how, the resulting system constitutes one 
> sign" (R 1476:36[5-1/2], 1904). It is "the aggregate formed by a sign and all 
> the signs which its occurrence carries with it. This aggregate will itself be 
> a sign; and we may call it a perfect sign, in the sense that it involves the 
> present existence of no other sign except such as are ingredients of itself" 
> (EP 2:545n25, 1906). As I have explained previously 
> (https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2024-09/msg00038.html), the 
> interpretant of any argument is its conclusion, so the dynamical 
> interpretants of the universe are the living realities that it is constantly 
> working out--every actual event is a dynamical interpretant of the entire 
> universe prior to the moment when it occurs.
> 
> I have never suggested that Peirce refers to a necessary being in his earlier 
> cosmological writings including CP 1.412 (1887-8) and CP 6.185-209&214-221 
> (1898), although he does state in the latter, "Those who express the idea to 
> themselves by saying that the Divine Creator determined so and so may be 
> incautiously clothing the idea in a garb that is open to criticism, but it 
> is, after all, substantially the only philosophical answer to the problem" 
> (CP 6.199). I simply maintain that those passages can and should be 
> interpreted in light of his 1908 writings that repeatedly refer to God as Ens 
> necessarium including "A Neglected Argument" (CP 6.452-491, EP 2:434-450), 
> its manuscript drafts (R 841-844), the Logic Notebook entries of August 28-29 
> (R 339:[293r-296r]), and R 611 (dated October 28). Again, Peirce 
> unambiguously asserts that logic requires the reality of God as Ens 
> necessarium in the state of things logically antecedent to the co-reality of 
> the three universes, in which there were no phenomena whatsoever. The only 
> alternative is that "the three universes must actually be absolutely 
> necessary results of a state of utter no

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Panentheism: A framework for reconciling diverse perspectives on God, was, A logical problem, was: Cosmic Christi Theology, was, A Scientific Religion, was, Semiosic Synechism: A Peirce

[Edwina Taborsky]

JAS, List

And I have pointed out to you - and ’this’ is ‘one more time’- that Peirce 
could not have meant that the universe is perfused with only the first 
correlate - since the correlates cannot be separated, except intellectually.  
The universe is hardly merely an action-of-mediation. See 5.436 where Peirce 
says that Thirdness ‘does not constitute reality’.  And Peirce continues ‘by 
[a] vigorous denial that the third category…suffices to make the world” 5.436.

The other two correlates are vital parts of the universe. You are now admitting 
this. So, indeed, it’s a triadic universe - made up of O-R-I.  As Peirce points 
out, “Signs, the only things with which a human being can, without derogation, 
consent to have any transaction, being a sign himself, are triadic” 6.344

  Your other claim that the universe is some kind of ‘whole unit’, and only the 
first correlate, is without any evidence [ other than your own persuasion] and 
you don’t explain what the Dynamic Interpretant would consist of - since it 
would presumably also have to be external to the universe. [None of this is 
found in Peirce ].  . 

And Peirce wrote, numerous times, in his analysis of the emergence of the 
universe and the three categories, that they emerged - from nothing. He was not 
using a Newtonian mechanical analysis - which indeed would reject 
’something-from-nothing’. Peirce’s examination of ’nothing’ sees it as ’not the 
nothing of negation’ but of ’nothing  at all’.. a state of absolute nothing’ 
6.215….’the nothing of not having been born’…the germinal nothing’..’boundless 
nothing’ 6.217-8.  He doesn’t refer to a ’necessary being’. 

Edwina

> On Sep 19, 2024, at 6:04 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt  
> wrote:
> 
> List:
> 
> I will point out one more time that in the 76 definitions complied by Robert 
> Marty, Peirce never says that a sign is a triadic relation; instead, he 
> repeatedly says that a sign is in a triadic relation. A sign is that which 
> mediates between its object and its interpretant, not the triadic relation of 
> mediating itself.
> 
> Accordingly, when Peirce says that the universe is "perfused with signs," he 
> means precisely that it is perfused with first correlates of triadic 
> relations. However, each of those signs must indeed have its corresponding 
> object and interpretant--the other two correlates, between which it 
> mediates--and within the universe, both of these are also signs with their 
> own objects and interpretants, and so on. Again, in my view, all these 
> individual signs/objects/interpretants are artifacts of analysis prescinded 
> from the real and continuous process of semiosis.
> 
> Nothing comes from nothing--Peirce's Logic Notebook entry of 1908 Aug 28 is 
> unambiguous in asserting the logical requirement for the reality of a 
> necessary being in the state of things logically antecedent to the co-reality 
> of the three universes, in which there were no phenomena whatsoever, to be 
> the author and creator of every phenomenon whatsoever.
> 
> Regards,
> 
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt 
> <http://www.linkedin.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt> / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt 
> <http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt>
> On Thu, Sep 19, 2024 at 1:41 PM Edwina Taborsky  <mailto:edwina.tabor...@gmail.com>> wrote:
>> JAS, Gary R, list
>> 
>> I will comment only on the last paragraph of this post by JAS. I feel it 
>> makes several assumptions which are not, in my interpretation,  grounded in 
>> the  Peircean analytic framework.
>> 
>> 1] “all this universe is perfused with signs, if it is not composed 
>> exclusively of signs" 6.5448ff emphasis added. I think the error here is to 
>> assume that Peirce meant by this - that the universe is composed 
>> ‘exclusively of Representamens’, ie, the first correlate in the semiosic 
>> triad. This is logically impossible, since the semiosic triad is irreducible 
>>  - and we cannot conclude therefore, that the universe is composed 
>> exclusively of ONLY the singular first correlate.  
>> 
>> In addition, it would also mean that the Representamen could NOT be in a 
>> mode of Thirdness, since this mode, as a generality,  cannot ‘exist’ on its 
>> own.  We see from the ten classes, that six of the ten, are in a mode of 
>> Thirdness. See also 5.436, where Peirce is quite specific that "the third 
>> category - the category of thought, representation, triadic relation, 
>> mediation, genuine thirdness, thirdness as such - does not by itself 
>> constitute reality ...…can have no concrete being without action”. 
>> 
>> By the above - I understand that Thirdness…whi

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Panentheism: A framework for reconciling diverse perspectives on God, was, A logical problem, was: Cosmic Christi Theology, was, A Scientific Religion, was, Semiosic Synechism: A Peirce

[Edwina Taborsky]

JAS, Gary R, list

I will comment only on the last paragraph of this post by JAS. I feel it makes 
several assumptions which are not, in my interpretation,  grounded in the  
Peircean analytic framework.

1] “all this universe is perfused with signs, if it is not composed exclusively 
of signs" 6.5448ff emphasis added. I think the error here is to assume that 
Peirce meant by this - that the universe is composed ‘exclusively of 
Representamens’, ie, the first correlate in the semiosic triad. This is 
logically impossible, since the semiosic triad is irreducible  - and we cannot 
conclude therefore, that the universe is composed exclusively of ONLY the 
singular first correlate.  

In addition, it would also mean that the Representamen could NOT be in a mode 
of Thirdness, since this mode, as a generality,  cannot ‘exist’ on its own.  We 
see from the ten classes, that six of the ten, are in a mode of Thirdness. See 
also 5.436, where Peirce is quite specific that "the third category - the 
category of thought, representation, triadic relation, mediation, genuine 
thirdness, thirdness as such - does not by itself constitute reality ...…can 
have no concrete being without action”. 

By the above - I understand that Thirdness…which he also sees as 
‘representation, triadic relation’ - can’t ‘fill the universe’ ; it does not, 
on its own, ‘constitute reality’; it requires a connection to its other 
correlates.  

In addition, the term of ‘correlate means, by definition, interactive; it 
cannot exist alone.

Given this error - [ of denying that Peirce meant the full triad with his use 
of ’signs] - one therefore must indeed search for a Dynamic Object [as well as 
a Dynamic Interpretant!!] - and the notion of ‘God’ is suggested.

2] But Peirce’s several outlines of the origin of the universe [1.412, 
6.214-19] are quite clear - “the initial condition …was a state of just nothing 
at all”..the germinal nothing”.

I don’t see  where the concept of a Dynamic Object could emerge in this 
situation…Indeed, the concept of a DO could only emerge with the emergence of 
semiosis, which itself, could only emerge with the emergence of the three 
categories/universes - as outlined in 1.412. ..which then set up the existence 
of matter, and habits..both of which would enable interactions within semiosis 
and the functioning of a Dynamic Object. 

3] This would thus bring us to a different definition of the term of God - 
which would not put that force outside of the Universe, would not have the 
universe itself consisting only of Representamens; but would instead, view the 
agential force of the functioning of the Universe as Mind - the force within 
the universe developing habits of organization of discrete matter as well as 
enabling chance deviations.  This is my reading of Perice - and I’m aware that 
others do not share this interpretation but have their own interpretations. 

Edwina





> On Sep 19, 2024, at 1:26 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt  
> wrote:
> 
> Gary R., List:
> 
> I appreciate the clarification that what you have in mind is not 
> soteriological panentheism as outlined by Gregersen, nor either of the other 
> two "varieties" that he identifies. However, your desire to develop a novel 
> "21st century version," incorporating certain insights from Peirce, 
> effectively confirms Gregersen's thesis that "the concept of panentheism is 
> not stable in itself" and therefore "needs specification." On the other hand, 
> I take it that you do concur with his two elements of "generic panentheism," 
> namely, "(1) the world is somehow contained by God and (2) the world affects 
> God and returns to God"; but again, please correct me if I am 
> misunderstanding.
> 
> Concerning (1), it is highly misleading to characterize classical theism as 
> conceiving God to be "separate from the universe," "a remote, external 
> being," and "a distant creator." Frankly, these descriptions sound more like 
> deism--God created the universe and then left it to itself, such that God is 
> not involved at all in whatever is happening here and now. As I have said 
> before, classical theism instead maintains that God is omnipresent both 
> temporally and spatially--always and everywhere immediately present. God is 
> the creator and sustainer of the entire universe and everything within it at 
> every moment, but it is not an organic part of God's own eternal and 
> spiritual being.
> 
> Concerning (2), if the world affects God, then God is subject to change; and 
> if God is subject to change, then God is (by definition) a contingent being 
> in at least some respects, not a thoroughly necessary being. In other words, 
> as I have also said before, it is logically impossible for God in any version 
> of panentheism to be conceived as Ens necessarium, without qualification. 
> Moreover, in accordance with Peirce's semeiotic, every sign must be 
> determined by a dynamical object that is unaffected by it; hence, if the 
> universe affects G

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Panentheism: A framework for reconciling diverse perspectives on God, was, A logical problem, was: Cosmic Christi Theology, was, A Scientific Religion, was, Semiosic Synechism: A Peirce

[Edwina Taborsky]

Gary R, List

I think this excellent outline ’says it all’ - ; clearly and succinctly.  I 
think that when one is examining Peirce, that you have to look at ALL his work 
[that is accessible!] - and not just selected parts of it. Peirce’s lifelong 
exploration of the world has to be taken into consideration - and Gary R’s 
outline of the universe as a ‘cosmic order of intelligence that permeates all 
reality’; creating,  evolving, developing ‘matter as effete mind’…And the 
concept of the continuous operation of semiosis, and the triadic signs….etc

I agree with it all - and feel that this outline does express the basic 
concepts of  there many years of Peirce’s work.  The last paragraph - is 
excellent.

Edwina


> On Sep 18, 2024, at 7:50 PM, Gary Richmond  wrote:
> 
> List, 
> 
> I should preface these comments by noting that I consider panentheism to be 
> at present an underdeveloped concept. So, for example, my understanding of it 
> is none of the three versions which Jon outlined (including Soteriological 
> panentheism) which he considers my 'version' to be. I would hope that there 
> are some here who might be interested in further developing a 21st century 
> version of panentheism, and I offer these thoughts as a kind of hope and 
> stimulus to the possibility of its further development.
> 
> Panentheism, as I see it, provides a framework for reconciling diverse 
> perspectives on God, including those of theists, atheists, and agnostics. By 
> viewing God through the lens of the conception of universal Mind (whatever 
> Peirce's personal views may have been as expressed in, for example, the 
> 'Neglected Argument') allows for a more flexible and inclusive understanding 
> of divinity -- one that transcends traditional theistic models while 
> remaining open to scientific inquiry.
> If one accepts the notion of God as universal Mind -- and it's clear that 
> even some in this forum will not -- a path is opened to reinterpret the 
> divine in ways that both theists and atheists could find plausible. Instead 
> of a personal, anthropomorphic God, this panentheistic interpretation 
> represents a cosmic order of intelligence that permeates all reality. The 
> concept of a universal Mind holds that God is not separate from the universe 
> but through the action of the three categories in communion, as it were, 
> creating 'then' structuring matter and the characters and 'feelings' involved 
> in matter at various levels of evolution -- thus both immanent within it and 
> transcending it: Yes, Ens Necessarium initiating the creation of a cosmos, in 
> this case, our universe.
> 
> For theists, Peirce's universal mind can still be considered "God," but not 
> God as confined to a remote, external being; rather, God as creating the 
> rational structure of the cosmos itself, guiding its unfolding and 
> development. For atheists, universal Mind does not demand belief in a 
> supernatural deity but instead allows one to view reality as being structured 
> by logical, meaningful processes. This could be seen as a metaphor for the 
> emergent properties of the universe, resonating with naturalistic and 
> scientific perspectives. Thus, panentheism represents a framework for 
> reconciling theism and atheism.
> 
> The idea that God created the cosmos but is separate from it is, as we well 
> know, often a source of tension between religion and science. Classical 
> theism (as Jon has properly defined it) in which God is a distant creator, 
> tends to make a dualistic separation between the spiritual and the physical 
> worlds. This makes it difficult for many to integrate scientific 
> understandings of the universe into religious worldviews. I find myself more 
> and more in that camp.
> 
> Panentheism, particularly as informed by certain aspects of Peirce’s 
> philosophy which are not centered on his personal theistic beliefs, offers an 
> alternative: to see God as the divine Reality that is dynamically interwoven 
> with all of existence. Since God is seen as Ens Necessarium and involved 
> inthe very fabric of the universe, scientific discoveries become revelations 
> of the divine order, rather than threats to it.
> 
> The reality of the cosmos being “perfused with signs" can be seen as 
> inherently semiotic, and so the evolution of the universe, including life and 
> consciousness, can be understood as a process of unfolding meaning, in line 
> with a deep cosmic principle of evolution. Peirce’s semiotic theory offers a 
> framework for both theists and atheists to understand the workings of 
> reality. 
> 
> Further, the categories can help explain the universe in a way that resonates 
> with both religious and secular views. 3ns, as involving mediation, 
> continuity, and the laws that govern relationships between things is where 
> the idea of a universal mind can come into play as the  Mind (intelligence) 
> which through 2ns and 1ns creates, connects, and ultimately makes scientific, 
> spirit

Re: [PEIRCE-L] A Scientific Religion, was, Semiosic Synechism: A Peircean Argumentation

[Edwina Taborsky]

JAS, List

The point of a definition [ see 5.491] is that it explains the HABIT or the 
kind of action that results from the functioning of that word. So, I continue 
to interpret Peirce’s use of the word ‘analogue’  in ‘analogue of a mind’, to 
mean that that force we term ‘God’ functions as Mind.

I don’t see the point of further comments; I think we’ve both provided our 
interpretations of these texts and concepts - and if we differ - then, that’s 
the nature of analysis and inquiry.

Edwina

> On Sep 18, 2024, at 2:02 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt  
> wrote:
> 
> List:
> 
> Again, according to Peirce, "God" is a unique proper name by virtue of being 
> definable--exactly one dynamical object, "that which would Really be in any 
> possible state of things whatever" (R 339:[295r], 1908), satisfies its 
> definition as Ens necessarium, "Really creator of all three Universes of 
> Experience" (CP 6.452, EP 2:434, 1908). That being the case, what does he 
> mean when he states that "'God' is a vernacular word and, like all such 
> words, but more than almost any, is vague"? He goes on to explain.
> 
> CSP: No words are so well understood as vernacular words, in one way; yet 
> they are invariably vague; and of many of them it is true that, let the 
> logician do his best to substitute precise equivalents in their places, still 
> the vernacular words alone, for all their vagueness, answer the principal 
> purposes. This is emphatically the case with the very vague word "God," which 
> is not made less vague by saying that it imports "infinity," etc., since 
> those attributes are at least as vague. (CP 6.494, c. 1906)
> 
> As I have been saying all along, for Peirce, any attribute that we ascribe to 
> God is likewise vague, figurative, loose, and/or analogous; which is why, 
> later in the same manuscript, he does not define "God" as "Mind" itself, but 
> as an "analogue of a mind--for it is impossible to say that any human 
> attribute is literally applicable" (CP 6.502).
> 
> Regards,
> 
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt 
> <http://www.linkedin.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt> / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt 
> <http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt>
> On Wed, Sep 18, 2024 at 7:26 AM Edwina Taborsky  <mailto:edwina.tabor...@gmail.com>> wrote:
>> JAS, list
>> 
>> And I continue to disagree with your interpretation. Peirce points out that 
>> “God’ is a vernacular word and like all such words, but more than almost 
>> any, is vague. 6.494…
>> 
>> Therefore - I don’t see how a vague word can also refer to a single 
>> individual ..
>> 
>> And Peirce himself provides a definition of there meaning of ‘God' with “the 
>> analogue of a mind” 6.502.
>> 
>> Edwina
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] A Scientific Religion, was, Semiosic Synechism: A Peircean Argumentation

[Edwina Taborsky]

JAS, list

And I continue to disagree with your interpretation. Peirce points out that 
“God’ is a vernacular word and like all such words, but more than almost any, 
is vague. 6.494…

Therefore - I don’t see how a vague word can also refer to a single individual 
..

And Peirce himself provides a definition of there meaning of ‘God' with “the 
analogue of a mind” 6.502.

Edwina

> On Sep 17, 2024, at 11:19 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt  
> wrote:
> 
> Jeff, List:
> 
> Peirce identifies the difference in his first two sentences--"God" is "the 
> definable proper name," while all the other capitalized words are "used, not 
> as vernacular, but as terms defined" within the article itself. As we 
> discussed on the List a month ago, a proper name is a rhematic indexical 
> legisign that "denotes a single individual well known to exist by the utterer 
> and interpreter" (EP 2:307, c. 1901). By contrast, a term is a rhematic 
> symbol that is "connected with its Object by an association of general ideas" 
> (CP 2.261, EP 2:295, 1903). Hence, "God" as a proper name, although unique by 
> virtue of being definable, cannot be synonymous with "Mind" as a general 
> term, even if the latter is assigned a peculiar definition.
> 
> Regards,
> 
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt 
>  / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt 
> 
> On Tue, Sep 17, 2024 at 8:15 PM Jeffrey Brian Downard 
> mailto:jeffrey.down...@nau.edu>> wrote:
>> Hi Jon S, List,
>> 
>>  
>> 
>> For the sake of interpreting what Peirce is doing in the first section of “A 
>> Neglected Argument”, what types of definitions do you take him to be 
>> providing?  For example, is Peirce providing nominal (i.e., verbal) 
>> definitions or real definitions?
>> 
>>  
>> 
>> He puts the following words into quotes with a capital first letter:  “God”, 
>> “Idea”, “Real”, “Experience”, “Argument”, “Argumentation”. Do these words 
>> require different kinds of definitions, or do they all admit of the same 
>> type?
>> 
>>  
>> 
>> For my part, I think Peirce is explicitly pointing out that the words have 
>> different functions. As such, they appear to need different types of 
>> definitions. If that is right, then what is the difference between giving an 
>> adequate definition of the word “God” and giving an adequate definition of 
>> “Real” or “Argument”?
>> 
>>  
>> 
>> --Jeff
>> 
> _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] A Scientific Religion, was, Semiosic Synechism: A Peircean Argumentation

[Edwina Taborsky]

JAS, List

I continue to disagree with your interpretation of Peirce’s meaning of the term 
of ‘god’. I am not, unlike you, ‘best buddies’ with Peirce, and so, cannot use 
the phrase, as you do  of ‘Peirce and I’, but I instead, say that MY 
interpretation of Peirce’s writings - is that ‘God’ means ‘Mind. You’ve 
provided several of the quotations which explain and define Peirce’s view that 
what he means by the term of ‘god’ is’ Mind. He does NOT mean a ‘brain’. 

Mind,, as I understand Pierce,  is ‘ens necessarium’ - and I understand it by 
’the pragmatistic definition’ as ‘a disembodied spirit or pure mind” 6.490] . 
This 'pure Mind’ functions in time and space as ALL the three 
universes/categories   “Consequently, whether in time or not, the three 
universes must actually be absolutely necessary results of a state of utter 
nothingness”…A state in which there should be absolutely no super-order 
whatsoever would be such a state of nility” 6.490

I don’t consider that Mind is a figurative action, but a vital and very real 
action enabling the emergence of the universe, by its generation of the three 
universes/categories. These include Thirdness  with its generation of Habits. 
And -  the deviations of chance [Firstness] and the hic et nunc realities of 
Secondness. [See Peirce’s outline, not merely in 1.412, but 6. 214-19].  That 
is, my reading of Peirce is that our existent universe is a result of this 
infrastructure of the three universes/categories - which are a function of Mind 
- and as such,  Mind is ‘ens necessarium’. 

As for religion and its concepts, I consider them emerging from a priori 
thinking, ie, the emotional attraction of a concept, and thus, primarily 
psychological and social - not metaphysical or scientific. The various theories 
and ideologies are not scientifically generated but are ‘literary’ additions.  

So- we continue to differ in our interpretations of Peirce. As he said - one 
must not ‘block the way of inquiry ; - and we’ll simply have to leave our 
differences as 'different suggestions on the road of inquiry’. 

Edwina

> On Sep 17, 2024, at 2:24 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt  
> wrote:
> 
> List:
> 
> Again, Peirce's explicit definition of God is not "Mind," it is "Ens 
> necessarium; in my belief Really creator of all three Universes of 
> Experience" (CP 6.452, EP 2:434, 1908). The very first hint that he 
> subsequently gives toward "the pragmaticistic definition of Ens necessarium" 
> is that "A disembodied spirit, or pure mind, has its being out of time, since 
> all that it is destined to think is fully in its being at any and every 
> previous time. But in endless time it is destined to think all that it is 
> capable of thinking" (CP 6.490). I already quoted Peirce's earlier 
> description of God as an "analogue of a mind" (CP 6.502, c. 1906), and in a 
> manuscript draft for "A Neglected Argument," he says of God, "I suppose most 
> of our knowledge of Him must be by similitudes. Thus, He is so much like a 
> mind, and so little like a singular Existent ... and so opposed in His Nature 
> to an ideal possibility, that we may loosely say that He is a Spirit, or 
> Mind" (R 843, 1908). In a later manuscript, he adds, "For we must not 
> predicate any Attribute of God otherwise than vaguely and figuratively, since 
> God, though in a sense essentially intelligible, is nevertheless essentially 
> incomprehensible" (SWS:283, 1909).
> 
> In short, I inserted "[merely]" when briefly quoting a previous post 
> <https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2024-09/msg9.html> to which I 
> was replying 
> <https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2024-09/msg00012.html> (not 
> Peirce's own words) to emphasize that for Peirce, "God" is by no means 
> synonymous with "Mind," even though there is a sense in which God is "pure 
> mind"--an analogous, loose, vague, and figurative sense.
> 
> Regards,
> 
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt 
> <http://www.linkedin.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt> / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt 
> <http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt>
> On Mon, Sep 16, 2024 at 7:51 PM Edwina Taborsky  <mailto:edwina.tabor...@gmail.com>> wrote:
>> JAS, Jeff, Gary R, Helmut, List
>> 
>> JAS- you wrote:
>> Moreover, Peirce follows up on the first statement by adding, "Now such 
>> being the pragmaticist's answer to the question what he means by the word 
>> 'God,' the question whether there really is such a being is the question 
>> whether all physical science is merely the figment--the arbitrary 
>> figment--of the 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] A Scientific Religion, was, Semiosic Synechism: A Peircean Argumentation

[Edwina Taborsky]

JAS, Jeff, Gary R, Helmut, List

JAS- you wrote:
Moreover, Peirce follows up on the first statement by adding, "Now such being 
the pragmaticist's answer to the question what he means by the word 'God,' the 
question whether there really is such a being is the question whether all 
physical science is merely the figment--the arbitrary figment--of the students 
of nature" (CP 6.503). He seems to be saying that the reality of God is 
logically equivalent to the reliability of scientific study of the universe. 
Why? "But whatever there may be of argument in all this is as nothing, the 
merest nothing, in comparison to its force as an appeal to one's own instinct, 
which is to argument what substance is to shadow, what bed-rock is to the built 
foundations of a cathedral" (ibid). Consider, then, his final words in the main 
text of "A Neglected Argument for the Reality of God," right before its 
published additament that begins by explaining pragmaticism.

I disagree with your interpretation of the underlined  above. You write that 
Peirce seems to be saying “that the reality of God is logically equivalent to 
the reliability of scientific study of the universe”.  You seem to be saying, 
if I understand your comment, that the ‘reality of God’ is equivalent to the 
reliability of science. We know that Peirce  places an emphasis on the role of 
empirical scientific analysis  - but to me, he seems to be saying that the 
physical sciences, which cannot prove the existence or non-existence off God, 
are NOT arbitrary actions. And therefore - have no role in this question.

And Peirce’s answer to the.. meaning of the word ‘God’ - is clear. He defines 
it as ‘Mind’. I know you have previously put the word ‘merely’ in square 
brackets before Peirce’s reference to Mind, but to Peirce, Mind is a key, THE 
key agency in the formation of the universe.  I won’t detail his many 
references to the role of Mind [ habit formation, Thirdness]. 

As for his references to a belief in God, as a ’natural instinct’, that is akin 
to the a priori method of ‘fixing belief’ - based as it is on an emotional 
attraction for the idea. But - such a belief is outside of any scientific 
examination. BUT, following the pragmatist's definition of God as ‘Mind’ then, 
I can accept that it is a ‘natural instinct’ to believe in the reality of Mind 
or Reason as an operative force in the universe [a belief which I accept and 
consider as amenable to scientific methods of proof].

 Whether one instead believes in the notion of an agential God - this, I 
consider is outside of any evidence - it becomes a personal choice.  The 
question then becomes societal - since almost ALL peoples develop some kind of 
‘religious’ ideology - whether it be animism, polytheism, monotheism. As I have 
outlined before, I consider that the type of religious ideology is directly 
related to population size, which is itself related to economic mode. But, 
pragmatically, it is a societal fact, that a belief in metaphysical agencies is 
a ’natural instinct’ in mankind. There must be some psychological and communal 
need for such a belief. Again - my point is that it’s not a scientific fact but 
a psychoglocial fact.

And of course, I accept that his explanation of the emergence of the universe 
from nothing [1.412 and elsewhere; 6.215, 6.262] is scientifically viable and 
not in the least illogical, 

Edwina


> On Sep 16, 2024, at 6:34 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt  
> wrote:
> 
> Jeff, List:
> 
> Your points below are well taken. Nevertheless, according to Peirce himself, 
> "If a pragmaticist is asked what he means by the word 'God,' he can only say 
> that ... if contemplation and study of the physico-psychical universe can 
> imbue a man with principles of conduct analogous to the influence of a great 
> man's works or conversation, then that analogue of a mind ... is what he 
> means by 'God'" (CP 6.502, c. 1906); and, "A full exposition of the 
> pragmaticistic definition of Ens necessarium would require many pages; but 
> some hints toward it may be given" (CP 6.490, 1908). These quotations 
> obviously imply that there is a pragmaticistic definition of God as Ens 
> necessarium, although unfortunately, he never spells it out in its entirety.
> 
> Moreover, Peirce follows up on the first statement by adding, "Now such being 
> the pragmaticist's answer to the question what he means by the word 'God,' 
> the question whether there really is such a being is the question whether all 
> physical science is merely the figment--the arbitrary figment--of the 
> students of nature" (CP 6.503). He seems to be saying that the reality of God 
> is logically equivalent to the reliability of scientific study of the 
> universe. Why? "But whatever there may be of argument in all this is as 
> nothing, the merest nothing, in comparison to its force as an appeal to one's 
> own instinct, which is to argument what substance is to shadow, what bed-rock 
> is to the built foundations of a ca

Re: [PEIRCE-L] A Scientific Religion, was, Semiosic Synechism: A Peircean Argumentation

[Edwina Taborsky]

Helmut, JAS, Gary R, Jeff, List

I’m not sure how one can argue about religion, since it is, by definition, a 
belief and not amenable to scientific or even logical examination.

Whether God is a reality;  whether this agency operates outside of the universe 
or within the universe of ‘is’ the universe ; whether God is causal or 
non-causal - - are all beliefs..and as such -  neither a necessary nor ad hoc 
belief and again, outside of pragmatic inquiry.

With regard to the Universe - Peirce’s focus was on pragmatism, and could only 
declare that the origin of the universe was spontaneous from chaos [ 1.412] and 
that this universe developed by the ‘laws of Mind’, which are ’the results of 
evolution”…and laws grow’..within ’the tendency of all things to take habits’  
but ’no law is absolute’..6.101-g..

And ‘in view of the principle of continuity, the supreme guide in framing 
philosophical hypotheses, we must, under this theory, read matter as mind, 
whose habits have become fixed so as to lose the powers of forming them and 
losing them……” AND - the mind “is to be regarded as a chemical genus of 
extremes complexity and instability,It has acquired in a remakable degree a 
habit of taking and laying aside habits….[so] the laws of mind to be themselves 
of so fluid a character as to simulate divergences from law. All this, 
according to the writer, constitutes a hypothesis capable of being tested by 
experiment” 6.101-g

That is - my understanding of Peirce’s analysis of the Universe is that he sees 
it as a vast self-organizing growth of complexity - operating via chance 
divergences, via habit-taking - and with no possibility of a ‘universal law ‘ 
6.65 .Therefore - the role and nature of God moves out of this area of 
examination and into, solely and strictly the area of personal beliefs .  Such 
beliefs remain personal, no matter how many people adhere to them - and, 
outside of discussion, I would think..other than to examine their historic 
role. 

Edwina



> On Sep 16, 2024, at 11:43 AM, Jeffrey Brian Downard  
> wrote:
> 
> Jon S, Gary R, Gary F, Edwina, List,
>  
> Consider the following remarks about pragmaticism in relation to Humanism, 
> theism, etc.
>  
> “There are certain questions commonly reckoned as metaphysical, and which 
> certainly are so, if by metaphysics we mean ontology, which as soon as 
> pragmatism is once sincerely accepted, cannot logically resist settlement. 
> These are for example, What is reality? Are necessity and contingency real 
> modes of being? Are the laws of nature real? Can they be assumed to be 
> immutable or are they presumably results of evolution? Is there any real 
> chance, or departure from real law? But on examination, if by metaphysics we 
> mean the broadest positive truths of the psycho-physical universe -- positive 
> in the sense of not being reducible to logical formulæ -- then the very fact 
> that these problems can be solved by a logical maxim is proof enough that 
> they do not belong to metaphysics but to "epistemology," an atrocious 
> translation of Erkenntnislehre. When we pass to consider the nature of Time, 
> it seems that pragmatism is of aid, but does not of itself yield a solution. 
> When we go on to the nature of Space, I boldly declare that Newton's view 
> that it is a real entity is alone logically tenable; and that leaves such 
> further questions as, Why should Space have three dimensions? quite 
> unanswerable for the present. This, however, is a purely speculative question 
> without much human interest. (It would, of course, be absurd to say that 
> tridimensionality is without practical consequences.) For those metaphysical 
> questions that have such interest, the question of a future life and 
> especially that of One Incomprehensible but Personal God, not immanent in but 
> creating the universe, I, for one, heartily admit that a Humanism, that does 
> not pretend to be a science but only an instinct, like a bird's power of 
> flight, but purified by meditation, is the most precious contribution that 
> has been made to philosophy for ages.” [CP, Survey of Pragmaticism, 5.496]
>  
> In this passage, Peirce makes a distinction between three sets of questions:
>  
> Questions of metaphysical ontology, such as: What is reality? Are necessity 
> and contingency real modes of being? Are the laws of nature real? Can they be 
> assumed to be immutable or are they presumably results of evolution? Is there 
> any real chance, or departure from real law?
> Purely speculative questions in metaphysics concerning the broadest positive 
> truths of the psycho-physical universe: “What is the nature of time and 
> space?” “At the current stage of the cosmos, why does space appear to have 
> three dimensions and time appear to have one dimension?” “Is the number of 
> dimensions of space and time fixed, or has the number of dimensions evolved?”
> Questions that have a strong human interest: “Is some sort of life of the 
> soul after 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] A Scientific Religion, was, Semiosic Synechism: A Peircean Argumentation

[Edwina Taborsky]

Jeff, list

Very nice post.

As you say - Peirce was clear that some questions can be solved pragmatically, 
ie, within the scientific method,[5.465]  but others are outside of it. [“My 
pragmatism, having nothing to do with qualities of feeling’ 5.467, ie, the use 
of the a priori method]. 

I suggest, that for Peirce  - the third set of questions belong in the domain 
of feeling [ a priori 5.382-3].  As such - as you point out, there is no one 
answer to such questions - and I don’t see such an attempt within the thought 
of Peirce.

Again, very astute post.

Edwina


> On Sep 16, 2024, at 11:43 AM, Jeffrey Brian Downard  
> wrote:
> 
> Jon S, Gary R, Gary F, Edwina, List,
>  
> Consider the following remarks about pragmaticism in relation to Humanism, 
> theism, etc.
>  
> “There are certain questions commonly reckoned as metaphysical, and which 
> certainly are so, if by metaphysics we mean ontology, which as soon as 
> pragmatism is once sincerely accepted, cannot logically resist settlement. 
> These are for example, What is reality? Are necessity and contingency real 
> modes of being? Are the laws of nature real? Can they be assumed to be 
> immutable or are they presumably results of evolution? Is there any real 
> chance, or departure from real law? But on examination, if by metaphysics we 
> mean the broadest positive truths of the psycho-physical universe -- positive 
> in the sense of not being reducible to logical formulæ -- then the very fact 
> that these problems can be solved by a logical maxim is proof enough that 
> they do not belong to metaphysics but to "epistemology," an atrocious 
> translation of Erkenntnislehre. When we pass to consider the nature of Time, 
> it seems that pragmatism is of aid, but does not of itself yield a solution. 
> When we go on to the nature of Space, I boldly declare that Newton's view 
> that it is a real entity is alone logically tenable; and that leaves such 
> further questions as, Why should Space have three dimensions? quite 
> unanswerable for the present. This, however, is a purely speculative question 
> without much human interest. (It would, of course, be absurd to say that 
> tridimensionality is without practical consequences.) For those metaphysical 
> questions that have such interest, the question of a future life and 
> especially that of One Incomprehensible but Personal God, not immanent in but 
> creating the universe, I, for one, heartily admit that a Humanism, that does 
> not pretend to be a science but only an instinct, like a bird's power of 
> flight, but purified by meditation, is the most precious contribution that 
> has been made to philosophy for ages.” [CP, Survey of Pragmaticism, 5.496]
>  
> In this passage, Peirce makes a distinction between three sets of questions:
>  
> Questions of metaphysical ontology, such as: What is reality? Are necessity 
> and contingency real modes of being? Are the laws of nature real? Can they be 
> assumed to be immutable or are they presumably results of evolution? Is there 
> any real chance, or departure from real law?
> Purely speculative questions in metaphysics concerning the broadest positive 
> truths of the psycho-physical universe: “What is the nature of time and 
> space?” “At the current stage of the cosmos, why does space appear to have 
> three dimensions and time appear to have one dimension?” “Is the number of 
> dimensions of space and time fixed, or has the number of dimensions evolved?”
> Questions that have a strong human interest: “Is some sort of life of the 
> soul after the biological death of a human being?” “What is the nature of 
> that which is most Divine?” 
>  
> If we adopt the methods of pragmaticism, it appears that there are different 
> sorts of grounds for affirming or denying various answers to these three sets 
> of questions. Once pragmatism is sincerely accepted, Peirce suggests that we 
> have logical grounds for adopting some hypotheses and rejecting others with 
> respect to the questions that fall into the first group. Given the 
> development of scientific methodologies and theories around 1900, some 
> questions that fall into the second group were “quite unanswerable for the 
> present.”
>  
> Questions that fall into the third group, which include questions about the 
> tenability of theism and humanism, bear on our natural instincts, but 
> probably should not “pretend” to be scientific. If they are not scientific, 
> then we need to consider the limits of philosophical methods in seeking 
> answers. James and Schiller seem to claim that pragmatic methods should be 
> used to clarify the meanings of the terms used the frame the questions and 
> formulate viable hypotheses in the third group. Peirce, on the other hand, 
> suggests in this essay and elsewhere that pragmaticist methods have their 
> limits, and it may be a mistake to apply them outside the realm of the 
> “intellectual conceptions” concerning positive matters of fact (see 5.464-

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Semiosic Synechism: A Peircean Argumentation

[Edwina Taborsky]

Jeff, list

I agree with you about concerns about rigidity of terminology use.

For example, Floyd Merrill, a well-known Peircean scholar, writes “ Peirce’s  
concept of the sign consists of a represmentam [ itself often called a sign], 
which relates to an object….[and] it must also relate to a third term, its 
interpretnat’ [ 30].   And Pierce’s “triadic concept of the sign [31].  I think 
that whether the one says that the sign IS a triadic relation or is IN a 
triadic relation - depends upon whether one is referring to ’the sign’ as the 
whole ’triadic concept’  or where  the sign ‘consists of’ the three relations’ 
..wihch is the same meaning as ‘is’….. or only the representamen.. But I think 
that we should be able to explore Peircean semiotics in an open manner.  [ He 
also explores Peircean semiosis as self-organized …..]. 

JJ Liszka, another Peircean scholar, writes “The relation among sign, object 
and intrepretnat must be triadic, that is, thought of as an irreducible 
interrelation through which each component gets its sense" p.19.  And he refers 
to this as its ’triadic condition’. [19] 

My point is that we should not focus on ‘what Peirce never said’. But focus on 
the meanings and interpretations that can be generated in what he wrote. Are 
these meanings by these scholars  false to what Peirce wrote? I don’t think so 
- I think they explain and clarify his thoughts. 

I note also, since I have been chastised on this list, for using the term 
’node’ that Merrell himself uses it to explain the semiotic process [ p 39-41], 
where he speaks f a ‘central node’ between the three peripheral points". [39]. 

[Merrell,Floyd; Peirce’s Semiotics Now: A Primer. Canadian Scholars Press 1995.
JJ Liszka A general Introduction to the Semeiotic of Charles Sanders Peirce 
Indiana U Press 1996

Edwina



> 
> On Thu, Sep 12, 2024 at 1:29 PM Jeffrey Brian Downard 
> mailto:jeffrey.down...@nau.edu>> wrote:
>> Hi Jon, List,
>> 
>>  
>> 
>> You say: 
>> 
>>  
>> 
>> Peirce never says that a sign is a triadic relation.
>> instead, he repeatedly says that a sign is in a triadic relation
>> An argument is not "made up of a full triad of correlates." It is a sign 
>> (first correlate) that is determined by its object (second correlate) to 
>> determine its interpretant (third correlate). As an argument, it involves 
>> other signs, namely, propositions and names; and as a symbol, it involves 
>> other signs, namely, indices and icons; and each of those other signs 
>> likewise has its own object and interpretant
>>  
>> 
>> As Peirce points out, we can use the term argument to refer only to the 
>> premisses of a reason, or we can use it to refer to the premisses and the 
>> conclusion. In my view, either can function as a sign in relationship to 
>> some further interpretant. That is, the premisses of an argument can 
>> function as a sign in relationship to a conclusion, which is the 
>> interpretant of the premisses. Or, an entire argument, such as an abductive 
>> inference, can function as a sign in relationship to a further argument in 
>> the cycle of inquiry, such as deductive inference about the possible tests 
>> that might be run and predicted consequences that are expected if the 
>> hypothesis is true.
>> 
>>  
>> 
>> On my interpretation of the relations that are involved in such symbolic 
>> signs, both (a) premisses and (b) whole arguments internally are composed of 
>> triadic relations. As such, symbolic signs involve these types of relations. 
>> As such, I tend to draw the conclusion that some signs are, in part, triadic 
>> relations because these signs internally are composed of such relations.
>> 
>>  
>> 
>> So, it appears we disagree on (1) above.
>> 
>>  
>> 
>> For my part, I try to avoid making claims about what Peirce never said. He 
>> said a lot of things he didn’t write down, and I wasn’t there to hear them. 
>> What is more, there are a lot of things that he did write down that I’ve not 
>> yet read. Those that I have read, I’ve often misunderstood or forgotten. 
>> Furthermore, a number of things he wrote down have been lost. My hope is 
>> that we recover some of them. I’ll leave it at that.
>> 
>>  
>> 
>> --Jeff
>> 
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Semiosic Synechism: A Peircean Argumentation

[Edwina Taborsky]

of things, namely, the all of reality" (CP 
> 5.549, EP 2:378, 1906). Taken together, the conclusion that I draw from these 
> statements is that the entire universe, "the all of reality," extending from 
> the infinite past to the infinite future (and back again), is one immense 
> sign--a vast semiosic continuum, unconnected with any other sign because 
> there are no other signs, perfectly and completely determinate from God's 
> perspective because it is eternally present to God and intuitively known by 
> God as a whole.
> 
> Regards,
> 
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt 
> <http://www.linkedin.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt> / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt 
> <http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt>
> On Tue, Sep 10, 2024 at 1:27 PM Edwina Taborsky  <mailto:edwina.tabor...@gmail.com>> wrote:
>> Jeff, list
>> 
>> Sorry - I don’t think that these examples apply to my concerns.  The 
>> integers and the rationals and reals in mathematics, aren’t applicable, in 
>> my view, ,to the assertion that a specific domain, such as the universe, is 
>> both spatially infinite AND finite. 
>> 
>> My focus is the assertion by JAS that the universe operates as a sign [ 
>> which reference is correctly taken from Peirce’s reference that ’the entire 
>> universe - not merely the universe of existents, but all that wider 
>> universe, embracing the universe of existents as a part, the universe which 
>> we are all accustomed to to refer to as ’the truth’ - that all this universe 
>> is perfused with signs, if it is not composed exclusively of signs” 5.488ff. 
>> 
>> My concern is that I see Peirce’s reference to ‘’signs’ to refer to the 
>> whole triad of O-S/R-I. [object-ssign/representamen-interpretant].  That is, 
>> I take it as given that the triad of O-S/R-I is irreducible. None of these 
>> three relations operates/exists on its own. So-, when Peirce refers to the 
>> whole universe being composed of signs - I understand this to mean the full 
>> set of..O-S/R-I.
>> 
>> JAS, however understands this reference differently. He seems to view the 
>> ’sign’ as written by Peirce to mean ONLY the ‘first correlate’, the 
>> sign/representamen. Then, he sets up the Dynamic Object as ‘outside the 
>> universe  [ and defines it as ‘god’].  
>> 
>> My concern is that this then redefines the infinite universe as having 
>> finite perimeters [ such that the DO can be located outside of it!]…and I 
>> consider that an infinite and finite universe is illogical.
>> 
>> I also feel that to conclude that when Peirce wrote that the ‘whole universe 
>> is ‘composed exclusively of signs’ - that he was referring ONLY TO the first 
>> correlate, the Representamen!!! Since the triad is irreducible, - then, 
>> again, to me, this is untenable and illogical - for it means that part of 
>> the triad is ‘outside of the universe!.  Not only that -  but I simply don’t 
>> see how the universe, filled with matter - can be composed ONLY of the 
>> Representamen/Sign [ which cannot function on its own, but only as an 
>> agency/action of promoting habits]. 
>> 
>> Those are my concerns.
>> 
>> Edwina 
>>> On Sep 10, 2024, at 1:47 PM, Jeffrey Brian Downard >> <mailto:jeffrey.down...@nau.edu>> wrote:
>>> 
>>> Hello,
>>>  
>>> Just a quick remark.
>>>  
>>> Edwina says:  2] The claim that ‘God is outside space and that space is 
>>> infinite - seems to me at least, to be illogical. If a force/whatever, has 
>>> a location outside [or inside], then the spatial domain has perimeters and 
>>> is not, by definition,  infinite. 
>>>  
>>> Let’s focus on examples drawn from mathematics. As Peirce points out, this 
>>> area of inquiry has the advantage of conceptions that are less vague than, 
>>> say, theology. Consider the following assertions.
>>>  
>>> The ring of the integers is infinite.
>>> The fields of the rationals and the reals are infinite.
>>> The geometrical space set forth in the Euclidean system is infinite.
>>> Logically speaking, the conception of Euclidean geometric space is outside 
>>> of the conceptions of the ring and fields mentioned above. That is, the 
>>> Euclidean geometric space characterized by the postulates, definitions and 
>>> common notions set forth in books 1-4 of the Elements is not numerically 
>>> ordered in the manner that, say, a Cartesian conception of space is ordered.
>&

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Semiosic Synechism: A Peircean Argumentation

[Edwina Taborsky]

Jeff, list

Sorry - I don’t think that these examples apply to my concerns.  The integers 
and the rationals and reals in mathematics, aren’t applicable, in my view, ,to 
the assertion that a specific domain, such as the universe, is both spatially 
infinite AND finite. 

