Re: Re: Re: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Way of Thinking (was Theory and Analysis of Semeiosis)

[Auke van Breemen]

Jon Alen,


> That is an opinion, and even if valid, it does not change the fact that 
> Peirce invented and defined "the commens."  I find it misleading to use his 
> peculiar term to mean something else.
>  
> 

Isn't our duscussion about the meaning of a particular term, i.e. commens? And, 
my contribution, about the need to look at the wider context in order to grasp 
the direction of a thought?

> 
> > > At that point, I agree that a case can sometimes be made for 
> either side; but my default assumption is that his later writings reflect his 
> more considered views, and hence should be given slightly more weight 
> accordingl
> > 
> > > 

Fine that you made clear that it is just your default assumption and not the 
nature of the case.

Look, with regard to your immediate...final interpretant, I prefer not want to 
discuss this with you. It feels like a boy coming to my shop asking for a cents 
worth of candy. I reply, which kind you would like: jelly beans, mint or 
licorice? And the boy responds: I want candy because that is all there is. 
There is no such tihng as a jelly bean, or mint or liquorice.

best,

Auke

 
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON 
PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . 
► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu 
with no subject, and with the sole line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of 
the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
► PEIRCE-L is owned by The PEIRCE GROUP;  moderated by Gary Richmond;  and 
co-managed by him and Ben Udell.

Re: Re: Re: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Way of Thinking (was Theory and Analysis of Semeiosis)

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Auke, List:

AvB:  Here we have in my opinion a typical example of the risks one runs if
only the words of the master count. The main risk is not a. an incorrect
understanding of Peirce, but b. of reality. Which of the two would count
heavier for Peirce?


Reality, of course; but this misses my point.  I already acknowledged
(twice) that there may very well be something in reality that conforms to
Robert's description; but if so, it is plainly *not* what Peirce calls "the
commens" (EP 2:478, 1906).

AvB:  man as a growing sign, being a token that is part of a common culture
and, as a person, not an individual, only survives in the measure in which
the commens or culture is enriched with interpretive habits.


The implication here that "the commens" is synonymous with "culture" is
likewise inconsistent with Peirce's definition.

AvB:  The commens for Peirce is, in short, too much colored by his
preoccupation with truth and too little with everyday business where the
truth seeking drive may be totally absent in favor of greed and other
motives.


That is an opinion, and even if valid, it does not change the fact that
Peirce invented and defined "the commens."  I find it misleading to use his
peculiar term to mean something else.

AvB:  If Peirce did have a thought A, and later had a thought not-A , we
may say that he indeed erred the first time with A, but as well that he did
err when he discarded A.


As I have said before, I believe that the proper approach--in accordance
with the hermeneutic principle of charity--is to assume that Peirce's
writings *never *contradict each other, unless and until this turns out to
be untenable.  At that point, I agree that a case can sometimes be made for
either side; but my default assumption is that his later writings reflect
his *more considered* views, and hence should be given *slightly *more
weight accordingly.

AvB:  Of course this leads to the question why he did abandon this
promising road of inquiry?


Peirce tells us in his Logic Notebook why he abandons the "intentional" (or
"intended") interpretant.  Again, I believe that he was experimenting with
different terminology and (to a lesser extent) different conceptualizations
for the *three *interpretants that he perceived to be *logically necessary*
counterparts of the one sign and its two objects, as demonstrated by
Robert's podium diagram and accompanying analysis.
Intentional/effectual/communicational was only one such attempt, and he
evidently found it unsatisfactory, perhaps precisely because it is too
specific to *human *semeiosis--like his later "sop to Cerberus" (EP 2:478,
1908).  Immediate/dynamical/final seems to be more readily generalizable.

AvB:  As a backwoodsman, his work is fragmentary going in and coming from
all kinds of directions.


I agree, which is why I sometimes go beyond his ideas myself; but I always
try to acknowledge when and how I am doing so.  All I ask is that others do
the same.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Wed, Jun 10, 2020 at 5:58 AM  wrote:

> Jon Alen, Robert, Edwina, John, List,
>
> RM:  We need the commens here to "contain" all these conventions and
> therefore it cannot depend on the only minds that communicate; it is out of
> minds. We discover it when we are born and then internalize it throughout
> our lives.
>
> JAS: Again, there may very well be something "out of minds" that "contains
> all these conventions," which we "internalize throughout our lives," but it
> is *not* what Peirce calls "the commens."  Again, he explicitly defines
> it as a "mind" that results from the fusing or welding of distinct minds.
> Moreover, Peirce's concept of "mind" is much broader than the notion of
> *individual* minds, perhaps even encompassing what you are describing.
> As Andre De Tienne has written
> , "Peirce in
> many places ... prefers to talk about the 'quasi-mind,' and this is a
> technical phrase used expressly to indicate that the more familiar 'mind'
> is only a special instantiation of a more general phenomenon, and that
> logic, or semiotic, really analyzes not the workings of the human mind, but
> those of that much more general entity" (p. 40).
>
> Jon, Here we have in my opinion a typical example of the risks one runs if
> only the words of the master count. The main risk is not a. an incorrect
> understanding of Peirce, but b. of reality. Which of the two would count
> heavier for Peirce?
>
> In Peirce's days the social sciences were not as developed as the natural.
> Something every historian of ideas will take account of. If a person avant
> la lettre is thinking the concept through, it must be no surprise to find
> terms that are at odds with later developments.  I think the commens is
> such a term. Especially the concept of culture in the antropological sense

Aw: Re: Re: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Way of Thinking (was Theory and Analysis of Semeiosis)

[Helmut Raulien]

 

 
 

Supplement: The relation between the DO and the sign is, that the sign denotes the DO, and the DO dertermines the sign. Apart from a true index, the DO determines the sign indirectly, by a bypass, via the shared memory of the commens. You are debating, whether this commens is a fusion merely of the minds of the utterer and the interpreter, or of other minds too. I think, both the minds of the utterer and the interpreter share same memories caused by other minds, which are not "on air" so to say, at the moment. But in the fusion process, these same memories, so the other minds, are somehow vitalised, brought "on air". So I can see your (Robert) broader concept of commens. But maybe the fusion quality between the utterer´s and interpreter´s minds is different from the fusion quality with the other, representationally resurrected, minds. The first is an actual (real) event, and the latter a representation.



