Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Biosemiosis (was Lowell Lecture 3.12

[Gary Richmond]

Helmut, list,

I have to run off to a very busy late afternoon/evening soon, but wanted to
quickly respond to your post. You wrote:

HR: I think, the presyllable "idio" has had a bad connotation to me due to
the word "idiot", which was the reason for my quibbling, but I´ve looked it
up, and it does not only mean "merely self-related", but also "special".

Well, I'm glad that *that* at least is cleared up. Continuing, you quoted
me:

GR: " Similarly, cenoscopic sciences can offer principles to ideoscopic
sciences which, in turn, may offer examples with which the cenoscopic
sciences may work (to exemplify those principles, conduct 'mental
experiments', etc.)"

Then commented:

HR: I would say, that once maybe biology did nothing more than just offer
examples. Today, I think, even biology contains chemistry, which in turn
contains atom and quantum physics, which contains mathematics. And
biosemiotics? I guess that depends on how you define it. Maybe biosemiotics
is just offering examples, and analyzing them is semiotics. Well, the way I
thought it was, was, that biosemiotics is semiotics with emphasis on
biology.

To say as I did that biology (and the other idioscopic sciences) can offer
examples is not for a moment to suggest that that is their principal work.
Hardly! Indeed, it isn't *their* work at all--they can, if they wish more
or less ignore the cenoscopic sciences (although I don't think it's best
practice and rarely happens since both logic and methodology are taken up
in cenoscopy). Rather *it is the work of those working in the idioscopic*
sciences to employ biological and other physical and psychical examples
from the work in those sciences. As for all the sciences, both ceno-and
idioscopic, employing mathematics, well, of course. And the various
sciences do employing the findings of other sciences in their own work when
applicable--no argument there! Continuing, you wrote:

HR: But is our argument respectively my error merely about the position of
the boundary between biosemiotics and semiotics? Or has it also to do with
the question in how far life is due to logic? Or logic due to life, or both
due to each other, or both isolated and not due to each other? Well, I
first did not want to quibble on, but now I think that the answer to this
question(s), resp. the belief about the answer would have an influence on
the classification. I do not have a clear opinion about which is due to
which, I only do not believe in the isolation answer possibility.

Some of your questions indeed seem related to classifications of the
sciences, others to logic (perhaps especially theoretical rhetoric and
methodeutic) or to metaphysics.

I haven't any quick answers except to say each of the cenoscopic sciences
have their own work to do while possibly employing principles from sciences
'higher' in the classification of sciences of discover, all of them from
math, logic as semeiotic employing principles from phenomenology, etc..  It
seems to me that idioscopic practitioners may *hope *the work they do, say
in logic, may be of value to the idioscopic/special sciences, while the
idioscopic sciences have their own *special* works, develop their own
methodologies, etc. They most certainly need not be in conflict. Indeed,
one would hope that they would mutually fecundate, even fructify each
other. There is also the real possibility and practice of inter- and
transdisciplinarity.

Best,

Gary R


xx

[image: Gary Richmond]

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*718 482-5690 <(718)%20482-5690>*

On Wed, Jan 24, 2018 at 12:33 PM, Helmut Raulien  wrote:

> Gary, List,
> I think, the presyllable "idio" has had a bad connotation to me due to the
> word "idiot", which was the reason for my quibbling, but I´ve looked it up,
> and it does not only mean "merely self-related", but also "special". Still,
> by the way you put it:
>
> " Similarly, cenoscopic sciences can offer principles to ideoscopic
> sciences which, in turn, may offer examples with which the cenoscopic
> sciences may work (to exemplify those principles, conduct 'mental
> experiments', etc.)"
>
> I would say, that once maybe biology did nothing more than just offer
> examples. Today, I think, even biology contains chemistry, which in turn
> contains atom and quantum physics, which contains mathematics. And
> biosemiotics? I guess that depends on how you define it. Maybe biosemiotics
> is just offering examples, and analyzing them is semiotics. Well, the way I
> thought it was, was, that biosemiotics is semiotics with emphasis on
> biology.
> But is our argument respectively my error merely about the position of the
> boundary between biosemiotics and semiotics? Or has it also to do with the
> question in how far life is due to logic? Or logic due to life, or both due
> to each other, or both isolated and not due to each other? Well, I first
> did not want to quibble on, but now 

Aw: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Biosemiosis (was Lowell Lecture 3.12

[Helmut Raulien]

Gary, List,

I think, the presyllable "idio" has had a bad connotation to me due to the word "idiot", which was the reason for my quibbling, but I´ve looked it up, and it does not only mean "merely self-related", but also "special". Still, by the way you put it:

 

" Similarly, cenoscopic sciences can offer principles to ideoscopic sciences which, in turn, may offer examples with which the cenoscopic sciences may work (to exemplify those principles, conduct 'mental experiments', etc.)"