My focus is the assertion by JAS that the universe operates as a sign [ which 
reference is correctly taken from Peirce’s reference that ’the entire universe 
- not merely the universe of existents, but all that wider universe, embracing 
the universe of existents as a part, the universe which we are all accustomed 
to to refer to as ’the truth’ - that all this universe is perfused with signs, 
if it is not composed exclusively of signs” 5.488ff. 

My concern is that I see Peirce’s reference to ‘’signs’ to refer to the whole 
triad of O-S/R-I. [object-ssign/representamen-interpretant].  That is, I take 
it as given that the triad of O-S/R-I is irreducible. None of these three 
relations operates/exists on its own. So-, when Peirce refers to the whole 
universe being composed of signs - I understand this to mean the full set 
of..O-S/R-I.

JAS, however understands this reference differently. He seems to view the 
’sign’ as written by Peirce to mean ONLY the ‘first correlate’, the 
sign/representamen. Then, he sets up the Dynamic Object as ‘outside the 
universe  [ and defines it as ‘god’].  

My concern is that this then redefines the infinite universe as having finite 
perimeters [ such that the DO can be located outside of it!]…and I consider 
that an infinite and finite universe is illogical.

I also feel that to conclude that when Peirce wrote that the ‘whole universe is 
‘composed exclusively of signs’ - that he was referring ONLY TO the first 
correlate, the Representamen!!! Since the triad is irreducible, - then, again, 
to me, this is untenable and illogical - for it means that part of the triad is 
‘outside of the universe!.  Not only that -  but I simply don’t see how the 
universe, filled with matter - can be composed ONLY of the Representamen/Sign [ 
which cannot function on its own, but only as an agency/action of promoting 
habits]. 

Those are my concerns.

Edwina 

> On Sep 10, 2024, at 1:47 PM, Jeffrey Brian Downard  
> wrote:
> 
> Hello,
>  
> Just a quick remark.
>  
> Edwina says:  2] The claim that ‘God is outside space and that space is 
> infinite - seems to me at least, to be illogical. If a force/whatever, has a 
> location outside [or inside], then the spatial domain has perimeters and is 
> not, by definition,  infinite. 
>  
> Let’s focus on examples drawn from mathematics. As Peirce points out, this 
> area of inquiry has the advantage of conceptions that are less vague than, 
> say, theology. Consider the following assertions.
>  
> The ring of the integers is infinite.
> The fields of the rationals and the reals are infinite.
> The geometrical space set forth in the Euclidean system is infinite.
> Logically speaking, the conception of Euclidean geometric space is outside of 
> the conceptions of the ring and fields mentioned above. That is, the 
> Euclidean geometric space characterized by the postulates, definitions and 
> common notions set forth in books 1-4 of the Elements is not numerically 
> ordered in the manner that, say, a Cartesian conception of space is ordered.
>  
> Is there something illogical here? I don’t think so.
>  
> Hope that helps.
>  
> Yours,
>  
> Jeff
>  
> From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu  on 
> behalf of Edwina Taborsky 
> Date: Monday, September 9, 2024 at 4:17 PM
> To: Jon Alan Schmidt 
> Cc: Peirce-L , Edwina Taborsky 
> 
> Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Semiosic Synechism: A Peircean Argumentation
> 
> JAS, list
>  
> 1] I would quibble with the concept that the ‘whole is ontologically prior to 
> its parts’. ..which sets up a kind of a priori Platonic ideal form [ and 
> Peirce was an Aristotelian] ..and saw Mind and Matter as bonded. 
>  
> 2] The claim that ‘God is outside space and that space is infinite - seems to 
> me at least, to be illogical. If a force/whatever, has a location outside [or 
> inside], then the spatial domain has perimeters and is not, by definition,  
> infinite. 
>  
> 3] If the sign/representamen’s relation with the Dynamic Object is that the 
> DO is external to the S/R, which requires a perimeter/boundary to the 
> S/R….then, this boundary has to also exist for the Dynamic Intepretant, 
> ..understanding the DI as ’the actual effect which the Sign, as a Sign, 
> really determines 4.536. I think that an ‘effect, which suggests a reaction 
> [2ns] requires a separation from the Sign/Representamen. 
>  
> Edwina
> 
> 
> On Sep 9, 2024, at 6:43 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt  wrote:
>  
> List:
>  
> When Peirce asserts that the universe is one immense sign, &quo

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Speculative Grammar (was Semiosic Synechism: A Peircean Argumentation)

[Edwina Taborsky]

“A sign or representamen involves a plural relation’ MS[R] 16:12 PM52

“ A representamen or sign is anything…which stands at once in a relation of 
correspondence…MS[R} 1147

 “ A representamen or sign is anything... which stands at  once in a relation 
of correspondence to a correlate, called its object and to another correlate, 
its interpretant… …MS[R} 1147

“A representamrn is an object, A, in such a triadic relation to an object, B, 
for an object, C…. MS[R]792.2

A sign is a species under the genus representamen, the definition of which says 
nothing about a mind. A representamen is an object, A, in such a triadic 
relation to an object B, of an object C MS R 800:3

A sign is anything, A, in a relation, r,to something B, its object, this 
relation, r, consisting in fitness to determine something so as to produce 
something C, the interpretant of the sign… MS[R] L107:25

“Every sign is in a triadic relation to an object and to an interpreting: MS[R] 
L107

A sign mediates between the interpretant sign and its object CP 8.332

A sign is something which is in a triadic relation to two things being a sign 
to an object for an interpreter. MS[R] 1334:51

“A sign is triadic because it determines an interpretant sign of the same 
object to which it refers itself  MS[R} L67:28,

“A sign is a species of medium of communication” MS[R]339:271r

“ A sign is whatever there may be whose intent is to mediate between an utterer 
of it and an interpreter of it” MS[R]318:18-9

“Any sign, of whosoever kind, professes to mediate between an Object…and a 
Meaning” MS[R]318:13-4

“Any sign, of whatever kind, mediates between an object…[MS[R[318:11-12

“The essential nature of a sign is that it mediates between its Object..and its 
Meaning [MS[R]318-14-5

“A sign is anything of whatsoever mode of being, which mediates between an 
object and an interpretant” EP 2:410”I define a Sign as anything which on the 
one hand is do determined by an Object and on the other hand so determines an 
idea in a person’s mind, that this latter determination, which I term the 
interpretant of the sign, is thereby mediately determined by that Object. A 
sign, therefore, has a triadic relation to its Object and to its interpreting” 
CP 8.343

Edwina

> On Sep 9, 2024, at 7:24 PM, Gary Richmond  wrote:
> 
> Edwina, Jon, List,
> 
> It would be helpful, Edwina, if you would add a quotation in support of each 
> of your points 1 and 2.
> 
> But as you wrote (emphasis added by me). . .
> 
> 1] Peirce constantly refers to the sign/representamen as a relation and as an 
> action of mediation.
> 
> 2] Peirce often refers to the triadic relations as a Sign.
> 
> . . . on further reflection, I think it would be immensely helpful if you 
> quoted Peirce more than once for each of these points. 
> 
> List: I have found using the search function (Control + F) of the online CP 
> very helpful and time saving in looking for particular quotations, especially 
> when I'm pressed for time.
>  
> https://colorysemiotica.wordpress.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/08/peirce-collectedpapers.pdf
> 
> I hope, and I supposed that I have for long assumed that List members knew of 
> this source (and several others now online, such as volume 2 of The Essential 
> Peirce)
> 
> Best,
> 
> Gary R
> 
> On Mon, Sep 9, 2024 at 7:01 PM Edwina Taborsky  <mailto:edwina.tabor...@gmail.com>> wrote:
>> JAS, list
>> 
>> As usual, we’ll have to continue to disagree.
>> 
>> 1] Peirce constantly refers to the sign/representamen as a relation and as 
>> an action of mediation.
>> 
>> 2] Peirce often refers to the triadic relations as a Sign.
>> 
>> 3] As for his comment that terminology can make little difference - I 
>> disagree with you that this refers only to the three categories.
>> 
>> 4] I have never said that the Real Object is connected to the sign. I never 
>> said that this Real Object was ‘the object of a sign. ..and would appreciate 
>> your not declaring that I said this.
>> 
>> I specifically said, several times,  that this Real object is OUTSIDE of the 
>> semiosic process. “There are real things, whose characters are entirely 
>> independent of our opinions about them, 5.384. When these Reals are moved 
>> into a semiotic interaction, they then can be understood as Dynamic Objects. 
>> See Peirce’s explanation of the weather - where he differentiates between 
>> this object..and the dynamic object. ...which reference I have previously 
>> provided. 8.314. 
>> 
>> Our disagreements continue. 
>> 
>> Edwina
>> 
>> 
>> 
>>> On Sep 9, 2024, at 6:25 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt >> <mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com>> wrote:
>>> 
>>> List:
>>> 
>>>

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Speculative Grammar (was Semiosic Synechism: A Peircean Argumentation)

[Edwina Taborsky]

Gary R, List

You can see the references [plural]  to the Sign/Representamen as a relation in 
Robert Marty’s 76 definitions of the sign.  Same with the Sign as a triadic 
relation. 

I find that long quotations are tedious to read, but I absolutely accept that I 
should have provided some support for my comments - I think the reference to 
Robert Marty’s impressive work ..should suffice. 

Edwina

> On Sep 9, 2024, at 7:24 PM, Gary Richmond  wrote:
> 
> Edwina, Jon, List,
> 
> It would be helpful, Edwina, if you would add a quotation in support of each 
> of your points 1 and 2.
> 
> But as you wrote (emphasis added by me). . .
> 
> 1] Peirce constantly refers to the sign/representamen as a relation and as an 
> action of mediation.
> 
> 2] Peirce often refers to the triadic relations as a Sign.
> 
> . . . on further reflection, I think it would be immensely helpful if you 
> quoted Peirce more than once for each of these points. 
> 
> List: I have found using the search function (Control + F) of the online CP 
> very helpful and time saving in looking for particular quotations, especially 
> when I'm pressed for time.
>  
> https://colorysemiotica.wordpress.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/08/peirce-collectedpapers.pdf
> 
> I hope, and I supposed that I have for long assumed that List members knew of 
> this source (and several others now online, such as volume 2 of The Essential 
> Peirce)
> 
> Best,
> 
> Gary R
> 
> On Mon, Sep 9, 2024 at 7:01 PM Edwina Taborsky  <mailto:edwina.tabor...@gmail.com>> wrote:
>> JAS, list
>> 
>> As usual, we’ll have to continue to disagree.
>> 
>> 1] Peirce constantly refers to the sign/representamen as a relation and as 
>> an action of mediation.
>> 
>> 2] Peirce often refers to the triadic relations as a Sign.
>> 
>> 3] As for his comment that terminology can make little difference - I 
>> disagree with you that this refers only to the three categories.
>> 
>> 4] I have never said that the Real Object is connected to the sign. I never 
>> said that this Real Object was ‘the object of a sign. ..and would appreciate 
>> your not declaring that I said this.
>> 
>> I specifically said, several times,  that this Real object is OUTSIDE of the 
>> semiosic process. “There are real things, whose characters are entirely 
>> independent of our opinions about them, 5.384. When these Reals are moved 
>> into a semiotic interaction, they then can be understood as Dynamic Objects. 
>> See Peirce’s explanation of the weather - where he differentiates between 
>> this object..and the dynamic object. ...which reference I have previously 
>> provided. 8.314. 
>> 
>> Our disagreements continue. 
>> 
>> Edwina
>> 
>> 
>> 
>>> On Sep 9, 2024, at 6:25 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt >> <mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com>> wrote:
>>> 
>>> List:
>>> 
>>> There was no ad hominem in my previous post--I made no argument directed 
>>> against a person instead of a position. Sarcasm is difficult to convey in 
>>> written communication, and I honestly did not detect it in the original 
>>> reference to "the ignorant and uneducated reader"; in fact, I still do not 
>>> see it.
>>> 
>>> Context is always important for interpreting and applying any quotation, 
>>> whether of Peirce or of someone else.
>>> 
>>> CSP: Even without Kant's categories, the recurrence of triads in logic was 
>>> quite marked, and must be the croppings out of some fundamental 
>>> conceptions. I now undertook to ascertain what the conceptions were. This 
>>> search resulted in what I call my categories. I then [in 1867] named them 
>>> Quality, Relation, and Representation. But I was not then aware that 
>>> undecomposable relations may necessarily require more subjects than two; 
>>> for this reason Reaction is a better term. Moreover, I did not then know 
>>> enough about language to see that to attempt to make the word 
>>> representation serve for an idea so much more general than any it 
>>> habitually carried, was injudicious. The word mediation would be better. 
>>> Quality, reaction, and mediation will do. But for scientific terms, 1ns, 
>>> 2ns, and 3ns, are to be preferred as being entirely new words without any 
>>> false associations whatever. How the conceptions are named makes, however, 
>>> little difference. (CP 4.3 [not 4.4], 1898)
>>> 
>>> Peirce does not say that how conceptions in general are named makes little 
>>> difference, he says th

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Semiosic Synechism: A Peircean Argumentation

[Edwina Taborsky]

JAS, list

1] I would quibble with the concept that the ‘whole is ontologically prior to 
its parts’. ..which sets up a kind of a priori Platonic ideal form [ and Peirce 
was an Aristotelian] ..and saw Mind and Matter as bonded. 

2] The claim that ‘God is outside space and that space is infinite - seems to 
me at least, to be illogical. If a force/whatever, has a location outside [or 
inside], then the spatial domain has perimeters and is not, by definition,  
infinite. 

3] If the sign/representamen’s relation with the Dynamic Object is that the DO 
is external to the S/R, which requires a perimeter/boundary to the S/R….then, 
this boundary has to also exist for the Dynamic Intepretant, ..understanding 
the DI as ’the actual effect which the Sign, as a Sign, really determines 
4.536. I think that an ‘effect, which suggests a reaction [2ns] requires a 
separation from the Sign/Representamen. 

Edwina

> On Sep 9, 2024, at 6:43 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt  wrote:
> 
> List:
> 
> When Peirce asserts that the universe is one immense sign, "a vast 
> representamen," he goes on to describe it as also encompassing many 
> signs--"Now every symbol must have, organically attached to it, its Indices 
> of Reactions and its Icons of Qualities" (CP 5.119, EP 2:193-194, 1903). In 
> other words, every symbol involves indices and icons; and likewise, every 
> argument involves propositions and names. However, he makes it clear 
> elsewhere that a symbol cannot be built up from icons and indices, and an 
> argument cannot be built up from names and propositions--the whole is 
> ontologically prior to its parts, which are indefinite until deliberately 
> marked off, consistent with his late topical conception of a true continuum. 
> I invite anyone interested in the details to read my paper on that subject 
> (https://philpapers.org/archive/SCHPTC-2.pdf).
> 
> The notion that the entire universe is a sign whose dynamical object is 
> external to it does not entail that the universe is finite; after all, Peirce 
> maintains both that God is outside time and that time is infinite, and I see 
> no reason why it could not likewise be the case both that God is outside 
> space and that space is infinite. To illustrate this, I have provided the 
> following diagram previously--his cosmology is hyperbolic, such that the 
> universe (3rd) is constantly proceeding from an initial state in the infinite 
> past (1st) toward a different final state in the infinite future (2nd). On 
> the projective plane, the circle represents time and the horizontal line at 
> infinity represents the Absolute, which is always at the same temporal (or 
> spatial) interval from any assignable date (or place)--both infinitely 
> distant (transcendent) and immediately present (eternal and omnipresent). 
> This is perhaps paradoxical, but not self-contradictory.
> 

> 
> Peirce repeatedly states that the dynamical object of any sign is external to 
> it, but as far as I know, he never says this about its dynamical 
> interpretant. In fact, according to him, the interpretant of any argument is 
> its conclusion, and the universe is still "working out its conclusions in 
> living realities" (CP 5.119, EP 2:193)--every actual event is a dynamical 
> interpretant of the entire universe prior to the moment when it occurs; 
> again, "The creation of the universe ... is going on today and never will be 
> done" (CP 1.615, EP 2:255, 1903). On the other hand, the final interpretant 
> of any sign is its ideal outcome, which need not ever actually be achieved. 
> That is why I suggest not only that God the Creator is the dynamical object 
> of the universe as a sign, but also that God completely revealed is its final 
> interpretant.
> 
> CSP: The starting-point of the universe, God the Creator, is the Absolute 
> 1st; the terminus of the universe, God completely revealed, is the Absolute 
> 2nd; every state of the universe at a measurable point of time is the 3rd. 
> (CP 1.362, EP 1:251, 1887-8)
> 
> As the subtitle of my "Semiosic Synechism" paper indicates, and as I 
> acknowledge at the end of its preface, what I have spelled out there (and 
> touched on here) is an ostensibly Peircean argumentation, not one that Peirce 
> himself ever explicitly presents. Each summary statement is (mostly) in my 
> own words as a proposed interpretation of his texts (and the world) for 
> consideration, along with the accompanying quotations and citations. Hence, 
> readers can decide for themselves whether my case is adequately supported by 
> those texts, as well as whether they find it plausible in accordance with 
> their understanding of the world.
> 
> Regards,
> 
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt 
>  / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt 
> _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
> ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Speculative Grammar (was Semiosic Synechism: A Peircean Argumentation)

[Edwina Taborsky]

JAS, list

As usual, we’ll have to continue to disagree.

1] Peirce constantly refers to the sign/representamen as a relation and as an 
action of mediation.

2] Peirce often refers to the triadic relations as a Sign.

3] As for his comment that terminology can make little difference - I disagree 
with you that this refers only to the three categories.

4] I have never said that the Real Object is connected to the sign. I never 
said that this Real Object was ‘the object of a sign. ..and would appreciate 
your not declaring that I said this.

I specifically said, several times,  that this Real object is OUTSIDE of the 
semiosic process. “There are real things, whose characters are entirely 
independent of our opinions about them, 5.384. When these Reals are moved into 
a semiotic interaction, they then can be understood as Dynamic Objects. See 
Peirce’s explanation of the weather - where he differentiates between this 
object..and the dynamic object. ...which reference I have previously provided. 
8.314. 

Our disagreements continue. 

Edwina



> On Sep 9, 2024, at 6:25 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt  wrote:
> 
> List:
> 
> There was no ad hominem in my previous post--I made no argument directed 
> against a person instead of a position. Sarcasm is difficult to convey in 
> written communication, and I honestly did not detect it in the original 
> reference to "the ignorant and uneducated reader"; in fact, I still do not 
> see it.
> 
> Context is always important for interpreting and applying any quotation, 
> whether of Peirce or of someone else.
> 
> CSP: Even without Kant's categories, the recurrence of triads in logic was 
> quite marked, and must be the croppings out of some fundamental conceptions. 
> I now undertook to ascertain what the conceptions were. This search resulted 
> in what I call my categories. I then [in 1867] named them Quality, Relation, 
> and Representation. But I was not then aware that undecomposable relations 
> may necessarily require more subjects than two; for this reason Reaction is a 
> better term. Moreover, I did not then know enough about language to see that 
> to attempt to make the word representation serve for an idea so much more 
> general than any it habitually carried, was injudicious. The word mediation 
> would be better. Quality, reaction, and mediation will do. But for scientific 
> terms, 1ns, 2ns, and 3ns, are to be preferred as being entirely new words 
> without any false associations whatever. How the conceptions are named makes, 
> however, little difference. (CP 4.3 [not 4.4], 1898)
> 
> Peirce does not say that how conceptions in general are named makes little 
> difference, he says that how his three categories are named makes little 
> difference--despite having just recounted why he ultimately preferred 
> 1ns/2ns/3ns over quality/reaction/mediation, and why he came to prefer these 
> names over quality/relation/representation. Moreover, only five years later, 
> he apparently changes his mind and reaffirms, "When you strive to get the 
> purest conceptions you can of 1ns, 2ns, and 3ns, thinking of quality, 
> reaction, and mediation ..." (CP 1.530, 1903). He also spells out a rigorous 
> ethics of terminology (CP 2.219-226, EP 2:263-266, 1903) in which he asserts 
> that maintaining consistent names for philosophical conceptions is extremely 
> important.
> 
> Again, the sign itself is not a "triad" nor a "mediating relation," and 
> Peirce never refers to it using either of these terms--not in any of the 76 
> definitions that Robert Marty collected 
> (https://cspeirce.com/rsources/76defs/76defs.htm), with which I am quite 
> familiar. Instead, the genuine triadic relation is representing or (more 
> generally) mediating--the sign (first correlate) represents its object 
> (second correlate) for its interpretant (third correlate); the sign (first 
> correlate) mediates between its object (second correlate) and its 
> interpretant (third correlate).
> 
> Again, the "real object" of a sign that has one is its dynamical object, not 
> some third object. Any other "real object" is not an object of the sign being 
> analyzed at all.
> 
> I will address the questions below about the universe as a sign in the thread 
> about my paper.
> 
> Regards,
> 
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt 
> <http://www.linkedin.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt> / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt 
> <http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt>
> On Sun, Sep 8, 2024 at 8:57 PM Edwina Taborsky  <mailto:edwina.tabor...@gmail.com>> wrote:
>> JAs, list
>> 
>> I don’t think it’s the time to move into ad homin

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Interpretation of Peirce on Aesthetics and the Divine

[Edwina Taborsky]

Jeff, List

Thanks for your post..

First -as with all discussions,  terms need definitions, and I would ask you to 
define what you mean by ‘aesthetics’.

I find the idea of God attractive [ if only], but completely implausible. I do 
find, however, the concept of Mind as outlined in Peirce’s definitions, both 
attractive and plausible. 

As for my understanding of the normative sciences [ the study of what ought to 
be], …aesthetics, from what I read in Peirce, is focused around ‘qualitative’  
ideals of feeling  [1.191, 5.129]  and thus, very difficult to come to any 
conclusions. We can certainly see this in the rejection of ideals in much of 
current Woke ideology.   However, I think that the realities of Secondness 
[ethics]  and Thirdness [logic]  will force the development of a normative 
ideal within the aesthetic realm. 

Do we have ‘habits’ of feeling? To my understanding, habits develop within the 
realm of Thirdness, and Feeling remains in the realm of Firstness - without 
habits. Can the two realms of Secondness and Thirdness control Firstness? 

As for the monotheistic religions, since my analysis of them is that these 
religious types emerge only within very large populations, then, the ideology 
in them is formed to deal with the societal requirements of very large 
populations; namely - commonality of identity,  rules for interactions with 
others, common beliefs requirement etc…

Edwina


> On Sep 9, 2024, at 12:29 AM, Jeffrey Brian Downard  
> wrote:
> 
> Hello Jon S, Edwina, Gary R, Gary F, and List,
> 
> Thank you, Jon, for addressing my questions about interpreting Peirce. It 
> seems we are largely in agreement on several of these issues. If that is the 
> case, your final remark should not significantly impact your interpretation 
> of Peirce. You mentioned:
> 
> “Peirce affirms natural theology but not Biblical theology, general 
> revelation but not special revelation, and theism in general but not any 
> creed in particular. I always try to keep this firmly in mind when reading, 
> contemplating, and discussing his writings since this is a major point of 
> difference between my personal views and his.”
> 
> Since these differences largely pertain to personal religious and theological 
> views, they should not significantly affect your interpretation of Peirce’s 
> arguments in the context of scientific logic and metaphysics, nor the extent 
> to which you find those arguments reasonable.
> 
> One place where the concept of God appears in Peirce’s normative sciences is 
> in aesthetics, where he examines ideals that might shape our habits of 
> feeling. In my reading of “A Neglected Argument,” I see several strands of 
> the argument as primarily aesthetic. By comparison, Kant’s three Critiques 
> explore whether the Idea of God should serve as a regulative ideal in 
> theoretical inquiry, practical pursuits, and aesthetic reflection. Richard 
> Smyth, in Reading Peirce Reading, notes that Peirce agrees with Emerson’s 
> approach in “The Poet,” asserting that the aesthetic dimensions of experience 
> hold a certain priority over practical and theoretical aspects for 
> philosophical reflection. I concur with Smyth and find Emerson’s and Peirce’s 
> views persuasive. They argue that aesthetic questions about ideals worth 
> admiring for their own sake take precedence over questions about ethically 
> good or logically sound ideals.
> 
> For those who find the idea of God unattractive or implausible, a pertinent 
> question is: “What ideal do you find more attractive, purely for its 
> aesthetic value, in the context of aesthetics as a normative science?” In 
> Thus Spoke Zarathustra, Nietzsche takes this question up and suggests an 
> alternative ideal. I would be interested in hearing Edwina’s interpretation 
> of Peirce’s view on aesthetics, as well as your own perspectives. Do such 
> reflections lead us naturally to consider the hypothesis of God as a 
> regulative ideal necessary for shaping our habits of feeling, such as wonder, 
> love, gratitude, and forgiveness? Or, is Nietzsche on to something when he 
> suggests the old monotheistic conceptions of God found in the Judaic, 
> Christian and Islamic traditions fall short insofar as the lead us to feel 
> pity for ourselves in light of our long record of human shortcomings and 
> nausea in response to the modern technological and social worlds we have 
> inherited from prior generations and have fashioned for ourselves?
> 
> Looking forward to your thoughts.
> 
> Best regards,
> 
> Jeff
> 
>  
>  
>  
>  
>  
>  
>  
>  
> From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu 
>   > on behalf of Jon Alan Schmidt 
> mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com>>
> Date: Sunday, September 8, 2024 at 7:06 PM
> To: Peirce-L mailto:peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>>
> Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Philosophy and Religion (was Peirce's Speculative Grammar)
> 
> Jeff, List:
>  
> I am inclined to a

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Speculative Grammar (was Semiosic Synechism: A Peircean Argumentation)

[Edwina Taborsky]

external to it, 
> independent of it, and unaffected by it. There is no inconsistency whatsoever 
> in understanding the universe to be both one sign and many signs, both "a 
> vast representamen" (CP 5.119, EP 2:193, 1903) and "perfused with signs, if 
> it is not composed exclusively of signs" (CP 5.448n, EP 2:394, 1906); see my 
> statements 4.1-3, their supporting Peirce quotations (including these two), 
> and footnotes 19-20 in my "Semiosic Synechism" paper 
> <https://philpapers.org/archive/SCHSSA-42.pdf>.
> 
> Regards,
> 
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt 
> <http://www.linkedin.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt> / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt 
> <http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt>
> On Sat, Sep 7, 2024 at 9:48 PM Edwina Taborsky  <mailto:edwina.tabor...@gmail.com>> wrote:
>> List, JAS 
>> 
>> 1] Not everyone knows ’standard practice’ ; therefore, I consider it 
>> courteous to let the ignorant  and uneducated reader  of your post know that 
>> it is YOU who have inserted the word… and even, to further explain WHY. Why 
>> would you add such a word [‘merely] without explaining your intention? 
>> 
>> 2] So what if Peirce doesn’t use the words of ‘information sites where 
>> information is processed’. Is it heretical to explain his  concepts using 
>> different terms?? Are you suggesting that this action of information 
>> processing doesn’t happen?  
>> 
>> What do you think  analysis actually does? Just quote texts without 
>> examination of their meaning? What’s the point of that? The function of 
>> analysis is to understand the texts - and usually, this means explaining 
>> them in other ways..- multiple ways - using different terms and examples -  
>> and in different disciplines. Just robotically repeating the terms is not an 
>> analysis. 
>> 
>> 23 I have outlined Peirce’s analytic process - where as he pointed out in 
>> his reference to the semiotic process in his determining the weather [8.314] 
>> - he does indeed refer to ’the Object as expressed, is the weather at that 
>> time’ - and is quite different from the Dynamic Object. He also frequently 
>> refers to the Real Object - which is outside of the semiotic process.   So- 
>> despite your claim - Peirce himself does often refer to an object outside of 
>> the semiosic process.
>> 
>> 3] WITHIN the semiosic process,  in its basic format,  it is an irreducible 
>> triad of Object-Representamen/Sign- Interpretant…and in its more detailed 
>> format: …the full semiosic process is: Dynamic Object- ImmediateObject - 
>> Representamen/Sign - Immediate Interpretant- Dynamic Interpretant-Final 
>> Interpretant.
>> 
>> I note again that the Real Object is outside of the semiosic process - but - 
>> it exists. 
>> 
>> 4]The above irreducible format of Object-Representamen/Sign-Interpretant is 
>> a key reason why I also reject your claim that the Dynamic Object is outside 
>> of the ’sign’. You stated that “every [dynamical] object stands outside of 
>> every sign that it determines . Therefore, if the entire universe is one 
>> immense sign, then its ‘[dynamical] object must nevertheless be external to 
>> it, independent of it, and unaffected by it”.
>> 
>> I disagree with the above - because NONE of the three correlates of the 
>> semiotic triad and NONE of the six correlates of the semiosic process stand 
>> alone and independently . There is no such thing as a singular 
>> sign/representamen on its own. No such thing as a Dynamic Object on its own 
>> - independent of the other correlates. Peirce's outline of the semiosic 
>> process is that the Sign is a TRIAD; and is irreducible. [See for example, 
>> 1.480..where “representation necessarily involves a genuine triad. For it 
>> involves a sign, or representamen, of some kind, outward or inward mediating 
>> between an object and an interpreting thought” . And all Peirce’s 
>> definitions off the sign refer to its triadic nature..eg, “A representamen, 
>> or sign is anything [ not necessarily real] which stands at once in a 
>> relation of correspondence to a second third, its object and to another 
>> possible representamen, its interpretant….” 1901. R 1147. . 
>> 
>> Are you really saying that the Universe is ONLY the mediate relation [S/R] 
>> in the triad? Is ONLY the middle term of the triad of O-S-I?? And that the 
>> Dynamic Object, which Peirce himself defines as “the reality which by some 
>> means contrives to dete

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Speculative Grammar (was Semiosic Synechism: A Peircean Argumentation)

[Edwina Taborsky]

as 
> represented in the sign,--and the Real (no, because perhaps the Object is 
> altogether fictive, I must choose a different term, therefore), say rather 
> the Dynamical Object, which, from the nature of things, the Sign cannot 
> express, which it can only indicate and leave the interpreter to find out by 
> collateral experience.
> 
> The question here is: how many objects of a sign does Peirce distinguish in 
> explicating his semeiotic? This quotation says only two (and not three). And 
> the truth is that Jon or I, or any interested scholar could find and quote 
> many other passages where Peirce says the equivalent thing. So, in this 
> matter as in myriad others regarding how Peirce himself saw something -- and 
> said so numerous times in various ways, but always arriving at the same view 
> --n o "interpretation" is required or, really, needed. In such matters I 
> always turn to Peirce's own words and not to some 'interpretation' by you, 
> Jon, me, or anyone. 
> 
> Of course, that doesn't mean that I always agree with one or another of 
> Peirce's views, only that I can be reasonably certain that that is what he 
> himself thought and wrote. A good portion, perhaps even the most of Jon's 
> work is to 'get at' what Peirce himself said. Peirce repeatedly said that the 
> Sign had two Objects, not three. I don't see how the latter could even be 
> properly called an 'interpretation'. And it is patently false.
> 
> Jon wrote earlier in this thread:
> 
> I do not ascribe my beliefs to Peirce, I scrupulously quote his own 
> statements.
> 
> It is standard practice to put any words added within a quotation in square 
> brackets, which signals that they are not in the original text.
> 
> And I have no hesitation in saying from what I've read of Jon's work that 
> this is true as much for speculative grammar -- and semeiotic generally -- as 
> for  cosmology, synechism, etc. Please try to offer a counter-example to 
> prove me wrong. (However, this is not to suggest that he hasn't done original 
> work in semeiotic and metaphysics, for example, but only that when the 
> thinking is his own -- even when springboarding from some Peircean idea or 
> another -- that he makes that clear.)
> 
> So, to conclude this single thought regarding your rather superheated 
> response to me, Edwina: It is clear to anyone who reads Jon's posts or his 
> papers (except, apparently you) that he does not ascribe his own views to 
> Peirce but, rather expounds Peirce's own views by offering quotations from 
> Peirce's work (and, having just glanced at Jeff's excellent post, I would 
> tend to agree with Jeff that there are questions regarding, for example, the 
> weight one should put on Peirce's personal views as expressed in, for 
> example, personal letters as opposed to his more formal writings).   
> 
> Having read myriad posts and more than a few papers by both you and Jon over 
> many years, I would say that it appears to me that you are committing the 
> very error of scholarship which you accuse Jon of, namely, that of ascribing 
> your views to Peirce. Further, you seem to be saying that all 
> 'interpretations' are 'just that' --interpretations. That may well be. But be 
> that as it may, when the question is a matter of what Peirce actually said 
> (that is, wrote and thought), that is simply not true. For example, it is not 
> true that Peirce wrote or thought that the Sign had three Objects: that's at 
> best a misinterpretation if ever there was one. Or, if I'm wrong about this, 
> offer a quotation or two from his work that holds that there are three 
> Objects.
> 
> Best,
> 
> Gary R
> 
> On Sun, Sep 8, 2024 at 10:46 AM Edwina Taborsky  <mailto:edwina.tabor...@gmail.com>> wrote:
>> Gary R, List
>> 
>> I’m not sure of the point of your post which seems to be that you support 
>> JAS’s posts [without argumentation]  as definitive and correct replications 
>> of Peirce’s views. I haven’t seen anyone else post either in favour of or 
>> rejecting JAS’s views - ie - that HIS views are also exactly those of 
>> Peirce. Is it the case that all others who post to this list are also 
>> correct - or are they incorrect? 
>> 
>> You write:  "You and I may argue that there are, within Peirce's trichotomic 
>> semeiotic and cosmology, passages and argumentations, etc. that support 
>> cosmological and religious views (perhaps even non-religious and scientific 
>> views and interpretations) far different from Peirce’s.”
>> 
>> I disagree - the passages and arguments that Peirce writes a

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Speculative Grammar (was Semiosic Synechism: A Peircean Argumentation)

[Edwina Taborsky]

e theism). 
> 
> One might argue, as I have occasionally done, that theism was the only real 
> option for Peirce in the interest of bringing his contemporaries to a sense 
> that the universe was not 'mechanical', nothing-but-accident, etc., and that 
> to contribute scientifically to a sense that the universe is alive with 
> meaning was more than a desideratum, but a (quasi-?) scientific truth that it 
> was his moral duty to support and promote. Promoting a religious sense of the 
> cosmos was for Peirce a desideratum.
> 
> As for my religious beliefs, they are most certainly currently in flux as 
> regards Christianity. For me, instructed first in the Episcopal Church, that 
> one ought see Christ (God) in the person facing you, your neighbor, your 
> brother or sister, Jon's rejection of my admittedly unorthodox understanding 
> of Christianity, was profoundly unsettling, especially as I saw Peirce 
> himself as standing far apart from the traditional and orthodox Christian 
> views. 
> 
> But all that discussion was off-List, and Jon has not discussed his orthodox 
> Lutheran views in this forum at all nor ever. That I now bring this up is 
> entirely my doing, and not his. Does Jon's research and philosophical 
> thinking mean to support his theistic views? Well, perhaps. But the truth is, 
> that there is much in Peirce to support, at very least, theism.
> 
> You and I may argue that there are, within Peirce's trichotomic semeiotic and 
> cosmology, passages and argumentations, etc. that support cosmological and 
> religious views (perhaps even non-religious and scientific views and 
> interpretations) far different from Peirce's. Jon has not denied that there 
> is that in Peirce's writing. So, there's disagreement to go all around! As 
> long as there is mutual respect, I'd say that that's a good thing!
> 
> So, while Jon is prone to supporting Peirce's views with incontrovertible 
> textual support, and while this seems to irritate some members of this forum 
> (occasionally me, included), his having done so regarding many facets of 
> Peirce's philosophy has been of really inestimable value for those who are 
> truly interested in how Peirce saw things, whether one agrees with Peirce or 
> not. Jon has made it clear that that is all that he's attempting to do. And, 
> I have always -- and always will -- support his right to do that on this 
> forum.
> 
> Gary R
> 
> Best,
> 
> Gary R
> 
> 
> 
> On Sat, Sep 7, 2024 at 10:48 PM Edwina Taborsky  <mailto:edwina.tabor...@gmail.com>> wrote:
>> List, JAS 
>> 
>> 1] Not everyone knows ’standard practice’ ; therefore, I consider it 
>> courteous to let the ignorant  and uneducated reader  of your post know that 
>> it is YOU who have inserted the word… and even, to further explain WHY. Why 
>> would you add such a word [‘merely] without explaining your intention? 
>> 
>> 2] So what if Peirce doesn’t use the words of ‘information sites where 
>> information is processed’. Is it heretical to explain his  concepts using 
>> different terms?? Are you suggesting that this action of information 
>> processing doesn’t happen?  
>> 
>> What do you think  analysis actually does? Just quote texts without 
>> examination of their meaning? What’s the point of that? The function of 
>> analysis is to understand the texts - and usually, this means explaining 
>> them in other ways..- multiple ways - using different terms and examples -  
>> and in different disciplines. Just robotically repeating the terms is not an 
>> analysis. 
>> 
>> 23 I have outlined Peirce’s analytic process - where as he pointed out in 
>> his reference to the semiotic process in his determining the weather [8.314] 
>> - he does indeed refer to ’the Object as expressed, is the weather at that 
>> time’ - and is quite different from the Dynamic Object. He also frequently 
>> refers to the Real Object - which is outside of the semiotic process.   So- 
>> despite your claim - Peirce himself does often refer to an object outside of 
>> the semiosic process.
>> 
>> 3] WITHIN the semiosic process,  in its basic format,  it is an irreducible 
>> triad of Object-Representamen/Sign- Interpretant…and in its more detailed 
>> format: …the full semiosic process is: Dynamic Object- ImmediateObject - 
>> Representamen/Sign - Immediate Interpretant- Dynamic Interpretant-Final 
>> Interpretant.
>> 
>> I note again that the Real Object is outside of the semiosic process - but - 
>> it exists. 
>> 
>> 4]The above irreducible format of Object-Representamen/Sign-Interpretant is 
>&g

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Speculative Grammar (was Semiosic Synechism: A Peircean Argumentation)

[Edwina Taborsky]

8, 1909 Mar 14) is in its very first sentence.
> 
> CSP: We must distinguish between the Immediate Object,--i.e. the Object as 
> represented in the sign,--and the Real (no, because perhaps the Object is 
> altogether fictive, I must choose a different term, therefore), say rather 
> the Dynamical Object, which, from the nature of things, the Sign cannot 
> express, which it can only indicate and leave the interpreter to find out by 
> collateral experience.
> 
> As Peirce repeatedly confirms elsewhere, a sign has only these two objects, 
> immediate and dynamical. Accordingly, in his first example later in the same 
> paragraph, the "Object, as expressed" is not some third object, it is the 
> immediate object. Likewise, for any sign that has a real (not fictive) 
> object, it is not some third object, it is the dynamical object. Peirce 
> confirms all this in his second example later in the same paragraph.
> 
> CSP: I reply, let us suppose: "It is a stormy day." Here is another sign. Its 
> Immediate Object is the notion of the present weather so far as this is 
> common to her mind and mine,--not the character of it, but the identity of 
> it. The Dynamical Object is the identity of the actual and Real 
> meteorological conditions at the moment.
> 
> Again, there is no third object.
> 
> Regards,
> 
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt 
> <http://www.linkedin.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt> / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt 
> <http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt>
> On Sat, Sep 7, 2024 at 2:21 PM Edwina Taborsky  <mailto:edwina.tabor...@gmail.com>> wrote:
>> List, JAS
>> 
>> I’ll continue to disagree with you - I do think that you post your own 
>> beliefs -[ and I don’t see what is wrong with this!]  for example, where you 
>> ascribe to god,   ‘creating and writing on the blackboard.  My only 
>> complaint is when you ascribe your beliefs to Peirce. 
>> 
>> And you ignore the definition of Peirce that God means ‘Mind’. [6.502] 
>> Indeed, you tried to denigrate this quotation by adding your own term of 
>> [merely] ..in brackets, before the word ‘mind’ - without informing us that 
>> this addition was your own. Peirce didn’t write ‘[merely] mind’. He said - 
>> ’the analogue of a mind..is what he means by “God”. And, “the pragmaticistic 
>> definition of ens necessariium would require many pages; but some hints 
>> toward it may be given. A disembodied spirit or pure mind”  [6.490 my 
>> emphasis]. 
>> 
>> So what if I use the term of nodes to describe the informational sites where 
>> information is processed? That’s a red herring tactic. What’s your problem 
>> with that? I didn’t declare their use as Peirce’s!  But- these terms do, in 
>> my view, help to clarify what is going on within the semiosic triad. ..which 
>> is an active processing of hard data from an external site  into an 
>> interpretation. 
>> 
>> And most certainly, there is a basis for Peirce explaining that there are 
>> three objects!! He specifically details them in 8.314 - which quotation I 
>> already gave, where he refers to the “This is a sign, whose Object, as 
>> expressed, is the weather at that time, but whose Dynamical Object is the 
>> impression which I have presumably derived from peeping between the window 
>> curtains”.  See the difference?
>> 
>> This third Object, which is external and not necessarily sensed - is “There 
>> are Real things, whose characters are entirely independent of our opinions 
>> about them; …5.384. The Real Object [the weather] only became the Dynamic 
>> Object when Peirce looked at it. 
>> 
>> That is, I consider that you err in assigning the term of ‘Dynamic Object to 
>> these external  ‘Real things’ with which we are not, at the time, 
>> semeosically interacting. .  I consider that the term of Dynamic Object is, 
>> as Peirce outlines, that first contact of external stimuli into the senses. 
>> …which the semiosic triad will ‘indicate [8.314] …via the actual acceptance 
>> of stimuli. The actual acceptance of stimuli is The Immediate Object - “the 
>> Object as represented in the sign” 8.314.  
>> 
>> To give an example - if a dog is running around in he woods - there are lots 
>> of ‘Real Objects’..which the dog doesn’t interact with. But they are real!  
>> BUT - if it stops and sniffs the air, then - it has interacted with a Real 
>> Object, by ‘connecting, semiotically, with it - and thus, accepting the 
>> external stimuli which is coming from that Real Object. That Real Object is 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Semiosic Synechism: A Peircean Argumentation

[Edwina Taborsky]

ee objects for every sign; on the contrary, he explicitly 
> and repeatedly states that there are exactly two objects, dynamical (external 
> to the sign) and immediate (internal to the sign). None of this is even 
> remotely controversial; see statement 4.5, the three Peirce quotations 
> supporting it, and footnote 24 in my "Semiosic Synechism" paper.
> 
> Regards,
> 
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt 
> <http://www.linkedin.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt> / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt 
> <http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt>
> On Sat, Sep 7, 2024 at 9:07 AM Edwina Taborsky  <mailto:edwina.tabor...@gmail.com>> wrote:
>> List
>> 
>> Since JAS is addressing the List and not only Gary R, then, I will also 
>> comment. I acknowledge that JAS has personal beliefs about the reality of 
>> God - and will not comment on his personal beliefs. My focus is only on his 
>> references to Peirce and my understanding of those same references. 
>> 
>> 1] In my understanding of Peirce, there is no such thing as a separate 
>> universe for each of the three categories. This particular quotation 5.448f 
>> does not refer to ‘all three universes’ but “the entire universe - not 
>> merely the universe of existents, but all that wider universe, embracing the 
>> universe of existents as a part, the universe which we are all accustomed to 
>> refer to as ’the truth’. That all this universe is perfused with signs, if 
>> it is not composed exclusively of signs”….That’s the quote.
>> 
>> That is, I can see no justification in Peirce to view the three 
>> categories/universes as separate realities. Peirce was not a Platonist but 
>> an Aristotelian, therefore, I don’t see any justification for a separate 
>> Platonic ‘universe of Ideas or a Universe of Reasons - each on their own. 
>> 
>> The ‘existing universe’ which we all experience is, in reality, according to 
>> Peirce, operative within all three categories of 1ns,2ns [ these existents] 
>> and 3ns.
>> 
>> 2]. The outline in 1.411-12 of the emergence of the universe is: “the 
>> original chaos, therefore, where there was no regularity, was in effect a 
>> state of mere indeterminacy, in which nothing existed or really 
>> happened….Out of the womb of indeterminacy we must say that there would have 
>> come something, by the  principle of Firstness, which we may call a flash. 
>> Then by the principle of habit, there would have been a second flash….the 
>> habits and the tendency to take them ever strengthening themselves”..
>> 
>> From this outline, I see no explanation of an agential force causing these 
>> flashes and habits. 
>> 
>> And “ The initial condition, before the universe existed, was not a state of 
>> pure abstract being. On the contrary it was a state of just nothing at 
>> all”..6.215
>> 
>> And, “We start with nothing, pure zero. But this is not the nothing of 
>> negation. …But this pure zero is the nothing of no having been b born. There 
>> is no individual thing, no compulsion, outward nor inward, no law. It is the 
>> germinal nothing, in which the whole universe is involved or foreshadowed. 
>> As such it is absolutely undefined and unlimited possibility - boundless 
>> possibility. “ 6.2l7.  
>> 
>> I do not see any implication that this emergence of the three categories 
>> with the universe requires an a priori agency standing outside of these 
>> ’three universes. The emergence of the universe is not a mechanical process 
>> which requires an external agent, but is, in these descriptions by Peirce,  
>> self-organized. 
>> 
>> 3] I have no comment on JAS’s view of the blackboard, since it is his own 
>> outline of ‘god making the blackboard’…and has nothing to do with Peirce’s 
>> outline
>> 
>> ] My understanding, however, of the Sign is that it is irreducibly triadic, 
>> [5.484] composed of a triadic relation of three ‘connected ’nodes’, which 
>> are termed the Object - the Representamen - and the Interpretant. 
>> This irreducible triad is then further broken down into six connected nodes: 
>> The Dynamic Object, the Immediate Object,, the Representamen, the Immediate 
>> Interpretant, the Dynamic Interpretant and the Final Interpretant. . 
>> 
>> Notice- these are all connected; none of them existentially exist outside of 
>> this semiotic process. However it is vital to note that Peirce, when using 
>> the term of ‘object’ provides THREE types. There is the Dynamic and the 
>&g

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Semiosic Synechism: A Peircean Argumentation

[Edwina Taborsky]

List

Since JAS is addressing the List and not only Gary R, then, I will also 
comment. I acknowledge that JAS has personal beliefs about the reality of God - 
and will not comment on his personal beliefs. My focus is only on his 
references to Peirce and my understanding of those same references. 