Robert, List,

 


yes, your post answers a lot of questions I had in the post I wrote that appeared after yours, but I had written before I had read yours. Thank you! I had felt, that representation is something quite different from event, two different ways of looking at a sign, but it is a matter of type, token, tone, resp. symbol, index, icon. A symbol includes an index and an icon, so I guess that in the Peircean analysis these two things, that have seemed to me as having to be analysed apartly, are blended. There are still many aspects I do not see, e.g. when you have a symbol, the included index is not about the DO, but the sign class. So I still do not see the relation between the DO and the sign, but let me think and read myself, I am sure I am wrong and Peirce is right.

 

Best,

 

Helmut

 

10. Juni 2020 um 11:25 Uhr
 "robert marty" 
 



Jon Alan, List

I sent a specific message to Helmut. I sincerely thought he was answering his questions. He has not yet reacted that already you have set off your usual firework  of quotations against my arguments, distorting them somewhat. I'm not denying you that right, but maybe we should let him live? What are you afraid of?

Best regards,


 


Le mer. 10 juin 2020 à 04:49, Jon Alan Schmidt  a écrit :



Helmut, Robert, List:

 

Returning to substantive matters ...

 




HR:  Isn't it so, that there are topics, about which Peirce did not write so much, but other writers did?




 

Yes, of course; but this is a Peirce list, so in general our discussions tend to focus on topics about which he did write.

 




HR:  For example, the online "Commens Dictionary" is named after the commens, which was a major topic of the last discussions, but if you look it up in the dictionary, there is only one entry about it (the "commens"), and the three interpretants effectual, intentional, communicational, that accord to the three interpreters utterer, interpreter, and both combined.




 

Indeed, as I have pointed out before, in Peirce's entire vast corpus of writings he used "commens" only twice and "commind" only once; and all three occurrences are in two consecutive paragraphs of a single 1906 letter, which is also the only place where he mentions the "effectual" interpretant and "communicational" interpretant (or "cominterpretant").  The "intentional" (or "intended") interpretant turns up in some of his Logic Notebook entries from around the same time, as well; most notably a few weeks later, when he explicitly abandons it because "So far as the intention is betrayed in the Sign, it belongs to the immediate Interpretant. So far as it is not so betrayed, it may be the Interpretant of another sign, but it is in no sense the interpretant of that sign" (R 339:414[276r]).

 




HR:  I still am struggeling with the two concepts of sign-as-representation, which is "not a real thing" versus sign-as-event, which would be a real thing and include the real things utterer and interpreter.




 

The distinction is between the sign in itself, which is "not a real thing," versus a sign token, which is a real thing that conforms to a sign type and is determined by the dynamical object to determine a dynamical interpretant.

 




RM:  A sign is always a real thing that represents because to be sign it must be perceived




 

This assertion directly contradicts Peirce's plain statement that "a sign is not a real thing. It is of such a nature as to exist in replicas" (EP 2:303, 1904).  To clarify, I do not believe that he is thereby denying the reality of a sign in itself, but rather its existence as a concrete thing apart from its instantiations in replicas (tokens).  This assertion also directly contradicts Peirce's plain statement that "If a sign has no interpreter, its interpretant is a 'would be,' i.e., is what it would determine in the interpreter if there were one" (EP 2:409, 1907).  Something need not be perceived in order to qualify as a sign, as long as it is capable of determining a dynamical interpretant by virtue of having an i

Aw: Re: Re: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Way of Thinking (was Theory and Analysis of Semeiosis)

[Helmut Raulien]

Robert, List,

 


yes, your post answers a lot of questions I had in the post I wrote that appeared after yours, but I had written before I had read yours. Thank you! I had felt, that representation is something quite different from event, two different ways of looking at a sign, but it is a matter of type, token, tone, resp. symbol, index, icon. A symbol includes an index and an icon, so I guess that in the Peircean analysis these two things, that have seemed to me as having to be analysed apartly, are blended. There are still many aspects I do not see, e.g. when you have a symbol, the included index is not about the DO, but the sign class. So I still do not see the relation between the DO and the sign, but let me think and read myself, I am sure I am wrong and Peirce is right.

 

Best,

 

Helmut

 

10. Juni 2020 um 11:25 Uhr
 "robert marty" 
 



Jon Alan, List

I sent a specific message to Helmut. I sincerely thought he was answering his questions. He has not yet reacted that already you have set off your usual firework  of quotations against my arguments, distorting them somewhat. I'm not denying you that right, but maybe we should let him live? What are you afraid of?

Best regards,


 


Le mer. 10 juin 2020 à 04:49, Jon Alan Schmidt  a écrit :



Helmut, Robert, List:

 

Returning to substantive matters ...

 




HR:  Isn't it so, that there are topics, about which Peirce did not write so much, but other writers did?




