Re: Chirality (was Re: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.4)

[Jerry LR Chandler]

Kirsti, John, List:

I was stunned by your response!

> On Dec 31, 2017, at 9:56 AM, kirst...@saunalahti.fi wrote:
> 
> Jerry, list,
> 
> JERRY:
> "Exactly what CSP means by "corpuscular philosophy" is a mystery to me.
> Was he arguing for the Boscowitz atoms derived from vortices?"
> 
> 
> No mystery to me what CSP meant with "corpuscular philosphy". - The problem 
> with your question lies in "Exactly what..." - It (logically ) demands some 
> kind of an exact (verbal) definition. Such cannot be given.
> 
> Definitely it was not (just) about Boscowitz.
> 
> Still, I find it silly to ponder what CSP may have or not have known at his 
> time. - What are theories for? They are for reaching beyond available 
> information. Philosophical theories especially are (or should be) for making 
> clear what must be, what may be, and what cannot be.
> 
> 
Why was I stunned?

Because consistency lies at the very essence of…
1. the ur-ground of theories.
2. the ur-ground of mathematics
3. the ur-ground of logic
usw.

I wrote

> "Exactly what CSP means by "corpuscular philosophy" is a mystery to me.


because as a consequence of his training in chemistry, his understanding of the 
meaning of  "corpuscular philosophy” 
is, in my opinion, one of the basic questions that motivates his life’s work, 
from his earliest writings (W1:xvii-xviii) to among his latest work (1911)?  
Thus, the question of "corpuscular philosophy” was one of the deepest and most 
profound questions he addressed in the entire body of his writings, approaching 
it from numerous different angles during his lifespan.  

Retrospectively, following the work of Rutherford and Moseley (1913), the 
development of the atomic numbers and mathematical valence theory (quantum 
chemistry), it is now clear why his approaches reached mysterious boundaries. 

John S., BTW, note that he wrote a “History of Chemistry” before he read his 
brother’s book on Logic. (W1:2, 1847, 1850 entries.)

Cheers

Jerry





> 
> Jerry LR Chandler kirjoitti 22.12.2017 18:03:
>> List, John:
>>> On Dec 19, 2017, at 10:10 PM, John F Sowa  wrote:
>>> Jerry,
>>> Your discussion and references about chirality are convincing.
>>> But they go beyond issues that Peirce would have known in his day.
>>> I think that he was using issues about chirality as examples
>>> for making a stronger claim:
 For example, in his lecture on phenomenology, (EP2, 159), ends
 with a discussion of chirality and the laws of motion
 (Right—handed and Left-handed screws)
 “There, then, is a physical phenomenon absolute inexplicable by
 mechanical action. This single instance suffices to overthrow the
 corpuscular philosophy.”
>>> By the end of the 19th century, the general consensus in physics
>>> was that all the major problems had been solved. But the first
>>> decade of the 20th c. shattered their complacency.
>>> If Peirce had access to a university library with the latest
>>> journals, he might have found stronger arguments to "overthrow
>>> the corpuscular philosophy."
>>> John
>> Your response deserves a longer reply.
>> But, for the moment, one brief comment.
>> Here is a recent reference from the the Royal Society journal:
>> Review article: Spontaneous mirror symmetry breaking and origin of
>> biological homochirality
>> Josep M. Ribó, David Hochberg, Joaquim Crusats, Zoubir El-Hachemi and
>> Albert Moyano
>> J. R. Soc. Interface 14:20170699; doi:10.1098/rsif.2017.0699
>> (published December 13, 2017)
>> http://rsif.royalsocietypublishing.org/content/14/137/20170699 
>>  [1]
>> It discusses the central role of the development of chirality in
>> emergence of life.
>> CSP concerns were well founded and remain a profound research problem
>> to this day.
>> The issue of chirality effectively blocks the mathematization of
>> natural sorts and kinds using physical laws alone.
>> Exactly what CSP means by "corpuscular philosophy” is a mystery to
>> me.
>> Was he arguing for the Boscowitz atoms derived from vortices?
>> At a minimum, CSP was arguing against a universal law of mechanics.
>> Or, was he merely arguing against the putatively universality of the
>> newly-defined laws of thermodynamics (entropy?)
>> Whatever he was arguing for or against, the chiral tetrahedral carbon
>> atom, as a well-defined natural geometrical object that was
>> irreducible to a triad, posed a major conundrum for him (and all
>> others) who seek to construct a universe in simpler terms.
>> Cheer
>> Jerry
>> Links:
>> --
>> [1] http://rsif.royalsocietypublishing.org/content/14/137/20170699?etoc 
>> 

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Re: Chirality (was Re: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.4)

[kirstima]

Jerry, list,

JERRY:
"Exactly what CSP means by "corpuscular philosophy" is a mystery to me.
Was he arguing for the Boscowitz atoms derived from vortices?"


No mystery to me what CSP meant with "corpuscular philosphy". - The 
problem with your question lies in "Exactly what..." - It (logically ) 
demands some kind of an exact (verbal) definition. Such cannot be given.


Definitely it was not (just) about Boscowitz.

Still, I find it silly to ponder what CSP may have or not have known at 
his time. - What are theories for? They are for reaching beyond 
available information. Philosophical theories especially are (or should 
be) for making clear what must be, what may be, and what cannot be.


There you have it. In a nutshell. This is a logical triad no new 
information or data may ever break down. All exact definitions must, of 
course, be accommondated to this logical triad together with new data or 
information, which consist of some experimental results. which - if 
brand new - have not been to hold in the long run OR with a wider view.




Best, Kirsti



Jerry LR Chandler kirjoitti 22.12.2017 18:03:

List, John:


On Dec 19, 2017, at 10:10 PM, John F Sowa  wrote:

Jerry,

Your discussion and references about chirality are convincing.
But they go beyond issues that Peirce would have known in his day.
I think that he was using issues about chirality as examples
for making a stronger claim:


For example, in his lecture on phenomenology, (EP2, 159), ends
with a discussion of chirality and the laws of motion
(Right—handed and Left-handed screws)

“There, then, is a physical phenomenon absolute inexplicable by
mechanical action. This single instance suffices to overthrow the
corpuscular philosophy.”


By the end of the 19th century, the general consensus in physics
was that all the major problems had been solved. But the first
decade of the 20th c. shattered their complacency.

If Peirce had access to a university library with the latest
journals, he might have found stronger arguments to "overthrow
the corpuscular philosophy."

John


Your response deserves a longer reply.

But, for the moment, one brief comment.
Here is a recent reference from the the Royal Society journal:

Review article: Spontaneous mirror symmetry breaking and origin of
biological homochirality
Josep M. Ribó, David Hochberg, Joaquim Crusats, Zoubir El-Hachemi and
Albert Moyano
J. R. Soc. Interface 14:20170699; doi:10.1098/rsif.2017.0699
(published December 13, 2017)
http://rsif.royalsocietypublishing.org/content/14/137/20170699 [1]

It discusses the central role of the development of chirality in
emergence of life.
CSP concerns were well founded and remain a profound research problem
to this day.

The issue of chirality effectively blocks the mathematization of
natural sorts and kinds using physical laws alone.
Exactly what CSP means by "corpuscular philosophy” is a mystery to
me.
Was he arguing for the Boscowitz atoms derived from vortices?

At a minimum, CSP was arguing against a universal law of mechanics.
Or, was he merely arguing against the putatively universality of the
newly-defined laws of thermodynamics (entropy?)

Whatever he was arguing for or against, the chiral tetrahedral carbon
atom, as a well-defined natural geometrical object that was
irreducible to a triad, posed a major conundrum for him (and all
others) who seek to construct a universe in simpler terms.

Cheer

Jerry



Links:
--
[1] http://rsif.royalsocietypublishing.org/content/14/137/20170699?etoc



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Aw: Re: Chirality (was Re: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.4)

[Helmut Raulien]

Jerry, List,

I guess, that the union of units that unifies the unity is something different from a part-whole-affair, that is something that can sufficiently be depicted with a Venn-diagram. I think your saying of union of units fits better to real nature or phenomena than the part-whole-concept. So I guess it might be better not to talk with the term "part" anymore, but replace it with "unit"? Maybe "part" suggests, that there is a "whole", which is nothing more than its parts, but "unit" is a term still freeer of such a presupposition? 

Best,

Helmut

 

22. Dezember 2017 um 19:47 Uhr
 "Jerry LR Chandler" 
wrote:


List, Helmut:


On Dec 22, 2017, at 11:36 AM, Helmut Raulien  wrote:
 

I can imagine, that there are simple relations that donot have parts, but there are also composed relations, that consist of other relations, which are their parts (given that I may use the term "parts" in this functional way, but maybe not, this still has got to be discussed, or is already, 


 

My response is very simple rhetoric.

 

A relation is a unity in the sense of my earlier assertion, some months ago:

 

"The union of units unifies the unity."

 

I concurred with John’s assertion because a questioner may be familiar with the logic of the meaning the term “relation” in only one symbol system. (Monadic symbol users appear to prevail on this list.)

 

The definition of part-whole relations varies between disciplines - human relations, biological relations, chemical relations, physical relations, mathematical relations, etc.

 

The rhetoric of the meaning of the assertion:

 

"The union of units unifies the unity.”

 

depends on the capacity of the questioner to interpret the rhetoric in which I frame the meaning of “union” and the corresponding relational logic of  “units.”

 

More precisely, in preparing my answer to the questioner, I must decide to either include or exclude the concept of emergence between logical symbol systems. In other words, the rhetoric of music relations differs from the rhetoric of chemical relations even though both musical and chemical  relations can be illustrated with associations of the union of number units and compositions of parts to form wholes (unities.)

 

 

See CP 1:288-299 for relevant discussion of valencies relevant to symbols.  CSP fully recognized that the mathematization of science is a deep metaphysical challenge, not merely a rhetorical flourish asserting that the valencies loosely associated with the Laws of Physics suffice to explain all of science.  He held that the example of “handedness” as chiral molecules sufficed for this purpose.(EP2:159)

 

Cheers

Jerry 

 

 
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Re: Chirality (was Re: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.4)

[Jerry LR Chandler]

List, Helmut:
> On Dec 22, 2017, at 11:36 AM, Helmut Raulien  wrote:
> 
> I can imagine, that there are simple relations that donot have parts, but 
> there are also composed relations, that consist of other relations, which are 
> their parts (given that I may use the term "parts" in this functional way, 
> but maybe not, this still has got to be discussed, or is already, 

My response is very simple rhetoric.

A relation is a unity in the sense of my earlier assertion, some months ago:

"The union of units unifies the unity."

I concurred with John’s assertion because a questioner may be familiar with the 
logic of the meaning the term “relation” in only one symbol system. (Monadic 
symbol users appear to prevail on this list.)

The definition of part-whole relations varies between disciplines - human 
relations, biological relations, chemical relations, physical relations, 
mathematical relations, etc.

The rhetoric of the meaning of the assertion:

"The union of units unifies the unity.”

depends on the capacity of the questioner to interpret the rhetoric in which I 
frame the meaning of “union” and the corresponding relational logic of  “units.”

More precisely, in preparing my answer to the questioner, I must decide to 
either include or exclude the concept of emergence between logical symbol 
systems. In other words, the rhetoric of music relations differs from the 
rhetoric of chemical relations even though both musical and chemical  relations 
can be illustrated with associations of the union of number units and 
compositions of parts to form wholes (unities.)


See CP 1:288-299 for relevant discussion of valencies relevant to symbols.  CSP 
fully recognized that the mathematization of science is a deep metaphysical 
challenge, not merely a rhetorical flourish asserting that the valencies 
loosely associated with the Laws of Physics suffice to explain all of science.  
He held that the example of “handedness” as chiral molecules sufficed for this 
purpose.(EP2:159)

Cheers
Jerry 



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Re: Chirality (was Re: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.4)

[Jerry LR Chandler]

List, John:


> On Dec 19, 2017, at 10:10 PM, John F Sowa  wrote:
> 
> Jerry,
> 
> Your discussion and references about chirality are convincing.
> But they go beyond issues that Peirce would have known in his day.
> I think that he was using issues about chirality as examples
> for making a stronger claim:
> 
>> For example, in his lecture on phenomenology, (EP2, 159), ends with a 
>> discussion of chirality and the laws of motion (Right—handed and Left-handed 
>>  screws)
>> 
>> “There, then, is a physical phenomenon absolute inexplicable by mechanical 
>> action. This single instance suffices to overthrow the corpuscular 
>> philosophy.”
> 
> By the end of the 19th century, the general consensus in physics
> was that all the major problems had been solved.  But the first
> decade of the 20th c. shattered their complacency.
> 
> If Peirce had access to a university library with the latest
> journals, he might have found stronger arguments to "overthrow
> the corpuscular philosophy."
> 
> John

Your response deserves a longer reply.

But, for the moment, one brief comment.
Here is a recent  reference from the the Royal Society journal:

Review article: Spontaneous mirror symmetry breaking and origin of biological 
homochirality
Josep M. Ribó, David Hochberg, Joaquim Crusats, Zoubir El-Hachemi and Albert 
Moyano
J. R. Soc. Interface 14:20170699; doi:10.1098/rsif.2017.0699 (published 
December 13, 2017)
http://rsif.royalsocietypublishing.org/content/14/137/20170699 


It discusses the central role of the development of chirality in emergence of 
life.
CSP concerns were well founded and remain a profound research problem to this 
day. 

The issue of chirality effectively blocks the mathematization of natural sorts 
and kinds using physical laws alone.
Exactly what CSP means by "corpuscular philosophy” is a mystery to me.
Was he arguing for the Boscowitz atoms derived from vortices?

At a minimum, CSP was arguing against a universal law of mechanics. 
Or, was he merely arguing against the putatively universality of the 
newly-defined laws of thermodynamics (entropy?)

Whatever he was arguing for or against, the chiral tetrahedral carbon atom, as 
a well-defined natural geometrical object that was irreducible to a triad, 
posed a major conundrum for him (and all others) who seek to construct a 
universe in simpler terms.

Cheer

Jerry


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Re: Chirality (was Re: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.4)

[John F Sowa]

Jerry,

Your discussion and references about chirality are convincing.
But they go beyond issues that Peirce would have known in his day.
I think that he was using issues about chirality as examples
for making a stronger claim:

For example, in his lecture on phenomenology, (EP2, 159), ends with 
a discussion of chirality and the laws of motion (Right—handed and 
Left-handed  screws)


“There, then, is a physical phenomenon absolute inexplicable by 
mechanical action. This single instance suffices to overthrow the 
corpuscular philosophy.”


By the end of the 19th century, the general consensus in physics
was that all the major problems had been solved.  But the first
decade of the 20th c. shattered their complacency.

If Peirce had access to a university library with the latest
journals, he might have found stronger arguments to "overthrow
the corpuscular philosophy."

John

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Chirality (was Re: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.4)

[Jerry LR Chandler]

List, John:

The issue of chirality is a critical issue in scientific philosophy.  The logic 
of chirality is vastly more perplex than the simple logic of mathematics or 
physics because it is necessary to invoke the logic of multiple scientific 
symbol systems in a coherent manner such that the predicates of the entity are 
coherent in all the relevant systems of logic. CSP recognized this. (EP2:159)

Your brief geometric explanation was “spot on” from the mathematical 
perspective of space and motion.
For a book-length inquiry into the relationship between mathematical graph 
theory of knots and chirality, see: 
“When Topology Meets Chemistry” CUP, Flapan, 2000. (Minor technical errors, but 
very sound over all.)

But, chemical chirality, in CSP’s lifespan, was defined in terms of Pasteur’s 
(1822-1895) separation of two crystalline forms of tartaric acid (from wine 
residues.) The sole difference between the two forms of the tartaric acid were 
two geometric forms, VISIBLE to the naked eye and the rotation of polarized 
light.  The two forms were identical in all other aspects; in chemical 
composition (carbon, hydrogen and oxygen), molecular weight, chemical 
reactivity and chemical reaction product and in physical attribute, melting 
point, etc. 

