Re: [PEIRCE-L] Categorizations of triadic Relationships (Was Re: Graphical Representations of the Sign by Peirce)

[John F Sowa]

Edwina, Jerry, Helmut, List,

Peirce's writings are always worth analyzing, but there has been over a century 
of research in the cognitive sciences, especially neuroscience.  Peirce was 
familiar with the research of his day..  William James, who was a professional 
in that field, acknowledged that he had learned more from Peirce than he could 
ever repay.

But another century of research has been done, and the developments have 
accelerated with the latest technologies of brain scans and implants.  I really 
don't trust speculation about issues of neuroscience that ignore that research.

But I believe that it is worthwhile to compare Peirce's writings to the latest 
developments in the cognitive sciences.  Neuroscience, especially, has made 
immense progress in recent years with the developments in brain scans and 
implants.  It's interesting to evaluate Peirce's writings in terms of the 
latest developments.

In many cases, I have found that Peirce's ideas can serve as guidelines for 
interpreting recent research, but there is no one-to-one mapping of the details.

John


From: "Edwina Taborsky" 
Sent: 1/20/24 9:25 AM

Jerry list

I'll answer within what I understand as ‘forms of consciousness’. Again - I 
don’t know what YOU mean by the phrase.

But in comparison to your view,  I’d have to include the processes of memory or 
habit - even in primisense, which is a first primal awareness of ‘otherness’.- 
as in a newborn.  But consciosuness, I think, has to gradually include  even 
quasi-mind memory or habits [ ie, the development of habits of association of 
’that’ input sensation’ with ’that experience'. This enables anticipation.

It need not be symbolic of course, since all matter has this capacity to 
develop habits and thus, anticipate.  A first primal awareness or feeling 
[primisense] would emerge within the experience of an ‘Other’ [ via Altersense].

This experience would have to be semiosic, ie, triadic, or within the operation 
of the sign triad, I can thus understand your reference to ’tones, tokens, 
types’ [ which are comparable to 1ns, 2ns, 3ns] and aren’t confined to words - 
see 1.322, where he discusses a blind person’s experience of ’scarlet colour’.

Therefore the question simply comes down to - is primisense or pure feeling 
totally alienated from habit? I think that a body’s capacity to even experience 
feeling, requires ‘habit’ - ie - the existence of a stable ground [even if it’s 
purely and only physiological ..ie hearing, or sight or touch or..]…which 
ground sensation within the perimeters of ‘habit’.  The subsequent ‘awareness’ 
of this sensation, develops within multiple experiences [altersense]..

Edwina

On Jan 20, 2024, at 1:21 AM, Jerry LR Chandler  
wrote:

List:Edwina:

Please step back a bit from your professional persona as a scholar.

Please ask yourself “what do these words mean in terms of my life experiences?”

Do you experience “forms of consciousness”?

How are the forms of personal consciousness you experience related to or 
conjoined to your memories?

Thanks for considering my “off the wall” questions.

Cheers
Jerry

On Jan 19, 2024, at 8:30 AM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:

Jerry, list

I’m not sure of your question. I’m quoting Peirce.  These terms refer to his 
outline of ‘forms of consciousness’.

And I don’t see what your reference to aphantasia means.

Edwina

On Jan 18, 2024, at 10:49 PM, Jerry LR Chandler  
wrote:

List:

On Jan 11, 2024, at 3:52 PM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:

Peirce’s outline of these forms of consciousness [7.551] of Feeling, Altersense 
and Medisense’ or primisense, alter sense, medisense. And, just as in his 
outline of the modal categories, these can be subdivided, so to speak, for 
‘primisense’ has only one mode; Altersnese has two modes [Sensagion and Will]; 
and Medisense has three modes ‘Abstraction, Suggestion, Association’. 7.551.

I am curious about your reasoning here.

In particular with regard to those individuals with the genetic deficiency of 
aphantasia (lack of ability to recall images or mental pictures).

Are these terms intended to be “forms” of consciousness?
Would perhaps conscious “tones” more like musical notations?
Clearly, a basis to related such terms to either “tokens” or “types” seem 
inappropriate given CSP’s allocation of these terms to words (composed from 
alphabetic symbols).

Alternatively, perhaps I’m not reading your usage of “modal categories” 
properly….

Cheers

Jerry
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Categorizations of triadic Relationships (Was Re: Graphical Representations of the Sign by Peirce)

[Edwina Taborsky]

Jerry list

I'll answer within what I understand as ‘forms of consciousness’. Again - I 
don’t know what YOU mean by the phrase.

But in comparison to your view,  I’d have to include the processes of memory or 
habit - even in primisense, which is a first primal awareness of ‘otherness’.- 
as in a newborn.  But consciosuness, I think, has to gradually include  even 
quasi-mind memory or habits [ ie, the development of habits of association of 
’that’ input sensation’ with ’that experience'. This enables anticipation.

 It need not be symbolic of course, since all matter has this capacity to 
develop habits and thus, anticipate.  A first primal awareness or feeling 
[primisense] would emerge within the experience of an ‘Other’ [ via Altersense].

This experience would have to be semiosic, ie, triadic, or within the operation 
of the sign triad, I can thus understand your reference to ’tones, tokens, 
types’ [ which are comparable to 1ns, 2ns, 3ns] and aren’t confined to words - 
see 1.322, where he discusses a blind person’s experience of ’scarlet colour’. 

Therefore the question simply comes down to - is primisense or pure feeling 
totally alienated from habit? I think that a body’s capacity to even experience 
feeling, requires ‘habit’ - ie - the existence of a stable ground [even if it’s 
purely and only physiological ..ie hearing, or sight or touch or..]…which 
ground sensation within the perimeters of ‘habit’.  The subsequent ‘awareness’ 
of this sensation, develops within multiple experiences [altersense]..

Edwina





> On Jan 20, 2024, at 1:21 AM, Jerry LR Chandler  
> wrote:
> 
> List:
> Edwina:
> 
> Please step back a bit from your professional persona as a scholar.
> 
> Please ask yourself “what do these words mean in terms of my life 
> experiences?”
> 
> Do you experience “forms of consciousness”?
> 
> How are the forms of personal consciousness you experience related to or 
> conjoined to your memories?  
> 
> Thanks for considering my “off the wall” questions.
> 
> Cheers
> Jerry 
> 
>> On Jan 19, 2024, at 8:30 AM, Edwina Taborsky  
>> wrote:
>> 
>> Jerry, list
>> 
>> I’m not sure of your question. I’m quoting Peirce.  These terms refer to his 
>> outline of ‘forms of consciousness’. 
>> 
>> And I don’t see what your reference to aphantasia means.
>> 
>> Edwina
>> 
>> 
>> 
>>> On Jan 18, 2024, at 10:49 PM, Jerry LR Chandler 
>>>  wrote:
>>> 
>>> List: 
>>> 
 On Jan 11, 2024, at 3:52 PM, Edwina Taborsky  
 wrote:
 
 Peirce’s outline of these forms of consciousness [7.551] of Feeling, 
 Altersense and Medisense’ or primisense, alter sense, medisense. And, just 
 as in his outline of the modal categories, these can be subdivided, so to 
 speak, for ‘primisense’ has only one mode; Altersnese has two modes 
 [Sensagion and Will]; and Medisense has three modes ‘Abstraction, 
 Suggestion, Association’. 7.551.
 
 
>>> I am curious about your reasoning here.
>>> 
>>> In particular with regard to those individuals with the genetic deficiency 
>>> of aphantasia (lack of ability to recall images or mental pictures).
>>> 
>>> Are these terms intended to be “forms” of consciousness? 
>>> Would perhaps conscious “tones” more like musical notations?   
>>> Clearly, a basis to related such terms to either “tokens” or “types” seem 
>>> inappropriate given CSP’s allocation of these terms to words (composed from 
>>> alphabetic symbols).
>>> 
>>> Alternatively, perhaps I’m not reading your usage of “modal categories” 
>>> properly….
>>> 
>>> Cheers
>>> 
>>> Jerry  
>>> _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
>>> ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at 
>>> https://cspeirce.com  and, just as well, at 
>>> https://www.cspeirce.com .  It'll take a while to repair / update all the 
>>> links!
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>> 
>> _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Categorizations of triadic Relationships (Was Re: Graphical Representations of the Sign by Peirce)

[Edwina Taborsky]

Jerry, list

First - being scholar is not akin to a hat that one puts on/takes off.

But the real problem here is that I don’t know what YOU mean by ‘forms of 
consciousness’.

You seem to differentiate them from ‘memories’.  Do yo mean current experiences?

Therefore - I can’t answer your question of ‘Do you experience forms of 
consciosuness’

Because - again I don’t know what the term means to you.

Edwina

> On Jan 20, 2024, at 1:21 AM, Jerry LR Chandler  
> wrote:
> 
> List:
> Edwina:
> 
> Please step back a bit from your professional persona as a scholar.
> 
> Please ask yourself “what do these words mean in terms of my life 
> experiences?”
> 
> Do you experience “forms of consciousness”?
> 
> How are the forms of personal consciousness you experience related to or 
> conjoined to your memories?  
> 
> Thanks for considering my “off the wall” questions.
> 
> Cheers
> Jerry 
> 
>> On Jan 19, 2024, at 8:30 AM, Edwina Taborsky  
>> wrote:
>> 
>> Jerry, list
>> 
>> I’m not sure of your question. I’m quoting Peirce.  These terms refer to his 
>> outline of ‘forms of consciousness’. 
>> 
>> And I don’t see what your reference to aphantasia means.
>> 
>> Edwina
>> 
>> 
>> 
>>> On Jan 18, 2024, at 10:49 PM, Jerry LR Chandler 
>>>  wrote:
>>> 
>>> List: 
>>> 
 On Jan 11, 2024, at 3:52 PM, Edwina Taborsky  
 wrote:
 
 Peirce’s outline of these forms of consciousness [7.551] of Feeling, 
 Altersense and Medisense’ or primisense, alter sense, medisense. And, just 
 as in his outline of the modal categories, these can be subdivided, so to 
 speak, for ‘primisense’ has only one mode; Altersnese has two modes 
 [Sensagion and Will]; and Medisense has three modes ‘Abstraction, 
 Suggestion, Association’. 7.551.
 
