Re: [PEIRCE-L] Signs, Types, Tokens, Instances

[Stephen Curtiss Rose]

This post points to semiotics, cosmology, and perhaps physics as well.
Peirce is writing from his own universalistic Christian, quasi-mystical
perspective. It would be reductionist to regard this as soluble without
inferring the context he was writing from.


On Tue, Jan 29, 2019 at 9:19 PM Jon Alan Schmidt 
wrote:

> List:
>
> Today I took a look at a couple of the manuscripts for discarded drafts of
> "Prolegomena to an Apology for Pragmaticism."  One of them included the
> following about a Type.
>
>
>
> CSP:  In the latter sense, which is by far the more important sense, a
> "word" does not exist:  it has a higher mode of being than existence, since
> it is a form that imparts utility to the existing matter in which it gets
> embodied.  I term any sign having the mode of being of a form a *type* …
> (R 292:[18])
>
>
>
> This is reminiscent of Peirce's assertion that "a sign is not a real
> thing. It is of such a nature as to exist in *replicas*" (EP 2:303;
> 1904).  It also matches his published description of a Type as "a
> definitely significant Form" (CP 4.537; 1906).  As I have discussed at
> length before, during that time frame he generally associated "the mode of
> being of a form" with 1ns, although there are other contexts where he
> associated "form" with 3ns.  In this case, he went on to make additional
> pertinent remarks after drawing a parallel between a thought as a Type and
> a "thinking" as a Token.
>
>
>
> CSP:  It frequently happens that the distinctions between the immediate
> object of a type, the type itself, and its immediate interpretant become
> all but evanescent, and this is especially true of thought considered as a
> type.  I think there are slight distinctions; but I have no occasion to
> dwell upon them at present. (R 292:[19])
>
>
>
> The Immediate Object and Immediate Interpretant are likewise associated
> with 1ns, at least relative to the Dynamic Object and Dynamic Interpretant
> as 2ns, and (in my view) the General Object and Final Interpretant as 3ns.
> The "evanescence" of their distinctions from the Type itself is consistent
> with my suggestion that they correspond to that which its Instances *possibly
> could* denote and signify, respectively, in accordance with the Type's
> definition within the Sign System to which it belongs.  Moreover, aligning
> the Type with Form as 1ns and (presumably) its Instances with Matter as 2ns
> clarifies why Peirce elsewhere aligned the Sign itself with Entelechy as
> 3ns.
>
>
>
> CSP:  This *Entelechy*, the third element which it is requisite to
> acknowledge besides Matter and Form, is that which brings things together
> ... and we infer that wherever Matter becomes determined to a Form it is
> through a sign. Much that happens certainly happens according to Natural
> Law; and what is this Law but something whose being consists in its
> determining Matter to Form in a certain way? ... It is to be observed that
> a sign has its being in the *power* to bring about a determination of a
> Matter to a Form ... (NEM 4:295-300; 1904)
>
>
>
> What is the Form to which a Sign is capable of determining a Matter?  A
> *Type*.  What is the Matter that the Sign is capable of determining to
> that Form?  A *Token*, which on that basis is an *Instance* of the Type.
> And notice that Peirce by no means limited this to *human* semiosis; it
> encompasses all that "happens according to Natural Law."
>
>
> Regards,
>
>
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
>

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Signs, Types, Tokens, Instances

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

List:

Today I took a look at a couple of the manuscripts for discarded drafts of
"Prolegomena to an Apology for Pragmaticism."  One of them included the
following about a Type.



CSP:  In the latter sense, which is by far the more important sense, a
"word" does not exist:  it has a higher mode of being than existence, since
it is a form that imparts utility to the existing matter in which it gets
embodied.  I term any sign having the mode of being of a form a *type* … (R
292:[18])



This is reminiscent of Peirce's assertion that "a sign is not a real thing.
It is of such a nature as to exist in *replicas*" (EP 2:303; 1904).  It
also matches his published description of a Type as "a definitely
significant Form" (CP 4.537; 1906).  As I have discussed at length before,
during that time frame he generally associated "the mode of being of a
form" with 1ns, although there are other contexts where he associated
"form" with 3ns.  In this case, he went on to make additional pertinent
remarks after drawing a parallel between a thought as a Type and a
"thinking" as a Token.



CSP:  It frequently happens that the distinctions between the immediate
object of a type, the type itself, and its immediate interpretant become
all but evanescent, and this is especially true of thought considered as a
type.  I think there are slight distinctions; but I have no occasion to
dwell upon them at present. (R 292:[19])



The Immediate Object and Immediate Interpretant are likewise associated
with 1ns, at least relative to the Dynamic Object and Dynamic Interpretant
as 2ns, and (in my view) the General Object and Final Interpretant as 3ns.
The "evanescence" of their distinctions from the Type itself is consistent
with my suggestion that they correspond to that which its Instances *possibly
could* denote and signify, respectively, in accordance with the Type's
definition within the Sign System to which it belongs.  Moreover, aligning
the Type with Form as 1ns and (presumably) its Instances with Matter as 2ns
clarifies why Peirce elsewhere aligned the Sign itself with Entelechy as
3ns.



CSP:  This *Entelechy*, the third element which it is requisite to
acknowledge besides Matter and Form, is that which brings things together
... and we infer that wherever Matter becomes determined to a Form it is
through a sign. Much that happens certainly happens according to Natural
Law; and what is this Law but something whose being consists in its
determining Matter to Form in a certain way? ... It is to be observed that
a sign has its being in the *power* to bring about a determination of a
Matter to a Form ... (NEM 4:295-300; 1904)



What is the Form to which a Sign is capable of determining a Matter?  A
*Type*.  What is the Matter that the Sign is capable of determining to that
Form?  A *Token*, which on that basis is an *Instance* of the Type.  And
notice that Peirce by no means limited this to *human* semiosis; it
encompasses all that "happens according to Natural Law."


Regards,


Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

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RE: [PEIRCE-L] Signs, Types, Tokens, Instances

[Auke van Breemen]

JAS,

 

Between the lines I respond. 

 

AvB:  What is the dynamical object of a lexical item like man or homme. Men in 
general I suppose.

 

That is why I suggest calling this the General Object, as distinguished from 
the individual Dynamic Object of a particular Instance.  Since "man" and 
"homme" have the same General Object, they are the same Sign; but because they 
have somewhat different Immediate Objects, they are different Types.

 

RE: A dynamical object needs not to be individual or particular instance. A 
general can be a dynamical object. The absolute individual does not exist 
according to the articles from the Questions claimed for man series.

 

 

AvB:  With regard to actual semiotic processes I agree with you that the 
dynamical object depends on the occasion, but then we don’t discus propositions 
or terms (lexical items), but utterances and communication processes.

 

As far as I can tell, Peirce did not make such a distinction.  An utterance is 
an Instance of a Type.

 

 

RE: I didn’t state that Peirce made that distinction, I just wanted to point 
your attention to a difference in the analysis of cases like you posed 
concerning terms man and homme and the kind of analysis Peirce performs when, 
for instance he discusses the Question: “What is the weather today?”, as posed 
to his wife on an early morning. 

 

Regards,

 

Jon S.

 

On Sat, Jan 26, 2019 at 10:02 AM Auke van Breemen mailto:a.bree...@chello.nl> > wrote:

JAS, List,

 

What is the dynamical object of a lexical item like man or homme. Men in 
general I suppose.

 

With regard to actual semiotic processes I agree with you that the dynamical 
object depends on the occasion, but then we don’t discus propositions or terms 
(lexical items), but utterances and communication processes. 

 

Best,

 

Auke van Breemen

 

Van: Jon Alan Schmidt mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com> > 
Verzonden: zaterdag 26 januari 2019 16:50
Aan: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu <mailto:peirce-l@list.iupui.edu> 
Onderwerp: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Signs, Types, Tokens, Instances

 

Auke, List:

 

What I am suggesting can be summarized as follows.

*   Every Token has a different Dynamic Object and Dynamic 
Interpretant--whatever it actually does denote and signify, respectively, on 
that particular occasion.
*   Every Type has a different Immediate Object and Immediate 
Interpretant--whatever it possibly could denote and signify, respectively, in 
accordance with the Sign System to which it belongs.
*   Every Sign has a different General Object and Final 
Interpretant--whatever it necessarily would denote and signify, respectively, 
after infinite inquiry by an infinite community; i.e., in the Ultimate Opinion.

In other words, two individual Instances of the same Type always have different 
individual Dynamic Objects and different individual Dynamic Interpretants; 
while two different Types of the same Sign always have at least somewhat 
different Immediate Objects and Immediate Interpretants within their different 
Sign Systems.  I am still pondering whether it is also possible for two 
Instances of the same Type to have different Immediate Interpretants, when they 
are accompanied by different Tones--font changes for emphasis, punctuation 
marks, voice inflections, etc.--or if those only affect their different Dynamic 
Interpretants.

 

Regards,




Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA

Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman

www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt <http://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt>  
- twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt <http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt> 

 

On Sat, Jan 26, 2019 at 7:32 AM Auke van Breemen mailto:a.bree...@chello.nl> > wrote:

JAS, List,

 

We must not forget that a sign needs to be considered in the context of 
semiosis in actu if we want to become determinate as to which sign aspects take 
what value on each of the trichotomies. For only that what contributes to the 
result, i.e. the responding sign, takes part in the semiotic process we study 
(See Hulswit’s A semiotic account of causation.)

 

With regard to the dynamical object the tokens ‘man’ and ‘homme’ both can be 
regarded as of the same type, just as the spoken and written forms of ‘there’ 
can be regarded as the same type, although this probably is not the rule. I 
agree that with regard to what the terms connote, respectively English, French 
language with man and homme and written, spoken form with ‘there’ they are 
definitely regarded as of different type. 

 

Best,

 

Auke van Breemen


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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Signs, Types, Tokens, Instances

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Auke, List:

AvB:  What is the dynamical object of a lexical item like man or homme. Men
in general I suppose.


That is why I suggest calling this the *General *Object, as distinguished
from the individual *Dynamic *Object of a particular Instance.  Since "man"
and "homme" have the same General Object, they are the same Sign; but
because they have somewhat different Immediate Objects, they are different
Types.

AvB:  With regard to actual semiotic processes I agree with you that the
dynamical object depends on the occasion, but then we don’t discus
propositions or terms (lexical items), but utterances and communication
processes.


As far as I can tell, Peirce did not make such a distinction.  An utterance
is an Instance of a Type.

Regards,

Jon S.