1] In my understanding of Peirce, there is no such thing as a separate universe 
for each of the three categories. This particular quotation 5.448f does not 
refer to ‘all three universes’ but “the entire universe - not merely the 
universe of existents, but all that wider universe, embracing the universe of 
existents as a part, the universe which we are all accustomed to refer to as 
’the truth’. That all this universe is perfused with signs, if it is not 
composed exclusively of signs”….That’s the quote.

That is, I can see no justification in Peirce to view the three 
categories/universes as separate realities. Peirce was not a Platonist but an 
Aristotelian, therefore, I don’t see any justification for a separate Platonic 
‘universe of Ideas or a Universe of Reasons - each on their own. 

The ‘existing universe’ which we all experience is, in reality, according to 
Peirce, operative within all three categories of 1ns,2ns [ these existents] and 
3ns.

2]. The outline in 1.411-12 of the emergence of the universe is: “the original 
chaos, therefore, where there was no regularity, was in effect a state of mere 
indeterminacy, in which nothing existed or really happened….Out of the womb of 
indeterminacy we must say that there would have come something, by the  
principle of Firstness, which we may call a flash. Then by the principle of 
habit, there would have been a second flash….the habits and the tendency to 
take them ever strengthening themselves”..

>From this outline, I see no explanation of an agential force causing these 
>flashes and habits. 

And “ The initial condition, before the universe existed, was not a state of 
pure abstract being. On the contrary it was a state of just nothing at 
all”..6.215

And, “We start with nothing, pure zero. But this is not the nothing of 
negation. …But this pure zero is the nothing of no having been b born. There is 
no individual thing, no compulsion, outward nor inward, no law. It is the 
germinal nothing, in which the whole universe is involved or foreshadowed. As 
such it is absolutely undefined and unlimited possibility - boundless 
possibility. “ 6.2l7.  

I do not see any implication that this emergence of the three categories with 
the universe requires an a priori agency standing outside of these ’three 
universes. The emergence of the universe is not a mechanical process which 
requires an external agent, but is, in these descriptions by Peirce,  
self-organized. 

3] I have no comment on JAS’s view of the blackboard, since it is his own 
outline of ‘god making the blackboard’…and has nothing to do with Peirce’s 
outline

] My understanding, however, of the Sign is that it is irreducibly triadic, 
[5.484] composed of a triadic relation of three ‘connected ’nodes’, which are 
termed the Object - the Representamen - and the Interpretant. 
This irreducible triad is then further broken down into six connected nodes: 
The Dynamic Object, the Immediate Object,, the Representamen, the Immediate 
Interpretant, the Dynamic Interpretant and the Final Interpretant. . 

Notice- these are all connected; none of them existentially exist outside of 
this semiotic process. However it is vital to note that Peirce, when using the 
term of ‘object’ provides THREE types. There is the Dynamic and the 
Immediate…which are both part of the semiosic triadic process AND there is also 
the Object - which is outside of the semiosic connective relationship! 

The DynamicObject is that which the mediate sign ‘indicates’ [8.314] ; the DO 
is” the Reality which by some means contrives to determine the Sign to its 
representation”. 4.536. It is not real but fictive [8.314]. That is, its 
‘informational content, so to speak, doesn’t become apparent and semiosic until 
its data is in connection with the Representamen. [ See Peirce’s outline of the 
weather in 8.314, where he writes that "the Object as expressed, is the weather 
at the time, but whose Dynamic Object is the impression which I have presumably 
derived  from peeping between the window curtains’. 8.314 1909]. That is, the 
DO is NOT external to the semiosic triad but is a vital part of it. The Object, 
on the other hand, outside of the particular semiosic interaction, is ‘real’ 
and independent of our thoughts of it [6.349].

I think it is important to clarify the definition of these three objects. 

Edwina

> On Sep 6, 2024, at 10:39 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt  
> wrote:
> 
> Gary R., List:
> 
> I sincerely hope that we can indeed continue discussing religious and 
> cosmological metaphysics from a Peircean standpoint, where I suspect that 
> there is still much on which we agree, even while refraining from discussing 
> our incre

Re: [PEIRCE-L] The pragmatic character of Peirce's religious views.

[Edwina Taborsky]

Helmut, List

You are asking me, if I understand you,  why I don’t call what Peirce calls  
the Three Categories by the term of ‘god’?  Hmm.

I think it’s because the term of ‘god’ has been given so many meanings, which 
meanings move its actions to the ‘unnatural’, to the magical, and above all,  
to the  incapable of being scientifically examined.  After all, I am claiming 
that all three of Peirce’s categories [as wells the semiosic triad]; as wells 
the emergence from Nothing,  can be examined using the scientific method. That 
is, one doesn’t have to use the methods of tenacity, authority or a priori to 
accept their validity and truth. 

Edwina





> On Sep 6, 2024, at 3:12 PM, Helmut Raulien  wrote:
> 
> Edwina, Jon, List,
>  
> Edwina, you wrote: "but I certainly don’t reject the formative authority of 
> the generals of 3ns,  or the productive results of chance, or the immediate 
> effects of reaction".
>  
> My question is, why not call that "God". Funny is, that both an atheist, and 
> a believer in God (pan-, or panen-, or theist), may attempt to refute the 
> opposing belief with the accusation of anthropomorphism: An atheist may say, 
> that to call these generals/ results/ effects a person (as God is a person) 
> is anthropomorphic, and a believer may say, that to save the term "person" 
> for humans and humanlike entities is anthropomorphic.
>  
> Well, but maybe the term "believer" is false, it doesn´t strike me as a 
> matter of belief, but merely as a quibble about terms: Whether the term 
> "person" and thus the term "God" is justified or not. "Belief", I think, 
> matters only between pan-, panen- and theism.
>  
> What I find astonishing is, that the evangelist John´s identification of God 
> with logic/word has been tolerated by the editors of the bible, although it 
> is, I don´t know, pantheism or panentheism, but surely not theism, I´d say.
>  
> Best regards, Helmut
>  
> , 06. September 2024 um 01:20 Uhr
> Von: "Edwina Taborsky" 
>  
> List, JAS
>  
> And I continue to disagree with you, JAS, that the key point of this 
> discussion is NOT how YOU understand Peirce’s outline of the emergence of the 
> universe; and its operative functioning, nor the use of the term ‘god’ - but 
> how each one of us understands Peirce’s outline of the above. And - I 
> disagree with your interpretation which is a classic theist one.  And I find 
> my explanation to be well documented in Peirce’s writings. I’m not going to 
> repeat the quotations or paragraphs since I’ve already given them in previous 
> posts. 
>  
> I think it’s very important to understand, also, that a belief in any ‘ism’ - 
> such as theism, deism, pantheism, panentheism and atheism - are beliefs . Not 
> facts. And therefore - are held by any one of the three ‘fixations of belief’ 
> - authority, tenacity, a priori- but most certainly, are not open to the 
> scientific method. 
>  
> That includes Peirce’s outline of the emergence of the universe from Nothing, 
> of the emergence of the three modal organizing principles of 1ns, 2ns, 3ns, 
> of the functioning of the triadic semiosic process; of the role of 
> Mind-as-Matter….etc. All of this - can be found in Peirce’s writings. 
>  
> The question then turns to one where one must ask: Can Peirce’s outline of 
> the ermgence of the universe from nothing, of the reality of the modal 
> actions of chance, creation andn continuity - can these be examined 
> scientifically? I think : Yes.. Can the triadic process be examined 
> scientifically? Yes. What about Mind-as-Matter? I think- yes. I think the 
> advances in quantum physics, in biology and in complex adaptive systems are 
> areas where these Peircean explanations can logically and functionally be 
> used. 
>  
> JAS - Can your understanding of God - which I do not find in Peirce - be 
> examined scientifically? I don’t think so, and therefore - I feel it is your 
> belief - and I stay out of such discussion.  I only comment when I feel that 
> you insist that YOUR interpretation of Peirce leads you to declare that your 
> interpretation is the only correct one. 
>  
> As for ‘atheism’ - and Peirce’s definition it as nominalism, I would agree 
> with him that in most cases, atheism is indeed nominalist in that it rejects 
> the reality of generals.. But- my atheism - merely rejects an agential a 
> priori metaphysical authority [ defined as god] but I certainly don’t reject 
> the formative authority of the generals of 3ns,  or the productive results of 
> chance, or the immediate effects of reaction. So- trying to equate that 
> nominalist definition of atheism with mine- [why did you do this?]..doesn’t 
> work.
>

Re: [PEIRCE-L] The pragmatic character of Peirce's religious views.

[Edwina Taborsky]

ay, therefore, truly be said that each of 
> us believes in God, and that the only quest is how to believe less crudely" 
> (SWS:283). Anyone may certainly disagree with Peirce on these matters--after 
> all, he would be the first to insist that his beliefs were entirely fallible, 
> just like everyone else's--but no one can credibly ascribe contradictory 
> views to him, e.g., by claiming to have a different "reading" of his own 
> words. Of course, I happen to agree with Peirce that "logic requires us to 
> postulate of any given phenomenon, that it is capable of rational 
> explanation," including "the co-reality of the three universes" that 
> encompass "all the phenomena there are" (R 339:[293r&295r], 1908 Aug 28), 
> instead of treating them as somehow coming into being on their own from 
> absolutely nothing (self-creation) or otherwise inexplicable.
> 
> Regards,
> 
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt 
> <http://www.linkedin.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt> / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt 
> <http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt>
> On Wed, Sep 4, 2024 at 11:11 AM Edwina Taborsky  <mailto:edwina.tabor...@gmail.com>> wrote:
>> List
>> 
>> I think the key point in this discussion is to acknowledge that a belief in 
>> theism [ and its various types] or atheism, or pantheism or panentheism, 
>> remains, always - a belief. That is, it is, as a conclusion about the world, 
>>  outside the realm of fallibility, of empirical evidence, …and remains, 
>> therefore, strictly an intellectual construct. 
>> 
>> One can set up logical arguments and so on  - all the cosmological, 
>> ontological,  design, causal and so on - but, it remains, always: a belief. 
>> Which means - you either believe it or you don’t. Logical arguments may be 
>> valid in their format, but if their premises are unsound and fallacious, 
>> then..the argument no matter how logical-  is empty!
>> 
>> Therefore - I’m not sure that one can conclude that any belief is ‘better 
>> than’ another. The key problem occurs when the individual belief is moved 
>> into a communal requirement - ie - when it becomes politicized and remade 
>> as, not a belief, but a FACT!. And becomes a social requirement! We see this 
>> in all fundamentalisms - whether it be the medieval Christian Church with 
>> its vicious heresies or Islam, with its equally vicious attacks on infidels. 
>> 
>> I consider that Peirce defines ‘god’ as Mind’, and the universe as a vast 
>> self-organized process of Mind, within the operation of the three categories 
>> and the semiosic triad. I’m not going to fill this post with quotations - 
>> since this analysis is, I feel, found all throughout Peirce’s work. Others 
>> may disagree - but again - I stress that any belief in God - and above all - 
>> a definition and description of the attributes of god - has to be, not fact, 
>> but belief…and therefore, beyond conclusive argument. It remains, always, a 
>> discussion….perhaps..an ‘endless discussion’..since there cannot be a single 
>> conclusion.
>> 
>> Edwina
> _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] The pragmatic character of Peirce's religious views.

[Edwina Taborsky]

; positive and organic relation of God to the world." It adds later, "In its 
> narrower and proper philosophic sense, pantheism is any system which 
> expressly (not merely by implication) regards the finite world as simply a 
> mode, limitation, part, or aspect of the one eternal, absolute Being; and of 
> such a nature that from the standpoint of this Being no distinct existence 
> can be attributed to it."
> 
> Regards,
> 
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt 
> <http://www.linkedin.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt> / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt 
> <http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt>
> On Mon, Sep 2, 2024 at 4:47 PM Helmut Raulien  <mailto:h.raul...@gmx.de>> wrote:
>> Gary, Edwina, List,
>>  
>> if "pantheism" hasn´t been in the air at Peirce´s time, then I guess, that 
>> the term hasn´t, though the thing existed. Bruno and Spinoza come out of my 
>> vague memory. I guess disapprovers, like the roman church and its 
>> inquisition, just subsumed it under "heresy", and more open minded 
>> theologists (about Spinoza mostly Rabbis I think) had words like "natural 
>> religion" or so, but not "pantheism" yet?
>>  
>> Differently from what I wrote before, I think, that the theistic concept of 
>> "God" doesn´t merely require intelligence for the personal aspect of God, 
>> but also, that it is possible to communicate with Him by prayer and 
>> information reception (inspiration, vision, revelation...). That means, 
>> given the spatial size of the universe, that this size scale doesn´t go 
>> along with a vry slow time scale, in which God´s intelligence acts 
>> itself out, as a sceptic person might assume, just like elephants move 
>> slower than insects do.
>>  
>> In this regard, quantum physics might intervene. I have read somewhere, that 
>> in the brain, between the myelin sheaths, there are entangled photons 
>> produced, which might provide the possibility of the brainwide (Damasio) 
>> function consciousness. Maybe the same thing happens in the universe, so 
>> that the whole universe can think and communicate with us in our time scale, 
>> or faster, and the left side of the universe doesn´t take billions of light 
>> years to tell the right side something. It just has to flip the spin of some 
>> photons, and other photons on the other side do the same. Humans cannot 
>> communicate this way, but maybe the universe as a whole can communicate with 
>> itself this way. So that would mean, that a big space scale doesn´t mean a 
>> slow time scale. So this might be a point for theism, but for pan/en/theism 
>> too.
>>  
>> Best regards, Helmut
>> Montag, 02. September 2024 um 16:32 Uhr
>>  "Edwina Taborsky" > <mailto:edwina.tabor...@gmail.com>>
>> wrote:
>> Gary R, List
>>  
>> I think it is important to focus on Peirce’s pragmatism, since it moves 
>> ’thought’ from the isolation of  idealism into reality.  
>>  
>> With reference to Peirce’s use of the term ‘god’, I think one has to explore 
>> HIS definition of the term. And, throughout Peirce’s work, one finds the 
>> constant explanation of the term ‘god’ to mean ‘Mind’. And then, what is 
>> Mind? It seems to be the operation of logic, of reason, the development of 
>> networked habits of formation. He further explains the integral relation of 
>> Mind-as-Matter [6.73, 6.158, 6.501, 6.73…]. And further - what is the 
>> operational nature of this bond? It is the triadic Sign and the three 
>> categories.  And - the whole universe is composed of Signs  [plural]. 
>> 5.418ff]. 
>>  
>> So- from all his work, we get a sense, I think of Peirce’s use of the term 
>> ‘god’, which is very different, in my view, from the theological use of the 
>> term.
>>  
>> Edwina
>> On Sep 2, 2024, at 1:58 AM, Gary Richmond > <mailto:gary.richm...@gmail.com>> wrote:
>> List,
>>  
>> As I recently argued, although Peirce described himself as a theist, he did 
>> not see himself as an orthodox Christian in the conventional sense, and in 
>> my view he would have approached the Christian creeds and doctrines with a 
>> critical, philosophically pragmatic mindset. In my view he was primarily 
>> interested in the logical coherence and practical consequences of religious 
>> beliefs such that the truth of a belief or doctrine was not merely a matter 
>> of adherence to tradition or scripture, but rather how it might be verified 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] The pragmatic character of Peirce's religious views.

[Edwina Taborsky]

Gary R, List

I think it is important to focus on Peirce’s pragmatism, since it moves 
’thought’ from the isolation of  idealism into reality.  

With reference to Peirce’s use of the term ‘god’, I think one has to explore 
HIS definition of the term. And, throughout Peirce’s work, one finds the 
constant explanation of the term ‘god’ to mean ‘Mind’. And then, what is Mind? 
It seems to be the operation of logic, of reason, the development of networked 
habits of formation. He further explains the integral relation of 
Mind-as-Matter [6.73, 6.158, 6.501, 6.73…]. And further - what is the 
operational nature of this bond? It is the triadic Sign and the three 
categories.  And - the whole universe is composed of Signs  [plural]. 5.418ff]. 

So- from all his work, we get a sense, I think of Peirce’s use of the term 
‘god’, which is very different, in my view, from the theological use of the 
term.

Edwina

> On Sep 2, 2024, at 1:58 AM, Gary Richmond  wrote:
> 
> List,
> 
> As I recently argued, although Peirce described himself as a theist, he did 
> not see himself as an orthodox Christian in the conventional sense, and in my 
> view he would have approached the Christian creeds and doctrines with a 
> critical, philosophically pragmatic mindset. In my view he was primarily 
> interested in the logical coherence and practical consequences of religious 
> beliefs such that the truth of a belief or doctrine was not merely a matter 
> of adherence to tradition or scripture, but rather how it might be verified 
> through experience and, especially, its practical effects. In other words, 
> Peirce was a thorough-going pragmatist in religion as in all matters.
> 
> Take for example the Christian creeds. Perhaps there is no more profound and 
> beautiful an expression of traditional Christian faith than the Nicene Creed. 
> That Peirce found it "precious" doesn't surprise me whatsoever, for I too 
> once placed a very high value on it (although I might not use the word 
> "precious" to describe that value, and my current religious views are, shall 
> we say, in flux). 
> But that he believed that creed "in a different way" than most others (as he 
> wrote to James) also doesn't surprise me. It seems to me that Peirce valued 
> religious doctrines to the extent that they could be pragmatically justified, 
> meaning that they were valued to the extent that they had a meaningful impact 
> on how one lives and experiences the world and, especially, in community. 
> 
> No doubt he had a high regard for the symbolic and communal aspects of 
> religious practice, including liturgy and ritual. He saw religious rituals 
> (such as reciting the creeds together in church) as important for the 
> community and for the growth of the individual’s spiritual life and for the 
> growth of the life of the community. These practices were likely seen by him 
> as signs that conveyed deeper meanings and helped to reinforce the values of 
> his religious community.
> 
> Further, in my view it seems likely that Peirce’s understanding of Christian 
> beliefs was closely tied to his understanding of belief formation within his 
> concept of "fallibilism," as the idea that human knowledge is never complete, 
> never secure, and is always open to revision. Is it possible that he saw 
> religious belief as a form of belief that, like all beliefs, need be 
> subjected to inquiry and could evolve over time? Well, the evolutionary 
> character of his thinking is as compelling as his synechism.
> 
> As I see it, Peirce was a theist, but that his belief was not based on a 
> literal or dogmatic acceptance of Christian teachings, but rather a more 
> philosophical and reflective -- even scientific -- faith, one that recognized 
> the limits of human understanding and the necessity of humility in all 
> things, including religious belief. But he most certainly thought that it 
> would be a boon to humanity if religion were shown to be true -- perhaps that 
> tended to color his religious metaphysics. While the community which he 
> thought he could best address, most likely influence to bring about that 
> belief (and, perhaps, even on a quasi-scientific basis) was the one he found 
> himself in, one that was primarily theistic (unless they happened to be 
> atheistic. since neither pantheism nor panentheism were 'in the air' then). 
> And all this to counter the mechanistic, nothing-but-ism, the universe is a 
> meaningless accidentism, which he found, frankly, illogical, and humanely 
> debilitating.
> 
> It seems to me probable that Peirce approached even the Judeo-Christian Bible 
> as, yes, a significant cultural and religious document, but not  a literal or 
> inerrant text, not as the final or sole authority on truth as Orthodox Jews 
> and orthodox Christians do. One can easily imagine that he appreciated the 
> Bible for its moral and spiritual teachings and its role in shaping Western 
> civilization. But for Peirce the Bible was a collect

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Energy conservation law (was "Peirce and Anselm (was 'A man could not have any idea that was not anthropomorphic')")

[Edwina Taborsky]

Lorentz transformations without assuming 
> the constancy of the speed of light. We will use only the principle of 
> special relativity and the symmetry associated with it. We will see that this 
> principle allows only Galilean or Lorentz space-time transformations between 
> two inertial systems.  In this case of the Lorentz transformations, we obtain 
> the conservation of an interval and a certain speed. From known experiments, 
> this speed is c, the speed of light in a vacuum.
> 
> [END QUOTE]
> 
> — Yaakov Friedman, Physical Applications of Homogeneous Balls, Progress in 
> Mathematical Physics 40 Birkhäuser, Boston, 2004, page 1.
> 
> See at 
> https://books.google.com/books?id=fa9CQBAJ&ppis=_c&lpg=PP1&pg=PA1#v=onepage&q&f=false
> 
> Best, Ben
> 
> On 8/30/2024 3:59 PM, Edwina Taborsky wrote:
>> Gary R , List
>> Yet another disagreement!  Yes, a CAS relies on “ the exchange of 
>> energy/matter/information within its environment to function, adapt, 
>> evolve…” and so the universe, which has no external environments -  as a 
>> system in itself, operates as a CAS, wherein its energy content is 
>> constantly adapting, evolving moving from simple to complex organization.
>> 
>> . ..There is no need for a CAS to require external energy input…which would 
>> make it a mechanical and complicated system, which requires external energy 
>> input -  not a CAS. Again, a CAS does not require external energy input to 
>> function; it is the way that it organizes its energy content in itself - 
>> that defines it as a CAS.   
>> 
>> A CAS is not something that only exists when it is open to external energy! 
>> Its energy content, in itself, operates in an operational format as a CAS. 
>> 
>> The universe, as a system without perimeters has no capacity to increase [or 
>> decrease] its energy content…As you note - all the energy and matter that 
>> exist are contained within the universe.  The question then moves to HOW is 
>> this energy/matter organized? The Answer - as a CAS - a complex organized 
>> system. 
>> 
>> Edwina
>> 
>>> On Aug 30, 2024, at 3:45 PM, Gary Richmond  
>>> <mailto:gary.richm...@gmail.com> wrote:
> _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
> ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at 
> https://cspeirce.com  and, just as well, at 
> https://www.cspeirce.com .  It'll take a while to repair / update all the 
> links!
> ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON 
> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu 
> . 
> ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu 
> with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in 
> the body.  More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html .
> ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP;  moderated by Gary Richmond;  and 
> co-managed by him and Ben Udell.

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at 
https://cspeirce.com  and, just as well, at 
https://www.cspeirce.com .  It'll take a while to repair / update all the links!
► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON 
PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . 
► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu 
with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the 
body.  More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html .
► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP;  moderated by Gary Richmond;  and 
co-managed by him and Ben Udell.

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Is CAS isomorphic to Peirce's 3 Categories, was,: Peirce and Anselm (was "A man could not have any idea that was not anthropomorphic")

[Edwina Taborsky]

Gary, List

It’s OK to disagree!! I certainly stand by my view that the universe is a CAS 
and that Peirce’s categories are basic to the operation of a CAS.  

And since I view all interactions - in the physics-chemical, biological and 
‘human’ realms - as semiotic,  and most certainly pragmatic [ ie, 
non-deterministic] - then, to me, the Peircean analytic framework is readily 
applicable to their analysis. And, of course, I also view these realms as 
operating within their own ‘mini-CAS systems.

I  dont’ see the analysis of the operation of a CAS as merely a model which 
makes it purely an intellectual construct- but as an explanation of how a 
particular system operates- whether it’s the universe or a plant species or a 
biome  - within the triadic process of semiosis… 

But- disagreement is basic to interaction and analysis…so…

Edwina



> On Aug 30, 2024, at 7:37 PM, Gary Richmond  wrote:
> 
> Edwina, List,
> 
> This has always been a matter of considerable disagreement between us, 
> indeed, since a couple of decades ago  when I was introduced to CAS by you, 
> Edwina. I believe your argument is, in a nutshell, that Peirce's categories 
> can be conceptualized isomorphic to CAS, that Peirce's categorial trichotomic 
> exhibits the essential features of CAS, such as dynamic interactions (2ns), 
> emergent patterns and adaptive evolution (3ns). You argue, I believe, that 
> the interplay between 1ns, 2ns, and 3ns can be interpreted as a 
> self-organizing process where the system evolves and adapts much like a CAS. 
> I'm not sure that you consider Peirce's to be a precursor to CAS, but it 
> would appear that you do see its principles as corresponding to those 
> underlying CAS.  
> 
> In my view, while Peirce's categories may share some superficial similarities 
> with the concepts of CAS, that is when dealing with certain interactions and 
> patterns, they are fundamentally different in purpose, structure, and 
> application. Peirce's philosophy -- including his semeiotic and trichotomic 
> theory -- is concerned essentially withl aspects of reality and thought seen 
> through the lens of semeiotics and pragmaticism. CAS, on the other hand, at 
> least as I understand it, is focused on the dynamics of complex systems. In 
> my view, the two frameworks operate on different levels of abstraction and 
> are not as easily reconcilable. 
> 
> Indeed, I have always thought that it was misleading to conceptualize 
> Peirce's ideas as an interpretation of the principles underlying CAS and that 
> framing Peirce's categories within the context of CAS risks reducing the 
> semeiotic depth of his ideas to fit that  model. 
> 
> As I see them, Peirce's three universes and three categories are intended to 
> address questions about the nature of reality, thought, and semiotics. CAS 
> appears to me to be essentially a tool for modeling specific types of systems 
> and predicting their behavior. The goals and methodologies of these two 
> approaches are, in my view, quite different. 
> 
> Best,
> 
> Gary R
> On Fri, Aug 30, 2024 at 4:36 PM Edwina Taborsky  <mailto:edwina.tabor...@gmail.com>> wrote:
>> And as an addendum - the operation of the three categories, which, as 
>> outlined in 1.412, emerged together, is ‘how’ a CAS operates. All three 
>> categories enable a CAS. And - no need for an external energy source - which 
>> again, would make a system complicated and mechanical, not complex.
>> 
>> Edwina.
>> 
>>> On Aug 30, 2024, at 3:59 PM, Edwina Taborsky >> <mailto:edwina.tabor...@gmail.com>> wrote:
>>> 
>>> Gary R , List
>>> Yet another disagreement!  Yes, a CAS relies on “ the exchange of 
>>> energy/matter/information within its environment to function, adapt, 
>>> evolve…” and so the universe, which has no external environments -  as a 
>>> system in itself, operates as a CAS, wherein its energy content is 
>>> constantly adapting, evolving moving from simple to complex organization.
>>> 
>>> . ..There is no need for a CAS to require external energy input…which would 
>>> make it a mechanical and complicated system, which requires external energy 
>>> input -  not a CAS. Again, a CAS does not require external energy input to 
>>> function; it is the way that it organizes its energy content in itself - 
>>> that defines it as a CAS.   
>>> 
>>> A CAS is not something that only exists when it is open to external energy! 
>>> Its energy content, in itself, operates in an operational format as a CAS. 
>>> 
>>> The universe, as a system without perimeters has no capacity to increase 
>>> [or decrea

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce and Anselm (was "A man could not have any idea that was not anthropomorphic")

[Edwina Taborsky]

And as an addendum - the operation of the three categories, which, as outlined 
in 1.412, emerged together, is ‘how’ a CAS operates. All three categories 
enable a CAS. And - no need for an external energy source - which again, would 
make a system complicated and mechanical, not complex.

Edwina.

> On Aug 30, 2024, at 3:59 PM, Edwina Taborsky  
> wrote:
> 
> Gary R , List
> Yet another disagreement!  Yes, a CAS relies on “ the exchange of 
> energy/matter/information within its environment to function, adapt, evolve…” 
> and so the universe, which has no external environments -  as a system in 
> itself, operates as a CAS, wherein its energy content is constantly adapting, 
> evolving moving from simple to complex organization.
> 
> . ..There is no need for a CAS to require external energy input…which would 
> make it a mechanical and complicated system, which requires external energy 
> input -  not a CAS. Again, a CAS does not require external energy input to 
> function; it is the way that it organizes its energy content in itself - that 
> defines it as a CAS.   
> 
> A CAS is not something that only exists when it is open to external energy! 
> Its energy content, in itself, operates in an operational format as a CAS. 
> 
> The universe, as a system without perimeters has no capacity to increase [or 
> decrease] its energy content…As you note - all the energy and matter that 
> exist are contained within the universe.  The question then moves to HOW is 
> this energy/matter organized? The Answer - as a CAS - a complex organized 
> system. 
> 
> Edwina
> 
>> On Aug 30, 2024, at 3:45 PM, Gary Richmond  wrote:
>> 
>> Edwina, Jon, Helmut, List,
>> 
>> I believe that the universe is generally considered a closed system in the 
>> context of thermodynamics because the universe, as a whole, does not 
>> exchange matter or energy with anything outside itself -- basically because 
>> there is no 'outside' of the universe as we understand it. All the energy 
>> and matter that exist are contained within the universe. 
>> Certainly it is true that within the universe that there are many open 
>> systems that can exchange energy and matter with their surroundings. I 
>> understand CAS as a framework for understanding complex, dynamic systems in 
>> a number of fields such as biology, sociology, economics, ecology, etc. (I 
>> think that the human brain might even be considered a CAS). And as Edwina 
>> has often noted, they demonstrate the importance of interactions, 
>> adaptation, and emergence in shaping the behavior of these systems over 
>> time.  But, again, CAS concerns open systems because they rely on the 
>> exchange of energy, matter, and information with their environment to 
>> function, adapt, and evolve. 
>> 
>> So, I also agree with Helmut that, as Jon wrote: "the universe as a whole 
>> cannot be accurately characterized as a complex adaptive system."
>> 
>> Best,
>> 
>> Gary R
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> On Fri, Aug 30, 2024 at 1:42 PM Jon Alan Schmidt > <mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com>> wrote:
>>> List:
>>> 
>>> I agree with Helmut.
>>> 
>>> HR: Is the universe a system? I'd say, yes, but a perfectly closed one 
>>> (apart from possibly presumed divine intervention). Because of this 
>>> closedness, it doesn't have to adapt, and it cannot integrate, at least 
>>> nothing from outside.
>>> 
>>> If the universe is a closed system, such that there is no external 
>>> environment to which it is constantly adapting itself, then by definition 
>>> it cannot be a complex adaptive system.
>>> 
>>> Regards,
>>> 
>>> Jon
>>> 
>>> On Fri, Aug 30, 2024 at 12:35 PM Edwina Taborsky >> <mailto:edwina.tabor...@gmail.com>> wrote:
>>>> JAS; list 
>>>> 
>>>>  Who are you agreeing with in your sentence '
>>>>> I agree that technically, the universe as a whole cannot be accurately 
>>>>> characterized as a complex adaptive system 
>>>> My view is that the universe ‘as a whole IS a complex adaptive system - 
>>>> and as such there is no ‘environment external to it’. ..Therefore,  the 
>>>> universe is most certainly not adapting itself to this non-existent 
>>>> ‘external environment’.  
>>>> 
>>>> Edwina
>>>>> On Aug 30, 2024, at 1:25 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt >>>> <mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com>> wrote:
>>>>> 
>>>>> 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce and Anselm (was "A man could not have any idea that was not anthropomorphic")

[Edwina Taborsky]

Gary R , List
Yet another disagreement!  Yes, a CAS relies on “ the exchange of 
energy/matter/information within its environment to function, adapt, evolve…” 
and so the universe, which has no external environments -  as a system in 
itself, operates as a CAS, wherein its energy content is constantly adapting, 
evolving moving from simple to complex organization.

. ..There is no need for a CAS to require external energy input…which would 
make it a mechanical and complicated system, which requires external energy 
input -  not a CAS. Again, a CAS does not require external energy input to 
function; it is the way that it organizes its energy content in itself - that 
defines it as a CAS.   

A CAS is not something that only exists when it is open to external energy! Its 
energy content, in itself, operates in an operational format as a CAS. 

The universe, as a system without perimeters has no capacity to increase [or 
decrease] its energy content…As you note - all the energy and matter that exist 
are contained within the universe.  The question then moves to HOW is this 
energy/matter organized? The Answer - as a CAS - a complex organized system. 

Edwina

> On Aug 30, 2024, at 3:45 PM, Gary Richmond  wrote:
> 
> Edwina, Jon, Helmut, List,
> 
> I believe that the universe is generally considered a closed system in the 
> context of thermodynamics because the universe, as a whole, does not exchange 
> matter or energy with anything outside itself -- basically because there is 
> no 'outside' of the universe as we understand it. All the energy and matter 
> that exist are contained within the universe. 
> Certainly it is true that within the universe that there are many open 
> systems that can exchange energy and matter with their surroundings. I 
> understand CAS as a framework for understanding complex, dynamic systems in a 
> number of fields such as biology, sociology, economics, ecology, etc. (I 
> think that the human brain might even be considered a CAS). And as Edwina has 
> often noted, they demonstrate the importance of interactions, adaptation, and 
> emergence in shaping the behavior of these systems over time.  But, again, 
> CAS concerns open systems because they rely on the exchange of energy, 
> matter, and information with their environment to function, adapt, and 
> evolve. 
> 
> So, I also agree with Helmut that, as Jon wrote: "the universe as a whole 
> cannot be accurately characterized as a complex adaptive system."
> 
> Best,
> 
> Gary R
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> On Fri, Aug 30, 2024 at 1:42 PM Jon Alan Schmidt  <mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com>> wrote:
>> List:
>> 
>> I agree with Helmut.
>> 
>> HR: Is the universe a system? I'd say, yes, but a perfectly closed one 
>> (apart from possibly presumed divine intervention). Because of this 
>> closedness, it doesn't have to adapt, and it cannot integrate, at least 
>> nothing from outside.
>> 
>> If the universe is a closed system, such that there is no external 
>> environment to which it is constantly adapting itself, then by definition it 
>> cannot be a complex adaptive system.
>> 
>> Regards,
>> 
>> Jon
>> 
>> On Fri, Aug 30, 2024 at 12:35 PM Edwina Taborsky > <mailto:edwina.tabor...@gmail.com>> wrote:
>>> JAS; list 
>>> 
>>>  Who are you agreeing with in your sentence '
>>>> I agree that technically, the universe as a whole cannot be accurately 
>>>> characterized as a complex adaptive system 
>>> My view is that the universe ‘as a whole IS a complex adaptive system - and 
>>> as such there is no ‘environment external to it’. ..Therefore,  the 
>>> universe is most certainly not adapting itself to this non-existent 
>>> ‘external environment’.  
>>> 
>>> Edwina
>>>> On Aug 30, 2024, at 1:25 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt >>> <mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com>> wrote:
>>>> 
>>>> List:
>>>> 
>>>> I agree that technically, the universe as a whole cannot be accurately 
>>>> characterized as a complex adaptive system unless there is an environment 
>>>> external to it, to which it is constantly adapting itself. What could that 
>>>> be, and how would we ever know anything about it?
>>>> 
>>>> Gödel's incompleteness theorems tell us nothing whatsoever about God or 
>>>> religious beliefs--they are purely logical demonstrations that certain 
>>>> kinds of sentences are undecidable within any sufficiently powerful formal 
>>>> system 
>>>> (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/G%C3%B6del%27s_incompleteness_theo

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce and Anselm (was "A man could not have any idea that was not anthropomorphic")

[Edwina Taborsky]

JAS- I think you should do a little research in CAS. A CAS is, in itself, a 
complex network of adaptive interactions. It is NOT the case that it, itself, 
is adapting to an ‘external environment’.  

A CAS again, is a system whose total contents are dynamic, open and adaptive, 
self-organizing with emergent, networked, unpredictable results. There is an 
enormous literature on CAS.  ..and I wouldn’t be able to recommend only one - 
but, Stu Kauffman’s The Origins of Order is a classic. 

As for the universe being ‘closed’ - I don’t know what Helmut actually means by 
this - perhaps he could explain.  He could simply be referring to the fact that 
the system is one in which its contents are  self-organizing.. My view of the 
universe as a CAS is that it has no perimeters. 

Edwina

> On Aug 30, 2024, at 1:41 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt  
> wrote:
> 
> List:
> 
> I agree with Helmut.
> 
> HR: Is the universe a system? I'd say, yes, but a perfectly closed one (apart 
> from possibly presumed divine intervention). Because of this closedness, it 
> doesn't have to adapt, and it cannot integrate, at least nothing from outside.
> 
> If the universe is a closed system, such that there is no external 
> environment to which it is constantly adapting itself, then by definition it 
> cannot be a complex adaptive system.
> 
> Regards,
> 
> Jon
> 
> On Fri, Aug 30, 2024 at 12:35 PM Edwina Taborsky  <mailto:edwina.tabor...@gmail.com>> wrote:
>> JAS; list 
>> 
>>  Who are you agreeing with in your sentence '
>>> I agree that technically, the universe as a whole cannot be accurately 
>>> characterized as a complex adaptive system 
>> My view is that the universe ‘as a whole IS a complex adaptive system - and 
>> as such there is no ‘environment external to it’. ..Therefore,  the universe 
>> is most certainly not adapting itself to this non-existent ‘external 
>> environment’.  
>> 
>> Edwina
>>> On Aug 30, 2024, at 1:25 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt >> <mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com>> wrote:
>>> 
>>> List:
>>> 
>>> I agree that technically, the universe as a whole cannot be accurately 
>>> characterized as a complex adaptive system unless there is an environment 
>>> external to it, to which it is constantly adapting itself. What could that 
>>> be, and how would we ever know anything about it?
>>> 
>>> Gödel's incompleteness theorems tell us nothing whatsoever about God or 
>>> religious beliefs--they are purely logical demonstrations that certain 
>>> kinds of sentences are undecidable within any sufficiently powerful formal 
>>> system 
>>> (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/G%C3%B6del%27s_incompleteness_theorems). In 
>>> fact, Gödel himself developed a modal ontological argument for the 
>>> existence/reality of God 
>>> (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/G%C3%B6del%27s_ontological_proof). As stated 
>>> in the linked article, "Gödel described his religion as 'baptized Lutheran 
>>> (but not member of any religious congregation). My belief is theistic, not 
>>> pantheistic, following Leibniz rather than Spinoza.'" He also echoed Peirce 
>>> by saying, "Religions are, for the most part, bad--but religion is not."
>>> 
>>> Regards,
>>> 
>>> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
>>> Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
>>> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt 
>>> <http://www.linkedin.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt> / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt 
>>> <http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt>
>>> On Fri, Aug 30, 2024 at 10:03 AM Helmut Raulien >> <mailto:h.raul...@gmx.de>> wrote:
>>>> Supplement: That "the question, whether the universe is God´s tool, a part 
>>>> of God, or God Himself" cannot be answered by us, is proved by Goedel, 
>>>> with his incompleteness theorem. Meaning, argueing about religious belief 
>>>> is futile.
>>>> Edwina, List,
>>>>  
>>>> in my last post I was trying to not anthropomorphise: I wrote, that the 
>>>> non-atheist view, that God is a person, can be justified by saying, that 
>>>> what makes a person is intelligence, and the reason for everything is 
>>>> intelligent, so a person. Of course, this argument is only then not 
>>>> anthropomorphic, if we all agree, that "intelligence" is not an 
>>>> anthropomorphic concept. Is it or not?
>>>>  
>>>> About "agential, deterministic": "Deteministic" I see 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce and Anselm (was "A man could not have any idea that was not anthropomorphic")

[Edwina Taborsky]

JAS; list 

 Who are you agreeing with in your sentence '
> I agree that technically, the universe as a whole cannot be accurately 
> characterized as a complex adaptive system 

My view is that the universe ‘as a whole IS a complex adaptive system - and as 
such there is no ‘environment external to it’. ..Therefore,  the universe is 
most certainly not adapting itself to this non-existent ‘external environment’. 
 

Edwina


> On Aug 30, 2024, at 1:25 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt  
> wrote:
> 
> List:
> 
> I agree that technically, the universe as a whole cannot be accurately 
> characterized as a complex adaptive system unless there is an environment 
> external to it, to which it is constantly adapting itself. What could that 
> be, and how would we ever know anything about it?
> 
> Gödel's incompleteness theorems tell us nothing whatsoever about God or 
> religious beliefs--they are purely logical demonstrations that certain kinds 
> of sentences are undecidable within any sufficiently powerful formal system 
> (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/G%C3%B6del%27s_incompleteness_theorems). In 
> fact, Gödel himself developed a modal ontological argument for the 
> existence/reality of God 
> (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/G%C3%B6del%27s_ontological_proof). As stated 
> in the linked article, "Gödel described his religion as 'baptized Lutheran 
> (but not member of any religious congregation). My belief is theistic, not 
> pantheistic, following Leibniz rather than Spinoza.'" He also echoed Peirce 
> by saying, "Religions are, for the most part, bad--but religion is not."
> 
> Regards,
> 
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt 
> <http://www.linkedin.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt> / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt 
> <http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt>
> On Fri, Aug 30, 2024 at 10:03 AM Helmut Raulien  <mailto:h.raul...@gmx.de>> wrote:
>> Supplement: That "the question, whether the universe is God´s tool, a part 
>> of God, or God Himself" cannot be answered by us, is proved by Goedel, with 
>> his incompleteness theorem. Meaning, argueing about religious belief is 
>> futile.
>> Edwina, List,
>>  
>> in my last post I was trying to not anthropomorphise: I wrote, that the 
>> non-atheist view, that God is a person, can be justified by saying, that 
>> what makes a person is intelligence, and the reason for everything is 
>> intelligent, so a person. Of course, this argument is only then not 
>> anthropomorphic, if we all agree, that "intelligence" is not an 
>> anthropomorphic concept. Is it or not?
>>  
>> About "agential, deterministic": "Deteministic" I see as too mechanical, 
>> intending only one purpose, instead of the Talcottian system  aspects 
>> "AGIL": Adaption, goal attainment, integration, latency. These system 
>> properties can also be explained in a Peircean way, I think, with habit 
>> formation and the three categories.
>>  
>> I´d say, everything is a system, but the more complex a system is, the more 
>> these AGIL aspects hold. "Goal attainment" of course is agential. Luhmann 
>> too spoke of the intention of a system. Its intention is to get bigger, more 
>> powerful, more complex, more latent (homeostatic), and therefore more 
>> capable of integrating all that may help to achieve all that.
>>  
>> Now- Is the universe a system? I´d say, yes, but a perfectly closed one 
>> (apart from possibly presumed divine intervention). Because of this 
>> closedness, it doesn´t have to adapt, and it cannot integrate, at least 
>> nothing from outside. But intention and agentiality, I´d say, yes, it has. 
>> The question, whether the universe is God´s tool, a part of God, or God 
>> Himself, I find irrelevant, due to this question´s non-solubility for us 
>> humble creatures. We should rather bother with problems we can deal with, 
>> and, apart from that, either unify or dump all religions, and praise God 
>> (just a suggestion).
>>  
>> Best regards, Helmut
>> 29. August 2024 um 20:39 Uhr
>>  "Edwina Taborsky" > <mailto:edwina.tabor...@gmail.com>>
>> wrote:
>> Helmut, List
>>  
>> Since I follow the theory of CAS, complex adaptive systems, then, I view the 
>> universe as a logical process of energy/matter transformation. And yes - 
>> this doesn’t necessarily lead to theism, unless one wants to 
>> anthropomorphize the nature of this logical adaptive process. Andn of 
>> course- to atheism, which merely reject

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce and Anselm (was "A man could not have any idea that was not anthropomorphic")

[Edwina Taborsky]

Helmut, list

Yes-  I’d say the universe is a system - a CAS, complex adaptive system. Adn my 
view of its goal is to prevent  the dissipation of its energy. Period. No 
perfect final state!  To achieve this energy-retention, I consider that the 
universe becomes more diverse and complex.

I also consider the universe ‘rational’ which means logical and focused on 
enveloping habits of organization of matter [via Mind] and networking with 
other forms of matter. All- to prevent entropy. As such - I refer to Peirce’s 
analysis of the universe as rational, and the role of Mind-as-Matter..

As for whether or not there is a ‘god’ aka, an agential force - since that’s a 
belief and totally unprovable, then, as you say - one can either  believe it - 
or not.  It can certainly be discussed - but I find such discussions also 
irrelevant. ..and all the various scholarly and esteemed arguments for ’the 
reality of god ‘ - interesting but ultimately circular and empty.