 
>>> I am curious about your reasoning here.
>>> 
>>> In particular with regard to those individuals with the genetic deficiency 
>>> of aphantasia (lack of ability to recall images or mental pictures).
>>> 
>>> Are these terms intended to be “forms” of consciousness? 
>>> Would perhaps conscious “tones” more like musical notations?   
>>> Clearly, a basis to related such terms to either “tokens” or “types” seem 
>>> inappropriate given CSP’s allocation of these terms to words (composed from 
>>> alphabetic symbols).
>>> 
>>> Alternatively, perhaps I’m not reading your usage of “modal categories” 
>>> properly….
>>> 
>>> Cheers
>>> 
>>> Jerry  
>>> _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
>>> ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at 
>>> https://cspeirce.com  and, just as well, at 
>>> https://www.cspeirce.com .  It'll take a while to repair / update all the 
>>> links!
>>> ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON 
>>> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to 
>>> peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . 
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>>> ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP;  moderated by Gary Richmond;  and 
>>> co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
>> 
>> _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
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>> https://cspeirce.com  and, just as well, at 
>> https://www.cspeirce.com .  It'll take a while to repair / update all the 
>> links!
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>> co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
> 

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Categorizations of triadic Relationships (Was Re: Graphical Representations of the Sign by Peirce)

[Jerry LR Chandler]

List:
Edwina:

Please step back a bit from your professional persona as a scholar.

Please ask yourself “what do these words mean in terms of my life experiences?”

Do you experience “forms of consciousness”?

How are the forms of personal consciousness you experience related to or 
conjoined to your memories?  

Thanks for considering my “off the wall” questions.

Cheers
Jerry 

> On Jan 19, 2024, at 8:30 AM, Edwina Taborsky  
> wrote:
> 
> Jerry, list
> 
> I’m not sure of your question. I’m quoting Peirce.  These terms refer to his 
> outline of ‘forms of consciousness’. 
> 
> And I don’t see what your reference to aphantasia means.
> 
> Edwina
> 
> 
> 
>> On Jan 18, 2024, at 10:49 PM, Jerry LR Chandler 
>>  wrote:
>> 
>> List: 
>> 
>>> On Jan 11, 2024, at 3:52 PM, Edwina Taborsky  
>>> wrote:
>>> 
>>> Peirce’s outline of these forms of consciousness [7.551] of Feeling, 
>>> Altersense and Medisense’ or primisense, alter sense, medisense. And, just 
>>> as in his outline of the modal categories, these can be subdivided, so to 
>>> speak, for ‘primisense’ has only one mode; Altersnese has two modes 
>>> [Sensagion and Will]; and Medisense has three modes ‘Abstraction, 
>>> Suggestion, Association’. 7.551.
>>> 
>>> 
>> I am curious about your reasoning here.
>> 
>> In particular with regard to those individuals with the genetic deficiency 
>> of aphantasia (lack of ability to recall images or mental pictures).
>> 
>> Are these terms intended to be “forms” of consciousness? 
>> Would perhaps conscious “tones” more like musical notations?   
>> Clearly, a basis to related such terms to either “tokens” or “types” seem 
>> inappropriate given CSP’s allocation of these terms to words (composed from 
>> alphabetic symbols).
>> 
>> Alternatively, perhaps I’m not reading your usage of “modal categories” 
>> properly….
>> 
>> Cheers
>> 
>> Jerry  
>> _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
>> ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at 
>> https://cspeirce.com  and, just as well, at 
>> https://www.cspeirce.com .  It'll take a while to repair / update all the 
>> links!
>> ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON 
>> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to 
>> peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . 
>> ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu 
>> with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in 
>> the body.  More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html .
>> ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP;  moderated by Gary Richmond;  and 
>> co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
> 
> _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
> ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at 
> https://cspeirce.com  and, just as well, at 
> https://www.cspeirce.com .  It'll take a while to repair / update all the 
> links!
> ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON 
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> . 
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> ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP;  moderated by Gary Richmond;  and 
> co-managed by him and Ben Udell.

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Categorizations of triadic Relationships (Was Re: Graphical Representations of the Sign by Peirce)

[Edwina Taborsky]

Jerry, list

I’m not sure of your question. I’m quoting Peirce.  These terms refer to his 
outline of ‘forms of consciousness’. 

And I don’t see what your reference to aphantasia means.

Edwina



> On Jan 18, 2024, at 10:49 PM, Jerry LR Chandler 
>  wrote:
> 
> List: 
> 
>> On Jan 11, 2024, at 3:52 PM, Edwina Taborsky  
>> wrote:
>> 
>> Peirce’s outline of these forms of consciousness [7.551] of Feeling, 
>> Altersense and Medisense’ or primisense, alter sense, medisense. And, just 
>> as in his outline of the modal categories, these can be subdivided, so to 
>> speak, for ‘primisense’ has only one mode; Altersnese has two modes 
>> [Sensagion and Will]; and Medisense has three modes ‘Abstraction, 
>> Suggestion, Association’. 7.551.
>> 
>> 
> I am curious about your reasoning here.
> 
> In particular with regard to those individuals with the genetic deficiency of 
> aphantasia (lack of ability to recall images or mental pictures).
> 
> Are these terms intended to be “forms” of consciousness? 
> Would perhaps conscious “tones” more like musical notations?   
> Clearly, a basis to related such terms to either “tokens” or “types” seem 
> inappropriate given CSP’s allocation of these terms to words (composed from 
> alphabetic symbols).
> 
> Alternatively, perhaps I’m not reading your usage of “modal categories” 
> properly….
> 
> Cheers
> 
> Jerry  
> _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
> ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at 
> https://cspeirce.com  and, just as well, at 
> https://www.cspeirce.com .  It'll take a while to repair / update all the 
> links!
> ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON 
> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu 
> . 
> ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu 
> with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in 
> the body.  More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html .
> ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP;  moderated by Gary Richmond;  and 
> co-managed by him and Ben Udell.

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Categorizations of triadic Relationships (Was Re: Graphical Representations of the Sign by Peirce)

[Jerry LR Chandler]

List: 

> On Jan 11, 2024, at 3:52 PM, Edwina Taborsky  
> wrote:
> 
> Peirce’s outline of these forms of consciousness [7.551] of Feeling, 
> Altersense and Medisense’ or primisense, alter sense, medisense. And, just as 
> in his outline of the modal categories, these can be subdivided, so to speak, 
> for ‘primisense’ has only one mode; Altersnese has two modes [Sensagion and 
> Will]; and Medisense has three modes ‘Abstraction, Suggestion, Association’. 
> 7.551.
> 
> 
I am curious about your reasoning here.

In particular with regard to those individuals with the genetic deficiency of 
aphantasia (lack of ability to recall images or mental pictures).

Are these terms intended to be “forms” of consciousness? 
Would perhaps conscious “tones” more like musical notations?   
Clearly, a basis to related such terms to either “tokens” or “types” seem 
inappropriate given CSP’s allocation of these terms to words (composed from 
alphabetic symbols).

Alternatively, perhaps I’m not reading your usage of “modal categories” 
properly….

Cheers

Jerry  _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at 
https://cspeirce.com  and, just as well, at 
https://www.cspeirce.com .  It'll take a while to repair / update all the links!
► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON 
PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . 
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Categorizations of triadic Relationships (Was Re: Graphical Representations of the Sign by Peirce)

[Jerry LR Chandler]

List:
Jon, John:

Obviously, both of you are struggling with what I am seeking to communicate. 
Perhaps the following paragraph will open your minds, your cognitive 
capabilities for  understanding, to navigating a semantic “symbol space” more 
like a biological organism (the sonar system of a bat) than a machine (an oil 
tanker with massive momentum).  I think that cognitive triadic relations are 
“real” - mens re.  I continue to struggle with how CSP navigated the symbolic 
channels of the quantitative chemical notational system into a theory of logic. 
This is not merely a question of semantics or classical symbolic logic.

  According to some, Schelling had a powerful influence on CSP.  
"Was Schelling’s “Identitatssystem” a contributing factor to organizing the 
trichotomies?” is a rhetorical question worthy of significant perusal .

Cheers
Jerry

Research Professor (Retired)
Krasnow Institute for Advanced Study
George Mason University


From:
Daniel Whistler.
Symbolic Language 
‘Symbol’ is one of the most polysemic words in theoretical discourse. Its 
connotations can be logico-mathematical, Lacanian, Peircean, anthropo- logical, 
liturgical, or romantic—and more often than not the symbol plays on a mixture 
of more than one of these discursive frameworks. What is more, the symbol takes 
on divergent, often opposed forms depending on the conno- tations one has in 
mind: the slippage and deferral constitutive of the Lacanian symbolic realm 
stand opposed to the unity of meaning and being in ‘the romantic symbol’. 
Nevertheless, the following is not a Begriffsgeschichte of the symbol, but a 
study of its fate in the hands of F. W. J. Schelling alone. What matters is not 
how we understand the term ‘symbol’ today, but how Schelling did: the contexts 
on which he drew and the conversations into which he entered when forming his 
theory of the symbol. In what follows, therefore, I will be almost entirely 
concerned with ‘the romantic symbol’ which emerged in German aesthetics and 
philosophy at the turn of the nineteenth century— even if one of my aims in 
what follows is to problematize the very existence of one, monolithic 
‘romantic’ symbol.

Part I of this book is devoted to the context in which Schelling’s construc- 
tion of symbolic language takes place. The present chapter considers theories 
of the symbol written during the Goethezeit, prior to Schelling’s own. I 
initially consider them historically, then from a synchronic viewpoint, 
examining in particular the essential properties of a symbol and the typical 
ways in which it was interpreted. As always, it is the interplay between ‘the 
romantic symbol’ and the Schellingian symbol in which I am interested: to what 
extent is Schelling to be positioned unproblematically in a genealogy of ‘the 
romantic symbol’ and to what extent does his theory in fact react against such 
an interpretation of the symbol?



> On Jan 11, 2024, at 6:16 PM, John F Sowa  wrote:
> 
> Jon, Jerry, List,
> 
> We had discussed this issue many times before.   R 669 was an attempt by 
> Peirce to relate all the versions of EGs he had written, published, and toyed 
> with.  The result (R 669) was a hodge-podge that had many ad hoc 
> constructions that Peirce was unable to justify by any convincing proof.  He 
> knew that it was bad.  
> 
> In R 670, he began to sketch out a new version, and a few weeks later he 
> produced his clearest, most precise, and most elegant foundation for EGs.  
> And he confirmed that version as his final choice in his last major letter in 
> 2013.
> 
> Peirce's three primitives are conjunction (AND), negation (NOT), and the 
> existential quantifier (line of identity).  These three primitives with 
> Peirce's 1911 rules of inference are so general and powerful, that they unify 
> and simplify Gerhard Gentzen's two systems -- clause form and natural 
> deduction.   
> 
> As a result an unsolved research problem about the relationship between the 
> two systems (stated in the 1970s) was finally solved by a simple proof when 
> translated to Peirce's 1911 notation and rules of inference.   That is 
> conclusive evidence beyond any shadow of a doubt that Peirce's 1911 system is 
> one of his most brilliant achievements.
> 
> I'll send another note with all the references. 
> 
> John
>  
> 
> From: "Jon Alan Schmidt" 
> Sent: 1/11/24 6:13 PM
> To: Peirce-L 
> Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Categorizations of triadic Relationships (Was Re: 
> Graphical Representations of the Sign by Peirce)
> 
> Jerry, List:
> 
> JLRC: The classical logic of mathematical reasoning (symbolized by five signs 
> - negation, conjunction, disjunction, material conditional, and 
> bi-conditional.
> 
> Actually, Peirce points out that only two signs are needed as primitives, 
> with the others being derived from them.
> 
&

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Categorizations of triadic Relationships (Was Re: Graphical Representations of the Sign by Peirce)

[John F Sowa]

Jon, Jerry, List,

We had discussed this issue many times before.   R 669 was an attempt by Peirce 
to relate all the versions of EGs he had written, published, and toyed with.  
The result (R 669) was a hodge-podge that had many ad hoc constructions that 
Peirce was unable to justify by any convincing proof.  He knew that it was bad.