 

Yes, of course; but this is a Peirce list, so in general our discussions tend to focus on topics about which he did write.

 




HR:  For example, the online "Commens Dictionary" is named after the commens, which was a major topic of the last discussions, but if you look it up in the dictionary, there is only one entry about it (the "commens"), and the three interpretants effectual, intentional, communicational, that accord to the three interpreters utterer, interpreter, and both combined.




 

Indeed, as I have pointed out before, in Peirce's entire vast corpus of writings he used "commens" only twice and "commind" only once; and all three occurrences are in two consecutive paragraphs of a single 1906 letter, which is also the only place where he mentions the "effectual" interpretant and "communicational" interpretant (or "cominterpretant").  The "intentional" (or "intended") interpretant turns up in some of his Logic Notebook entries from around the same time, as well; most notably a few weeks later, when he explicitly abandons it because "So far as the intention is betrayed in the Sign, it belongs to the immediate Interpretant. So far as it is not so betrayed, it may be the Interpretant of another sign, but it is in no sense the interpretant of that sign" (R 339:414[276r]).

 




HR:  I still am struggeling with the two concepts of sign-as-representation, which is "not a real thing" versus sign-as-event, which would be a real thing and include the real things utterer and interpreter.




 

The distinction is between the sign in itself, which is "not a real thing," versus a sign token, which is a real thing that conforms to a sign type and is determined by the dynamical object to determine a dynamical interpretant.

 




RM:  A sign is always a real thing that represents because to be sign it must be perceived




 

This assertion directly contradicts Peirce's plain statement that "a sign is not a real thing. It is of such a nature as to exist in replicas" (EP 2:303, 1904).  To clarify, I do not believe that he is thereby denying the reality of a sign in itself, but rather its existence as a concrete thing apart from its instantiations in replicas (tokens).  This assertion also directly contradicts Peirce's plain statement that "If a sign has no interpreter, its interpretant is a 'would be,' i.e., is what it would determine in the interpreter if there were one" (EP 2:409, 1907).  Something need not be perceived in order to qualify as a sign, as long as it is capable of determining a dynamical interpretant by virtue of having an immediate interpretant, "its peculiar Interpretability before it gets any Interpreter" (SS 111, 1909), and a final interpretant, "the effect the Sign would produce upon any mind upon which circumstances should permit it to work out its full effect" (SS 110, 1909).

 




RM:  It has led you to internalize a convention shared by billions of individuals that is a reality in the shared social space, independent of these billions of minds, what I think Peirce calls the commens.




 

There may very well be such a "shared social space, independent of these billions of minds," but it is not what Peirce calls "the commens."  Again, he explicitly defines "the commens" (or "the commind") as "that mind into which the minds of utterer and interpreter have to be fused in order that any communication should take place," which "consists of all that is, and must be, well understood between utterer and interpreter, at the outset, 

Fwd: Re: Re: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Way of Thinking (was Theory and Analysis of Semeiosis)

[a . breemen]

Jon Alen, Robert, Edwina, John, List,


RM:  We need the commens here to "contain" all these conventions and therefore 
it cannot depend on the only minds that communicate; it is out of minds. We 
discover it when we are born and then internalize it throughout our lives.

JAS: Again, there may very well be something "out of minds" that "contains all 
these conventions," which we "internalize throughout our lives," but it is not 
what Peirce calls "the commens."  Again, he explicitly defines it as a "mind" 
that results from the fusing or welding of distinct minds.  Moreover, Peirce's 
concept of "mind" is much broader than the notion of individual minds, perhaps 
even encompassing what you are describing.  As Andre De Tienne has written 
https://see.library.utoronto.ca/SEED/Vol3-3/De_Tienne.pdf , "Peirce in many 
places ... prefers to talk about the 'quasi-mind,' and this is a technical 
phrase used expressly to indicate that the more familiar 'mind' is only a 
special instantiation of a more general phenomenon, and that logic, or 
semiotic, really analyzes not the workings of the human mind, but those of that 
much more general entity" (p. 40).


Jon, Here we have in my opinion a typical example of the risks one runs if only 
the words of the master count. The main risk is not a. an incorrect 
understanding of Peirce, but b. of reality. Which of the two would count 
heavier for Peirce?

In Peirce's days the social sciences were not as developed as the natural. 
Something every historian of ideas will take account of. If a person avant la 
lettre is thinking the concept through, it must be no surprise to find terms 
that are at odds with later developments.  I think the commens is such a term. 
Especially the concept of culture in the antropological sense was lacking, but 
arising. And when it did arise in the early 1900's it was taken as a monilitic 
concept, even by cultural relativists like Boas.

Peirce's commens fits in with this development and there are striking 
similarities with this first cultural antropological movement:

1. man as a growing sign, being a token that is part of a common culture and, 
as a person, not an individual, only survives in the measure in which the 
commens or culture is enriched with interpretive habits.  

2. The monolitic character of the commens. Peirce, I side with Short here,  was 
so much occupied with the project of science that it hindered him in completing 
his system. The commens for Peirce is, in short, to much colored by his 
preoccupation with truth and to little with everyday bussiness where the truth 
seeking drive may be totally absent in favor of greed and other motives.