 

I would say, that once maybe biology did nothing more than just offer examples. Today, I think, even biology contains chemistry, which in turn contains atom and quantum physics, which contains mathematics. And biosemiotics? I guess that depends on how you define it. Maybe biosemiotics is just offering examples, and analyzing them is semiotics. Well, the way I thought it was, was, that biosemiotics is semiotics with emphasis on biology.

But is our argument respectively my error merely about the position of the boundary between biosemiotics and semiotics? Or has it also to do with the question in how far life is due to logic? Or logic due to life, or both due to each other, or both isolated and not due to each other? Well, I first did not want to quibble on, but now I think that the answer to this question(s), resp. the belief about the answer would have an influence on the classification. I do not have a clear opinion about which is due to which, I only do not believe in the isolation answer possibility.

Best,

Helmut

 

24. Januar 2018 um 12:48 Uhr
Von: "Gary Richmond" 
 



Helmut, list,

 

You wrote: "Maybe I have  had the wrong concept about idioscopy: I thought that it was observing phenomena without connecting them to cenoscopy such as semiotics/logic."

 

I think you have the "observing phenomena" part of idioscopy right but, as I understand it, not the "without connecting them to cenoscopy" part. Peirce writes (re: the 1903 Classification):

 


This classification, which aims to base itself on the principal affinities of the objects classified, is concerned not with all possible sciences, nor with so many branches of knowledge, but with sciences in their present condition, as so many businesses of groups of living men. It borrows its idea from Comte's classification; namely, the idea that one science depends upon another for fundamental principles, but does not furnish such principles to that other. It turns out that in most cases the divisions are trichotomic.


 

Compte's idea, which Peirce embraces, is that sciences higher in the outline classification offer principles to those lower in it; while sciences lower in the classification can offer examples for those higher in the classification. So, mathematics can offer principles to all the other sciences as being 'first science' in the Classification. Similarly, cenoscopic sciences can offer principles to ideoscopic sciences which, in turn, may offer examples with which the cenoscopic sciences may work (to exemplify those principles, conduct 'mental experiments', etc.)

 

So, to return to the point at hand, the cenoscopic sciences--phenomenology, normative science (esthetics, ethics, logic as semeiotic) metaphysics--offer principles to the idioscopic sciences, both physical and psychical, while these may provide examples for the cenoscopic sciences--'material' to exemplify the principles discovered.

 

As I see it, of the three branches of Discovery Science: Mathematics, Cenoscopy, and Idioscopy, the first and the last will forever need "updating." I suggested in an earlier post how the advances in the Idioscopic sciences would necessarily much modify that part of the Classification, and would now add that much the same is undoubtedly so for First Science, Mathematics, in our day. 
 

Yet as I see it, Peirce's Cenoscopic philosophy holds its own today while, iin my opinion, it has not begun to be sufficiently explored nor developed (with the possible exception of the third branch of the normative sciences, namely, logic as semiotic). 

 

Best,

 

Gary R

 


 








 

Gary Richmond

Philosophy and Critical Thinking

Communication Studies

LaGuardia College of the City University of New York

718 482-5690






 

On Wed, Jan 24, 2018 at 5:40 AM, Helmut Raulien  wrote:





Gary List,

Maybe I have  had the wrong concept about idioscopy: I thought that it was observing phenomena without connecting them to cenoscopy such as semiotics/logic.

Best, Helmut

 

 22. Januar 2018 um 23:24 Uhr
Von: "Gary Richmond" 
 





Helmut, list,

 

You wrote: If biology is idioscopic, and semiotics is cenoscopic, then, just following the rules of linguistics, which in my understanding say that the first half of a double-word is a restriction, but not a modification, of the second half, I would say, that biosemiotics is cenoscopic, and semiobiology is idioscopic.

 

First, I'm not at all sure what "semiobiology" is (is th

Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Biosemiosis (was Lowell Lecture 3.12

[Gary Richmond]

Helmut, list,

You wrote: "Maybe I have  had the wrong concept about idioscopy: I thought
that it was observing phenomena without connecting them to cenoscopy such
as semiotics/logic."