In R 670, he began to sketch out a new version, and a few weeks later he 
produced his clearest, most precise, and most elegant foundation for EGs.  And 
he confirmed that version as his final choice in his last major letter in 2013.

Peirce's three primitives are conjunction (AND), negation (NOT), and the 
existential quantifier (line of identity).  These three primitives with 
Peirce's 1911 rules of inference are so general and powerful, that they unify 
and simplify Gerhard Gentzen's two systems -- clause form and natural deduction.

As a result an unsolved research problem about the relationship between the two 
systems (stated in the 1970s) was finally solved by a simple proof when 
translated to Peirce's 1911 notation and rules of inference.   That is 
conclusive evidence beyond any shadow of a doubt that Peirce's 1911 system is 
one of his most brilliant achievements.

I'll send another note with all the references.

John


From: "Jon Alan Schmidt" 
Sent: 1/11/24 6:13 PM
To: Peirce-L 
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Categorizations of triadic Relationships (Was Re: 
Graphical Representations of the Sign by Peirce)

Jerry, List:

JLRC: The classical logic of mathematical reasoning (symbolized by five signs - 
negation, conjunction, disjunction, material conditional, and bi-conditional.

Actually, Peirce points out that only two signs are needed as primitives, with 
the others being derived from them.

CSP: Out of the conceptions of non-relative deductive logic, such as 
consequence, coexistence or composition, aggregation, incompossibility, 
negation, etc., it is only necessary to select two, and almost any two at that, 
to have the material needed for defining the others. What ones are to be 
selected is a question the decision of which transcends the function of this 
branch of logic. (CP 2.379, 1902)

For example, in the Alpha part of Existential Graphs for propositional logic, 
the simplest approach is to select the two primitives as juxtaposition for 
conjunction (coexistence) and shading for negation* such that disjunction is 
then defined as multiple unshaded areas within a shaded area, material 
conditional (consequence) as one unshaded area within a shaded area (scroll), 
and bi-conditional as juxtaposed scrolls with the antecedent and consequent 
reversed. The Beta part for first-order predicate logic adds one more 
primitive, the line of identity for existential quantification such that 
universal quantification is then defined as a line of identity whose outermost 
part is within a shaded area.

*As I have discussed on the List many times before, although this choice is 
practically more efficient and easier to explain, Peirce suggests on several 
occasions that it is philosophically more accurate to select the scroll for 
material implication as the second primitive such that negation is then defined 
as a scroll with a blackened inner close shrunk to infinitesimal size, 
signifying that every proposition is true if the antecedent is true (CP 
4.454-456, 1903; CP 4.564n, c. 1906; R 300:[47-51], 1908; R 669:[16-18], 1911).

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Thu, Jan 11, 2024 at 12:52 PM Jerry LR Chandler 
 wrote:
On Jan 11, 2024, at 11:28 AM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:

But  you already know this

Edwinia:

If I understood the meaning of the “triadic relations”, I would not waste my 
time attempting to frame precise questions and intensely analyzing the 
grammatical structures of your and other responses.

Mathematical reasoning is grounded in set theory - the relation between ordered 
pairs.

The classical  logic of mathematical reasoning (symbolized by five signs - 
negation, conjunction, disjunction, material conditional, and bi-conditional.

These signs are often interpreted in terms of the Aristotelian syllogisms.  
Which in turn, are related to sentences and sentence grammars.  For a 
discussion of Peircian “tokens and types” from a categorical perspective, see 
the recent text by Ursula Skadowski, Logic - Language - Ontology. 2022.

Or, asserted in similar terms, is the meaning of a triadic relation constrained 
to multi-valued logics?

My interpretation of the posts by the John / Jon / Robert posts is that the 
classical logic for deduction preserves the truths of propositions of molecular 
sentences.  (Note, it was not necessary to invoke either Robert Rosen’s 
writings on the philosophy of science or thermodynamics or entropy or dogmas 
or….  Just seeking a scie

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Categorizations of triadic Relationships (Was Re: Graphical Representations of the Sign by Peirce)

[John F Sowa]

Jerry, Jon, List,

There is no single theory by Peirce that can explain everything.  For any 
particular quotation, it's important to study the context to determine which 
theory (or theories) Peirce was using when he wrote that paragraph.

JLRC> We seem to be on different wavelengths...  It seems to me that there is a 
profound distinction between a categorical decision to express a feeling / 
emotion and experiencing a relation with the exterior world...  Further the 
design and conduct of chemical experiments necessary to compose two nouns into 
a single “sin-sign”, such as planning to combine Sodium and Chlorine to create 
Sodium Chloride (NaCl) is another example.   Perhaps the modern usage of 
symbols differs at a foundational level of logical meanings than during the CSP 
era.

Peirce's background in philosophy, science, formal logic, and semeiotic is very 
much at the same level as modern developments in the cognitive sciences 
(Philosopy, Psychology, Linguistics, Artificial Intelligence, Neuroscience, and 
Anthropology).  At Peirce conferences (Sesquicentennial in 1989 and Centennial 
in 2019), there were many specialists from all those fields who showed how 
modern and up-to-date his contributions have been.

In the quotations cited by Jon (copy below), the context shows that Peirce was 
addressing different issues from different areas of his vast range of thought.  
 In some cases, the issues are about logic, in other cases phaneroscopy or some 
other field may be more relevant.

I agree with Jon that "We can substitute "headache," "orange," or any other 
common noun for "camel" in this passage."

But it's essential to ask in what context Peirce might happen to mention those 
three words.  If it's merely to use those words as signs, he might talk about 
them in the same way.  But if he is talking about feelings, such as a headache, 
he  is more likely to be talking about phaneroscopy.  If he is talking about an 
orange, he might be talking about the chemistry and methods for analyzing the 
constituents of orange juice.  And he might mention a camel for many other 
reasons.

Issues about signs are relevant to chemical experiments in many ways.  But when 
Peirce talks about any science, he does so with a focus on applications of 
logic to propositions stated in the terminology of that science.  Issues about 
interpretants of signs are, of course, relevant at the lowest levels of 
interpretinf anything.  But those issues are so detailed that a discussion at 
that level might obscure, rather than clarify the more relevant issues.

Summary:  when citing any quotation by Peirce, we need to consider the context 
of the quotation and how it is related to the context we are discussing  --  
and consider how Peirce himself would relate those two different contexts.   
'when we consider multiple contexts that happen to mention the same words, we 
may have to interpret those words in different senses.

With his deep experience in lexicography for the Century Dictionary, Peirce 
knew very well how words senses shift from one context to another.   We must 
always consider how and whether words from different contexts might be used in 
different senses.

John


From: "Jerry LR Chandler" 
Sent: 1/11/24 4:09 PM
To: Jon Alan Schmidt 
Cc: Peirce List 
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Categorizations of triadic Relationships (Was Re: 
Graphical Representations of the Sign by Peirce)

Thanks for your answer.

We seem to be on different wavelengths.

On Jan 11, 2024, at 12:24 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt  wrote:

We can substitute "headache," "orange," or any other common noun for "camel" in 
this passage.

It seems to me that there is a profound distinction between a categorical 
decision to express a feeling / emotion and experiencing a relation with the 
exterior world.

One example is that combines both an internal feeling and an external 
experience is sexual copulation.

Further the design and conduct of chemical experiments necessary to compose two 
nouns into a single “sin-sign”, such as planning to combine Sodium and Chlorine 
to create Sodium Chloride (NaCl) is another example.

Perhaps the modern usage of symbols differs at a foundational level of logical 
meanings than during the CSP era.

I appreciate your responses.

Cheers

Jerry

From: Jon Alan Schmidt 
To: Peirce-L

Every word is a token of a type--in Peirce's 1903 taxonomy, a replica of a 
rhematic symbol or symbolic rheme, and therefore a peculiar kind of rhematic 
indexical sinsign.

CSP: Eighth, a Rhematic Symbol, or Symbolic Rheme, is a sign connected with its 
Object by an association of general ideas in such a way that its Replica calls 
up an image in the mind which image, owing to certain habits or dispositions of 
that mind, tends to produce a general concept, and the Replica is interpreted 
as 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Categorizations of triadic Relationships (Was Re: Graphical Representations of the Sign by Peirce)

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Jerry, List:

JLRC: The classical logic of mathematical reasoning (symbolized by five
signs - negation, conjunction, disjunction, material conditional, and
bi-conditional.


Actually, Peirce points out that only two signs are needed as primitives,
with the others being derived from them.

CSP: Out of the conceptions of non-relative deductive logic, such as
consequence, coexistence or composition, aggregation, incompossibility,
negation, etc., it is only necessary to select two, and almost any two at
that, to have the material needed for defining the others. What ones are to
be selected is a question the decision of which transcends the function of
this branch of logic. (CP 2.379, 1902)


For example, in the Alpha part of Existential Graphs for propositional
logic, the simplest approach is to select the two primitives as
juxtaposition for conjunction (coexistence) and shading for negation* such
that disjunction is then defined as multiple unshaded areas within a shaded
area, material conditional (consequence) as one unshaded area within a
shaded area (scroll), and bi-conditional as juxtaposed scrolls with the
antecedent and consequent reversed. The Beta part for first-order predicate
logic adds one more primitive, the line of identity for existential
quantification such that universal quantification is then defined as a line
of identity whose outermost part is within a shaded area.

*As I have discussed on the List many times before, although this choice is
practically more efficient and easier to explain, Peirce suggests on
several occasions that it is philosophically more accurate to select the
scroll for material implication as the second primitive such that negation
is then defined as a scroll with a blackened inner close shrunk to
infinitesimal size, signifying that *every *proposition is true if the
antecedent is true (CP 4.454-456, 1903; CP 4.564n, c. 1906; R 300:[47-51],
1908; R 669:[16-18], 1911).