It was in 1946 that the concept of plural culture was coined by Furnivall. Even 
that idea did pass Peirce's mind, but only at some moments and not persued for 
longer periods as to its concequences. It was when he was contemplating the 
intended, effectual en cominterpretant. You summerize what I wrote above with 
Peirce quote's:

JAS: Indeed, as I have pointed out before, in Peirce's entire vast corpus of 
writings he used "commens" only twice and "commind" only once; and all three 
occurrences are in two consecutive paragraphs of a single 1906 letter, which is 
also the only place where he mentions the "effectual" interpretant and 
"communicational" interpretant (or "cominterpretant").  The "intentional" (or 
"intended") interpretant turns up in some of his Logic Notebook entries from 
around the same time, as well; most notably a few weeks later, when he 
explicitly abandons it because "So far as the intention is betrayed in the 
Sign, it belongs to the immediate Interpretant. So far as it is not so 
betrayed, it may be the Interpretant of another sign, but it is in no sense the 
interpretant of that sign" (R 339:414[276r]).

--

If Peirce did have a thought A, and later had a thought not-A , we may say that 
he indeed erred the first time with A, but as well that he did err when he 
discarded A. I do side with Robert in this case.

Of course this leads to the question why he did abandon this promissing road of 
inquiry? Probably his devotion to logic in which the apprehension of the sign 
as an object is of no importance and where we assume a quasi mind. So, probably 
his discarding of a may have been done in a specific context and a particular 
line of thought. As a backwoodsman, his work is fragmentary going in and 
comming from all kinds of directions.  

Best,

Auke 

Op 10 juni 2020 om 4:49 schreef Jon Alan Schmidt : 


Helmut, Robert, List:

Returning to substantive matters ...

HR:  Isn't it so, that there are topics, about which Peirce did not write so 
much, but other writers did?

Yes, of course; but this is a Peirce list, so in general our discussions tend 
to focus on topics about which he did write.

HR:  For example, the online "Commens Dictionary" is named after the commens, 
which was a major topic of the last discussions, but if you look it up in the 
dictionary, 

Re: Re: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Way of Thinking (was Theory and Analysis of Semeiosis)

[Auke van Breemen]

Jon Alen, Robert, Edwina, John, List,


> RM:  We need the commens here to "contain" all these conventions and 
> therefore it cannot depend on the only minds that communicate; it is out of 
> minds. We discover it when we are born and then internalize it throughout our 
> lives.
> 

JAS: Again, there may very well be something "out of minds" that "contains all 
these conventions," which we "internalize throughout our lives," but it is not 
what Peirce calls "the commens."  Again, he explicitly defines it as a "mind" 
that results from the fusing or welding of distinct minds.  Moreover, Peirce's 
concept of "mind" is much broader than the notion of individual minds, perhaps 
even encompassing what you are describing.  As Andre De Tienne has written 
https://see.library.utoronto.ca/SEED/Vol3-3/De_Tienne.pdf , "Peirce in many 
places ... prefers to talk about the 'quasi-mind,' and this is a technical 
phrase used expressly to indicate that the more familiar 'mind' is only a 
special instantiation of a more general phenomenon, and that logic, or 
semiotic, really analyzes not the workings of the human mind, but those of that 
much more general entity" (p. 40).


Jon, Here we have in my opinion a typical example of the risks one runs if only 
the words of the master count. The main risk is not a. an incorrect 
understanding of Peirce, but b. of reality. Which of the two would count 
heavier for Peirce?

In Peirce's days the social sciences were not as developed as the natural. 
Something every historian of ideas will take account of. If a person avant la 
lettre is thinking the concept through, it must be no surprise to find terms 
that are at odds with later developments.  I think the commens is such a term. 
Especially the concept of culture in the antropological sense was lacking, but 
arising. And when it did arise in the early 1900's it was taken as a monilitic 
concept, even by cultural relativists like Boas.

Peirce's commens fits in with this development and there are striking 
similarities with this first cultural antropological movement:

1. man as a growing sign, being a token that is part of a common culture and, 
as a person, not an individual, only survives in the measure in which the 
commens or culture is enriched with interpretive habits.  

2. The monolitic character of the commens. Peirce, I side with Short here,  was 
so much occupied with the project of science that it hindered him in completing 
his system. The commens for Peirce is, in short, to much colored by his 
preoccupation with truth and to little with everyday bussiness where the truth 
seeking drive may be totally absent in favor of greed and other motives.

It was in 1946 that the concept of plural culture was coined by Furnivall. Even 
that idea did pass Peirce's mind, but only at some moments and not persued for 
longer periods as to its concequences. It was when he was contemplating the 
intended, effectual en cominterpretant. You summerize what I wrote above with 
Peirce quote's:

JAS: Indeed, as I have pointed out before, in Peirce's entire vast corpus of 
writings he used "commens" only twice and "commind" only once; and all three 
occurrences are in two consecutive paragraphs of a single 1906 letter, which is 
also the only place where he mentions the "effectual" interpretant and 
"communicational" interpretant (or "cominterpretant").  The "intentional" (or 
"intended") interpretant turns up in some of his Logic Notebook entries from 
around the same time, as well; most notably a few weeks later, when he 
explicitly abandons it because "So far as the intention is betrayed in the 
Sign, it belongs to the immediate Interpretant. So far as it is not so 
betrayed, it may be the Interpretant of another sign, but it is in no sense the 
interpretant of that sign" (R 339:414[276r]).

--

If Peirce did have a thought A, and later had a thought not-A , we may say that 
he indeed erred the first time with A, but as well that he did err when he 
discarded A. I do side with Robert in this case.

Of course this leads to the question why he did abandon this promissing road of 
inquiry? Probably his devotion to logic in which the apprehension of the sign 
as an object is of no importance and where we assume a quasi mind. So, probably 
his discarding of a may have been done in a specific context and a particular 
line of thought. As a backwoodsman, his work is fragmentary going in and 
comming from all kinds of directions.  