Edwina



> On Aug 30, 2024, at 10:54 AM, Helmut Raulien  wrote:
> 
> Edwina, List,
>  
> in my last post I was trying to not anthropomorphise: I wrote, that the 
> non-atheist view, that God is a person, can be justified by saying, that what 
> makes a person is intelligence, and the reason for everything is intelligent, 
> so a person. Of course, this argument is only then not anthropomorphic, if we 
> all agree, that "intelligence" is not an anthropomorphic concept. Is it or 
> not?
>  
> About "agential, deterministic": "Deteministic" I see as too mechanical, 
> intending only one purpose, instead of the Talcottian system  aspects "AGIL": 
> Adaption, goal attainment, integration, latency. These system properties can 
> also be explained in a Peircean way, I think, with habit formation and the 
> three categories.
>  
> I´d say, everything is a system, but the more complex a system is, the more 
> these AGIL aspects hold. "Goal attainment" of course is agential. Luhmann too 
> spoke of the intention of a system. Its intention is to get bigger, more 
> powerful, more complex, more latent (homeostatic), and therefore more capable 
> of integrating all that may help to achieve all that.
>  
> Now- Is the universe a system? I´d say, yes, but a perfectly closed one 
> (apart from possibly presumed divine intervention). Because of this 
> closedness, it doesn´t have to adapt, and it cannot integrate, at least 
> nothing from outside. But intention and agentiality, I´d say, yes, it has. 
> The question, whether the universe is God´s tool, a part of God, or God 
> Himself, I find irrelevant, due to this question´s non-solubility for us 
> humble creatures. We should rather bother with problems we can deal with, 
> and, apart from that, either unify or dump all religions, and praise God 
> (just a suggestion).
>  
> Best regards, Helmut
>  
>  
> 29. August 2024 um 20:39 Uhr
>  "Edwina Taborsky" 
> wrote:
> Helmut, List
>  
> Since I follow the theory of CAS, complex adaptive systems, then, I view the 
> universe as a logical process of energy/matter transformation. And yes - this 
> doesn’t necessarily lead to theism, unless one wants to anthropomorphize the 
> nature of this logical adaptive process. Andn of course- to atheism, which 
> merely rejects the anthropomorphic or agential, deterministic Supreme  
> purpose—and, more often, accepts a self-organizing, self-creating process of 
> energy transforming to matter. As Peirce so often says ‘ matter is effete 
> mind’.
>  
> Edwina. 
>  
> On Aug 29, 2024, at 2:05 PM, Helmut Raulien  wrote:
>  
> List,
>  
> the argument "If A then B, if B then C, so: If A then C", given, that the two 
> premisses are true, has a third premiss: Transitivity. Transitivity is an 
> axiom, because it cannot be deduced from other premisses. Logic/reason is 
> based on axioms. They are the reason for logic. In a universe, where in this 
> example "If A then C" would not be true, no intelligent life could emerge, I 
> am quite sure. And there would be no reason for anything.
>  
> Given, that the axioms are the ens nessecitarium, we may say with John 
> (Johannes) of the bible, that God is logic. I think, this view does not 
> nessecarily lead to theism, it might as well lead to pantheism or 
> panentheism. Panentheism, because logic/reason/God may exist ouside of our 
> universe too.
>  
> May it lead to atheism too? I guess, atheists say, that there is no personal 
> God. But may logic, reason, the reason, be impersonal, inanimate? I´d say, if 
> something is intelligent, it is a person. Intelligence is proved by action, 
> e.g. if somebody fills out well an IQ-test. The emergence of intelligent life 
> on our planet has a rea

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce and Anselm (was "A man could not have any idea that was not anthropomorphic")

[Edwina Taborsky]

Helmut, List

Since I follow the theory of CAS, complex adaptive systems, then, I view the 
universe as a logical process of energy/matter transformation. And yes - this 
doesn’t necessarily lead to theism, unless one wants to anthropomorphize the 
nature of this logical adaptive process. Andn of course- to atheism, which 
merely rejects the anthropomorphic or agential, deterministic Supreme  
purpose—and, more often, accepts a self-organizing, self-creating process of 
energy transforming to matter. As Peirce so often says ‘ matter is effete mind’.

Edwina. 

> On Aug 29, 2024, at 2:05 PM, Helmut Raulien  wrote:
> 
> List,
>  
> the argument "If A then B, if B then C, so: If A then C", given, that the two 
> premisses are true, has a third premiss: Transitivity. Transitivity is an 
> axiom, because it cannot be deduced from other premisses. Logic/reason is 
> based on axioms. They are the reason for logic. In a universe, where in this 
> example "If A then C" would not be true, no intelligent life could emerge, I 
> am quite sure. And there would be no reason for anything.
>  
> Given, that the axioms are the ens nessecitarium, we may say with John 
> (Johannes) of the bible, that God is logic. I think, this view does not 
> nessecarily lead to theism, it might as well lead to pantheism or 
> panentheism. Panentheism, because logic/reason/God may exist ouside of our 
> universe too.
>  
> May it lead to atheism too? I guess, atheists say, that there is no personal 
> God. But may logic, reason, the reason, be impersonal, inanimate? I´d say, if 
> something is intelligent, it is a person. Intelligence is proved by action, 
> e.g. if somebody fills out well an IQ-test. The emergence of intelligent life 
> on our planet has a reason, because transitivity is in charge. This reason 
> has done an act, we may call "creation" or "evolution". So this reason is 
> intelligent, so it is a person, no matter, however technical, inanimate the 
> term "axioms" sounds, with which mathematicians name the reason.
>  
> Best regards, Helmut
>  
> Gesendet: Donnerstag, 29. August 2024 um 13:57 Uhr
> Von: "Edwina Taborsky" 
> An: "Jon Alan Schmidt" 
> Cc: "Peirce-L" 
> Betreff: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce and Anselm (was "A man could not have any idea 
> that was not anthropomorphic")
> JAS, List
>  
> But - Peirce, in 1.412, does indeed very specifically  outline how the three 
> categories ‘come into being’ from Nothing. So, contrary to your 
> interpretation, I think it’s quite proper to ‘ascribe this belief’ to him. 
>  
> As for your arguments about ponens and tollens [both are modus] - if your 
> premises are false due to circularity or ambiguity or.., then the logical 
> validity is totally irrelevant. 
>  
> You can hardly want to ‘prove’ an assertion by its logical format alone; your 
> premises must have value of truth. Otherwise, I could ‘prove’ anything - such 
> as the existence of unicorns and ..
>  
> If horses exist, then unicorns exist.
> Horses exist
> Therefore, unicorns exist.  
>  
> Finally - The ambiguity comes from the merger of ‘possible’ and 
> ’necessary’…which makes the ‘god' argument false. 
>  
> Edwina
>  
> On Aug 28, 2024, at 10:01 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt  
> wrote:
>  
> List:
>  
> Regarding #1 below, my point is simply that we can properly ascribe beliefs 
> to Peirce that he explicitly endorses, such as God being Ens necessarium, 
> "Really creator of all three Universes of Experience"; and we cannot properly 
> ascribe contradictory beliefs to him, such as the three universes (and 
> corresponding categories) being eternal or somehow coming into being from 
> absolutely nothing.
>  
> Regarding #2 below, the following argument is deductively valid--if both 
> premisses are true, then the conclusion must also be true.
>  
> P1. If God is not actually real, then God is not possibly real.
> P2. God is possibly real.
> C1. Therefore, God is actually real.
>  
> It is neither circular (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Circular_reasoning) nor 
> question-begging (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Begging_the_question), 
> because C1 is not already assumed in P1 or P2. Denying the antecedent after 
> denying the consequent is not a fallacy, it is (as I said) the classical 
> inference rule called modus tollens 
> (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Modus_tollens). Accordingly, the following 
> argument is also deductively valid.
>  
> If it does not rain then my car will not be wet.
> My car is wet
> Therefore it did rain.
>  
> If my car is wet because the sprinkler was on, not because it rained, then 
> the first premiss is false--the argument 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce and Anselm (was "A man could not have any idea that was not anthropomorphic")

[Edwina Taborsky]

List 

I’ll stand by my reading of 1.412 - that the categories emerge from Nothing. 
And I don’t equate Nothing with ‘god’ or ‘ens Necessarium. Even 6.490 says ‘a 
state of things in which the three universes were completely nil…the three 
universes must be absolutely necessary results of a state of utter 
nothingness’. As for ‘Ens Necessarium - I’d accept Peirce’s concept of Pure 
Mind - which I’d consider as the state of the emergence of the three Categories.

There is no point in quibbling about the meaning of the terms of ‘false vs 
‘unsound’. As noted, an argument can be logically valid in form but its 
premises can be false - and the argument is therefore, in itself, false. The 
various arguments for the existence of God [cosmological, ontological, prime 
mover, perfection etc].. - rest on a belief in the veracity of the premises - 

I think your atheist example is an example of Denying the Antecedent. 

But - since both an acceptance of the reality of god and an atheist rejection 
of ‘god’ are beliefs and impossible to empirically prove either way - then, the 
objection is moot.  No point in further discussion..One doesn’t discuss beliefs 
; one merely ‘articulates' them. 

Edwina





> On Aug 29, 2024, at 1:58 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt  
> wrote:
> 
> List:
> 
> The principle of charity (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Principle_of_charity) 
> is that we do not treat any author's writings as self-contradictory unless it 
> is utterly unavoidable to do so. As I observe at the end of section 4 in "A 
> Neglected Additament," it is evident from CP 6.490 and other contemporaneous 
> manuscripts that Peirce did not change his basic cosmology between 1887-8 and 
> 1908; he simply clarified that God as Ens necessarium, "Really creator of all 
> three Universes of Experience," is indispensable to it.
> 
> Again, there is nothing fallacious about any of the simple arguments that I 
> have posted in this thread--they are all deductively valid--but I agree that, 
> as always, their soundness depends on the truth of their premisses. For 
> example, the first premiss below ("If horses exist, then unicorns exist") is 
> false, so the subsequent conclusion ("unicorns exist") is also false, even 
> though the argument is deductively valid.
> 
> As I said before, the persuasiveness of ontological arguments depends 
> entirely on the plausibility of their metaphysical premisses. I do not know 
> what is meant below by "the merger of 'possible' and 'necessary,'" but in 
> modal logic, they are always interdefined--"possibly" is logically equivalent 
> to "not necessarily not," and "necessarily" is logically equivalent to "not 
> possibly not." With that in mind, an atheist could offer the following 
> unambiguous ontological argument for the non-reality of God.
> 
> P3d. If God is possibly real, then God is not possibly not real.
> P4. God is possibly not real.
> C3. Therefore, God is not possibly real.
> 
> P3d is logically equivalent to P3, P3a, P3b, and P3c, all of which are 
> entailed by the conception of God as Ens necessarium. Hence, as I said in the 
> first post of this thread, the bottom line is whether one finds it more 
> plausible that God is possibly real (P2), from which it follows that God's 
> reality is necessary (C2); or that God is possibly not real (P4), from which 
> it follows that God's reality is impossible (C3).
> 
> Regards,
> 
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt 
> <http://www.linkedin.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt> / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt 
> <http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt>
> On Thu, Aug 29, 2024 at 6:57 AM Edwina Taborsky  <mailto:edwina.tabor...@gmail.com>> wrote:
>> JAS, List
>> 
>> But - Peirce, in 1.412, does indeed very specifically  outline how the three 
>> categories ‘come into being’ from Nothing. So, contrary to your 
>> interpretation, I think it’s quite proper to ‘ascribe this belief’ to him. 
>> 
>> As for your arguments about ponens and tollens [both are modus] - if your 
>> premises are false due to circularity or ambiguity or.., then the logical 
>> validity is totally irrelevant. 
>> 
>> You can hardly want to ‘prove’ an assertion by its logical format alone; 
>> your premises must have value of truth. Otherwise, I could ‘prove’ anything 
>> - such as the existence of unicorns and ..
>> 
>> If horses exist, then unicorns exist.
>> Horses exist
>> Therefore, unicorns exist.  
>> 
>> Finally - The ambiguity comes from the merger of ‘possible’ and 
>> ’necessary’…whic

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce and Anselm (was "A man could not have any idea that was not anthropomorphic")

[Edwina Taborsky]

JAS, List

But - Peirce, in 1.412, does indeed very specifically  outline how the three 
categories ‘come into being’ from Nothing. So, contrary to your interpretation, 
I think it’s quite proper to ‘ascribe this belief’ to him. 

As for your arguments about ponens and tollens [both are modus] - if your 
premises are false due to circularity or ambiguity or.., then the logical 
validity is totally irrelevant. 

You can hardly want to ‘prove’ an assertion by its logical format alone; your 
premises must have value of truth. Otherwise, I could ‘prove’ anything - such 
as the existence of unicorns and ..

If horses exist, then unicorns exist.
Horses exist
Therefore, unicorns exist.  

Finally - The ambiguity comes from the merger of ‘possible’ and 
’necessary’…which makes the ‘god' argument false. 

Edwina

> On Aug 28, 2024, at 10:01 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt  
> wrote:
> 
> List:
> 
> Regarding #1 below, my point is simply that we can properly ascribe beliefs 
> to Peirce that he explicitly endorses, such as God being Ens necessarium, 
> "Really creator of all three Universes of Experience"; and we cannot properly 
> ascribe contradictory beliefs to him, such as the three universes (and 
> corresponding categories) being eternal or somehow coming into being from 
> absolutely nothing.
> 
> Regarding #2 below, the following argument is deductively valid--if both 
> premisses are true, then the conclusion must also be true.
> 
> P1. If God is not actually real, then God is not possibly real.
> P2. God is possibly real.
> C1. Therefore, God is actually real.
> 
> It is neither circular (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Circular_reasoning) nor 
> question-begging (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Begging_the_question), 
> because C1 is not already assumed in P1 or P2. Denying the antecedent after 
> denying the consequent is not a fallacy, it is (as I said) the classical 
> inference rule called modus tollens 
> (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Modus_tollens). Accordingly, the following 
> argument is also deductively valid.
> 
> If it does not rain then my car will not be wet.
> My car is wet
> Therefore it did rain.
> 
> If my car is wet because the sprinkler was on, not because it rained, then 
> the first premiss is false--the argument is still valid, but unsound. 
> Likewise, the only way that C1 could be false is if either P1 or P2 is false.
> 
> Regarding #3 below, the following argument is also deductively valid.
> 
> P2. God is possibly real.
> P3. If God is possibly real, then God is necessarily real.
> C2. Therefore, God is necessarily real.
> 
> This is (as I said) the classical inference rule called modus ponens 
> (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Modus_ponens). There is no ambiguity here 
> because "possibly" has exactly the same meaning in P2 and P3, and 
> "necessarily" has exactly the same meaning in P3 and C2. Again, the only way 
> that C2 could be false is if either P2 or P3 is false.
> 
> Regards,
> 
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt 
> <http://www.linkedin.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt> / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt 
> <http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt>
> On Wed, Aug 28, 2024 at 6:56 PM Edwina Taborsky  <mailto:edwina.tabor...@gmail.com>> wrote:
>> List
>> 
>> 1]First - I think you should follow your own advice - about Dynamic 
>> Interpretants and Immediate Interpretants.I did NOT say that "every 
>> "individual and current personal reading of Peirce" is equally valid”.
>> 
>> I said that each of us interprets Peirce’s writings, within a semiosic 
>> triad, particular to their own knowledge base. As to which of these 
>> interpretations is ‘valid’ - that’s for the ‘community of scholars to 
>> affirm. Not the individual author of that interpretation.
>> 
>> 2] You wrote this example:
>>> P1. If God is not actually real, then God is not possibly real.
>>> P2. God is possibly real.
>>> C1. Therefore, God is actually real.
>> 
>> This is called the Fallacy of Circular Reasoning, where the conclusion [god 
>> is actually real] is used as a premise. And also - a version of the Fallacy 
>> of denying the antecedent. 
>> 
>> An example would be:
>> If it does not rain then my car will not be wet.
>> My car is wet
>> Therefore it did rain. [No, the sprinkler was on]. 
>> 
>> 3] You wrote this example:
>>> P3. If God is possibly real, then God is necessarily real.
>>> C2. Therefore, God is necessarily real.
>> 
>> This is in my view, fallacious due to ambiguity,  since it merges the two 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce and Anselm (was "A man could not have any idea that was not anthropomorphic")

[Edwina Taborsky]

 ontological 
> argument into formal modal logic, and Andrzej Biłat even offers this 
> "simplest relevant version" that does not require any modal operators 
> (https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11229-020-02908-5).
> 
> P1. If God is not actually real, then God is not possibly real.
> P2. God is possibly real.
> C1. Therefore, God is actually real.
> 
> P1 and P2 both seem quite plausible, and C1 follows from them by modus 
> tollens. However, P1 is logically equivalent to this less plausible 
> formulation.
> 
> P1a. If God is possibly real, then God is actually real.
> 
> The underlying idea is that God is defined as necessary being, so if God is 
> real in some possible world, then God is real in every possible world, 
> including the actual world. This is more accurately expressed as follows.
> 
> P3. If God is possibly real, then God is necessarily real.
> C2. Therefore, God is necessarily real.
> 
> C2 follows from P2 and P3 by modus ponens, and C1 can then be derived from C2 
> in accordance with modal axiom T--if God is necessarily real, then God is 
> actually real--which is uncontroversial and corresponds directly to Peirce's 
> permission in the Gamma part of Existential Graphs to convert any oddly 
> enclosed broken cut into a solid cut. However, P3 is even less plausible than 
> P1a. The heart of the matter is revealed by these formulations that are 
> logically equivalent to P3.
> 
> P3a. God's reality is either necessary or impossible.
> P3b. God is not both possibly real and possibly not real.
> 
> In summary, the persuasiveness of such modal ontological arguments boils down 
> to finding it more plausible that God's reality is necessary than that it is 
> impossible, and/or finding it more plausible that God is possibly real than 
> that God is possibly not real. An upshot of P3b is that what Gary Mar calls 
> "notional agnosticism" 
> (https://place.asburyseminary.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1563&context=faithandphilosophy),
>  where God's reality is treated as contingent, is not a rational alternative 
> given the definition of God as Ens necessarium.
> 
> Finally, it will surprise no one who is paying attention that I flatly reject 
> the self-defeating claim that every "individual and current personal reading 
> of Peirce" is equally valid. Otherwise, I could assert that he was a devout 
> confessional Lutheran Christian, and no one could challenge me--not even by 
> providing multiple quotations where he blatantly contradicts such a 
> description. Our proper goal when reading his texts, or those of any other 
> author, is to conform our individual dynamical interpretants to the final 
> interpretant of those texts--how an infinite community would understand them 
> after infinite investigation. The first step is making sure that our 
> individual dynamical interpretants are consistent with the immediate 
> interpretant of those texts--the meaning of the words themselves in 
> accordance with their definitions, rules of grammar, context, etc., i.e., 
> "what his own words plainly assert." This is the sense in which logic as 
> semeiotic is a normative science.
> 
> Regards,
> 
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt 
> <http://www.linkedin.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt> / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt 
> <http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt>
> On Tue, Aug 27, 2024 at 6:49 PM Edwina Taborsky  <mailto:edwina.tabor...@gmail.com>> wrote:
>> Helmut, List 
>> 
>> Just a further point about your reference to Anselm - who uses the 
>> ontological argument to ‘prove’ the existence of God. I consider this a 
>> circular argument [ and thus, invalid] - ie, to declare that ’IF the 
>> greatest possible being exists in the mind, THEN it must also exist in 
>> reality…ie..the Cartesian notion of a ‘clear and distinct idea’. And the 
>> concepts of an a priori necessary causality  But, after all, this 
>> ontological argument can be used to prove the existence of anything - even 
>> unicorns and witches.
>> 
>> As for JAS’s sentence -  This is not "my reading of Peirce," it is what his 
>> own words plainly assert.” - No- any conclusion any of us come to - since 
>> Peirce is no longer here - has to be derived from our personal reading of 
>> Peirce. There is no such thing as ‘his own words plainly assert’, There is 
>> only what our individual and current personal reading of those words 
>> conclude.
>> 
>> Edwina
> _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
> ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at 
> https://cspeirc

Re: [PEIRCE-L] CSP: "A man could not have any idea that was not anthropomorphic," was, Ens necessarium

[Edwina Taborsky]

List - I wish this computer would allow me to do the writing and stop changing 
my terms!

The clean blackboard is Aspatial and Atemporal.  [not spatial and 
atemporal]….Again, I find the 1.412 outline a very compelling argument - more 
so, frankly, than the blackboard!
 
> On Aug 28, 2024, at 6:42 PM, Edwina Taborsky  
> wrote:
> 
> My answer is equally speculative. 
> 
> As Peirce notes - the universe rests on continuity [6.202] - which, to me, 
> basically means that the universe is geared to preventingenropic dissipation 
> ‘of itself’. And that both  "Firstness or chance and Secondness or Brute 
> reaction’ are necessary elements which Thirdness acts upon.
> 
> Was there anything that ‘preceded the universe? According to Peirce’s view 
> [1.412] there was Nothing. - a state of mere indeterminacy in which nothing 
> existed or really happened” 1.411].  I would die an analogy of it as ‘pure 
> [not free] energy. 
> 
> The clean blackboard is an image of this Nothing;  “the original vague 
> potentiality - it has no dimensions, no points. That is, it is spatial and 
> atemporal. Then,Peirce’s analogy is that He draws a chalk line - but- he 
> defines it as ‘A Firstness, a springing up of something new’ [6.203]. In 
> 1.412 - he calls this first existeniality a ‘flash’. ..which I would assume 
> is a flashof discrete matter.  My understanding of this first flash is that 
> it is self-generated. But essentially what has happened is the emergence of 
> space and time - and with this Firstness/ this flash..also emerges the modal 
> reality of Secondness [ since, with space and time, otherness is 
> existent..and Thirdness, which enables networking between these 
> marks/instances…andn the development of common habits among them. 
> 
> I don’t ’see’ that a blank slate or ‘ur-continuum has any existentially - how 
> could it, even as itself, exist without also the three categories, which are 
> basic modes of being to all existence?those are my ‘mutterings of the day - 
> and would require more thought!
> 
> Edwina/ 
> 
>> On Aug 28, 2024, at 5:53 PM, Gary Richmond  wrote:
>> 
>> Edwina,
>> 
>> I rather thought -- assumed really -- that we'd have to agree to disagree on 
>> this. After all, while even Big Bang Theory seems to me to be more 
>> conjectural with each cosmological reorientation which the James telescope 
>> (for example) has been stimulating, the character of that which 'preceded' 
>> our universe is, well, rather entirely conjectural.
>> 
>> But I would be interested in your taking a shot at answering this question. 
>> You wrote: ". . .the three categories only came-into-modal-being..together, 
>> all at once. " How do you think that happened? Saying for example,"out of 
>> nothing," seems to me to a non-answer. How might such a categorial complexus 
>> arise? Why should there be out of time little 'flashes' of 1ns, let alone 
>> complexes of 1nses and 2nses forming habits (3ns), without there being some 
>> sort of "blank canvas" or "blank slate" (the ur-continuum which the 
>> Blackboard metaphor represents) for these to appear upon (and then together 
>> work to create an actual cosmos!) Thus, I will for now stay with that later 
>> Blackboard analogy as it seems to me to be a development of Peirce's 
>> cosmological thinking just the year before and that which you 
>> characteristically refer to (much less frequently that of the 1898 
>> lectures). I will give you the last word and call it a day on this topic.
>> 
>> Best,
>> 
>> Gary R
>> 
>> On Wed, Aug 28, 2024 at 4:43 PM Edwina Taborsky > <mailto:edwina.tabor...@gmail.com>> wrote:
>>> Gary R, list
>>> 
>>> I see your point, but I continue to disagree. My understanding of Thirdness 
>>> is not only is it a process of ‘continuum’ but also - of habit formation [ 
>>> which is what enables a continuum].  But I dont’ see that this Thirdness 
>>> was operative ‘before the Big Bang’ [or whatever]…
>>> 
>>> Yes potentiality is essentially general - since it is unable to ‘be’ 
>>> specific, but, just because it is such, does not, in my view, align it with 
>>> 3ns. 
>>> 
>>> I still view the pre-appearance of the universe [ clumsy wording, I 
>>> admit]..as Peirce’s ’Nothing’…and that the three categories only 
>>> came-into-modal-being..together, all at once. 
>>> 
>>> So- we’ll have to disagree!  But - that’s what discussion permits!
>>> 
>>> Edwina 
>>> 
>>>> On Aug 28, 2024, at 2:39 PM, Gary Richmo

Re: [PEIRCE-L] CSP: "A man could not have any idea that was not anthropomorphic," was, Ens necessarium

[Edwina Taborsky]

My answer is equally speculative. 

As Peirce notes - the universe rests on continuity [6.202] - which, to me, 
basically means that the universe is geared to preventingenropic dissipation 
‘of itself’. And that both  "Firstness or chance and Secondness or Brute 
reaction’ are necessary elements which Thirdness acts upon.

Was there anything that ‘preceded the universe? According to Peirce’s view 
[1.412] there was Nothing. - a state of mere indeterminacy in which nothing 
existed or really happened” 1.411].  I would die an analogy of it as ‘pure [not 
free] energy. 

The clean blackboard is an image of this Nothing;  “the original vague 
potentiality - it has no dimensions, no points. That is, it is spatial and 
atemporal. Then,Peirce’s analogy is that He draws a chalk line - but- he 
defines it as ‘A Firstness, a springing up of something new’ [6.203]. In 1.412 
- he calls this first existeniality a ‘flash’. ..which I would assume is a 
flashof discrete matter.  My understanding of this first flash is that it is 
self-generated. But essentially what has happened is the emergence of space and 
time - and with this Firstness/ this flash..also emerges the modal reality of 
Secondness [ since, with space and time, otherness is existent..and Thirdness, 
which enables networking between these marks/instances…andn the development of 
common habits among them. 

I don’t ’see’ that a blank slate or ‘ur-continuum has any existentially - how 
could it, even as itself, exist without also the three categories, which are 
basic modes of being to all existence?those are my ‘mutterings of the day - and 
would require more thought!

Edwina/ 

> On Aug 28, 2024, at 5:53 PM, Gary Richmond  wrote:
> 
> Edwina,
> 
> I rather thought -- assumed really -- that we'd have to agree to disagree on 
> this. After all, while even Big Bang Theory seems to me to be more 
> conjectural with each cosmological reorientation which the James telescope 
> (for example) has been stimulating, the character of that which 'preceded' 
> our universe is, well, rather entirely conjectural.
> 
> But I would be interested in your taking a shot at answering this question. 
> You wrote: ". . .the three categories only came-into-modal-being..together, 
> all at once. " How do you think that happened? Saying for example,"out of 
> nothing," seems to me to a non-answer. How might such a categorial complexus 
> arise? Why should there be out of time little 'flashes' of 1ns, let alone 
> complexes of 1nses and 2nses forming habits (3ns), without there being some 
> sort of "blank canvas" or "blank slate" (the ur-continuum which the 
> Blackboard metaphor represents) for these to appear upon (and then together 
> work to create an actual cosmos!) Thus, I will for now stay with that later 
> Blackboard analogy as it seems to me to be a development of Peirce's 
> cosmological thinking just the year before and that which you 
> characteristically refer to (much less frequently that of the 1898 lectures). 
> I will give you the last word and call it a day on this topic.
> 
> Best,
> 
> Gary R
> 
> On Wed, Aug 28, 2024 at 4:43 PM Edwina Taborsky  <mailto:edwina.tabor...@gmail.com>> wrote:
>> Gary R, list
>> 
>> I see your point, but I continue to disagree. My understanding of Thirdness 
>> is not only is it a process of ‘continuum’ but also - of habit formation [ 
>> which is what enables a continuum].  But I dont’ see that this Thirdness was 
>> operative ‘before the Big Bang’ [or whatever]…
>> 
>> Yes potentiality is essentially general - since it is unable to ‘be’ 
>> specific, but, just because it is such, does not, in my view, align it with 
>> 3ns. 
>> 
>> I still view the pre-appearance of the universe [ clumsy wording, I 
>> admit]..as Peirce’s ’Nothing’…and that the three categories only 
>> came-into-modal-being..together, all at once. 
>> 
>> So- we’ll have to disagree!  But - that’s what discussion permits!
>> 
>> Edwina 
>> 
>>> On Aug 28, 2024, at 2:39 PM, Gary Richmond >> <mailto:gary.richm...@gmail.com>> wrote:
>>> 
>>> Edwina, List,
>>> 
>>> Perhaps we'll never see eye to eye on this, but let me at least respond to 
>>> your question.
>>> 
>>> You asked: "Now- my question is - you seem to consider this continuum as a 
>>> mode of Thirdness - even if primal." I do indeed. But keeping with my 
>>> resolution to cut down on Peirce quotes, most especially lengthy ones, here 
>>> is a single snippet to this point: "Continuity represents Thirdness almost 
>>> to perfection" (CP, 6.175, ca. 1907).
>>> 
>>> 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] CSP: "A man could not have any idea that was not anthropomorphic," was, Ens necessarium

[Edwina Taborsky]

JAS, list

The problem I have with your claim that you wish to “let Peirce speak for 
himself as much as possible, especially when it seems others are 
misrepresenting him” - is that, as I have pointed out - Peirce-Is-Not-Here and 
thus, ANY AND ALL readings of his work are interpretations - functioning within 
the triadic semiotics process of O-R-I. This means that we - all of us, 
including you - are ‘interpreting' Peirce. It is functionally impossible for 
Peirce to “speak for himself”.  You seem to be suggesting that your 
interpretations of Peirce are the correct ones, while others are 
misrepresenting him. Could it not be the other way around? 

And Peirce was quite insistent that randomness, chance, [Firstness]  is a 
reality. As he says of the chalk line, a brute act’, ‘a mere accident’..and 
doesn’t mention someone drawing these marks. 
And who says that someone has to make the blackboard? These are your beliefs - 
but I don’t see them outlined within Pirean analysis.

Edwina

> On Aug 28, 2024, at 2:02 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt  
> wrote:
> 
> List:
> 
> I recognize that I am the likely target of complaints such as the one 
> described in the first paragraph below. My intention is not at all to 
> suppress open discussion, but to let Peirce speak for himself as much as 
> possible, especially when it seems to me that others are misrepresenting him. 
> As I have said many times before, we cannot properly claim to be applying his 
> ideas to today's problems without first carefully establishing what his ideas 
> actually were, as opposed to our own ideas that might have been inspired in 
> some way by his words.
> 
> I heartily agree that Peirce's blackboard diagram (CP 6.203-208, 1898) is one 
> of his clearest presentations of his overall cosmology, especially in 
> conjunction with his summary statement in an earlier lecture--"The whole 
> universe of true and real possibilities forms a continuum, upon which this 
> Universe of Actual Existence is, by virtue of the essential 2ns of Existence, 
> a discontinuous mark--like a line figure drawn on the area of the blackboard" 
> (NEM 4:345). I discuss it in detail in section 5 of my 2018 paper, "A 
> Neglected Additament: Peirce on Logic, Cosmology, and the Reality of God" 
> (https://tidsskrift.dk/signs/article/view/103187/152244).
> 
> However, as I say there, chalk marks do not just randomly appear on a 
> blackboard, especially not in intelligible patterns such as the "new curve" 
> that emerges when they "multiply themselves under the habit of being tangent 
> to the envelope" (CP 6.206). Instead, someone has to draw them, and this 
> person's relation to them is that of creator to creation--"Those who express 
> the idea to themselves by saying that the Divine Creator determined so and so 
> may be incautiously clothing the idea in a garb that is open to criticism, 
> but it is, after all, substantially the only philosophical answer to the 
> problem" (CP 6.199).
> 
> Moreover, someone has to make the clean blackboard itself in the first place. 
> That is why I interpret the primordial "ur-continuum" that it represents as 
> created 3ns, distinct from God the Creator who is outside it (transcendent). 
> In short, I maintain that Peirce's cosmology as illustrated by the blackboard 
> diagram does require an Ens necessarium. After all, he says so explicitly in 
> "A Neglected Argument" and the contemporaneous Logic Notebook entry that we 
> have been discussing.
> 
> Regards,
> 
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt 
>  / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt 
> 
> On Wed, Aug 28, 2024 at 2:42 AM Gary Richmond  > wrote:
>> List,
>> 
>> I would like to preface these comments by remarking that, and especially 
>> over the past year or so, I have received more than a few off List emails 
>> saying that some participants here, as one person put it "seem to be deeply 
>> habituated to pushing Peircean plug-in quotes buttons to outdo each other 
>> [and that these] same people [seem] more interested in Peircean Correctness 
>> than open discussion." As I myself no doubt have been guilty of at least 
>> overdoing the Peirce quotes in some of my posts, I've decided to begin a 
>> practice of strictly limiting such quotations in this and in all future 
>> messages, and in this case to only one. And I would most certainly encourage 
>> more "open discussion: in the forum.
>> 
>> I think that I perhaps have a somewhat different understanding of the 
>> origins of the categories and the universe than others on the List. I don't 
>> know if it is possible to reconcile those different views, but I will at 
>> least attempt taking a stab at it here and, perhaps, in future posts on the 
>> topic.
>> 
>> I base my understanding of the origin of the categories and the

Re: [PEIRCE-L] CSP: "A man could not have any idea that was not anthropomorphic," was, Ens necessarium

[Edwina Taborsky]

Gary R, list

I see your point, but I continue to disagree. My understanding of Thirdness is 
not only is it a process of ‘continuum’ but also - of habit formation [ which 
is what enables a continuum].  But I dont’ see that this Thirdness was 
operative ‘before the Big Bang’ [or whatever]…

Yes potentiality is essentially general - since it is unable to ‘be’ specific, 
but, just because it is such, does not, in my view, align it with 3ns. 

I still view the pre-appearance of the universe [ clumsy wording, I admit]..as 
Peirce’s ’Nothing’…and that the three categories only 
came-into-modal-being..together, all at once. 

So- we’ll have to disagree!  But - that’s what discussion permits!

Edwina 

> On Aug 28, 2024, at 2:39 PM, Gary Richmond  wrote:
> 
> Edwina, List,
> 
> Perhaps we'll never see eye to eye on this, but let me at least respond to 
> your question.
> 
> You asked: "Now- my question is - you seem to consider this continuum as a 
> mode of Thirdness - even if primal." I do indeed. But keeping with my 
> resolution to cut down on Peirce quotes, most especially lengthy ones, here 
> is a single snippet to this point: "Continuity represents Thirdness almost to 
> perfection" (CP, 6.175, ca. 1907).
> 
> There are numerous places where he associates continuity and the continuum 
> with 3ns, for example CP. 6.201-3 (ca. 1908) where he argues that the 
> evolutionary process itself is the result of the principle of continuity and 
> that process is itself an expression of 3ns. In "The Law of Mind" he says 
> something to the effect that continuity is the "keystone of the arch of 3ns" 
> in its application to metaphysics and cosmology (that is obviously not a 
> direct quote).
>   
> ET: ". .  my point is that ALL THREE Modes are necessarily operating within 
> this emergence of the universe. There isn’t any linear first…in their 
> existentiality of being. 
> 
> I'd agree that they appear -- and even necessarily -- all together "in their 
> existentiality of being.(emphasis added). That is to say, as they evolve an 
> existente universe, after what (and only for convenience sake I'll call) the 
> 'Big Bang'. 
> 
> Also note that CP 1.412 (from "A Guess at the Riddle") was written before the 
> 1898 lecture series, so it's possible that Peirce is still working his 
> cosmology out in "The First Rule of Logic," well in that and the lecture. But 
> in the lecture he writes (as you quoted) that "potentiality. . . is 
> essentially general’ 6.204." Generality and continuity are closely linked in 
> Peirce's thought, including not only his logic, but also his metaphysical and 
> cosmological thought, and both represent 3ns, "generality being a kind of 
> continuity." 
> 
> You may also recall that Peirce rejected being called a Tychast and 
> considered his philosophy most generally as Synechism. So, in the 
> proto-universe (or whatever one wants to call it), I read the Blackboard 
> metaphor as meaning that the Blackboard indeed represents a continuum (3ns) 
> upon which 1ns and 2ns appear (or, are written. [Btw, a theological 
> interpretation of 'Who's the Scribe?' in the proto-universe is clearly, in my 
> view, not necessary, although it might well have been Peirce's view as I 
> think Gary F is implying in his most recent note to Jon).
> 
> Interestingly, Peirce remarks that immediately upon that flash of 1ns a 
> distinction is made between the blackboard and the line, and that distinction 
> is categorial 2ns. But there must first be an ur-continuity, a 3ns (the 
> Blackboard), for 1ns and 2ns to manifest and, yes,  then there can be 
> realized a, shall I say 'second' generality (3ns), namely, habit taking. ET: 
> " … As you say- 3ns involves 2ns and 2ns involves 1sn…   " Yet as Peirce also 
> insists, 2ns and 3ns cannot be built from 1ns. 
> 
> In both the 1898 lecture, and especially in "A Guess at the Riddle," he 
> argues that a kind of evolution must occur even before there was time. But 
> that is not at all an existential evolution -- that one that will in time 
> come in the evolution of an actual universe such as ours; and, yes, then all 
> three categories will be functioning together.
> 
> Well, I doubt that any of what I've written will have convinced you of my 
> position regarding the proto-cosmos. Peirce notes in "The Logic of 
> Mathematics" (my last quotation):
> 
> It will be very difficult for many minds -- and for the very best and 
> clearest minds, more difficult than for others -- to comprehend the logical 
> correctness of a view which does not put the assumption of time before eith

Re: [PEIRCE-L] CSP: "A man could not have any idea that was not anthropomorphic," was, Ens necessarium

[Edwina Taborsky]

s 
> everything appearing on it also continuous.
> 
> The chalk line on the blackboard represents a boundary between two 
> contrasting surfaces: one black, one white. This boundary represents a kind 
> of interaction between these two continuous surfaces, signifying the 
> 'pairedness' between contrasting 'elements', the white surface representing 
> 1ns, the boundary between black and white representing the relationship 
> between 1ns and 3ns. So 2ns appears in the passage through this pairedness of 
> contrasting elements, that is, in their 'defining' each other. 
> 
> Now, when a particular character gains stability and consistency ('stays' on 
> the Blackboard), a 'habit' is established. As more lines appear, they create 
> new forms and patterns, symbolizing new habits and tendencies emerging from 
> initial chance occurrences (again, out of what Peirce calls elsewhere a 
> Platonic world of ideas). Some of these habits (perhaps, better, 
> 'proto-habits') eventually gain stability and consistency. But, again, I want 
> to emphasize that this process of habit formation is rooted in the original 
> continuity which is inherently general and continuous. As stated above, this 
> pre-temporal state can be imagined as a "before" that is not bound by our 
> usual understanding of time. 
> 
> Space and time and matter and evolutionary logic  -- that is to say, a 
> universe -- emerges from the interaction of 1ns, 2ns, and 3ns. (As I've 
> occasionally noted in the past, I am not a big fan of the Big Bang theory -- 
> actually, theories.)
> 
>  Peirce elsewhere argues as if 1ns arises 'first'. But this is not the case 
> in the Cambridge lecture under consideration where the ur-continuity is the 
> locus of the emergence of 1nses, literally the locus of every specific 
> character and every thing which will exist in some universe. Is that 
> ur-continuity Nothing? Well, as has been repeatedly noted in these 
> discussions, if it is, it is the nothing of pure potential (and not, as 
> Peirce contrasts it with, the 'nothing' of negation).
> 
> I'll conclude with but one quotation which I hope might help both reconcile  
> two seemingly different views ( being,1ns 1st v 3ns 1st) as well Peirce's use 
> of the expression "Platonic ideas" (for it is fairly certainly that he was 
> much less a Platonist than an Aristotilian).
> 
> In short, if we are going to regard the universe as a result of evolution at 
> all, we must think that not merely the existing universe, that locus in the 
> cosmos to which our reactions are limited, but the whole Platonic world, 
> which in itself is equally real, is evolutionary in its origin, too. And 
> among the things so resulting are time and logic. 
> 
> The very first and most fundamental element that we have to assume is a 
> Freedom, or Chance, or Spontaneity, by virtue of which the general vague 
> nothing-in-particular-ness that preceded the chaos took a thousand definite 
> qualities. The second element we have to assume is that there could be 
> accidental reactions between those qualities. The qualities themselves are 
> mere eternal possibilities. But these reactions we must think of as events. 
> Not that Time was. But still, they had all the here-and-nowness of events. CP 
> 6.200 
> 
> In such a manner "the general vague nothing-in-particular-ness" becomes every 
> quality, every relationship, everything that exists and evolves in some 
> possible universe, even such an actual universe as ours (but leaving room, I 
> think, for  hypotheses regarding other possible worlds). 
> 
> In our universe 3ns involves 2ns and 1ns, while 2ns involves 1ns. This is to 
> suggest that the involutional evolution of our universe seemingly took a 
> categorial vectorial path different from that of the categories 'before time 
> was'.
> 
>  And none of this, as Gary Furhman just well argued, requires an Ens 
> Necessarium.
> 
> Best,
> 
> Gary R
> 
> 
> On Tue, Aug 27, 2024 at 3:44 PM Edwina Taborsky  <mailto:edwina.tabor...@gmail.com>> wrote:
>> Helmut, List
>> 
>> Comments on your questions,,
>> 
>> 1] Yes, my reading of Peirce is that the term of ‘God’ means Reason, 
>> Reasoning, Logic, Mind. See 6.218 ’there is no principle of action in the 
>> universe but reason’….but, this reasoning is not deductive but also  
>> inductive and abdutive, ie, open. This is the result of, as you note, that 
>> ALL THREE Categories were existent from the beginning. 
>> 
>> Therefore reasoning or logic is necessary - since it enables continuity and 
>> the formation of 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] CSP: "A man could not have any idea that was not anthropomorphic," was, Ens necessarium

[Edwina Taborsky]

all" observable phenomena. This is not "my reading of Peirce," it 
> is what his own words plainly assert.
> 
>  
> 
> Regards,
> 
>  
> 
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> 
> Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
> 
> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt 
> <http://www.linkedin.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt> / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt 
> <http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt>
>  
> 
> On Tue, Aug 27, 2024 at 2:50 PM Edwina Taborsky  <mailto:edwina.tabor...@gmail.com>> wrote:
> 
>> Helmut, List
>> 
>>  
>> 
>> Comments on your questions,,
>> 
>>  
>> 
>> 1] Yes, my reading of Peirce is that the term of ‘God’ means Reason, 
>> Reasoning, Logic, Mind. See 6.218 ’there is no principle of action in the 
>> universe but reason’….but, this reasoning is not deductive but also  
>> inductive and abdutive, ie, open. This is the result of, as you note, that 
>> ALL THREE Categories were existent from the beginning. 
>> 
>>  
>> 
>> Therefore reasoning or logic is necessary - since it enables continuity and 
>> the formation of habits of generality..Without habits - what would result? 
>> That is - a universe operative only in Firstness and/or Secondness - would 
>> result in:  Entropy. 
>> 
>>  
>> 
>> What is meant by the term of ‘god’? In In 8.211-212, he compares it with 
>> ’Nature’ - andNature is an evolving, rational expression of Mind as 
>> Matter.The concept that ‘Matter is effete Mind’ [6.25] is basic to Peirce’s 
>> objective idealism [6.24]; Note that 6.268 ‘where all mind partakes of the 
>> nature of matter’..and so on. See an extensive analysis; 6.277. 
>> 
>>  
>> 
>>  In 6.502, Peirce uses the analogy of “a mind’ for the meaning of ‘god’. I 
>> have no problem with such an analogy - and reject the anthropomorphic images 
>> [again, I’m an atheist so….]…and reject the concept of god as causal. Again, 
>> I consider Peirce’s insistence that all three categories emerged together - 
>> to be a key infrastructure in his concept of the role of reason in the 
>> operation of the universe. . 
>> 
>>  
>> 
>> And Peirce’s outline of nothing [see 1.412 and 6.217 is not the ’nothing of 
>> negation [6.217…”There is no individual thing, no compulsion outward nor 
>> inward, no law”…andn “nothing necessarily resulted [6.218\. 
>> 
>>  
>> 
>> 3. I’m not sure what you mean by ‘capitalism’. My understanding of the term 
>> is that it means that the actions of the Investment and Production of goods 
>> and services are in the control of the individual, the private individual. 
>> Rather than the collective or State. 
>> 
>>  
>> 
>> The benefits of capitalism is that this enables diversity and novelty of 
>> innovation [ which can only be done by free-thinking, curious individuals]; 
>> it enables an economy whose goods and services are linked to local realities 
>> [ local environment of land and plants/animals, local needs, …rather than 
>> top-down one-style fits all ]. It enables multiple sites of production - and 
>> - importantly, if one individual’s enterprise fails - only he fails - not 
>> the whole collective. The emergence of capitalism in the 15th 16th century 
>> and the concomitant development of the middle class enabled an explosion of 
>> population growth in Europe  - and a concomitant increase in health and 
>> well-being - and - eventually, a need to expand to the ’new world’ because 
>> of this population growth [ see Braudel F, histories].
>> 
>>  
>> 
>> Edwina 
>> 
>>> On Aug 27, 2024, at 2:40 PM, Helmut Raulien >> <mailto:h.raul...@gmx.de>> wrote:
>>> 
>>>  
>>> 
>>> List,
>>> 
>>>  
>>> 
>>> as I said, I find the term "habit" at least as due to investigating its 
>>> anthropomorphicity. The term "nothing" though I don´t see for 
>>> anthropomorphic at all. (Sorry for my bad English, maybe I confuese "to" 
>>> with "as" and "for"). Anyways, when we speak of "nothing" in a theological 
>>> context, it becomes complex, I think:
>>> 
>>>  
>>> 
>>> 1-- Is God logic/word, like John wrote (Bible) at the beginning of his 
>>> gospel?
>>> 
>>>  
>>> 
>>> 2 -- Or does God have to, like all creatures and all inanimate nature, obey 
>>> to logic, because logic is absolutely inevitable, and the one primary ens 
>&g

Re: [PEIRCE-L] CSP: "A man could not have any idea that was not anthropomorphic," was, Ens necessarium

[Edwina Taborsky]

Helmut, List 

Just a further point about your reference to Anselm - who uses the ontological 
argument to ‘prove’ the existence of God. I consider this a circular argument [ 
and thus, invalid] - ie, to declare that ’IF the greatest possible being exists 
in the mind, THEN it must also exist in reality…ie..the Cartesian notion of a 
‘clear and distinct idea’. And the concepts of an a priori necessary causality  
But, after all, this ontological argument can be used to prove the existence of 
anything - even unicorns and witches.