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Thu, Jan 11, 2024 at 12:52 PM Jerry LR Chandler <
jerry_lr_chand...@icloud.com> wrote:

> On Jan 11, 2024, at 11:28 AM, Edwina Taborsky 
> wrote:
>
> But  you already know this
>
> Edwinia:
>
> If I understood the meaning of the “triadic relations”, I would not waste
> my time attempting to frame precise questions and intensely analyzing the
> grammatical structures of your and other responses.
>
> Mathematical reasoning is grounded in set theory - the relation between 
> *ordered
> pair*s.
>
> The classical  logic of mathematical reasoning (symbolized by five signs -
> negation, conjunction, disjunction, material conditional, and
> bi-conditional.
>
> These signs are often interpreted in terms of the Aristotelian
> syllogisms.  Which in turn, are related to sentences and sentence
> grammars.  For a discussion of Peircian *“tokens and types” *from a
> categorical perspective, see the recent text by Ursula Skadowski, Logic -
> Language - Ontology. 2022.
>
> Or, asserted in similar terms, is the meaning of a triadic relation
> constrained to multi-valued logics?
>
> My interpretation of the posts by the John / Jon / Robert posts is that
> the classical logic for deduction preserves the truths of propositions of
> molecular sentences.  (Note, it was not necessary to invoke either Robert
> Rosen’s writings on the philosophy of science or thermodynamics or entropy
> or dogmas or….  Just seeking a scientifically useful meaning for my
> research.
>
> Cheers
> Jerry
>
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Categorizations of triadic Relationships (Was Re: Graphical Representations of the Sign by Peirce)

[Edwina Taborsky]

Helmut, list

I’m not sure of your point. 

Peirce is here writing about consciousness - and I think that not all, indeed, 
a great portion of the universe’s semiosic triads have little to do with 
‘consciousness.  That is, in the physics-chemical and biological realms, the 
semiosic process is a vibrant reality in the formation and functioning of 
matter. And, as noted, “thought is not necessarily connected with a brain. It 
appears in the work of crystals, and throughout the purely physical world” 4.551

This doesn’t mean that the three categories are not fully operational in the 
non-brain/mind world [ ie, Firstness or feeling, Secondness or reaction; 
Thirdness or the formation of habits]. Indeed, I think that it is clear that 
all categorical modes are found in these realms.These enable anticipation - ie, 
Thirdness or habits is a key mode enabling the material entities to, without 
consciousness, anticipate. Surely a plant anticipates the warmer weather and 
begins to develop leaves?  But consciousness?

Peirce’s outline of these forms of consciousness [7.551] of Feeling, Altersense 
and Medisense’ or primisense, alter sense, medisense. And, just as in his 
outline of the modal categories, these can be subdivided, so to speak, for 
‘primisense’ has only one mode; Altersnese has two modes [Sensagion and Will]; 
and Medisense has three modes ‘Abstraction, Suggestion, Association’. 7.551.

Again - I’m not sure of your point.

Edwina

> On Jan 11, 2024, at 12:40 PM, Helmut Raulien  wrote:
> 
> Edwina, list,
>  
> what about primisense, altersense, medisense? Three entities in one person. 
> E.g. I have a headache (feeling, primisense), then I remember, that coffee 
> can help (memory from altersense), then I think, I should drink one 
> (thinking, medisense).
>  
> Best, Helmut
>  
> Gesendet: Donnerstag, 11. Januar 2024 um 18:28 Uhr
> Von: "Edwina Taborsky" 
> An: "Jerry LR Chandler" 
> Cc: "Peirce List" 
> Betreff: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Categorizations of triadic Relationships (Was Re: 
> Graphical Representations of the Sign by Peirce)
> jerry
>  
> Yes- you can feel a headache without going through the rather complicated 
> analysis that it’s a triadic experience.
>  
> No- I don’t think the triad requires ‘exterior objects’ in the sense of being 
> external to the person. You can mutter through your own thoughts all alone! 
> But I think the notion of external does apply to the semiotic process. Take a 
> cell- it necessarily interacts with its surroundings- otherwise it would be 
> dead - and these interactions function within the triadic process. In that 
> sense - yes , semiosis functions by an entity interacting with its exterior.
>  
> And no - the triadic relation is basic within the physical and chemical and 
> biological realms. Ie the non symbolic realms. 
> But  you already know this 
>  
> Edwina
>  
> Sent from my iPhone
>  
> On Jan 11, 2024, at 11:43 AM, Jerry LR Chandler 
>  wrote:
>  
> 
> Edwina, List.
>  
> Very interesting response.
>  
> The absence of Persian terminology about semiotics is notable.
>  
> In other words, I can have a feeling of a headache Without any notion of 
> triadicity!u
>  
> The question becomes one of the role of cognition in creating descriptions of 
> experiences.
> Does this suggest to you that Peircian semiotics is only for exterior objects?
>  
> Is the triadic relation merrily a suggestion for determining a feeling that 
> can be given symbolic descriptions that can be communicated to the Other?
>  
> Cheers.
> Jerry.
>  
> Sent from my iPad 
>  
> On Jan 11, 2024, at 8:11 AM, Edwina Taborsky  
> wrote:
>  
> Jerry - list
>  
> Ii think you yourself know the answer - but…let’s say, the word ‘ headache’ = 
> or any sound
>  
> 1] If you have, within your mind, a developed, learned knowledge base that 
> recognizes this sound as having-a-meaning-, then, the triadic interaction is:
>  
> Sound-> Memory or Knowledge Base -> Meaning of the sound as a word
>  
> 2] If you don’t have this sound within your mind’s knowledge base, then, the 
> triadic interaction is:
>  
> Sound->Memory or Knowledge Base -> noise/ ..the ‘meaning’ is empty…and the 
> sound entropically dissipates, so to speak. 
>  
> I like your definitions of ‘relation’ - particularly the sense of ’to bear or 
> to carry’.. I think that describes the semiosic relation quite well. 
>  
> By the way - the Sinsign is not a single term, but is the mediative 
> Represetnamen within a triad, where the Representamen is in a mode of 
> Secondness. 
>  
> So- all of life functions within these triadic relations…and , of course, 
> that means that there is even no such thing as a singular tria

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Categorizations of triadic Relationships (Was Re: Graphical Representations of the Sign by Peirce)

[Jerry LR Chandler]

Thanks for your answer.

We seem to be on different wavelengths. 

> On Jan 11, 2024, at 12:24 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt  
> wrote:
> 
> We can substitute "headache," "orange," or any other common noun for "camel" 
> in this passage.

It seems to me that there is a profound distinction between a categorical 
decision to express a feeling / emotion and experiencing a relation with the 
exterior world.

One example is that combines both an internal feeling and an external 
experience is sexual copulation.  

Further the design and conduct of chemical experiments necessary to compose two 
nouns into a single “sin-sign”, such as planning to combine Sodium and Chlorine 
to create Sodium Chloride (NaCl) is another example. 

Perhaps the modern usage of symbols differs at a foundational level of logical 
meanings than during the CSP era.

I appreciate your responses.

Cheers

Jerry _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
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https://www.cspeirce.com .  It'll take a while to repair / update all the links!
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Categorizations of triadic Relationships (Was Re: Graphical Representations of the Sign by Peirce)

[Edwina Taborsky]

Jerry - frankly - I’ve never been a fan of Robert Rosen ; my reference to 
entropy was more along the lines of Prigogine.

And yes- I consider that signs can be understood within the outline of the 
Aristotlean syllogism. ..but I don’t see this triad as confined to the symbolic 
realm of language. 

Edwina

> On Jan 11, 2024, at 1:55 PM, Jerry LR Chandler  
> wrote:
> 
> 
> 
>> On Jan 11, 2024, at 11:28 AM, Edwina Taborsky  
>> wrote:
>> 
>> But  you already know this 
> 
> Edwinia:  
> 
> If I understood the meaning of the “triadic relations”, I would not waste my 
> time attempting to frame precise questions and intensely analyzing the 
> grammatical structures of your and other responses.
> 
> Mathematical reasoning is grounded in set theory - the relation between 
> ordered pairs.  
> 
> The classical  logic of mathematical reasoning (symbolized by five signs - 
> negation, conjunction, disjunction, material conditional, and bi-conditional.
> 
> These signs are often interpreted in terms of the Aristotelian syllogisms.  
> Which in turn, are related to sentences and sentence grammars.  For a 
> discussion of Peircian “tokens and types” from a categorical perspective, see 
> the recent text by Ursula Skadowski, Logic - Language - Ontology. 2022.
> 
> Or, asserted in similar terms, is the meaning of a triadic relation 
> constrained to multi-valued logics?  
> 
> My interpretation of the posts by the John / Jon / Robert posts is that the 
> classical logic for deduction preserves the truths of propositions of 
> molecular sentences.  (Note, it was not necessary to invoke either Robert 
> Rosen’s writings on the philosophy of science or thermodynamics or entropy or 
> dogmas or….  Just seeking a scientifically useful meaning for my research.
> 
> Cheers
> Jerry
> 

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Categorizations of triadic Relationships (Was Re: Graphical Representations of the Sign by Peirce)

[Jerry LR Chandler]

> On Jan 11, 2024, at 11:28 AM, Edwina Taborsky  
> wrote:
> 
> But  you already know this 

Edwinia:  

If I understood the meaning of the “triadic relations”, I would not waste my 
time attempting to frame precise questions and intensely analyzing the 
grammatical structures of your and other responses.

Mathematical reasoning is grounded in set theory - the relation between ordered 
pairs.  

The classical  logic of mathematical reasoning (symbolized by five signs - 
negation, conjunction, disjunction, material conditional, and bi-conditional.

These signs are often interpreted in terms of the Aristotelian syllogisms.  
Which in turn, are related to sentences and sentence grammars.  For a 
discussion of Peircian “tokens and types” from a categorical perspective, see 
the recent text by Ursula Skadowski, Logic - Language - Ontology. 2022.

Or, asserted in similar terms, is the meaning of a triadic relation constrained 
to multi-valued logics?  

My interpretation of the posts by the John / Jon / Robert posts is that the 
classical logic for deduction preserves the truths of propositions of molecular 
sentences.  (Note, it was not necessary to invoke either Robert Rosen’s 
writings on the philosophy of science or thermodynamics or entropy or dogmas 
or….  Just seeking a scientifically useful meaning for my research.

Cheers
Jerry

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Categorizations of triadic Relationships (Was Re: Graphical Representations of the Sign by Peirce)

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Jerry, List:

Every word is a token of a type--in Peirce's 1903 taxonomy, a replica of a
rhematic symbol or symbolic rheme, and therefore a peculiar kind of
rhematic indexical sinsign.