On Sat, Jan 26, 2019 at 10:02 AM Auke van Breemen 
wrote:

> JAS, List,
>
>
>
> What is the dynamical object of a lexical item like man or homme. Men in
> general I suppose.
>
>
>
> With regard to actual semiotic processes I agree with you that the
> dynamical object depends on the occasion, but then we don’t discus
> propositions or terms (lexical items), but utterances and communication
> processes.
>
>
>
> Best,
>
>
>
> Auke van Breemen
>
>
>
> *Van:* Jon Alan Schmidt 
> *Verzonden:* zaterdag 26 januari 2019 16:50
> *Aan:* peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
> *Onderwerp:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Signs, Types, Tokens, Instances
>
>
>
> Auke, List:
>
>
>
> What I am suggesting can be summarized as follows.
>
>- Every Token has a different *Dynamic *Object and *Dynamic 
> *Interpretant--whatever
>it *actually does* denote and signify, respectively, on that
>particular occasion.
>- Every Type has a different *Immediate *Object and *Immediate 
> *Interpretant--whatever
>it *possibly could* denote and signify, respectively, in accordance
>with the Sign System to which it belongs.
>- Every Sign has a different *General *Object and *Final 
> *Interpretant--whatever
>it *necessarily would* denote and signify, respectively, after
>infinite inquiry by an infinite community; i.e., in the Ultimate Opinion.
>
> In other words, two *individual *Instances of the same Type always have
> different *individual *Dynamic Objects and different *individual *Dynamic
> Interpretants; while two different Types of the same Sign always have at
> least *somewhat *different Immediate Objects and Immediate Interpretants
> within their different Sign Systems.  I am still pondering whether it is *also
> *possible for two Instances of the same Type to have different *Immediate
> *Interpretants, when they are accompanied by different Tones--font
> changes for emphasis, punctuation marks, voice inflections, etc.--or if
> those only affect their different *Dynamic *Interpretants.
>
>
>
> Regards,
>
>
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
>
> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
>
> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
>
>
>
> On Sat, Jan 26, 2019 at 7:32 AM Auke van Breemen 
> wrote:
>
> JAS, List,
>
>
>
> We must not forget that a sign needs to be considered in the context of
> semiosis in actu if we want to become determinate as to which sign aspects
> take what value on each of the trichotomies. For only that what contributes
> to the result, i.e. the responding sign, takes part in the semiotic process
> we study (See Hulswit’s *A semiotic account of causation*.)
>
>
>
> With regard to the dynamical object the tokens ‘man’ and ‘homme’ both can
> be regarded as of the same type, just as the spoken and written forms of
> ‘there’ can be regarded as the same type, although this probably is not the
> rule. I agree that with regard to what the terms connote, respectively
> English, French language with man and homme and written, spoken form with
> ‘there’ they are definitely regarded as of different type.
>
>
>
> Best,
>
>
>
> Auke van Breemen
>
>

-
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RE: [PEIRCE-L] Signs, Types, Tokens, Instances

[Auke van Breemen]

JAS, List,

 

What is the dynamical object of a lexical item like man or homme. Men in 
general I suppose.

 

With regard to actual semiotic processes I agree with you that the dynamical 
object depends on the occasion, but then we don’t discus propositions or terms 
(lexical items), but utterances and communication processes. 

 

Best,

 

Auke van Breemen

 

Van: Jon Alan Schmidt  
Verzonden: zaterdag 26 januari 2019 16:50
Aan: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Onderwerp: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Signs, Types, Tokens, Instances

 

Auke, List:

 

What I am suggesting can be summarized as follows.

*   Every Token has a different Dynamic Object and Dynamic 
Interpretant--whatever it actually does denote and signify, respectively, on 
that particular occasion.
*   Every Type has a different Immediate Object and Immediate 
Interpretant--whatever it possibly could denote and signify, respectively, in 
accordance with the Sign System to which it belongs.
*   Every Sign has a different General Object and Final 
Interpretant--whatever it necessarily would denote and signify, respectively, 
after infinite inquiry by an infinite community; i.e., in the Ultimate Opinion.

In other words, two individual Instances of the same Type always have different 
individual Dynamic Objects and different individual Dynamic Interpretants; 
while two different Types of the same Sign always have at least somewhat 
different Immediate Objects and Immediate Interpretants within their different 
Sign Systems.  I am still pondering whether it is also possible for two 
Instances of the same Type to have different Immediate Interpretants, when they 
are accompanied by different Tones--font changes for emphasis, punctuation 
marks, voice inflections, etc.--or if those only affect their different Dynamic 
Interpretants.

 

Regards,




Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA

Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman

www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt <http://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt>  
- twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt <http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt> 

 

On Sat, Jan 26, 2019 at 7:32 AM Auke van Breemen mailto:a.bree...@chello.nl> > wrote:

JAS, List,

 

We must not forget that a sign needs to be considered in the context of 
semiosis in actu if we want to become determinate as to which sign aspects take 
what value on each of the trichotomies. For only that what contributes to the 
result, i.e. the responding sign, takes part in the semiotic process we study 
(See Hulswit’s A semiotic account of causation.)

 

With regard to the dynamical object the tokens ‘man’ and ‘homme’ both can be 
regarded as of the same type, just as the spoken and written forms of ‘there’ 
can be regarded as the same type, although this probably is not the rule. I 
agree that with regard to what the terms connote, respectively English, French 
language with man and homme and written, spoken form with ‘there’ they are 
definitely regarded as of different type. 

 

Best,

 

Auke van Breemen


-
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Signs, Types, Tokens, Instances

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Auke, List:

What I am suggesting can be summarized as follows.

   - Every Token has a different *Dynamic *Object and *Dynamic
*Interpretant--whatever
   it *actually does* denote and signify, respectively, on that particular
   occasion.
   - Every Type has a different *Immediate *Object and *Immediate
*Interpretant--whatever
   it *possibly could* denote and signify, respectively, in accordance with
   the Sign System to which it belongs.
   - Every Sign has a different *General *Object and *Final
*Interpretant--whatever
   it *necessarily would* denote and signify, respectively, after infinite
   inquiry by an infinite community; i.e., in the Ultimate Opinion.

In other words, two *individual *Instances of the same Type always have
different *individual *Dynamic Objects and different *individual *Dynamic
Interpretants; while two different Types of the same Sign always have at
least *somewhat *different Immediate Objects and Immediate Interpretants
within their different Sign Systems.  I am still pondering whether it is *also
*possible for two Instances of the same Type to have different
*Immediate *Interpretants,
when they are accompanied by different Tones--font changes for emphasis,
punctuation marks, voice inflections, etc.--or if those only affect their
different *Dynamic *Interpretants.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Sat, Jan 26, 2019 at 7:32 AM Auke van Breemen 
wrote:

> JAS, List,
>
>
>
> We must not forget that a sign needs to be considered in the context of
> semiosis in actu if we want to become determinate as to which sign aspects
> take what value on each of the trichotomies. For only that what contributes
> to the result, i.e. the responding sign, takes part in the semiotic process
> we study (See Hulswit’s *A semiotic account of causation*.)
>
>
>
> With regard to the dynamical object the tokens ‘man’ and ‘homme’ both can
> be regarded as of the same type, just as the spoken and written forms of
> ‘there’ can be regarded as the same type, although this probably is not the
> rule. I agree that with regard to what the terms connote, respectively
> English, French language with man and homme and written, spoken form with
> ‘there’ they are definitely regarded as of different type.
>
>
>
> Best,
>
>
>
> Auke van Breemen
>
>

-
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RE: [PEIRCE-L] Signs, Types, Tokens, Instances

[Auke van Breemen]

JAS, List,

 

As propositions the three sentences may be the same sign, but here clearly we 
are arguing as logicians about terms and propositions. From a logical 
perspective we can abstract from the apprehension of the sign as an object. Not 
so if we treat the proposition semiotically as it functions in different 
interpretation processes.

 

 

Accordingly, when I say that Existential Graphs put before us moving

pictures of thought, I mean of thought in its essence free from

physiological and other accidents. CP 4.8 1905

It is the purified view of the logician, exemplified by the above remark on the

Existential graphs, that enables Peirce to hold that:

 

It seems best to regard a sign as a determination of a quasi-mind;

for if we regard it as an outward object, and as addressing itself to

a human mind, that mind must _rst apprehend it as an object in

itself, and only after that consider it in its signi_cance; and the like

must happen if the sign addresses itself to any quasi-mind. It must

begin by forming a determination of that quasi-mind, and nothing

will be lost by regarding that determination as the sign.14 EP 2

p.391 1906

 

 

Best,

 

Auke van Breemen

 

Van: Jon Alan Schmidt  
Verzonden: vrijdag 25 januari 2019 23:09
Aan: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Onderwerp: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Signs, Types, Tokens, Instances

 

Jerry C., List:

 

JLRC:  These three sentence have three different meaning if one takes the 
propositional logic of punctuation seriously.

 

I agree, as three different Tokens they produce three different Dynamic 
Interpretants; yet Peirce clearly affirmed that they are all the same 
proposition, the same Sign, and thus presumably have the same Final 
Interpretant.  Do they have three different Immediate Interpretants?  Are they 
three different Instances of the same Type, or single Instances of three 
different Types?

 

JAS:  I trust that the reader can imagine how these three sentences would also 
sound quite different when spoken, rather than written.

JLRC:  Certainly not this reader!

 

Really?  If you were to read them aloud, there would be no difference at all in 
how you spoke each sentence?

 

JLRC:  The differences that makes a difference in these three sentences are 
semes at the end that are very meaningful.

 

Again, at the moment I am tentatively inclined to treat those punctuation marks 
as different Tones that accompany three different Instances of the same Type, 
rather than additional Semes that make them three different Types.  However, I 
am open to being persuaded otherwise.

 

JLRC:  The meanings of the spoken forms depends on the context of the entire 
situation, especially the tone of voice and interpersonal relationships so it 
is hardly relevant to the semiotic interpretations of the alphabetic forms.

 

I agree, which is one reason why I believe that the spoken forms are different 
Types of the same Sign.

 

Regards,




Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA

Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman

www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt <http://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt>  
- twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt <http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt> 

 

On Fri, Jan 25, 2019 at 3:25 PM Jerry LR Chandler mailto:jerry_lr_chand...@icloud.com> > wrote:

List, Jon 

On Jan 25, 2019, at 1:47 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com> > wrote:

 

How should we characterize these various ways of uttering the same Proposition? 
 For example ...

*   We are going to the restaurant.
*   We are going to the restaurant?
*   We are going to the restaurant!

These three sentence have three different meaning if one takes the 
propositional logic of punctuation seriously.

The only change here is the punctuation at the end, but I trust that the reader 
can imagine how these three sentences would also sound quite different when 
spoken, rather than written. 