Best,

Auke 


> Op 10 juni 2020 om 4:49 schreef Jon Alan Schmidt :
> 
> Helmut, Robert, List:
> 
> Returning to substantive matters ...
> 
> 
> > > HR:  Isn't it so, that there are topics, about which 
> Peirce did not write so much, but other writers did?
> > 
> > > 
> Yes, of course; but this is a Peirce list, so in general our discussions 
> tend to focus on topics about which he did write.
> 
> 
> > > HR:  For example, the online "Commens Dictionary" is 
> named a

Re: Re: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Way of Thinking (was Theory and Analysis of Semeiosis)

[robert marty]

Jon Alan, List

I sent a specific message to Helmut. I sincerely thought he was answering
his questions. He has not yet reacted that already you have set off your
usual firework  of quotations against my arguments, distorting them
somewhat. I'm not denying you that right, but maybe we should let him live?
What are you afraid of?

Best regards,

Le mer. 10 juin 2020 à 04:49, Jon Alan Schmidt  a
écrit :

> Helmut, Robert, List:
>
> Returning to substantive matters ...
>
> HR:  Isn't it so, that there are topics, about which Peirce did not write
> so much, but other writers did?
>
>
> Yes, of course; but this is a *Peirce *list, so in general our
> discussions tend to focus on topics about which he *did *write.
>
> HR:  For example, the online "Commens Dictionary" is named after the
> commens, which was a major topic of the last discussions, but if you look
> it up in the dictionary, there is only one entry about it (the "commens"),
> and the three interpretants effectual, intentional, communicational, that
> accord to the three interpreters utterer, interpreter, and both combined.
>
>
> Indeed, as I have pointed out before, in Peirce's entire vast corpus of
> writings he used "commens" only twice and "commind" only once; and all
> three occurrences are in two consecutive paragraphs of a single 1906
> letter, which is also the only place where he mentions the "effectual"
> interpretant and "communicational" interpretant (or "cominterpretant").
> The "intentional" (or "intended") interpretant turns up in some of his
> Logic Notebook entries from around the same time, as well; most notably a
> few weeks later, when he explicitly abandons it because "So far as the
> intention is betrayed in the Sign, it belongs to the immediate
> Interpretant. So far as it is not so betrayed, it may be the Interpretant
> of *another* sign, but it is in no sense the interpretant of *that*
> sign" (R 339:414[276r]).
>
> HR:  I still am struggeling with the two concepts of
> sign-as-representation, which is "not a real thing" versus sign-as-event,
> which would be a real thing and include the real things utterer and
> interpreter.
>
>
> The distinction is between the sign *in itself*, which is "not a real
> thing," versus a sign *token*, which is a real thing that conforms to a
> sign *type* and is determined by the dynamical object to determine a
> dynamical interpretant.
>
> RM:  A sign is always a real thing that represents because to be sign it
> must be perceived
>
>
> This assertion directly contradicts Peirce's plain statement that "a sign
> is not a real thing. It is of such a nature as to exist in replicas" (EP
> 2:303, 1904).  To clarify, I do not believe that he is thereby denying the
> *reality* of a sign in itself, but rather its existence as a concrete
> *thing *apart from its instantiations in replicas (tokens).  This
> assertion also directly contradicts Peirce's plain statement that "If a
> sign has no interpreter, its interpretant is a 'would be,' i.e., is what it
> *would* determine in the interpreter if there were one" (EP 2:409,
> 1907).  Something need not be perceived in order to qualify as a sign, as
> long as it is *capable *of determining a dynamical interpretant by virtue
> of having an immediate interpretant, "its peculiar Interpretability before
> it gets any Interpreter" (SS 111, 1909), and a final interpretant, "the
> effect the Sign *would *produce upon any mind upon which circumstances
> should permit it to work out its full effect" (SS 110, 1909).
>
> RM:  It has led you to internalize a convention shared by billions of
> individuals that is a reality in the shared social space, independent of
> these billions of minds, what I think Peirce calls the commens.
>
>
> There may very well be such a "shared social space, independent of these
> billions of minds," but it is *not *what Peirce calls "the commens."
> Again, he explicitly defines "the commens" (or "the commind") as "that mind
> into which the minds of utterer and interpreter have to be fused in order
> that any communication should take place," which "consists of all that is,
> and must be, well understood between utterer and interpreter, at the
> outset, in order that the sign in question should fulfill its function" (EP
> 2:478, 1906).  Taking the statue that stands in New York Harbor as "the
> sign in question," the otherwise distinct minds of its utterer--presumably
> the sculptor, Frédéric Bartholdi--and each interpreter "are at one (i.e.,
> are one mind) in the sign itself ... In the Sign they are, so to say,
> *welded*" (CP 4.551, 1906).  The result is that the idea of liberty is 
> *communicated
> *from the utterer to all the different interpreters.
>
> RM:  I will quote just three that support my point, it seems to me, but it
> is up to you to judge.
>
>
> The quoted passage (CP 3.359-362) is from 1885--coincidentally, the same
> year in which the disassembled Statue of Liberty arrived in New York from
> France.  Although generally c

Re: Re: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Way of Thinking (was Theory and Analysis of Semeiosis)

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Helmut, Robert, List:

Returning to substantive matters ...

HR:  Isn't it so, that there are topics, about which Peirce did not write
so much, but other writers did?


Yes, of course; but this is a *Peirce *list, so in general our discussions
tend to focus on topics about which he *did *write.

HR:  For example, the online "Commens Dictionary" is named after the
commens, which was a major topic of the last discussions, but if you look
it up in the dictionary, there is only one entry about it (the "commens"),
and the three interpretants effectual, intentional, communicational, that
accord to the three interpreters utterer, interpreter, and both combined.