CSP: Eighth, a Rhematic Symbol, or Symbolic Rheme, is a sign connected with
its Object by an association of general ideas in such a way that its
Replica calls up an image in the mind which image, owing to certain habits
or dispositions of that mind, tends to produce a general concept, and the
Replica is interpreted as a sign of an Object that is an instance of that
concept. Thus, the Rhematic Symbol either is, or is very like, what the
logicians call a general term. The Rhematic Symbol, like any Symbol, is
necessarily itself of the nature of a general type, and is thus a Legisign.
Its Replica, however, is a Rhematic Indexical Sinsign of a peculiar kind,
in that the image it suggests to the mind acts upon a Symbol already in
that mind to give rise to a general concept. ... A Replica of the word
"camel" is likewise a Rhematic Indexical Sinsign, being really affected,
through the knowledge of camels, common to the speaker and auditor, by the
real camel it denotes, even if this one is not individually known to the
auditor; and it is through such real connection that the word "camel" calls
up the idea of a camel. The same thing is true of the word "phoenix." For
although no phoenix really exists, real descriptions of the phoenix are
well known to the speaker and his auditor; and thus the word is really
affected by the Object denoted. (CP 2.261, EP 2:295, 1903)


We can substitute "headache," "orange," or any other common noun for
"camel" in this passage. The word by itself is a name, its dynamical object
is the general concept that it denotes, its immediate object is the idea
that can be associated with it by virtue of previous collateral experience,
its immediate interpretant is its verbal definition describing the range of
meanings that it *possibly could* have, its dynamical interpretant is any
effect that it *actually does *have, and its final interpretant is the
effect that it *necessarily would *have under ideal circumstances, after
infinite inquiry by an infinite community. However, "there can be no
isolated sign" (CP 4.551, 1906)--each dynamical interpretant is affected by
the context of the word's utterance and the interpreter's established
habits of interpretation. Moreover ...

CSP: The purpose of every sign is to express "fact," and by being joined
with other signs, to approach as nearly as possible to determining an
interpretant which would be the *perfect Truth*, the absolute Truth, and as
such (at least, we may use this language) would be the very Universe. (EP
2:304, c. 1901)

CSP: A *state of things* is an abstract constituent part of reality, of
such a nature that a proposition is needed to represent it. There is but
one *individual*, or completely determinate, state of things, namely, the
all of reality. A. *fact *is so highly a prescissively abstract state of
things, that it can be wholly represented in a simple proposition, and the
term "simple," here, has no absolute meaning, but is merely a comparative
expression. (CP 5.549, EP 2:378, 1906)


CSP: {A]n Argument is no more built up of Propositions than a motion is
built up of positions. So to regard it is to neglect the very essence of
it. ... [P]ropositions are either roughly described states of
Thought-motion, or are artificial creations intended to render the
description of Thought-motion possible; and Names are creations of a second
order serving to render the representation of propositions possible. (R
295, 1906)


CSP: [N]o sign of a thing or kind of thing--the ideas of signs to which
concepts belong--can arise except in a proposition; and no logical
operation upon a proposition can result in anything but a proposition; so
that non-propositional signs can only exist as constituents of
propositions. But it is not true, as ordinarily represented, that a
proposition can be built up of non-propositional signs. The truth is that
concepts are nothing but indefinite problematic judgments. The concept of *man
*[or headache or orange] necessarily involves the thought of the possible
being of a man [or headache or orange]; and thus it is precisely the
judgment, "There may be a man."(CP 4.583, 1906)


In short, words as names of concepts are artifacts used to formulate
propositions describing facts prescinded from the real and continuous
inferential process of semiosis. That is why Existential Graphs, as
individual frames in "a moving-picture of Thought" (CP 4.11, 1906), always
represent propositions. In the Beta part, a name typically cannot be
scribed by itself, it must be attached to at least one line of identity. As
I said before, this attribution of a general (indeterminate) concept to an
indefinite individual makes the former more determinate and the latter more
definite. The logical meaning of a concept (second grade of clearness) is
the continuum of all 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Categorizations of triadic Relationships (Was Re: Graphical Representations of the Sign by Peirce)

[Edwina Taborsky]

jerryYes- you can feel a headache without going through the rather complicated analysis that it’s a triadic experience.No- I don’t think the triad requires ‘exterior objects’ in the sense of being external to the person. You can mutter through your own thoughts all alone! But I think the notion of external does apply to the semiotic process. Take a cell- it necessarily interacts with its surroundings- otherwise it would be dead - and these interactions function within the triadic process. In that sense - yes , semiosis functions by an entity interacting with its exterior.And no - the triadic relation is basic within the physical and chemical and biological realms. Ie the non symbolic realms. But  you already know this EdwinaSent from my iPhoneOn Jan 11, 2024, at 11:43 AM, Jerry LR Chandler  wrote:Edwina, List.Very interesting response.The absence of Persian terminology about semiotics is notable.In other words, I can have a feeling of a headache Without any notion of triadicity!uThe question becomes one of the role of cognition in creating descriptions of experiences.Does this suggest to you that Peircian semiotics is only for exterior objects?Is the triadic relation merrily a suggestion for determining a feeling that can be given symbolic descriptions that can be communicated to the Other?Cheers.Jerry.Sent from my iPad On Jan 11, 2024, at 8:11 AM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:Jerry - listIi think you yourself know the answer - but…let’s say, the word ‘ headache’ = or any sound1] If you have, within your mind, a developed, learned knowledge base that recognizes this sound as having-a-meaning-, then, the triadic interaction is:Sound-> Memory or Knowledge Base -> Meaning of the sound as a word2] If you don’t have this sound within your mind’s knowledge base, then, the triadic interaction is:Sound->Memory or Knowledge Base -> noise/ ..the ‘meaning’ is empty…and the sound entropically dissipates, so to speak. I like your definitions of ‘relation’ - particularly the sense of ’to bear or to carry’.. I think that describes the semiosic relation quite well. By the way - the Sinsign is not a single term, but is the mediative Represetnamen within a triad, where the Representamen is in a mode of Secondness. So- all of life functions within these triadic relations…and , of course, that means that there is even no such thing as a singular triad. Everything is networking with other triads.EdwinaOn Jan 10, 2024, at 10:04 PM, Jerry LR Chandler  wrote:List: Well, I will continue to search for an adequate semantic _expression_ for my feelings about the meanings (plural) of a triadic relation. Perhaps it would be helpful to note that the meaning of “triadic” is a critical part of the question, but not particularly difficult or controversial (outside the CSP community.)The term “relation” is highly controversial throughout the kingdom of mathematics. The word “relation” is derived from the Latin, “relates” (See the Wikipedia declension below) , putatively meaning to bear or to carry, including sense of “bearing a child”, that is, the biological sense.  That is, in the genetic sense.  In mathematics, it may mean to “entail”, that is, as an inheritance from a prior sentence or terms of a sentence. So, the implication of a family of relatives may be intrinsic (symbolically) to a set of triadic relations.From these perspectives, I now give an examples.When one simply states a sinsign, a single term, how is the meaning interpreted as a “triadic relation”.“HEADACHE”.Or“ORANGE”How does one ascribe meaning to the “triadic relation” in the sense of interrogatories - What, Who, When, Where, How and Why ?  (Or any other sense or sensory mode you are capable of exploring.)In the cognitive (grammatical) sense, what locates the three predicates(?) (Or, what locates the three subjects?)  Or are the three terms of the triadic relations merely adjectives?Beyond what CSP may have opined about, personal interpretations of CSP’s phrases are welcome.  (Yes, Robert, your’s in particular! As you are aware of the role of “ordered pairs” in set theory.)  (Ben:  In part, this refers back to your “tetradicity” if that term is correctly remembered.)Alternatively, is this a meaningful conundrum?CheersJerry Participlerelātus (feminine relāta, neuter relātum); first/second-declension participlePerfect passive participle of referō(having been) driven or carried back(having been) returned, restored, repaid(having been) reported(having been) reconsideredOn Jan 10, 2024, at 1:28 PM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:ListI think the quotations provided by JAS do not change the meaning of the quotations I provided to show that the categories are described by Peirce as having both genuine and degenerate modes. That is, the category of Secondness has both a genuine and degenerate mode; the category of Thirdness has a genuine, a degenerate in the first degree, a degenerate in the third degree.These terms of ‘genuine’ and ‘degenerate' are completely different in meaning from the 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Categorizations of triadic Relationships (Was Re: Graphical Representations of the Sign by Peirce)

[Edwina Taborsky]

Helmet- the triadic process - ie the sign meditation is taking place within the persons mind. EdwinaSent from my iPhoneOn Jan 11, 2024, at 11:43 AM, Jerry LR Chandler  wrote:Edwina, List.Very interesting response.The absence of Persian terminology about semiotics is notable.In other words, I can have a feeling of a headache Without any notion of triadicity!uThe question becomes one of the role of cognition in creating descriptions of experiences.Does this suggest to you that Peircian semiotics is only for exterior objects?Is the triadic relation merrily a suggestion for determining a feeling that can be given symbolic descriptions that can be communicated to the Other?Cheers.Jerry.Sent from my iPad On Jan 11, 2024, at 8:11 AM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:Jerry - listIi think you yourself know the answer - but…let’s say, the word ‘ headache’ = or any sound1] If you have, within your mind, a developed, learned knowledge base that recognizes this sound as having-a-meaning-, then, the triadic interaction is:Sound-> Memory or Knowledge Base -> Meaning of the sound as a word2] If you don’t have this sound within your mind’s knowledge base, then, the triadic interaction is:Sound->Memory or Knowledge Base -> noise/ ..the ‘meaning’ is empty…and the sound entropically dissipates, so to speak. I like your definitions of ‘relation’ - particularly the sense of ’to bear or to carry’.. I think that describes the semiosic relation quite well. By the way - the Sinsign is not a single term, but is the mediative Represetnamen within a triad, where the Representamen is in a mode of Secondness. So- all of life functions within these triadic relations…and , of course, that means that there is even no such thing as a singular triad. Everything is networking with other triads.EdwinaOn Jan 10, 2024, at 10:04 PM, Jerry LR Chandler  wrote:List: Well, I will continue to search for an adequate semantic _expression_ for my feelings about the meanings (plural) of a triadic relation. Perhaps it would be helpful to note that the meaning of “triadic” is a critical part of the question, but not particularly difficult or controversial (outside the CSP community.)The term “relation” is highly controversial throughout the kingdom of mathematics. The word “relation” is derived from the Latin, “relates” (See the Wikipedia declension below) , putatively meaning to bear or to carry, including sense of “bearing a child”, that is, the biological sense.  That is, in the genetic sense.  In mathematics, it may mean to “entail”, that is, as an inheritance from a prior sentence or terms of a sentence. So, the implication of a family of relatives may be intrinsic (symbolically) to a set of triadic relations.From these perspectives, I now give an examples.When one simply states a sinsign, a single term, how is the meaning interpreted as a “triadic relation”.“HEADACHE”.Or“ORANGE”How does one ascribe meaning to the “triadic relation” in the sense of interrogatories - What, Who, When, Where, How and Why ?  (Or any other sense or sensory mode you are capable of exploring.)In the cognitive (grammatical) sense, what locates the three predicates(?) (Or, what locates the three subjects?)  Or are the three terms of the triadic relations merely adjectives?Beyond what CSP may have opined about, personal interpretations of CSP’s phrases are welcome.  (Yes, Robert, your’s in particular! As you are aware of the role of “ordered pairs” in set theory.)  (Ben:  In part, this refers back to your “tetradicity” if that term is correctly remembered.)Alternatively, is this a meaningful conundrum?CheersJerry Participlerelātus (feminine relāta, neuter relātum); first/second-declension participlePerfect passive participle of referō(having been) driven or carried back(having been) returned, restored, repaid(having been) reported(having been) reconsideredOn Jan 10, 2024, at 1:28 PM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:ListI think the quotations provided by JAS do not change the meaning of the quotations I provided to show that the categories are described by Peirce as having both genuine and degenerate modes. That is, the category of Secondness has both a genuine and degenerate mode; the category of Thirdness has a genuine, a degenerate in the first degree, a degenerate in the third degree.These terms of ‘genuine’ and ‘degenerate' are completely different in meaning from the quotation provided by JAS CSP: A sign is a Priman which is Secundan to an Object and is Tertian in determining an Interpretant into Secundanity to that Object. It has two Objects, the immediate, to which it is degenerately Secundan, the dynamic, to which it is genuinely Secundan. It has three Interpretants, the immediate, to which it is primarily Tertian, the dynamic, to which it is secundally Tertian, the rational, to which it is genuinely Tertian. (R 339:247r, 1905 Jul 7)The above terms , with, eg, reference to the two objects, means only that the Immediate Object has a ‘degenerate’ or less intact’ form of informational 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Categorizations of triadic Relationships (Was Re: Graphical Representations of the Sign by Peirce)