Certainly not this reader!

 

The differences that makes a difference in these three sentences are semes at 
the end that are very meaningful. The meanings of the spoken forms depends on 
the context of the entire situation, especially the tone of voice and 
interpersonal relationships so it is hardly relevant to the semiotic 
interpretations of the alphabetic forms.

 

Cheers

 

Jerry


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RE: [PEIRCE-L] Signs, Types, Tokens, Instances

[Auke van Breemen]

JAS, List,

 

We must not forget that a sign needs to be considered in the context of 
semiosis in actu if we want to become determinate as to which sign aspects take 
what value on each of the trichotomies. For only that what contributes to the 
result, i.e. the responding sign, takes part in the semiotic process we study 
(See Hulswit’s A semiotic account of causation.)

 

With regard to the dynamical object the tokens ‘man’ and ‘homme’ both can be 
regarded as of the same type, just as the spoken and written forms of ‘there’ 
can be regarded as the same type, although this probably is not the rule. I 
agree that with regard to what the terms connote, respectively English, French 
language with man and homme and written, spoken form with ‘there’ they are 
definitely regarded as of different type. 

 

 

Best,

 

Auke van Breemen

 

Van: Jon Alan Schmidt  
Verzonden: donderdag 24 januari 2019 17:50
Aan: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Onderwerp: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Signs, Types, Tokens, Instances

 

Auke, List:

 

According to the second long quote that I provided below from Peirce, "man" and 
"homme" are one and the same Sign, consistent with his statement elsewhere that 
"a sign is not a real thing" (EP 2:303; 1904).  I understand his emphasis here 
to be on "thing" (Brute Actuality), rather than "real."  My question remains 
whether "man" and "homme" are also one and the same Type, or two different 
Types of the same Sign.

 

Again, I now lean toward the latter.  The three-letter sequence, m-a-n, is "a 
definitely significant Form" that an individual Token must embody (at least 
approximately) in order to serve as an actual Instance of the Type in written 
English.  The five-letter sequence, h-o-m-m-e, is "a definitely significant 
Form" that an individual Token must embody (at least approximately) in order to 
serve as an actual Instance of the Type in written French.  To me, these 
different specifications for Instances imply different Types.

 

Thanks,

 

Jon S.

 

On Thu, Jan 24, 2019 at 10:22 AM Auke van Breemen mailto:a.bree...@chello.nl> > wrote:

JAS, List,

 

I am referring to aspects of signs when I am using terms like token, type and 
symbol. It is not the same sign, it is of the same type, symbol combination, 
ruled by the symbolic aspect, not the token, qualisign aspects. A habit of 
interpretation Is involved. Whether or not something(s) is the same sign (what 
for the qualisign/token aspects?) is a complicated question.

 

So I would substitute on aspect level.

 

Best,

 

Auke van breemen

 

Van: Jon Alan Schmidt mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com> > 
Verzonden: donderdag 24 januari 2019 16:51
Aan: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu <mailto:peirce-l@list.iupui.edu> 
Onderwerp: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Signs, Types, Tokens, Instances

 

Auke, List:

 

It is comforting to learn that I am not alone in wrestling with this question.  
Based on your analysis below, would you characterize the written versions of 
"man" and "homme" as two different Types of the same Sign, or two different 
_ of the same Type?  If the latter, what term fills the blank?  Again, I am 
not referring here to actual individual Instances/Tokens, but to the one word 
"man" in written English and the one word "homme" in written French.

 

Thanks,

 

Jon S.

 

On Thu, Jan 24, 2019 at 8:45 AM Auke van Breemen mailto:a.bree...@chello.nl> > wrote:

JAS, list,

 

I have been considering the same question. My conclusion is that a type 
originally is based on similarity. From an evolutionary point of view this 
probably is the first form. But If symbols are around that are based on the 
same type although the tokens that gave rise to the type differ, we may have 
imposed in our interpretation habit similarity to those different type/tokens. 
Thus, although at first sight the types differ, our habit of interpretation 
takes them as the same. From some point of view this is a similarity relation. 
For instance already all those different letter types handwritten, printed or 
on the screen, regarded as the same, already pull in the direction of a 
tolerant way in dealing with similarity.

 

Best,

 

Auke van Breemen

 

Van: Jon Alan Schmidt mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com> > 
Verzonden: donderdag 24 januari 2019 15:15
Aan: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu <mailto:peirce-l@list.iupui.edu> 
Onderwerp: [PEIRCE-L] Signs, Types, Tokens, Instances

 

List:

 

At the risk of initiating the kind of terminology-focused discussion that has 
prompted complaints from certain quarters in the past, I am seeking input on a 
specific issue that has been causing me some mild consternation.  The following 
passage provides what I consider to be Peirce's clearest definitions for Type, 
Token, and Instance.

 

CSP:  A common mode of estimating the amount of matter in a MS. or printed book 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Signs, Types, Tokens, Instances

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Jerry C., List:

A follow-up question occurred to me.

JLRC:  The differences that makes a difference in these three sentences are
semes at the end that are very meaningful.


If punctuation marks were Semes, what would be their Objects for which they
serve as substitutes in accordance with Peirce's definition?

I tentatively suggest that they are instead part of the *continuous
predicate* of the corresponding Proposition--which is *not *a Seme itself,
but rather a *relation *among Semes--and thus belong to its Immediate
Interpretant, which is why they are indeed "very meaningful."  This would
entail that the *same *Type can have *different *Immediate Interpretants,
in accordance with the different Tones that its individual Instances *possibly
could* embody.

Thanks,

Jon S.

On Fri, Jan 25, 2019 at 4:09 PM Jon Alan Schmidt 
wrote:

> Jerry C., List:
>
> JLRC:  These three sentence have three different meaning if one takes the
> propositional logic of punctuation seriously.
>
>
> I agree, as three different Tokens they produce three different *Dynamic 
> *Interpretants;
> yet Peirce clearly affirmed that they are all the same proposition, the
> same Sign, and thus presumably have the same *Final *Interpretant.  Do
> they have three different *Immediate *Interpretants?  Are they three
> different Instances of the same Type, or single Instances of three
> different Types?
>
> JAS:  I trust that the reader can imagine how these three sentences would
> also sound quite different when spoken, rather than written.
>
> JLRC:  Certainly not this reader!
>
>
> Really?  If you were to read them aloud, there would be no difference at
> all in how you spoke each sentence?
>
> JLRC:  The differences that makes a difference in these three sentences
> are semes at the end that are very meaningful.
>
>
> Again, at the moment I am tentatively inclined to treat those punctuation
> marks as different Tones that accompany three different Instances of the
> same Type, rather than additional Semes that make them three different
> Types.  However, I am open to being persuaded otherwise.
>
> JLRC:  The meanings of the spoken forms depends on the context of the
> entire situation, especially the tone of voice and interpersonal
> relationships so it is hardly relevant to the semiotic interpretations of
> the alphabetic forms.
>
>
> I agree, which is one reason why I believe that the spoken forms are
> different Types of the same Sign.
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
>
> On Fri, Jan 25, 2019 at 3:25 PM Jerry LR Chandler <
> jerry_lr_chand...@icloud.com> wrote:
>
>> List, Jon
>>
>> On Jan 25, 2019, at 1:47 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt 
>> wrote:
>>
>> How should we characterize these various ways of uttering the same
>> Proposition?  For example ...
>>
>>- We are going to the restaurant.
>>- We are going to the restaurant?
>>- We are going to the restaurant!
>>
>> These three sentence have three different meaning if one takes the
>> propositional logic of punctuation seriously.
>>
>> The only change here is the punctuation at the end, but I trust that the
>> reader can imagine how these three sentences would also *sound *quite
>> different when spoken, rather than written.
>>
>> Certainly not this reader!
>>
>> The differences that makes a difference in these three sentences are
>> semes at the end that are very meaningful. The meanings of the spoken forms
>> depends on the context of the entire situation, especially the tone of
>> voice and interpersonal relationships so it is hardly relevant to the
>> semiotic interpretations of the alphabetic forms.
>>
>> Cheers
>>
>> Jerry
>>
>

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Signs, Types, Tokens, Instances

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Clark, List:

Francesco Bellucci discusses speech act theory quite extensively in his
recent and comprehensive explication of *Peirce's Speculative Grammar:
Logic as Semiotics*, including a lengthy endnote (p. 348 n. 9) summarizing
Searle's approach and citing Brock's paper.  Bellucci even suggests that
Peirce's much-debated two different trichotomies of Interpretants were
directly motivated by such considerations.

FB:  ... *speculative grammar came to include a pioneering speech act
theory.  *For the *general *distinction between the immediate, the dynamic,
and the final interpretant was needed in order to differentiate the
illocutionary, the perlocutionary, and the locutionary levels of analysis,
while the *specific *distinction between the emotional, the energetic, and
the logical interpretant was needed in order to provide, from 1905 onwards,
a typology of perlocutionary effects. (p. 327)


However, as Bellucci points out, in Peirce's late taxonomies the divisions
based on perlocutionary effects and illocutionary forces are both
associated with the *Dynamic* Interpretant--its nature and its relation to
the Sign, respectively.

As I have already noted, this implies to me that those are properties
of an *individual
Token*, rather than the *general Type* of which it is an Instance.  In
other words, since two Instances of the same Type can have different
Dynamic Interpretants, they can also have different perlocutionary effects
and illocutionary forces.  Such aspects accompany those Instances as Tones,
"indefinite significant characters" that do not alter the "definitely
significant Form" that the Type requires, including punctuation marks and
bold/italic/underline for written English or voice inflections in spoken
English.  At least, that is how I see it right now.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Fri, Jan 25, 2019 at 3:44 PM Clark Goble  wrote:

> Worth noting that the distinction here is of course the characteristic
> focus of speech act theory of John Searle. I think Peirce had a somewhat
> similar albeit deeper notion as well. Jarrett Brock wrote an interesting
> paper on Peirce’s speech act theory in *Transactions *back in the 80’s
> that I have in my notes.
>
> https://www.jstor.org/stable/40319937?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents
>
> One can debate how close this is to Searle of course. I think unlimited
> semiosis undermines a lot of Searle’s particular approaches.
>
> One rather key difference as well is how Peirce conceives of propositions.
> Quoting Peirce,
>
> A proposition, as I have just intimated, is not to be understood as the
> lingual expression of a judgment. It is, on the contrary, that sign of
> which the judgment is one replica and the lingual expression another. But a
> judgment is distinctly *more *than the mere mental replica of a
> proposition*. *It not merely *expresses* the proposition, but it goes
> further an *accepts* it. I grant that the normal use of a proposition is
> to affirm it; and its chief logical properties relate to what would result
> in reference to its affirmation. (MS 517, 40-41; NEM 5.248)
>
> This is just the illocutionary act and its content.
>
> It is very important that this distinction should be understood. The
> various acts of assertion or assevation, judgment, denial, effective
> command, and teaching are acts *which establish general rules by which
> real things will be governed*. No mere icon does that, for it only
> signifies a character and is perfectly passive; no index does it, although
> it is effective in the special case. No mere proposition does it. But it is
> of the nature of *every complete symbol that it effects a general mode of
> real happening*. (ibid, 36-38)
>
>
> So I’d say there are either three different modes of meaning of the same
> sign.
>

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Signs, Types, Tokens, Instances

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Jerry C., List:

JLRC:  These three sentence have three different meaning if one takes the
propositional logic of punctuation seriously.