As for JAS’s sentence -  This is not "my reading of Peirce," it is what his own 
words plainly assert.” - No- any conclusion any of us come to - since Peirce is 
no longer here - has to be derived from our personal reading of Peirce. There 
is no such thing as ‘his own words plainly assert’, There is only what our 
individual and current personal reading of those words conclude.

Edwina


> On Aug 27, 2024, at 6:45 PM, Gary Richmond  wrote:
> 
> Jon, List,
> 
> I completely agree:There can be absolutely no doubt that Peirce considered 
> himself a theist. 
> 
> And I should not have conflated that understanding with that of God as 
> conceived by Peirce in anthropomorphic terms, and further with his writing 
> that "it stood to reason that a man could not have any idea that was not 
> anthropomorphic." I somehow saw you as having conjoined the ideas of theism 
> and anthropomorphism in your post.
> 
> Best,
> 
> Gary R
> 
> On Tue, Aug 27, 2024 at 6:19 PM Jon Alan Schmidt  <mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com>> wrote:
>> List:
>> 
>> I agree that Peirce was an unorthodox Christian in his religious beliefs, 
>> but the abundant quotations that I have provided in other recent threads 
>> amply demonstrate that his philosophical conception of God was quite 
>> compatible with classical theism. Again, he explicitly affirmed that God is 
>> real, personal, omniscient, omnipotent, omnibenevolent, infinite, 
>> transcendent (not immanent), knowable (not utterly inscrutable), necessary 
>> (not contingent), immaterial (not embodied), and eternal (outside time).
>> 
>> GR: Jon concludes that "It would be disingenuous for any purported Peirce 
>> scholar to claim otherwise [than that Peirce was a theist and an 
>> anthropocentrist in his conception of God].
>> 
>> For the record, here is what I actually said.
>> 
>> JAS: By his own abundant and unambiguous testimony, Peirce believed that God 
>> as Ens necessarium is "Really creator of all three Universes of Experience" 
>> (CP 6.452, EP 2:434, 1908). It would be disingenuous for any purported 
>> Peirce scholar to claim otherwise.
>> 
>> While I have acknowledged that much can be gleaned from his writings that is 
>> compatible with pantheism, panentheism, or atheism, my recurring point is 
>> that no one can accurately ascribe to Peirce himself the view that the three 
>> universes (and corresponding categories) are identical to God, are contained 
>> within God, are themselves eternal, or came into being from absolutely 
>> nothing. Again, he explicitly stated otherwise in his Logic Notebook entry 
>> that I will quote one more time.
>> 
>> CSP: Cosmology or the explanatory science of the Three Universes shows then 
>> plausibly at least how the Three Universes were produced, from an antecedent 
>> state. But their Phenomena are all the phenomena there are. The task of 
>> Cosmology is therefore to show how all phenomena were produced from a state 
>> of absolute absence of any; and logic requires that this problem [is] to be 
>> solved. But it must suppose something to be in that antecedent state, and 
>> this must be that which would Really be in any possible state of things 
>> whatever, that is, an Ens Necessarium. This Ens necessarium being, then, the 
>> Principle of all Phenomena, must be the author and creator of all that could 
>> ever be observed of Ideas [1ns], Occurrences [2ns], or Logoi [3ns]. (R 
>> 339:[295r], 1908 Aug 28)
>> 
>> According to Peirce, God as Ens necessarium is distinct from and logically 
>> antecedent to "all the phenomena there are" (1ns/2ns/3ns) as "the author and 
>> creator of all" observable phenomena. This is not "my reading of Peirce," it 
>> is what his own words plainly assert.
>> 
>> Regards,
>> 
>> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
>> Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
>> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt 
>> <http://www.linkedin.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt> / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt 
>> <http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchm

Re: [PEIRCE-L] CSP: "A man could not have any idea that was not anthropomorphic," was, Ens necessarium

[Edwina Taborsky]

Helmut, List

Comments on your questions,,

1] Yes, my reading of Peirce is that the term of ‘God’ means Reason, Reasoning, 
Logic, Mind. See 6.218 ’there is no principle of action in the universe but 
reason’….but, this reasoning is not deductive but also  inductive and abdutive, 
ie, open. This is the result of, as you note, that ALL THREE Categories were 
existent from the beginning. 

Therefore reasoning or logic is necessary - since it enables continuity and the 
formation of habits of generality..Without habits - what would result? That is 
- a universe operative only in Firstness and/or Secondness - would result in:  
Entropy. 

What is meant by the term of ‘god’? In In 8.211-212, he compares it with 
’Nature’ - andNature is an evolving, rational expression of Mind as Matter.The 
concept that ‘Matter is effete Mind’ [6.25] is basic to Peirce’s objective 
idealism [6.24]; Note that 6.268 ‘where all mind partakes of the nature of 
matter’..and so on. See an extensive analysis; 6.277. 

 In 6.502, Peirce uses the analogy of “a mind’ for the meaning of ‘god’. I have 
no problem with such an analogy - and reject the anthropomorphic images [again, 
I’m an atheist so….]…and reject the concept of god as causal. Again, I consider 
Peirce’s insistence that all three categories emerged together - to be a key 
infrastructure in his concept of the role of reason in the operation of the 
universe. . 

And Peirce’s outline of nothing [see 1.412 and 6.217 is not the ’nothing of 
negation [6.217…”There is no individual thing, no compulsion outward nor 
inward, no law”…andn “nothing necessarily resulted [6.218\. 

3. I’m not sure what you mean by ‘capitalism’. My understanding of the term is 
that it means that the actions of the Investment and Production of goods and 
services are in the control of the individual, the private individual. Rather 
than the collective or State. 

The benefits of capitalism is that this enables diversity and novelty of 
innovation [ which can only be done by free-thinking, curious individuals]; it 
enables an economy whose goods and services are linked to local realities [ 
local environment of land and plants/animals, local needs, …rather than 
top-down one-style fits all ]. It enables multiple sites of production - and - 
importantly, if one individual’s enterprise fails - only he fails - not the 
whole collective. The emergence of capitalism in the 15th 16th century and the 
concomitant development of the middle class enabled an explosion of population 
growth in Europe  - and a concomitant increase in health and well-being - and - 
eventually, a need to expand to the ’new world’ because of this population 
growth [ see Braudel F, histories].


Edwina 



> On Aug 27, 2024, at 2:40 PM, Helmut Raulien  wrote:
> 
> List,
>  
> as I said, I find the term "habit" at least as due to investigating its 
> anthropomorphicity. The term "nothing" though I don´t see for anthropomorphic 
> at all. (Sorry for my bad English, maybe I confuese "to" with "as" and 
> "for"). Anyways, when we speak of "nothing" in a theological context, it 
> becomes complex, I think:
>  
> 1-- Is God logic/word, like John wrote (Bible) at the beginning of his gospel?
>  
> 2 -- Or does God have to, like all creatures and all inanimate nature, obey 
> to logic, because logic is absolutely inevitable, and the one primary ens 
> nessecitarium? I think that is e.g. the position of Omri Boehm, in whose view 
> ethics too derive from logic, as I think to have understood).
>  
> I´m am against Hegel, but must admit, that he wrote a fine description, how 
> everything evolved from nothing. BUT: I agree with Edwina (if i understood 
> right), that this is not an evolution, as all three categories must have been 
> there from the start.
>  
> Well, I am sort of an agnostic, somewhere between panentheism and theism. I 
> guess, even between theists, there are different ways to define the concept 
> "God". And certainly the concept "nothing": Might well be, that it merely 
> exist for concept in capitalism? (Sorry for that, Edwina, but I just felt 
> like this). I just wanted to say, that maybe point 2 is true, and in that 
> case, maybe there never has been "nothing". I think, the buddhist say so, I 
> am not a buddhist, but this their point is worth of taking it into the 
> discourse as possibility (type due to not knowing).
>  
> But with Anselm of Canterbury, we might say, that if we can imagine 
> "nothing", there must be, or have been, nothing. But I would doubt that we 
> can imagine nothing (besides of being broke). It is a nonsentic term. Maybe.
>  
> Best regards, Helmut
>  
> Gesendet: Dienstag, 27. August 2024 um 03:50 Uhr
> Von: "Edwina Taborsky" 
> An: "Gary Richmond" 
> Cc

Re: [PEIRCE-L] CSP: "A man could not have any idea that was not anthropomorphic," was, Ens necessarium

[Edwina Taborsky]

t be the author and creator of all that could 
>> ever be observed of Ideas [1ns], Occurrences [2ns], or Logoi [3ns]. (R 
>> 339:[295r], 1908 Aug 28)
>> 
>> This is Peirce's version of the Leibnizian Cosmological Argument, which 
>> follows from the PSR. In the state of things logically antecedent to the 
>> three universes (and corresponding categories), which was utterly devoid of 
>> any phenomena whatsoever, there must have been something else real that 
>> produced all observable phenomena (contingent being), namely, that which is 
>> real in every possible state of things (necessary being). He presents this 
>> as neither a hard fact nor a mere opinion, but a highly plausible 
>> hypothesis, and elsewhere directly addresses the charge of anthropomorphism.
>> 
>> CSP: I have after long years of the severest examination become fully 
>> satisfied that, other things being equal, an anthropomorphic conception, 
>> whether it makes the best nucleus for a scientific working hypothesis or 
>> not, is far more likely to be approximately true than one that is not 
>> anthropomorphic. ... [A]s between an old-fashioned God and a modern patent 
>> Absolute, recommend me to the anthropomorphic conception if it is a question 
>> of which is the more likely to be about the truth. (CP 5.47n, EP 2:152, 1903)
>> 
>> He even explicitly endorses anthropomorphism in conjunction with theism.
>> 
>> CSP: To Schiller's anthropomorphism I subscribe in the main. And in 
>> particular if it implies theism, I am an anthropomorphist. But the God of my 
>> theism is not finite. That won't do at all. (CP 8.262, 1905 Jul 23)
>> 
>> By his own abundant and unambiguous testimony, Peirce believed that God as 
>> Ens necessarium is "Really creator of all three Universes of Experience" (CP 
>> 6.452, EP 2:434, 1908). It would be disingenuous for any purported Peirce 
>> scholar to claim otherwise.
>> 
>> Regards,
>> 
>> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
>> Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
>> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt 
>> <http://www.linkedin.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt> / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt 
>> <http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt>
>> On Mon, Aug 19, 2024 at 10:54 AM Helmut Raulien > <mailto:h.raul...@gmx.de>> wrote:
>>> Edwina, Jon, Gary, List,
>>>  
>>> an engineer, who makes a machine that replicates and develops 
>>> automatically, is a worse engineer than one, who creates a situation, where 
>>> parts self-organize to replicating, self-organizing, self-developing 
>>> machines. So with the analogy to God, i would say, the less of His actions 
>>> you can see, the better and more effective His creativity is. If people (as 
>>> it is the case, I think) cannot see any direct divine action, but can 
>>> explain more and more with science, His creativity is the best I can think 
>>> of. But God is not falsifiable, so, according to Popper, not a valid 
>>> hypothesis. But, differently from other hypotheses, it always will be 
>>> possible to claim an intelligent (personal) principle behind any 
>>> phenomenon, how scientifically analysed it ever might be, and it is 
>>> justified, i think, to call that "God", or "Ens nessecarium".
>>>  
>>> To the term "habit" I think, that this is not the end of inquiry. It just 
>>> is an anthropomorphic term, extracted from our way of learning. Ok, we see 
>>> the development of relations, that reminds us of our own habit-formation, 
>>> in nature, but nature doesn´t work like our brain.
>>>  
>>> To claim pure energy as a starting thing, I am not sure of that, and 
>>> neither of the big bang. I have read, that astronomers have detected a big 
>>> galaxy, only 300 million years after the presumed big bang. They call that 
>>> unlikely. So maybe, an universe, when it becomes too big, calves, like a 
>>> big soap-bubble that splits. And in every calf-bubble-universe, it looks as 
>>> if there has been a big bang, but it hasn´t. At least this may be a 
>>> possibility, so the theory of a primordial pure energy is not the only 
>>> possible theory.
>>>  
>>> Best regards,
>>>  
>>> Helmut
>>> 19. August 2024 um 00:59 Uhr
>>>  
>>>  "Edwina Taborsky" >> <mailto:edwina.tabor...@gmail.com>>
>>> wrote:
>>>  
>>> List, JAS
>>>  
>>> No-one suggests that self-oganization is not ‘without re

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Ens necessarium

[Edwina Taborsky]

t; 
> This is Peirce's version of the Leibnizian Cosmological Argument, which 
> follows from the PSR. In the state of things logically antecedent to the 
> three universes (and corresponding categories), which was utterly devoid of 
> any phenomena whatsoever, there must have been something else real that 
> produced all observable phenomena (contingent being), namely, that which is 
> real in every possible state of things (necessary being). He presents this as 
> neither a hard fact nor a mere opinion, but a highly plausible hypothesis, 
> and elsewhere directly addresses the charge of anthropomorphism.
> 
> CSP: I have after long years of the severest examination become fully 
> satisfied that, other things being equal, an anthropomorphic conception, 
> whether it makes the best nucleus for a scientific working hypothesis or not, 
> is far more likely to be approximately true than one that is not 
> anthropomorphic. ... [A]s between an old-fashioned God and a modern patent 
> Absolute, recommend me to the anthropomorphic conception if it is a question 
> of which is the more likely to be about the truth. (CP 5.47n, EP 2:152, 1903)
> 
> He even explicitly endorses anthropomorphism in conjunction with theism.
> 
> CSP: To Schiller's anthropomorphism I subscribe in the main. And in 
> particular if it implies theism, I am an anthropomorphist. But the God of my 
> theism is not finite. That won't do at all. (CP 8.262, 1905 Jul 23)
> 
> By his own abundant and unambiguous testimony, Peirce believed that God as 
> Ens necessarium is "Really creator of all three Universes of Experience" (CP 
> 6.452, EP 2:434, 1908). It would be disingenuous for any purported Peirce 
> scholar to claim otherwise.
> 
> Regards,
> 
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt 
> <http://www.linkedin.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt> / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt 
> <http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt>
> On Mon, Aug 19, 2024 at 10:54 AM Helmut Raulien  <mailto:h.raul...@gmx.de>> wrote:
> Edwina, Jon, Gary, List,
>  
> an engineer, who makes a machine that replicates and develops automatically, 
> is a worse engineer than one, who creates a situation, where parts 
> self-organize to replicating, self-organizing, self-developing machines. So 
> with the analogy to God, i would say, the less of His actions you can see, 
> the better and more effective His creativity is. If people (as it is the 
> case, I think) cannot see any direct divine action, but can explain more and 
> more with science, His creativity is the best I can think of. But God is not 
> falsifiable, so, according to Popper, not a valid hypothesis. But, 
> differently from other hypotheses, it always will be possible to claim an 
> intelligent (personal) principle behind any phenomenon, how scientifically 
> analysed it ever might be, and it is justified, i think, to call that "God", 
> or "Ens nessecarium".
>  
> To the term "habit" I think, that this is not the end of inquiry. It just is 
> an anthropomorphic term, extracted from our way of learning. Ok, we see the 
> development of relations, that reminds us of our own habit-formation, in 
> nature, but nature doesn´t work like our brain.
>  
> To claim pure energy as a starting thing, I am not sure of that, and neither 
> of the big bang. I have read, that astronomers have detected a big galaxy, 
> only 300 million years after the presumed big bang. They call that unlikely. 
> So maybe, an universe, when it becomes too big, calves, like a big 
> soap-bubble that splits. And in every calf-bubble-universe, it looks as if 
> there has been a big bang, but it hasn´t. At least this may be a possibility, 
> so the theory of a primordial pure energy is not the only possible theory.
>  
> Best regards,
>  
> Helmut
> 19. August 2024 um 00:59 Uhr
>  
>  "Edwina Taborsky"  <mailto:edwina.tabor...@gmail.com>>
> wrote:
>  
> List, JAS
>  
> No-one suggests that self-oganization is not ‘without reason’. The reason for 
> the self-organization of a system is to preserve energy by forming it as 
> instances operating within organized habits. [matter is effete mind]... 
> Peirce’s focus onThirdness or ‘Mind’ is quite clear on its function in this 
> manner - and since the categories operate within self-organization, then 
> obviously, Reason is a vital part of a CAS [complex adaptive system]. 
>  
> I disagree that ‘ens necessarium’ - that state of Nothing [which I also call 
> pure energy..not free energy but pure energy]  - and which is the ‘absolute 
> absence of phenomena’ [ ie, the absence of th

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Ens necessarium

[Edwina Taborsky]

ere ...
> 
> CSP: The Meliorist view is that there are in the first place certain real 
> facts, which are as they are quite independently of what you or I or any man 
> may think about them. Secondly, truth, being the agreement of our assertions 
> with those facts, is something definitely one way, and not otherwise. 
> Thirdly, observation and reflection, stimulated by an eager desire to 
> ascertain that truth, gradually lead minds toward it, so that, though 
> ignorance and error always remain in reference to each question, yet they 
> become gradually dispelled. (R 953, c. 1897).
> 
> Finally, the following appears on the next page of the Logic Notebook.
> 
> CSP: Although the Ens necessarium is, I will not say mysterious, for He is 
> the furthest possible from mystery; yet perfectly incomprehensible to us 
> because He [is] supremely infinite while we are finite, nevertheless Logic 
> inexorably requires us to hold that there is an analogy,--necessarily vague 
> to us,--between the elements of our reason and Him. For unless there were we 
> could discover nothing. (R 339:[296r], 1908 Aug 29)
> 
> Peirce recognizes once again that our finite knowledge of an infinite and 
> therefore incomprehensible being must be analogous rather than univocal.
> 
> Regards,
> 
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt 
> <http://www.linkedin.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt> / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt 
> <http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt>
> On Sat, Aug 17, 2024 at 7:11 PM Edwina Taborsky  <mailto:tabor...@primus.ca>> wrote:
>> I’m not getting into the Best Buddies ]Peirce and I] tactic; I’ll refer to 
>> my own views - that the universe is a CAS, which means self-organizing 
>> …but..also..point out Peirce’s outline  of the emergence and development of 
>> the universe, which seems to me, at least, to be an outline of a 
>> self-organizing system…and not requiring an agential Force.
>> 
>> “Out of the womb of indeterminacy we must say that there would have come 
>> something, by the principle of Firstness, which we may call a flash. Then by 
>> the principle of habit, there would have been a second flash. Though time 
>> would not yet have been, this second flash was in some sense after the 
>> first, because resulting from it. Then there would be have come other 
>> successions ever more and more closely connected, the habits and the 
>> tendency to take them ever strengthening themselves, until the events would 
>> have been bound together into something like a continuous flow.” 1.412.
>> 
>> The above sounds to me, like a self-organizing system - and note that it’s 
>> the Three Categories that by their principles, are organizing the emergence 
>> of the universe. So- the universe emerged ‘out of the womb of indeterminacy…'
>> 
>> As for some beliefs being truths - one can’t rely on an ‘infinite community 
>> over an infinite time’ to define these beliefs as truths, since the 
>> infinite..has no termination and thus, no conclusion [This is The Truth].
>> 
>> I do NOT declare that my belief in the reality of CAS is The Truth - it’s 
>> just that to me, all scientific evidence shows that self-organization is a 
>> fact in the physics-biological realm - and our universe is a 
>> physico-biological realm. On the other hand -  I have seen no evidence of 
>> the reality of ‘god’.  I am aware of the vast theological treatises on the 
>> ‘reality of god’ - [none of which are proof] but are logical 
>> analyses..Logically - they can be valid; but are they evidence of reality?
>> 
>> Edwina
> _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Ens necessarium

[Edwina Taborsky]

I’m not getting into the Best Buddies ]Peirce and I] tactic; I’ll refer to my 
own views - that the universe is a CAS, which means self-organizing 
…but..also..point out Peirce’s outline  of the emergence and development of the 
universe, which seems to me, at least, to be an outline of a self-organizing 
system…and not requiring an agential Force.

“Out of the womb of indeterminacy we must say that there would have come 
something, by the principle of Firstness, which we may call a flash. Then by 
the principle of habit, there would have been a second flash. Though time would 
not yet have been, this second flash was in some sense after the first, because 
resulting from it. Then there would be have come other successions ever more 
and more closely connected, the habits and the tendency to take them ever 
strengthening themselves, until the events would have been bound together into 
something like a continuous flow.” 1.412.

The above sounds to me, like a self-organizing system - and note that it’s the 
Three Categories that by their principles, are organizing the emergence of the 
universe. So- the universe emerged ‘out of the womb of indeterminacy…'

As for some beliefs being truths - one can’t rely on an ‘infinite community 
over an infinite time’ to define these beliefs as truths, since the 
infinite..has no termination and thus, no conclusion [This is The Truth].

I do NOT declare that my belief in the reality of CAS is The Truth - it’s just 
that to me, all scientific evidence shows that self-organization is a fact in 
the physics-biological realm - and our universe is a physico-biological realm. 
On the other hand -  I have seen no evidence of the reality of ‘god’.  I am 
aware of the vast theological treatises on the ‘reality of god’ - [none of 
which are proof] but are logical analyses..Logically - they can be valid; but 
are they evidence of reality?

Edwina


> On Aug 17, 2024, at 7:27 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt  
> wrote:
> 
> List:
> 
> The point of Peirce's reductio in CP 6.490 is that Nothing cannot actualize 
> anything, so the physical universe could not possibly have appeared from 
> Nothing by itself. The reality of necessary being (Ens necessarium) is a 
> prerequisite for the existence of contingent being.
> 
> Peirce and I (and other theists) do not treat the reality of God "as a basic 
> axiom," an assumed starting point for inquiry. We have reasons for affirming 
> it, including the one just mentioned.
> 
> Some beliefs are truths, namely, whatever beliefs would be held by an 
> infinite community after infinite investigation. Peirce and I (and other 
> theists) obviously maintain that the reality of God is one such belief.
> 
> Regards,
> 
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt 
> <http://www.linkedin.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt> / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt 
> <http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt>
> On Sat, Aug 17, 2024 at 2:37 PM Edwina Taborsky  <mailto:edwina.tabor...@gmail.com>> wrote:
>> 1] The below comment about Nothing, aptly quoted by JAS, is what I consider 
>> as ‘pure’ energy’ - which must be actualized into mass to function as 
>> ‘energy’. That is. - the law of thermodynamics and mass-energy states that 
>> mass/energy cannot  be created or destroyed. The state of Nothing, as 
>> outlined below is the state as outlined by Peirce in his outline of the 
>> mergence of the universe [1.412] and is the prior state [ if we can use the 
>> temporal term] to the development of mass/energy as operative within the 
>> Three Categories.  And, as Peirce points out, this appearance/transformation 
>> from Nothing to Something [mass/energy] also- produces the Three Categories.
>> 
>> CSP: If we are to explain the universe, we must assume that there was in the 
>> beginning a state of things in which there was nothing, no reaction and no 
>> quality, no matter, no consciousness, no space and no time, but just nothing 
>> at all. Not determinately nothing. For that which is determinately not A 
>> supposes the being of A in some mode. Utter indetermination. But a symbol 
>> alone is indeterminate. Therefore, Nothing, the indeterminate of the 
>> absolute beginning, is a symbol. That is the way in which the beginning of 
>> things can alone be understood. (EP 2:322, c. 1901)
>> 
>> CSP: Consequently, whether in time or not, the three universes must actually 
>> be absolutely necessary results of a state of utter nothingness. ... In that 
>> state of absolute nility, in or out of time, that is, before or after the 
>> evolution of time, there must then have been a tohu bohu of which nothing 
>> whatever affirmative or negative was tr

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Ens necessarium

[Edwina Taborsky]

1] The below comment about Nothing, aptly quoted by JAS, is what I consider as 
‘pure’ energy’ - which must be actualized into mass to function as ‘energy’. 
That is. - the law of thermodynamics and mass-energy states that mass/energy 
cannot  be created or destroyed. The state of Nothing, as outlined below is the 
state as outlined by Peirce in his outline of the mergence of the universe 
[1.412] and is the prior state [ if we can use the temporal term] to the 
development of mass/energy as operative within the Three Categories.  And, as 
Peirce points out, this appearance/transformation from Nothing to Something 
[mass/energy] also- produces the Three Categories. 


CSP: If we are to explain the universe, we must assume that there was in the 
beginning a state of things in which there was nothing, no reaction and no 
quality, no matter, no consciousness, no space and no time, but just nothing at 
all. Not determinately nothing. For that which is determinately not A supposes 
the being of A in some mode. Utter indetermination. But a symbol alone is 
indeterminate. Therefore, Nothing, the indeterminate of the absolute beginning, 
is a symbol. That is the way in which the beginning of things can alone be 
understood. (EP 2:322, c. 1901)

CSP: Consequently, whether in time or not, the three universes must actually be 
absolutely necessary results of a state of utter nothingness. ... In that state 
of absolute nility, in or out of time, that is, before or after the evolution 
of time, there must then have been a tohu bohu of which nothing whatever 
affirmative or negative was true universally. There must have been, therefore, 
a little of everything conceivable. (CP 6.490, 1908)

My view is that religious ideologies developed to explain Firstness and 
Thirdness. [chance and continuity]. 

2] And my statement as a basic axiom that religious ideologies are beliefs and 
creations of man [ie, not physical truths or revelations from god]” …is most 
certainly NOT begging the question ..- This is a weak critique, by the way, 
since the criticism is that I am assuming that my axiom is sound and declares 
that I should not have a conclusion to which I adhere because this is 
‘unscientific and ’stops the way of inquiry’. That, I consider is illogical, 
since there are many conclusions we must make in our lives which ar outside the 
bounds of science and which we must accept as valid - we cannot function within 
a permanent state of doubt. [see also Peirce’s comments on doubt and belief..].

Plus - I can make the same critique of someone who assumes that there IS a God 
- and -  with the various definitions as often outlined by JAS. That too - 
blocks the way of inquiry.  

So- we are no further ahead in this outline!

Beliefs are just that - beliefs. They are not truths. There is no evidentiary 
proof and quite a few of them can be logically valid. As to which Belief one  
takes as ultimately valid - that can be up to the individual. I am an atheist - 
and adhere to, as outlined, the concept of the universe as a CAS, complex 
adaptive system. Other people - believe in God as an agential force - that’s 
their choice. My concern, with religious ideologies, is when these beliefs are 
moved into being upheld by Authority and Tenacity - and different beliefs ae 
defined as ‘heresies. 

Edwina


> On Aug 17, 2024, at 2:48 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt  
> wrote:
> 
> List:
> 
> Pure energy is obviously something, not nothing, and certainly not the 
> primordial "Nothing" that Peirce posits in his cosmology. As I discuss in the 
> paper that I linked in my last post, CP 6.490 (1908) includes a reductio ad 
> absurdum for any claim that our existing universe came about on its own, out 
> of absolutely nothing.
> 
> Again, adopting "as a basic axiom that religious ideologies are beliefs and 
> creations of man [ie, not physical truths or revelations from god]" is 
> straightforwardly begging the question. It blocks the way of inquiry by 
> ruling out up-front Peirce's hypothesis that the reality of God as Ens 
> necessarium is the most plausible explanation for the origin and order of the 
> universe.
> 
> Regards,
> 
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt 
> <http://www.linkedin.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt> / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt 
> <http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt>
> On Sat, Aug 17, 2024 at 10:20 AM Edwina Taborsky  <mailto:edwina.tabor...@gmail.com>> wrote:
>> And while I’m still thinking about these issues -  since I use as a basic 
>> axiom that religious ideologies are beliefs and creations of man [ ie, not 
>> physical truths or revelations from god] - then, I’d consider that the 
>> animistic theories of indigenous peoples are far more satisfying and the 
>> least harm

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Ens necessarium

[Edwina Taborsky]

And while I’m still thinking about these issues -  since I use as a basic axiom 
that religious ideologies are beliefs and creations of man [ ie, not physical 
truths or revelations from god] - then, I’d consider that the animistic 
theories of indigenous peoples are far more satisfying and the least harmful of 
all such beliefs. Why?

Because they are not transformed into political ideologies as developed within 
the monotheistic ideologies, where, for example, the medieval Church took over 
Christianity and made it a political and economic ideology where, if you 
disagreed with its beliefs, you were defined as a heretic, an outsider, ’not 
one of us’. Same with the other two monotheistic ideologies, which focused on 
us vs them. 

In my view, Thirdness and Firstness are universal and cannot be defined within 
any ideology.

Edwina

> On Aug 17, 2024, at 10:58 AM, Edwina Taborsky  
> wrote:
> 
> Gary F, List
> 
> Yes, I see your point. Most certainly, within the realm of Logic,  if X [aka 
> Nothing] equals "every instance of X that  is", is true - and you then define 
> God as an Agent that uses this X[Nothing] to generate the world…and 
> understand God-The-Agent ‘ of whom no predicate is adequately true’…then this 
> means that the created world is fallible -ie, not adequately true’. . 
> 
> Have I understood you correctly?
> 
> Now, if I translate this into my own analytic terminology - I remove the 
> belief of God [ whether animistic, polytheistic or monotheistic - as I claim 
> that all religious ideologies are beliefs generated by man to explain the 
> realities of Firstness and Thirdness [ chance and continuity]
> - then,  I come up with a view that ‘
> 
> - Nothing is to. Be understood as pure energy and the universe was created [ 
> and I accept Peirce’s outline in 1.412] as moving from the first flashes of 
> 1ns to particular existences of 2ns to their control by habits of 3ns..
> 
> - This of course removes the agential intentionality of an anthropomorphic 
> force [ God] and instead inserts physics as the agential rule, where energy 
> MUST be stored within Matter or it will entropically dissipate. This storage 
> is accomplished via the formation of normative, continuous and networked  
> habits - which suggests that energy/matter operates rationally, or ‘as Mind’ 
> . I consider this as a CAS, a complex adaptive system. - a system which is 
> intimately networked and networking, continuously generating novel forms, 
> removing others, ..  
> 
> I note that there is no specific intentional plan for this formation of 
> matter - other than, that it be formed and that it be capable of networking 
> with other forms - in a continuous and predictable manner. That is - there is 
> no reason for a dog to evolve.. but once it did, then, other mammalian forms 
> with which it can interact will also exist [ rabbits]. 
> 
> - Now-  with the emergence of humans, whose knowledge base is not innate but 
> is socially developed and stored within symbols [ language] - I’m not sure of 
> the reason for their emergence, other than their capacity to increase the 
> complexity of organization on the planet [ as well as destroy it]…
> 
> But, again, I see religious ideologies as the attempts by the human species 
> to explain the realities [ not beliefs but realites] of he three categories, 
> in particular 1ns and 3ns [ chance and continuity]…both of which are vastly 
> outside the control of humans. 
> 
> If one wants to anthropomorphize this ideology, I can see that Panentheism, 
> as outlined by others on this thread, would be a logical ideology - and fits 
> in, I consider, with the Peircean framework. I remain, however, an atheist. 
> 
> However, one can also examine further the networking of Thirdness - which is 
> a basic characteristic of its nature -  - both in its genuine form [3-3] and 
> its two degenerate forms [3-2 and 3-1].  I consider that these latter two, 
> since their addition of both 1ns and 2ns  put them into materiality ... 
> enable/establish physical, material non-verbal networks. Therefore I consider 
> it valid that an individual can ‘feel’ the presence of another person, with 
> whom they have close emotional ties - despite being thousands of miles away.  
> They can ‘’feel’ illness or health in this other person..via the powerful 
> networked ties of 3ns. I think there are too many instances of these 
> experiences to deny their validity. Some people attribute these experiences 
> to ‘god’ but I define them within the networking of Thirdness and energy. 
> 
> I also agree with you about Peirce’s extending logic as semeiotic into the 
> metaphysical realm…
> 
> Edwina
> 
> 
> 
>> On Aug 17, 2024, at 10:02 AM,   
>> wrote:
>> 
>> Edwina,

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Ens necessarium

[Edwina Taborsky]

scussion is too unfamiliar to you, in which 
> case the next chapter will render what I say obvious,) involve the 
> consequence that of whatever there can anyway be imagined of which any pair 
> of mutually contradictory predicates are both true, all possible predicates 
> are true. Now if you have ever studied the elements of geometry, you will 
> probably recall on operation called a reductio ad absurdum, where by absurdum 
> is meant anything of which a pair of contradictory predicates would both be 
> true. We have, therefore, an indirect idea, an idea of an idea, of something 
> of which both of a pair of contradictory predicates would be true, and of 
> which, as I have just shown you, all predicates would be true. Such a thing, 
> then, though it does not exist in nature, and though nobody can definitely 
> imagine or conceive of it, is nameable, and indeed has a name, the absurdum. 
> Of any two nameables whatsoever, one could be distinguished from the other by 
> the circumstance that some possible predicate would be untrue of it, though 
> true of the other. Consequently, the absurdum is single. It is a sort of 
> correlative of God, of Whom no predicate is adequately true. Of the absurdum, 
> which I shall hereafter designate as Nothing (with a capitalized initial 
> letter,) every predicate is true. God made the world out of this Nothing.
> 
> GF: Logically speaking, if “God” names that of which no predicate is 
> adequately true, it is not adequately true that “God made the world.” Or else 
> it confirms the vagueness of the word “God”, since the vague may be defined 
> as anything to which “the principle of contradiction does not apply” 
> (EP2:351, CP 5.448, 1905). I think Peirce’s point here is a metaphysical one: 
> that God is vague “not in description but in being,” just as “Nothing may be 
> defined as that which is indistinct in being” (R 611). That is why Nothing is 
> a “sort of correlate” of God.
> 
> I also think Peirce’s reasoning here is an echo of the 1903 Lowell lecture 
> <https://gnusystems.ca/Lowell2.htm#cutneg> where he uses existential graphs 
> to derive the idea of negation from the more primitive idea of the 
> conditional. But I think Peirce’s main point here is to extend logic as 
> semeiotic into the metaphysical realm.
> 
> Love, gary
> 
> Coming from the ancestral lands of the Anishinaabeg
> 
> } The creative mind plays with the objects it loves. [Jung] {
> https://gnusystems.ca/wp/ }{ Turning Signs <https://gnusystems.ca/TS/>
>  
> From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu  On 
> Behalf Of Edwina Taborsky
> Sent: Friday, August 16, 2024 2:53 PM
> To: g...@gnusystems.ca
> Cc: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
> Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Ens necessarium
>  
> Gary F, List
>  
> I’m afraid I don’t quite see that ’Nothing’ is a correlative of God’ and ‘ens 
> necessarium’ …although, the addition of ‘of whom no predicate is absolutely 
> true’ transforms the idea-of-god’ into ‘boundless freedom’.  Is that 
> understood as the ‘definition of God’? 
>  
> My understanding of Peirce’s Nothing is, as he writes” The initial 
> conditions, before the universe existed, was not a state of pure abstract 
> being.. On the contrary, it was a state of just nothing at all, not even a 
> state of emptiness, for even emptiness is something” 6.214 1898
>  
> As he also continues” Religion is a practical matter . Its beliefs are 
> formulae you will go upon. But a scientific proposition is merely something 
> you take up provisionally as being the proper hypothesis to try first and 
> endeavour to refute"” 6.216. And therefore - religious beliefs are not also 
> true or false ; they are beliefs.  
>  
> He continues with the analysis of ’nothing’. 
> “We start then, with nothing, pure zero. But this is not the nothing of 
> negation….There is no individual thing, no compulsion, outward nor inward, no 
> law. It is the germinal nothing, in which the whole universe else is involved 
> or foreshadowned. As such it is absolutely undefined and unlimited 
> possibility….It is boundless freedom”. 6.217
>  
> And " I say that nothing necessarily resulted from the Nothing of boundless 
> freedom” 6.219
>  
> See also his outline of the emergence of the universe 1.412, which begins 
> with the emergence of he three categories, in order, 1ns,2ns  and 3ns. 
>  
> But this refers to the ideological content of religion - and my point is that 
> humans have had to deal with and understand the basic physical realities of 
> the universe; namely, the categories of 1ns, 2ns and 3ns - and developed 
> religion to establish beliefs about the reality of 1ns and 3ns. If one wants 
> to call these two categories as attributes of ‘god’ - well- so be it. 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] "Is God Sustainable?" by Eugene Halton

[Edwina Taborsky]

Martin, List

Thanks for your reply.  My problem with your terminology is that, as an 
atheist, I need some clarification of how the Peircean categories can be used 
to define ‘god’.

That is, if I understand Firstness as referring to the indeterminate, then I 
don’t see how omnipotent  or science or goodness can be considered synonyms to 
‘indeterminate’. After all, omnipotent is an evaluative judgment, defining X as 
more powerful than Y. But Firstness has no activity that could be considered to 
fall within any evaluation.  Science is an evaluative and empirical action - 
again, nothing to do with the indeterminate non-quantitative actions  of 
Firstness. And ‘goodness’ is equally evaluative and therefore not a function of 
1ns.

I also don’t see how a force that transcends space/time can be understood as 
operative within the direct contact-based reactive interaction of Secondness. 
Secondness is always local and individual. Transcendence is non-local and is 
not reactive.

And no- I don’t understand evolution as a ‘continuity that sustains all’  - 
which suggests, frankly, no change. To me, evolution is an adaptive, 
interactive local action, operating within a Complex Adaptive System - filled 
with novel developments.  That is, ALL THREE categories are always operative - 
which means, that novelty or deviation exists [ 1ns] as does brute kinetic 
reaction [2ns] as does the requirement for stabilizing normative habits 3ns].

I acknowledge that a part of my problem with your outline - is my basic 
atheism. But, I don’t see how assigning Peircean categories to definitions of 
the actions of God helps to clarify either analyses.

Edwina.


> On Aug 16, 2024, at 4:30 PM, Martin Kettelhut  wrote:
> 
> Dear Edwina,
> 
> Thank you for citing those core characterizations of firstness, secondness, 
> and thirdness. Isn't the non-referral to anything else, the indeterminacy, 
> the freedom, and quality of God God's Omni-Potence/Science/Goodness? Isn't 
> the reaction/resistance/againstness of God God's transcendence of space-time. 
> Are we not denoting a general rule, a general interpretation of non-local 
> non-stimuli (vs "a specific actual noun; an individual interpretation of 
> local stimuli as referenced to a general law," when we say of evolution, 
> "That's --in part-- what we mean by God," that continuity that sustains All?
> 
> Martin Kettelhut, PhD
> 
> Schedule a time chat - https://listen.ceo/lets-chat
> 
> Learn about my practice - https://www.listeningisthekey.com 
> <https://www.listeningisthekey.com/>
> Read (about) my latest book - https://tinyurl.com/4zr7vb6w 
> <https://tinyurl.com/4zr7vb6w?fbclid=IwZXh0bgNhZW0CMTAAAR3FFVYU4--dgNytKxaLqN5pNotVbwAebAe2ysqgJdlKLqbDz0A2CCBeWZ0_aem_eChNfVwH3aV0ichfyW5IDA>
> Check out an installment of my newsletter - 
> https://mailchi.mp/listeningisthekey/real-change-real-power
> 
> Attend my monthly Leadership Roundtable - 
> https://listen.ceo/leadership-roundtable
> 
> Listen to my & Bill Tierney's Leadership Coaching Podcast - YouTube 
> <https://www.youtube.com/playlist?list=PLb-rUe-cRq5qIdoKrkMHrKCbtUndaj60n>
> Apple 
> <https://podcasts.apple.com/us/podcast/not-your-typical-leadership-coaching-podcast/id1695651436>
> Spotify 
> <https://open.spotify.com/show/4xIkFV5ZBM17I5xCPYDEsn?si=a892cec89c714f00>
> PocketCast 
> <https://play.pocketcasts.com/podcasts/0a6fac30-0962-013d-5cfe-0affe788e147>
> iHeartRadio 
> <https://www.iheart.com/podcast/269-not-your-typical-leadershi-126277873/>
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> From: Edwina Taborsky 
> Sent: Friday, August 16, 2024 1:11 PM
> To: Martin Kettelhut 
> Cc: Helmut Raulien ; Gary Richmond 
> ; Peirce-L 
> Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] "Is God Sustainable?" by Eugene Halton
>  
> I’m going to disagree with defining God’s Firstness ras eferring to 
> ‘all-power/knowledge/benevolence’, for the basic identity of Firstness is not 
> Knowledge, Power or Benevolence. But “ The First is that whose being is 
> simply in itself not referring to anything nor lying behind anything” 1.356.  
> It is
> Indeterminacy ‘ 1.275; it is ‘freshness, life, freedom’ 1.302..it is quality 
> 1.530
> 
> My understanding of Secondness is that it has nothing transcendent; but is 
> operative in the existential hic et nunc; it is ‘brute actions of one subject 
> or substance on another’ 5.469
> 
> And Thirdness - I understand as ’the tendency to take habits’ 1.243..which 
> can be considered a rational action…but its ha its are not necessary  ut 
> adaptive and evolving.
> 
> I certainly think that the rhematic indexical legisign is a powerful semiosic 
> action, but I wouldn’t define it as a ‘demonstrative pronoun for god’  - 
> since that puts th

Re: [PEIRCE-L] "Is God Sustainable?" by Eugene Halton

[Edwina Taborsky]

I’m going to disagree with defining God’s Firstness ras eferring to 
‘all-power/knowledge/benevolence’, for the basic identity of Firstness is not 
Knowledge, Power or Benevolence. But “ The First is that whose being is simply 
in itself not referring to anything nor lying behind anything” 1.356.  It is 
Indeterminacy ‘ 1.275; it is ‘freshness, life, freedom’ 1.302..it is quality 
1.530

My understanding of Secondness is that it has nothing transcendent; but is 
operative in the existential hic et nunc; it is ‘brute actions of one subject 
or substance on another’ 5.469

And Thirdness - I understand as ’the tendency to take habits’ 1.243..which can 
be considered a rational action…but its ha its are not necessary  ut adaptive 
and evolving.

I certainly think that the rhematic indexical legisign is a powerful semiosic 
action, but I wouldn’t define it as a ‘demonstrative pronoun for god’  - since 
that puts the term of ‘god’ as a general rule’. I see it as a demonstrative 
pronoun for a specific actual noun; an individual interpretation of local 
stimuli as referenced to a general law. 