I think you have the "observing phenomena" part of idioscopy right but, as
I understand it, not the "without connecting them to cenoscopy" part.
Peirce writes (re: the 1903 Classification):

This classification, which aims to base itself on the principal affinities
of the objects classified, is concerned not with all possible sciences, nor
with so many branches of knowledge, but with sciences in their present
condition, as so many businesses of groups of living men. It borrows its
idea from Comte's classification; namely, the idea that one science depends
upon another for fundamental principles, but does not furnish such
principles to that other. It turns out that in most cases the divisions are
trichotomic.


Compte's idea, which Peirce embraces, is that sciences higher in the
outline classification offer principles to those lower in it; while
sciences lower in the classification can offer examples for those higher in
the classification. So, mathematics can offer principles to all the other
sciences as being 'first science' in the Classification. Similarly,
cenoscopic sciences can offer principles to ideoscopic sciences which, in
turn, may offer examples with which the cenoscopic sciences may work (to
exemplify those principles, conduct 'mental experiments', etc.)

So, to return to the point at hand, the cenoscopic sciences--phenomenology,
normative science (esthetics, ethics, logic as semeiotic)
metaphysics--offer principles to the idioscopic sciences, both physical and
psychical, while these *may* provide examples for the cenoscopic
sciences--'material' to exemplify the principles discovered.

As I see it, of the three branches of Discovery Science: Mathematics,
Cenoscopy, and Idioscopy, the first and the last will forever need
"updating." I suggested in an earlier post how the advances in the
Idioscopic sciences would necessarily much modify that part of the
Classification, and would now add that much the same is undoubtedly so for
First Science, Mathematics, in our day.

Yet as I see it, Peirce's Cenoscopic philosophy holds its own today while,
iin my opinion, it has not begun to be sufficiently explored nor developed
(with the possible exception of the third branch of the normative sciences,
namely, logic as semiotic).

Best,

Gary R


[image: Gary Richmond]

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*718 482-5690*

On Wed, Jan 24, 2018 at 5:40 AM, Helmut Raulien  wrote:

> Gary List,
> Maybe I have  had the wrong concept about idioscopy: I thought that it was
> observing phenomena without connecting them to cenoscopy such as
> semiotics/logic.
> Best, Helmut
>
>  22. Januar 2018 um 23:24 Uhr
> *Von:* "Gary Richmond" 
>
> Helmut, list,
>
> You wrote: If biology is idioscopic, and semiotics is cenoscopic, then,
> just following the rules of linguistics, which in my understanding say that
> the first half of a double-word is a restriction, but not a modification,
> of the second half, I would say, that biosemiotics is cenoscopic, and
> semiobiology is idioscopic.
>
> First, I'm not at all sure what "semiobiology" is (is there such a field,
> maybe a Saussurean approach to biology?), but I don't think your linguistic
> analysis holds any water for Peirce's classification of sciences, the
> schema of which is clear enough.
>
> The cenoscopic science of logic as semiotic has three branches:
> theoretical grammar, critical logic, and methodeutic (or theoretical
> rhetoric). The subjects of none of these has anything whatsoever to do with
> biology except 1. its practitioners are biological entities, viz., humans,
> and 2. what is discovered in the biological sciences may serve as*
> examples* in logic as semeiotics according to Peirce. But biosemiotics is
> its own special science.
>
> iii. Logic
> 
> (*or* Semiotic *or*Formal Semiotic). *(Study of true and false.)*
>
> *(The presuppositions of reason are the locus of Peirce's truth theory and
> his fallibilism.)*
> 1. Speculative Grammar
> 
> (*or* Philosophical *or* Universal Grammar)
> (*or* Stechiology)
> *(Includes the classification of signs).*
> 2. Critic
> 
> (*or* Logical Critic, Critical Logic, *or* Logic Proper).
> *(Includes study of the modes of inference: abduction, induction, and
> deduction).*
> 3. Methodeutic
> 
> (*or* Speculative Rhetoric,
> *or* Universal *or* Philosophical Rhetoric).
> *(Is the locus of Peirce's Pragmatism
> 

Aw: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Biosemiosis (was Lowell Lecture 3.12

[Helmut Raulien]

Gary List,

Maybe I have  had the wrong concept about idioscopy: I thought that it was observing phenomena without connecting them to cenoscopy such as semiotics/logic.

Best, Helmut

 

 22. Januar 2018 um 23:24 Uhr
Von: "Gary Richmond" 
 



Helmut, list,

 

You wrote: If biology is idioscopic, and semiotics is cenoscopic, then, just following the rules of linguistics, which in my understanding say that the first half of a double-word is a restriction, but not a modification, of the second half, I would say, that biosemiotics is cenoscopic, and semiobiology is idioscopic.