In the 1870’s, Van’t Hoff and LaBell, proved that this was only possible if the 
central carbon atoms organized the four substituents in a form of a 
tetrahedron. This requires that the four substituents must be separate and 
distinct from each other.  If the four substituents are non-identical to each 
other, then, if one observes the order FROM ANY of the FOUR corners of the 
tetrahedron, then the arrangements of the other three will be either a 
clock-wise or counterclockwise in the two crystal forms AND will rotate plane 
polarized light in OPPOSITE directions. 

The BIG question to CSP was how was this possible? He deemed it critical for 
scientific philosophy of matter.
For example, in his lecture on phenomenology, (EP2, 159), ends with a 
discussion of chirality and the laws of motion (Right—handed and Left-handed  
screws)
  “There, then, is a physical phenomena absolute inexplicable by mechanical 
action. This single instance suffices to overthrow the corpuscular philosophy.”

Thus, I think the notion of chirality was a significant factor in his mistaken 
beliefs about the Boscowitz hypothesis.

I would note two further facts that are important in assessing the scientific 
importance of chirality.

1. Virtually all biological molecules are chiral because virtually all the 
chemical building blocks fro constructing the anatomy of living beings are 
chiral. 
2. Even the induced “taste” of chiral molecules differ.

We can compare the mathematical perspective of chirality with the chemical 
perspective of chirality, because of the difference between geometric logic and 
chemical logic, very roughly speaking:

1. The scaling of circles is not a possible logical action on atoms or 
molecules, that is, atoms and molecules are not scalable in the mathematical 
sense of topology.
2. The logical origin of chemical chirality is not the direction of motion of a 
point on the circle, but, roughly speaking, the order of substitution of 
structurally distinct radicals on a points of a tetrahedron, all bonded to a 
central ligand.  

Finally, I would note that the entire collection of facts about chemical 
isomers (see Jeff D. post) illustrate the deep mathematical distinctions 
between the meaning of chemical and physical symbols.


Cheers
jerry

BTW, see the book by the nobel laureate, R. Hoffmann for a deeper look on the 
meaning of “isomers”.
The Same and Not the Same



> On Dec 19, 2017, at 12:43 PM, John F Sowa  wrote:
> 
> On 12/17/2017 3:24 PM, Helmut Raulien wrote:
>> Now, do you think that there is chirality also in other contexts than 
>> molecules, e.g. in signs?
> 
> To illustrate that issue, consider the analogs in 2 dimensions
> and 3 dimensions.
> 
> For example, any circle on a plane can be made congruent with any
> other circle by two transformation:  movement and size.
> 
> Given two circles A and B, move A to B so that the center point
> of A coincides with the center point of B.  Then enlarge or contract
> the radius of A until its circumference coincides with B.
> 
> But if you put an arrowhead on A that points clockwise and
> an arrowhead on B that points counterclockwise, there is no
> way to make A and B congruent by those two transformations:
> the arrows will always point in opposite directions.
> 
> However, if you're allowed to move A out of the plane into
> 3-D space, you can flip it over, put it back on the plane,
> and make it congruent with both the circle and arrow of B.
> 
> The same issue holds for chiral pairs in 3-D space:  there is
> no transformation by movement and size that can make your left
> and right hands coincide.  But if you could move out of 3-D
> space into 4-D space, it would be possible to 

Re: Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.4

[John F Sowa]

On 12/17/2017 3:24 PM, Helmut Raulien wrote:
Now, do you think that there is chirality also in other contexts 
than molecules, e.g. in signs?


To illustrate that issue, consider the analogs in 2 dimensions
and 3 dimensions.

For example, any circle on a plane can be made congruent with any
other circle by two transformation:  movement and size.

Given two circles A and B, move A to B so that the center point
of A coincides with the center point of B.  Then enlarge or contract
the radius of A until its circumference coincides with B.

But if you put an arrowhead on A that points clockwise and
an arrowhead on B that points counterclockwise, there is no
way to make A and B congruent by those two transformations:
the arrows will always point in opposite directions.

However, if you're allowed to move A out of the plane into
3-D space, you can flip it over, put it back on the plane,
and make it congruent with both the circle and arrow of B.

The same issue holds for chiral pairs in 3-D space:  there is
no transformation by movement and size that can make your left
and right hands coincide.  But if you could move out of 3-D
space into 4-D space, it would be possible to "flip" your left
hand to give yourself two right hands.  (But don't do that.
It would have bad effects on the rest of your body.)

To generalize:  In a space of any number of dimensions,
the operations of movement and size can be specified by a
dyadic relation of A to B.  But the operation of "flipping"
requires some space (a Third) that cannot be specified within
the original space.

John

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.4

[John F Sowa]

On 12/16/2017 12:37 AM, Jeffrey Brian Downard wrote:
It appears to me that there is a natural progression of sorts. The 
polarity of a dyadic relation can be represented as positive and 
negatives on a line in one dimension. The order in the complexity of the 
correlates in a triadic relation can be represented in two dimensions. 
The representation of the chirality of carbon based enantiomers is best 
expressed in three dimensions.


I agree.

But I believe that he's using geometrical examples to counter the
claim that dyadic relations are sufficient for logic.  For example,
the triadic relation between(x,y,z) can be defined in terms of
two dyads:

between(x,y,z)  is defined as  leftOf(x,y) & leftOf(y,z).

By using examples of chirality, Peirce shows that triads are essential
even for the "hard sciences" of physics, chemistry, and geometry.
There is no way to define chirality in terms of dyads.

Note what Peirce says at the beginning of 3.4:

I will sketch a proof that the idea of Meaning is irreducible to
those of Quality and Reaction. It depends on two main premisses.
The first is that every genuine triadic relation involves meaning,
as meaning is obviously a triadic relation. The second is that a
triadic relation is inexpressible by means of dyadic relations alone. 


The discussion of chirality supports the second premise.

John




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Re: Re: Re: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.4

[Edwina Taborsky]

t the
action of almost any kind of sign; and my definition confers on
anything that so acts the title of a “sign.”) ]EP2:411]  
But I don’t think anybody sees the “three-body problem” in
astrophysics, for instance, as embodying the kind of complexity we
see in a semiotic or a living process; so it’s not just the
interaction of  any three subjects that constitutes Thirdness. “The
third Universe  comprises everything whose Being consists in active
power to establish connections between different objects, especially
between objects in different Universes” (EP2:435, emphasis mine).
 I don’t suppose that I’m telling readers of this list anything
they don’t already know, I’m just trying to articulate it in a
way that seems clearer to me than Lowell 3.4 does. Perhaps others can
clarify it better. 
Gary f.
-Original Message-
 From: John F Sowa [mailto:s...@bestweb.net] 
 Sent: 14-Dec-17 15:27
 To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
 Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.4
On 12/13/2017 7:56 AM, g...@gnusystems.ca wrote: 

> Peirce is referring to /organic/ compounds as “such active
substances.”  

 > But I still don’t know what he’s referring to as “those
substances 

> which rotate the plane of polarization to the right or left.”
What 

 > would those be called by chemists today?
 Many kinds of crystals and solutions rotate the plane of polarized
light.  But organic molecules tend to be more complex than inorganic
molecules, and they frequently come in pairs that are identical,
except for *chirality* (left or right handedness). 
The formulas of the L- and R- versions are identical, but because of
the geometry of the molecules, they differ in exactly the same way as
the right and left hands.  When light passes through solutions of
those molecules, it reacts differently with the two kinds, but the
difference is only detected when the light happens to be polarized. 
The two kinds of molecules are called *enatiomers* of each other.

 See https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Enantiomer [5]
See below for an excerpt from the Wikipedia article about splitting
sucrose into *invert sugar*, a mixture of glucose and fructose. 
John

 ___
  From  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Inverted_sugar_syrup [6]
The term "inverted" is derived from the practice of measuring the
concentration of sugar syrup using a polarimeter. Plane polarized
light, when passed through a sample of pure sucrose solution, is
rotated to the right (optical rotation). As the solution is converted
to a mixture of sucrose, fructose and glucose, the amount of rotation
is reduced until (in a fully converted solution) the direction of
rotation has changed  

(inverted) from right to left.
C12H22O11 (sucrose, Specific rotation = +66.5°) + H2O (water, no

rotation) → C6H12O6 (glucose, Specific rotation = +52.7°) +
C6H12O6 (fructose, Specific rotation = −92°) 
net: +66.5° converts to −19.65° (half of the sum of the specific
rotation of fructose and glucose) 
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[4] http://webmail.primus.ca/tel:(718)%20482-5690
[5] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Enantiomer
[6] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Inverted_sugar_syrup
[7] http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm
[8] http://www.cspeirce.com/

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Re: Re: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.4

[Gary Richmond]

nfinite
> semiosis). This is not the same as saying that the "interpretant could
> function as an object." As I see it, this could not happen unless some
> interpretant were made the object of another--a new and different sign.
> Anyhow, that is my understanding of the interpretant in semiosis.
>
> Best,
>
> Gary R
>
> [image: Blocked image]
>
> Gary Richmond
> Philosophy and Critical Thinking
> Communication Studies
> LaGuardia College of the City University of New York
> 718 482-5690 <(718)%20482-5690>
>
> On Fri, Dec 15, 2017 at 10:25 AM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca>
> wrote:
>
>> List - my few comments are
>>
>> 1] I don't think that Peirce confined semiosis to 'life', understood as
>> biological, but included the physic-chemical realm as well.
>>
>> 2] And yes, semiosis is a 'process' - a term for which I've been
>> chastised on this list for using - but it emphasizes the active interaction
>> that takes place within the triad.
>>
>> 3] I remain concerned about our understanding of Peirce's use of the term
>> 'subject'.
>>
>> "But by “semiosis” I mean, on the contrary, an action, or influence,
>> which is, or involves, a cooperation of three subjects, such as a sign,
>> its object, and its interpretant, this tri-relative influence not being in
>> any way resolvable into actions between pairs."
>>
>>  As he says, it's an action involving THREE sites. BUT, I don't
>> think these three are each, before the semiosic interaction, understandable
>> as separate existences, as separate agents - the way we commonly understand
>> the grammatical term of 'subject'. By giving them a different name [ sign,
>> its object, its interpretant] and the use of the term 'its' - the way I see
>> it is that Peirce is pointing out that they function, not as separate
>> Subjects but as interactive forms, each with a different function,  within
>> one process, the semiosic process. In the next instant - that 'interpretant
>> could function as an Object within a different triadic process.
>>
>> Edwina
>>
>>
>>
>> On Fri 15/12/17 6:49 AM , g...@gnusystems.ca sent:
>>
>> John,
>>
>>
>>
>> Thanks for this, it’s helpful in reducing somewhat the vagueness of
>> Peirce’s references to physics and chemistry in Lowell 3.4 — and answering
>> the question I posed, which was badly put in the first place. What I was
>> trying to “get” was why Peirce would focus on “substances” of this
>> particular kind to argue for the reality of Thirdness. There is certainly a
>> conceptual connection between Thirdness and life, and the phenomenon of
>> chirality doesn’t strike me as especially exemplary of that connection.
>>
>>
>>
>> But now I see the historical context these lectures as an earlier stage
>> in the gradual shift from conceiving the essence of life as a substance
>> (such as “protoplasm” or in this case “active substance”) to conceiving it
>> as a process (such as Maturana/Varela’s “autopoiesis” or Kaufmann’s
>> “autocatalysis” or Deacon’s “teleogenesis”). Nowadays we all see an
>> intimate connection between semiosis and the life process, but we forget
>> that Peirce did not introduce the term “semiosis” until 1907. MS 318, where
>> he introduced it, is perhaps a better example of what Peirce was driving at
>> in Lowell 3.4.
>>
>> [[ (It is important to understand what I mean by semiosis. All dynamical
>> action, or action of brute force, physical or psychical, either takes place
>> between two subjects,— whether they react equally upon each other, or one
>> is agent and the other patient, entirely or partially,— or at any rate is a
>> resultant of such actions between pairs. But by “semiosis” I mean, on the
>> contrary, an action, or influence, which is, or involves, a cooperation of
>> three subjects, such as a sign, its object, and its interpretant, this
>> tri-relative influence not being in any way resolvable into actions between
>> pairs. Σημείωσις in Greek of the Roman period, as early as Cicero’s
>> time, if I remember rightly, meant the action of almost any kind of sign;
>> and my definition confers on anything that so acts the title of a “sign.”)
>> ]EP2:411]
>>
>>
>>
>> But I don’t think anybody sees the “three-body problem” in astrophysics,
>> for instance, as embodying the kind of complexity we see in a semiotic or a
>> living process; so it’s not just the interaction of any three subjects
>> that constitutes Thirdness. “The third Universe comprises everything
>> whose Being 

Re: Re: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.4

[Edwina Taborsky]

There is certainly a conceptual connection between
Thirdness and life, and the phenomenon of chirality doesn’t strike
me as especially exemplary of that connection.   
But now I see the historical context these lectures as an earlier
stage in the gradual shift from conceiving the essence of life as a
substance (such as “protoplasm” or in this case “active
substance”) to conceiving it as a  process (such as
Maturana/Varela’s “autopoiesis” or Kaufmann’s
“autocatalysis” or Deacon’s “teleogenesis”). Nowadays we
all see an intimate connection between semiosis and the life process,
but we forget that Peirce did not introduce the term “semiosis”
until 1907. MS 318, where he introduced it, is perhaps a better
example of what Peirce was driving at in Lowell 3.4.  

[[ (It is important to understand what I mean by semiosis. All
dynamical action, or action of brute force, physical or psychical,
either takes place between two subjects,— whether they react
equally upon each other, or one is agent and the other patient,
entirely or partially,— or at any rate is a resultant of such
actions between pairs. But by “semiosis” I mean, on the contrary,
an action, or influence, which is, or involves, a cooperation of 
three subjects, such as a sign, its object, and its interpretant,
this tri-relative influence not being in any way resolvable into
actions between pairs. Σημείωσις in Greek of the Roman
period, as early as Cicero’s time, if I remember rightly, meant the
action of almost any kind of sign; and my definition confers on
anything that so acts the title of a “sign.”) ]EP2:411]  
But I don’t think anybody sees the “three-body problem” in
astrophysics, for instance, as embodying the kind of complexity we
see in a semiotic or a living process; so it’s not just the
interaction of  any three subjects that constitutes Thirdness. “The
third Universe  comprises everything whose Being consists in active
power to establish connections between different objects, especially
between objects in different Universes” (EP2:435, emphasis mine).
 I don’t suppose that I’m telling readers of this list anything
they don’t already know, I’m just trying to articulate it in a
way that seems clearer to me than Lowell 3.4 does. Perhaps others can
clarify it better. 
Gary f.
-Original Message-
 From: John F Sowa [mailto:s...@bestweb.net [3]] 
 Sent: 14-Dec-17 15:27
 To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu [4]
 Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.4
On 12/13/2017 7:56 AM, g...@gnusystems.ca wrote:

> Peirce is referring to /organic/ compounds as “such active
substances.”  

 > But I still don’t know what he’s referring to as “those
substances 

> which rotate the plane of polarization to the right or left.”
What 

> would those be called by chemists today?
 Many kinds of crystals and solutions rotate the plane of polarized
light.  But organic molecules tend to be more complex than inorganic
molecules, and they frequently come in pairs that are identical,
except for *chirality* (left or right handedness). 
The formulas of the L- and R- versions are identical, but because of
the geometry of the molecules, they differ in exactly the same way as
the right and left hands.  When light passes through solutions of
those molecules, it reacts differently with the two kinds, but the
difference is only detected when the light happens to be polarized. 
The two kinds of molecules are called *enatiomers* of each other.