Indeed, as I have pointed out before, in Peirce's entire vast corpus of
writings he used "commens" only twice and "commind" only once; and all
three occurrences are in two consecutive paragraphs of a single 1906
letter, which is also the only place where he mentions the "effectual"
interpretant and "communicational" interpretant (or "cominterpretant").
The "intentional" (or "intended") interpretant turns up in some of his
Logic Notebook entries from around the same time, as well; most notably a
few weeks later, when he explicitly abandons it because "So far as the
intention is betrayed in the Sign, it belongs to the immediate
Interpretant. So far as it is not so betrayed, it may be the Interpretant
of *another* sign, but it is in no sense the interpretant of *that*
sign" (R 339:414[276r]).

HR:  I still am struggeling with the two concepts of
sign-as-representation, which is "not a real thing" versus sign-as-event,
which would be a real thing and include the real things utterer and
interpreter.


The distinction is between the sign *in itself*, which is "not a real
thing," versus a sign *token*, which is a real thing that conforms to a
sign *type* and is determined by the dynamical object to determine a
dynamical interpretant.

RM:  A sign is always a real thing that represents because to be sign it
must be perceived


This assertion directly contradicts Peirce's plain statement that "a sign
is not a real thing. It is of such a nature as to exist in replicas" (EP
2:303, 1904).  To clarify, I do not believe that he is thereby denying the
*reality* of a sign in itself, but rather its existence as a concrete
*thing *apart from its instantiations in replicas (tokens).  This assertion
also directly contradicts Peirce's plain statement that "If a sign has no
interpreter, its interpretant is a 'would be,' i.e., is what it *would*
determine in the interpreter if there were one" (EP 2:409, 1907).
Something need not be perceived in order to qualify as a sign, as long as
it is *capable *of determining a dynamical interpretant by virtue of having
an immediate interpretant, "its peculiar Interpretability before it gets
any Interpreter" (SS 111, 1909), and a final interpretant, "the effect the
Sign *would *produce upon any mind upon which circumstances should permit
it to work out its full effect" (SS 110, 1909).

RM:  It has led you to internalize a convention shared by billions of
individuals that is a reality in the shared social space, independent of
these billions of minds, what I think Peirce calls the commens.


There may very well be such a "shared social space, independent of these
billions of minds," but it is *not *what Peirce calls "the commens."
Again, he explicitly defines "the commens" (or "the commind") as "that mind
into which the minds of utterer and interpreter have to be fused in order
that any communication should take place," which "consists of all that is,
and must be, well understood between utterer and interpreter, at the
outset, in order that the sign in question should fulfill its function" (EP
2:478, 1906).  Taking the statue that stands in New York Harbor as "the
sign in question," the otherwise distinct minds of its utterer--presumably
the sculptor, Frédéric Bartholdi--and each interpreter "are at one (i.e.,
are one mind) in the sign itself ... In the Sign they are, so to say,
*welded*" (CP 4.551, 1906).  The result is that the idea of liberty is
*communicated
*from the utterer to all the different interpreters.

RM:  I will quote just three that support my point, it seems to me, but it
is up to you to judge.


The quoted passage (CP 3.359-362) is from 1885--coincidentally, the same
year in which the disassembled Statue of Liberty arrived in New York from
France.  Although generally consistent with Peirce's later writings about
semeiotic, we need to interpret it carefully in light of those many
subsequent texts.  It is especially important to recognize that what he
means by "tokens" in CP 3.359 are what he eventually calls "symbols."  From
1906 on, he instead uses "tokens" for the concrete embodiments of signs,
which he calls "sinsigns" and "replicas" in 1903-5.

RM:  So a sign, a thing conceived by convention (what does convention
mean?) or even arbitrarily can represent an idea.


"By convention" and "arbitrarily" are almost synonymous 

RE: Re: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Way of Thinking (was Theory and Analysis of Semeiosis)

[gnox]

Helmut, you wrote,

“Peirce did not write much about interpreters.”

A quick search of Peirce texts gives over 100 hits for “interpreter”.

 

Of course it is not a waste of time to read writers other than Peirce. What I 
said was that it’s a waste of time to debate about “Peirce’s way of thinking” 
with people who don’t want to discuss what Peirce actually wrote, but prefer 
their own versions of what Peirce thought over his versions.

 

If you want to discuss a “sign-as-event, which would be a real thing and 
include the real things utterer and interpreter” whatever that is, go ahead. 
But if you want to know what Peirce thought about it, then find what he wrote 
about it (if you can) and read it. And let us know what you find.

 

Gary f.

 

From: Helmut Raulien  
Sent: 9-Jun-20 12:34
To: tabor...@primus.ca
Cc: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu; g...@gnusystems.ca
Subject: Aw: Re: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Way of Thinking (was Theory and 
Analysis of Semeiosis)

 

Gary F., Edwina, List,

 

Isn´t it so, that there are topics, about which Peirce did not write so much, 
but other writers did? For example, the online "Commens Dictionary" is named 
after the commens, which was a major topic of the last discussions, but if you 
look it up in the dictionary, there is only one entry about it (the "commens"), 
and the three interpretants effectual, intentional, communicational, that 
accord to the three interpreters utterer, interpreter, and both combined.

 

Peirce did not write much about interpreters. So I think it is useful to 
compare him with e.g. Uexküll and systems theoreticians. For the advanced I 
think it also is good to compare Peirce´s mathematics and relation logic with 
other mathematics.