I agree, as three different Tokens they produce three different
*Dynamic *Interpretants;
yet Peirce clearly affirmed that they are all the same proposition, the
same Sign, and thus presumably have the same *Final *Interpretant.  Do they
have three different *Immediate *Interpretants?  Are they three different
Instances of the same Type, or single Instances of three different Types?

JAS:  I trust that the reader can imagine how these three sentences would
also sound quite different when spoken, rather than written.

JLRC:  Certainly not this reader!


Really?  If you were to read them aloud, there would be no difference at
all in how you spoke each sentence?

JLRC:  The differences that makes a difference in these three sentences are
semes at the end that are very meaningful.


Again, at the moment I am tentatively inclined to treat those punctuation
marks as different Tones that accompany three different Instances of the
same Type, rather than additional Semes that make them three different
Types.  However, I am open to being persuaded otherwise.

JLRC:  The meanings of the spoken forms depends on the context of the
entire situation, especially the tone of voice and interpersonal
relationships so it is hardly relevant to the semiotic interpretations of
the alphabetic forms.


I agree, which is one reason why I believe that the spoken forms are
different Types of the same Sign.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Fri, Jan 25, 2019 at 3:25 PM Jerry LR Chandler <
jerry_lr_chand...@icloud.com> wrote:

> List, Jon
>
> On Jan 25, 2019, at 1:47 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt 
> wrote:
>
> How should we characterize these various ways of uttering the same
> Proposition?  For example ...
>
>- We are going to the restaurant.
>- We are going to the restaurant?
>- We are going to the restaurant!
>
> These three sentence have three different meaning if one takes the
> propositional logic of punctuation seriously.
>
> The only change here is the punctuation at the end, but I trust that the
> reader can imagine how these three sentences would also *sound *quite
> different when spoken, rather than written.
>
> Certainly not this reader!
>
> The differences that makes a difference in these three sentences are semes
> at the end that are very meaningful. The meanings of the spoken forms
> depends on the context of the entire situation, especially the tone of
> voice and interpersonal relationships so it is hardly relevant to the
> semiotic interpretations of the alphabetic forms.
>
> Cheers
>
> Jerry
>

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Signs, Types, Tokens, Instances

[Stephen Curtiss Rose]

Seems to me the three punctuations make these different signs. They are
unified expressions that differ. They are meanings that differ. As written
they are not the same. I am used to being ignored in these threads. But I
want to at least record a sense that by delving deeply into authenticating
what Peirce had in mind there s a risk of ignoring the forest for the
trees. For me the forest is what Peirce means for theology and Biblical
studies. Call it an orchard.
amazon.com/author/stephenrose


On Fri, Jan 25, 2019 at 4:44 PM Clark Goble  wrote:

>
>
> On Jan 25, 2019, at 12:47 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt 
> wrote:
>
> How should we characterize these various ways of uttering the same
> Proposition?  For example ...
>
>- We are going to the restaurant.
>- We are going to the restaurant?
>- We are going to the restaurant!
>
> The only change here is the punctuation at the end, but I trust that the
> reader can imagine how these three sentences would also *sound *quite
> different when spoken, rather than written.  Clearly Peirce held that these
> are *not *three different Signs; so are they three different Types of the
> same Sign, or three different _ of the same Type?  Once again, if the
> latter, what fills the blank?
>
>
> Worth noting that the distinction here is of course the characteristic
> focus of speech act theory of John Searle. I think Peirce had a somewhat
> similar albeit deeper notion as well. Jarrett Brock wrote an interesting
> paper on Peirce’s speech act theory in *Transactions *back in the 80’s
> that I have in my notes.
>
> https://www.jstor.org/stable/40319937?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents
>
> One can debate how close this is to Searle of course. I think unlimited
> semiosis undermines a lot of Searle’s particular approaches.
>
> One rather key difference as well is how Peirce conceives of propositions.
> Quoting Peirce,
>
> A proposition, as I have just intimated, is not to be understood as the
> lingual expression of a judgment. It is, on the contrary, that sign of
> which the judgment is one replica and the lingual expression another. But a
> judgment is distinctly *more *than the mere mental replica of a
> proposition*. *It not merely *expresses* the proposition, but it goes
> further an *accepts* it. I grant that the normal use of a proposition is
> to affirm it; and its chief logical properties relate to what would result
> in reference to its affirmation. (MS 517, 40-41; NEM 5.248)
>
> This is just the illocutionary act and its content.
>
> It is very important that this distinction should be understood. The
> various acts of assertion or assevation, judgment, denial, effective
> command, and teaching are acts *which establish general rules by which
> real things will be governed*. No mere icon does that, for it only
> signifies a character and is perfectly passive; no index does it, although
> it is effective in the special case. No mere proposition does it. But it is
> of the nature of *every complete symbol that it effects a general mode of
> real happening*. (ibid, 36-38)
>
>
> So I’d say there are either three different modes of meaning of the same
> sign.
>
>
>

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Signs, Types, Tokens, Instances

[Clark Goble]

> On Jan 25, 2019, at 12:47 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt  
> wrote:
> 
> How should we characterize these various ways of uttering the same 
> Proposition?  For example ...
> We are going to the restaurant.
> We are going to the restaurant?
> We are going to the restaurant!
> The only change here is the punctuation at the end, but I trust that the 
> reader can imagine how these three sentences would also sound quite different 
> when spoken, rather than written.  Clearly Peirce held that these are not 
> three different Signs; so are they three different Types of the same Sign, or 
> three different _ of the same Type?  Once again, if the latter, what 
> fills the blank?
> 

Worth noting that the distinction here is of course the characteristic focus of 
speech act theory of John Searle. I think Peirce had a somewhat similar albeit 
deeper notion as well. Jarrett Brock wrote an interesting paper on Peirce’s 
speech act theory in Transactions back in the 80’s that I have in my notes.

https://www.jstor.org/stable/40319937?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents 


One can debate how close this is to Searle of course. I think unlimited 
semiosis undermines a lot of Searle’s particular approaches. 

One rather key difference as well is how Peirce conceives of propositions. 
Quoting Peirce,

A proposition, as I have just intimated, is not to be understood as the lingual 
expression of a judgment. It is, on the contrary, that sign of which the 
judgment is one replica and the lingual expression another. But a judgment is 
distinctly more than the mere mental replica of a proposition. It not merely 
expresses the proposition, but it goes further an accepts it. I grant that the 
normal use of a proposition is to affirm it; and its chief logical properties 
relate to what would result in reference to its affirmation. (MS 517, 40-41; 
NEM 5.248)

This is just the illocutionary act and its content. 

It is very important that this distinction should be understood. The various 
acts of assertion or assevation, judgment, denial, effective command, and 
teaching are acts which establish general rules by which real things will be 
governed. No mere icon does that, for it only signifies a character and is 
perfectly passive; no index does it, although it is effective in the special 
case. No mere proposition does it. But it is of the nature of every complete 
symbol that it effects a general mode of real happening. (ibid, 36-38)

So I’d say there are either three different modes of meaning of the same sign.



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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Signs, Types, Tokens, Instances

[Jerry LR Chandler]

List, Jon 
> On Jan 25, 2019, at 1:47 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt  
> wrote:
> 
> How should we characterize these various ways of uttering the same 
> Proposition?  For example ...
> We are going to the restaurant.
> We are going to the restaurant?
> We are going to the restaurant!
These three sentence have three different meaning if one takes the 
propositional logic of punctuation seriously.

> The only change here is the punctuation at the end, but I trust that the 
> reader can imagine how these three sentences would also sound quite different 
> when spoken, rather than written. 


Certainly not this reader!

The differences that makes a difference in these three sentences are semes at 
the end that are very meaningful. The meanings of the spoken forms depends on 
the context of the entire situation, especially the tone of voice and 
interpersonal relationships so it is hardly relevant to the semiotic 
interpretations of the alphabetic forms.

Cheers

Jerry
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Signs, Types, Tokens, Instances

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

List:

A related question occurred to me today, involving a more complex case.

CSP:  One and the same proposition may be affirmed, denied, judged,
doubted, inwardly inquired into, put as a question, wished, asked for,
effectively commanded, taught, or merely expressed, and does not thereby
become a different proposition. (EP 2:312; 1904)


How should we characterize these various ways of uttering the same
Proposition?  For example ...

   - We are going to the restaurant.
   - We are going to the restaurant?
   - We are going to the restaurant!

The only change here is the punctuation at the end, but I trust that the
reader can imagine how these three sentences would also *sound *quite
different when spoken, rather than written.  Clearly Peirce held that these
are *not *three different Signs; so are they three different Types of the
same Sign, or three different _ of the same Type?  Once again, if the
latter, what fills the blank?

I suppose that one option is simply to call them three different *Instances
*of the same Type, such that the mode of utterance pertains to each
*individual* Token on that *particular *occasion.  After all, Peirce
divided Signs according to the *nature *of the Dynamic Interpretant into
Feeling/Exertion/Sign (1906) or Sympathetic/Percussive/Usual (1908), and
according to the *relation *with the Dynamic Interpretant into
Presented/Urged/Submitted (1904) or Suggestive/Imperative/Indicative
(1908).  Together these distinctions would encompass at least a few of the
alternatives, and in my current view the Dynamic Interpretant is indeed
associated with each *Instance *rather than the overall *Type*.

It really comes down to whether aspects like punctuation in written English
and inflection of voice in spoken English are *essential *or
*accidental *aspects
of a Type; likewise such practices as the use of *italics*, *underlining*,
*bold*, ALL CAPS, or volume to convey emphasis.  These all seem to be what
Peirce had in mind as what he called *Tones *(or Tinges or Marks).