[Jerry LR Chandler]

Edwina, List.Very interesting response.The absence of Persian terminology about semiotics is notable.In other words, I can have a feeling of a headache Without any notion of triadicity!uThe question becomes one of the role of cognition in creating descriptions of experiences.Does this suggest to you that Peircian semiotics is only for exterior objects?Is the triadic relation merrily a suggestion for determining a feeling that can be given symbolic descriptions that can be communicated to the Other?Cheers.Jerry.Sent from my iPad On Jan 11, 2024, at 8:11 AM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:Jerry - listIi think you yourself know the answer - but…let’s say, the word ‘ headache’ = or any sound1] If you have, within your mind, a developed, learned knowledge base that recognizes this sound as having-a-meaning-, then, the triadic interaction is:Sound-> Memory or Knowledge Base -> Meaning of the sound as a word2] If you don’t have this sound within your mind’s knowledge base, then, the triadic interaction is:Sound->Memory or Knowledge Base -> noise/ ..the ‘meaning’ is empty…and the sound entropically dissipates, so to speak. I like your definitions of ‘relation’ - particularly the sense of ’to bear or to carry’.. I think that describes the semiosic relation quite well. By the way - the Sinsign is not a single term, but is the mediative Represetnamen within a triad, where the Representamen is in a mode of Secondness. So- all of life functions within these triadic relations…and , of course, that means that there is even no such thing as a singular triad. Everything is networking with other triads.EdwinaOn Jan 10, 2024, at 10:04 PM, Jerry LR Chandler  wrote:List: Well, I will continue to search for an adequate semantic _expression_ for my feelings about the meanings (plural) of a triadic relation. Perhaps it would be helpful to note that the meaning of “triadic” is a critical part of the question, but not particularly difficult or controversial (outside the CSP community.)The term “relation” is highly controversial throughout the kingdom of mathematics. The word “relation” is derived from the Latin, “relates” (See the Wikipedia declension below) , putatively meaning to bear or to carry, including sense of “bearing a child”, that is, the biological sense.  That is, in the genetic sense.  In mathematics, it may mean to “entail”, that is, as an inheritance from a prior sentence or terms of a sentence. So, the implication of a family of relatives may be intrinsic (symbolically) to a set of triadic relations.From these perspectives, I now give an examples.When one simply states a sinsign, a single term, how is the meaning interpreted as a “triadic relation”.“HEADACHE”.Or“ORANGE”How does one ascribe meaning to the “triadic relation” in the sense of interrogatories - What, Who, When, Where, How and Why ?  (Or any other sense or sensory mode you are capable of exploring.)In the cognitive (grammatical) sense, what locates the three predicates(?) (Or, what locates the three subjects?)  Or are the three terms of the triadic relations merely adjectives?Beyond what CSP may have opined about, personal interpretations of CSP’s phrases are welcome.  (Yes, Robert, your’s in particular! As you are aware of the role of “ordered pairs” in set theory.)  (Ben:  In part, this refers back to your “tetradicity” if that term is correctly remembered.)Alternatively, is this a meaningful conundrum?CheersJerry Participlerelātus (feminine relāta, neuter relātum); first/second-declension participlePerfect passive participle of referō(having been) driven or carried back(having been) returned, restored, repaid(having been) reported(having been) reconsideredOn Jan 10, 2024, at 1:28 PM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:ListI think the quotations provided by JAS do not change the meaning of the quotations I provided to show that the categories are described by Peirce as having both genuine and degenerate modes. That is, the category of Secondness has both a genuine and degenerate mode; the category of Thirdness has a genuine, a degenerate in the first degree, a degenerate in the third degree.These terms of ‘genuine’ and ‘degenerate' are completely different in meaning from the quotation provided by JAS CSP: A sign is a Priman which is Secundan to an Object and is Tertian in determining an Interpretant into Secundanity to that Object. It has two Objects, the immediate, to which it is degenerately Secundan, the dynamic, to which it is genuinely Secundan. It has three Interpretants, the immediate, to which it is primarily Tertian, the dynamic, to which it is secundally Tertian, the rational, to which it is genuinely Tertian. (R 339:247r, 1905 Jul 7)The above terms , with, eg, reference to the two objects, means only that the Immediate Object has a ‘degenerate’ or less intact’ form of informational content than the Dynamic Object. These terms, I suggest, refer to the determination of the semiosic process - and have nothing to do with the categories.  That is, although JAS 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Categorizations of triadic Relationships (Was Re: Graphical Representations of the Sign by Peirce)

[Edwina Taborsky]

Jerry - list

Ii think you yourself know the answer - but…let’s say, the word ‘ headache’ = 
or any sound

1] If you have, within your mind, a developed, learned knowledge base that 
recognizes this sound as having-a-meaning-, then, the triadic interaction is:

Sound-> Memory or Knowledge Base -> Meaning of the sound as a word

2] If you don’t have this sound within your mind’s knowledge base, then, the 
triadic interaction is:

Sound->Memory or Knowledge Base -> noise/ ..the ‘meaning’ is empty…and the 
sound entropically dissipates, so to speak. 

I like your definitions of ‘relation’ - particularly the sense of ’to bear or 
to carry’.. I think that describes the semiosic relation quite well. 

By the way - the Sinsign is not a single term, but is the mediative 
Represetnamen within a triad, where the Representamen is in a mode of 
Secondness. 

So- all of life functions within these triadic relations…and , of course, that 
means that there is even no such thing as a singular triad. Everything is 
networking with other triads.

Edwina



> On Jan 10, 2024, at 10:04 PM, Jerry LR Chandler 
>  wrote:
> 
> List: 
> 
> Well, I will continue to search for an adequate semantic expression for my 
> feelings about the meanings (plural) of a triadic relation. 
> Perhaps it would be helpful to note that the meaning of “triadic” is a 
> critical part of the question, but not particularly difficult or 
> controversial (outside the CSP community.)
> The term “relation” is highly controversial throughout the kingdom of 
> mathematics. 
> The word “relation” is derived from the Latin, “relates” 
> (See the Wikipedia declension below) , putatively meaning to bear or to 
> carry, including sense of “bearing a child”, that is, the biological sense.  
> That is, in the genetic sense.  In mathematics, it may mean to “entail”, that 
> is, as an inheritance from a prior sentence or terms of a sentence. So, the 
> implication of a family of relatives may be intrinsic (symbolically) to a set 
> of triadic relations.
> 
> From these perspectives, I now give an examples.
> When one simply states a sinsign, a single term, how is the meaning 
> interpreted as a “triadic relation”.
> 
> “HEADACHE”.
> 
> Or
> 
> “ORANGE”
> 
> How does one ascribe meaning to the “triadic relation” in the sense of 
> interrogatories - What, Who, When, Where, How and Why ?  (Or any other sense 
> or sensory mode you are capable of exploring.)
> 
> In the cognitive (grammatical) sense, what locates the three predicates(?) 
> (Or, what locates the three subjects?)  Or are the three terms of the triadic 
> relations merely adjectives?
> 
> Beyond what CSP may have opined about, personal interpretations of CSP’s 
> phrases are welcome. 
> 
>  (Yes, Robert, your’s in particular! As you are aware of the role of “ordered 
> pairs” in set theory.)  
> (Ben:  In part, this refers back to your “tetradicity” if that term is 
> correctly remembered.)
> 
> Alternatively, is this a meaningful conundrum?
> 
> Cheers
> 
> Jerry 
> 
> Participle
> relātus (feminine relāta , 
> neuter relātum ); first 
> /second-declension
>   participle
> Perfect passive participle of referō 
> (having been) driven  or carried 
>  back
> (having been) returned , restored 
> , repaid 
> 
> (having been) reported 
> (having been) reconsidered 
> 
>> On Jan 10, 2024, at 1:28 PM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:
>> 
>> List
>> 
>> I think the quotations provided by JAS do not change the meaning of the 
>> quotations I provided to show that the categories are described by Peirce as 
>> having both genuine and degenerate modes. That is, the category of 
>> Secondness has both a genuine and degenerate mode; the category of Thirdness 
>> has a genuine, a degenerate in the first degree, a degenerate in the third 
>> degree.
>> 
>> These terms of ‘genuine’ and ‘degenerate' are completely different in 
>> meaning from the quotation provided by JAS 
>> 
>>> CSP: A sign is a Priman which is Secundan to an Object and is Tertian in 
>>> determining an Interpretant into Secundanity to that Object. It has two 
>>> Objects, the immediate, to which it is degenerately Secundan, the dynamic, 
>>> to which it is genuinely Secundan. It has three Interpretants, the 
>>> immediate, to which it is primarily Tertian, the dynamic, to which it is 
>>> secundally Tertian, the rational, to which it is genuinely Tertian. (R 
>>> 339:247r, 1905 Jul 7)
>> 
>> The above terms , with, eg, 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Categorizations of triadic Relationships (Was Re: Graphical Representations of the Sign by Peirce)

[Jerry LR Chandler]

List: 

Well, I will continue to search for an adequate semantic expression for my 
feelings about the meanings (plural) of a triadic relation. 
Perhaps it would be helpful to note that the meaning of “triadic” is a critical 
part of the question, but not particularly difficult or controversial (outside 
the CSP community.)
The term “relation” is highly controversial throughout the kingdom of 
mathematics. 
The word “relation” is derived from the Latin, “relates” 
(See the Wikipedia declension below) , putatively meaning to bear or to carry, 
including sense of “bearing a child”, that is, the biological sense.  That is, 
in the genetic sense.  In mathematics, it may mean to “entail”, that is, as an 
inheritance from a prior sentence or terms of a sentence. So, the implication 
of a family of relatives may be intrinsic (symbolically) to a set of triadic 
relations.