 

First, I'm not at all sure what "semiobiology" is (is there such a field, maybe a Saussurean approach to biology?), but I don't think your linguistic analysis holds any water for Peirce's classification of sciences, the schema of which is clear enough.

 

The cenoscopic science of logic as semiotic has three branches: theoretical grammar, critical logic, and methodeutic (or theoretical rhetoric). The subjects of none of these has anything whatsoever to do with biology except 1. its practitioners are biological entities, viz., humans, and 2. what is discovered in the biological sciences may serve as examples in logic as semeiotics according to Peirce. But biosemiotics is its own special science.

 



	
		
			iii. Logic
			(or Semiotic orFormal Semiotic). (Study of true and false.)

			(The presuppositions of reason are the locus of Peirce's truth theory and his fallibilism.)
			
			1. Speculative Grammar
			(or Philosophical or Universal Grammar)
			(or Stechiology)
			(Includes the classification of signs).
		
		
			2. Critic
			(or Logical Critic, Critical Logic, or Logic Proper).
			(Includes study of the modes of inference: abduction, induction, and deduction).
		
		
			3. Methodeutic
			(or Speculative Rhetoric,
			or Universal or Philosophical Rhetoric).
			(Is the locus of Peirce's Pragmatism, and includes study of scientific method).
			 
		
	



 

As I understand it, biosemiotics takes the principles of logic as semeiotics and uses them in its own, new inquiries leading to fresh discoveries. This is the kind of thing one would expect a special (idioscopic) science to do. In my view, biosemiotics has expanded the subject matter of biology exactly on semeiotic principles. 

 

I would recommend that you study the chart of the Classification of the Sciences of Discovery near the bottom of this article on Peirce's classification. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Classification_of_the_sciences_(Peirce)

 

Biology--as have all the physical and psychic sciences--has come a very long way since Peirce's day and a new outline of idioscopy would no doubt look very different from Peirce's. But one would expect to find biosemiotics among the special sciences and most certainly not as a sub-division of the normative science of logic as semeiotic. 

 

Best,

 

Gary  R

 

 


 








 

Gary Richmond

Philosophy and Critical Thinking

Communication Studies

LaGuardia College of the City University of New York

718 482-5690






 

On Mon, Jan 22, 2018 at 4:29 PM, Helmut Raulien  wrote:





Gary, List,

If biology is idioscopic, and semiotics is cenoscopic, then, just following the rules of linguistics, which in my understanding say that the first half of a double-word is a restriction, but not a modification, of the second half, I would say, that biosemiotics is cenoscopic, and semiobiology is idioscopic.

Best, Helmut

 

 22. Januar 2018 um 22:15 Uhr
Von: "Gary Richmond" 
 





Jon S, Edwina, list,

 

Jon wrote: " classifying biosemiotics under the special sciences does not somehow turn it into "a special use of Peirce"; it simply recognizes that it does not fall under (cenoscopic) philosophy, which I thought (perhaps mistakenly) was obvious and non-controversial."

 

I agree that biosemiotics is not a cenoscopic but rather a special (idioscopic) science. This is the kind of distinction I just pointed to in my note to Stephen (now in a new thread as given another Subject). I too see this as obvious and non-controversial. 

 

It is not as if the idioscopic sciences were, say, any less important than the cenoscopic ones: phenomenology, normative science, and metaphysics. Indeed, the idioscopic (special) science are, one might say, "invited" to use the findings of those sciences, perhaps most especially the findings of logic as semeiotic. 

 

And, furthermore, there is nothing keeping researchers in the special sciences from working in cenoscopy. (The following quotes are from the Commens dictionary.)







1905 | Review of Wilhelm Wundt's Principles of Physiological Psychology | CP 8.199The  sort of science that is founded upon the common experience of all men was recognized by Jeremy Bentham under the name of cenoscopy, in opposition to idioscopy, which discovers new phenomena.











1905-06 [c.] | Monist [R] | MS [R] 1338:7 The intermediate department [of heuretic science], c

Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Biosemiosis (was Lowell Lecture 3.12

[Edwina Taborsky]

 

 BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px;
}Intentionality is a basic, indeed, I'd say THE basic component of
semiosis. ..

Intentionality is expressed in the three modes of Firstness,
Secondness and Thirdness - in all their forms, both genuine and
degenerate. That is, intentionality, as a power of interaction, has
different methods for expressing and attaining those interactions.
So- you will get what some will call hard and soft anticipation, and
strong and weak anticipation/intentionality. 