Edwina

> On Aug 16, 2024, at 2:05 PM, Martin Kettelhut  wrote:
> 
> Dear Gary, Jon, & List;
> 
> Just one observation amidst this complex and charged discussion:
> 
> One (among many) thing(s) it appears you both agree on is that God 
> sustains...which (contrary to what the topic "Is God Sustainble?" suggests) 
> means 
> 
> for us Peirceans, God (in God's firstness) is 
> all-power/knowledge/benevolence, and God (in God's secondness) transcends 
> cosmic time and space, and God (in God's thirdness) is the eternal/timeless 
> ens necessarium in our inquiry's evolution (of which—I would submit--natural 
> selection, the law of the physical universe's evolution, is a rhematic 
> indexical legisign, a kind of demonstrative pronoun for God).
> 
> Martin Kettelhut, PhD
> 
> Schedule a time chat - https://listen.ceo/lets-chat
> 
> Learn about my practice - https://www.listeningisthekey.com 
> <https://www.listeningisthekey.com/>
> Read (about) my latest book - https://tinyurl.com/4zr7vb6w 
> <https://tinyurl.com/4zr7vb6w?fbclid=IwZXh0bgNhZW0CMTAAAR3FFVYU4--dgNytKxaLqN5pNotVbwAebAe2ysqgJdlKLqbDz0A2CCBeWZ0_aem_eChNfVwH3aV0ichfyW5IDA>
> Check out an installment of my newsletter - 
> https://mailchi.mp/listeningisthekey/real-change-real-power
> 
> Attend my monthly Leadership Roundtable - 
> https://listen.ceo/leadership-roundtable
> 
> Listen to my & Bill Tierney's Leadership Coaching Podcast - YouTube 
> <https://www.youtube.com/playlist?list=PLb-rUe-cRq5qIdoKrkMHrKCbtUndaj60n>
> Apple 
> <https://podcasts.apple.com/us/podcast/not-your-typical-leadership-coaching-podcast/id1695651436>
> Spotify 
> <https://open.spotify.com/show/4xIkFV5ZBM17I5xCPYDEsn?si=a892cec89c714f00>
> PocketCast 
> <https://play.pocketcasts.com/podcasts/0a6fac30-0962-013d-5cfe-0affe788e147>
> iHeartRadio 
> <https://www.iheart.com/podcast/269-not-your-typical-leadershi-126277873/>
> 
> 
> 
> 
> From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu  on 
> behalf of Helmut Raulien 
> Sent: Friday, August 16, 2024 10:42 AM
> To: tabor...@primus.ca 
> Cc: Gary Richmond ; Peirce-L 
> ; Edwina Taborsky 
> Subject: Aw: [PEIRCE-L] "Is God Sustainable?" by Eugene Halton
>  
>  
> Edwina, Gary, Jon, List,
>  
> regarding religions as ideologies, I find it most interesting, what impact 
> does each religion have on ethics. I think, the mono-religions universalistic 
> theism in general and panentheism both result to the same ethics. In both, 
> God is good and almighty, so there is no reasonable motive fore a believer, 
> to choose the evil path. This would be sin, and I think, sin is individual 
> nonintegrity: To apply double standards, to not practice what one preaches... 
> Even atheism with acceptance of the Kantian categorical imperative does the 
> same service. 
>  
> The problem with theism is, that it not always is universalistic. This is the 
> case, when non-believers are excluded, and often even dehumanized.
>  
> But I theoretically want to put hypothetical universalistic theism (in which 
> the commandments and the equality before God counts for all humans), 
> panentheism (maybe pantheism too) and Kantianism on one side, and suggest, 
> that they all deliver a motive for only acting in a good way, other than e.g 
> polytheism (e.g. the thugs, who worship Kali), or dualistic religions, like 
> Manicheism, Zaratustra, or so, where Good and Evil have equal power, which 
> might be (mis?) understood for equal rights.
>  
> I guess, if you look at a theistic religion, and want to decide whether it is 
> universalistic or not, you often will f

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Ens necessarium

[Edwina Taborsky]

Gary F, List

I’m afraid I don’t quite see that ’Nothing’ is a correlative of God’ and ‘ens 
necessarium’ …although, the addition of ‘of whom no predicate is absolutely 
true’ transforms the idea-of-god’ into ‘boundless freedom’.  Is that understood 
as the ‘definition of God’? 

My understanding of Peirce’s Nothing is, as he writes” The initial conditions, 
before the universe existed, was not a state of pure abstract being.. On the 
contrary, it was a state of just nothing at all, not even a state of emptiness, 
for even emptiness is something” 6.214 1898

As he also continues” Religion is a practical matter . Its beliefs are formulae 
you will go upon. But a scientific proposition is merely something you take up 
provisionally as being the proper hypothesis to try first and endeavour to 
refute"” 6.216. And therefore - religious beliefs are not also true or false ; 
they are beliefs.  

He continues with the analysis of ’nothing’. 
“We start then, with nothing, pure zero. But this is not the nothing of 
negation….There is no individual thing, no compulsion, outward nor inward, no 
law. It is the germinal nothing, in which the whole universe else is involved 
or foreshadowned. As such it is absolutely undefined and unlimited 
possibility….It is boundless freedom”. 6.217

And " I say that nothing necessarily resulted from the Nothing of boundless 
freedom” 6.219

See also his outline of the emergence of the universe 1.412, which begins with 
the emergence of he three categories, in order, 1ns,2ns  and 3ns. 

But this refers to the ideological content of religion - and my point is that 
humans have had to deal with and understand the basic physical realities of the 
universe; namely, the categories of 1ns, 2ns and 3ns - and developed religion 
to establish beliefs about the reality of 1ns and 3ns. If one wants to call 
these two categories as attributes of ‘god’ - well- so be it. Such seems to 
have been done in all populations since the beginning of human species - from 
animism to polytheism to monotheism - but I remain focused on WHY man develops 
religions…and so far, conclude that they are developed to explain the realities 
of[ not beliefs. Ut realities] of the categories of 1ns and 3ns. 

Edwina


> On Aug 16, 2024, at 12:32 PM,   wrote:
> 
> List,
> 
> Peirce's essay “A Neglected Argument for the Reality of God” (1908) begins as 
> follows:
> 
> CSP: The word “God,” so “capitalized” (as we Americans say), is the definable 
> proper name, signifying Ens necessarium;
> 
> GF: The the is italicized because all other proper names are not definable: 
> each denotes an individual, by virtue of being indexically connected to it. 
> The word “God” does not denote an individual, but instead “signifies” Ens 
> necessarium. 
> 
> The latter term in metaphysics and theology can be traced back to Francisco 
> Suárez  (if not 
> further). But Peirce used it in a more strictly logical (i.e. semeiotic) 
> context in R 611, “Logic. Chapter 1. Common Ground” (Selected Writings on 
> Semiotics, ed. Bellucci, pp. 264-69). This was written in October 1908, the 
> same month that the “Neglected Argument” was published in the Hibbert Journal.
> 
> R 611 is one of several places where Peirce makes the distinction between 
> generality and vagueness as they apply to the subjects of propositions. An 
> individual or “singular” subject is neither general nor vague.
> 
> CSP: All propositions relate to the same ever-reacting singular; namely, to 
> the totality of all real objects [EP2:208]. 
> 
> GF: But the propositions describing their subjects may refer to them vaguely 
> or generally rather than identifying them as singulars. In R 611, Peirce also 
> makes a distinction between necessity in description and necessity in being: 
> 
> CSP: It is the predicate of an assertion about “whatever you please” of any 
> kind that is said to be general. The subject is said to be referred to per 
> se, or necessarily. To say, “Whatever man you please to imagine is a biped,” 
> is what we mean by saying “Man is per se a biped,” or “Man is by logical 
> necessity a biped.” Now that of which every predicate is necessary, not in 
> description but in being, is the definition of God as Ens necessarium. 
> 
> CSP continues: Thus, every nameable is one of three things; either Nothing, 
> or Ens necessarium, or a thing such that of every pair of mutually 
> contradictory predicates one is true of it and the other untrue of it. 
> 
> GF: In other words, as Peirce says elsewhere, the Principles of Contradiction 
> and of Excluded Middle apply only to propositions about individual subjects. 
> They do not apply to Ens necessarium, to “that of which every predicate is 
> necessary, not in description but in being.” This may explain why “no 
> predicate is adequately true” of God, as Peirce says earlier in R 611. And 
> the reason for the inadequacy could be that what is necessarily true of God

Re: [PEIRCE-L] "Is God Sustainable?" by Eugene Halton

[Edwina Taborsky]

I think it is interesting to consider religion, not for its theories, which are 
“post hoc’ so to speak, but for  its very existence. - That is - a societal 
rather than ideological view.  WHY does religion develop, not WHAT it says. 

I consider that our species, whose knowledge base is self-developed and learned 
rather than innate, developed religion to explain the Categories! That is - the 
realities of both Firstness [ chance, random, freedom] and Thirdness [ 
continuity, habit]. There is no need to explain Secondness except in basic 
kinetic and local analysis. Secondness, after all, can be manipulated by man,  
but 1ns and 3ns cannot be so controlled.  But, all three Categories are real 
and entwined - and so - those two require some analysis to lessen stress. 

Peirce, by the way, declared, in his outline of the emergence of life,  that 
there was NOTHING before the emergence of the Categories. [[6.215; and 
6.189.1.412 etc.etc]. So, the  categories are the basis of life - and we humans 
need to live within their ‘rule’ - and so, must explain them.  [We try to do 
so, by anthropomorphic means - so that we can interact with them in consistent 
ways]. 

My analysis of the development of religions - as a means to deal with the 
Categories,  and their subsequent ideologies is based on population size and 
therefore, socioeconomic actions.  

- Small migratory populations develop beliefs in animism, where spirits - be 
they assigned to particular  entities [ trees, clouds, animals, birds] or not, 
are considered to rule over 1ns and 3ns events.  The population will attempt to 
control these actions of 1ns and 3ns by song, dance etc.

- Larger, settled populations [ ie, agricultural] will move these early 
animistic spirits into clearly defined gods. [ eg, consider the Greek and Roman 
gods]. And the populations will attempt to control 1ns and 3ns by interacting 
via festivals and..with these gods. 

- you only get monotheism in extremely large populations, which require a 
unifying and controlling ideology which all the population must follow. This 
can become a political and economic power force, where ideology becomes, 
instead of BELIEF, it becomes TRUTH - and dissent is heretical. 

- I consider that Judaism developed within a kin-based socioeconomic society…
-but Christianity, I consider developed to unify disparate populations when the 
Romans via their irrigation , trade routes and law and order, brought different 
populations in touch with each other and the population, in itself, required a 
unifying ‘Love Thy Neighbour ‘ ideology
- Islam, in my view developed as a militant reaction to the settled economies 
taking over the land base of the Arab pastoral nomadic economies.

This view thus doesn’t deal with the ideologies of each religion, except to 
examine them within their development as socio-economic productions. Nor does 
it deal with the movement of a religious ideology into a political and societal 
force - and it is undeniable that such movements do occur!

As for the ideologies -  because they are man-made, they tend to operate within 
Peirce’s Fixation of Belief, under the concept of Tenacity, where as Peirce 
writes, a man will say “ I hold steadfastly to the truth and the truth is 
always wholesome” 6.377. Of course, the truth is not open to scientific 
questions or analysis. Add this mindset to the Fixation of Belief by Authority- 
and you get a societal force beyond the capacity of any individual to confront. 
"This method has, from the earliest times, been one of the chief means of 
upholding correct theological and political doctrines’” 6.380. 

That is, religious ideologies which emerge, as I claim to deal with the 
realities of 1ns and 3ns, tend to b become societal and political 
infrastructures and not open to scientific fallibility.   That is both their 
strength [ ie they provide stability in a diverse population] and their 
weakness [ they become dogma and their protection violates all freedom]. 

Can mankind do without religion? The realities of 1ns and 3ns require 
explanation but there is no need, in my view, for these explanations to move 
into Beliefs held within Tenacity and Authority -   Instead, beliefs, should, 
by the fact that we humans have retained the capacity for thought and reasoning 
- be constantly open to fallibility and interaction.

Edwina



> On Aug 15, 2024, at 11:24 PM, Gary Richmond  wrote:
> 
> Jon,
> 
> You are much too erudite and, perhaps, more to the point, far too clever for 
> me to even attempt to respond to your message today, especially since I have 
> made it clear that I do not want to discuss religious metaphysics with you on 
> or off List. 
> 
> On List I responded to your post addressing me in response to my comments on 
> Gene Halton's  essay by referencing your earlier comments off List because 
> (a) I knew that we had agreed not to have discussions regarding religion or 
> religious metaphysics off or on List, but you addr

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Mark Token Type

[Edwina Taborsky]

cause it is essential to explain Peirce's 
> writings.  But I strongly suspect that more people (including Peirce 
> scholars) would get a better understanding of his intentions if he had not 
> coined that word.
> 
> I believe that Peirce would have written more clearly and even more precisely 
> if he had a regular teaching job where he would talk to students on a daily 
> basis.  Those few years at Johns Hopkins, for example, enabled him to create 
> a revolution in logic.  I also believe that his writings in his last decade 
> would also have been far clearer and much more convincing if he had met a 
> class of students on a daily basis,
> 
> Fundamental principle:  If Peirce had more feedback from his readers, I 
> believe that he would have made major changes in his choice of terminology 
> and style of writing.  He can no longer change his texts, but we can improve 
> the way we teach, talk, and write about his theories.   And choice of 
> terminology is a good part of that process.
> 
> John
>  
> 
> From: "Edwina Taborsky" 
> 
> List, JAS
> 
> I think JAS and I, at least, are discussing two different issues. 
> 
> No-one is arguing against the use of specific terminology, accepted by all, 
> in particular, in the scientific disciplines. And this includes the term 
> created by an individual for a specific specimen or action or..medical 
> treatment or…
> 
> Or - if we are studying one particular person, be it Kant or Aristotle or 
> Peirce - then, obviously, our focus is on and only on, that particular 
> individual’s works and terms. 
> 
> What some of us are discussing is totally different from taxonomy  We aren’t 
> talking about any one’s particular terminology but about thought and about 
> Reality, the Real world. - and refers to the processes of semiosic dynamics, 
> ie.., information or cognitive dynamics - in the physicochemical, biological 
> and social realms. And in this area, as Peirce points out - “to make single 
> individuals absolute judges of truth is most pernicious” 5.265. 1868. 
> 
> And therefore what we are talking about is Reality - and “Thus, the very 
> origin of the conception of reality shows that this conception essentially 
> involves the notion of a COMMUNITY, without definite limits and capable of a 
> definite increase in knowledge” [5.311; emphasis in original]
> 
> And this exploration of reality involves a community of scholars, using 
> reason, doubt, discussion,ie, “There are Real Things, whose characters are 
> entirely independent of our opinions about them; those Reals affects our 
> senses according to regular laws, and though our sensations are as different 
> as are our relations to the objects, yet, by taking advantage of the laws of 
> perception, we can ascertain by reasoning how things really and truly are”  
> 5.384. And we achieve this by a ‘community of inquirers
> 5.265
> 
> That is, Peirce was cautious about the individual [Cartesian] ‘intuition’  
> and reliance on personal ‘clear and distinct ideas' and instead, focused on 
> that ‘community of inquirers over time’ - Furthermore his focus is on the 
> connection that our idea has with the real world; ie,  ’the effects, that 
> might conceivably have practical bearings, we conceive the object of our 
> conception to have’. 5.402.
> 
> This isn’t about terminology; this is about the exploration of Reality - and 
> requires a community. Therefore - to examine what other scholars are saying 
> about their explorations of Reality - and with their terms The fact is - 
> other scholars are also exploring Reality; they are using different terms - 
> but- their focus and agenda is similar, and in many cases their 
> infrastructure they develop is similar to that of Peirce. Edwina
> 
>> On Apr 13, 2024, at 6:01 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt  
>> wrote:
>> 
>> John, Edwina, List:
>> 
>> Like Gary, I would prefer not to engage in another back-and-forth on this 
>> well-worn ground, so I will just offer a few comments and hopefully leave it 
>> at that.
>> 
>> JFS: The position he recommended was the Linnaean conventions for naming 
>> biological species.
>> 
>> Peirce did not so much recommend those conventions themselves as the 
>> underlying motivation that prompted biologists to embrace them.
>> 
>> CSP: The problem of the biological taxonomists has, however, been 
>> incomparably more difficult; and they have solved it (barring small 
>> exceptions) with brilliant success. How did they accomplish this? Not by 
>> appealing to the power of congresses, but by appealing to the power of the 
>> idea of right and wrong. ... [W]hoever deliberately uses a word or other 
>

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Mark Token Type

[Edwina Taborsky]

coining the new term 'phaneroscopy', but there is enough overlap 
> that he could have continued to use 'phenomenology'.
> 
> Indeed, this change in terminology for a subtle distinction in meaning was 
> perfectly consistent with the principles that Peirce spelled out--"for 
> philosophical conceptions which vary by a hair's breadth from those for which 
> suitable terms exist, to invent terms with a due regard for the usages of 
> philosophical terminology and those of the English language, but yet with a 
> distinctly technical appearance" (CP 2.226, EP 2:266; emphasis mine). He 
> coined "the phaneron" for whatever is or could be present to any mind in any 
> way because this is a slightly different conception from "the phenomenon" as 
> introduced by Hegel and later adopted by Husserl, and he renamed the 
> corresponding science "phaneroscopy" because it is more about direct 
> observation than systematic study.
> 
> JFS: It is the practice of taking the advice of an expert in a field for 
> choosing terminology for that field. I recommend that practice.
> 
> In the field of Peirce scholarship, the expert whose advice on choosing 
> terminology should be given the most weight is obviously Peirce himself. 
> Otherwise, how can we legitimately claim to be expounding his ideas and 
> applying his framework? Unfortunately, when the terminology of modern 
> research fields is used instead, it is not always clear that those different 
> terms really have the same meanings as Peirce's terms. Consequently, it can 
> be inaccurate or at least misleading to describe the resulting framework as 
> Peircean--the terminological differences reflect underlying conceptual 
> differences. Frankly, that is one of my concerns about "mark"--perhaps it 
> seems congenial to audiences today because they already have a sense of what 
> it means, but in fact they do not have in mind "Objects which are Signs so 
> far as they are merely possible, but felt to be positively possible" (CP 
> 8.363, EP 2:488, 1908 Dec 25).
> 
> Regards,
> 
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt 
> <http://www.linkedin.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt> / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt 
> <http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt>
> On Sat, Apr 13, 2024 at 12:07 PM Edwina Taborsky  <mailto:edwina.tabor...@gmail.com>> wrote:
>> John, List
>> 
>> I think that Peirce’s focus on the ethics of terminology points to his claim 
>> that a term that he uses means, so to speak, ’this but not that’.In other 
>> words, his focus was that a term has a specific meaning..and I see 
>> absolutely nothing wrong with this!!
>> 
>> My point is different - What I’m saying is that other scholars have focused 
>> on the same issues as Peirce, but they have used different terms.  When we 
>> refer to these issues and this includes within a Peircean discussion, I 
>> think we should feel free to use those different terms and thus, show how 
>> Peirce and other scholars have similar or even different analyses of these 
>> realities…even though they use different terms for the same phenomena. 
>> 
>> I think it is vital to move the Peircean framework into modern research 
>> fields; It is a powerful analytic framework and has a great deal to teach us 
>> - and to do so, I feel, requires that we use terminology that these other 
>> fields feel comfortable with. …
>> 
>> Edwina
>>> On Apr 13, 2024, at 12:53 PM, John F Sowa >> <mailto:s...@bestweb.net>> wrote:
>>> 
>>> Edwina, Gary, Robert, List,
>>> 
>>> I'm sure that we're all familiar with Peirce's note about the ethics of 
>>> terminology.  But it's not clear whether its influence was good, bad, or 
>>> indifferent.  The position he recommended was the Linnaean conventions for 
>>> naming biological species.  But very few things in the world are so rigidly 
>>> classifiable.  And those that are have been classified by international 
>>> conventions:  the integers, the chemical elements, and the chemical 
>>> compounds.  
>>> 
>>> And if you look at Peirce's own practice, he replaced 'phenomenology' with 
>>> 'phaneroscopy' just a couple of years later.  I believe that he was 
>>> justified in coining the new term 'phaneroscopy', but there is enough 
>>> overlap that he could have continued to use 'phenomenology'.   As for the 
>>> choice of 'mark' vs 'tone', I b

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Mark Token Type

[Edwina Taborsky]

Gary, List

 1] With regard to terminology - the question becomes - whose terms are to be 
used?  My point is that there are other researchers who are focused on similar 
issues, each unknown to the others, [such as complex adaptive systems, the 
development of information,  anticipation processes, the development of norms 
of behaviour; genetic developments etc and etc  - the list is enormous]…I don’t 
think that anyone can be certain of ‘who thought it first’ -and therefore we 
must use The First Person's terminology’.  Most certainly, as has been pointed 
out, when we are referring to objective sciences such as  chemistry and 
referring to empirically observable chemicals and molecules and interactions 
etc… the Community of Scholars develops the terminology, over time, together.

But- cognitive and semiosic processes are different - and as I’ve said, there 
are multiple scholars working in these fields - each unknown to the other,  and 
there is no reason why, in my view, that we cannot use their terms when we 
refer to the Peircean framework…I think we should acknowledge the analytic work 
that is being done in other fields that, unknown to the researcher, fits in 
perfectly within the Peircean framework. …And I don’t see why we should insist 
that they use Peircan terminology!

2] I think that ‘purist’ could describe Jon’s approach to Peirce, but I wasn’t 
referencing him in particular - I was referencing my view that it is a fact 
that other research is being done in the same areas that Peirce focused on - 
albeit with different terminology - and I consider it important that Peircean 
research acknowledge this work and see where these analysis, using different 
terms,  align within the Peircean framework. And of course, I always emphasize 
pragmatic applications of theory.

Edwina

> On Apr 13, 2024, at 2:13 PM, Gary Richmond  wrote:
> 
> Edwina, List,
> 
> I would prefer not to get into a back and forth with you on this matter. I 
> will comment briefly, and if you care to respond, I will give you the last 
> word.
> 
> We disagree on the matter of the use of different terms for the same 
> situation. I would argue that Peirce held that to do so fosters confusion, 
> that within a scientific community that a shared shared terminology is a 
> desideratum which affords clarity in discussions of specific subject matter 
> if and when such a shared terminology is adopted. Of course such a 
> desideratum is a kind of ideal for a given scientific discipline, for any 
> scientific community, one that is not always possible, but desirable where 
> and when it is possible. 
> 
> My point today would be that if Peirce's work in semeiotic, etc. is as 
> important as, for example, Jon and John (and I and many others) claim that it 
> is for possible future advances in a host of sciences, and if there is no 
> already established terminology in a given one, that in the interest of 
> introducing Peirce's often breakthrough work to ever more scientists, that it 
> behooves us to do so whenever and wherever possible; that is, when it is 
> feasible to use his terminology. For example, this is precisely what Claudio 
> Guerri is doing in the semiotics of urban ecology, art, architecture and 
> design. 
> 
> It is true that, in what I consider one of the darkest periods of Peirce-L, 
> there was a heated exchange of off List emails in May 2021 involving several 
> forum members including both of us, Jon and John, and several others. 
> Unpleasant things were said, not always intended to be seen by others (and 
> yet some inadvertently or purposefully were). I will admit that during that 
> intense exchange I did indeed use such words as "pseudo-Peircean" to describe 
> you, but that I promptly apologized, and that you accepted my apology. [I 
> will not comment here on the unpleasant expressions which were directed at me 
> (and others) by you (and others) in that fusilade of off List exchanges since 
> I would hope that the List is well on its way to putting that difficult 
> period behind us. In any event, I am truly sorry for anything I said then 
> that was offensive.]
> 
> If your use of "purist" was meant to describe Jon, I would say that he does 
> indeed consider himself a "textualist" and, especially regarding Peirce's 
> terminology, a "literalist"; and he has said as much on the List. As for my 
> referencing his accomplishments in structural engineering, it was meant 
> primarily to show that he has not just been discussing theory "in the seminar 
> room" (as you occasionally phrase it), but that he has also put Peirce's 
> ideas into practical applications. I'm sure I embarrassed him with those 
> accolades as he has never so much as hinted at his accomplishments in 
> s

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Mark Token Type

[Edwina Taborsky]

John, List

I think that Peirce’s focus on the ethics of terminology points to his claim 
that a term that he uses means, so to speak, ’this but not that’.In other 
words, his focus was that a term has a specific meaning..and I see absolutely 
nothing wrong with this!!

My point is different - What I’m saying is that other scholars have focused on 
the same issues as Peirce, but they have used different terms.  When we refer 
to these issues and this includes within a Peircean discussion, I think we 
should feel free to use those different terms and thus, show how Peirce and 
other scholars have similar or even different analyses of these realities…even 
though they use different terms for the same phenomena. 

I think it is vital to move the Peircean framework into modern research fields; 
It is a powerful analytic framework and has a great deal to teach us - and to 
do so, I feel, requires that we use terminology that these other fields feel 
comfortable with. …

Edwina

> On Apr 13, 2024, at 12:53 PM, John F Sowa  wrote:
> 
> Edwina, Gary, Robert, List,
> 
> I'm sure that we're all familiar with Peirce's note about the ethics of 
> terminology.  But it's not clear whether its influence was good, bad, or 
> indifferent.  The position he recommended was the Linnaean conventions for 
> naming biological species.  But very few things in the world are so rigidly 
> classifiable.  And those that are have been classified by international 
> conventions:  the integers, the chemical elements, and the chemical 
> compounds.  
> 
> And if you look at Peirce's own practice, he replaced 'phenomenology' with 
> 'phaneroscopy' just a couple of years later.  I believe that he was justified 
> in coining the new term 'phaneroscopy', but there is enough overlap that he 
> could have continued to use 'phenomenology'.   As for the choice of 'mark' vs 
> 'tone', I believe that 'tone' was a poor choice, and his vacillation in 1908 
> indicates that he had some misgivings.  That vacillation nullifies any 
> obligation to continue his practice.
> 
> Another poor choice on Peirce's part was to make 'logic' a synonym for 'logic 
> as semeiotic'.  Until 1902, he used 'logic' as a synonym for the symbolic 
> logic of Boole and his followers (of which he was one).  Instead, he chose 
> the usage for the title of books, such as Whateley's.   I believe that Peirce 
> made a serious mistake, and Fisch (in his 1986 book) deliberately chose the 
> term 'semeiotic' as the abbreviation for 'logic as semeiotic'.  In my recent 
> article on phaneroscopy, I adopted  Fisch's recommendation.
> 
> And by the way, my citation of Fisch is NOT an appeal to authority.  It is 
> the practice of taking the advice of an expert in a field for choosing 
> terminology for that field.  I recommend that practice.
> 
> John
>  
> 
> From: "Edwina Taborsky" 
> 
> Gary R, List
> 
> 1] Yes - I am aware of Peirce’s insistence on accurate terminology.  I am 
> also aware of the many different terms he used for the same thing.  I am also 
> aware of the many different terms that other scholars use to refer to the 
> same  situations as Peirce describes. My point is that we cannot isolate 
> scholars and research from each other by insisting that use only the terms 
> that specific scholar used. We should, rather, understand that these 
> different scholars were trying to examine the same situations - and should be 
> open to using  these different terms for the SAME situation.
> 
> 2] Yes - I am indeed suggesting that the focus on terminology - and the 
> insistence that one can use only Peirce’s terminology - because, for some 
> reason, the meaning of Peirce’s terms cannot be considered as similar to the 
> meanings yet with different terms used by others - - is a reduction into 
> nominalism. And by nominalism - I mean a focus rejecting commonality - aka 
> universals, such that one rejects the fact that, despite the different terms, 
> there can be a commonality of existence….This can also be known as 
> conceptualism. 
> 
> Of course - different terminology can mean different meanings….but that’s not 
> my point, is it?
> 
> 3] You yourself referred to me as ‘pseudo-Peircean. As well as ‘dogmatic, 
> idiosyncratic- and your claim that my work ‘has ‘long been discredited’. 
> 
> 4] A ‘purist’ in my view is someone who is unwilling to acknowledge that the 
> work of some scholar can be similar in its analysis to the work of another 
> scholar - but - that the terms used are different. ..and above all - it is 
> perfectly acceptable to , for example, examine the work of Peirce using the 
>

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Mark Token Type

[Edwina Taborsky]

> conventions and other gatherings because of his expertise.
> 
> And among the 44 papers of his cited on Google Scholar one will find, along 
> with the specifically Peircean ones, some papers in which Peircean thought is 
> applied in various ways, including engineering reasoning and ethics. 
>  https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=EfQhY7cJ&hl=en
> 
> Best,
> 
> Gary
> 
> 
> 
> On Fri, Apr 12, 2024 at 10:38 AM Edwina Taborsky  <mailto:edwina.tabor...@gmail.com>> wrote:
>> List
>> 
>> As an addendum - I wonder if this tortured focus on ‘ which term is the 
>> correct one’ has shades of nominalism in it…ie, that focus on the 
>> particular, the individual, [ ie the exact term]  and an difference to ‘what 
>> is real’. [ ie the meaning and function].
>> 
>> Edwina
>> 
>>> On Apr 12, 2024, at 9:32 AM, Edwina Taborsky >> <mailto:edwina.tabor...@gmail.com>> wrote:
>>> 
>>> Robert- I agree with you about examining how the ‘relations of embodiment’ 
>>> of the triadic sign actually function - but this recent debate - and it’s a 
>>> debate not a discussion’[ i.e., it’s focused on Who Wins ]- rejects a more 
>>> basic requirement of analysis; namely - what is the operative function of 
>>> the triad which is using those terms; it is instead focused solely on 
>>> ‘which term to use’ - and the focus is on ‘purity vs functionality’. .
>>> 
>>>  Therefore , as you point out, we get a focus on ‘which word did Peirce 
>>> prefer’ with the result as you point out that  “imaginary distinctions are 
>>> often drawn between beliefs which differ only in their mode of expression - 
>>> the wrangling which ensues is real enough, however” 5.398…But, equally 
>>> according to Peirce -  these are ‘false distinctions’….
>>> 
>>> Is it so impossible to state that one prefers the use of x-term [ which 
>>> Peirce used] to Y-term [ which Peirce used] because, according to your 
>>> analysis,  it better explains the operative function of what is 
>>> semiotically  taking place - without the heavens opening up with a downpour 
>>> of rejection???
>>> 
>>> I recall the equal horror of some members of this list when I use the terms 
>>> ‘input’ and ‘output’ to refer to the incoming data from the Dynamic object 
>>> and the resultant output Interpretant meaning of the semiosic 
>>> mediation….[Peirce never used those words!! You’re a pseudo-Peircean; you 
>>> are…” . But without such modernization and explanation of the function of 
>>> semiosis, and the insistence by ’The Purists’ on using only Peircean terms 
>>> - and above all, his ‘favourite terms’ - , we will never be able to move 
>>> the real analytic power of Peircean semiosis into the modern world. And 
>>> that -  - is where I believe the focus should be. 
>>> 
>>> Edwina
>>> 
>>> 
>>>> On Apr 12, 2024, at 6:29 AM, robert marty >>> <mailto:robert.mart...@gmail.com>> wrote:
>>>> 
>>>> List,
>>>> I contribute to the debate with this note that I posted on Academia.edu a 
>>>> few years ago ... at my peril ... I have not yet looked at tone/mark, but 
>>>> the same methodology should make it possible to conclude that each of the 
>>>> six types of token involves a tone/mark of a particular kind.
>>>> https://www.academia.edu/61335079/Note_on_Signs_Types_and_Tokens
>>>> Regards,
>>>> Robert Marty
>>>> Honorary Professor ; PhD Mathematics ; PhD Philosophy 
>>>> fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Marty 
>>>> <https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Marty>
>>>> https://martyrobert.academia.edu/
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>>> Le ven. 12 avr. 2024 à 05:04, Jon Alan Schmidt >>> <mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com>> a écrit :
>>>>> John, List:
>>>>> 
>>>>> JFS: As words, there is no logical difference between the words 'mark' 
>>>>> and 'tone' as a term for a possible mark.
>>>>> 
>>>>> Again, the key difference is between Peirce's definition of "mark" in 
>>>>> Baldwin's dictionary and his definition of "tone"--as well as "tuone," 
>>>>> "tinge," and "potisign"--in various other places.
>>>>> 
>>>>> JFS: But some words, such as potisign are rather unusual and may even be 
>>>>> co

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Mark Token Type

[Edwina Taborsky]

List

As an addendum - I wonder if this tortured focus on ‘ which term is the correct 
one’ has shades of nominalism in it…ie, that focus on the particular, the 
individual, [ ie the exact term]  and an difference to ‘what is real’. [ ie the 
meaning and function].

Edwina

> On Apr 12, 2024, at 9:32 AM, Edwina Taborsky  
> wrote:
> 
> Robert- I agree with you about examining how the ‘relations of embodiment’ of 
> the triadic sign actually function - but this recent debate - and it’s a 
> debate not a discussion’[ i.e., it’s focused on Who Wins ]- rejects a more 
> basic requirement of analysis; namely - what is the operative function of the 
> triad which is using those terms; it is instead focused solely on ‘which term 
> to use’ - and the focus is on ‘purity vs functionality’. .
> 
>  Therefore , as you point out, we get a focus on ‘which word did Peirce 
> prefer’ with the result as you point out that  “imaginary distinctions are 
> often drawn between beliefs which differ only in their mode of expression - 
> the wrangling which ensues is real enough, however” 5.398…But, equally 
> according to Peirce -  these are ‘false distinctions’….
> 
> Is it so impossible to state that one prefers the use of x-term [ which 
> Peirce used] to Y-term [ which Peirce used] because, according to your 
> analysis,  it better explains the operative function of what is semiotically  
> taking place - without the heavens opening up with a downpour of rejection???
> 
> I recall the equal horror of some members of this list when I use the terms 
> ‘input’ and ‘output’ to refer to the incoming data from the Dynamic object 
> and the resultant output Interpretant meaning of the semiosic 
> mediation….[Peirce never used those words!! You’re a pseudo-Peircean; you 
> are…” . But without such modernization and explanation of the function of 
> semiosis, and the insistence by ’The Purists’ on using only Peircean terms - 
> and above all, his ‘favourite terms’ - , we will never be able to move the 
> real analytic power of Peircean semiosis into the modern world. And that -  - 
> is where I believe the focus should be. 
> 
> Edwina
> 
> 
>> On Apr 12, 2024, at 6:29 AM, robert marty  wrote:
>> 
>> List,
>> I contribute to the debate with this note that I posted on Academia.edu a 
>> few years ago ... at my peril ... I have not yet looked at tone/mark, but 
>> the same methodology should make it possible to conclude that each of the 
>> six types of token involves a tone/mark of a particular kind.
>> https://www.academia.edu/61335079/Note_on_Signs_Types_and_Tokens
>> Regards,
>> Robert Marty
>> Honorary Professor ; PhD Mathematics ; PhD Philosophy 
>> fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Marty 
>> <https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Marty>
>> https://martyrobert.academia.edu/
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> Le ven. 12 avr. 2024 à 05:04, Jon Alan Schmidt > <mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com>> a écrit :
>>> John, List:
>>> 
>>> JFS: As words, there is no logical difference between the words 'mark' and 
>>> 'tone' as a term for a possible mark.
>>> 
>>> Again, the key difference is between Peirce's definition of "mark" in 
>>> Baldwin's dictionary and his definition of "tone"--as well as "tuone," 
>>> "tinge," and "potisign"--in various other places.
>>> 
>>> JFS: But some words, such as potisign are rather unusual and may even be 
>>> considered ugly. They are certainly not memorable.
>>> 
>>> Peirce famously preferred an ugly word for his version of pragmatism so 
>>> that it would be "safe from kidnappers." If being memorable is a criterion, 
>>> then "tone" is superior to "mark" due to its alliteration with "token" and 
>>> "type"; as Gary said, someone suggested to him "that the three all starting 
>>> with the letter 't' perhaps constituted a kind of mnemonic device."
>>> 
>>> JFS: Jon made the claim that Peirce used the word 'tone' more often, mainly 
>>> in obscure MSS. That is not a ringing endorsement.
>>> 
>>> It is not a mere claim that I made, it is an indisputable fact--"tone" is 
>>> the only word that Peirce used in multiple places and at multiple times 
>>> between 1906 and 1908 for the possible counterpart of existent "token" and 
>>> necessitant "type." It is also the only one that was published during his 
>>> lifetime (CP 4.537, 1906)--the others appear in Logic Notebook entries and 
>&g

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Mark Token Type

[Edwina Taborsky]

Robert- I agree with you about examining how the ‘relations of embodiment’ of 
the triadic sign actually function - but this recent debate - and it’s a debate 
not a discussion’[ i.e., it’s focused on Who Wins ]- rejects a more basic 
requirement of analysis; namely - what is the operative function of the triad 
which is using those terms; it is instead focused solely on ‘which term to use’ 
- and the focus is on ‘purity vs functionality’. .

 Therefore , as you point out, we get a focus on ‘which word did Peirce prefer’ 
with the result as you point out that  “imaginary distinctions are often drawn 
between beliefs which differ only in their mode of expression - the wrangling 
which ensues is real enough, however” 5.398…But, equally according to Peirce -  
these are ‘false distinctions’….

Is it so impossible to state that one prefers the use of x-term [ which Peirce 
used] to Y-term [ which Peirce used] because, according to your analysis,  it 
better explains the operative function of what is semiotically  taking place - 
without the heavens opening up with a downpour of rejection???

I recall the equal horror of some members of this list when I use the terms 
‘input’ and ‘output’ to refer to the incoming data from the Dynamic object and 
the resultant output Interpretant meaning of the semiosic mediation….[Peirce 
never used those words!! You’re a pseudo-Peircean; you are…” . But without such 
modernization and explanation of the function of semiosis, and the insistence 
by ’The Purists’ on using only Peircean terms - and above all, his ‘favourite 
terms’ - , we will never be able to move the real analytic power of Peircean 
semiosis into the modern world. And that -  - is where I believe the focus 
should be. 

Edwina


> On Apr 12, 2024, at 6:29 AM, robert marty  wrote:
> 
> List,
> I contribute to the debate with this note that I posted on Academia.edu a few 
> years ago ... at my peril ... I have not yet looked at tone/mark, but the 
> same methodology should make it possible to conclude that each of the six 
> types of token involves a tone/mark of a particular kind.
> https://www.academia.edu/61335079/Note_on_Signs_Types_and_Tokens
> Regards,
> Robert Marty
> Honorary Professor ; PhD Mathematics ; PhD Philosophy 
> fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Marty 
> 
> https://martyrobert.academia.edu/
> 
> 
> 
> Le ven. 12 avr. 2024 à 05:04, Jon Alan Schmidt  > a écrit :
>> John, List:
>> 
>> JFS: As words, there is no logical difference between the words 'mark' and 
>> 'tone' as a term for a possible mark.
>> 
>> Again, the key difference is between Peirce's definition of "mark" in 
>> Baldwin's dictionary and his definition of "tone"--as well as "tuone," 
>> "tinge," and "potisign"--in various other places.
>> 
>> JFS: But some words, such as potisign are rather unusual and may even be 
>> considered ugly. They are certainly not memorable.
>> 
>> Peirce famously preferred an ugly word for his version of pragmatism so that 
>> it would be "safe from kidnappers." If being memorable is a criterion, then 
>> "tone" is superior to "mark" due to its alliteration with "token" and 
>> "type"; as Gary said, someone suggested to him "that the three all starting 
>> with the letter 't' perhaps constituted a kind of mnemonic device."
>> 
>> JFS: Jon made the claim that Peirce used the word 'tone' more often, mainly 
>> in obscure MSS. That is not a ringing endorsement.
>> 
>> It is not a mere claim that I made, it is an indisputable fact--"tone" is 
>> the only word that Peirce used in multiple places and at multiple times 
>> between 1906 and 1908 for the possible counterpart of existent "token" and 
>> necessitant "type." It is also the only one that was published during his 
>> lifetime (CP 4.537, 1906)--the others appear in Logic Notebook entries and 
>> the December 1908 letters to Lady Welby, with "mark" and "potisign" found 
>> solely in the latter, although she subsequently endorsed "tone." As someone 
>> once said, "She had a solid intuitive way of explaining principles that he 
>> tended to explain in ways that were more abstract and difficult to 
>> understand. Her influence enabled him to find simpler and more convincing 
>> explanations for his abstract ideas" 
>> (https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2024-02/msg00096.html).
>> 
>> JFS: That is not a scientific survey, but I could not find a single 
>> non-Peircean scholar who would even consider the word 'tone'. If anybody 
>> else has any further evidence (or just a personal preference) one way or the 
>> other, please let us know.
>> 
>> Gary already provided anecdotal evidence to the contrary and expressed his 
>> personal preference for "tone." As always, my own priority is accurately 
>> understanding, helpfully explaining, and fruitfully building on Peirce's 
>> views by carefully studying and adhering to his words.
>> 
>> Regards,
>> 
>> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kan

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Zoom lecture on the CSP's role in philosophy of science (U Pitt)

[Edwina Taborsky]

Jerry
This section is, I believe,from 1868 - and there are more descriptions of the 
categories elsewhere., eg. 8/328 1904.

The three terms you reference - quality, relation, representation] can be 
understood to refer to Firstness, Secondness and Thirdness.The categories, are 
‘modes of being’, or the form of the substance in which information is 
functioning,  and are basic to the Peircean framework.  And he explains them in 
the preceding and following paragrdaphs. But you can also see his outline in 
5.41 and on-150. And 1.23; And 1.300 and on [1894] 1:277 and on….

I am not sure of your agenda re: icon, index, symbol…which are Relations 
between the Represetnamen and Object in the mode of Firstness, Secondness and 
thirdness [ but I assume you know that already]…

I think my analogy of the three categorical modes of chance/freedom; current 
state interaction; and new habits of organization [aka Firstness, Secondness 
and Thirdness] ae pretty obvious within an economic process.  After all- an 
economy operates within entrepreneurship [ Firstness] where novel ideas are 
generated and developed. It operates within a steady state daily life process 
of local interactions [Secondness] - which process takes up most of the 
‘energy’ of an economic mode. And - it operates within the development of new 
economic modes and goods and services - which require the development of 
new‘habits of organization’ to produce and deliver the products. 

Even such a system as the use of symbolic units [ money[ went through these 
three categories, with the introduction of the symbol [Firstness]; and then, 
the common use in local interactions [ Secondness] and the legislated 
overseeing of the common value of these ‘bits of metal and paper’ [Thirdness]. 
And now -we are developing new symbols and new habits of the use of ‘money’..as 
a symbol of value. ..

I analyze economic modes with a triad of Investment/Production/Consumption [and 
these can even. E understood within 3ns, 2ns, 1ns!!!

Edwina



> On Apr 7, 2024, at 8:45 PM, Jerry LR Chandler  
> wrote:
> 
> Dear Edwinia, List 
> 
>> On Apr 7, 2024, at 1:09 PM, Edwina Taborsky  
>> wrote:
>> 
>> And I also am a strong supporter of Peirce’s three categories, with the 
>> interplay between Firstnerss [ randomnness, chance, freedom]; steady-state 
>> interaction [Secondness] and the development of new habits of organization [ 
>> Thirdness]. One can explain a capitalist economy using all three categories. 
>> 
> 
> Your exuberant assertions are a bit beyond my amateurish  reach. 
> 
> I am curious about these theses from the perspective of CSP theory of 
> categories with respect to your understandings of semiosis and semantic 
> closures. 
> 
> In the “A New List of Categories”, CSP describes the meaning of his terms and 
> then asserts:
> 
> "BEING
>   Quality (Reference to a Ground)
>   Relation(Reference to a Correlate)
>   Representation  (Reference to an Interpretant)
> SUBSTANCE
> 
> The three intermediate conceptions may be termed accidents.”
> 
> (The punctuation is reproduced from the Essential Peirce, Vol 1., page 6)
> 
> I am attempting to sort through the terms in light of “icons, indices, and 
> symbols”.
> 
> Can you briefly connect to an understanding of “BEING”? 
> Can you briefly elucidate the threads of reasoning that connect this view of 
> “SUBSTANCE”  to the conclusions in economics?
> 
> Yes, I know that you may find these to be “Philosophy 101” questions, but I 
> have been reading a bit of Metaphysics in recent months…
> 
> Michael, your thoughts are equally welcomed.
> 
> Cheers
> 
> Jerry 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Zoom lecture on the CSP's role in philosophy of science (U Pitt)

[Edwina Taborsky]

Michale

Thank you for this excellent post. You are exactly right 

Peirce's agapastic  semiosis is a dynamic and generative process- and it 
explains not merely the increasing complexity of the physicochemical and 
biological realms [which are, indeed, complex adaptive systems,]  but also, 
explains the socioeconomic world of our species. 

As you say - wealth creation, which is all about a growth economy- - is quite 
different from the no-growth zero sum wealth transfer which is found in all no 
growth steady state populations [ before the industrial age]. 

And I also am a strong supporter of Peirce’s three categories, with the 
interplay between Firstnerss [ randomnness, chance, freedom]; steady-state 
interaction [Secondness] and the development of new habits of organization [ 
Thirdness]. One can explain a capitalist economy using all three categories. 

Again - thank you for an excellent post, and moving Peirce out of the seminar 
room into the real world.