See https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Enantiomer [5]
See below for an excerpt from the Wikipedia article about splitting
sucrose into *invert sugar*, a mixture of glucose and fructose. 
John

___
  From  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Inverted_sugar_syrup [6]
The term "inverted" is derived from the practice of measuring the
concentration of sugar syrup using a polarimeter. Plane polarized
light, when passed through a sample of pure sucrose solution, is
rotated to the right (optical rotation). As the solution is converted
to a mixture of sucrose, fructose and glucose, the amount of rotation
is reduced until (in a fully converted solution) the direction of
rotation has changed  

(inverted) from right to left.
C12H22O11 (sucrose, Specific rotation = +66.5°) + H2O (water, no

rotation) → C6H12O6 (glucose, Specific rotation = +52.7°) +
C6H12O6 (fructose, Specific rotation = −92°) 
net: +66.5° converts to −19.65° (half of the sum of the specific
rotation of fructose and glucose) 
 -
 PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY
ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to
peirce-L@list.iupui.edu [7] . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to
PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu [8] with the line "UNSubscribe

Re: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.4

[Gary Richmond]

; pairs. Σημείωσις in Greek of the Roman period, as early as Cicero’s time,
> if I remember rightly, meant the action of almost any kind of sign; and my
> definition confers on anything that so acts the title of a “sign.”)
> ]EP2:411]
>
>
>
> But I don’t think anybody sees the “three-body problem” in astrophysics,
> for instance, as embodying the kind of complexity we see in a semiotic or a
> living process; so it’s not just the interaction of any three subjects
> that constitutes Thirdness. “The third Universe comprises everything
> whose Being consists in active power to establish connections between
> different objects, especially between objects in different Universes”
> (EP2:435, emphasis mine).
>
>
>
> I don’t suppose that I’m telling readers of this list anything they don’t
> already know, I’m just trying to articulate it in a way that seems clearer
> to me than Lowell 3.4 does. Perhaps others can clarify it better.
>
>
>
> Gary f.
>
>
>
> -Original Message-
> From: John F Sowa [mailto:s...@bestweb.net]
> Sent: 14-Dec-17 15:27
> To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
> Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.4
>
>
>
> On 12/13/2017 7:56 AM, g...@gnusystems.ca wrote:
>
> > Peirce is referring to /organic/ compounds as “such active substances.”
>
> > But I still don’t know what he’s referring to as “those substances
>
> > which rotate the plane of polarization to the right or left.” What
>
> > would those be called by chemists today?
>
>
>
> Many kinds of crystals and solutions rotate the plane of polarized light.
> But organic molecules tend to be more complex than inorganic molecules, and
> they frequently come in pairs that are identical, except for *chirality*
> (left or right handedness).
>
>
>
> The formulas of the L- and R- versions are identical, but because of the
> geometry of the molecules, they differ in exactly the same way as the right
> and left hands.  When light passes through solutions of those molecules, it
> reacts differently with the two kinds, but the difference is only detected
> when the light happens to be polarized.
>
>
>
> The two kinds of molecules are called *enatiomers* of each other.
>
> See https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Enantiomer
>
>
>
> See below for an excerpt from the Wikipedia article about splitting
> sucrose into *invert sugar*, a mixture of glucose and fructose.
>
>
>
> John
>
> ___
>
>
>
> From https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Inverted_sugar_syrup
>
>
>
> The term "inverted" is derived from the practice of measuring the
> concentration of sugar syrup using a polarimeter. Plane polarized light,
> when passed through a sample of pure sucrose solution, is rotated to the
> right (optical rotation). As the solution is converted to a mixture of
> sucrose, fructose and glucose, the amount of rotation is reduced until (in
> a fully converted solution) the direction of rotation has changed
>
> (inverted) from right to left.
>
>
>
> C12H22O11 (sucrose, Specific rotation = +66.5°) + H2O (water, no
>
> rotation) → C6H12O6 (glucose, Specific rotation = +52.7°) + C6H12O6
> (fructose, Specific rotation = −92°)
>
>
>
> net: +66.5° converts to −19.65° (half of the sum of the specific rotation
> of fructose and glucose)
>
>
>
>
> -
> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON
> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to
> peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L
> but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the
> BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm
> .
>
>
>
>
>
>

-
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Re: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.4

[Edwina Taborsky]

 

List - my few comments are

1] I don't think that Peirce confined semiosis to 'life', understood
as biological, but included the physic-chemical realm as well.

2] And yes, semiosis is a 'process' - a term for which I've been
chastised on this list for using - but it emphasizes the active
interaction that takes place within the triad.

3] I remain concerned about our understanding of Peirce's use of the
term 'subject'. 

"But by “semiosis” I mean, on the contrary, an action, or
influence, which is, or involves, a cooperation of  three subjects,
such as a sign, its object, and its interpretant, this tri-relative
influence not being in any way resolvable into actions between
pairs."

 As he says, it's an action involving THREE sites. BUT, I don't
think these three are each, before the semiosic interaction,
understandable as separate existences, as separate agents - the way
we commonly understand the grammatical term of 'subject'. By giving
them a different name [ sign, its object, its interpretant] and the
use of the term 'its' - the way I see it is that Peirce is pointing
out that they function, not as separate Subjects but as interactive
forms, each with a different function,  within one process, the
semiosic process. In the next instant - that 'interpretant could
function as an Object within a different triadic process.

Edwina
 On Fri 15/12/17  6:49 AM , g...@gnusystems.ca sent:
John,
Thanks for this, it’s helpful in reducing somewhat the vagueness
of Peirce’s references to physics and chemistry in Lowell 3.4 —
and answering the question I posed, which was badly put in the first
place. What I was trying to “get” was why Peirce would focus on
“substances” of this particular kind to argue for the reality of
Thirdness. There is certainly a conceptual connection between
Thirdness and life, and the phenomenon of chirality doesn’t strike
me as especially exemplary of that connection.  
But now I see the historical context these lectures as an earlier
stage in the gradual shift from conceiving the essence of life as a
substance (such as “protoplasm” or in this case “active
substance”) to conceiving it as a process (such as
Maturana/Varela’s “autopoiesis” or Kaufmann’s
“autocatalysis” or Deacon’s “teleogenesis”). Nowadays we
all see an intimate connection between semiosis and the life process,
but we forget that Peirce did not introduce the term “semiosis”
until 1907. MS 318, where he introduced it, is perhaps a better
example of what Peirce was driving at in Lowell 3.4.  

[[ (It is important to understand what I mean by semiosis. All
dynamical action, or action of brute force, physical or psychical,
either takes place between two subjects,— whether they react
equally upon each other, or one is agent and the other patient,
entirely or partially,— or at any rate is a resultant of such
actions between pairs. But by “semiosis” I mean, on the contrary,
an action, or influence, which is, or involves, a cooperation of 
three subjects, such as a sign, its object, and its interpretant,
this tri-relative influence not being in any way resolvable into
actions between pairs. Σημείωσις in Greek of the Roman
period, as early as Cicero’s time, if I remember rightly, meant the
action of almost any kind of sign; and my definition confers on
anything that so acts the title of a “sign.”) ]EP2:411] 
But I don’t think anybody sees the “three-body problem” in
astrophysics, for instance, as embodying the kind of complexity we
see in a semiotic or a living process; so it’s not just the
interaction of any three subjects that constitutes Thirdness. “The
third Universe  comprises everything whose Being consists in active
power to establish connections between different objects, especially
between objects in different Universes” (EP2:435, emphasis mine).
I don’t suppose that I’m telling readers of this list anything
they don’t already know, I’m just trying to articulate it in a
way that seems clearer to me than Lowell 3.4 does. Perhaps others can
clarify it better. 
Gary f.
-Original Message-
 From: John F Sowa [mailto:s...@bestweb.net] 
 Sent: 14-Dec-17 15:27
 To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
 Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.4
On 12/13/2017 7:56 AM, g...@gnusystems.ca [1] wrote:

> Peirce is referring to /organic/ compounds as “such active
substances.” 

 > But I still don’t know what he’s referring to as “those
substances 

> which rotate the plane of polarization to the right or left.”
What 

> would those be called by chemists today?
Many kinds of crystals and solutions rotate the plane of polarized
light.  But organic molecules tend to be more complex than inorganic
molecules, and they frequently come in pairs that are identical,
except for *chirality* (left or right handedness). 
The formulas of the L- and R- 

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.4

[gnox]

John,

 

Thanks for this, it’s helpful in reducing somewhat the vagueness of Peirce’s 
references to physics and chemistry in Lowell 3.4 — and answering the question 
I posed, which was badly put in the first place. What I was trying to “get” was 
why Peirce would focus on “substances” of this particular kind to argue for the 
reality of Thirdness. There is certainly a conceptual connection between 
Thirdness and life, and the phenomenon of chirality doesn’t strike me as 
especially exemplary of that connection. 

 

But now I see the historical context these lectures as an earlier stage in the 
gradual shift from conceiving the essence of life as a substance (such as 
“protoplasm” or in this case “active substance”) to conceiving it as a process 
(such as Maturana/Varela’s “autopoiesis” or Kaufmann’s “autocatalysis” or 
Deacon’s “teleogenesis”). Nowadays we all see an intimate connection between 
semiosis and the life process, but we forget that Peirce did not introduce the 
term “semiosis” until 1907. MS 318, where he introduced it, is perhaps a better 
example of what Peirce was driving at in Lowell 3.4. 

[[ (It is important to understand what I mean by semiosis. All dynamical 
action, or action of brute force, physical or psychical, either takes place 
between two subjects,— whether they react equally upon each other, or one is 
agent and the other patient, entirely or partially,— or at any rate is a 
resultant of such actions between pairs. But by “semiosis” I mean, on the 
contrary, an action, or influence, which is, or involves, a cooperation of 
three subjects, such as a sign, its object, and its interpretant, this 
tri-relative influence not being in any way resolvable into actions between 
pairs. Σημείωσις in Greek of the Roman period, as early as Cicero’s time, if I 
remember rightly, meant the action of almost any kind of sign; and my 
definition confers on anything that so acts the title of a “sign.”) ]EP2:411]

 

But I don’t think anybody sees the “three-body problem” in astrophysics, for 
instance, as embodying the kind of complexity we see in a semiotic or a living 
process; so it’s not just the interaction of any three subjects that 
constitutes Thirdness. “The third Universe comprises everything whose Being 
consists in active power to establish connections between different objects, 
especially between objects in different Universes” (EP2:435, emphasis mine).

 

I don’t suppose that I’m telling readers of this list anything they don’t 
already know, I’m just trying to articulate it in a way that seems clearer to 
me than Lowell 3.4 does. Perhaps others can clarify it better.

 

Gary f.

 

-Original Message-
From: John F Sowa [mailto:s...@bestweb.net] 
Sent: 14-Dec-17 15:27
To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.4

 

On 12/13/2017 7:56 AM,  <mailto:g...@gnusystems.ca> g...@gnusystems.ca wrote:

> Peirce is referring to /organic/ compounds as “such active substances.” 

> But I still don’t know what he’s referring to as “those substances 

> which rotate the plane of polarization to the right or left.” What 

> would those be called by chemists today?

 

Many kinds of crystals and solutions rotate the plane of polarized light.  But 
organic molecules tend to be more complex than inorganic molecules, and they 
frequently come in pairs that are identical, except for *chirality* (left or 
right handedness).

 

The formulas of the L- and R- versions are identical, but because of the 
geometry of the molecules, they differ in exactly the same way as the right and 
left hands.  When light passes through solutions of those molecules, it reacts 
differently with the two kinds, but the difference is only detected when the 
light happens to be polarized.

 

The two kinds of molecules are called *enatiomers* of each other.

See  <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Enantiomer> 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Enantiomer

 

See below for an excerpt from the Wikipedia article about splitting sucrose 
into *invert sugar*, a mixture of glucose and fructose.

 

John

___

 

>From  <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Inverted_sugar_syrup> 
>https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Inverted_sugar_syrup

 

The term "inverted" is derived from the practice of measuring the concentration 
of sugar syrup using a polarimeter. Plane polarized light, when passed through 
a sample of pure sucrose solution, is rotated to the right (optical rotation). 
As the solution is converted to a mixture of sucrose, fructose and glucose, the 
amount of rotation is reduced until (in a fully converted solution) the 
direction of rotation has changed

(inverted) from right to left.

 

C12H22O11 (sucrose, Specific rotation = +66.5°) + H2O (water, no

rotation) → C6H12O6 (glucose, Specific rotation = +52.7°) + C6H12O6 (fructose, 
Specific rotation = −92°)

 

net: +66.5° converts to −19

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.4

[Jerry Rhee]

Dear list:



Collagen and spirals are chiral.



All the abstrusities can be entered here, a nice illustration of the
investigative process.  I, for one, do not have the time, as having to do
so will affect my sensibility.



https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3675869/



Best,
Jerry R

On Thu, Dec 14, 2017 at 2:27 PM, John F Sowa  wrote:

> On 12/13/2017 7:56 AM, g...@gnusystems.ca wrote:
>
>> Peirce is referring to /organic/ compounds as “such active substances.”
>> But I still don’t know what he’s referring to as “those substances which
>> rotate the plane of polarization to the right or left.” What would those be
>> called by chemists today?
>>
>
> Many kinds of crystals and solutions rotate the plane of polarized
> light.  But organic molecules tend to be more complex than inorganic
> molecules, and they frequently come in pairs that are identical,
> except for *chirality* (left or right handedness).
>
> The formulas of the L- and R- versions are identical, but because of
> the geometry of the molecules, they differ in exactly the same way as
> the right and left hands.  When light passes through solutions of those
> molecules, it reacts differently with the two kinds, but the difference
> is only detected when the light happens to be polarized.
>
> The two kinds of molecules are called *enatiomers* of each other.
> See https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Enantiomer
>
> See below for an excerpt from the Wikipedia article about splitting
> sucrose into *invert sugar*, a mixture of glucose and fructose.
>
> John
> ___
>
> From https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Inverted_sugar_syrup
>
> The term "inverted" is derived from the practice of measuring the
> concentration of sugar syrup using a polarimeter. Plane polarized light,
> when passed through a sample of pure sucrose solution, is rotated to the
> right (optical rotation). As the solution is converted to a mixture of
> sucrose, fructose and glucose, the amount of rotation is reduced until (in
> a fully converted solution) the direction of rotation has changed
> (inverted) from right to left.
>
> C12H22O11 (sucrose, Specific rotation = +66.5°) + H2O (water, no rotation)
> → C6H12O6 (glucose, Specific rotation = +52.7°) + C6H12O6 (fructose,
> Specific rotation = −92°)
>
> net: +66.5° converts to −19.65° (half of the sum of the specific rotation
> of fructose and glucose)
>
>
> -
> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON
> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to
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> but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the
> BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm
> .
>
>
>
>
>
>

-
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.4

[John F Sowa]

On 12/13/2017 7:56 AM, g...@gnusystems.ca wrote:
Peirce is referring to /organic/ compounds as “such active substances.” 
But I still don’t know what he’s referring to as “those substances which 
rotate the plane of polarization to the right or left.” What would those 
be called by chemists today?


Many kinds of crystals and solutions rotate the plane of polarized
light.  But organic molecules tend to be more complex than inorganic
molecules, and they frequently come in pairs that are identical,
except for *chirality* (left or right handedness).

The formulas of the L- and R- versions are identical, but because of
the geometry of the molecules, they differ in exactly the same way as
the right and left hands.  When light passes through solutions of those
molecules, it reacts differently with the two kinds, but the difference
is only detected when the light happens to be polarized.

The two kinds of molecules are called *enatiomers* of each other.
See https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Enantiomer

See below for an excerpt from the Wikipedia article about splitting
sucrose into *invert sugar*, a mixture of glucose and fructose.

John
___

From https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Inverted_sugar_syrup

The term "inverted" is derived from the practice of measuring the 
concentration of sugar syrup using a polarimeter. Plane polarized light, 
when passed through a sample of pure sucrose solution, is rotated to the 
right (optical rotation). As the solution is converted to a mixture of 
sucrose, fructose and glucose, the amount of rotation is reduced until 
(in a fully converted solution) the direction of rotation has changed 
(inverted) from right to left.