 

So I think, it is not a waste of time for new list members to not only read 
Peirce, but- not "advance" and "channel", but compare his thoughts with the 
thoughts of others. Because new list members may know other philosophers from 
school or from voluntary reading, and not yet Peirce so well. 

 

I still am struggeling with the two concepts of sign-as-representation, which 
is "not a real thing" versus sign-as-event, which would be a real thing and 
include the real things utterer and interpreter. I am close to asking myself, 
is the more or less complete ignorance of the latter concept not a hidden form 
of dualism??

 

Best,

Helmut

  

  

 09. Juni 2020 um 16:57 Uhr
 "Edwina Taborsky" mailto:tabor...@primus.ca> >
wrote:

Gary F,

I'll disagree with you. I think that debates about method are important. The 
only 'method' I've seen that JAS outlines, is to provide quotations from Peirce 
texts. But does interpretation of these texts consist only of repeating them 
and declaring that 'it means this'? Rather Saussurian. Is such a method enough 
to validate that particular interpretation? As some of us have been saying, as 
a method - it is weak, and requires real life pragmatics [Secondness] examples. 
Therefore - methodology is important.

So- one can have one's own ideology about semiosis - and, quite frankly, one 
can support this personal ideology with many quotations from Peirce. BUT, these 
quotations can be a complete misinterpretation of what Peirce was really 
saying, because the quotations, lifted from the page, can take on a new meaning 
in this 'new page'. That is - a lot of what we see here is all about 'special 
interests' .. Now - who can evaluate whether these 'interpretations' are valid 
to Peirce, or  valid for the personal 'special interest' ideology? That's not a 
simple task.

When some of us, for example, ask repeatedly for real world examples of the 
interpretations offered - and don't get them, are we supposed to accept that 
the conclusions of this rather authoritarian method [I say this, and so, it is 
so] - must be accepted as valid? Jon Awbrey's recent outline of methods was, I 
felt, rather important and relevant to this situation.

With regard to the debate between Robert and JAS - I don't see that it came to 
a 'natural end' [whatever that means]. It ended because the two participants 
have extremely different views both on Peircean semiosis, and on the methods of 
arriving at those views - and could come to no common ground. Yes, they were 
civil about it, and nodded graciously and said nice things about each other - 
but the real issue was: two completely different views on Peircean semiosis AND 
methodology.

Edwina



 

On Tue 09/06/20 10:04 AM , g...@gnusystems.ca   sent:

Jon A.S., list,

I can’t speak for Gary the moderator or anyone else on the list, but I think 
the principles you’ve outlined here are pretty much self-evident for any 
serious Peirce scholarship, and I would certainly prefer not to be subjected to 
further debates about them. If a list member feels that he or she can advance 
the understanding of Peirce’s thought by somehow ‘channeling’ him instead of 
carefully reading and quoting what he actually wrote (and citing its context),

Aw: Re: Re: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Way of Thinking (was Theory and Analysis of Semeiosis)

[Helmut Raulien]

Edwina, List,

 

you wrote:


 "Think of semiosis not as a mechanical action but as a process of the actual generation of information". But information is a mechanical process. There is no habit without a memory, and a memory is a solid state apparatus, or a quasi-solid equilibrial attractor like a biotop, a chromosom, a visual cortex or a SD-chip.

Mechanical action versus information process, I think, these again are the two concepts, which Peirce does not combine. Or it is relatio rationis versus relatio naturalis. DO and S have a relatio rationalis with each other. The relatio naturalis is between the memory about the DO and the sign. The DO could justifiedly say: "We don´t have a real relation, sign, it is all in your mind, you are stalking me". Peirce writes at some places about the natural relation/the mechanical action. The said quote about commens, and also about consciousness: Primisense, Altersense, Medisense. But in the whole semiotics this is not relevant. The three interpretants intentional, effectual, communicational do not play a role in semiotics either (or?) To me it seems like Peirce from time to time mentions reality, but does not integrate or interweave it with the theory of (not real) signs. To from time to time say things like a human too is a sign, or an object is a sign too, or matter is effete mind, is not enough to undualize it (the theory) and make it a monism. Neither the tychism-move as an attempt to present the whole reality as unreal. It does not work for me. It would, if it was hypothized as a scale matter, like, if something appears as matter or as mind, as real or unreal, as a DO or a sign, depends on the temporal and spatial scale of a system in a systems hierarchy. But for this topic other writers would have to be taken in account.


 

The hexad I do not understand. A hexad must be reducible. Peirce has proved, that only triads are not reducible.

 

Best,

 

Helmut


09. Juni 2020 um 20:57 Uhr
 "Edwina Taborsky" 
wrote:


Helmut - Personally I think that a lot of the confusion to which you allude.

"two concepts of sign-as-representation, which is "not a real thing" versus sign-as-event, which would be a real thing and include the real things utterer and interpreter. "

...is due to the lack of clarity in the use of the term 'sign' on this list.

That is - the term of 'sign' can be used to refer just to the mediative node in the triadic [or hexadic] semiosic process. To be clear about this, I refer to that mediative node as the Representamen. But the term 'sign' is also used to refer to the agential power, so to speak. of the semiosic process and the focus is on the 'sign' as having this power. This is what seems to be the most common use on this list.

And there's a third use, which I use, which refers to the triad or hexad in full, as the Sign, and views this full process as a morphological instance of semiosis. The reason I do this, is because I consider that the triad/hexad is irreducible, and to refer only to the sign alone [that mediative node] denies this irreducible reality. That mediative node never, ever, exists 'as such'; it is not 'on its own', so to speak.