Edwina 

> On Apr 7, 2024, at 1:57 PM, Michael J.J. Tiffany 
>  wrote:
> 
> John, List:
> 
> I agree with John regarding the urgent relevance of Peirce to this century.
> 
> I have been a subscriber to this list for 17 years (since I was 26). In that 
> time, among other things, I co-founded a billion dollar cybersecurity company 
> (HUMAN Security, also one of the TIME100 Most Influential Companies 2023). 
> Two personal observations:
> 
> 1. Agapism has greater predictive power than the "Gospel of Greed" Peirce 
> railed against in "Evolutionary Love", his fifth article for the Open Court. 
> In evolutionary biology, I think this is substantially clearer now than in 
> Peirce's time, with the careful study of countless cases of group selection > 
> individual selection. 
> 
> However, Peirce's insight is still underappreciated in today's thinking about 
> socio-economic evolution. Wealth creation -- distinct from zero sum wealth 
> transfer -- comes from a kind of sustainable generosity. There are many 
> examples of successful wealth aggregators whose success could be predicted 
> with naive selection pressure heuristics like "survival of the fittest" or 
> even "greed is good." However, those heuristics cannot account for the 
> extraordinary wealth creation of the past 200 years nor the motivations of 
> the most successful creators and the massive amount of cooperation they 
> shepherded. Peirce's model isn't just nicer or more inspiring. It's a 
> literally more useful model for understanding and predicting reality, 
> especially complex emergent phenomena (the "worlds hidden in plain sight" as 
> the Santa Fe Institute once put it).
> 
> 2. An understanding of Peirce's notion of abduction dramatically accelerates 
> understanding of the (surprising!) emergent functionality of large pretrained 
> transformer models like GPT-4. (BTW it is a CRAZY tragedy that there's 
> another, vastly less useful, meaning of "abduction" now, hence having to 
> write qualifiers like "Peirce's notion of...".) In fact, I don't see how you 
> can understand how this emergent behavior arises -- what we're calling the 
> reasoning capabilities of these models -- without an understanding of 
> abduction as a kind of activity that you could be better or worse at. 
> 
> 
> Warm regards,
> 
> Michael J.J. Tiffany
> Portsmouth, New Hampshire
> 
> 
> On Sun, Apr 7, 2024 at 11:58 AM John F Sowa  > wrote:
>> Following is an offline note endorsing my note that endorses  Jerry's note 
>> about the upcoming talk on Friday, which emphasizes the importance of 
>> Peirce's writings for our time (the 21st C).
>> 
>> Basic point:  Peirce was writing for the future.  Those of us who value his 
>> contributions should emphasize his contributions to his future, which is our 
>> present.   
>> 
>> John
>>  
>> 
>> Sent: 4/7/24 10:36 AM
>> To: John Sowa mailto:s...@bestweb.net>>
>> Subject: FW: [PEIRCE-L] Zoom lecture on the CSP's role in philosophy of 
>> science (U Pitt)
>> John,  
>> 
>> I harbor a suspicion, perhaps more like a fantasy, that had Peirce’s 
>> ‘pragmaticism’ carried the day against James & Dewey, logical and empirical 
>> positivism and the ‘linguistic turn’ wouldn’t have established the beachhead 
>> in philosophy of science that has pretty clearly, imho, led to the global 
>> existential crisis we’re facing today at the event horizon of mass 
>> extinction. Similarly, perhaps if Karl Popper had succeeded more widely in 
>> his opposition to the “Scientific World Conception” of the Vienna Circle in 
>> his day and since, the affinities of those two men’s philosophical views 
>> would have led to a radically different paradigmatic foundation of the 
>> sciences than the ‘value-free’ paradigm that apparently remains entrenched 
>> nearly a century later. I imagine Kuhn would agree we’re long overdue for a 
>> revolution. 
>> 
>> In this paragraph from his 2021 article on Peirce in the Stanford 
>> Encyclopedia of Philosophy 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Evolution of Peirce's theoretical foundation from 1903 to the end

[Edwina Taborsky]

ble effects) is either as abstract 
> qualities (for a hypothetic sign), as concrete inherences (for a categorical 
> sign), or as real relations (for a relative sign).

9] ET: My discussion has primarily been around your positioning of the Final 
Interpretant before the Dynamic and Immediate Interpretants - In my post of 
today, I outlined what I consider to be the function of the FI - and note that 
it is not always part of the semiosic action. 

Edwina
> 
> Regards,
> 
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt 
> <http://www.linkedin.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt> / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt 
> <http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt>
> On Thu, Apr 4, 2024 at 8:07 PM Edwina Taborsky  <mailto:edwina.tabor...@gmail.com>> wrote:
>> I will try to answer in pints:
>> 
>> 1] I’m afraid that I don’t see why or how an ‘abstract classification of 
>> signs’ can differ from the outline of the pragmatic/concrete process of 
>> semiosis. Again - who and how and why ‘assign’ ‘universe/categorical modes 
>> to the interpretants? 
>> 
>> 2] I’m afraid I simply don’t understand your outline - and wonder why the’ 
>> phaneroscopic analysis differs from the ‘classification of signs’. 
>> 
>> 3] There is no such thing as ’the interpretant itself’ ; or the ‘object 
>> itself’ or the ‘representamen itself’. All function only within the semiosic 
>> process. The triad is irreducible - and when we speak of the ‘inerpretant, 
>> of course we ae speaking of its relationship with the representamen/sign. 
>> 
>> 4] The above, to me, means that the relation between theSign/representamen 
>> and the Dynamic Interpretant can be in any one of the three categorical 
>> modes. 
>> 
>> 5] Sorry- I’m simply not convinced; I don’t see how the 8.338 reference 
>> suggests your conclusion. 
>> 
>> 6]  My phrase of ‘cognitive movement’ is hardly outside the bounds of 
>> understanding; after all - that’s precisely what is going on within the 
>> semiosic process. And I disagree with your conclusion about the purpose of 
>> the Final Interpretant…..I don’t agree that it ‘constrains the mode of being 
>> of the DI..and the DI contains  the mode of presentation of the II. I don’t 
>> see how this could functionally occur- and would appreciate an actual 
>> example.
>> 
>> I also don’t agree that the ‘mode of presentation/being of the II 
>> ‘constrains’ the mode of being of the DI…and I don’t agree that there is a 
>> ‘purpose to the FI.  Most certainly, if the II is in a mode of 1ns, then, th 
>> DI is also in a mode of 1ns - but, I’d put that down to the fact that the 
>> mode of Firstness has a limited amount of information [ being primarily 
>> feeling] and therefore - can’t provide enough information to the next 
>> experience [ the Dynamic Interpretant]..to enable it to function within the 
>> clarity of Secondness. 
>> 
>> So- we’ll have to as usual, continue to disagree.
>> 
>> Edwina
> _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Evolution of Peirce's theoretical foundation from 1903 to the end

[Edwina Taborsky]

#x27;s language-based phenomenology to an 
> image-based phaneroscopy was necessary to get rid of Kant's struggle with a 
> Ding an sich,  Peirce's1903 terminology was based on language, which, by 
> itself, is hopelessly inadequate for mapping the phaneron to a linear 
> notation.  But his shift from phenomenology to phaneroscopy coincided with an 
> emphasis on diagrams and images as more fundamental representations than 
> language or even his 1885 algebra of logic.  That shift coincided with his 
> generalization of term, proposition, argument to seme, pheme, and delome.  
> For example, the following paragraph from 1906 summarizes the issues:
> 
> "It is necessary that the Diagram should be an Icon in which the inferred 
> relation should be preserved.  And it is necessary that it should be insofar 
> General that one sees that accompaniments are no part of the Object. The 
> Diagram is an Interpretant of a Symbol in which the signification of the 
> Symbol becomes a part of the object of the icon. No other kind of sign can 
> make a Truth evident.  For the evident is that which is presented in an 
> image, leaving for the work of the understanding merely the Interpretation of 
> the Image in a Symbol."  (LNB 286r, 1906)
> 
> In his version of phenomenology, Kant was left with an unbridgeable gap 
> between a Ding an sich and the words that describe it.  Peirce removed that 
> gap by replacing phenomenology with phaneroscopy.  Too many people treat 
> those two words as synonyms.  But the crucial difference is that  the 
> phaneron is in direct contact with the Ding an sich. by means of the 
> sensations, feelings, and physical actions.  The images and feelings become 
> semes, and constructions of them become phemes.   Phaneroscopy is the science 
> of images, diagrams of images, and their mapping to symbols that may be 
> expressed in various ways, including language.
> 
> But language is secondary.  It is not the primary medium of thought.  That is 
> why the 1903 lectures are just the starting point for his last decade of 
> research and his evolution to completely new ways of thinking and a 
> revolution in his methods of analyzing and diagramming his own thoughts and 
> his system of representing it.
> 
> I started to write an article for the book Kees was editing, but I missed the 
> deadline because I kept revising it over and over again, as I kept running 
> into all these issues.  It eventually evolved into an article on phaneroscopy 
> for the book that Ahti was editing.  And after I finished that article, I saw 
> how those issues were related to (1) the topics that Tony was working on and 
> (2) the topics that Peirce was addressing with his Delta graphs.
> 
> I believe that if Peirce had not had that accident in December 1911, he would 
> have written an outstanding proof of pragmatism with the help of his Delta 
> graphs and the methods he developed in the years after 1903.
> 
> John
>  
> 
> From: "Edwina Taborsky" 
> 
> List
> 
> I think it’s almost useless to discuss these issues, since I’m aware that JAS 
> has his set of beliefs about the Peircean framework - and I [ and others] - 
> have our own beliefs - which may or may not, align with his.
> 
> But just a few points:
> 
> 1] JAS quote Peirce: “ No matter what his opinion at the outset may be, it is 
> assumed that he will end in one predestined belief” 7.327]. This quote is to 
> support his belief in the primacy of the order of the Final Interpretant in 
> the set of three Interpretants. But- JAS left out the following sentence, 
> which is” “Hence it appears tha in the process of investigation wholly new 
> ideas and elements of belief must spring up in the mind that were not there 
> before” …He continues on with this examination of the development of entirely 
> new ideas in the following paragraphs.[ Note = the process of abduction]. 
> 
> 2] And the same with his quotation from 5.407 “ No modification..can enable a 
> man to escape the predestined opinion"
> . Again- like the other quotation, this is not referring to the three 
> interpretants or the Final Interpretant, but is an analysis of the ‘process 
> of investigation’ - which obviously involves all parts of the semiosic hexad. 
> 
> 3] And the same with 3.161 …carrying belief …toward certain predestinate 
> conclusions”. Again, this refers to the “process of inference” 3.161, snd not 
> the Fi, and as Peirce writes, these “fresh peripheral excitations are also 
> continually creating new belief-habits” [3.161.  
> 
> I could also note that the Final or logical interpretant is, “that of the 
> conditional mood’ [5.482] and therefore, in my view, not destinate’.  
> 
> And I don’t think that t

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Evolution of Peirce's theoretical foundation from 1903 to the end

[Edwina Taborsky]

des. 
> 
> In fact, this is my fourth reason for believing that the proper logical order 
> of the three interpretant trichotomies for sign classification is final, then 
> dynamical, then immediate--since the S-If trichotomy unambiguously comes 
> before the S-Id trichotomy, it makes sense that the If trichotomy likewise 
> comes before the Id trichotomy.

5] Sorry- I’m simply not convinced; I don’t see how the 8.338 reference 
suggests your conclusion. 
> 
> ET: And - there is no argument that, one cannot move, cognitively, from 
> possible to existent to necessitate [1ns to 2ns to 3ns] BUT this does not 
> then mean that the Final Interpretant is in a mode of 3ns! All it means is 
> that, if the Immediate Interpretant is in a mode of 1ns, then, the other two 
> interpretants will be in the same mode. BUT, if the immediate interpretant is 
> in a mode of 2ns, then, the Dynamic and Final Intepretants can be either in a 
> modes of 1ns or 2ns.


> 
> Again, we are discussing sign classification, not "cognitive movement" 
> (whatever that is). My position is that the purpose of the final interpretant 
> (to produce feeling/action/self-control) constrains the mode of being of the 
> dynamical interpretant (feeling/exertion/sign), which constrains the mode of 
> presentation of the immediate interpretant (hypothetic/categorical/relative). 
> The competing claim is that the mode of presentation of the immediate 
> interpretant constrains the mode of being of the dynamical interpretant, 
> which constrains the purpose of the final interpretant. I find the former 
> much more plausible than the latter.

6]  My phrase of ‘cognitive movement’ is hardly outside the bounds of 
understanding; after all - that’s precisely what is going on within the 
semiosic process. And I disagree with your conclusion about the purpose of the 
Final Interpretant…..I don’t agree that it ‘constrains the mode of being of the 
DI..and the DI contains  the mode of presentation of the II. I don’t see how 
this could functionally occur- and would appreciate an actual example.

I also don’t agree that the ‘mode of presentation/being of the II ‘constrains’ 
the mode of being of the DI…and I don’t agree that there is a ‘purpose to the 
FI.  Most certainly, if the II is in a mode of 1ns, then, th DI is also in a 
mode of 1ns - but, I’d put that down to the fact that the mode of Firstness has 
a limited amount of information [ being primarily feeling] and therefore - 
can’t provide enough information to the next experience [ the Dynamic 
Interpretant]..to enable it to function within the clarity of Secondness. 

So- we’ll have to as usual, continue to disagree.

Edwina
> 
> Regards,
> 
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt 
> <http://www.linkedin.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt> / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt 
> <http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt>
> On Thu, Apr 4, 2024 at 12:53 PM Edwina Taborsky  <mailto:edwina.tabor...@gmail.com>> wrote:
>> List
>> 
>> I am aware that JAS’s use of ‘determines’ is not synonymous with ‘causes’ or 
>> ‘precedes’ - but is ‘logically constrains’. However, something that 
>> ‘logically constrains’ DOES, functionally operate as causal and precedent to 
>> other forces- otherwise - how would it function as that constraint?. 
>> 
>> And, to my understanding, JAS’s definition of the Interpretants includes an 
>> assumption that each is also in a different categorical mode, ie, as he 
>> says: possible-existent-necessitnat [ for Immediate/Dynamic and Final]. But 
>> this is not found in Peirce’s outline of the ten classes. 
>> 
>> And, for an Interpretant to function as ‘constraint’ would mean that the 
>> Interpretant would have to be in a mode of 3ns, [ understood as a 
>> necessitant] but, if we consider  the ten classes, then, we find that ONLY 
>> ONE of the ten has the Interpretant in a mode of 3ns. The others - six are 
>> in a mode of 1ns and three are in a mode of 2ns, ie, are dicisigns. . I 
>> think this is a key point - only one of the ten classes has the Final 
>> Interpretant in a mode of 3ns, ie, capable of imposing constraint. A FI in a 
>> mode of 1ns or 2ns cannot impose constraint. 
>> 
>>  And when we consider Robert Marty’s outline of the hexadic ten classes - we 
>> see, of course, the same format 
>> 
>> Where then is the constraint? It’s within the mediative representamen/sign, 
>> not within the Interpretants. It is this site that plays the key role in 
>> forming the nature of the sign triad’/hexad.
>> 
>> And - there is no argument that, one cannot move, cognitively, from possible 
>> to exist

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Evolution of Peirce's theoretical foundation from 1903 to the end

[Edwina Taborsky]

List

I am aware that JAS’s use of ‘determines’ is not synonymous with ‘causes’ or 
‘precedes’ - but is ‘logically constrains’. However, something that ‘logically 
constrains’ DOES, functionally operate as causal and precedent to other forces- 
otherwise - how would it function as that constraint?. 

And, to my understanding, JAS’s definition of the Interpretants includes an 
assumption that each is also in a different categorical mode, ie, as he says: 
possible-existent-necessitnat [ for Immediate/Dynamic and Final]. But this is 
not found in Peirce’s outline of the ten classes. 

And, for an Interpretant to function as ‘constraint’ would mean that the 
Interpretant would have to be in a mode of 3ns, [ understood as a necessitant] 
but, if we consider  the ten classes, then, we find that ONLY ONE of the ten 
has the Interpretant in a mode of 3ns. The others - six are in a mode of 1ns 
and three are in a mode of 2ns, ie, are dicisigns. . I think this is a key 
point - only one of the ten classes has the Final Interpretant in a mode of 
3ns, ie, capable of imposing constraint. A FI in a mode of 1ns or 2ns cannot 
impose constraint. 

 And when we consider Robert Marty’s outline of the hexadic ten classes - we 
see, of course, the same format 

Where then is the constraint? It’s within the mediative representamen/sign, not 
within the Interpretants. It is this site that plays the key role in forming 
the nature of the sign triad’/hexad.

And - there is no argument that, one cannot move, cognitively, from possible to 
existent to necessitate [ 1ns to 2ns to 3ns] BUT this does not then mean that 
the Final Interpretant is in a mode of 3ns! All it means is that, if the 
Immediate Interpretant is in a mode of 1ns, then, the other two interpretants 
will be in the same mode. BUT, if the immediate interpretant is in a mode of 
2ns, then, the Dynamic and Final Intepretants can be either in a modes of 1ns 
or 2ns. Again - see Robert Marty’s outlines. 

Edwina







> On Apr 4, 2024, at 12:37 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt  
> wrote:
> 
> List:
> 
> While I am at it, I might as well elaborate on my third reason for believing 
> that the proper order of the interpretant trichotomies for sign 
> classification is final, then dynamical, then immediate--namely, the ten sign 
> classes that result from applying the rule of determination are much more 
> plausible than the other way around, especially when accounting for the 
> possibility of misinterpretations.
> 
> Again, in this context, "determines" is not synonymous with "causes" nor 
> "precedes." Instead, it means "logically constrains," such that "a Possible 
> can determine nothing but a Possible" and "a Necessitant can be determined by 
> nothing but a Necessitant" (EP 2:481, 1908 Dec 23). For the interpretant 
> divisions in Peirce’s last complete taxonomy (CP 8.344-375, EP 2:482-490, 
> 1908 Dec 24-25)--using "actuous" or "temperative" for a sign whose final 
> interpretant's purpose is "to produce action" or "to produce self-control," 
> respectively (R 339:424[285r], 1906 Aug 31)--this imposes the following 
> restrictions.
> A gratific sign, whose final interpretant’s purpose is possible, must be a 
> sympathetic sign, whose dynamical interpretant’s mode of being is possible; 
> i.e., a sign that would ideally produce feelings can actually produce only 
> feelings.
> Only a temperative sign, whose final interpretant’s purpose is necessitant, 
> can be a usual sign, whose dynamical interpretant’s mode of being is 
> necessitant, although it might instead be existent (for a percussive sign) or 
> possible (for a sympathetic sign); i.e., only a sign that would ideally 
> produce self-control can actually produce further signs, although it might 
> instead produce exertions or feelings.
> A sympathetic sign, whose dynamical interpretant’s mode of being is possible, 
> must be a hypothetic sign, whose immediate interpretant’s mode of 
> presentation is possible; i.e., a sign that actually produces feelings can 
> only present those effects as abstract qualities.
> Only a usual sign, whose dynamical interpretant’s mode of being is 
> necessitant, can be a relative sign, whose immediate interpretant’s mode of 
> presentation is necessitant, although it might instead be existent (for a 
> categorical sign) or possible (for a hypothetic sign); i.e., only a sign that 
> actually produces further signs can present those effects as real relations, 
> although it might instead present them as concrete inherences or abstract 
> qualities.
> Hence, the ten sign classes are gratific, sympathetic actuous, hypothetic 
> percussive actuous, categorical actuous, sympathetic temperative, hypothetic 
> percussive temperative, categorical percussive temperative, hypothetic usual, 
> categorical usual, and relative. The upshot is that when a sign is 
> misinterpreted, such that its dynamical interpretant's mode of being is of a 
> different universe from that of its final interpretant's pur

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Evolution of Peirce's theoretical foundation from 1903 to the end

[Edwina Taborsky]

List

I think it’s almost useless to discuss these issues, since I’m aware that JAS 
has his set of beliefs about the Peircean framework - and I [ and others] - 
have our own beliefs - which may or may not, align with his.

But just a few points:

1] JAS quote Peirce: “ No matter what his opinion at the outset may be, it is 
assumed that he will end in one predestined belief” 7.327]. This quote is to 
support his belief in the primacy of the order of the Final Interpretant in the 
set of three Interpretants. But- JAS left out the following sentence, which is” 
“Hence it appears tha in the process of investigation wholly new ideas and 
elements of belief must spring up in the mind that were not there before” …He 
continues on with this examination of the development of entirely new ideas in 
the following paragraphs.[ Note = the process of abduction]. 

2] And the same with his quotation from 5.407 “ No modification..can enable a 
man to escape the predestined opinion"
. Again- like the other quotation, this is not referring to the three 
interpretants or the Final Interpretant, but is an analysis of the ‘process of 
investigation’ - which obviously involves all parts of the semiosic hexad. 

3] And the same with 3.161 …carrying belief …toward certain predestinate 
conclusions”. Again, this refers to the “process of inference” 3.161, snd not 
the Fi, and as Peirce writes, these “fresh peripheral excitations are also 
continually creating new belief-habits” [3.161.  

I could also note that the Final or logical interpretant is, “that of the 
conditional mood’ [5.482] and therefore, in my view, not destinate’.  

And I don’t think that there is much difference in these conclusions as to 
whether the terms are logical or temporal. 

4] I remain concerned about out the definition of the Dynamic Object, which I 
reject  JAS’s view as “independent of the sign’. Peirce is quite explicit that 
“reality is independent, not necessarily of thought in general,  but only of 
what you or I or any finite number of men may think about it” 5.408… I refer to 
this comment of Peirce only to state that the reality of objects ‘out there’ 
is, as he notes elsewhere, outside of our experience [see his explanations of 
the ‘ding an sich’ which is not the same as the Dynamic Object- which is “the 
Reality which by some means contrives to determine the Sign of its 
Representation” 4.536.1906.   And “the dynamical object does not mean something 
out of the mind. It means something forced upon the mind in perception” 
SS197..1906. 

That is, my understanding of the DO is that it functions as such ONLY when it 
becomes part of the semiotic process. 

And as I’ve said before - I reject the use of the terms of genuine, degenerate 
etc referring to the DO and IO [ and II, DI, FI] for this use of terms I think 
refer more properly to the categorical modes-of-being - and these nodal sites 
in the hexad can be in any one of the three modes. .

5] I note that JAS seems to refer to his examination of the hexadic semiosic 
process as within the linguistic realm. If this outline refers ONLY to 
linguistic terms - then, I can see his point, where, for example, the word 
’STOP’ does have a ‘predestined meaning’ . But - I cannot see that Peirce’s 
extensive examination of the semiotic process and the interpretants - is 
confined to the linguistic realm, for such a realm-of-examination would require 
merely half a paragraph - and not years of thought and work. 

But- I am aware that JAS will not change his conclusions - and I, am not ready 
to subscribe to his, so this post seems almost irrelevant, other than that I 
prefer to not ‘be silent’ about issues which, to me, undermine the value of the 
Peircean framework.

Edwina

> On Apr 3, 2024, at 9:39 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt  wrote:
> 
> List:
> 
> It is telling that this rebuttal does not address my first and most important 
> reason for equating "the Destinate Interpretant" to the final interpretant 
> and "the Explicit Interpretant" to the immediate interpretant (SS84, EP 
> 2:481, 1908 Dec 23), namely, because the terms themselves clearly imply this. 
> In fact, some of the textual evidence offered below strongly supports my 
> position.
> 
> TJ: In the Logic Notebook, Peirce offers the following very clear definition 
> of the term ‘immediate’: ‘to say that A is immediate to B means that it is 
> present in B’ (R339: 243Av,1905). This corresponds to descriptions Peirce 
> gives of the immediate interpretant as being the interpretant ‘in the sign’: 
> ‘It is likewise requisite to distinguish the Immediate Interpretant, i.e., 
> the Interpretant represented or signified in the Sign, from the Dynamic 
> Interpretant, or effect actually produced on the mind by the Sign’ (EP2: 482, 
> 1908).
> 
> Being "immediate" in this sense is practically synonymous with being 
> "explicit." It is the interpretant that is right there in the sign itself, 
> which is why the corresponding trichotomy for sign classific

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Evolution of Peirce's theoretical foundation from 1903 to the end

[Edwina Taborsky]

This is a discussion we’ve had with JAS before - and I agree with Dr. Jappy 
[TJ]. .

I agree with his view of semiosis as ’thought in action’ . My own view of 
Peircean semiosis is that it outlines an active, adaptive, evolving process of 
mind-as-matter formation; ie, an agapastic process.

This would require that the three interpretants function as capable of this 
generative, creative agapastic evolution - and this means that the Immediate 
Interpretant, which is internal to the sign-vehicle operates as the most 
immediate and ambiguously open interpretant form…. Followed by the Dynamic 
Interpretant as a more specific and discrete result…and sometimes, not 
always..by the Final Interpretant, which is a communal not individual result.

And, any of these Interpretants can be in any of the categorical modes.

The way that JAS has set up the three Interpretants, seems to me to set up an 
priori deterministic, necessitarian process, which is obviously closed [ by the 
Final Interpretant’s privileged first step role]…and to me, this is the 
opposite of that open, adaptive Peircean semeiosis.

And as TJ points out - it doesn’t make sense that the Dynamic Interpretant 
follows the Final…unless, in my view, that DI is merely a determined clone of 
the authoritarian FI. 

Edwina

> On Apr 3, 2024, at 3:45 AM, Anthony Jappy  wrote:
> 
> List,
> 
> I learn that Jon Schmid (henceforth JS) has proposed an ordering of the three 
> interpretants which differs from one that I suggest in a paper published in 
> Semiotica (which is indeed the published version of the text mentioned by 
> John Sowa in a private conversation). As JS states in his posting, I prefer 
> not to get involved in list disputes, but nevertheless will offer an 
> alternative interpretation which is dealt with in much greater detail in 
> Chapter Four of my recent book, where I dispute the interpretant ordering of 
> David Savan (the one proposed by JS). I quote JS and reply to two of his 
> objections to my ordering. These replies are sufficient to support my 
> position. First this statement:
> 
> ‘The context of the destinate/effective/explicit passage is logical 
> determination for sign classification, not causal nor temporal determination 
> within the process of semiosis; hence, the genuine correlate (If) determines 
> the degenerate correlate (Id), which determines the doubly degenerate 
> correlate (Ii)’. (JS)
> 
> Here are two premisses on which we disagree irreconcilably:
> 
> 1)  That Peirce distinguished between the logical and the empirical 
> (causal, temporal). As I understand Peirce, logic was the theory of thought 
> and reason. I don’t believe he considered that logic was simply the concern 
> of books and blackboards, rather that it was the process of ratiocination out 
> in the world and common to animate and inanimate agencies alike (‘The action 
> of a sign generally takes place between two parties, the utterer and the 
> interpreter. They need not be persons; for a chamelion and many kinds of 
> insects and even plants make their livings by uttering signs, and lying 
> signs, at that’ (R318: 419, 1907)). Semiosis, I believe, is simply thought in 
> action, irrespective of triggering agency, and a process in which there is no 
> difference between the logical and the empirical, a process in which the 
> empirical simply actualises the logical. Moreover, I maintain that the 
> six-correlate passage yielding 28 classes is also a ‘blueprint’ for the 
> process of semiosis.
> 2)  That Peirce attributed ‘horizontal’ phenomenological values within 
> the correlate/interpretant sequence (If genuine, Id degenerate, Ii doubly 
> degenerate). If such values were to be associated with the interpretant, for 
> example, it would surely be more logical to apply them vertically within each 
> interpretant division, following the universe distinction from least to most 
> complex within the possible, existent and necessitant universe  hierarchy. 
> Although Peirce states in R318 ‘It is now necessary to point out that there 
> are three kinds of interpretant. Our categories suggest them, and the 
> suggestion is confirmed by careful consideration.’ (R318: 251, 1907), there 
> is no suggestion in the manuscript that they are hierarchically organized; 
> they simply differ in complexity. JS’s phenomenological hierarchy would 
> suggest, too, that the dynamic object is genuine and the immediate 
> degenerate, which is surely not the case.
> 
> What proof do I have? None, simply, like those adduced by JS, opinions, 
> opinions based on snatches of text from various Peirce sources.
> 
> 
> 
> I would justify the order …S > Ii > Id > If for the following reasons (there 
> are others):
> 
> · In the Logic Notebook, Peirce offers the following very clear 
> definition of the term ‘immediate’: ‘to say that A is immediate to B means 
> that it is present in B’ (R339: 243Av,1905). This corresponds to descriptions 
> Peirce gives of the i

Re: [PEIRCE-L] [CG] Artificial empathy by a central executive

[Edwina Taborsky]

John

It seems to me that an emphasis on ’semantics rather than syntax’ sets up an 
analytic frame focusing only on entities operating within a mode of Secondness 
- and ignoring the mode of Thirdness operating in syntax.. 

Edwina

> On Mar 11, 2024, at 3:27 PM, John F Sowa  wrote:
> 
> In my previous note, I forgot to include a link to the updated (March 8} 
> slides for my talk on March 6.  Here is the URL:   
> https://ontologforum.s3.amazonaws.com/OntologySummit2024/TrackA/LLMs-are-clueless--JohnSowa_20240228.pdf
>  .
> 
> I also received an offline note about a linguistic theory that emphasizes 
> semantics rather than syntax:  
> The method of Generative semantics by Seuren, 
> https://www.mpi.nl/sites/default/files/2020-07/Seuren_Abralin_Article_2020.pdf
>  .  Other linguists and computational linguists have proposed, developed, 
> and/or implemented related versions. 
> 
> Methods that emphasize semantics have been used in conjunction with ontology 
> to correct and avoid the errors and hallucinations created by LLMs.  For 
> critical applications, 99% correct can be a disaster.   Nobody wants to fly 
> in an airplane that has a 1% chance of crashing.
> 
> LLMs are very good for translating linear languages and notations.  But when 
> accuracy is essential, precise semantics is much more important than elegant 
> syntax. 
> 
> I also want to emphasize Section 3.  That begins with slide 32, which has the 
> title Neuro-Cognitive Cycles.  The word 'cognitive' is much more general than 
> 'symbolic', since it includes images as well as linear notations for 
> language.  Note slide 7, which shows an image in the mind of a policeman, and 
> the attempt by a man who is trying to reconstruct an image from a verbal 
> explanation. 
> 
> In slide 24, I added a picture of a baby who is using sign language.  For 
> multi-dimensional topics, a sign language can be more detailed and precise 
> that a spoken language.
> 
> This section also emphasizes Peirce's methods of reasoning in Slides 33 and 
> 34, and their applications in the remaining slides.  Slide 35 on the Central 
> Executive, as defined by neuroscientists, shows how to avoid the errors, 
> hallucinations, and dangers created by the Large Language Models (LLMs):  
> Include a Central Executive, which has the responsibility and the power to 
> evaluate any proposed language or actions and revise or reject those that may 
> be erroneous or even dangerous.
> 
> Also note slide 39 on "Wicked Problems"; slide 40, which explains "Why Humans 
> are not obsolete; and Slide 41, which asks whether there is "A Path to AGI?"  
>  The answer to that question is joke by George Burns, which might be taken 
> seriously.
> 
> That reminds me of a remark by Ludwig Wittgenstein:  "It's possible to write 
> a book on philosophy that consists entirely of jokes."  A Zen Buddhist could 
> write a book on religion that consists entirely of jokes.  Depending on the 
> definition of 'joke', somebody might say that they have.
> 
> John
> ___
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] The Proper Way in Logic (was Peirce's Ongoing Semiotic Project)

[Edwina Taborsky]

I did not say that the Hopi way of taking about time is objectionable. I said 
that I consider it incorrect to consider that because the Hopi view time in a 
particular manner and have words for this view, that this does not mean that 
they would not understand the SAE way of thinking about time. That is - I 
reject the dominance of sociolinguistics or the dominance of 
words-over-the-mind. 

Edwina

> On Feb 19, 2024, at 10:58 PM, John F Sowa  wrote:
> 
> Jon, Edwina, List,
> 
> Peirce's writings and Jon's article about "temporal synechism" do not 
> conflict with the following sentence:
> 
> JFS: In any case, there is no conflict between Peirce's categories and 
> different theories about time.
> 
> There is a major difference between Newtonian time, time in Einstein's 
> special relativity, time in general relativity, and time in many variations 
> that physicists have proposed in the past century.   Nobody know what 
> theories may be developed in the future.   But it's doubtful that any of them 
> will make any noticeable difference in the way that different cultures talk 
> about time.
> 
> Edwina said that she considered the Hopi way of talking about time as 
> objectionable.  I admit that it's different from SAE, which is closer to my 
> way of thinking.  But I believe that there is a one-to-one mapping between 
> Hopi times and SAE times -- at least at a level that is humanly perceptible 
> without special instruments. 
> 
> And I can't see any conflict with anything Peirce wrote.  Those examples just 
> show that different people think in different ways.  I can't see any reason 
> for objecting.
> 
> John  
> 
>  
> 
> From: "Jon Alan Schmidt" 
> 
> John, List:
> 
> JFS: In any case, there is no conflict between Peirce's categories and 
> different theories about time.
> 
> I wrote a lengthy paper on this subject, "Temporal Synechism: A Peircean 
> Philosophy of Time" (https://rdcu.be/b9xVm).
> 
> JFS: Since every hypothesis is stated as a proposition, asking the question 
> "Why?" about any 3ns would lead to a proposition. That proposition is the 
> reason that explains why the first and second are related.
> 
> This is getting closer to the phaneroscopic essence of 3ns as mediation, and 
> it is fully consistent with one of Peirce's own examples that I quoted 
> previously.
> 
> CSP: Nature herself often supplies the place of the intention of a rational 
> agent in making a 3ns genuine and not merely accidental; as when a spark, as 
> third, falling into a barrel of gunpowder, as first, causes an explosion, as 
> second. But how does nature do this? By virtue of an intelligible law 
> according to which she acts. (CP 1.366, EP 1:255, 1886-7)
> 
> Why did the gunpowder explode? Because a spark ignited it. Indeed, the third 
> (spark) explains why the first (gunpowder) and second (explosion) are 
> related, reflecting the intelligibility of that relation. Nevertheless, this 
> answer does not require a verb that names a triadic relation; and although it 
> provides a reason for what happened, it does not identify a rational agent's 
> goal, purpose, or intention behind it. After all, the explosion might have 
> been entirely accidental, not the result of any goal/purpose/intention at all.
> 
> Regards,
> 
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
>  
> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt 
>  / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt 
> 
> 
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Entropy and the Universal Categories (was Re: The Proper Way in Logic)

[Edwina Taborsky]

John, list

I think it would help if you defined ‘intentionality’.   Is it involved in all 
human actions? Did the bus driver intentionally run over the pedestrian? 

Edwina

> On Feb 13, 2024, at 3:26 PM, John F Sowa  wrote:
> 
> Edwina,
> 
> Please see my response to Mike.
> 
> I used the word 'intentionality' because it (or something like it) is 
> involved in all human actions.  For example, I can intentionally walk to the 
> store.  But what about each step in the walk?  In effect, it is intentional, 
> but it's only conscious when there is a puddle or a broken place in the 
> sidewalk.
> 
> Other animals at every level and even plants act upon principles that would 
> be called intentional if they had been human.  But consciousness is not 
> necessary.  And even for humans, all actions appear to have the some kind of 
> intentionality, but the actors themselves will often say that they did it 
> "absent mindedly".
> 
> But absent minded actions are often done when people are "multitasking", such 
> as talking on their cell phones while crossing the street and getting run 
> over by a bus.  They didn't intend to get run over by the bus, but they did 
> intend to cross the street.  The steps of walking were not conscious, but 
> they were necessary parts of an intentional process.
> 
> In effect, Thirdness is involved in every intentional action.  And every 
> instance of Thirdness by any living being could be called intentional if a 
> human did it.   Can anybody find an example of Thirdness in any of Peirce's 
> writings that could not be considered intentional if it had been performed by 
> a human?
> 
> John
>  
> 
> From: "Edwina Taborsky" 
> 
> List
> 
> I agree with Mike. Thirdness, in my view, does not imply or require 
> intentionality. That, after all, suggests some kind of consciousness - and I 
> think we find Thirdness in chemical and physical matter - and these forms of 
> matter do not include consciousness.
> 
> I have a problem with the quote of “Continuity presents 3ns almost to 
> perfection’ 1.337. I think that the rules of Thirdness CAN and must be, for a 
> certain period of time, ‘continuous and stable.After all- we cannot live iin 
> a world where a cat suddenly transforms into a dog.  BUT, since thirdness 
> also includes 2ns and 1ns, then, it contains within itself, the ability to 
> interact with other units of matter - as well as chance - and thus, has the 
> capacity to accept more data and thus, change these ‘continuous rules’ and 
> so, adapt and evolve.
> 
> Again - I consider that Peircean ‘continuity’ is not 3ns but is the 
> continuous morphological semiosis formation of energy-into-matter - which is 
> ongoing [ or else, as has been pointed out, entropy sneaks in]….
> 
> Edwina
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] The Proper Way in Logic (was Peirce's Ongoing Semiotic Project)

[Edwina Taborsky]

John, list

I’m not a fan of the Whorf-Sapir sociolinguistics hypotheses…Objective reality 
exists, regardless of how we talk about it - and I maintain that its influence 
can be far stronger than words ie - Secondness has its own way of intruding on 
our words. And mathematics has nothing to do with sociolinguistic relativism.

As for time - I tend to follow Matsuno’s analysis [Koichiro Matsuno] with his 
three types of time: present, perfect and progressive, which can be compared 
with Peircean 1ns, 2ns and 3ns. …and Peirce has written about the temporal and 
spatial nature of these three categories extensively [ ie, no need for 
quotations].

Yes, 3ns includes continuity -of its habits - but, I don’t see this type of 
continuity as the same as the continuous semiosic functions of the universe.  
Imagine what our universe would be, if it stopped transforming x into y via its 
mediative  process?….But, a habit in 3ns can and does change…

Edwina

> On Feb 13, 2024, at 4:40 PM, John F Sowa  wrote:
> 
> Jon,
> 
> Peirce's observations about the human perception of time as a continuum is 
> important.  But there are many different ways of talking and thinking about 
> time.   And there are also many different mathematical ways of formulating 
> theories.  See my previous note in response to Edwina.
> 
> For starters, see the Wikipedia article about Whorf:  
> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Benjamin_Lee_Whorf .
> 
> The IndoEuropean way of thinking about time is by no means universal, and the 
> long-standing puzzle by Zeno shows that the answer by Aristotle is not 
> obvious.  It's not true that all people everywhere have the same ways of 
> thinking about time, continuity, or the relation between time and continuity.
> 
> And the Peirce-Aristotle theory about the continuum is not the one that 
> Cantor formalized.  More mathematicians today follow Cantor than Peirce.
> 
> JAS> he nevertheless suggests in the other two that its inescapability 
> assures us of its reality, and that this is the only way to account for our 
> having the idea of a true continuum 
> 
> I admit that this statement is consistent with Peirce's quotations.  But the 
> languages Peirce knew, although remarkably extensive among 19th century 
> philosophers, do not exhaust the full range of thought about time or 
> continuity or the relations between them.  And the different theories about 
> continuity among professional mathematicians does not imply that the way 
> people talk about time implies the way they must formulate theories about 
> continuity.
> 
> The best we can say is that Peirce's views are consistent with views in SAE 
> (Whorf's abbreviation for Standard Average European), but they are by no 
> means universal.  They do not rule out other reasonable human ways of 
> thinking about, talking about, and representing time and continuity.
> 
> John
> _
>  
> From: "Jon Alan Schmidt" 
> 
> Helmut, List:
> 
> According to Peirce, we discover (not invent) continuity in phaneroscopy--our 
> conception of it comes from directly observing the flow of time, which he 
> calls "the continuum par excellence, through the spectacles of which we 
> envisage every other continuum" (CP 6.86, 1898), so that "to say it is 
> continuous is just like saying that the atomic weight of oxygen is 16, 
> meaning that that shall be the standard for all other atomic weights. The one 
> asserts no more of Time than the other asserts concerning the atomic weight 
> of oxygen; that is, just nothing at all" (CP 4.642, 1908). Here are a few 
> more quotations about this.
> 
> CSP: To imagine time, time is required. Hence, if we do not directly perceive 
> the flow of time, we cannot imagine time. Yet the sense of time is something 
> forced upon common-sense. So that, if common-sense denies that the flow [of] 
> time is directly perceived, it is hopelessly entangled in contradictions and 
> cannot be identified with any distinct and intelligible conception. But to me 
> it seems clear that our natural common-sense belief is that the flow of time 
> is directly perceived. (NEM 3:60, c. 1895)
> 
> CSP: That this element [continuity] is found in experience is shown by the 
> fact that all experience involves time. Now the flow of time is conceived as 
> continuous. No matter whether this continuity is a datum of sense, or a 
> quasi-hypothesis imported by the mind into experience, or even an illusion; 
> in any case it remains a direct experience. (CP 7.535, 1899)
> 
> CSP: One opinion which has been put forward and which seems, at any rate, to 
> be tenable and to harmonize with the modern logico-mathematical conceptions, 
> is that our image of the flow of events receives, in a strictly continuous 
> time, strictly continual accessions on the side of the future, while fading 
> in a gradual manner on the side of the past, and that thus the absolutely 
> immediate present is gradually transformed by an immediately 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Entropy and the Universal Categories (was Re: The Proper Way in Logic)

[Edwina Taborsky]

List

I agree with Mike. Thirdness, in my view, does not imply or require 
intentionality. That, after all, suggests some kind of consciousness - and I 
think we find Thirdness in chemical and physical matter - and these forms of 
matter do not include consciousness.

I have a problem with the quote of “Continuity presents 3ns almost to 
perfection’ 1.337. I think that the rules of Thirdness CAN and must be, for a 
certain period of time, ‘continuous and stable.After all- we cannot live iin a 
world where a cat suddenly transforms into a dog.  BUT, since thirdness also 
includes 2ns and 1ns, then, it contains within itself, the ability to interact 
with other units of matter - as well as chance - and thus, has the capacity to 
accept more data and thus, change these ‘continuous rules’ and so, adapt and 
evolve.

Again - I consider that Peircean ‘continuity’ is not 3ns but is the continuous 
morphological semiosis formation of energy-into-matter - which is ongoing [ or 
else, as has been pointed out, entropy sneaks in]….

Edwina

> On Feb 12, 2024, at 5:19 PM, Mike Bergman  wrote:
> 
> Hi John,
> 
> I categorically disagree. Intentionality may be an example of Thirdness, but 
> is not definitive of it. JAS just posted "Continuity represents 3ns almost to 
> perfection" (CP 1.337, c. 1882), which I concur best captures (with Mind) 
> Peirce's prominent view of Thirdness, and contintuity does not require 
> intentionality. You might even diagram it out.
> 
> And don't forget crystals (and atoms).
> 
> Best, Mike
> 
> 
> 
> On 2/12/2024 3:59 PM, John F Sowa wrote:
>> Mike,
>> 
>> In every example and application that Peirce wrote or cited, Thirdness 
>> involves intentionality.  But intentionality is not an anthropomorphic 
>> notion, it is biomorphic in the most fundamental sense.
>> 
>> Lynn Margulis wrote that a bacterium swimming upstream in a glucose gradient 
>> is a primitive example of intentionality, and no non-living physical system 
>> shows any kind of intentionality,  I believe that Peirce would agree, since 
>> he cited dogs, parrots, bees, and even plants at various times.
>> 
>> And by the way, viruses don't have intentions, since they're not alive.   
>> They are signs that are interpreted by living things to produce more signs 
>> of the same kind.
>> 
>> John
>>  
>> 
>> From: "Mike Bergman"  
>> Hi Edwina, Helmut, List,
>> 
>> I would like to hear you expand, Edwina, on what you mean about the 
>> 'idexicality of locality'. And, speaking of entropy, here is another 
>> possible link to the universal categories.
>> 
>> flash (of light) [1ns] - energy [2ns] - information [3ns]
>> 
>> I've been toying with this thought for quite a few years. Peirce's cosmogony 
>> begins with a flash (significantly a reference to light). I don't know if 
>> 'flash' is the right analog in Firstness, since both quantum mechanics and 
>> the nature of energy can arguably be better traced to the ideas of harmonic 
>> oscillators. Still, there is something pregnant in that nexus . . . .
>> 
>> For decades there has been confusion and controversy about entropy in the 
>> sense of thermodynamics and its relation to Shannon (information) entropy. 
>> It strikes me that recasting these in terms of Peircean Secondness (energy) 
>> and Thirdness (information) brings sense to the conundrum. Both apply; it is 
>> more a matter of contextual interpretation.
>> 
>> What say the list?
>> 
>> Thanks!
>> 
>> Best, Mike
>> 
> -- 
> __
> 
> Michael K. Bergman
> 319.621.5225
> http://mkbergman.com 
> http://www.linkedin.com/in/mkbergman
> __ 
> _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Entropy and the Universal Categories (was Re: The Proper Way in Logic)

[Edwina Taborsky]

Mike, list

I’d define energy as 1ns, with matter being 2ns, and information as these units 
of 2ns defined within 3ns.

By ‘indexicality of locality, I mean that matter functions only within 
relations with other matter . That is, there is no such thing as an 
entity/unit//Sign, that is isolate. Everything is networked and in relationship 
with other enities/units//Signs - and thus, is local in real spatial and 
temporal terms. I think that is part of Stjernfelt’s argument on the Dicisign 
which rejects linguistic and psychological factors in the formation of a Sign 
[triad] and focuses on the physical, or indexical connection. 

I don’t reference my papers here, but, I can send you a recent one on ‘Peircean 
 Semiosis as the transformation of Eerngy and Matter’.  [If I can find it - I’m 
very sloppy with storing papers - both hard copies and online]. 