C12H22O11 (sucrose, Specific rotation = +66.5°) + H2O (water, no 
rotation) → C6H12O6 (glucose, Specific rotation = +52.7°) + C6H12O6 
(fructose, Specific rotation = −92°)


net: +66.5° converts to −19.65° (half of the sum of the specific 
rotation of fructose and glucose)

-
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L 
to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To 
UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the 
line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at 
http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .

Re: RE: RE: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.4

[Edwina Taborsky]

 
 Gary, list
Gary, you wrote: "All I ask of an interpreter of Peirce is that he
or she read the whole text, exactly as Peirce wrote it at the time
and in the context he was working in, and see for themselves what it
means — realizing that its implications for the reader might differ
from the implications of a previous (or subsequent) reading of the
same text. "

This is quite different from your now saying that people have the
'right to read Peirce differently'. And, for your belittling of my
method of reading Peirce. Furthermore, I did NOT say to Mary that my
view of the triad was 'correct'. I said - "in my view' I understood
the triad as non-triangular. That doesn't mean 'correct'; it means my
understanding.

Nor did I say that I have read all of Peirce. Please tell me where I
said that I've 'finished reading Peirce'? You are introducing a red
herring. The verb 'read' is present tense - and my point is that I
reject reading Peirce as if he were a literary writer with early and
late works, where one reads that author in an 'historical sense' as
they write over the years. My point is that I consider that Peirce is
consistent and thorough in his thoughts and these views can be found
in all his works. I don't think one needs to read them in a linear
manner.

And of course I re-read - I suggest you stop the belittling. 

Edwina
 On Wed 13/12/17 10:33 AM , g...@gnusystems.ca sent:
Edwina, a few responses,
 ET: “this is simply how YOU choose to read Peirce.”

GF: Yes. That is exactly what I said in my post, and I gave my
reasons for choosing to read that way, and said explicitly that
people who read differently  have a right to do so.
ET: “you cannot claim that your method produces 'the correct
Peirce'.”

 GF: I neither made nor implied any such claim. You are the one who
applies the word “correct” to your own reading, as for instance
in your post to Mary the other day.
ET: “ I read ALL of Peirce.”

GF: Really? That’s much more than I can claim. And I read Peirce
sentence by sentence, paper by paper, and often have to read papers
more than once. You are truly fortunate if you are not subject to
such limitations.
ET: “I'm not belittling you! I focus only on the issue and never
on the person.” 

 GF: You are accusing me of doing what you yourself are doing in
this very post: focusing on me, or rather on your misreading of me. I
guess you don’t consider methods of reading an important semiotic
issue, which is fine, but if you want to make more personal attacks,
I suggest you take them offlist. Just don’t expect me to respond.
I’m going back to studying Peirce’s Lowell lectures — my way,
of course: I’m not finished with reading Peirce as you are.
Gary f.
From:  Edwina Taborsky [mailto:tabor...@primus.ca] 
 Sent: 13-Dec-17 08:50
 To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu; g...@gnusystems.ca
 Subject: Re: RE: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.4
Gary F, list

I disagree with you. I don't think that you have a right to assert
that 'all I ask of an interpreter of Peirce' is. You and I are
equal - and this sentence of yours denies that equality and instead
inserts you as The Authority on How To Read and Understand Peirce.
Instead - this is simply how YOU choose to read Peirce. Others do not
choose this method. And you cannot claim that your method produces
'the correct Peirce'. It is simply YOUR method.  

Your outline of how I read Peirce is quite incorrect. As I said - I
read Peirce in a holistic manner, which means - not 'free' as you
belittle the term  - but that I read ALL of Peirce, and don't read
him as do you and a few [not all] others do - in a literary manner,
i.e., as if he were writing literature and you approach it as a
literary critique of all the years of his work, in a year by year,
essay by essay, text-based and linear manner.

Furthermore - you seem to be suggesting that the massive amount of
work [all those volumes are not bits and pieces] already available to
us - somehow doesn't tell the 'truth', the 'full story' about what
Peirce meant. I doubt that a few more essays/pages/articles can
really change the basic framework and thought of Peirce that is
already to be found in what we have available. Peirce was a very
thorough and consistent thinker - and his analysis is found already
in what we have available... 

 I choose a different approach to Peirce - and you have no right to
assert that your method is superior - No-one is asking you to change
your method of reading Peirce - and I'm not belittling you! I focus
only on the issue and never on the person. 

Given  this, all that I ask of you - is that you respect other
researchers in Peirce...rather than belittling them. You can - and
should - certainly disagree with their conclusions - but I consider
that you should focus your critique on the topic and points raised in
th

RE: RE: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.4

[gnox]

Edwina, a few responses,

 

ET: “this is simply how YOU choose to read Peirce.”

GF: Yes. That is exactly what I said in my post, and I gave my reasons for 
choosing to read that way, and said explicitly that people who read differently 
have a right to do so.

 

ET: “you cannot claim that your method produces 'the correct Peirce'.”

GF: I neither made nor implied any such claim. You are the one who applies the 
word “correct” to your own reading, as for instance in your post to Mary the 
other day.

 

ET: “I read ALL of Peirce.”

GF: Really? That’s much more than I can claim. And I read Peirce sentence by 
sentence, paper by paper, and often have to read papers more than once. You are 
truly fortunate if you are not subject to such limitations.

 

ET: “I'm not belittling you! I focus only on the issue and never on the 
person.” 

GF: You are accusing me of doing what you yourself are doing in this very post: 
focusing on me, or rather on your misreading of me. I guess you don’t consider 
methods of reading an important semiotic issue, which is fine, but if you want 
to make more personal attacks, I suggest you take them offlist. Just don’t 
expect me to respond. I’m going back to studying Peirce’s Lowell lectures — my 
way, of course: I’m not finished with reading Peirce as you are.

 

Gary f.

 

From: Edwina Taborsky [mailto:tabor...@primus.ca] 
Sent: 13-Dec-17 08:50
To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu; g...@gnusystems.ca
Subject: Re: RE: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.4

 

Gary F, list

I disagree with you. I don't think that you have a right to assert that 'all I 
ask of an interpreter of Peirce' is. You and I are equal - and this 
sentence of yours denies that equality and instead inserts you as The Authority 
on How To Read and Understand Peirce. Instead - this is simply how YOU choose 
to read Peirce. Others do not choose this method. And you cannot claim that 
your method produces 'the correct Peirce'. It is simply YOUR method. 

Your outline of how I read Peirce is quite incorrect. As I said - I read Peirce 
in a holistic manner, which means - not 'free' as you belittle the term  - but 
that I read ALL of Peirce, and don't read him as do you and a few [not all] 
others do - in a literary manner, i.e., as if he were writing literature and 
you approach it as a literary critique of all the years of his work, in a year 
by year, essay by essay, text-based and linear manner.

Furthermore - you seem to be suggesting that the massive amount of work [all 
those volumes are not bits and pieces] already available to us - somehow 
doesn't tell the 'truth', the 'full story' about what Peirce meant. I doubt 
that a few more essays/pages/articles can really change the basic framework and 
thought of Peirce that is already to be found in what we have available. Peirce 
was a very thorough and consistent thinker - and his analysis is found already 
in what we have available...

 I choose a different approach to Peirce - and you have no right to assert that 
your method is superior - No-one is asking you to change your method of reading 
Peirce - and I'm not belittling you! I focus only on the issue and never on the 
person. 

Given  this, all that I ask of you - is that you respect other researchers in 
Peirce...rather than belittling them. You can - and should - certainly disagree 
with their conclusions - but I consider that you should focus your critique on 
the topic and points raised in those conclusions - rather than belittling their 
person, their intellect, their way of working...and suggesting that their way 
does not lead to 'enlightenment' while your way does.  

Edwina



 

On Wed 13/12/17 7:59 AM ,  <mailto:g...@gnusystems.ca> g...@gnusystems.ca sent:

Edwina,

 

All I ask of an interpreter of Peirce is that he or she read the whole text, 
exactly as Peirce wrote it at the time and in the context he was working in, 
and see for themselves what it means — realizing that its implications for the 
reader might differ from the implications of a previous (or subsequent) reading 
of the same text. 

 

The alternative method (which you’ve called “holistic” and I’ve called “free”) 
is to pick out a few phrases here and there, rearrange them to suit one’s 
preconceived ideas, fill the gaps with some phrases of your own invention, and 
defend that “reading” against all others. Interpreters have a right to read 
that way, of course; the trouble is that if you read a text that way, it can 
never mean anything new to you, and thus can’t extend or deepen your 
understanding of Peirce’s work as a whole.

 

I don’t object to people reading that way, or even posting such readings to the 
list in opposition to others, but I can’t read or post that way myself because 
I’m still learning from Peirce. That’s why I keep coming back to Peirce texts 
that I’ve read before, hoping to see what they mean that I didn’t see before, 
in the light of other texts I’ve read in the meantime, such as the one Jeff 

Re: RE: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.4

[Stephen C. Rose]

I meant fallible!

amazon.com/author/stephenrose

On Wed, Dec 13, 2017 at 9:03 AM, Stephen C. Rose 
wrote:

> Peirce is intelligible in the way anyone else is -- randomly and
> imperfectly. See Shakespeare scholarship over time. My favorite example of
> the miasm that applies to comprehension is the typical greeting one gets
> after a sermon. On examination what the person is lauding is her own
> hearing which has nothing to do with what the speaker thinks he or she was
> saying. Dylan says at one point that it's a wonder we can even feed
> ourselves. Everything is infallible, imperfect, changing, evolving.And oh,
> I got that from Charles Sanders Peirce. Or was it Heraclitus?
>
> amazon.com/author/stephenrose
>
> On Wed, Dec 13, 2017 at 8:50 AM, Edwina Taborsky 
> wrote:
>
>> Gary F, list
>>
>> I disagree with you. I don't think that you have a right to assert that
>> 'all I ask of an interpreter of Peirce' is. You and I are equal - and
>> this sentence of yours denies that equality and instead inserts you as The
>> Authority on How To Read and Understand Peirce. Instead - this is simply
>> how YOU choose to read Peirce. Others do not choose this method. And you
>> cannot claim that your method produces 'the correct Peirce'. It is simply
>> YOUR method.
>>
>> Your outline of how I read Peirce is quite incorrect. As I said - I read
>> Peirce in a holistic manner, which means - not 'free' as you belittle the
>> term  - but that I read ALL of Peirce, and don't read him as do you and a
>> few [not all] others do - in a literary manner, i.e., as if he were writing
>> literature and you approach it as a literary critique of all the years of
>> his work, in a year by year, essay by essay, text-based and linear manner.
>>
>> Furthermore - you seem to be suggesting that the massive amount of work
>> [all those volumes are not bits and pieces] already available to us -
>> somehow doesn't tell the 'truth', the 'full story' about what Peirce meant.
>> I doubt that a few more essays/pages/articles can really change the basic
>> framework and thought of Peirce that is already to be found in what we have
>> available. Peirce was a very thorough and consistent thinker - and his
>> analysis is found already in what we have available...
>>
>>  I choose a different approach to Peirce - and you have no right to
>> assert that your method is superior - No-one is asking you to change your
>> method of reading Peirce - and I'm not belittling you! I focus only on the
>> issue and never on the person.
>>
>> Given  this, all that I ask of you - is that you respect other
>> researchers in Peirce...rather than belittling them. You can - and should -
>> certainly disagree with their conclusions - but I consider that you should
>> focus your critique on the topic and points raised in those conclusions -
>> rather than belittling their person, their intellect, their way of
>> working...and suggesting that their way does not lead to 'enlightenment'
>> while your way does.
>>
>> Edwina
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> On Wed 13/12/17 7:59 AM , g...@gnusystems.ca sent:
>>
>> Edwina,
>>
>>
>>
>> All I ask of an interpreter of Peirce is that he or she read the whole
>> text, exactly as Peirce wrote it at the time and in the context he was
>> working in, and see for themselves what it means — realizing that its
>> implications for the reader might differ from the implications of a
>> previous (or subsequent) reading of the same text.
>>
>>
>>
>> The alternative method (which you’ve called “holistic” and I’ve called
>> “free”) is to pick out a few phrases here and there, rearrange them to suit
>> one’s preconceived ideas, fill the gaps with some phrases of your own
>> invention, and defend that “reading” against all others. Interpreters have
>> a right to read that way, of course; the trouble is that if you read a text
>> that way, it can never mean anything new to you, and thus can’t extend
>> or deepen your understanding of Peirce’s work as a whole.
>>
>>
>>
>> I don’t object to people reading that way, or even posting such readings
>> to the list in opposition to others, but I can’t read or post that way
>> myself because I’m still learning from Peirce. That’s why I keep coming
>> back to Peirce texts that I’ve read before, hoping to see what they mean
>> that I didn’t see before, in the light of other texts I’ve read in the
>> meantime, such as the one Jeff quoted in his post last night. I’m in no
>> rush to arrive at a Final Interpretation of Peirce, I just want to keep
>> learning.
>>
>>
>>
>> I am certainly learning from reading these Lowell lectures — especially
>> so because I never had a chance to read entire drafts of them until the
>> SPIN project made the manuscripts available online. Reading a whole text
>> as Peirce wrote it is what I would prefer to call a holistic reading.
>> Before this, I had to settle for the bits and pieces selected by editors of
>> the Collected Papers and scattered around 

Re: RE: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.4

[Stephen C. Rose]

Peirce is intelligible in the way anyone else is -- randomly and
imperfectly. See Shakespeare scholarship over time. My favorite example of
the miasm that applies to comprehension is the typical greeting one gets
after a sermon. On examination what the person is lauding is her own
hearing which has nothing to do with what the speaker thinks he or she was
saying. Dylan says at one point that it's a wonder we can even feed
ourselves. Everything is infallible, imperfect, changing, evolving.And oh,
I got that from Charles Sanders Peirce. Or was it Heraclitus?

amazon.com/author/stephenrose

On Wed, Dec 13, 2017 at 8:50 AM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:

> Gary F, list
>
> I disagree with you. I don't think that you have a right to assert that
> 'all I ask of an interpreter of Peirce' is. You and I are equal - and
> this sentence of yours denies that equality and instead inserts you as The
> Authority on How To Read and Understand Peirce. Instead - this is simply
> how YOU choose to read Peirce. Others do not choose this method. And you
> cannot claim that your method produces 'the correct Peirce'. It is simply
> YOUR method.
>
> Your outline of how I read Peirce is quite incorrect. As I said - I read
> Peirce in a holistic manner, which means - not 'free' as you belittle the
> term  - but that I read ALL of Peirce, and don't read him as do you and a
> few [not all] others do - in a literary manner, i.e., as if he were writing
> literature and you approach it as a literary critique of all the years of
> his work, in a year by year, essay by essay, text-based and linear manner.
>
> Furthermore - you seem to be suggesting that the massive amount of work
> [all those volumes are not bits and pieces] already available to us -
> somehow doesn't tell the 'truth', the 'full story' about what Peirce meant.
> I doubt that a few more essays/pages/articles can really change the basic
> framework and thought of Peirce that is already to be found in what we have
> available. Peirce was a very thorough and consistent thinker - and his
> analysis is found already in what we have available...
>
>  I choose a different approach to Peirce - and you have no right to assert
> that your method is superior - No-one is asking you to change your method
> of reading Peirce - and I'm not belittling you! I focus only on the issue
> and never on the person.
>
> Given  this, all that I ask of you - is that you respect other researchers
> in Peirce...rather than belittling them. You can - and should - certainly
> disagree with their conclusions - but I consider that you should focus your
> critique on the topic and points raised in those conclusions - rather than
> belittling their person, their intellect, their way of working...and
> suggesting that their way does not lead to 'enlightenment' while your way
> does.
>
> Edwina
>
>
>
>
>
> On Wed 13/12/17 7:59 AM , g...@gnusystems.ca sent:
>
> Edwina,
>
>
>
> All I ask of an interpreter of Peirce is that he or she read the whole
> text, exactly as Peirce wrote it at the time and in the context he was
> working in, and see for themselves what it means — realizing that its
> implications for the reader might differ from the implications of a
> previous (or subsequent) reading of the same text.
>
>
>
> The alternative method (which you’ve called “holistic” and I’ve called
> “free”) is to pick out a few phrases here and there, rearrange them to suit
> one’s preconceived ideas, fill the gaps with some phrases of your own
> invention, and defend that “reading” against all others. Interpreters have
> a right to read that way, of course; the trouble is that if you read a text
> that way, it can never mean anything new to you, and thus can’t extend or
> deepen your understanding of Peirce’s work as a whole.
>
>
>
> I don’t object to people reading that way, or even posting such readings
> to the list in opposition to others, but I can’t read or post that way
> myself because I’m still learning from Peirce. That’s why I keep coming
> back to Peirce texts that I’ve read before, hoping to see what they mean
> that I didn’t see before, in the light of other texts I’ve read in the
> meantime, such as the one Jeff quoted in his post last night. I’m in no
> rush to arrive at a Final Interpretation of Peirce, I just want to keep
> learning.
>
>
>
> I am certainly learning from reading these Lowell lectures — especially so
> because I never had a chance to read entire drafts of them until the SPIN
> project made the manuscripts available online. Reading a whole text as
> Peirce wrote it is what I would prefer to call a holistic reading. Before
> this, I had to settle for the bits and pieces selected by editors of the 
> Collected
> Papers and scattered around in its several volumes. The transcriptions of
> the Lowells that I’ve put on my own website are my attempt to remedy that
> situation, or at least improve on it, for those who don’t have the time or
> inclination to read the manuscripts 

Re: RE: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.4

[Edwina Taborsky]

 

Gary F, list

I disagree with you. I don't think that you have a right to assert
that 'all I ask of an interpreter of Peirce' is. You and I are
equal - and this sentence of yours denies that equality and instead
inserts you as The Authority on How To Read and Understand Peirce.
Instead - this is simply how YOU choose to read Peirce. Others do not
choose this method. And you cannot claim that your method produces
'the correct Peirce'. It is simply YOUR method. 