From these perspectives, I now give an examples.
When one simply states a sinsign, a single term, how is the meaning interpreted 
as a “triadic relation”.

“HEADACHE”.

Or

“ORANGE”

How does one ascribe meaning to the “triadic relation” in the sense of 
interrogatories - What, Who, When, Where, How and Why ?  (Or any other sense or 
sensory mode you are capable of exploring.)

In the cognitive (grammatical) sense, what locates the three predicates(?) 
(Or, what locates the three subjects?)  Or are the three terms of the triadic 
relations merely adjectives?

Beyond what CSP may have opined about, personal interpretations of CSP’s 
phrases are welcome. 

 (Yes, Robert, your’s in particular! As you are aware of the role of “ordered 
pairs” in set theory.)  
(Ben:  In part, this refers back to your “tetradicity” if that term is 
correctly remembered.)

Alternatively, is this a meaningful conundrum?

Cheers

Jerry 

Participle
relātus (feminine relāta , neuter 
relātum ); first 
/second-declension
  participle

Perfect passive participle of referō 
(having been) driven  or carried 
 back
(having been) returned , restored 
, repaid 

(having been) reported 
(having been) reconsidered 

> On Jan 10, 2024, at 1:28 PM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:
> 
> List
> 
> I think the quotations provided by JAS do not change the meaning of the 
> quotations I provided to show that the categories are described by Peirce as 
> having both genuine and degenerate modes. That is, the category of Secondness 
> has both a genuine and degenerate mode; the category of Thirdness has a 
> genuine, a degenerate in the first degree, a degenerate in the third degree.
> 
> These terms of ‘genuine’ and ‘degenerate' are completely different in meaning 
> from the quotation provided by JAS 
> 
>> CSP: A sign is a Priman which is Secundan to an Object and is Tertian in 
>> determining an Interpretant into Secundanity to that Object. It has two 
>> Objects, the immediate, to which it is degenerately Secundan, the dynamic, 
>> to which it is genuinely Secundan. It has three Interpretants, the 
>> immediate, to which it is primarily Tertian, the dynamic, to which it is 
>> secundally Tertian, the rational, to which it is genuinely Tertian. (R 
>> 339:247r, 1905 Jul 7)
> 
> The above terms , with, eg, reference to the two objects, means only that the 
> Immediate Object has a ‘degenerate’ or less intact’ form of informational 
> content than the Dynamic Object. These terms, I suggest, refer to the 
> determination of the semiosic process - and have nothing to do with the 
> categories.  That is, although JAS declares:
> 
>>  In context, "primarily Tertian" clearly corresponds to doubly degenerate 
>> (1ns of 3ns) and "secundally Tertian" corresponds to degenerate (2ns of 3ns)
> 
> 
> I continue to disagree, since this is setting up the semiotic triad and 
> hexagon as having the Interpretants all in a categorical mode of Thirdness! 
> But we can see from even the list of ten classes, that there is only ONE 
> class where the Interpretant is in a mode of Thirdness - the Argument 
> Symbolic Legisign. [See 2.234-264 and also 8.341]. All the other nine classes 
> have the Interpretant in a mode of either Firstness [there are SIX of these] 
> or in a mode of Secondness [ there are three of these]. 
> 
> With regard to the following quotation
> 
> 
>> CSP: A representamen, or sign, is anything which stands, in any respect, at 
>> once in a relation of correspondence to a correlate, called its object and 
>> to another correlate, its interpretant. which is a 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Categorizations of triadic Relationships (Was Re: Graphical Representations of the Sign by Peirce)

[Edwina Taborsky]

List

I think the quotations provided by JAS do not change the meaning of the 
quotations I provided to show that the categories are described by Peirce as 
having both genuine and degenerate modes. That is, the category of Secondness 
has both a genuine and degenerate mode; the category of Thirdness has a 
genuine, a degenerate in the first degree, a degenerate in the third degree.

These terms of ‘genuine’ and ‘degenerate' are completely different in meaning 
from the quotation provided by JAS 

> CSP: A sign is a Priman which is Secundan to an Object and is Tertian in 
> determining an Interpretant into Secundanity to that Object. It has two 
> Objects, the immediate, to which it is degenerately Secundan, the dynamic, to 
> which it is genuinely Secundan. It has three Interpretants, the immediate, to 
> which it is primarily Tertian, the dynamic, to which it is secundally 
> Tertian, the rational, to which it is genuinely Tertian. (R 339:247r, 1905 
> Jul 7)

The above terms , with, eg, reference to the two objects, means only that the 
Immediate Object has a ‘degenerate’ or less intact’ form of informational 
content than the Dynamic Object. These terms, I suggest, refer to the 
determination of the semiosic process - and have nothing to do with the 
categories.  That is, although JAS declares:

>  In context, "primarily Tertian" clearly corresponds to doubly degenerate 
> (1ns of 3ns) and "secundally Tertian" corresponds to degenerate (2ns of 3ns)


I continue to disagree, since this is setting up the semiotic triad and hexagon 
as having the Interpretants all in a categorical mode of Thirdness! But we can 
see from even the list of ten classes, that there is only ONE class where the 
Interpretant is in a mode of Thirdness - the Argument Symbolic Legisign. [See 
2.234-264 and also 8.341]. All the other nine classes have the Interpretant in 
a mode of either Firstness [there are SIX of these] or in a mode of Secondness 
[ there are three of these]. 

With regard to the following quotation


> CSP: A representamen, or sign, is anything which stands, in any respect, at 
> once in a relation of correspondence to a correlate, called its object and to 
> another correlate, its interpretant. which is a possible representamen 
> determined by the first and referring to the same object. (R 1147, c. 1901-2)

I consider that the triad is made up of three correlates or relations, and is 
irreducible. My reading of the above is that the mediate Representamen/Sign 
does not stand in - which suggests some kind of passive existence - but 
actually functions, in that it acts; it transforms the information of the 
Object into a meaning, an Interpretant, according to the knowledge base 
/habits, held within the Sign/Representamen in itself. 

I see no evidence in the many quotations provided that "  the 
representamen/sign stands in or has that relation to its object and 
interpretant, it is not that relation itself.”

I consider that the Sign/Representamen is a mediate node in the triadl;  it is 
an active relation and its function is to do just that - mediate between the 
Object and Interpretant. Therefore - I agree that the Sign/Representamen can be 
defined as

> "anything, of whatsoever mode of being, which mediates between an object and 
> an interpretant" (EP 2:410, 1907).

And note - that Peirce says ‘of whosoever mode of being’ - which means that 
this Sign/Representamen can function in any of the modal categories - and we 
can see in the ten classes, that it is in the mode of Firstness only once, in 
the mode of Thirdness six times, and in the mode of Secondness, three times.

Edwina



> On Jan 10, 2024, at 1:51 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt  
> wrote:
> 
> List:
> 
> For the record, Peirce describes the first, second, and third correlates of a 
> triadic relation as "simplest," "of middling complexity," and "most complex" 
> right before explicitly identifying the representamen/sign, object, and 
> interpretant as the three correlates of one such relation (CP 2.235-242, EP 
> 2:290, 1903); and he later outlines the two objects and three interpretants 
> in terms of genuine and degenerate in his Logic Notebook, as follows.
> 
> CSP: A sign is a Priman which is Secundan to an Object and is Tertian in 
> determining an Interpretant into Secundanity to that Object. It has two 
> Objects, the immediate, to which it is degenerately Secundan, the dynamic, to 
> which it is genuinely Secundan. It has three Interpretants, the immediate, to 
> which it is primarily Tertian, the dynamic, to which it is secundally 
> Tertian, the rational, to which it is genuinely Tertian. (R 339:247r, 1905 
> Jul 7)
> 
> CSP: The Interpretant is Threefold. The Normal Interpretant is the Genuine 
> Interpretant, embracing all that the Sign could reveal concerning the Object 
> to a sufficiently penetrating mind, being more than any mind, however 
> penetrating, could conclude from it, since there is no end to the distinct 
> conclusions that 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Categorizations of triadic Relationships (Was Re: Graphical Representations of the Sign by Peirce)

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

List:

For the record, Peirce describes the first, second, and third correlates of
a triadic relation as "simplest," "of middling complexity," and "most
complex" right before explicitly identifying the representamen/sign,
object, and interpretant as the three correlates of one such relation (CP
2.235-242, EP 2:290, 1903); and he later outlines the two objects and three
interpretants in terms of genuine and degenerate in his Logic Notebook, as
follows.

CSP: A sign is a Priman which is Secundan to an Object and is Tertian in
determining an Interpretant into Secundanity to that Object. It has two
Objects, the *immediate*, to which it is *degenerately* Secundan, the
*dynamic*, to which it is *genuinely* Secundan. It has three Interpretants,
the *immediate*, to which it is primarily Tertian, the *dynamic*, to which
it is secundally Tertian, the *rational*, to which it is genuinely Tertian.
(R 339:247r, 1905 Jul 7)

CSP: The Interpretant is Threefold. The Normal Interpretant is the Genuine
Interpretant, embracing all that the Sign could reveal concerning the
Object to a sufficiently penetrating mind, being more than any mind,
however penetrating, could conclude from it, since there is no end to the
distinct conclusions that could be drawn concerning the Object from any
Sign. ...
This triplet concerns the Dynamical, or Genuine Object. It is misleading to
call it the *real* object, since it may be unreal. It is the object that
truly determines the sign. (R 339:277r&279r, 1906 Apr 2-3)


It seems clear that the rational and normal interpretants in these passages
correspond directly to what Peirce calls the eventual and final
interpretants elsewhere, reflecting his confession "that my own conception
of this third interpretant is not yet quite free from mist" (CP 4.536,
1906). In context, "primarily Tertian" clearly corresponds to doubly
degenerate (1ns of 3ns) and "secundally Tertian" corresponds to degenerate
(2ns of 3ns). Again, these are results of phaneroscopic analysis--1ns, 2ns,
and 3ns are "the most universal categories of elements of all experience"
(CP 1.417, c. 1896), by no means limited to Peirce's various trichotomies
for sign classification.

Note also that the three divisions in his best-known taxonomy are according
to the nature of the representamen/sign *itself*, its *relation *to its
object, and its *relation *to its interpretant (CP 2.243, EP 2:291, 1903).
The representamen/sign, object, and interpretant are all *correlates*, not
relations, although they only serve as such *within *their genuine triadic
relation to each other. As Peirce states repeatedly (bold added in
quotations below), the representamen/sign *stands in *or *has *that
relation to its object and interpretant, it is not that relation *itself*.