Edwina

> On Feb 12, 2024, at 12:53 PM, Mike Bergman  wrote:
> 
> Hi Edwina, Helmut, List,
> 
> I would like to hear you expand, Edwina, on what you mean about the 
> 'idexicality of locality'. And, speaking of entropy, here is another possible 
> link to the universal categories.
> 
> flash (of light) [1ns] - energy [2ns] - information [3ns]
> 
> I've been toying with this thought for quite a few years. Peirce's cosmogony 
> begins with a flash (significantly a reference to light). I don't know if 
> 'flash' is the right analog in Firstness, since both quantum mechanics and 
> the nature of energy can arguably be better traced to the ideas of harmonic 
> oscillators. Still, there is something pregnant in that nexus . . . .
> 
> For decades there has been confusion and controversy about entropy in the 
> sense of thermodynamics and its relation to Shannon (information) entropy. It 
> strikes me that recasting these in terms of Peircean Secondness (energy) and 
> Thirdness (information) brings sense to the conundrum. Both apply; it is more 
> a matter of contextual interpretation.
> 
> What say the list?
> 
> Thanks!
> 
> Best, Mike
> 
> On 2/12/2024 11:31 AM, Edwina Taborsky wrote:
>> Helmut - I agree with your outline, where the three categories are operative 
>> within continuity. But what is continuity? 
>> 
>> I consider it as the basic ‘force’ of the universe to ‘exist as signs [ ie 
>> discrete entities]. , This force, which Peirce variously called Mind, 
>> Nature, God, means that the energy that IS the universe functions as a 
>> ‘rational action’ [ie Mind] by constantly transforming itself into ever more 
>> complex networked discreteness, operative within evolving 
>> habits-of-formation [and chance!]. There is no final perfection, because of 
>> the realities of both 2ns and 1ns which introduce freedom and variation and, 
>> importantly, the indexicality of locality. 
>> 
>> If we consider the basic identity of the universe as E=MC2 [ and I think we 
>> have to accept this!] then it can be understood that Energy is transforming 
>> into Matter — within a rational, networked, ordered manner - to prevent, as 
>> Michael pointed out, thermodynamic entropy.  It is this 
>> ‘force-of-transformation’ that I consider as the definition of ‘continuity. 
>> After all - without it - thermodynamics, as Michael pointed out, jumps 
>> in..and….
>> 
>> Edwina
>> 
>>> On Feb 12, 2024, at 12:01 PM, Helmut Raulien  
>>> <mailto:h.raul...@gmx.de> wrote:
>>> 
>>>  
>>> List, I think, we can prescind discreteness from continuity, e.g. by 
>>> supposing the formation of attractors, or coagulation, or reentry (logical 
>>> or actual loops), but we cannot prescind continuity from discreteness. So 
>>> everything including thirdness is at first based on continuity, even if it 
>>> requires discreteness. I think, that thirdness requires discreteness, 
>>> because a relation as part of structure, and a habit too, can and has to be 
>>> prescinded (or discriminated, or dissociated) as something discrete from 
>>> continuity, to logically handle it.
>>>  
>>> Best, Helmut
>>>  
>>> Gesendet: Montag, 12. Februar 2024 um 03:07 Uhr
>>> Von: "Edwina Taborsky"  <mailto:tabor...@primus.ca>
>>> An: "Peirce-L"  <mailto:peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>
>>> Cc: "Edwina Taborsky"  
>>> <mailto:edwina.tabor...@gmail.com>
>>> Betreff: Re: [PEIRCE-L] The Proper Way in Logic (was Peirce's Ongoing 
>>> Semiotic Project)
>>> List-  I don’t see synergism as equivalent to Thirdness, for Thirdness is 
>>> the establishment of habits, ie, habitual ‘modes of being’ - which habits 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] The Proper Way in Logic (was Peirce's Ongoing Semiotic Project)

[Edwina Taborsky]

Helmut - I agree with your outline, where the three categories are operative 
within continuity. But what is continuity? 

I consider it as the basic ‘force’ of the universe to ‘exist as signs [ ie 
discrete entities]. , This force, which Peirce variously called Mind, Nature, 
God, means that the energy that IS the universe functions as a ‘rational 
action’ [ie Mind] by constantly transforming itself into ever more complex 
networked discreteness, operative within evolving habits-of-formation [and 
chance!]. There is no final perfection, because of the realities of both 2ns 
and 1ns which introduce freedom and variation and, importantly, the 
indexicality of locality. 

If we consider the basic identity of the universe as E=MC2 [ and I think we 
have to accept this!] then it can be understood that Energy is transforming 
into Matter — within a rational, networked, ordered manner - to prevent, as 
Michael pointed out, thermodynamic entropy.  It is this 
‘force-of-transformation’ that I consider as the definition of ‘continuity. 
After all - without it - thermodynamics, as Michael pointed out, jumps in..and….

Edwina

> On Feb 12, 2024, at 12:01 PM, Helmut Raulien  wrote:
> 
>  
> List, I think, we can prescind discreteness from continuity, e.g. by 
> supposing the formation of attractors, or coagulation, or reentry (logical or 
> actual loops), but we cannot prescind continuity from discreteness. So 
> everything including thirdness is at first based on continuity, even if it 
> requires discreteness. I think, that thirdness requires discreteness, because 
> a relation as part of structure, and a habit too, can and has to be 
> prescinded (or discriminated, or dissociated) as something discrete from 
> continuity, to logically handle it.
>  
> Best, Helmut
>  
> Gesendet: Montag, 12. Februar 2024 um 03:07 Uhr
> Von: "Edwina Taborsky" 
> An: "Peirce-L" 
> Cc: "Edwina Taborsky" 
> Betreff: Re: [PEIRCE-L] The Proper Way in Logic (was Peirce's Ongoing 
> Semiotic Project)
> List-  I don’t see synergism as equivalent to Thirdness, for Thirdness is the 
> establishment of habits, ie, habitual ‘modes of being’ - which habits are 
> established by and within the universe in conjunction with the modes of both 
> Firstness and Secondness. . 
>  
> Instead, synergism, or continuity, seems to me, more akin to the concept of 
> free energy…the genuinely general, so to speak - and this free energy is the 
> basis of our universe> “Continuity is nothing but perfect generality of a law 
> of relationship” 6.170. See also his outline of ’The Logic of th Universe 
> 6.189, where, again, continuity is understood as ‘generality’. This is not 
> the same as the general laws of Thirdness which are generated within and by 
> the universe for the maintenance of its reality as material exiistentiality. 
>  
> As he writes, the universe, made up of Secondness or discrete entities, began 
> ‘in the utter vagueness of completely undetermined and dimensionless 
> potentiality” 6.193.  This, to me, is not Thirdness. It is free energy. 
> ..which I see as continuity/synechism. 
>  
> Jerry- I’m sorry, but you’ve lost me - I’ve no idea what you are referring to 
> .
>  
> Edwina
>  
>  
>  
> Again, my understanding of this is that 
> On Feb 11, 2024, at 8:41 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt  
> wrote:
>  
> Mike:
>  
> I do not know what you mean by "penultimate" in this context. As I have said 
> on the List many times before, as well as in my published work, my 
> understanding of synechism as applied in metaphysics is that the entire 
> universe is an inexhaustible continuum (3ns) of indefinite possibilities 
> (1ns), some of which are actualized (2ns). Again, discrete things and their 
> dyadic reactions, as well as monadic qualities and their inherence in 
> discrete things, are degenerate outcomes of continuous and triadic semiosis.
>  
> Regards,
>  
> Jon
>  
>  
> On Sun, Feb 11, 2024 at 5:15 PM Mike Bergman  <mailto:m...@mkbergman.com>> wrote:
>> Hi Jon,
>> 
>> To quibble, I see synechism and its great definer of continuity as the 
>> guiding principle of Thirdness (as I think Peirce did, too). It can't be 
>> elevated to the penultimate, because our operative world also requires the 
>> discrete and discontinuous. (Enter 2nd law of thermodynamics stage left.)
>> 
>> Best, Mike
>> 
>> On 2/11/2024 5:03 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt wrote:
>> Mike:
>>  
>> I am glad that we agree on that point. I also agree that it is a mistake to 
>> treat semiosis as the most fundamental aspect of Peirce's philosophy, and 
>> that his three universal categories--firmly grounded in both the 
>> hypothetical scie

Re: [PEIRCE-L] The Proper Way in Logic (was Peirce's Ongoing Semiotic Project)

[Edwina Taborsky]

List-  I don’t see synergism as equivalent to Thirdness, for Thirdness is the 
establishment of habits, ie, habitual ‘modes of being’ - which habits are 
established by and within the universe in conjunction with the modes of both 
Firstness and Secondness. . 

Instead, synergism, or continuity, seems to me, more akin to the concept of 
free energy…the genuinely general, so to speak - and this free energy is the 
basis of our universe> “Continuity is nothing but perfect generality of a law 
of relationship” 6.170. See also his outline of ’The Logic of th Universe 
6.189, where, again, continuity is understood as ‘generality’. This is not the 
same as the general laws of Thirdness which are generated within and by the 
universe for the maintenance of its reality as material exiistentiality. 

As he writes, the universe, made up of Secondness or discrete entities, began 
‘in the utter vagueness of completely undetermined and dimensionless 
potentiality” 6.193.  This, to me, is not Thirdness. It is free energy. ..which 
I see as continuity/synechism. 

Jerry- I’m sorry, but you’ve lost me - I’ve no idea what you are referring to .

Edwina



Again, my understanding of this is that 
> On Feb 11, 2024, at 8:41 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt  
> wrote:
> 
> Mike:
> 
> I do not know what you mean by "penultimate" in this context. As I have said 
> on the List many times before, as well as in my published work, my 
> understanding of synechism as applied in metaphysics is that the entire 
> universe is an inexhaustible continuum (3ns) of indefinite possibilities 
> (1ns), some of which are actualized (2ns). Again, discrete things and their 
> dyadic reactions, as well as monadic qualities and their inherence in 
> discrete things, are degenerate outcomes of continuous and triadic semiosis.
> 
> Regards,
> 
> Jon
> 
> On Sun, Feb 11, 2024 at 5:15 PM Mike Bergman  > wrote:
>> Hi Jon,
>> 
>> To quibble, I see synechism and its great definer of continuity as the 
>> guiding principle of Thirdness (as I think Peirce did, too). It can't be 
>> elevated to the penultimate, because our operative world also requires the 
>> discrete and discontinuous. (Enter 2nd law of thermodynamics stage left.)
>> 
>> Best, Mike
>> 
>> On 2/11/2024 5:03 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt wrote:
>>> Mike:
>>> 
>>> I am glad that we agree on that point. I also agree that it is a mistake to 
>>> treat semiosis as the most fundamental aspect of Peirce's philosophy, and 
>>> that his three universal categories--firmly grounded in both the 
>>> hypothetical science of mathematics and the primal positive science of 
>>> phaneroscopy--are even more central, especially as an organizing principle.
>>> 
>>> However, Peirce's preference to call his overall system of thought 
>>> synechism suggests that he regarded "continuity as an idea of prime 
>>> importance in philosophy" (CP 6.103, EP 1:313, 1892)--especially since he 
>>> also stated, "I carry the doctrine so far as to maintain that continuity 
>>> governs the whole domain of experience in every element of it" (CP 7.566, 
>>> EP 2:1, 1893). This has implications for semiosis as I have already 
>>> outlined, as well as the categories--1ns is prescinded from 2ns and 3ns, 
>>> and 2ns is prescinded from 3ns; but 2ns cannot be built up from 1ns, and 
>>> 3ns cannot be built up from 1ns and 2ns.
>>> 
>>> Regards,
>>> 
>>> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
>>> Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
>>> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt 
>>>  / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt 
>>> 
>>> On Sun, Feb 11, 2024 at 3:13 PM Mike Bergman >> > wrote:
 Hi Jon,
 
 Here is a point with which I have vehement agreement with you (dare I say 
 I suspect Edwina does as well):
 
 
> What I can say is that I obviously disagree with anyone who confines 
> semiosis to the biological realm, since I maintain with Peirce that the 
> entire universe is "a vast representamen" that is "perfused with signs, 
> if it is not composed exclusively of signs."
 Further keys to this assertion are found in Peirce's writings on 
 evolution, emergence, cosmogony, and his anticipation of the quantum vs 
 the classical. These are a focus of my current studies.
 One of the bones I have to pick with many scholars of semiosis is their 
 too literal restriction to human signs and perhaps even elevating semiosis 
 as a Peircean thesis first among others. I have found the universal 
 categories to be a more robust grounding to generalize to the entirety of 
 Nature and its manifestations.
 
 Best, Mike
 
>> -- 
>> __
>> 
>> Michael K. Bergman
>> 319.621.5225
>> http://mkbergman.com 
>> http://www.linkedin.com/in/mkbergman
>> __ 
>>

Re: [PEIRCE-L] The Proper Way in Logic (was Peirce's Ongoing Semiotic Project)

[Edwina Taborsky]

Mike list

I agree with your comments. Synechism is the functionality of Thirdness [the 
becoming governed by laws} 5.4] - and isn’t the penultimate, because, just as 
you say - the world requires the discrete and discontinuousness of ontological 
Secondness [entropy] and also- the chance functions of Firstness. 

Indeed, Peirce in his critique of Hegel, considered that Thirdness “is an 
essential ingredient of reality, yet does not by itself constitute reality, 
since this category [which in that cosmology appears as the element of habit] 
can have no concrete being without action, as a separate object on which to 
work its government, just as action cannot exist without the immediate being of 
feeling on which to act” 5.436….and Peirce continues that he differs from 
Hegel’s  ‘absolute idealism’. By which “it is sundered by its vigorous denial 
that the third category [which Hegel degrades to a mere stage of thinking] 
suffices to make the world “…and Pierce also rejects Hegels’ rejection of ’the 
first two stages [ ie 1ns and 2ns].

Edwina



> On Feb 11, 2024, at 6:14 PM, Mike Bergman  wrote:
> 
> Hi Jon,
> 
> To quibble, I see synechism and its great definer of continuity as the 
> guiding principle of Thirdness (as I think Peirce did, too). It can't be 
> elevated to the penultimate, because our operative world also requires the 
> discrete and discontinuous. (Enter 2nd law of thermodynamics stage left.)
> 
> Best, Mike
> 
> On 2/11/2024 5:03 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt wrote:
>> Mike:
>> 
>> I am glad that we agree on that point. I also agree that it is a mistake to 
>> treat semiosis as the most fundamental aspect of Peirce's philosophy, and 
>> that his three universal categories--firmly grounded in both the 
>> hypothetical science of mathematics and the primal positive science of 
>> phaneroscopy--are even more central, especially as an organizing principle.
>> 
>> However, Peirce's preference to call his overall system of thought synechism 
>> suggests that he regarded "continuity as an idea of prime importance in 
>> philosophy" (CP 6.103, EP 1:313, 1892)--especially since he also stated, "I 
>> carry the doctrine so far as to maintain that continuity governs the whole 
>> domain of experience in every element of it" (CP 7.566, EP 2:1, 1893). This 
>> has implications for semiosis as I have already outlined, as well as the 
>> categories--1ns is prescinded from 2ns and 3ns, and 2ns is prescinded from 
>> 3ns; but 2ns cannot be built up from 1ns, and 3ns cannot be built up from 
>> 1ns and 2ns.
>> 
>> Regards,
>> 
>> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
>> Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
>> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt 
>>  / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt 
>> 
>> On Sun, Feb 11, 2024 at 3:13 PM Mike Bergman > > wrote:
>>> Hi Jon,
>>> 
>>> Here is a point with which I have vehement agreement with you (dare I say I 
>>> suspect Edwina does as well):
>>> 
>>> 
 What I can say is that I obviously disagree with anyone who confines 
 semiosis to the biological realm, since I maintain with Peirce that the 
 entire universe is "a vast representamen" that is "perfused with signs, if 
 it is not composed exclusively of signs."
>>> Further keys to this assertion are found in Peirce's writings on evolution, 
>>> emergence, cosmogony, and his anticipation of the quantum vs the classical. 
>>> These are a focus of my current studies.
>>> One of the bones I have to pick with many scholars of semiosis is their too 
>>> literal restriction to human signs and perhaps even elevating semiosis as a 
>>> Peircean thesis first among others. I have found the universal categories 
>>> to be a more robust grounding to generalize to the entirety of Nature and 
>>> its manifestations.
>>> 
>>> Best, Mike
>>> 
>> 
>> 
>> _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
>> ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at 
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> -- 
> __
> 
> Michael K. Bergman
> 319.621.5225
> http://mkbergman.com 
> http://www.linkedin.com/in/mkbergman
> __ 
> _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

Re: [PEIRCE-L] The Proper Way in Logic (was Peirce's Ongoing Semiotic Project)

[Edwina Taborsky]

List

I am unaware of anyone who "confines semiosis to the biological realm”!! Never 
heard of such a thing!  But, of course, there are many who confine semiosis to 
the human mind realm - and many who reject the operation of semiosis within the 
physicochemical realms.

As I’ve said - my point is that there are many researchers who are actually 
examining the semiotic function within non-human realms - but are not using 
Peircean terms.  The difficulty, as I’ve said, of accessing and deciphering the 
Peircean texts - as well as the isolationism of the Peircean community - has, I 
think, led to this separation. 

I think it would be instructive for Peirceans to actually explore the work 
being done in biological, physico-chemical and AI areas and see how- using 
different terms from Peirce - there are strong correlations to Peirce in their 
arguments. The additional emphasis in their work on material, concrete 
examples, is, I feel, extremely helpful in moving Peircean analysis from the 
purely argumentative and hypothetical into the pragmatic realism that, after 
all, was Peirce’s basic agenda.

Edwina



> On Feb 11, 2024, at 3:50 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt  
> wrote:
> 
> Gary, List:
> 
> It has been several years since I read Natural Propositions, so I will not be 
> able to comment on it specifically, although Stjernfelt's more recent book 
> includes examples like fireflies glowing and bees dancing. What I can say is 
> that I obviously disagree with anyone who confines semiosis to the biological 
> realm, since I maintain with Peirce that the entire universe is "a vast 
> representamen" that is "perfused with signs, if it is not composed 
> exclusively of signs." I take the additional step, fully consistent with his 
> overarching synechism though never explicitly expressed in his writings, of 
> conceiving it as a semiosic continuum--an ongoing inferential process whose 
> parts are likewise signs, but indefinite unless and until they are 
> deliberately marked off for a purpose. The analysis of propositions is one 
> such purpose; after all ...
> 
> CSP: What we call a "fact" is something having the structure of a 
> proposition, but supposed to be an element of the very universe itself. The 
> purpose of every sign is to express "fact," and by being joined with other 
> signs, to approach as nearly as possible to determining an interpretant which 
> would be the perfect Truth, the absolute Truth, and as such (at least, we may 
> use this language) would be the very Universe. (EP 2:304, c. 1901)
> 
> If the universe consists entirely of signs, and the purpose of every sign is 
> to express fact, and a fact is an element of the universe itself that has the 
> structure of a proposition, then the importance of understanding the 
> structure of a proposition should be obvious. Moreover ...
> 
> CSP: A state of things is an abstract constituent part of reality, of such a 
> nature that a proposition is needed to represent it. There is but one 
> individual, or completely determinate, state of things, namely, the all of 
> reality. A fact is so highly a prescissively abstract state of things, that 
> it can be wholly represented in a simple proposition, and the term "simple," 
> here, has no absolute meaning, but is merely a comparative expression. (CP 
> 5.549, EP 2:378, 1906)
> 
> Every asserted proposition purports to represent a fact prescinded from 
> reality as a whole, directly corresponding to a scribed Existential Graph on 
> the otherwise blank sheet that represents the entire continuum of true 
> propositions within the universe of discourse. In both cases, the whole is 
> ontologically prior to its parts--reality is not built up of discrete facts 
> and the sheet of assertion is not built up of discrete EGs, any more than an 
> argument is built up of discrete propositions.
> 
> CSP: [A]n Argument is no more built up of Propositions than a motion is built 
> up of positions. So to regard it is to neglect the very essence of it. ... 
> Just as it is strictly correct to say that nobody is ever in an exact 
> Position (except instantaneously, and an Instant is a fiction, or ens 
> rationis), but Positions are either vaguely described states of motion of 
> small range, or else (what is the better view), are entia rationis (i.e. 
> fictions recognized to be fictions, and thus no longer fictions) invented for 
> the purposes of closer descriptions of states of motion; so likewise, Thought 
> (I am not talking Psychology, but Logic, or the essence of Semeiotics) 
> cannot, from the nature of it, be at rest, or be anything but inferential 
> process; and propositions are either roughly described states of 
> Thought-motion, or are artificial creations intended to render the 
> description of Thought-motion possible; and Names are creations of a second 
> order serving to render the representation of propositions possible. (R 295, 
> 1906)
> 
> The upshot is that discrete things and their dyadic reaction

Re: [PEIRCE-L] The Proper Way in Logic (was Peirce's Ongoing Semiotic Project)

[Edwina Taborsky]

Gary, list

Thanks - that book however, is from ten years ago. My point is that current 
research in information dynamics in the ’natural realms’  - which, very often, 
doesn’t use Peircean terms but is obviously working within the same analytic 
framework of morphological formation,  information generation, transmission and 
transformation, and the nature of ‘objective idealism’ [ the integration of 
matter and mind] …is extensive.

 I’d say that these are all analyses well within the notion of the dicisign- 
ie, the concept that information generation, processing etc is not dependent on 
language or even consciousness but is a basic process in the biological and 
physico-chemical realms. ..operative within sensate rather than symbolic 
networking. And - I’d say that these fit the definition of a dicisign 
propositional interaction, where meanings [Interpretants]  are in direct or 
factual connection to the object. The problem is - as noted - this research 
doesn’t use Peircean terminology!

Edwina

> On Feb 11, 2024, at 11:39 AM, Gary Richmond  wrote:
> 
> Edwina, List,
> 
> ET: I’m a bit surprised by your  request - since surely you are aware of the 
> focus in science of Peircean principles in the biological, physic-chemical 
> and artificial worlds.
> 
> Yes, I'm well aware of that focus and have read extensively in the 
> literature. Thank you, though, for providing some recent examples, none of 
> which I knew.
> 
> My question, however, specifically pointed to Stjernfelt's work on dicisigns. 
> I wrote: "I've been wondering how this move of Peirce [throwing everything 
> possible into the subject] might figure, if it plays a part at all, in 
> consideration of what Stjernfelt called 'Natural Propositions',"  the 
> dicisign being a generalization of the proposition. Helmut Pape called 
> Stjernfelt's book "an inter- and transdisciplinary study that discusses and 
> criticizes theories and uses examples coming from psychology, biology, 
> anthropology, neuroscience, biosemiotics etc."
> 
> So, mine was not a general question as to the influence of Peirce in fields 
> other than logic -- there is no question of that -- but of this particular 
> matter which Jon discusses at length and which may nor may not extend beyond 
> logic as we generally think of it.
> 
> Btw, here is another book I'd highly recommend for discussions of Peirce's 
> influence in biosemiotics in particular, edited by two fine Peirce scholars.
> 
> Peirce and Biosemiotics: A Guess at the Riddle of Life 
> Vinicius Romanini (Editor), Eliseo Fernández 
> <https://www.amazon.com/s/ref=dp_byline_sr_book_2?ie=UTF8&field-author=Eliseo+Fern%C3%A1ndez&text=Eliseo+Fern%C3%A1ndez&sort=relevancerank&search-alias=books>
>  (Editor)
> 
> The table of contents suggests the depth of the scholarship both by 
> distinguished Peirce scholars and equally distinguished biosemioticians.
> 
> Table of Contents
> 
> Introduction; V. Romanini, E. Fernández.- 1. The Intelligible Universe; N. 
> Houser.- 2. The Continuity of Life: On Peirce’s Objective Idealism; I.A. 
> Ibri.- 3. Peircian Semiotic Indeterminacy and Its Relevance for Biosemiotics; 
> R. Lane.- 4. Peircean Habits, Broken Symmetries, and Biosemiotics; E. 
> Fernández.- 5. Semeiotic Causation and the Breath of Life; M. Hulswit, V. 
> Romanini.- 6. The Ineffable, the Individual, and the Intelligible: Peircean 
> Reflections on the Innate Ingenuity of the Human Animal; V. Colapietro.- 7. 
> Instinct and Abduction in the Peircean Informational Perspective: 
> Contributions to Biosemiotics; L.F. Barbosa da Silveira, M.E. Quilici 
> Gonzalez.- 8. The Life of Symbols and Other Legisigns: More than a mere 
> Metaphor?; W. Nöth.- 9. Signs without Minds; J. Collier.- 10. Dicent Symbols 
> and Proto-propositions in Biological Mimicry; J. Queiroz.- 11. Semeiosis as a 
> Living Process; V. Romanini.
> 
> Best,
> 
> Gary Richmond
> 
> On Sun, Feb 11, 2024 at 10:34 AM Edwina Taborsky  <mailto:tabor...@primus.ca>> wrote:
>> Gary R,list
>> 
>> I’m a bit surprised by your  request - since surely you are aware of the 
>> focus in science of Peircean principles in the biological, physic-chemical 
>> and artificial worlds.
>> 
>> A few quick examples: 
>> 
>> Homeostasis and Information Processing: Eduardo Mizraji. Biosystems 2024 
>> February
>> 
>> "Teleonomic objects are purpose-oriented entities lacking a creator 
>> (Igamberdiev, 2023 
>> <https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0303264723002903#bib22>).
>> 
>> "What is the nature of the various types of information that different 
>> living beings, at different scales 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] The Proper Way in Logic (was Peirce's Ongoing Semiotic Project)

[Edwina Taborsky]

Gary R,list

I’m a bit surprised by your  request - since surely you are aware of the focus 
in science of Peircean principles in the biological, physic-chemical and 
artificial worlds.

A few quick examples: 

Homeostasis and Information Processing: Eduardo Mizraji. Biosystems 2024 
February

"Teleonomic objects are purpose-oriented entities lacking a creator 
(Igamberdiev, 2023 
).

"What is the nature of the various types of information that different living 
beings, at different scales of their organization, use to inform their 
regulatory systems? This information is the result of the simultaneous 
existence of patterns and receptors capable of detecting these patterns. In 
this context, information is an emergent property of the interaction of two 
categories of entities, patterns and receptors.

This duo of conditions, thermodynamic openness and the need for homeostatic 
regulatory systems, are inherent to all forms of life that we know."
———
Computation in Biological Systems as a quantum mechanical simulation .
Ron Cottam. Biosystems April 2022. 

This article actually references Peirce.
——

The Information Continuum Model of Evolution BioSystems November 2021 R.Skern 
Mauritzen

-
 The Biosystems journal  is a major site for the examination of informational 
processing within the natural world.  That is - the focus is on information 
processes - and this, after all, is what Peircean semiotics is all about. [And 
there are other journals tha examine information processing]...

As I’ve kept saying, you don’t have to use Peircean terms to examine the same 
outlines Peirce was writing about …Unfortunately, the tendency of many Peircean 
scholars, to insist, almost with a religious and even cult-like fervour,  on 
the use of exact and specific Peircean terms, obscures the fact that the same 
objective processes are being outlined in many papers - but- using different 
terms.

It is no secret that the difficulty of both accessing Peircean texts AND the 
obscure terminology [AND, I’ll add, the isolationism of the Peircean scholarly 
set]  has hindered the widespread use of Peircean theories. But -once past 
these Walls  - it is clear that the Peircean analysis is a fundamental outline 
of both the natural and human worlds of information processing.  

Edwina



> On Feb 11, 2024, at 12:23 AM, Gary Richmond  wrote:
> 
> Jon, List,
> 
> Thanks for these additional comments and examples as they further clarify 
> Peirce's bold logical move. As you noted:
> 
> JFS: Throwing everything possible into the subject recognizes the indexical 
> nature of most words--functioning much like proper names, since one must 
> already be acquainted with their objects in order to understand them--and 
> leaves only the pure/continuous predicate as the iconic part of the 
> proposition.
> 
> Since you mentioned Frederik Stjernfelt, I've been wondering how this move of 
> Peirce might figure in consideration of what Stjernfelt called "Natural 
> Propositions." In his extraordinary book, Natural Propositions: The Actuality 
> of Peirce's Doctrine of Dicisigns, Stjernfelt takes Peirce at his word, so to 
> speak, and generalizes the meaning of proposition well beyond the 
> logical-linguistic into the natural world, that which biosemioticians 
> naturally have a particular interested in. I don't know what lasting impact 
> -- if any -- his book has had in that community since, as far as I can tell, 
> it has been somewhat resistant to Peircean thinking. This antipathy was 
> suggested to me when I attended a Biosemiotics Gathering at Roosevelt 
> University in NYC some years ago (I was asked by Vinicius Romanini to read a 
> paper he himself could not deliver since officials refused to allow him to 
> board a plane to the USA because he'd brought his Italian, rather than his 
> Brazilian, passport to the airport) as the several Peircean-inspired 
> biosemioticians present seemed to be contradicted at every turn.
> 
> Be that as it may, Stjernfelt argues in Natural Propositions that Peirce's 
> generalization of the logical concept of proposition to dicisign as to 
> include semiosis that occurs in the natural world, is of the greatest 
> consequence for our understanding of reality beyond our specie's 
> intellectual/logical conception of it. For dicisigns do not necessarily 
> require human language, thought, and logic -- not human consciousness -- 
> whatsoever. 
> 
> I'm not a biosemiotician -- although I find the field of considerable 
> interest -- and I know that you aren't either, Jon. But I'd be most 
> interested in what you or others on the List might think regarding the 
> generalization of Peirce's furthest thinking as regards propositions into the 
> natural world. 
> 
> Best,
> 
> Gary Richmond
> 
> 
> On Sat, Feb 10, 2024 at 9:35 PM Jon Alan

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Interpretants, as analyzed and discussed by T. L. Short

[Edwina Taborsky]

practical purpose?   What kind of applications would be possible? 
> 
> I mean USEFUL applications that do something practical that could not be done 
> as well or better without a theory of interpretants.  I have written a lot 
> about applications of Peirce's theories in computer science, computational 
> linguistics, and artificial intelligence.  But I have never found a use for 
> interpretants.  Many other authors have found important applications of 
> Peirce's ideas and theories and cited them in their publications.  But I have 
> never seen anybody who mentioned interpretants.  Can anybody find any 
> published examples?  By anybody for any practical purpose?
> 
> That reminds me of the parody:  "This theory is so perfectly general that no 
> practical application is possible".
> 
> John
>  
> 
> ,From: "Edwina Taborsky" 
> 
> John
> 
> I don't see what linguistic understanding of words has to do with the 
> interpretants. 
> 
> The utterer’s Object [his words] can only carry his reality [phaneron] within 
> the words he knows. - and as Peirce said - [can’t recall the reference] if 
> the Object is unknown, then, the words used to describe it are open to 
> interpretation; and if the utterer doesn’t have the words to describe the 
> phaneron…this is a problem. AND the context for the meaning of the words is 
> held within the knowledge base [ the Represenamen]. This is also a problem - 
> what if the utterer has no context for this phaneron???In a constructive 
> intreating - presumably, the listener shares some of this contextual 
> knowledge base and so, can to a certain extent, understand the Utterer.  If 
> he doesn’t share this knowledge base - then- the resultant interpretation is 
> quite different from the utterer’s intended meaning. 
> 
> We all know how such an interaction is open to misunderstanding. And to my 
> knowledge, no scholar has ever been able to reduce the capacity for 
> misunderstanding these verbal interactions. That’s because of so many issues: 
> the different knowledge bases held within the representamens; the multiple 
> meanings of words and the reliance on linguistic context, word order, 
> intonation …
> 
> I don’t see what these issues have to do with the three interpretants. 
> 
> My view of the interpretants refers to a situation where data/information is 
> moved from the Object via the Representamen’s knowledge base ---and the 
> Interpretant's function is to clarify the nature of the input data…from its 
> first internal reaction…moving on to a reaction to that input…and maybe, 
> sometime…if these interactions are operative within a community - to the 
> development of a habit-of-dealing with this input. So, an animal will develop 
> a thick coat of fur to deal with long term cooling temperatures and this 
> behaviour will be common to all members of the local species. 
> 
> As for linguistics - I’m not a follower of that discipline- and so, can only 
> refer to Bakhtin’s ‘dialogic’ emphasis on context enabling linguistic 
> changes. 
> 
> Edwina
> _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
> ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at 
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_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Interpretants, as analyzed and discussed by T. L. Short

[Edwina Taborsky]

John

I don't see what linguistic understanding of words has to do with the 
interpretants. 

The utterer’s Object [his words] can only carry his reality [phaneron] within 
the words he knows. - and as Peirce said - [can’t recall the reference] if the 
Object is unknown, then, the words used to describe it are open to 
interpretation; and if the utterer doesn’t have the words to describe the 
phaneron…this is a problem. AND the context for the meaning of the words is 
held within the knowledge base [ the Represenamen]. This is also a problem - 
what if the utterer has no context for this phaneron???In a constructive 
intreating - presumably, the listener shares some of this contextual knowledge 
base and so, can to a certain extent, understand the Utterer.  If he doesn’t 
share this knowledge base - then- the resultant interpretation is quite 
different from the utterer’s intended meaning. 

We all know how such an interaction is open to misunderstanding. And to my 
knowledge, no scholar has ever been able to reduce the capacity for 
misunderstanding these verbal interactions. That’s because of so many issues: 
the different knowledge bases held within the representamens; the multiple 
meanings of words and the reliance on linguistic context, word order, 
intonation …

I don’t see what these issues have to do with the three interpretants. 

My view of the interpretants refers to a situation where data/information is 
moved from the Object via the Representamen’s knowledge base ---and the 
Interpretant's function is to clarify the nature of the input data…from its 
first internal reaction…moving on to a reaction to that input…and maybe, 
sometime…if these interactions are operative within a community - to the 
development of a habit-of-dealing with this input. So, an animal will develop a 
thick coat of fur to deal with long term cooling temperatures and this 
behaviour will be common to all members of the local species. 

As for linguistics - I’m not a follower of that discipline- and so, can only 
refer to Bakhtin’s ‘dialogic’ emphasis on context enabling linguistic changes. 

Edwina

> On Feb 8, 2024, at 6:21 PM, John F Sowa  wrote:
> 
> Edwina,
> 
> I was just copying what Short said.  If you don't have it, I'll send you the 
> PDF of his entire book.
> 
> All Peirce scholars agree that Peirce had settled on three kinds of 
> interpretants.  I don't deny that.  But there is no information about how 
> anybody can determine how the utterer can express the content of the phaneron 
> as a linguistic sign, and how the listener can interpret the uttered sign.  
> The critical issue for both of them is the context which may be much more 
> difficult to determine than the words in the utterance.
> 
> In a previous note, I recommended the 70 page article by Keith Devlin, 
> "Confronting context effects in intelligence analysis".   You don't have to 
> read the whole thing because the early examples show why context is so 
> overwhelmingly important in determining the interpretant.  Just look  below 
> for an example from page 9 of 
> <https://duckduckgo.com/?q=%22Confronting+context+effects+in+intelligence+analysis%22+by+Keith+Devlin.&t=opera&ia=web>
>  
> https://www.researchgate.net/publication/228579637_Confronting_context_effects_in_intelligence_analysis_How_can_mathematics_help
> 
> Just one example like that undermines everything Peirce wrote about 
> determining the interpretant.  And examples like that can be repeated 
> endlessly.   Devlin's article is one source, but any detailed analysis of 
> language in context will turn up endless numbers of examples.
> 
> John
> __
>  
> From: "Edwina Taborsky" " style="box-sizing: border-box; color: rgb(0, 102, 
> 147); text-decoration: underline; user-select: 
> auto;"> 
> 
> John, list
> 
> I disagree with your view that Peirce never had a coherent theory of the 
> interpretants’. I find his outlines clear and coherent  and are all through 
> his writings- in that it is logical and obvious that the triad includes not 
> merely a single interpretant but several - and these several are basic and 
> functional.  That is- the notion of not merely one but three Interpretants 
> is, I feel, basic to the Peircena semiosis
> _
> 
> Example from page 9 of "Confronting context effects in intelligence analysis" 
> by Keith Devlin.  The actual sentences that were spoken are in BOLD.  And the 
> context is in italics.   Without the context, it's impossible to determine 
> the interpretant of the sentence.
> 
> HUSBAND: Dana succeeded in putting a penny in a parking meter today without
> being picked up.
> 
> Th

[PEIRCE-L] New Semiotic Publication

[Edwina Taborsky]

There’s a new four volume set of papers just published. 141 papers. 
> 
> 
> Editor: Amir Biglari
> Title: OPEN SEMIOTICS
> Publisher: Editions L’Harmattan 2023
> 
> Volume 1: Epistemological and Conceptual Foundations 
> Part I; Semiotics Without Borders
> Part II: Rethinking Sign and Meaning
> Part III: Semiotics and Philosophy
> Part IV: Semiotics and Mathematics
> Part V: Semiotics and Computing
> 
> Volume 2: Culture and Society
> Part I: Semiotics, Culture and History
> Part II: Semiotics and Social Domains
> Part III: Semiotics, Communication, Media
> Part IV: Semiotics, Learning, Education
> Part V: Semiotics, Economy, Business
> 
> Volume 3: Text, Images, Arts
> Part I: Semiotics and Text Studies
> Part II: Semiotics and Image Studies
> Part III: Semiotics and Art Theories
> Part IV: Semiotics andVisual Arts
> Part V: Semiotics and Performing Arts
> Part VI: Semiotics and Film Studies
> Part VII: Semiotics and Music
> 
> Volume 4: Life land Its Extensions
> Part I:Semiotics and Biology
> Part II: Semiotics and Medicine
> Part III: Semiotics and Psychology
> Part IV: Semiotics anthology
> Part V: Semiotics and Ecology
> Part VI: Semiotics and Cognitive Science
> Part VII: Semiotics and Artificial Intelligence
> 
> Edwina
> 
> 

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at 
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Interpretants

[Edwina Taborsky]

Michael - Why not instead provide us with a brief discussion of your discussion?

Edwina

> On Feb 3, 2024, at 1:14 PM, Michael Shapiro  wrote:
> 
> To all participants in this discussion of interpretants I would like to 
> recommend that they take a look at my discussion of markedness in one or more 
> of my books, the latest being The Logic of Lasnguage (New York: Springer, 
> 2022). Markedness in language is the epitomre of the relationship between 
> sign and object.
> -Original Message-
> From: Edwina Taborsky mailto:tabor...@primus.ca>>
> Sent: Feb 3, 2024 7:46 AM
> To: Edwina Taborsky mailto:tabor...@primus.ca>>
> Cc: John F Sowa mailto:s...@bestweb.net>>, Peirce List 
> mailto:peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>>, CG 
> mailto:c...@lists.iccs-conference.org>>
> Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Interpretants
> 
>  
> Again, if I might continue with the importance of the hexadic semiosic 
> process, in that it enables complex adaptation…within interaction  
>  
> That is - the reality of two Object relations, the Dynamic and the Immediate 
> acknowledges that not all off the input data from the external interaction 
> will be accepted by the capacity of the sign -vehicle and its representamen. 
> And indeed, some of this data might be changed /affected by other input 
> happening at the same time.
>  
> Then - the three Interpretants are vital.
>  
> The first one, the Immediate, confines the reaction to the internal 
> experience of the individual. It goes no further. I think this is important - 
> if we think of a disease - it would confine the infection to one individual. 
> If we think of another situation - it would confine the sensation of the 
> experience to one individual [ rather than mob hysteria]. 
>  
> The next one, the Dynamic, is important - since it produces an external 
> response to the input data and brings in local ‘observers’, so to speak, who 
> treat this external Interfpretant as a Sign in itself. //something that they 
> might react to. .
>  
> The last one, the Final - moves the response to a general, common one.
>  
> An example would be a sound heard by an individual in a group of monkeys. 
> This one individual might only feel a subjective internal response [Immediae 
> Interpretant] and other than that - continue gathering fruit]. But - it might 
> instead, produce an external result [ the monkey would scream]. This would 
> act as its own triadic Sign to the other monkeys….who would recognize it as 
> an Alarm.  Over time - this particular sound by the monkey is understood, 
> always, as an Alarm.
>  
> That is - I think the function of the three Interpretants, nuanced as they 
> are, is vital.
>  
> Edwina
> 
> On Feb 2, 2024, at 7:05 PM, Edwina Taborsky  <mailto:tabor...@primus.ca>> wrote:
> 
> John, list
>  
> 1] I don’t know what you mean by ‘His Commentary’…in your sentence 
> But in his important analyses of those subjects, I have not seen him show how 
> his theory of interpretants aided him in the discovery and formulation of his 
> commentary.
>  
> 2] And I don’t know what you mean by ’that insight’ in your sentence: 
> Can you (or any other reader of P-List) find any important (or just useful) 
> example of an insight in which Peirce's theory of interpretants helped 
> discover that insight?
> 
> 3] I briefly outlined why I think that the the hexadic semosic process is 
> capable of generative development of matter and mind.  That is, 
>  
> 3-a] the reality of two object relations, with one, the DO,  being input from 
> an external source, and the other, the IO, being the input that the 
> sign-vehicle is equipped to accept as input [ a dog can smell better than a 
> human; an owl can see better; a…etc etc]…
>  
> Along with the reality that input from multiple DOs might be happening at the 
> same time..
>  
> 3-b; the reality that the mediative process, theRepresentamen GROWS in its 
> mediative capacity by learning, by exposure, by..even, chance [ see Peirce’s 
> three methods of evolution: tychasm,  anancasm, agapasm]
>  
> 3c- the reality of THREE Interpretant relations - 
>  
> with one being strictly a local, subjective, individual result..[the II] - an 
> action that generates a potentiality for change; 
>  
> and the more complex next one [DI]  being individual but external to the 
> individual, which moves the result of the original DO, IO input it into an 
> actual existentially…that affects OTHER sign-vehicles 
>  
> ….and the next one [FI] being the communal non-local non-individual 
> generality where new laws are developed. 
>  
> That is - my view is that this whole process enables adaptive complexity to 
> develop. An

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Interpretants

[Edwina Taborsky]

Again, if I might continue with the importance of the hexadic semiosic process, 
in that it enables complex adaptation…within interaction  

That is - the reality of two Object relations, the Dynamic and the Immediate 
acknowledges that not all off the input data from the external interaction will 
be accepted by the capacity of the sign -vehicle and its representamen. And 
indeed, some of this data might be changed /affected by other input happening 
at the same time.

Then - the three Interpretants are vital.

The first one, the Immediate, confines the reaction to the internal experience 
of the individual. It goes no further. I think this is important - if we think 
of a disease - it would confine the infection to one individual. If we think of 
another situation - it would confine the sensation of the experience to one 
individual [ rather than mob hysteria]. 

The next one, the Dynamic, is important - since it produces an external 
response to the input data and brings in local ‘observers’, so to speak, who 
treat this external Interfpretant as a Sign in itself. //something that they 
might react to. .

The last one, the Final - moves the response to a general, common one.

An example would be a sound heard by an individual in a group of monkeys. This 
one individual might only feel a subjective internal response [Immediae 
Interpretant] and other than that - continue gathering fruit]. But - it might 
instead, produce an external result [ the monkey would scream]. This would act 
as its own triadic Sign to the other monkeys….who would recognize it as an 
Alarm.  Over time - this particular sound by the monkey is understood, always, 
as an Alarm.

That is - I think the function of the three Interpretants, nuanced as they are, 
is vital.

Edwina

> On Feb 2, 2024, at 7:05 PM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:
> 
> John, list
> 
> 1] I don’t know what you mean by ‘His Commentary’…in your sentence 
>> But in his important analyses of those subjects, I have not seen him show 
>> how his theory of interpretants aided him in the discovery and formulation 
>> of his commentary.
> 
> 2] And I don’t know what you mean by ’that insight’ in your sentence: 
>> Can you (or any other reader of P-List) find any important (or just useful) 
>> example of an insight in which Peirce's theory of interpretants helped 
>> discover that insight?
> 
> 
> 3] I briefly outlined why I think that the the hexadic semosic process is 
> capable of generative development of matter and mind.  That is, 
> 
> 3-a] the reality of two object relations, with one, the DO,  being input from 
> an external source, and the other, the IO, being the input that the 
> sign-vehicle is equipped to accept as input [ a dog can smell better than a 
> human; an owl can see better; a…etc etc]…
> 
> Along with the reality that input from multiple DOs might be happening at the 
> same time..
> 
> 3-b; the reality that the mediative process, theRepresentamen GROWS in its 
> mediative capacity by learning, by exposure, by..even, chance [ see Peirce’s 
> three methods of evolution: tychasm,  anancasm, agapasm]
> 
> 3c- the reality of THREE Interpretant relations - 
> 
> with one being strictly a local, subjective, individual result..[the II] - an 
> action that generates a potentiality for change; 
> 
> and the more complex next one [DI]  being individual but external to the 
> individual, which moves the result of the original DO, IO input it into an 
> actual existentially…that affects OTHER sign-vehicles 
> 
> ….and the next one [FI] being the communal non-local non-individual 
> generality where new laws are developed. 
> 
> That is - my view is that this whole process enables adaptive complexity to 
> develop. An example could be where a bird tries to eat a seed, which has a 
> hard shell [DO]; and what little it can extract from this shell [ IO] …is 
> processed by its digestive system [Representamen in a mode of 3ns, 2ns and 
> 1ns] , which, possibly lacking in nutrients from this small amount produces 
> only a small nutrition result, [II] , but this small result forces the  
> bird’s body to develop a stronger digestion [to digest shells[ and even, 
> these chemicals act to strengthen its beak…[DI]..and this reaction  becomes 
> common among the local bird population [FI].
> 
> My point is that both the number of interactions that take place - and that 
> includes all three interpretant which I think are vital - , along with the 
> capacities of the three categorical modes - are basic to complex adaptive 
> systems. 
> 
> Edwina
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
>> On Feb 2, 2024, at 5:22 PM, John F Sowa > <mailto:s...@bestweb.net>> wrote:
>> 
>> Edwina,
>> 
>> I strongly agree with you that Peirce's analyses of