Your outline of how I read Peirce is quite incorrect. As I said - I
read Peirce in a holistic manner, which means - not 'free' as you
belittle the term  - but that I read ALL of Peirce, and don't read
him as do you and a few [not all] others do - in a literary manner,
i.e., as if he were writing literature and you approach it as a
literary critique of all the years of his work, in a year by year,
essay by essay, text-based and linear manner.

Furthermore - you seem to be suggesting that the massive amount of
work [all those volumes are not bits and pieces] already available to
us - somehow doesn't tell the 'truth', the 'full story' about what
Peirce meant. I doubt that a few more essays/pages/articles can
really change the basic framework and thought of Peirce that is
already to be found in what we have available. Peirce was a very
thorough and consistent thinker - and his analysis is found already
in what we have available...

 I choose a different approach to Peirce - and you have no right to
assert that your method is superior - No-one is asking you to change
your method of reading Peirce - and I'm not belittling you! I focus
only on the issue and never on the person. 

Given  this, all that I ask of you - is that you respect other
researchers in Peirce...rather than belittling them. You can - and
should - certainly disagree with their conclusions - but I consider
that you should focus your critique on the topic and points raised in
those conclusions - rather than belittling their person, their
intellect, their way of working...and suggesting that their way does
not lead to 'enlightenment' while your way does.  

Edwina
 On Wed 13/12/17  7:59 AM , g...@gnusystems.ca sent:
Edwina,
 All I ask of an interpreter of Peirce is that he or she read the
whole text, exactly as Peirce wrote it at the time and in the context
he was working in, and see for themselves what it means — realizing
that its implications for the reader might differ from the
implications of a previous (or subsequent) reading of the same text. 
 The alternative method (which you’ve called “holistic” and
I’ve called “free”) is to pick out a few phrases here and
there, rearrange them to suit one’s preconceived ideas, fill the
gaps with some phrases of your own invention, and defend that
“reading” against all others. Interpreters have a right to read
that way, of course; the trouble is that if you read a text that way,
it can never mean anything  new to you, and thus can’t extend or
deepen your understanding of Peirce’s work as a whole.
I don’t object to people reading that way, or even posting such
readings to the list in opposition to others, but I can’t read or
post that way myself because I’m still learning from Peirce.
That’s why I keep coming back to Peirce texts that I’ve read
before, hoping to see what they mean that I didn’t see before, in
the light of other texts I’ve read in the meantime, such as the one
Jeff quoted in his post last night. I’m in no rush to arrive at a
Final Interpretation of Peirce, I just want to keep learning. 
I am certainly learning from reading these Lowell lectures —
especially so because I never had a chance to read entire drafts of
them until the SPIN project made the manuscripts available online.
Reading a whole text as Peirce wrote it is what  I would prefer to
call a holistic reading. Before this, I had to settle for the bits
and pieces selected by editors of the Collected Papers and scattered
around in its several volumes. The transcriptions of the Lowells that
I’ve put on my own website are my attempt to remedy that situation,
or at least improve on it, for those who don’t have the time or
inclination to read the manuscripts themselves.
Gary f. 

 http://gnusystems.ca/Lowell3.htm [1] }{ Peirce’s Lowell Lectures
of 1903 
From:  Edwina Taborsky [mailto:tabor...@primus.ca] 
 Sent: 12-Dec-17 21:26
Gary F, list

I guess we'll just continue to disagree.

I don't consider that I've given a 'very free translation'  of
1.346-7 which sounds rather denigrating of my view. I wasn't
translating at all, but reading and understanding it. You read and
understand it differently. I'm certainly not going to say that YOU
provide a 'very free translation'. Instead - you offer a different
interpretation. OK? 

Peirce himself says that 'genuine triadic relations can never be
built of dyadic relations'..and 

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.4

[kirstima]

List,

Peirce did not just "refer to" some  well-established "facts" of his 
time; he has all the time been developing a whole theory. All good and 
true theories go beyond any number of "facts" (id est: array of 
empirical findings). It could be called 'hypo-determination' (just a 
coined word, c.f hypo-stasis and hypo-thesis). They are under-determined 
by  empirical findings. Theories aim to the future, their purpose is to 
guide later investigations.


Organic substances are active substances. Rotating to the right or to 
the left has later been commonly called handedness. Thus 'handedness' 
and/or 'veering to the right or left' are what anyone can google and 
find out about the present views.


This is not just about organic chemistry, it is about LIFE.

Kirsti



g...@gnusystems.ca kirjoitti 13.12.2017 14:56:

Jeff,

Thanks for drawing our attention to Peirce's remarks on substances in
the earlier "Logic of Mathematics" text. They do seem to confirm what
I'd suspected, that Peirce is referring to _organic_ compounds as
"such active substances." But I still don't know what he's referring
to as "those substances which rotate the plane of polarization to the
right or left." What would those be called by chemists today?
Something like the DNA molecule? Of course its structure was not known
until long after Peirce died, but I'm guessing some simpler organic
molecules would have been known at the time to fit Peirce's
description. I guess what I'm trying to grasp is the connection (in
Peirce's mind) between three-dimensionality and Thirdness.
Conceptualizing the elements of the phaneron takes a long time, as
Peirce is about to say in Lowell 3 …

Gary f.

FROM: Jeffrey Brian Downard [mailto:jeffrey.down...@nau.edu]
SENT: 12-Dec-17 22:11
TO: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu; g...@gnusystems.ca
SUBJECT: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.4

Gary F, Mary, Edwina, Gary R, List,

Gary F: "his reference to the chemistry of "active substances" is not
very clear, at least to me"

One place where Peirce seems to clear this matter up about the
chemical character of "active substances", at least to some degree, is
in "On the Logic of Mathematics, an attempt to develop my categories
from within." As in the Lowell Lectures of 1903, I take him to be
drawing on a phenomenological account of the categories--both material
and formal--as a basis for sorting out the phenomena that call out for
explanation in philosophy.

Peirce says:

Laws which connect phenomena by a synthesis more or less intellectual,
or inward, are divided somewhat broadly into laws of the inward
relations, or resemblances, of bodies, and laws of mind. The laws of
resemblances and differences of bodies are classificatory, or
chemical. We know little about them; but we may assert with some
confidence that there are differences between substances -- i.e.,
differences in the smallest parts of bodies, and a classification
based on that, and there are differences in the structure of bodies,
and a classification based on that. Then of these latter we may
distinguish differences in the structure of the smallest pieces of
bodies, depending on the shape and size of atomicules, and differences
in the manner in which bodies are built up out of their smallest
pieces. Here we have a distinction between that kind of structure
which gives rise to forms without power of truth [true?] growth or
inorganic structures, and the chemistry of protoplasms which develope
[or] living organisms. (CP 1.512)

Let us outline the classification of the laws that "connect phenomena
by a synthesis more or less intellectual or inward."

(1) Chemical or classificatory laws of inward relations or
resemblances of bodies.

(2) Law_s of mind._

The first class is further divided into laws based on the (a) nature
of the smallest part of the bodies that make them up (e.g., atomic
elements), and the laws that are based (b) on the structural relations
between the parts of bodies. The latter class is further divided into
the laws of (i) inorganic chemistry, which are based on the shape and
size of the atomicules, and the laws of organic chemistry, which give
rise to (ii) forms that have the power of growth and life.

The laws of organic chemistry (including biochemistry and protoplasm)
are, I take it, examples of the chemistry of "active substances"
because they are the kinds of things that are capable of growth and of
developing into living organisms. As such, the laws of organic
chemistry are on the border between the laws of fact and the
principles of thoroughly genuine thirds that govern the growth of
living things.

--Jeff

Jeffrey Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
Northern Arizona University
(o) 928 523-8354

-

FROM: g...@gnusystems.ca <g...@gnusystems.ca>
SENT: Tuesday, December 12, 2017 5:56:07 PM
TO: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
SUBJE

RE: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.4

[gnox]

Edwina,

 

All I ask of an interpreter of Peirce is that he or she read the whole text, 
exactly as Peirce wrote it at the time and in the context he was working in, 
and see for themselves what it means — realizing that its implications for the 
reader might differ from the implications of a previous (or subsequent) reading 
of the same text. 

 

The alternative method (which you’ve called “holistic” and I’ve called “free”) 
is to pick out a few phrases here and there, rearrange them to suit one’s 
preconceived ideas, fill the gaps with some phrases of your own invention, and 
defend that “reading” against all others. Interpreters have a right to read 
that way, of course; the trouble is that if you read a text that way, it can 
never mean anything new to you, and thus can’t extend or deepen your 
understanding of Peirce’s work as a whole.

 

I don’t object to people reading that way, or even posting such readings to the 
list in opposition to others, but I can’t read or post that way myself because 
I’m still learning from Peirce. That’s why I keep coming back to Peirce texts 
that I’ve read before, hoping to see what they mean that I didn’t see before, 
in the light of other texts I’ve read in the meantime, such as the one Jeff 
quoted in his post last night. I’m in no rush to arrive at a Final 
Interpretation of Peirce, I just want to keep learning.

 

I am certainly learning from reading these Lowell lectures — especially so 
because I never had a chance to read entire drafts of them until the SPIN 
project made the manuscripts available online. Reading a whole text as Peirce 
wrote it is what I would prefer to call a holistic reading. Before this, I had 
to settle for the bits and pieces selected by editors of the Collected Papers 
and scattered around in its several volumes. The transcriptions of the Lowells 
that I’ve put on my own website are my attempt to remedy that situation, or at 
least improve on it, for those who don’t have the time or inclination to read 
the manuscripts themselves.

 

Gary f. 

http://gnusystems.ca/Lowell3.htm }{ Peirce’s Lowell Lectures of 1903 

 

 

From: Edwina Taborsky [mailto:tabor...@primus.ca] 
Sent: 12-Dec-17 21:26



Gary F, list

I guess we'll just continue to disagree.

I don't consider that I've given a 'very free translation'  of 1.346-7 which 
sounds rather denigrating of my view. I wasn't translating at all, but reading 
and understanding it. You read and understand it differently. I'm certainly not 
going to say that YOU provide a 'very free translation'. Instead - you offer a 
different interpretation. OK?

Peirce himself says that 'genuine triadic relations can never be built of 
dyadic relations'..and refers to a 'spot with one tail, a spot with two 
tails'[i.e., he does use the term 'spot'] and writes: 'You may think that a 
node connecting three lines of identity Y is not a triadic idea. But analysis 
will show that it is so". 1.346. 

And that 'Y'  which is in that sentence - is definitely that three -spoked 
image.  Further in that same section, as you also write,  he refers to the 
syllogistic triad .."There is a recognition of triadic identity but it is only 
brought about as a conclusion from two premises, which is itself a triadic 
relation".  [Major premise, minor premise, conclusion]. BUT - I consider that a 
syllogism is ONE Sign, a semiosic triad. It is an Argument - and is made up of 
three Relations in a mode of Thirdness.  You would disagree.

So- I consider that Peirce was quite clear about the spoked image of the 
semiosic triad. 

Therefore - all that can be said is that you and I have a clear disagreement on 
this issue. We can each present our views - and that's that. 

Edwina

 


-
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L 
to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To 
UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the 
line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at 
http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.4

[gnox]

Jeff,

 

Thanks for drawing our attention to Peirce's remarks on substances in the
earlier "Logic of Mathematics" text. They do seem to confirm what I'd
suspected, that Peirce is referring to organic compounds as "such active
substances." But I still don't know what he's referring to as "those
substances which rotate the plane of polarization to the right or left."
What would those be called by chemists today? Something like the DNA
molecule? Of course its structure was not known until long after Peirce
died, but I'm guessing some simpler organic molecules would have been known
at the time to fit Peirce's description. I guess what I'm trying to grasp is
the connection (in Peirce's mind) between three-dimensionality and
Thirdness. Conceptualizing the elements of the phaneron takes a long time,
as Peirce is about to say in Lowell 3 .

 

Gary f.

 

From: Jeffrey Brian Downard [mailto:jeffrey.down...@nau.edu] 
Sent: 12-Dec-17 22:11
To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu; g...@gnusystems.ca
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.4

 

Gary F, Mary, Edwina, Gary R, List,

 

Gary F:  "his reference to the chemistry of "active substances" is not very
clear, at least to me"

 

One place where Peirce seems to clear this matter up about the chemical
character of "active substances", at least to some degree, is in "On the
Logic of Mathematics, an attempt to develop my categories from within." As
in the Lowell Lectures of 1903, I take him to be drawing on a
phenomenological account of the categories--both material and formal--as a
basis for sorting out the phenomena that call out for explanation in
philosophy.

 

Peirce says: 

 

Laws which connect phenomena by a synthesis more or less intellectual, or
inward, are divided somewhat broadly into laws of the inward relations, or
resemblances, of bodies, and laws of mind. The laws of resemblances and
differences of bodies are classificatory, or chemical. We know little about
them; but we may assert with some confidence that there are differences
between substances - i.e., differences in the smallest parts of bodies, and
a classification based on that, and there are differences in the structure
of bodies, and a classification based on that. Then of these latter we may
distinguish differences in the structure of the smallest pieces of bodies,
depending on the shape and size of atomicules, and differences in the manner
in which bodies are built up out of their smallest pieces. Here we have a
distinction between that kind of structure which gives rise to forms without
power of truth [true?] growth or inorganic structures, and the chemistry of
protoplasms which develope [or] living organisms. (CP 1.512)

 

Let us outline the classification of the laws that "connect phenomena by a
synthesis more or less intellectual or inward."

 

(1) Chemical or classificatory laws of inward relations or resemblances of
bodies.

(2) Laws of mind.

 

The first class is further divided into laws based on the (a) nature of the
smallest part of the bodies that make them up (e.g., atomic elements), and
the laws that are based (b) on the structural relations between the parts of
bodies. The latter class is further divided into the laws of (i) inorganic
chemistry, which are based on the shape and size of the atomicules, and the
laws of organic chemistry, which give rise to (ii) forms that have the power
of growth and life. 

 

The laws of organic chemistry (including biochemistry and protoplasm) are, I
take it, examples of the chemistry of "active substances" because they are
the kinds of things that are capable of growth and of developing into living
organisms. As such, the laws of organic chemistry are on the border between
the laws of fact and the principles of thoroughly genuine thirds that govern
the growth of living things.