Intentionality - can be understood as 'Anticipation' as well -

The concepts of memory, of learning, of exploring, of networking, of
generalizing, of differentiationit's all there - within the notion
of intentionality and anticipation -...and that's semiosis. 

One of the most important conferences and groups of researchers from
different disciplines, all focused on intentionality and anticipation
- can be found in the conference organized by Daniel Dubois, of
Liege, Belgium. The volumes of papers from these conferences, which
have been held for many years, are published by the AIP [American
Institute of Physics]. Conference Name: Computing Anticipatory
Systems.

Research is in mathematics, chemistry, physics, biology, economics,
philosophy, cybernetics, artificial intelligence, computing..and the
social sciences. 

Edwina
 On Tue 23/01/18  5:41 PM , John F Sowa s...@bestweb.net sent:
 Jon AS, 
 Thanks for the references from 1891 and 1896.  That is evidence 
 for Peirce's thoughts about minds or quasi-minds prior to 1903. 
 But it would be useful to see more explicit mention of animals. 
 On related issues, following is an excerpt from a note that I sent 
 to Ontolog Forum about the need for recognizing intentionality as 
 fundamental to every aspect of human and animal activity. 
 There are many nominalists who refuse to admit intentionality 
 as fundamental to all life. 
 John 
 ___ 
  From RC: 
 > In summary, intentionality would seem to be an unmeasureable
value. 
 > Nice theoretical touch, but what good would it be for processing 
 > realistic models of behavior? 
 >  
 > Is there a way to obtain more realistic measurements? 
 No.  The first step to solving a problem is to recognize that there 
 is a problem.  The second step is to remove the barriers that are 
 created when you deny that you can't do anything about it. 
 Congratulations on taking the first step. 
 But now you have to take the next step:  Recognize that intentions 
 are fundamental to everything that people and other animals do. 
 Furthermore, every business, social event, and government action 
 depends critically on intentions.  Signs, such as signing a contract

 or just shaking hands, are critical methods for showing intentions. 
 And they are admissible as evidence in a court of law. 
 Intentionality *must* be recognized at the very top of any ontology 
 that is adequate for business, engineering, finance, law,
government... 
 The overwhelming majority of the time, people correctly interpret 
 the intentions of other people and animals.  Do you have a pet? 
 If so, you probably have a good idea about your pet's intentions. 
 People don't always tell the truth, but most people have a fairly 
 good sense that somebody is lying or at least not saying everything 
 that is on their mind. 
 In fact, anthropologists who study chimps and bonobos say that they 
 are often better at detecting human intentions than other humans -- 
 primarily because they look at what people do, not at what they say.

 Even your pet dog or cat has good insights into your intentions. 
 Have you ever tried to conceal your intentions about taking them 
 to the vet? 
 For more about these issues, see http://jfsowa.com/pubs/signs.pdf
[1] 


Links:
--
[1]
http://webmail.primus.ca/parse.php?redirect=http%3A%2F%2Fjfsowa.com%2Fpubs%2Fsigns.pdf

-
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L 
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Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Biosemiosis (was Lowell Lecture 3.12

[Gary Richmond]

Helmut, list,

You wrote: If biology is idioscopic, and semiotics is cenoscopic, then,
just following the rules of linguistics, which in my understanding say that
the first half of a double-word is a restriction, but not a modification,
of the second half, I would say, that biosemiotics is cenoscopic, and
semiobiology is idioscopic.

First, I'm not at all sure what "semiobiology" is (is there such a field,
maybe a Saussurean approach to biology?), but I don't think your linguistic
analysis holds any water for Peirce's classification of sciences, the
schema of which is clear enough.

The cenoscopic science of logic as semiotic has three branches: theoretical
grammar, critical logic, and methodeutic (or theoretical rhetoric). The
subjects of none of these has anything whatsoever to do with biology except
1. its practitioners are biological entities, viz., humans, and 2. what is
discovered in the biological sciences may serve as* examples* in logic as
semeiotics according to Peirce. But biosemiotics is its own special science.

iii. Logic

(*or* Semiotic *or*Formal Semiotic). *(Study of true and false.)*

*(The presuppositions of reason are the locus of Peirce's truth theory and
his fallibilism.)*
1. Speculative Grammar

(*or* Philosophical *or* Universal Grammar)
(*or* Stechiology)
*(Includes the classification of signs).*
2. Critic

(*or* Logical Critic, Critical Logic, *or* Logic Proper).
*(Includes study of the modes of inference: abduction, induction, and
deduction).*
3. Methodeutic

(*or* Speculative Rhetoric,
*or* Universal *or* Philosophical Rhetoric).