CSP:  An indefinite significant character such as a tone of voice can
neither be called a Type nor a Token. I propose to call such a Sign a *Tone*.
(CP 4.537; 1906)


Note that within the same paragraph, Peirce defined a Tone as "an
indefinite significant character" and a Type is "a definitely significant
Form."  How does this (presumably deliberate) parallelism affect our
understanding of the relation between the two?  Should we perhaps consider
the three sentences above to be Instances of the same Type, but with three
different Tones?  Or is having different Tones--including more obvious
variations like the sequence of written letters or spoken sounds; e.g.,
"man" vs. "homme"--precisely what distinguishes one Type of the same Sign
from another?

Adding a further wrinkle, the question came up previously of whether the
one word "man" in written English and a generic image of a man are two
different Types of the same Sign or two different _ of the same Type.
If we were to say that they are two different *Instances *of the same Type,
but with different *Tones*, we would be treating a Symbol (the word) and an
Icon (the image) as not only the same *Sign*, but also the same *Type*.
Although *Instances *of both could certainly have the same *Dynamic *Object,
is it even possible for two Instances of the same Type to have completely
different *relations *with that Dynamic Object, as well as different *Immediate
*Objects?  I would not think so.

With all of that in mind, my tentative conclusions are as follows.

   - "Man," "homme," and a generic image of a man are three different
   "definitely significant Forms," and therefore three different *Types *of
   the same *Sign*.
   - Punctuation and inflection are "indefinite significant characters,"
   and therefore three different *Tones*, but the three sentences above are
   still *Instances *of the same *Type*.
   - Minor variations or mistakes in spelling or pronunciation may not even
   rise to the level of "indefinite significant characters," and thus are
   likewise insufficient to constitute different *Types*.

As tends to be the case in these kinds of classification exercises, I
suspect that the boundary between "a definitely significant Form" and "an
indefinite significant character" is quite *vague*, such that any sharp
lines we were to draw would inevitably be arbitrary to some degree.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

>

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Signs, Types, Tokens, Instances

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Gary R., List:

Thank you for your very stimulating post!  This is intended to be a
*tentative* response, with the hope of prompting further discussion.

GR:  If the three and five letter sequences of the written word for
man/homme are each definitely significant forms, then I assume the spoken
words are as well.


Yes, in my current view spoken English is a different Sign System from
written English, even though there is a close correspondence between the
two.  This is evident from the fact that people can be--and throughout most
of history, have been--quite competent at speaking and hearing English (or
another language) without having *any *ability to read or write it.
Consequently, I am inclined to consider "man" written and "man" spoken to
be two different Types of the same Sign.

GR:  If so, then are all variations in pronunciation of 'man' or 'homme'
(either a personal or regional variation) definitely significant forms and
so "specifications for Instances imply different Types"?  Is a misspelling,
say, "mann" for "man" in a English sentence otherwise quite correct ... a
specification of an instance of a different type?


No, in my current view *minor *deviations from the specifications do not
entail different Types.  As I said before, it seems sufficient that an
individual Token *approximately *embodies the "definitely significant Form"
of the Type.  I am inclined to consider small variations in spoken
pronunciation and written spelling of the same word to be "accidental"
rather than "essential" to a Type, along with aspects such as font, size,
and color.

GR:  Similarly is every image (for the moment, let's limit it to the kinds
of abstractions one sees on the doors of restrooms in France and the USA)
of a man/homme a significantly different form and so also an instance
implying a different type?


Yes, in my current view iconic conventions, such as those used for restroom
doors, are different Sign Systems from English, French, or any other
particular language.  That is what makes them so useful in multilingual
contexts.  In this case, though, I an *not *inclined to consider "man" in
written English and the wordless sign on a restroom door to be Types of the
same Sign; the latter does not translate to "man," but rather to "restroom
for men."

GR:  Because of my own tentative answers to these questions, at the moment
I'm leaning towards the first of the two interpretations Jon offered, that
'man' and 'homme' (written or spoken, etc.) are the same type.


In that case, how would you fill the blank?  The one English word "man" and
the one French word "homme" are two different _ of the same Type.

GR:  How does the meaning of the word or image of a man figure into all of
this? All the tokens/instances (except the example of Thomas Mann's name)
have the same meaning, have they not?


No, Peirce consistently associated the *meaning *of a Sign with its
*Interpretants*; and in my current view, every Sign has a Final
Interpretant, every Type has an Immediate Interpretant, and every Instance
has a Dynamic Interpretant.  A Sign's Final Interpretant is whatever
it *necessarily
would* signify after infinite inquiry by an infinite community; i.e., its
meaning in the Ultimate Opinion.  A Type's Immediate Interpretant is
whatever it *possibly could* signify within the corresponding Sign System;
i.e., its meaning as expressed in its definition.  Consequently, different
Types of the same Sign can have *somewhat *different Immediate
Interpretants, which is one reason why translation between languages is
rarely a straightforward process of direct substitution.  An Instance's
Dynamic Interpretant is whatever it *actually does* signify on that
particular occasion; i.e., its meaning as its *effect *on a
Quasi-mind--which can be a Feeling, an Exertion, or a further Instance of a
Sign.  Since different Quasi-minds can (and often do) have different (and
fallible) Interpretative Habits, different Instances of the same Type can
have *quite *different Dynamic Interpretants.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Thu, Jan 24, 2019 at 3:25 PM Gary Richmond 
wrote:

> Jon, Auke, List,
>
> Jon wrote:
>
> According to the second long quote [. . .] "man" and "homme" are one and
> the same Sign, consistent with his statement elsewhere that "a sign is not
> a real thing" (EP 2:303; 1904). [. . .] My question remains whether "man"
> and "homme" are *also *one and the same Type, or two *different *Types of
> the same Sign.
>
> Again, I now lean toward the latter.  The three-letter sequence, m-a-n, is
> "a definitely significant Form" that an individual Token must embody (at
> least approximately) in order to serve as an actual Instance of the Type in
> written English.  The five-letter sequence, h-o-m-m-e, is "a definitely
> significant Form" that an individual Token must embody (at least
> 

Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Signs, Types, Tokens, Instances

[Helmut Raulien]

te:




JAS, List,

 

I am referring to aspects of signs when I am using terms like token, type and symbol. It is not the same sign, it is of the same type, symbol combination, ruled by the symbolic aspect, not the token, qualisign aspects. A habit of interpretation Is involved. Whether or not something(s) is the same sign (what for the qualisign/token aspects?) is a complicated question.

 

So I would substitute on aspect level.

 

Best,

 

Auke van breemen

 

Van: Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com>
Verzonden: donderdag 24 januari 2019 16:51
Aan: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Onderwerp: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Signs, Types, Tokens, Instances

 



Auke, List:


 



It is comforting to learn that I am not alone in wrestling with this question.  Based on your analysis below, would you characterize the written versions of "man" and "homme" as two different Types of the same Sign, or two different _ of the same Type?  If the latter, what term fills the blank?  Again, I am not referring here to actual individual Instances/Tokens, but to the one word "man" in written English and the one word "homme" in written French.



 



Thanks,



 



Jon S.



 



On Thu, Jan 24, 2019 at 8:45 AM Auke van Breemen <a.bree...@chello.nl> wrote:





JAS, list,

 

I have been considering the same question. My conclusion is that a type originally is based on similarity. From an evolutionary point of view this probably is the first form. But If symbols are around that are based on the same type although the tokens that gave rise to the type differ, we may have imposed in our interpretation habit similarity to those different type/tokens. Thus, although at first sight the types differ, our habit of interpretation takes them as the same. From some point of view this is a similarity relation. For instance already all those different letter types handwritten, printed or on the screen, regarded as the same, already pull in the direction of a tolerant way in dealing with similarity.

 

Best,

 

Auke van Breemen

 

Van: Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com>
Verzonden: donderdag 24 januari 2019 15:15
Aan: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Onderwerp: [PEIRCE-L] Signs, Types, Tokens, Instances

 








List:


 



At the risk of initiating the kind of terminology-focused discussion that has prompted complaints from certain quarters in the past, I am seeking input on a specific issue that has been causing me some mild consternation.  The following passage provides what I consider to be Peirce's clearest definitions for Type, Token, and Instance.



 








CSP:  A common mode of estimating the amount of matter in a MS. or printed book is to count the number of words. There will ordinarily be about twenty the's on a page, and of course they count as twenty words. In another sense of the word "word," however, there is but one word "the" in the English language; and it is impossible that this word should lie visibly on a page or be heard in any voice, for the reason that it is not a Single thing or Single event. It does not exist; it only determines things that do exist. Such a definitely significant Form, I propose to term a Type. A Single event which happens once and whose identity is limited to that one happening or a Single object or thing which is in some single place at any one instant of time, such event or thing being significant only as occurring just when and where it does, such as this or that word on a single line of a single page of a single copy of a book, I will venture to call a Token ... In order that a Type may be used, it has to be embodied in a Token which shall be a sign of the Type, and thereby of the object the Type signifies. I propose to call such a Token of a Type an Instance of the Type. Thus, there may be twenty Instances of the Type "the" on a page. (CP 4.537; 1906)








 



Peirce's illustrative example here (and elsewhere) is "the," which is both one word in written English as a Type and twenty words on a printed page as Instances; i.e., Tokens of the Type.  Now, consider what he wrote a few years earlier about a "representamen," which at that time he explicitly defined as a generalization of "sign," writing a few months later that "A Sign is a Representamen with a mental Interpretant" (CP 2.273, EP 2:273; 1903).



 










CSP:  The mode of being of a representamen is such that it is capable of repetition. Take, for example, any proverb. "Evil communications corrupt good manners." Every time this is written or spoken in English, Greek, or any other language, and every time it is thought of, it is one and the same representamen. It is the same with a diagram or picture. It is the same with a physical sign or symptom. If two weathercocks are different signs, it is only in so far as they refer to different parts of the air. A representamen which should ha

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Signs, Types, Tokens, Instances

[frances.kelly]

Curiosity--- 
At an anglophonic kennel club, if the toilet door sign has the word "pointers" 
that stands for "men" as a male washroom, then the word "pointers" is seemingly 
a different type, albeit a different synonym of sorts as determined by the same 
meant object. It is after all the referred object that determines the main kind 
or type a sign will be in any signage or language at least as an icon or index 
or symbol; and any type is a mental construct of law with an exemplified 
presence that cannot be shown materially except by a sampled token fact that 
stands for the type. This whole issue for say subsigns of course drifts into 
the many complex versions and aspects of tones and tokens and types, all of 
which seems somewhat unclear to me. 
Footnote--- 
If a male pictogram for a toilet depicted a man in a kilt or a robe instead of 
in pants or tights, then the sign panels would all seemingly be male tokens or 
fonts of a usual "man" type, because the tokens all stand in identical ways for 
the same referred determinate object. If a single specific pictogram were 
isolated as a common type of them all, then that selected sample would itself 
probably be a kind of master token, because a mental type is likely an 
exemplified law that can only be sensibly manifested by a material token of 
factual substance. In other words, to point to a type is perhaps to point to a 
token of that type. 
---Frances 


From: Gary Richmond  
Sent: Thursday, 24 January, 2019 16:25
To: Peirce-L 
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Signs, Types, Tokens, Instances
Jon, Auke, List,
Jon wrote: 
"According to the second long quote [. . .] "man" and "homme" are one and the 
same Sign, consistent with his statement elsewhere that "a sign is not a real 
thing" (EP 2:303; 1904). [. . .] My question remains whether "man" and "homme" 
are also one and the same Type, or two different Types of the same Sign.
Again, I now lean toward the latter.  The three-letter sequence, m-a-n, is "a 
definitely significant Form" that an individual Token must embody (at least 
approximately) in order to serve as an actual Instance of the Type in written 
English.  The five-letter sequence, h-o-m-m-e, is "a definitely significant 
Form" that an individual Token must embody (at least approximately) in order to 
serve as an actual Instance of the Type in written French.  To me, these 
different specifications for Instances imply different Types."