 

--Jeff

 

Jeffrey Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
Northern Arizona University
(o) 928 523-8354

  _  

From: g...@gnusystems.ca <mailto:g...@gnusystems.ca>  <g...@gnusystems.ca
<mailto:g...@gnusystems.ca> >
Sent: Tuesday, December 12, 2017 5:56:07 PM
To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu <mailto:peirce-l@list.iupui.edu> 
Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.4 

 

Mary, Edwina, Gary R, list,

 

Getting back to Mary's question, I dug out my copy of The Meaning of
Meaning, and found no triangle diagram in it; the brief summary of Peirce's
work in the Appendix contains no diagram at all. So I don't know where that
diagram started its career, except that it wasn't with Peirce. But then the
three-spoke diagram of the "semiosic triad" (as Edwina calls it) didn't
start with Peirce either. Edwina's given us a very free translation of what
Peirce says in Lowell 3.4 (aka CP 1.347), and I'd like to direct attention
back to what Peirce actually said (included below, diagrams and all).

 

Peirce does give a little diagram of "a n

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.4

[Jeffrey Brian Downard]

Gary F, Mary, Edwina, Gary R, List,


Gary F:  "his reference to the chemistry of “active substances” is not very 
clear, at least to me"


One place where Peirce seems to clear this matter up about the chemical 
character of "active substances", at least to some degree, is in "On the Logic 
of Mathematics, an attempt to develop my categories from within." As in the 
Lowell Lectures of 1903, I take him to be drawing on a phenomenological account 
of the categories--both material and formal--as a basis for sorting out the 
phenomena that call out for explanation in philosophy.


Peirce says:


Laws which connect phenomena by a synthesis more or less intellectual, or 
inward, are divided somewhat broadly into laws of the inward relations, or 
resemblances, of bodies, and laws of mind. The laws of resemblances and 
differences of bodies are classificatory, or chemical. We know little about 
them; but we may assert with some confidence that there are differences between 
substances — i.e., differences in the smallest parts of bodies, and a 
classification based on that, and there are differences in the structure of 
bodies, and a classification based on that. Then of these latter we may 
distinguish differences in the structure of the smallest pieces of bodies, 
depending on the shape and size of atomicules, and differences in the manner in 
which bodies are built up out of their smallest pieces. Here we have a 
distinction between that kind of structure which gives rise to forms without 
power of truth [true?] growth or inorganic structures, and the chemistry of 
protoplasms which develope [or] living organisms. (CP 1.512)


Let us outline the classification of the laws that "connect phenomena by a 
synthesis more or less intellectual or inward."


(1) Chemical or classificatory laws of inward relations or resemblances of 
bodies.

(2) Laws of mind.


The first class is further divided into laws based on the (a) nature of the 
smallest part of the bodies that make them up (e.g., atomic elements), and the 
laws that are based (b) on the structural relations between the parts of 
bodies. The latter class is further divided into the laws of (i) inorganic 
chemistry, which are based on the shape and size of the atomicules, and the 
laws of organic chemistry, which give rise to (ii) forms that have the power of 
growth and life.


The laws of organic chemistry (including biochemistry and protoplasm) are, I 
take it, examples of the chemistry of “active substances" because they are the 
kinds of things that are capable of growth and of developing into living 
organisms. As such, the laws of organic chemistry are on the border between the 
laws of fact and the principles of thoroughly genuine thirds that govern the 
growth of living things.


--Jeff


Jeffrey Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
Northern Arizona University
(o) 928 523-8354

From: g...@gnusystems.ca <g...@gnusystems.ca>
Sent: Tuesday, December 12, 2017 5:56:07 PM
To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.4

Mary, Edwina, Gary R, list,

Getting back to Mary’s question, I dug out my copy of The Meaning of Meaning, 
and found no triangle diagram in it; the brief summary of Peirce’s work in the 
Appendix contains no diagram at all. So I don’t know where that diagram started 
its career, except that it wasn’t with Peirce. But then the three-spoke diagram 
of the “semiosic triad” (as Edwina calls it) didn’t start with Peirce either. 
Edwina’s given us a very free translation of what Peirce says in Lowell 3.4 
(aka CP 1.347), and I’d like to direct attention back to what Peirce actually 
said (included below, diagrams and all).

Peirce does give a little diagram of “a node connecting three lines of 
identity”: [cid:image001.jpg@01D3736C.70F457C0]  . This is what he elsewhere 
calls a “point of teridentity,” which is entirely different from a “spot with 
three tails” (it’s not a spot at all). He uses both diagrams, in different 
ways, to prove (or rather “sketch a proof” of) the irreducibility of Thirdness, 
which he refers to here as “Meaning,” which “is obviously a triadic relation.” 
(At least, that should be obvious to any student of the logic of relations.)

To establish the truth of his first premiss, “that every genuine triadic 
relation involves meaning,” he asks us to take “any fact in physics of the 
triadic kind.” It’s clear enough that “Three things, east, west, and up, are 
required to define the difference between right and left”; but his reference to 
the chemistry of “active substances” is not very clear, at least to me. Maybe 
some of the chemists on the list can comment on that. The relation of “giving,” 
which he also uses elsewhere as an exemplary triadic relation, would be 
represented by a “spot with three tails,” because “giving” is a triadic rheme, 
a predicate which requires three subjects.

But it’s the “oth

Re: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.4

[Edwina Taborsky]

 

Gary F, list

I guess we'll just continue to disagree.

I don't consider that I've given a 'very free translation'  of
1.346-7 which sounds rather denigrating of my view. I wasn't
translating at all, but reading and understanding it. You read and
understand it differently. I'm certainly not going to say that YOU
provide a 'very free translation'. Instead - you offer a different
interpretation. OK?

Peirce himself says that 'genuine triadic relations can never be
built of dyadic relations'..and refers to a 'spot with one tail, a
spot with two tails'[i.e., he does use the term 'spot'] and
writes: 'You may think that a node connecting three lines of identity
Y is not a triadic idea. But analysis will show that it is so". 1.346.


And that 'Y'  which is in that sentence - is definitely that three
-spoked image.  Further in that same section, as you also write,  he
refers to the syllogistic triad .."There is a recognition of triadic
identity but it is only brought about as a conclusion from two
premises, which is itself a triadic relation".  [Major premise, minor
premise, conclusion]. BUT - I consider that a syllogism is ONE Sign, a
semiosic triad. It is an Argument - and is made up of three Relations
in a mode of Thirdness.  You would disagree.

So- I consider that Peirce was quite clear about the spoked image of
the semiosic triad. 

Therefore - all that can be said is that you and I have a clear
disagreement on this issue. We can each present our views - and
that's that. 

Edwina
 On Tue 12/12/17  7:56 PM , g...@gnusystems.ca sent:
Mary, Edwina, Gary R, list,
 Getting back to Mary’s question, I dug out my copy of The Meaning
of Meaning, and found no triangle diagram in it; the brief summary of
Peirce’s work in the Appendix contains no diagram at all. So I
don’t know where that diagram started its career, except that it
wasn’t with Peirce. But then the three-spoke diagram of the
“semiosic triad” (as Edwina calls it) didn’t start with Peirce
either. Edwina’s given us a very free translation of what Peirce
says in Lowell 3.4 (aka CP 1.347), and I’d like to direct attention
back to what Peirce actually said (included below, diagrams and all). 
Peirce does give a little diagram of “a node connecting three
lines of identity”:   . This is what he elsewhere calls a “point
of teridentity,” which is entirely different from a “spot with
three tails” (it’s not a spot at all). He uses both diagrams, in
different ways, to prove (or rather “sketch a proof” of) the
irreducibility of Thirdness, which he refers to here as
“Meaning,” which “is obviously a triadic relation.” (At
least, that should be obvious to any student of the logic of
relations.) 
To establish the truth of his first premiss, “that every genuine
triadic relation involves meaning, ” he asks us to take “any fact
in physics of the triadic kind.” It’s clear enough that “Three
things, east, west, and up, are required to define the difference
between right and left”; but his reference to the chemistry of
“active substances” is not very clear, at least to me. Maybe some
of the chemists on the list can comment on that. The relation of
“giving,” which he also uses elsewhere as an exemplary triadic
relation, would be represented by a “spot with three tails,”
because “giving” is a triadic  rheme, a predicate which requires
three subjects.
But it’s the “other premiss of the argument” — “that
genuine triadic relations can never be built of dyadic relations and
of Qualities” — that Peirce elects to illustrate with Existential
Graphs, and in two different ways. First, you can’t make a triadic
rheme by joining the tails of two (or more) dyadic spots; that would
just give you two dyadic rhemes (or a chain of them, which is still
dyadic.  
Second, you do have a triadic relation if three lines of identity
are joined at a spot of teridentity. This is what would occur in the
transformations of a sequence of beta graphs that would diagram the
series of events Peirce narrates, leading to the conclusion: “On
Wednesday I see a man and I say, “That is the same man I saw on
Tuesday, and consequently is the same I saw on Monday. There is a
recognition of triadic identity; but it is only brought about as a
conclusion from two premisses, which is itself a triadic relation.”
The key word that makes this a triadic relation is “consequently”;
the whole sequence is an  argument, or inference, which is
unquestionably triadic. And of course an argument is a sign — a
sign which cannot be fully represented by a single existential graph,
but only by a sequence of them. Semiosis takes time.
 Then, as an “interesting” afterthought, Peirce adds that while
no “complexus of dyadic relations” (as he put it in the Syllabus)
can constitute a genuine triadic relation, a complexus of triadic
relations can give you any higher -adicity — the point being,
again, that Thirdness is an 

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.4

[gnox]

Mary, Edwina, Gary R, list,

 

Getting back to Mary's question, I dug out my copy of The Meaning of
Meaning, and found no triangle diagram in it; the brief summary of Peirce's
work in the Appendix contains no diagram at all. So I don't know where that
diagram started its career, except that it wasn't with Peirce. But then the
three-spoke diagram of the "semiosic triad" (as Edwina calls it) didn't
start with Peirce either. Edwina's given us a very free translation of what
Peirce says in Lowell 3.4 (aka CP 1.347), and I'd like to direct attention
back to what Peirce actually said (included below, diagrams and all).

 

Peirce does give a little diagram of "a node connecting three lines of
identity":  . This is what he elsewhere calls a "point of teridentity,"
which is entirely different from a "spot with three tails" (it's not a spot
at all). He uses both diagrams, in different ways, to prove (or rather
"sketch a proof" of) the irreducibility of Thirdness, which he refers to
here as "Meaning," which "is obviously a triadic relation." (At least, that
should be obvious to any student of the logic of relations.)

 

To establish the truth of his first premiss, "that every genuine triadic
relation involves meaning," he asks us to take "any fact in physics of the
triadic kind." It's clear enough that "Three things, east, west, and up, are
required to define the difference between right and left"; but his reference
to the chemistry of "active substances" is not very clear, at least to me.
Maybe some of the chemists on the list can comment on that. The relation of
"giving," which he also uses elsewhere as an exemplary triadic relation,
would be represented by a "spot with three tails," because "giving" is a
triadic rheme, a predicate which requires three subjects.

 

But it's the "other premiss of the argument" - "that genuine triadic
relations can never be built of dyadic relations and of Qualities" - that
Peirce elects to illustrate with Existential Graphs, and in two different
ways. First, you can't make a triadic rheme by joining the tails of two (or
more) dyadic spots; that would just give you two dyadic rhemes (or a chain
of them, which is still dyadic. 

 

Second, you do have a triadic relation if three lines of identity are joined
at a spot of teridentity. This is what would occur in the transformations of
a sequence of beta graphs that would diagram the series of events Peirce
narrates, leading to the conclusion: "On Wednesday I see a man and I say,
"That is the same man I saw on Tuesday, and consequently is the same I saw
on Monday. There is a recognition of triadic identity; but it is only
brought about as a conclusion from two premisses, which is itself a triadic
relation." The key word that makes this a triadic relation is
"consequently"; the whole sequence is an argument, or inference, which is
unquestionably triadic. And of course an argument is a sign - a sign which
cannot be fully represented by a single existential graph, but only by a
sequence of them. Semiosis takes time.

 

Then, as an "interesting" afterthought, Peirce adds that while no "complexus
of dyadic relations" (as he put it in the Syllabus) can constitute a genuine
triadic relation, a complexus of triadic relations can give you any higher
-adicity - the point being, again, that Thirdness is an irreducible element
but there is no irreducible Fourthness.

This brings us back to Phenomenology, with perhaps a deeper understanding of
its mathematical aspect.

 

As for semiotics, there is no diagram here of the triad
object-sign-interpretant. If someone can point to such a diagram anywhere in
Peirce's writings (either triangular or three-spoked), I will thank them
profusely, for refuting my claim that neither of those diagramming habits
started with Peirce.

 

Gary f.

 

 

From: g...@gnusystems.ca [mailto:g...@gnusystems.ca] 
Sent: 12-Dec-17 07:01
To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.4

 

Continuing from Lowell Lecture 3.3,

https://fromthepage.com/jeffdown1/c-s-peirce-manuscripts/ms-464-465-1903-low
ell-lecture-iii-3rd-draught/display/13884

 

I will sketch a proof that the idea of Meaning is irreducible to those of
Quality and Reaction. It depends on two main premisses. The first is that
every genuine triadic relation involves meaning, as meaning is obviously a
triadic relation. The second is that a triadic relation is inexpressible by
means of dyadic relations alone. Considerable reflexion may be required to
convince yourself of the first of these premisses, that every triadic
relation involves meaning. There will be two lines of inquiry. First, all
physical forces appear to subsist between pairs of particles. This was
assumed by Helmholtz in his original paper on the Conservation of Forces.
Take any fact in physics of the triadic kind, by which I mean a fact which
can only be defined by simultaneous reference to three things, and you will
find there is ample evidence that it never was produced by 

Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.4

[Gary Richmond]

Edwina, list,

While I think that a kind of temporary consensus is sometimes necessary in
science--for example, when we can assume that we understand certain
physical laws well enough to develop technologies based on that
understanding--for the most part, and, as you, Mike, and I have all noted,
especially in a small community such as this forum, and even in the example
I just gave of the development of technologies, such a passing 'pause', as
it were, if seen as 'closure' seems scientifically mistaken.

So, for example, Newtonian science certainly allowed us to develop some
mighty technologies; but had we stopped there, assuming, as all too many
scientists and philosophers of the 19th century did (excluding Peirce, of
course) that science was more or less complete, that all that was needed
was to "fill in the blanks," then inquiry would have ceased: the quest for
new understandings leading, for example, to discoveries in the quantum
realm (and the technologies which followed from these discoveries), would
not have occurred.

As for sporting (1ns);  new habit-formation (3ns); evolutionary
modification (2ns), you wrote:

ET: By the way - you write: " first, chance 'sporting' (1ns), then, the
possibility of new habit-formation (3ns), and finally the possibility of a
evolutionary, say, structural change (2ns).".  Wouldn't you say that before
the habit-formation emerges, that there have to be incidents in a mode of
Secondness..which might vanish or might exist long enough to interact with
each other and form those habits?

Well, yes. But the structure, the organism, is already there in biological
evolution so that the 'sporting' necessarily occurs in the context of
already existent 'material' (2ns). But that biological sporting is not what
the passage you quoted is concerned with.

ET: I refer to 1.412 [A guess at the Riddle] - where Peirce writes: .."
there would have come something,.by the principle of Firstness...then by
the principle of habit there would have been a second flash"...But
Secondness is of two types. consequently besides flashes genuinely second
to others, so as to come after them, there will be pairs of flashes, or,
since time is now supposed to have developed, we had better say pairs of
states, which are reciprocally second, each member of the pair to the
other. This is the first germ of spatial extension. These states will
undergo changes; and habits will be formed of passing from certain states
to certain others, and of not passing from certain states to certain
others"...