*(Is the locus of Peirce's Pragmatism
, and
includes study of scientific method).*

As I understand it, biosemiotics takes the principles of logic as
semeiotics and uses them in its own, new inquiries leading to fresh
discoveries. This is the kind of thing one would expect a special
(idioscopic) science to do. In my view, biosemiotics has expanded the
subject matter of biology exactly on semeiotic principles.

I would recommend that you study the chart of the Classification of the
Sciences of Discovery near the bottom of this article on Peirce's
classification.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Classification_of_the_sciences_(Peirce)

Biology--as have all the physical and psychic sciences--has come a very
long way since Peirce's day and a new outline of idioscopy would no doubt
look very different from Peirce's. But one would expect to find
biosemiotics among the special sciences and most certainly not as a
sub-division of the *normative science* of logic as semeiotic.

Best,

Gary  R



[image: Gary Richmond]

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*718 482-5690*

On Mon, Jan 22, 2018 at 4:29 PM, Helmut Raulien  wrote:

> Gary, List,
> If biology is idioscopic, and semiotics is cenoscopic, then, just
> following the rules of linguistics, which in my understanding say that the
> first half of a double-word is a restriction, but not a modification, of
> the second half, I would say, that biosemiotics is cenoscopic, and
> semiobiology is idioscopic.
> Best, Helmut
>
>  22. Januar 2018 um 22:15 Uhr
> *Von:* "Gary Richmond" 
>
> Jon S, Edwina, list,
>
> Jon wrote: " classifying biosemiotics under the special sciences does not
> somehow turn it into "a special use of Peirce"; it simply recognizes that
> it does not fall under (cenoscopic) philosophy, which I thought (perhaps
> mistakenly) was obvious and non-controversial."
>
> I agree that biosemiotics is not a cenoscopic but rather a special
> (idioscopic) science. This is the *kind* of distinction I just pointed to
> in my note to Stephen (now in a new thread as given another Subject). I too
> see this as obvious and non-controversial.
>
> It is not as if the idioscopic sciences were, say, any less important than
> the cenoscopic ones: phenomenology, normative science, and metaphysics.
> Indeed, the idioscopic (special) science are, one might say, "invited" to
> use the findings of those sciences, perhaps most especially the findings of
> logic as semeiotic.
>
> And, furthermore, there is nothing keeping researchers in the special
> sciences from working in cenoscopy. (The following quotes are from the
> *Commens* dictionary.)
>
> 1905 | Review of Wilhelm Wundt's Principles of Physiological Psychology | CP
> 8.199The  sort of science that is founded upon the common experience of
> all men was recognized by Jeremy Bentham under the name of *cenoscopy*,
> in opposition to *idioscopy*, which discovers new phenomena.
> 1905-06 [c.] | Monist [R] | MS [R] 1338:7 The inter

Aw: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Biosemiosis (was Lowell Lecture 3.12

[Helmut Raulien]

Gary, List,

If biology is idioscopic, and semiotics is cenoscopic, then, just following the rules of linguistics, which in my understanding say that the first half of a double-word is a restriction, but not a modification, of the second half, I would say, that biosemiotics is cenoscopic, and semiobiology is idioscopic.

Best, Helmut

 

 22. Januar 2018 um 22:15 Uhr
Von: "Gary Richmond" 
 



Jon S, Edwina, list,

 

Jon wrote: " classifying biosemiotics under the special sciences does not somehow turn it into "a special use of Peirce"; it simply recognizes that it does not fall under (cenoscopic) philosophy, which I thought (perhaps mistakenly) was obvious and non-controversial."

 

I agree that biosemiotics is not a cenoscopic but rather a special (idioscopic) science. This is the kind of distinction I just pointed to in my note to Stephen (now in a new thread as given another Subject). I too see this as obvious and non-controversial. 

 

It is not as if the idioscopic sciences were, say, any less important than the cenoscopic ones: phenomenology, normative science, and metaphysics. Indeed, the idioscopic (special) science are, one might say, "invited" to use the findings of those sciences, perhaps most especially the findings of logic as semeiotic. 

 

And, furthermore, there is nothing keeping researchers in the special sciences from working in cenoscopy. (The following quotes are from the Commens dictionary.)







1905 | Review of Wilhelm Wundt's Principles of Physiological Psychology | CP 8.199The  sort of science that is founded upon the common experience of all men was recognized by Jeremy Bentham under the name of cenoscopy, in opposition to idioscopy, which discovers new phenomena.