I have only a couple of questions at the moment. If the three and five letter 
sequences of the written word for man/homme are each definitely significant 
forms, then I assume the spoken words are as well. If so, then are all 
variations in pronunciation of 'man' or 'homme' (either a personal or regional 
variation) definitely significant forms and so "specifications for Instances 
imply different Types"? 
Is a misspelling, say, "mann" for "man" in a English sentence otherwise quite 
correct, say by a young German student of English and easily seen to have the 
same meaning as the English word (and, indeed, being the German word for 'man' 
minus the capitalization which it would have in German), a specification of an 
instance of a different type? Similarly, is this so for the mispronunciation of 
a English student of Thomas Mann's last name?
Similarly is every image (for the moment, let's limit it to the kinds of 
abstractions one sees on the doors of restrooms in France and the USA) of a 
man/homme.


a significantly different form and so also an instance implying a different 
type?
Because of my own tentative answers to these questions, at the moment I'm 
leaning towards the first of the two interpretations Jon offered, that 'man' 
and 'homme' (written or spoken, etc.) are the same type.
Perhaps another way of asking these questions would be: How does the meaning of 
the word or image of a man figure into all of this? All the tokens/instances 
(except the example of Thomas Mann's name) have the same meaning, have they not?
Best, Gary 

 


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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Signs, Types, Tokens, Instances

[Gary Richmond]

Jon, Auke, List,

Jon wrote:

According to the second long quote [. . .] "man" and "homme" are one and
the same Sign, consistent with his statement elsewhere that "a sign is not
a real thing" (EP 2:303; 1904). [. . .] My question remains whether "man"
and "homme" are *also *one and the same Type, or two *different *Types of
the same Sign.

Again, I now lean toward the latter.  The three-letter sequence, m-a-n, is
"a definitely significant Form" that an individual Token must embody (at
least approximately) in order to serve as an actual Instance of the Type in
written English.  The five-letter sequence, h-o-m-m-e, is "a definitely
significant Form" that an individual Token must embody (at least
approximately) in order to serve as an actual Instance of the Type in
written French.  To me, these different specifications for Instances imply
different Types.



I have only a couple of questions at the moment. If the three and five
letter sequences of the written word for man/homme are each definitely
significant forms, then I assume the spoken words are as well. If so, then
are all variations in pronunciation of 'man' or 'homme' (either a personal
or regional variation) definitely significant forms and so "specifications
for Instances imply different Types"?

Is a misspelling, say, "mann" for "man" in a English sentence otherwise
quite correct, say by a young German student of English and easily seen to
have the same meaning as the English word (and, indeed, being the German
word for 'man' minus the capitalization which it would have in German), a
specification of an instance of a different type? Similarly, is this so for
the mispronunciation of a English student of Thomas Mann's last name?

Similarly is every image (for the moment, let's limit it to the kinds of
abstractions one sees on the doors of restrooms in France and the USA) of a
man/homme.
[image: image.png]
[image: image.png]

a significantly different form and so also an instance implying a different
type?

Because of my own tentative answers to these questions, at the moment I'm
leaning towards the first of the two interpretations Jon offered, that
'man' and 'homme' (written or spoken, etc.) are the same type.

Perhaps another way of asking these questions would be: How does the
meaning of the word or image of a man figure into all of this? All the
tokens/instances (except the example of Thomas Mann's name) have the same
meaning, have they not?

Best,

Gary



Best,

Gary


*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*

*718 482-5690*


On Thu, Jan 24, 2019 at 11:50 AM Jon Alan Schmidt 
wrote:

> Auke, List:
>
> According to the second long quote that I provided below from Peirce,
> "man" and "homme" are one and the same Sign, consistent with his statement
> elsewhere that "a sign is not a real thing" (EP 2:303; 1904).  I understand
> his emphasis here to be on "thing" (Brute Actuality), rather than "real."
> My question remains whether "man" and "homme" are *also *one and the same
> Type, or two *different *Types of the same Sign.
>
> Again, I now lean toward the latter.  The three-letter sequence, m-a-n, is
> "a definitely significant Form" that an individual Token must embody (at
> least approximately) in order to serve as an actual Instance of the Type in
> written English.  The five-letter sequence, h-o-m-m-e, is "a definitely
> significant Form" that an individual Token must embody (at least
> approximately) in order to serve as an actual Instance of the Type in
> written French.  To me, these different specifications for Instances imply
> different Types.
>
> Thanks,
>
> Jon S.
>
> On Thu, Jan 24, 2019 at 10:22 AM Auke van Breemen 
> wrote:
>
>> JAS, List,
>>
>>
>>
>> I am referring to aspects of signs when I am using terms like token, type
>> and symbol. It is not the same sign, it is of the same type, symbol
>> combination, ruled by the symbolic aspect, not the token, qualisign
>> aspects. A habit of interpretation Is involved. Whether or not something(s)
>> is the same sign (what for the qualisign/token aspects?) is a complicated
>> question.
>>
>>
>>
>> So I would substitute on aspect level.
>>
>>
>>
>> Best,
>>
>>
>>
>> Auke van breemen
>>
>>
>>
>> *Van:* Jon Alan Schmidt 
>> *Verzonden:* donderdag 24 januari 2019 16:51
>> *Aan:* peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
>> *Onderwerp:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Signs, Types, Tokens, Instances
>>
>>
>>
>> Auke, List:
>>
>>
>>
>> It is comforting to learn 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Signs, Types, Tokens, Instances

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Auke, List:

According to the second long quote that I provided below from Peirce, "man"
and "homme" are one and the same Sign, consistent with his statement
elsewhere that "a sign is not a real thing" (EP 2:303; 1904).  I understand
his emphasis here to be on "thing" (Brute Actuality), rather than "real."
My question remains whether "man" and "homme" are *also *one and the same
Type, or two *different *Types of the same Sign.

Again, I now lean toward the latter.  The three-letter sequence, m-a-n, is
"a definitely significant Form" that an individual Token must embody (at
least approximately) in order to serve as an actual Instance of the Type in
written English.  The five-letter sequence, h-o-m-m-e, is "a definitely
significant Form" that an individual Token must embody (at least
approximately) in order to serve as an actual Instance of the Type in
written French.  To me, these different specifications for Instances imply
different Types.

Thanks,

Jon S.

On Thu, Jan 24, 2019 at 10:22 AM Auke van Breemen 
wrote:

> JAS, List,
>
>
>
> I am referring to aspects of signs when I am using terms like token, type
> and symbol. It is not the same sign, it is of the same type, symbol
> combination, ruled by the symbolic aspect, not the token, qualisign
> aspects. A habit of interpretation Is involved. Whether or not something(s)
> is the same sign (what for the qualisign/token aspects?) is a complicated
> question.
>
>
>
> So I would substitute on aspect level.
>
>
>
> Best,
>
>
>
> Auke van breemen
>
>
>
> *Van:* Jon Alan Schmidt 
> *Verzonden:* donderdag 24 januari 2019 16:51
> *Aan:* peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
> *Onderwerp:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Signs, Types, Tokens, Instances
>
>
>
> Auke, List:
>
>
>
> It is comforting to learn that I am not alone in wrestling with this
> question.  Based on your analysis below, would you characterize the written
> versions of "man" and "homme" as two different Types of the same Sign, or
> two different _ of the same Type?  If the latter, what term fills the
> blank?  Again, I am not referring here to actual individual
> Instances/Tokens, but to the one word "man" in written English and the one
> word "homme" in written French.
>
>
>
> Thanks,
>
>
>
> Jon S.
>
>
>
> On Thu, Jan 24, 2019 at 8:45 AM Auke van Breemen 
> wrote:
>
> JAS, list,
>
>
>
> I have been considering the same question. My conclusion is that a type
> originally is based on similarity. From an evolutionary point of view this
> probably is the first form. But If symbols are around that are based on the
> same type although the tokens that gave rise to the type differ, we may
> have imposed in our interpretation habit similarity to those different
> type/tokens. Thus, although at first sight the types differ, our habit of
> interpretation takes them as the same. From some point of view this is a
> similarity relation. For instance already all those different letter types
> handwritten, printed or on the screen, regarded as the same, already pull
> in the direction of a tolerant way in dealing with similarity.
>
>
>
> Best,
>
>
>
> Auke van Breemen
>
>
>
> *Van:* Jon Alan Schmidt 
> *Verzonden:* donderdag 24 januari 2019 15:15
> *Aan:* peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
> *Onderwerp:* [PEIRCE-L] Signs, Types, Tokens, Instances
>
>
>
> List:
>
>
>
> At the risk of initiating the kind of terminology-focused discussion that
> has prompted complaints from certain quarters in the past, I am seeking
> input on a specific issue that has been causing me some mild
> consternation.  The following passage provides what I consider to be
> Peirce's clearest definitions for Type, Token, and Instance.
>
>
>
> CSP:  A common mode of estimating the amount of matter in a MS. or printed
> book is to count the number of words. There will ordinarily be about twenty
> the's on a page, and of course they count as twenty words. In another sense
> of the word "word," however, there is but one word "the" in the English
> language; and it is impossible that this word should lie visibly on a page
> or be heard in any voice, for the reason that it is not a Single thing or
> Single event. It does not exist; it only determines things that do exist.
> Such a definitely significant Form, I propose to term a *Type*. A Single
> event which happens once and whose identity is limited to that one
> happening or a Single object or thing which is in some single place at any
> one instant of time, such event or thing being significant only as
> occurring just when and where 

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Signs, Types, Tokens, Instances

[Auke van Breemen]

JAS, List,

 

I am referring to aspects of signs when I am using terms like token, type and 
symbol. It is not the same sign, it is of the same type, symbol combination, 
ruled by the symbolic aspect, not the token, qualisign aspects. A habit of 
interpretation Is involved. Whether or not something(s) is the same sign (what 
for the qualisign/token aspects?) is a complicated question.