This passage in *A Guess at the Riddle* concerns the earliest conditions
"before time yet existed" (1.412, first sentence) so may not directly apply
to biological evolution. Yet even in this earliest condition of a potential
Universe, first, a 'flash' (1ns) and *next*, "by the principle of habit"
(3ns) a second flash occurs. (Of course you will recall that this early,
shall we say 'proto-Universe', was discussed at some length here some
months ago, while our present discussion concerns evolution within this
existent Universe, and in particular, as regards biological evolution, at
least in consideration of the vector of process I gave.) So, again, even
for the earliest conditions leading to a Universe: first,1ns (the flash)
and next, 3ns (habituality leading to a second and, perhaps, other
flashes).

However, I think your emphasis is entirely different as you wrote:

ET: My reading of the above is that the FLASH [energy into matter?]
operates within its own Firstness and Thirdness [habit]..but the matter
that is formed in these flashes exists first, in Secondness since this
matter is both temporally and spatially existent. Then, these 'states'/bits
of matter will develop their own habits..and so on.

My reading of this passage within the 'time not yet existing' context is
that *nothing *yet exists, that there is yet no 2ns, there is no matter.
Matter is *not* in "the first stages of the development" of what will
eventually yield *this* Universe (perhaps "energy into matter" at the Big
Bang?) One could say that at these earliest stages "before time was" that
Universal 'choices' regarding the very qualities from perhaps a limitless
gamut of qualitative possibilities (Peirce phrases it in terms of a
spectrum of Platonic qualities, as I recall) have not even yet been made.
At some point these *will be* the 1nses of the material 2nses yet to occur
when there *comes into being* an existent Universe. (But all that is
proto-science and, perhaps, mythology or theology, so need not concern us
now.)

However, for the evolutionary events in *this *world, and most certainly in
the biological realm, I would tend to agree with you that there must be
some 2ns (matter) for 1ns and 3ns to have something to work on. Peirce says
this explicitly. So, agreed.
But, again, the categories are just "hints and suggestions," so that Peirce
himself will change his mind characterizing some of his trichotomies,
although the later changes always 

Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.4

[Edwina Taborsky]

 

 BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px; }
 Heh - but I'm not a fan of Hegel or indeed, of any utopian
idealism...which 'absolute truth' seems to me, to hover around.

I think that one can't get away from the realities of Firstness and
Secondness [entropy and diversity]...

Edwina
 On Tue 12/12/17  3:38 PM , Jerry Rhee jerryr...@gmail.com sent:
Hi Edwina, list: 
You said,  

“Agreed - we shouldn't seek consensus. “ 
J 
"it is unlikely that you are not mistaken but why such absolute
truth?" 
In this way Hegel advances until he reaches the 'Absolute Idea',
which, according to him, has no incompleteness, no opposite, and no
need of further development. The Absolute Idea, therefore, is
adequate to describe Absolute Reality. 
Best,
 Jerry R 
 On Tue, Dec 12, 2017 at 2:10 PM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:
Agreed - we shouldn't seek consensus. Not only is such closure
unscientific but we are not a large or diverse enough group to
substantiate a scientifically valid consensus. 

 I'm not against the triangle as such - as in, for example, that
Lady Welby classification triangle of the signs to which you refer.
As you say, this is a static image and not meant to imagize the
process of the Object-Representamen-Interpretant triad. My focus on
the 'spoke' is only to imagize the semiosic O-R-I process as am open
and networking interaction.  

By the way - you write: " first, chance 'sporting' (1ns), then, the
possibility of new habit-formation (3ns), and finally the possibility
of a evolutionary, say, structural change (2ns).".  Wouldn't you say
that before the habit-formation emerges, that there have to be
incidents in a mode of Secondness..which might vanish or might exist
long enough to interact with each other and form those habits? 

I refer to 1.412 [A guess at the Riddle] - where Peirce writes: .."
there would have come something,.by the principle of Firstness...then
by the principle of habit there would have been a second
flash"...But Secondness is of two types. consequently besides
flashes genuinely second to others, so as to come after them, there
will be pairs of flashes, or, since time is now supposed to have
developed, we had better say pairs of states, which are reciprocally
second, each member of the pair to the other. This is the first germ
of spatial extension. These states will undergo changes; and habits
will be formed of passing from certain states to certain others, and
of not passing from certain states to certain others"... 

My reading of the above is that the FLASH [energy into matter?]
operates within its own Firstness and Thirdness [habit]..but the
matter that is formed in these flashes exists first, in Secondness
since this matter is both temporally and spatially existent. Then,
these 'states'/bits of matter will develop their own habits..and so
on.

Edwina
 On Tue 12/12/17  2:42 PM , Gary Richmond gary.richm...@gmail.com [2]
sent:
 Edwina, Mary, Gary f, list,
 I can't say that I experience the horror that Edwina does with the
use of the triangle for specific analyses and, in point of fact,
Peirce himself uses is for certain purposes (see, for example, the
famous diagram of the classification of signs which he sent to Lady
Welby). Admittedly such an analysis of sign classes is relatively
static, but that is perhaps the point: that for particular purposes
of phenomenological, metaphysical, and semiotic tricategorial
analysis (although, perhaps, not in representing any  particular
semiosis) that the triangle can be helpful.
 But more than that, the triangle is quite useful when considering
movement through the categories (which paths of movement I've called
categorial vectors) where a bent arrow shows which of the 6 possible
vectors is in play. 
 (I have renamed the vector of analysis that of involution, although
both terms can be found in Peirce's paper, "The Mathematics of
Logic"). 
 For example, taking the vector at the top of the diagram, Peirce
says in the N.A. that there are three stages to a discrete inquiry
(which involves what I call the vector of process) which begins with
a hypothesis (1ns), after which the implications of the hypothesis
are deduced for the purpose of devising an experimental testing of
the hypothesis (3ns), followed by the inductive testing itself (2ns).
This 'movement through the categories' is, in my opinion, best
illustrated by a bent arrow either within or outside of a triangle.
That the process doesn't end there is well illustrated by John Sowa's
'Knowledge Soup' diagram.
 As I've noted here before, this process vector is the very same one
Peirce offers for biological evolution, namely, first, chance
'sporting' (1ns), then, the possibility of new habit-formation (3ns),
and finally the possibility of a evolutionary, say, structural change
(2ns). Again, if you see the process as triadic, it most certainly

Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.4

[Jerry Rhee]

Dear list,



To better honor Peirce,



*Absolutum means finished, perfected, completed..*



*Absolutum a termino.  A term is said to be absolute which can of itself be
the subject or predicate of a complete proposition.. *



*.. ‘Doctrines of the Absolute,” saying that to think is to limit;
hence to think God would be to *

*determine or limit Him; and hence is inferred the impossibility of
thinking God as he truly is.*



*If it be said that the Absolute is unthinkable, *

*in this assertion it is affirmed that all predicates or categories of
thought are inapplicable *

*to the Absolute, for to think is to predicate of some object, the
categories of thought; *

*and in so far as these categories apply, to that extent is the
Absolute thinkable.  *



What would God be?



Hth,

Jerry Rhee


On Tue, Dec 12, 2017 at 2:38 PM, Jerry Rhee  wrote:

> Hi Edwina, list:
>
>
>
> You said,
>
> “Agreed - we shouldn't seek consensus. “
>
>
>
> J
>
>
>
> "it is unlikely that you are not mistaken but why such absolute truth?"
>
>
>
> In this way Hegel advances until he reaches the 'Absolute Idea', which,
> according to him, has no incompleteness, no opposite, and no need of
> further development. The Absolute Idea, therefore, is adequate to describe
> Absolute Reality.
>
>
>
> Best,
> Jerry R
>
> On Tue, Dec 12, 2017 at 2:10 PM, Edwina Taborsky 
> wrote:
>
>> Agreed - we shouldn't seek consensus. Not only is such
>> closure unscientific but we are not a large or diverse enough group to
>> substantiate a scientifically valid consensus.
>>
>>  I'm not against the triangle as such - as in, for example, that Lady
>> Welby classification triangle of the signs to which you refer. As you say,
>> this is a static image and not meant to imagize the process of the
>> Object-Representamen-Interpretant triad. My focus on the 'spoke' is only
>> to imagize the semiosic O-R-I process as am open and networking
>> interaction.
>>
>> By the way - you write: " first, chance 'sporting' (1ns), then, the
>> possibility of new habit-formation (3ns), and finally the possibility of a
>> evolutionary, say, structural change (2ns).".  Wouldn't you say that before
>> the habit-formation emerges, that there have to be incidents in a mode of
>> Secondness..which might vanish or might exist long enough to interact with
>> each other and form those habits?
>>
>> I refer to 1.412 [A guess at the Riddle] - where Peirce writes: .." there
>> would have come something,.by the principle of Firstness...then by the
>> principle of habit there would have been a second flash"...But
>> Secondness is of two types. consequently besides flashes genuinely second
>> to others, so as to come after them, there will be pairs of flashes, or,
>> since time is now supposed to have developed, we had better say pairs of
>> states, which are reciprocally second, each member of the pair to the
>> other. This is the first germ of spatial extension. These states will
>> undergo changes; and habits will be formed of passing from certain states
>> to certain others, and of not passing from certain states to certain
>> others"...
>>
>> My reading of the above is that the FLASH [energy into matter?] operates
>> within its own Firstness and Thirdness [habit]..but the matter that is
>> formed in these flashes exists first, in Secondness since this matter is
>> both temporally and spatially existent. Then, these 'states'/bits of matter
>> will develop their own habits..and so on.
>>
>> Edwina
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> On Tue 12/12/17 2:42 PM , Gary Richmond gary.richm...@gmail.com sent:
>>
>> Edwina, Mary, Gary f, list,
>>
>> I can't say that I experience the horror that Edwina does with the use
>> of the triangle for specific analyses and, in point of fact, Peirce himself
>> uses is for certain purposes (see, for example, the famous diagram of the
>> classification of signs which he sent to Lady Welby). Admittedly such an
>> analysis of sign classes is relatively static, but that is perhaps the
>> point: that for particular purposes of phenomenological, metaphysical, and
>> semiotic tricategorial analysis (although, perhaps, not in representing any
>> particular semiosis) that the triangle can be helpful.
>>
>> But more than that, the triangle is quite useful when considering
>> movement through the categories (which paths of movement I've called
>> categorial vectors) where a bent arrow shows which of the 6 possible
>> vectors is in play.
>>
>> [image: Blocked image]
>>
>> (I have renamed the vector of analysis that of involution, although both
>> terms can be found in Peirce's paper, "The Mathematics of Logic").
>>
>> For example, taking the vector at the top of the diagram, Peirce says in
>> the N.A. that there are three stages to a discrete inquiry (which involves
>> what I call the vector of process) which begins with a hypothesis (1ns),
>> after which the implications of the hypothesis are deduced for the purpose
>> of devising an 

Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.4

[Jerry Rhee]

Hi Edwina, list:



You said,

“Agreed - we shouldn't seek consensus. “



J



"it is unlikely that you are not mistaken but why such absolute truth?"



In this way Hegel advances until he reaches the 'Absolute Idea', which,
according to him, has no incompleteness, no opposite, and no need of
further development. The Absolute Idea, therefore, is adequate to describe
Absolute Reality.



Best,
Jerry R

On Tue, Dec 12, 2017 at 2:10 PM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:

> Agreed - we shouldn't seek consensus. Not only is such
> closure unscientific but we are not a large or diverse enough group to
> substantiate a scientifically valid consensus.
>
>  I'm not against the triangle as such - as in, for example, that Lady
> Welby classification triangle of the signs to which you refer. As you say,
> this is a static image and not meant to imagize the process of the
> Object-Representamen-Interpretant triad. My focus on the 'spoke' is only
> to imagize the semiosic O-R-I process as am open and networking
> interaction.
>
> By the way - you write: " first, chance 'sporting' (1ns), then, the
> possibility of new habit-formation (3ns), and finally the possibility of a
> evolutionary, say, structural change (2ns).".  Wouldn't you say that before
> the habit-formation emerges, that there have to be incidents in a mode of
> Secondness..which might vanish or might exist long enough to interact with
> each other and form those habits?
>
> I refer to 1.412 [A guess at the Riddle] - where Peirce writes: .." there
> would have come something,.by the principle of Firstness...then by the
> principle of habit there would have been a second flash"...But
> Secondness is of two types. consequently besides flashes genuinely second
> to others, so as to come after them, there will be pairs of flashes, or,
> since time is now supposed to have developed, we had better say pairs of
> states, which are reciprocally second, each member of the pair to the
> other. This is the first germ of spatial extension. These states will
> undergo changes; and habits will be formed of passing from certain states
> to certain others, and of not passing from certain states to certain
> others"...
>
> My reading of the above is that the FLASH [energy into matter?] operates
> within its own Firstness and Thirdness [habit]..but the matter that is
> formed in these flashes exists first, in Secondness since this matter is
> both temporally and spatially existent. Then, these 'states'/bits of matter
> will develop their own habits..and so on.
>
> Edwina
>
>
>
>
>
> On Tue 12/12/17 2:42 PM , Gary Richmond gary.richm...@gmail.com sent:
>
> Edwina, Mary, Gary f, list,
>
> I can't say that I experience the horror that Edwina does with the use of
> the triangle for specific analyses and, in point of fact, Peirce himself
> uses is for certain purposes (see, for example, the famous diagram of the
> classification of signs which he sent to Lady Welby). Admittedly such an
> analysis of sign classes is relatively static, but that is perhaps the
> point: that for particular purposes of phenomenological, metaphysical, and
> semiotic tricategorial analysis (although, perhaps, not in representing any
> particular semiosis) that the triangle can be helpful.
>
> But more than that, the triangle is quite useful when considering movement
> through the categories (which paths of movement I've called categorial
> vectors) where a bent arrow shows which of the 6 possible vectors is in
> play.
>
> [image: Blocked image]
>
> (I have renamed the vector of analysis that of involution, although both
> terms can be found in Peirce's paper, "The Mathematics of Logic").
>
> For example, taking the vector at the top of the diagram, Peirce says in
> the N.A. that there are three stages to a discrete inquiry (which involves
> what I call the vector of process) which begins with a hypothesis (1ns),
> after which the implications of the hypothesis are deduced for the purpose
> of devising an experimental testing of the hypothesis (3ns), followed by
> the inductive testing itself (2ns). This 'movement through the categories'
> is, in my opinion, best illustrated by a bent arrow either within or
> outside of a triangle. That the process doesn't end there is well
> illustrated by John Sowa's 'Knowledge Soup' diagram.
>
> As I've noted here before, this process vector is the very same one
> Peirce offers for biological evolution, namely, first, chance 'sporting'
> (1ns), then, the possibility of new habit-formation (3ns), and finally the
> possibility of a evolutionary, say, structural change (2ns). Again, if you
> see the process as triadic, it most certainly doesn't *end* with that
> evolutionary adaptation. Yet, for me being able to see the direction of the
> several vectors, comparing (as I just did with inquiry and biological
> evolution), or contrasting them (for example, contrasting both inquiry and
> evolution with the semiotic path (the vector of determination) whereas

Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.4

[Gary Richmond]

Edwina, Mary, Gary f, list,

I can't say that I experience the *horror* that Edwina does with the use of
the triangle for specific analyses and, in point of fact, Peirce himself
uses is for certain purposes (see, for example, the famous diagram of the
classification of signs which he sent to Lady Welby). Admittedly such an
analysis of sign classes is relatively static, but that is perhaps the
point: that for particular purposes of phenomenological, metaphysical, and
semiotic tricategorial analysis (although, perhaps, not in representing any
*particular* semiosis) that the triangle can be helpful.

But more than that, the triangle is quite useful when considering movement
through the categories (which paths of movement I've called categorial
vectors) where a bent arrow shows which of the 6 possible vectors is in
play.

[image: Inline image 3]

(I have renamed the vector of analysis that of *involution*, although both
terms can be found in Peirce's paper, "The Mathematics of Logic").