1905-06 [c.] | Monist [R] | MS [R] 1338:7 The intermediate department [of heuretic science], called cenoscopy, does not attempt to discover new phenomena but only analyzes those truths that are known and acknowledged by everybody.












1905-06 [c.] | Monist [R] | MS [R] 1338:7 The third department [of heuretic science], called idioscopy, embraces all those kinds of investigation which are occupied in bringing to light phenomena previously unknown and which having discovered these phenomena use the same observational methods to push the study of them further.








 

Again, why is any of this controversial?

 

Best,

 

Gary R


 








 

Gary Richmond

Philosophy and Critical Thinking

Communication Studies

LaGuardia College of the City University of New York

718 482-5690






 

On Mon, Jan 22, 2018 at 1:21 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt  wrote:


Edwina, List:
 

You keep attributing words to me that I have not said; please stop doing that.  For example, classifying biosemiotics under the special sciences does not somehow turn it into "a special use of Peirce"; it simply recognizes that it does not fall under (cenoscopic) philosophy, which I thought (perhaps mistakenly) was obvious and non-controversial.  For my own clarification, do you consider biosemiotics to be fundamentally normative, such that it primarily investigates how biological systems ought to behave; or descriptive, such that it primarily investigates how biological systems actually do behave?

 

Thanks,

 

Jon








 




 

On Mon, Jan 22, 2018 at 11:56 AM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:


Jon - you have used those terms before- therefore, it is irrelevant that you haven't used them in the current thread. And I disagree that forbidding such terms as 'unPeircean' and 'more/less legitimate' would block 'the way of inquiry. I consider that their use actually blocks inquiry since it sets up boundaries to the discussion. It tells the other person in the debate: No- I won't consider your view as having any validity because it is 'judged' as 'unPeircean'.

As for your other comments - I disagree with your compartmentalization of Peirce. Since, as you note:

  Hence the normative science of logic as semeiotic explores how "every intelligence which can learn from experience" (CP 3.428; 1896)  ought to go about pursuing truth as "the conformity of a representamen to its object" (CP 5.554, EP 2:380; 1906).  Likewise, "Metaphysics ... endeavors to comprehend the Reality of Phenomena" (CP 2:197; 1903).  "Its business is to study the most general features of reality and real objects" (CP 6.6, EP 2:375; 1906).

Then..the fact that biological systems have intelligence and can learn from experience means that Peircean semiosis should not be defined as a 'special science'. And what does 'special science' mean? You seem to consider that it is a 'broad and open' use of Peircean theories. No.

That is, in my view, biological systems ARE logical - and biosemiotics certainly wants to 'comprehend the reality of phenomena. Many may consider that logic and metaphysics are the sole domain of the human mind - and certainly, the human mind is focused on these areas as conceptual areas of thought  - but - although

Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Biosemiosis (was Lowell Lecture 3.12

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Søren, List:

I am inclined to agree, and increasingly see Peirce's pragmaticism as a
viable "third way" between various false dichotomies posed by modern and
postmodern thought.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Mon, Jan 22, 2018 at 3:11 PM, Søren Brier  wrote:

> Dear Jon
>
>
>
> If one considers the object of biosemiotic as the evolutionary link
> between what present natural scien ces considers  inanimate nature and
> human development of consciousness language and culture then biosemiotics
> makes it possible to see Peirce process and fallibilist philosophy of
> science as a transdisciplinary alternative to logical positivsim on one
> hand and social constructivism on the other in that his view encompasses
> the qualitative sciences as well as the quantitaticew ones.
>
>
>
> Best wishes
>
>
>
> Søren Brier
>
>
>
> New articles in *Progress in Biophysics and Molecular Biology*
>
> *How Peircean semiotic philosophy connects Western science with Eastern
> emptiness ontology* https://authors.elsevier.com/a/1WF7KI6VGXcejand
>
> *Peircean cosmogony's symbolic agapistic self-organization as an example
> of the influence of eastern philosophy on western thinking*
> https://authors.elsevier.com/a/1WF7KI6VGXceX
>
> 2017 JPBMB Focused Issue on Integral Biomathics: The Necessary Conjunction
> of Western and Eastern Thought Traditions for Exploring the Nature of Mind
> and Life   *
>
> * free promotional access to all focused issue articles until June 20th
> 2018
>
> Brier, S. (2017). C.S. Peirce’s Phenomenological, Evolutionary and
> Trans-disciplinary Semiotic Conception of Science and Religion*. Research
> as Realization: Science, Spirituality and Harmony*. Editor / Ananta Kumar
> Giri. Delhi : Primus Books, 2017. pp. 53-96
>

-
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Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Biosemiosis (was Lowell Lecture 3.12

[Gary Richmond]

Jon S, Edwina, list,

Jon wrote: " classifying biosemiotics under the special sciences does not
somehow turn it into "a special use of Peirce"; it simply recognizes that
it does not fall under (cenoscopic) philosophy, which I thought (perhaps
mistakenly) was obvious and non-controversial."