  Think of semiosis not as a mechanical action but as a process of the actual generation of information, taking raw data from objective reality as input and, using a developed knowledge base, transforming that raw data into a morphological actuality as a result. This result could be a molecule, a cell, an insect,  the meaning of strange sounds, an understanding of a map.

To achieve this result - there are three-six 'nodes' or sites for the transmission/transformation of data. You know them already:

The DO, IO, R, II, DI, FI Not all are involved [usually the FI is not part of the normal experience]…

The sign-as-representation, if I understand you correctly, would be the mediative node - but, which is often defined as having agential power to represent-the-input-data. The sign-as-event, again, if I understand you correctly, would be the full hexadic process.

And I'm sure that there are plenty of people on this list who disagree with me - but- that's not a problem.

Edwina
 

On Tue 09/06/20 12:34 PM , Helmut Raulien h.raul...@gmx.de sent:



Gary F., Edwina, List,

 

Isn´t it so, that there are topics, about which Peirce did not write so much, but other writers did? For example, the online "Commens Dictionary" is named after the commens, which was a major topic of the last discussions, but if you look it up in the dictionary, there is only one entry about it (the "commens"), and the three interpretants effectual, intentional, communicational, that accord to the three interpreters utterer, interpreter, and both combined.

 

Peirce did not write much about interpreters. So I think it is useful to compare him with e.g. Uexküll and systems theoreticians. For the advanced I think it also is good to compare Peirce´s mathematics and relation logic with other mathematics.

 

So I think, it is no

Re: Re: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Way of Thinking (was Theory and Analysis of Semeiosis)

[Robert Marty]

Helmut, List

If I can tell Helmut there are no two concepts. A sign is always a real
thing that represents because to be sign it must be perceived ... Why
wouldn't a sign as a representation" be a real thing? Let's look at the
statue that is at the entrance to New York Harbor ... Isn't that an
existing thing so a real thing? And yet when you perceive it your mind is
occupied by the idea of Liberty (and more but we will leave it at that).
Why would you do that? As a result of your collateral experience that is
earlier and external at the time of perception. It has led you to
internalize a convention shared by billions of individuals that is a
reality in the shared social space, independent of these billions of minds,
what I think Peirce calls the commens. I have already made arguments for
that and I will give more. However, the experience of my debates has taught
me at least one thing is that one cannot make an assertion involving Peirce
without a few quotations. I will quote just three that support my point, it
seems to me, but it is up to you to judge.



Let's go to CP 3.359:



*CP 3.359"**A sign is in a conjoint relation to the thing denoted and to
the mind. If this triple relation is not of a degenerate species, the sign
is related to its object only in consequence of a mental association, and
depends upon a habit. Such signs are always abstract and general, because
habits are general rules to which the organism has become subjected. They
are, for the most part, conventional or arbitrary. They include all general
words, the main body of speech, and any mode of conveying a judgment. For
the sake of brevity I will call them tokens."*



What is  described here is the sign as representation that concerns you.



So a sign, a  thing conceived by convention (what does convention mean?) or
even arbitrarily can represent an idea. We need the commens here to
"contain" all these conventions and therefore it cannot depend on the only
minds that communicate; it is  out of minds. We discover it when we are
born and then internalize it throughout our lives. That was the substance
of my direct debate with Jon Alan and perhaps indirect with a few others.



We continue:



*CP 3.361  But if the triple relation between the sign, its object, and the
mind, is degenerate, then of the three pairs sign object sign mind object
mind two at least are in dual relations which constitute the triple
relation. One of the connected pairs must consist of the sign and its
object, for if the sign were not related to its object except by the mind
thinking of them separately, it would not fulfill the function of a sign at
all. Supposing, then, the relation of the sign to its object does not lie
in a mental association, there must be a direct dual relation of the sign
to its object independent of the mind using the sign. In the second of the
three cases just spoken of, this dual relation is not degenerate, and the
sign signifies its object solely by virtue of being really connected with
it. Of this nature are all natural signs and physical symptoms. I call such
a sign an index, a pointing finger being the type of the class.*



What is described here is " sign-as-event, which would be a real thing"
that you also care about."



Are you afraid of some dualism? No, because there's another case.



*CP 362. The third case is where the dual relation between the sign and its
object is degenerate and consists in a mere resemblance between them. I
call a sign which stands for something merely because it resembles it, an
icon. *



In this case it is a quality of "the concrete thing that represents" that
makes the sign; as a red thing to represent the quality of being red, or
the blood of a person represented by a trace or the communism on the flag
of China.



If you continue reading you will find some very interesting things about
algebraic notations...

Best regards,

Robert

Le mar. 9 juin 2020 à 18:35, Helmut Raulien  a écrit :

> Gary F., Edwina, List,
>
> Isn´t it so, that there are topics, about which Peirce did not write so
> much, but other writers did? For example, the online "Commens Dictionary"
> is named after the commens, which was a major topic of the last
> discussions, but if you look it up in the dictionary, there is only one
> entry about it (the "commens"), and the three interpretants effectual,
> intentional, communicational, that accord to the three interpreters
> utterer, interpreter, and both combined.
>
> Peirce did not write much about interpreters. So I think it is useful to
> compare him with e.g. Uexküll and systems theoreticians. For the advanced I
> think it also is good to compare Peirce´s mathematics and relation logic
> with other mathematics.
>
> So I think, it is not a waste of time for new list members to not only
> read Peirce, but- not "advance" and "channel", but compare his thoughts
> with the thoughts of others. Because new list members may know other
> philosophers from school or from voluntary readi