For example, taking the vector at the top of the diagram, Peirce says in
the N.A. that there are three stages to a discrete inquiry (which involves
what I call the vector of process) which begins with a hypothesis (1ns),
after which the implications of the hypothesis are deduced for the purpose
of devising an experimental testing of the hypothesis (3ns), followed by
the inductive testing itself (2ns). This 'movement through the categories'
is, in my opinion, best illustrated by a bent arrow either within or
outside of a triangle. That the process doesn't end there is well
illustrated by John Sowa's 'Knowledge Soup' diagram.

As I've noted here before, this *process vector* is the very same one
Peirce offers for biological evolution, namely, first, chance 'sporting'
(1ns), then, the possibility of new habit-formation (3ns), and finally the
possibility of a evolutionary, say, structural change (2ns). Again, if you
see the process as triadic, it most certainly doesn't *end* with that
evolutionary adaptation. Yet, for me being able to see the direction of the
several vectors, comparing (as I just did with inquiry and biological
evolution), or contrasting them (for example, contrasting both inquiry and
evolution with the semiotic path (the *vector of determination*) whereas
the object (2ns) determines the representamen (1ns) which determines the
interpretant 3ns) can potentially reveal interesting new relations.

So, I agree with Gary F:

Yes, it’s a long-running debate whether we should use a triangle or a
three-spoke diagram. . . Personally I don’t think it matters much which one
you use, as long as you recognize that relation as triadic.


And yet (1) it is especially important in, for example, considering the ->
representamen -> interpretant path that "you recognize that relation as
triadic" and, in the sense of  infinite semiosis, neither linear nor
arriving at an end point) and (2) for many purposes the three spoked
diagram is indeed. preferable. But for some, especially certain analytical
purposes, the triangle proves quite helpful.

This is one of those areas where I think the decision as to which (the
triangle or the spoke) manner of diagramming a triadic relation is most
useful for her purposes ought be left up to the individual inquirer, that
we ought not insist on what is right or wrong (seek consensus) for others
in this matter.

Best,

Gary R

[image: Gary Richmond]

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*718 482-5690 <(718)%20482-5690>*

On Tue, Dec 12, 2017 at 12:47 PM, Edwina Taborsky 
wrote:

> Mary, list - I fully agree with you. I have always been horrified - and I
> mean the word - by the use of the triangle to portray the semiosic triad.
> It is, in my view, so completely wrong, for it sets up a closed linear path.
>
> The' node connecting three lines of identity' [1.347] is, in my view, the
> correct image, for as Peirce points out - it clearly shows how such a node
> and its relations is networked almost to infinity with other such formats.
> As you say - it shows the 'openness inherent in triadic relations'.
>
> Edwina -
>
>
>
> On Tue 12/12/17 3:32 PM , Mary Libertin mary.liber...@gmail.com sent:
>
> Gary, list,
>
> I prefer the use of Peirce’s Icon/index/symbol of a “genuine triadic
> relation”—“a node with three lines of identity” instead of a triangle.
> Ogden popularized the Peircean concept of triangle in an appendix in his
> book “The Meaning of Meaning”, and that triangle has been repeated over and
> over. I believe the node with three lines of identity makes immediate,
> diagrammatic sense and I believe shows forth the openness inherent in
> triadic relations. I’d like to investigate this—its historical context,
> literature on it, etc. Do you think I’m making sense, and /or can you point
> me in the right direction? Thanks.
>
> Mary Libertin
>
> On Tue, Dec 12, 2017 at 7:01 AM 

Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.4

[Edwina Taborsky]

 

 BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px;
}Mary, list - I fully agree with you. I have always been horrified -
and I mean the word - by the use of the triangle to portray the
semiosic triad. It is, in my view, so completely wrong, for it sets
up a closed linear path.

The' node connecting three lines of identity' [1.347] is, in my
view, the correct image, for as Peirce points out - it clearly shows
how such a node and its relations is networked almost to infinity
with other such formats. As you say - it shows the 'openness inherent
in triadic relations'.

Edwina - 
 On Tue 12/12/17  3:32 PM , Mary Libertin mary.liber...@gmail.com
sent:
 Gary, list,
 I prefer the use of Peirce’s Icon/index/symbol of a “genuine
triadic relation”—“a node with three lines of identity”
instead of a triangle. Ogden popularized the Peircean concept of
triangle in an appendix in his book “The Meaning of Meaning”, and
that triangle has been repeated over and over. I believe the node with
three lines of identity makes immediate, diagrammatic sense and I
believe shows forth the openness inherent in triadic relations. I’d
like to investigate this—its historical context, literature on it,
etc. Do you think I’m making sense, and /or can you point me in the
right direction? Thanks. 
 Mary Libertin 
 On Tue, Dec 12, 2017 at 7:01 AM  wrote:
 Continuing from Lowell Lecture 3.3,


https://fromthepage.com/jeffdown1/c-s-peirce-manuscripts/ms-464-465-1903-lowell-lecture-iii-3rd-draught/display/13884
[2]
I will sketch a proof that the idea of Meaning is irreducible to
those of Quality and Reaction. It depends on two main premisses. The
first is that every genuine triadic relation involves meaning, as
meaning is obviously a triadic relation. The second is that a triadic
relation is inexpressible by means of dyadic relations alone.
Considerable reflexion may be required to convince yourself of the
first of these premisses, that every triadic relation involves
meaning. There will be two lines of inquiry. First, all physical
forces appear to subsist between pairs of particles. This was assumed
by Helmholtz in his original paper on the Conservation of Forces. Take
any fact in physics of the triadic kind, by which I mean a fact which
can only be defined by simultaneous reference to three things, and
you will find there is ample evidence that it never was produced by
the action of forces on mere dyadic conditions. Thus, your right hand
is that hand which is toward the  east, when you face the north with
your head toward the zenith. Three things, east, west, and up, are
required to define the difference between right and left.
Consequently chemists find that those substances which rotate the
plane of polarization to the right or left can only be produced from
such active substances. They are all of such complex constitution
that they cannot have existed when the earth was very hot, and how
the first one was produced is a puzzle. It cannot have been by the
action of brute forces. For the second branch of the inquiry, you
must train yourself to the analysis of relations, beginning with such
as are very markedly triadic, gradually going on to others. In that
way, you will convince yourself thoroughly that every genuine triadic
relation involves thought or  meaning. Take, for example, the relation
of giving. A gives B to C. This does not consist in A's throwing B
away and its accidentally hitting C, like the date-stone, which hit
the Jinnee in the eye. If that were all, it would not be a genuine
triadic relation, but merely one dyadic relation followed by another.
There need be no motion of the thing given. Giving is a transfer of
the right of property. Now right is a matter of law, and law is a
matter of thought and meaning. I there leave the matter to your own
reflection, merely adding that, though I have inserted the word
“genuine,” yet I do not really think that necessary. I think even
degenerate triadic relations involve something like thought.  

The other premiss of the argument that genuine triadic relations can
never be built of dyadic relations and of Qualities is easily shown.
In Existential Graphs, a spot with one tail —X represents a
quality, a spot with two tails —R— a dyadic relation. Joining the
ends of two tails is also a dyadic relation. But you can never by such
joining make a graph with three tails. You may think that a node
connecting three lines of identity  is not a triadic idea. But
analysis will show that it is so. I see a man on Monday. On Tuesday I
see a man, and I exclaim, “Why, that is the very man I saw on
Monday.” We may say, with sufficient accuracy, that I directly
experienced the identity. On Wednesday I see a man and I say, “That
is the same man I saw on Tuesday, and consequently is the same I saw
on Monday.” There is a recognition of triadic identity; but it is
only brought about as a conclusion from two premisses, which is
itself a triadic 

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.4

[gnox]

Mary,

 

I assume you’re referring to the diagram that’s used to represent the triadic 
relation sign-object-interpretant. Yes, it’s a long-running debate whether we 
should use a triangle or a three-spoke diagram. As far as I know, Peirce 
himself never used either one for that particular triadic relation. Personally 
I don’t think it matters much which one you use, as long as you recognize that 
relation as triadic.

 

The diagram in Lowell 3.4 of “a spot with three tails” represents a rheme, or 
predicate, with three subjects. But according to the conventions of existential 
graphs, the subjects must be logical individuals, or existing things, which 
would never be the case with all three of the sign-object-interpretant triad; 
so you can’t use a beta graph to represent that relation. A beta graph 
represents a proposition, and a “spot with three tails” represents a rheme with 
its subjects left blank. Peirce’s term “tail” is somewhat ambiguous, as the 
“tails” could be either “hooks” (“pegs,” blanks) or the lines of identity 
attached to them.

 

I’m being called away, that’s all I can say right now!

 

Gary f.

 

From: Mary Libertin [mailto:mary.liber...@gmail.com] 
Sent: 12-Dec-17 10:32
To: g...@gnusystems.ca
Cc: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.4

 

Gary, list,

 

I prefer the use of Peirce’s Icon/index/symbol of a “genuine triadic 
relation”—“a node with three lines of identity” instead of a triangle. Ogden 
popularized the Peircean concept of triangle in an appendix in his book “The 
Meaning of Meaning”, and that triangle has been repeated over and over. I 
believe the node with three lines of identity makes immediate, diagrammatic 
sense and I believe shows forth the openness inherent in triadic relations. I’d 
like to investigate this—its historical context, literature on it, etc. Do you 
think I’m making sense, and /or can you point me in the right direction? Thanks.

 

Mary Libertin 

 

On Tue, Dec 12, 2017 at 7:01 AM <g...@gnusystems.ca <mailto:g...@gnusystems.ca> 
> wrote:

Continuing from Lowell Lecture 3.3,

https://fromthepage.com/jeffdown1/c-s-peirce-manuscripts/ms-464-465-1903-lowell-lecture-iii-3rd-draught/display/13884

 

I will sketch a proof that the idea of Meaning is irreducible to those of 
Quality and Reaction. It depends on two main premisses. The first is that every 
genuine triadic relation involves meaning, as meaning is obviously a triadic 
relation. The second is that a triadic relation is inexpressible by means of 
dyadic relations alone. Considerable reflexion may be required to convince 
yourself of the first of these premisses, that every triadic relation involves 
meaning. There will be two lines of inquiry. First, all physical forces appear 
to subsist between pairs of particles. This was assumed by Helmholtz in his 
original paper on the Conservation of Forces. Take any fact in physics of the 
triadic kind, by which I mean a fact which can only be defined by simultaneous 
reference to three things, and you will find there is ample evidence that it 
never was produced by the action of forces on mere dyadic conditions. Thus, 
your right hand is that hand which is toward the east, when you face the north 
with your head toward the zenith. Three things, east, west, and up, are 
required to define the difference between right and left. Consequently chemists 
find that those substances which rotate the plane of polarization to the right 
or left can only be produced from such active substances. They are all of such 
complex constitution that they cannot have existed when the earth was very hot, 
and how the first one was produced is a puzzle. It cannot have been by the 
action of brute forces. For the second branch of the inquiry, you must train 
yourself to the analysis of relations, beginning with such as are very markedly 
triadic, gradually going on to others. In that way, you will convince yourself 
thoroughly that every genuine triadic relation involves thought or meaning. 
Take, for example, the relation of giving. A gives B to C. This does not 
consist in A's throwing B away and its accidentally hitting C, like the 
date-stone, which hit the Jinnee in the eye. If that were all, it would not be 
a genuine triadic relation, but merely one dyadic relation followed by another. 
There need be no motion of the thing given. Giving is a transfer of the right 
of property. Now right is a matter of law, and law is a matter of thought and 
meaning. I there leave the matter to your own reflection, merely adding that, 
though I have inserted the word “genuine,” yet I do not really think that 
necessary. I think even degenerate triadic relations involve something like 
thought. 

The other premiss of the argument that genuine triadic relations can never be 
built of dyadic relations and of Qualities is easily shown. In Existential 
Graphs, a spot with one tail —X represents a quality, a spot with two tails —R— 
a dya

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.4

[Mary Libertin]

Gary, list,

I prefer the use of Peirce’s Icon/index/symbol of a “genuine triadic
relation”—“a node with three lines of identity” instead of a triangle.
Ogden popularized the Peircean concept of triangle in an appendix in his
book “The Meaning of Meaning”, and that triangle has been repeated over and
over. I believe the node with three lines of identity makes immediate,
diagrammatic sense and I believe shows forth the openness inherent in
triadic relations. I’d like to investigate this—its historical context,
literature on it, etc. Do you think I’m making sense, and /or can you point
me in the right direction? Thanks.

Mary Libertin

On Tue, Dec 12, 2017 at 7:01 AM  wrote:

> Continuing from Lowell Lecture 3.3,
>
>
> https://fromthepage.com/jeffdown1/c-s-peirce-manuscripts/ms-464-465-1903-lowell-lecture-iii-3rd-draught/display/13884
>
>
>
> I will sketch a proof that the idea of Meaning is irreducible to those of
> Quality and Reaction. It depends on two main premisses. The first is that
> every genuine triadic relation involves meaning, as meaning is obviously a
> triadic relation. The second is that a triadic relation is inexpressible by
> means of dyadic relations alone. Considerable reflexion may be required to
> convince yourself of the first of these premisses, that every triadic
> relation involves meaning. There will be two lines of inquiry. First, all
> physical forces appear to subsist between pairs of particles. This was
> assumed by Helmholtz in his original paper on the Conservation of Forces.
> Take any fact in physics of the triadic kind, by which I mean a fact which
> can only be defined by simultaneous reference to three things, and you will
> find there is ample evidence that it never was produced by the action of
> forces on mere dyadic conditions. Thus, your right hand is that hand which
> is toward the *east,* when you face the *north* with your head toward the
> *zenith.* Three things, east, west, and up, are required to define the
> difference between right and left. Consequently chemists find that those
> substances which rotate the plane of polarization to the right or left can
> only be produced from such active substances. They are all of such complex
> constitution that they cannot have existed when the earth was very hot, and
> how the first one was produced is a puzzle. It cannot have been by the
> action of brute forces. For the second branch of the inquiry, you must
> train yourself to the analysis of relations, beginning with such as are
> very markedly triadic, gradually going on to others. In that way, you will
> convince yourself thoroughly that every genuine triadic relation involves
> thought or *meaning.* Take, for example, the relation of *giving.* A
> *gives* B to C. This does not consist in A's throwing B away and its
> accidentally hitting C, like the date-stone, which hit the Jinnee in the
> eye. If that were all, it would not be a genuine triadic relation, but
> merely one dyadic relation followed by another. There need be no motion of
> the thing given. Giving is a transfer of the right of property. Now right
> is a matter of law, and law is a matter of thought and meaning. I there
> leave the matter to your own reflection, merely adding that, though I have
> inserted the word “genuine,” yet I do not really think that necessary. I
> think even degenerate triadic relations involve something like thought.
>
> The other premiss of the argument that genuine triadic relations can never
> be built of dyadic relations and of Qualities is easily shown. In
> Existential Graphs, a spot with one tail —X represents a quality, a spot
> with two tails —R— a dyadic relation. Joining the ends of two tails is also
> a dyadic relation. But you can never by such joining make a graph with
> three tails. You may think that a node connecting three lines of identity is
> not a triadic idea. But analysis will show that it is so. I see a man on
> Monday. On Tuesday I see a man, and I exclaim, “Why, that is the *very*
> man I saw on Monday.” We may say, with sufficient accuracy, that I directly
> experienced the identity. On Wednesday I see a man and I say, “That is the
> same man I saw on Tuesday, and consequently is the same I saw on Monday.”
> There is a recognition of triadic identity; but it is only brought about as
> a conclusion from two premisses, which is itself a triadic relation. If I
> see two men at once, I cannot by any such direct experience identify both
> of them with a man I saw before. I can only identify them if I regard them,
> not as the *very* same, but as two different manifestations of the same
> man. But the idea of *manifestation* is the idea of a sign. Now a sign is
> something, A, which denotes some fact or object, B, to some interpretant
> thought, C.
>
> 347. It is interesting to remark that while a graph with three tails
> cannot be made out of graphs each with two or one tail, yet combinations of
> graphs of three tails each will