 

So I would substitute on aspect level.

 

Best,

 

Auke van breemen

 

 

 

Van: Jon Alan Schmidt  
Verzonden: donderdag 24 januari 2019 16:51
Aan: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Onderwerp: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Signs, Types, Tokens, Instances

 

Auke, List:

 

It is comforting to learn that I am not alone in wrestling with this question.  
Based on your analysis below, would you characterize the written versions of 
"man" and "homme" as two different Types of the same Sign, or two different 
_ of the same Type?  If the latter, what term fills the blank?  Again, I am 
not referring here to actual individual Instances/Tokens, but to the one word 
"man" in written English and the one word "homme" in written French.

 

Thanks,

 

Jon S.

 

On Thu, Jan 24, 2019 at 8:45 AM Auke van Breemen mailto:a.bree...@chello.nl> > wrote:

JAS, list,

 

I have been considering the same question. My conclusion is that a type 
originally is based on similarity. From an evolutionary point of view this 
probably is the first form. But If symbols are around that are based on the 
same type although the tokens that gave rise to the type differ, we may have 
imposed in our interpretation habit similarity to those different type/tokens. 
Thus, although at first sight the types differ, our habit of interpretation 
takes them as the same. From some point of view this is a similarity relation. 
For instance already all those different letter types handwritten, printed or 
on the screen, regarded as the same, already pull in the direction of a 
tolerant way in dealing with similarity.

 

Best,

 

Auke van Breemen

 

Van: Jon Alan Schmidt mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com> > 
Verzonden: donderdag 24 januari 2019 15:15
Aan: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu <mailto:peirce-l@list.iupui.edu> 
Onderwerp: [PEIRCE-L] Signs, Types, Tokens, Instances

 

List:

 

At the risk of initiating the kind of terminology-focused discussion that has 
prompted complaints from certain quarters in the past, I am seeking input on a 
specific issue that has been causing me some mild consternation.  The following 
passage provides what I consider to be Peirce's clearest definitions for Type, 
Token, and Instance.

 

CSP:  A common mode of estimating the amount of matter in a MS. or printed book 
is to count the number of words. There will ordinarily be about twenty the's on 
a page, and of course they count as twenty words. In another sense of the word 
"word," however, there is but one word "the" in the English language; and it is 
impossible that this word should lie visibly on a page or be heard in any 
voice, for the reason that it is not a Single thing or Single event. It does 
not exist; it only determines things that do exist. Such a definitely 
significant Form, I propose to term a Type. A Single event which happens once 
and whose identity is limited to that one happening or a Single object or thing 
which is in some single place at any one instant of time, such event or thing 
being significant only as occurring just when and where it does, such as this 
or that word on a single line of a single page of a single copy of a book, I 
will venture to call a Token ... In order that a Type may be used, it has to be 
embodied in a Token which shall be a sign of the Type, and thereby of the 
object the Type signifies. I propose to call such a Token of a Type an Instance 
of the Type. Thus, there may be twenty Instances of the Type "the" on a page. 
(CP 4.537; 1906)

 

Peirce's illustrative example here (and elsewhere) is "the," which is both one 
word in written English as a Type and twenty words on a printed page as 
Instances; i.e., Tokens of the Type.  Now, consider what he wrote a few years 
earlier about a "representamen," which at that time he explicitly defined as a 
generalization of "sign," writing a few months later that "A Sign is a 
Representamen with a mental Interpretant" (CP 2.273, EP 2:273; 1903).

 

CSP:  The mode of being of a representamen is such that it is capable of 
repetition. Take, for example, any proverb. "Evil communications corrupt good 
manners." Every time this is written or spoken in English, Greek, or any other 
language, and every time it is thought of, it is one and the same 
representamen. It is the same with a diagram or picture. It is the same with a 
physical sign or symptom. If two weathercocks are different signs, it is only 
in so far as they refer to different parts of the air. A representam

Re: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Signs, Types, Tokens, Instances

[Stephen Curtiss Rose]

My spontaneoous reaction to this is how does one envision a sign? I suspect
this propels us into subjectivity. I have a sense of signs as a thick mist
of wisps infusing all around wherecer I might be and extending through the
universe. In other words I am in subjectiveland -- precisely the areas
where much beauty, art, imaging and poetry emerge. And dreams and so forth.
I have no brief for this or capacity to defend it. But It makes sense.
Signs are tangible to consciousness but what they really all do, any of
them, is to remind us of the source of our prompts -- the basis of our
thinking, the basis of conscious awareness. Signs are the closest link we
have to the nvisible world from which we may come and to which we may
return. However this is expressed I cannot believe Peirce saw things that
differently with his talks of musing and the like.
amazon.com/author/stephenrose


On Thu, Jan 24, 2019 at 10:36 AM Helmut Raulien  wrote:

> Auke, Jon, list,
> I find the idea very confusing, that a type is a sign. I am thinking of
> instantiations only as signs. Isnt the term "type" a generalisation of that
> what makes something a sign? Examples: An original of similarities is an
> iconic type, something giving a hint is an indexical type, some pattern
> that is agreed to have a certain meaning is a symbolic type within a
> certain language, some meaning expressed with different patterns in
> different languages is... I dont know: an interidiomatic symbolic type??
> I guess, the type itself is not a sign by itself, because it does not work
> as a sign, only its instantiations do.
> On the other hand, a type is a final interpretant of each
> instantiation-(token-)sign (if I am not completely wrong). And Peirce often
> has called the sign-parts "signs" too, e.g. by saying, that an object is a
> sign.
>
> Best, Helmut
>
> 24. Januar 2019 um 15:45 Uhr
>  "Auke van Breemen" 
>
>
> JAS, list,
>
>
>
> I have been considering the same question. My conclusion is that a type
> originally is based on similarity. From an evolutionary point of view this
> probably is the first form. But If symbols are around that are based on the
> same type although the tokens that gave rise to the type differ, we may
> have imposed in our interpretation habit similarity to those different
> type/tokens. Thus, although at first sight the types differ, our habit of
> interpretation takes them as the same. From some point of view this is a
> similarity relation. For instance already all those different letter types
> handwritten, printed or on the screen, regarded as the same, already pull
> in the direction of a tolerant way in dealing with similarity.
>
>
>
> Best,
>
>
>
> Auke van Breemen
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> *Van:* Jon Alan Schmidt 
> *Verzonden:* donderdag 24 januari 2019 15:15
> *Aan:* peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
> *Onderwerp:* [PEIRCE-L] Signs, Types, Tokens, Instances
>
>
>
> List:
>
>
>
> At the risk of initiating the kind of terminology-focused discussion that
> has prompted complaints from certain quarters in the past, I am seeking
> input on a specific issue that has been causing me some mild
> consternation.  The following passage provides what I consider to be
> Peirce's clearest definitions for Type, Token, and Instance.
>
>
>
> CSP:  A common mode of estimating the amount of matter in a MS. or printed
> book is to count the number of words. There will ordinarily be about twenty
> the's on a page, and of course they count as twenty words. In another sense
> of the word "word," however, there is but one word "the" in the English
> language; and it is impossible that this word should lie visibly on a page
> or be heard in any voice, for the reason that it is not a Single thing or
> Single event. It does not exist; it only determines things that do exist.
> Such a definitely significant Form, I propose to term a *Type*. A Single
> event which happens once and whose identity is limited to that one
> happening or a Single object or thing which is in some single place at any
> one instant of time, such event or thing being significant only as
> occurring just when and where it does, such as this or that word on a
> single line of a single page of a single copy of a book, I will venture to
> call a *Token *... In order that a Type may be used, it has to be
> embodied in a Token which shall be a sign of the Type, and thereby of the
> object the Type signifies. I propose to call such a Token of a Type an 
> *Instance
> *of the Type. Thus, there may be twenty Instances of the Type "the" on a
> page. (CP 4.537; 1906)
>
>
>
> Peirce's illustrative example here (and elsewhere) is "the," which is both 
> *one
> *word in written English as a Type and *twenty *words on a printed page
> as Instances; i.e., Tokens of the Type.  Now, consider what he wrote a few
> years earlier about a "representamen," which at that time he explicitly
> defined as a generalization of "sign," writing a few months later that "A 
> *Sign
> *is a Representamen with a mental 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Signs, Types, Tokens, Instances

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Auke, List:

It is comforting to learn that I am not alone in wrestling with this
question.  Based on your analysis below, would you characterize the written
versions of "man" and "homme" as two different Types of the same Sign, or
two different _ of the same Type?  If the latter, what term fills the
blank?  Again, I am not referring here to actual individual
Instances/Tokens, but to the one word "man" in written English and the one
word "homme" in written French.

Thanks,

Jon S.