CSP: A *representamen*, or sign, is anything which *stands, in any respect,
at once in a relation* of correspondence to a *correlate*, called its
*object* and to another *correlate*, its *interpretant*. which is a
possible representamen determined by the first and referring to the same
object. (R 1147, c. 1901-2)

CSP: A *Sign*, or *Representamen*, is a First which *stands in such a
genuine triadic relation* to a Second, called its *Object*, as to be
capable of determining a Third, called its *Interpretant*, to assume the
same triadic relation to its Object in which it stands itself to the same
Object. (CP 2.274, EP 2:272-273, 1903)

CSP: A *Representamen *is the First *Correlate of a triadic relation*, the
Second *Correlate *being termed its *Object*, and the possible Third *Correlate
*being termed its *Interpretant*, by which triadic relation the possible
Interpretant is determined to be the First Correlate of the same triadic
relation to the same Object, and for some possible Interpretant. (CP 2.242,
EP 2:290, 1903)

CSP: A sign therefore is *an object which is in relation* to its object on
the one hand and to an interpretant on the other, in such a way as to bring
the interpretant into a relation to the object, corresponding to its own
relation to the object. (CP 8.332, 1904)


CSP: As a *medium*, the Sign is *essentially in a triadic relation*, to its
Object which determines it, and to its Interpretant which it determines.
(EP 2:544n22, 1906)

CSP: A sign, therefore, *has a triadic relation* to its Object and to its
Interpretant. (CP 8.343, EP 2:482, 1908)


Again, although that relation can be called "representing," I prefer to
call it "mediating" because Peirce more generally defines a sign as
"anything, of whatsoever mode of being, which mediates between an object
and an interpretant" (EP 2:410, 1907).

Regards,

Jon

On Tue, Jan 9, 2024 at 5:08 PM Jon Alan Schmidt 
wrote:

> Jerry, List:
>
> I am honestly not sure exactly what all you are asking me to address here
> and how my engineering background is relevant. What do you mean by "the
> origins of the 'triadic relations'"? From what are we seeking to
> distinguish Peirce's semeiotic? What do you have in mind as *semantic*
> 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Categorizations of triadic Relationships (Was Re: Graphical Representations of the Sign by Peirce)

[Edwina Taborsky]

List

With regard to the use of the terms of ‘genuine, degenerate and doubly 
degenerate’ - my understanding of these terms is that they refer only to the 
categories. Not to the ’nodes’ and relations, ie, not to the two Objects or the 
three Interpretants. .

For example, Peirce writes: “The Sign may be said pose as a representative of 
its object, that is, suggests an idea of the Object which is distinguishable 
from the Object in its own Being. The former I term the Dynamoid Object [for I 
want the word “genuine” to express something different]; the latter the 
Immediate Object …Each off these many have either off the three Modalities of 
Being, the former in itself, the latter in representation.  1908 Letters to 
Lady Welby lMS[R] L463.15. 

That is, Peirce specifically rejects in the above quote,  the use of the term 
‘genuine’ to refer to the Dynamoid Object. 

With regard to the terms of ‘genuine’, degenerate and doubly degenerate’, as 
I’ve said - my readings of Peirce are that these terms refer strictly to the 
categories, with there being genuine and degenerate forms of Secondness [ 2-2 
and 2-1]; See 1903 1.535. and three forms of Thirdness, from genuine, to  a 
first degree of degeneracy [3-2] to ’the most degenerate [3-1]. See 5.70-71; 
and 1903; 1.536-37.  and 8.331-32

I don’t consider that the ordinal numbers of First, Second and Third refer to 
the complexity of the Relations and ’nodes’, but to the order of processing [ 
this is not the same as ‘determination’]..

That is - the Representamen, which functions within the sign-vehicle, begins. 
[is First] the semiosic process when it receives input data from the Dynamical 
Object. [Second]…and mediates this input to arrive at, Third, the 
Interpretant[s]. 

The determinative process, as outlined clearly by Robert Marty, moves from 
O-R-I - by which is meant, the nature of and content of the information being 
semiotically processed. The point of ‘determination, as Robert Marty points out 
is that it ‘renders definitely to be such as it will be [8.361 1908[…by which I 
understand that the informational content [as Interpreted]  is determined  by 
the nature of and content of the data input from the Object…as mediated by the 
semiosic nature of the Representamen…
I am presuming that this ‘grounds’ the semeiotic process in an objective rather 
than subjective world.

Edwina

> On Jan 9, 2024, at 6:08 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt  wrote:
> 
> Jerry, List:
> 
> I am honestly not sure exactly what all you are asking me to address here and 
> how my engineering background is relevant. What do you mean by "the origins 
> of the 'triadic relations'"? From what are we seeking to distinguish Peirce's 
> semeiotic? What do you have in mind as semantic aspects of the triadic 
> relations?
> 
> My understanding is that the immediate object and immediate interpretant are 
> internal to the sign, while the dynamical object, dynamical interpretant, and 
> final interpretant are external to the sign. Presumably, that is why Peirce's 
> late taxonomies for sign classification include separate trichotomies for the 
> sign's dyadic relations with the latter three correlates, but not the former 
> two.
> 
> Regarding where syntax originates and resides, this passage seems relevant.
> 
> CSP: A single Assertion has but a single Predicate; but the simplest 
> Assertion has more than one Subject, unless it be such a statement as "It 
> rains," where one of the Subjects is expressed otherwise than in words. But I 
> must explain myself more fully, and in the way which alone will be truly 
> expressive, namely, by examples. I will, however, first remark that the 
> Proposition that embodies an Assertion has the same Subjects and Predicate as 
> the Assertion itself. Take the Proposition "Cain killed Abel." This is 
> identically the same Proposition as "Abel was killed by Cain": It is only the 
> grammatical dress that is different. Other things being equal, everybody will 
> prefer the former. Why? Because it is simpler; but why is it simpler? Because 
> in putting the cause before the effect, it in that respect diagrammatizes the 
> truth. What are the Subjects of this Proposition[?] Cain, first: that is not 
> only a Subject of the Proposition, but is the principal Subject of the 
> Assertion which a historian would naturally make. But in the Proposition Cain 
> and Abel are, as Subjects, on one footing precisely (or almost precisely, for 
> Cain is preponderant in causality). But besides these, "killed" = committed 
> murder upon, is a third Subject, since no study of the words alone, without 
> extraneous experience, would enable the Ad[d]ressee to understand it. What, 
> then, is left to serve as Predicate? Nothing but the flow of causation. It is 
> true that we are more acquainted even with that in Experience. When we see a 
> babe in its cradle bending its arms this way and that, while a smile of 
> exultation plays upon its features, it is making acquaintance with 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Categorizations of triadic Relationships (Was Re: Graphical Representations of the Sign by Peirce)

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Jerry, List:

I am honestly not sure exactly what all you are asking me to address here
and how my engineering background is relevant. What do you mean by "the
origins of the 'triadic relations'"? From what are we seeking to
distinguish Peirce's semeiotic? What do you have in mind as *semantic*
aspects of the triadic relations?

My understanding is that the immediate object and immediate interpretant
are *internal *to the sign, while the dynamical object, dynamical
interpretant, and final interpretant are *external *to the sign.
Presumably, that is why Peirce's late taxonomies for sign classification
include separate trichotomies for the sign's dyadic relations with the
latter three correlates, but not the former two.

Regarding where syntax originates and resides, this passage seems relevant.

CSP: A single Assertion has but a single Predicate; but the simplest
Assertion has more than one Subject, unless it be such a statement as "It
rains," where one of the Subjects is expressed otherwise than in words. But
I must explain myself more fully, and in the way which alone will be truly
expressive, namely, by examples. I will, however, first remark that the
Proposition that embodies an Assertion has the same Subjects and Predicate
as the Assertion itself. Take the Proposition "Cain killed Abel." This is
identically the same Proposition as "Abel was killed by Cain": It is only
the grammatical dress that is different. Other things being equal,
everybody will prefer the former. Why? Because it is simpler; but why is it
simpler? Because in putting the cause before the effect, it in that respect
diagrammatizes the truth. What are the Subjects of this Proposition[?]
Cain, first: that is not only a Subject of the Proposition, but is the
principal Subject of the Assertion which a historian would naturally make.
But in the Proposition Cain and Abel are, as Subjects, on one footing
precisely (or almost precisely, for Cain is preponderant in causality). But
besides these, "killed" = committed *murder* upon, is a third Subject,
since no study of the words alone, without extraneous experience, would
enable the Ad[d]ressee to understand it. What, then, is left to serve as
Predicate? Nothing but the *flow of causation*. It is true that we are more
acquainted even with that in Experience. When we see a babe in its cradle
bending its arms this way and that, while a smile of exultation plays upon
its features, it is making acquaintance with the flow of causation. So
acquaintance with the flow of causation so early as to make it familiar
before speech is so far acquired that an assertion can be syntactically
framed, and it is embodied in the syntax of every tongue. (R 664, 1910)


The proposition "Cain killed Abel" has three subjects denoted by its three
words--the dyadic relation of killing and its two correlates, Cain and
Abel, all of which require collateral experience/observation to
understand--and exactly one predicate, a *pure *or *continuous *predicate
that "is signified as the logical connexion between the Subjects" (R 611,
1908) only by its *syntax*. As Peirce explains elsewhere, "A proposition
can be separated into a predicate and subjects in more ways than one," but
this approach is "the proper way in logic" (NEM 3:885, 1908) because "when
we have carried analysis so far as to leave only a continuous predicate, we
have carried it to its ultimate elements" (SS 72, 1908). For more on this,
I highly recommend Francesco Bellucci's 2013 paper about it (
https://www.academia.edu/11685812/Peirces_Continuous_Predicates).

In the Beta part of Existential Graphs (EG), there are two ways of
indexically denoting subjects--lines of identity for indefinite
individuals, and names for general concepts--while the pure/continuous
predicate is again iconically signified by the syntax, in this case the
arrangement of the lines and names (as well as any shaded areas for
negation) on the sheet of assertion that represents the universe of
discourse. Attributing concepts to individuals by attaching names to lines
increases the information being conveyed by making those individuals more
definite (increasing logical depth) and those concepts more determinate
(increasing logical breadth). As a *dyadic *relation, the EG for killing
has two lines and three names, while as genuine *triadic *relations, the
EGs for representing/mediating and giving have three lines and four names
each (as I have noted previously).

When it comes to ordinal numbers, phaneroscopic analysis of the genuine
triadic relation of representing/mediating establishes that the sign is the
first (simplest) correlate, the object is the second (of middling
complexity), and the interpretant is the third (most complex). The upshot
is that there is only the genuine correlate for the sign itself, there are
genuine (dynamical) and degenerate (immediate) correlates for the object,
and there are genuine (final), degenerate (dynamical), and doubly
degenerate (immediate) correlates for