On Thu, Jan 24, 2019 at 8:45 AM Auke van Breemen 
wrote:

> JAS, list,
>
>
>
> I have been considering the same question. My conclusion is that a type
> originally is based on similarity. From an evolutionary point of view this
> probably is the first form. But If symbols are around that are based on the
> same type although the tokens that gave rise to the type differ, we may
> have imposed in our interpretation habit similarity to those different
> type/tokens. Thus, although at first sight the types differ, our habit of
> interpretation takes them as the same. From some point of view this is a
> similarity relation. For instance already all those different letter types
> handwritten, printed or on the screen, regarded as the same, already pull
> in the direction of a tolerant way in dealing with similarity.
>
>
>
> Best,
>
>
>
> Auke van Breemen
>
>
>
> *Van:* Jon Alan Schmidt 
> *Verzonden:* donderdag 24 januari 2019 15:15
> *Aan:* peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
> *Onderwerp:* [PEIRCE-L] Signs, Types, Tokens, Instances
>
>
>
> List:
>
>
>
> At the risk of initiating the kind of terminology-focused discussion that
> has prompted complaints from certain quarters in the past, I am seeking
> input on a specific issue that has been causing me some mild
> consternation.  The following passage provides what I consider to be
> Peirce's clearest definitions for Type, Token, and Instance.
>
>
>
> CSP:  A common mode of estimating the amount of matter in a MS. or printed
> book is to count the number of words. There will ordinarily be about twenty
> the's on a page, and of course they count as twenty words. In another sense
> of the word "word," however, there is but one word "the" in the English
> language; and it is impossible that this word should lie visibly on a page
> or be heard in any voice, for the reason that it is not a Single thing or
> Single event. It does not exist; it only determines things that do exist.
> Such a definitely significant Form, I propose to term a *Type*. A Single
> event which happens once and whose identity is limited to that one
> happening or a Single object or thing which is in some single place at any
> one instant of time, such event or thing being significant only as
> occurring just when and where it does, such as this or that word on a
> single line of a single page of a single copy of a book, I will venture to
> call a *Token *... In order that a Type may be used, it has to be
> embodied in a Token which shall be a sign of the Type, and thereby of the
> object the Type signifies. I propose to call such a Token of a Type an 
> *Instance
> *of the Type. Thus, there may be twenty Instances of the Type "the" on a
> page. (CP 4.537; 1906)
>
>
>
> Peirce's illustrative example here (and elsewhere) is "the," which is both 
> *one
> *word in written English as a Type and *twenty *words on a printed page
> as Instances; i.e., Tokens of the Type.  Now, consider what he wrote a few
> years earlier about a "representamen," which at that time he explicitly
> defined as a generalization of "sign," writing a few months later that "A 
> *Sign
> *is a Representamen with a mental Interpretant" (CP 2.273, EP 2:273;
> 1903).
>
>
>
> CSP:  The mode of being of a representamen is such that it is capable of
> repetition. Take, for example, any proverb. "Evil communications corrupt
> good manners." Every time this is written or spoken in English, Greek, or
> any other language, and every time it is thought of, it is one and the same
> representamen. It is the same with a diagram or picture. It is the same
> with a physical sign or symptom. If two weathercocks are different signs,
> it is only in so far as they refer to different parts of the air. A
> representamen which should have a unique embodiment, incapable of
> repetition, would not be a representamen, but a part of the very fact
> represented ... "Evil communications corrupt good manners" and *Φθείρουσιν
> ἢθη χρήσθ' όμιλίαι κακαί* are one and the same representamen. (CP 5.138,
> EP 2:203; 1903)
>
>
>
> According to this passage, the *same *Sign can be written, spoken, or
> thought in a *given *language; and it can also be written, spoken, or
> thought in *different *languages.  For example, the written, spoken, and
> thought versions of "man" in English and "homme" in French are six *distinct
> *ways of embodying the same Sign.  The many individual occasions when and
> where each is *actually *written, spoken, or thought are clearly
> Instances of a Type--but 

Aw: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Signs, Types, Tokens, Instances

[Helmut Raulien]

Auke, Jon, list,

I find the idea very confusing, that a type is a sign. I am thinking of instantiations only as signs. Isnt the term "type" a generalisation of that what makes something a sign? Examples: An original of similarities is an iconic type, something giving a hint is an indexical type, some pattern that is agreed to have a certain meaning is a symbolic type within a certain language, some meaning expressed with different patterns in different languages is... I dont know: an interidiomatic symbolic type??

I guess, the type itself is not a sign by itself, because it does not work as a sign, only its instantiations do.

On the other hand, a type is a final interpretant of each instantiation-(token-)sign (if I am not completely wrong). And Peirce often has called the sign-parts "signs" too, e.g. by saying, that an object is a sign.

 

Best, Helmut

 

24. Januar 2019 um 15:45 Uhr
 "Auke van Breemen" 
 




JAS, list,

 

I have been considering the same question. My conclusion is that a type originally is based on similarity. From an evolutionary point of view this probably is the first form. But If symbols are around that are based on the same type although the tokens that gave rise to the type differ, we may have imposed in our interpretation habit similarity to those different type/tokens. Thus, although at first sight the types differ, our habit of interpretation takes them as the same. From some point of view this is a similarity relation. For instance already all those different letter types handwritten, printed or on the screen, regarded as the same, already pull in the direction of a tolerant way in dealing with similarity.

 

Best,

 

Auke van Breemen

 

 

 

Van: Jon Alan Schmidt 
Verzonden: donderdag 24 januari 2019 15:15
Aan: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Onderwerp: [PEIRCE-L] Signs, Types, Tokens, Instances

 








List:


 



At the risk of initiating the kind of terminology-focused discussion that has prompted complaints from certain quarters in the past, I am seeking input on a specific issue that has been causing me some mild consternation.  The following passage provides what I consider to be Peirce's clearest definitions for Type, Token, and Instance.



 








CSP:  A common mode of estimating the amount of matter in a MS. or printed book is to count the number of words. There will ordinarily be about twenty the's on a page, and of course they count as twenty words. In another sense of the word "word," however, there is but one word "the" in the English language; and it is impossible that this word should lie visibly on a page or be heard in any voice, for the reason that it is not a Single thing or Single event. It does not exist; it only determines things that do exist. Such a definitely significant Form, I propose to term a Type. A Single event which happens once and whose identity is limited to that one happening or a Single object or thing which is in some single place at any one instant of time, such event or thing being significant only as occurring just when and where it does, such as this or that word on a single line of a single page of a single copy of a book, I will venture to call a Token ... In order that a Type may be used, it has to be embodied in a Token which shall be a sign of the Type, and thereby of the object the Type signifies. I propose to call such a Token of a Type an Instance of the Type. Thus, there may be twenty Instances of the Type "the" on a page. (CP 4.537; 1906)








 



Peirce's illustrative example here (and elsewhere) is "the," which is both one word in written English as a Type and twenty words on a printed page as Instances; i.e., Tokens of the Type.  Now, consider what he wrote a few years earlier about a "representamen," which at that time he explicitly defined as a generalization of "sign," writing a few months later that "A Sign is a Representamen with a mental Interpretant" (CP 2.273, EP 2:273; 1903).



 










CSP:  The mode of being of a representamen is such that it is capable of repetition. Take, for example, any proverb. "Evil communications corrupt good manners." Every time this is written or spoken in English, Greek, or any other language, and every time it is thought of, it is one and the same representamen. It is the same with a diagram or picture. It is the same with a physical sign or symptom. If two weathercocks are different signs, it is only in so far as they refer to different parts of the air. A representamen which should have a unique embodiment, incapable of repetition, would not be a representamen, but a part of the very fact represented ... "Evil communications corrupt good manners" and Φθείρουσιν ἢθη χρήσθ' όμιλίαι κακαί are one and the same representamen. (CP 5.138, EP 2:203; 1903)










 



According to this passage, the same Sign can be written, spoken, or thought in a given language; and it can also be written, spoken, or thought in different languages.  For example, the written, spoken, 

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Signs, Types, Tokens, Instances

[Auke van Breemen]

JAS, list,

 

I have been considering the same question. My conclusion is that a type 
originally is based on similarity. From an evolutionary point of view this 
probably is the first form. But If symbols are around that are based on the 
same type although the tokens that gave rise to the type differ, we may have 
imposed in our interpretation habit similarity to those different type/tokens. 
Thus, although at first sight the types differ, our habit of interpretation 
takes them as the same. From some point of view this is a similarity relation. 
For instance already all those different letter types handwritten, printed or 
on the screen, regarded as the same, already pull in the direction of a 
tolerant way in dealing with similarity.

 

Best,

 

Auke van Breemen

 

 

 

Van: Jon Alan Schmidt  
Verzonden: donderdag 24 januari 2019 15:15
Aan: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Onderwerp: [PEIRCE-L] Signs, Types, Tokens, Instances

 

List:

 

At the risk of initiating the kind of terminology-focused discussion that has 
prompted complaints from certain quarters in the past, I am seeking input on a 
specific issue that has been causing me some mild consternation.  The following 
passage provides what I consider to be Peirce's clearest definitions for Type, 
Token, and Instance.

 

CSP:  A common mode of estimating the amount of matter in a MS. or printed book 
is to count the number of words. There will ordinarily be about twenty the's on 
a page, and of course they count as twenty words. In another sense of the word 
"word," however, there is but one word "the" in the English language; and it is 
impossible that this word should lie visibly on a page or be heard in any 
voice, for the reason that it is not a Single thing or Single event. It does 
not exist; it only determines things that do exist. Such a definitely 
significant Form, I propose to term a Type. A Single event which happens once 
and whose identity is limited to that one happening or a Single object or thing 
which is in some single place at any one instant of time, such event or thing 
being significant only as occurring just when and where it does, such as this 
or that word on a single line of a single page of a single copy of a book, I 
will venture to call a Token ... In order that a Type may be used, it has to be 
embodied in a Token which shall be a sign of the Type, and thereby of the 
object the Type signifies. I propose to call such a Token of a Type an Instance 
of the Type. Thus, there may be twenty Instances of the Type "the" on a page. 
(CP 4.537; 1906)

 

Peirce's illustrative example here (and elsewhere) is "the," which is both one 
word in written English as a Type and twenty words on a printed page as 
Instances; i.e., Tokens of the Type.  Now, consider what he wrote a few years 
earlier about a "representamen," which at that time he explicitly defined as a 
generalization of "sign," writing a few months later that "A Sign is a 
Representamen with a mental Interpretant" (CP 2.273, EP 2:273; 1903).

 

CSP:  The mode of being of a representamen is such that it is capable of 
repetition. Take, for example, any proverb. "Evil communications corrupt good 
manners." Every time this is written or spoken in English, Greek, or any other 
language, and every time it is thought of, it is one and the same 
representamen. It is the same with a diagram or picture. It is the same with a 
physical sign or symptom. If two weathercocks are different signs, it is only 
in so far as they refer to different parts of the air. A representamen which 
should have a unique embodiment, incapable of repetition, would not be a 
representamen, but a part of the very fact represented ... "Evil communications 
corrupt good manners" and Φθείρουσιν ἢθη χρήσθ' όμιλίαι κακαί are one and the 
same representamen. (CP 5.138, EP 2:203; 1903)

 

According to this passage, the same Sign can be written, spoken, or thought in 
a given language; and it can also be written, spoken, or thought in different 
languages.  For example, the written, spoken, and thought versions of "man" in 
English and "homme" in French are six distinct ways of embodying the same Sign. 
 The many individual occasions when and where each is actually written, spoken, 
or thought are clearly Instances of a Type--but are they all Instances of the 
same Type, or Instances of six different Types of the same Sign?

 

I previously thought the former, but now find myself inclined toward the 
latter--which would entail that many of my recent posts require careful 
revision accordingly.  A Sign itself is indifferent to how it is embodied, but 
Peirce described a Type as "a definitely significant Form," which suggests to 
me a certain set of characters that something must possess in order to serve as 
an Instance of the Type within a particular Sign System.  In written English, 
the recognizable three-letter sequence m-a-n is required for any Instance of 
"man" as a Type, even though aspects such as