I agree that biosemiotics is not a cenoscopic but rather a special
(idioscopic) science. This is the *kind* of distinction I just pointed to
in my note to Stephen (now in a new thread as given another Subject). I too
see this as obvious and non-controversial.

It is not as if the idioscopic sciences were, say, any less important than
the cenoscopic ones: phenomenology, normative science, and metaphysics.
Indeed, the idioscopic (special) science are, one might say, "invited" to
use the findings of those sciences, perhaps most especially the findings of
logic as semeiotic.

And, furthermore, there is nothing keeping researchers in the special
sciences from working in cenoscopy. (The following quotes are from the
*Commens* dictionary.)

1905 | Review of Wilhelm Wundt's Principles of Physiological Psychology | CP
8.199The  sort of science that is founded upon the common experience of all
men was recognized by Jeremy Bentham under the name of *cenoscopy*, in
opposition to *idioscopy*, which discovers new phenomena.
1905-06 [c.] | Monist [R] | MS [R] 1338:7 The intermediate department [of
heuretic science], called *cenoscopy*, does not attempt to discover new
phenomena but only analyzes those truths that are known and acknowledged by
everybody.
1905-06 [c.] | Monist [R] | MS [R] 1338:7 The third department [of heuretic
science], called *idioscopy*, embraces all those kinds of investigation
which are occupied in bringing to light phenomena previously unknown and
which having discovered these phenomena use the same observational methods
to push the study of them further.


Again, why is any of this controversial?

Best,

Gary R

[image: Gary Richmond]

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*718 482-5690*

On Mon, Jan 22, 2018 at 1:21 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt 
wrote:

> Edwina, List:
>
> You keep attributing words to me that I have not said; please stop doing
> that.  For example, classifying biosemiotics under the special sciences
> does not somehow turn it into "a special use of Peirce"; it simply
> recognizes that it does not fall under (cenoscopic) philosophy, which I
> thought (perhaps mistakenly) was obvious and non-controversial.  For my own
> clarification, do you consider biosemiotics to be fundamentally
> *normative*, such that it primarily investigates how biological systems *ought
> *to behave; or *descriptive*, such that it primarily investigates how
> biological systems *actually do* behave?
>
> Thanks,
>
> Jon
>
> On Mon, Jan 22, 2018 at 11:56 AM, Edwina Taborsky 
> wrote:
>
>> Jon - you have used those terms before- therefore, it is irrelevant that
>> you haven't used them in the current thread. And I disagree that forbidding
>> such terms as 'unPeircean' and 'more/less legitimate' would block 'the way
>> of inquiry. I consider that their use actually blocks inquiry since it sets
>> up boundaries to the discussion. It tells the other person in the debate:
>> No- I won't consider your view as having any validity because it is
>> 'judged' as 'unPeircean'.
>>
>> As for your other comments - I disagree with your compartmentalization of
>> Peirce. Since, as you note:
>>
>>   Hence the normative science of logic as semeiotic explores how "every
>> intelligence which can learn from experience" (CP 3.428; 1896) ought to
>> go about pursuing truth as "the conformity of a representamen to its
>> object" (CP 5.554, EP 2:380; 1906).  Likewise, "Metaphysics ... endeavors
>> to comprehend the Reality of Phenomena" (CP 2:197; 1903).  "Its business is
>> to study the most general features of reality and real objects" (CP 6.6, EP
>> 2:375; 1906).
>>
>> Then..the fact that biological systems have intelligence and can learn
>> from experience means that Peircean semiosis should not be defined as a
>> 'special science'. And what does 'special science' mean? You seem to
>> consider that it is a 'broad and open' use of Peircean theories. No.
>>
>> That is, in my view, biological systems ARE logical - and biosemiotics
>> certainly wants to 'comprehend the reality of phenomena. Many may consider
>> that logic and metaphysics are the sole domain of the human mind - and
>> certainly, the human mind is focused on these areas as conceptual areas of
>> thought  - but - although the biological realm does not itself reflect on
>> or study the nature of logic and metaphysics - it nevertheless operates
>> within the rules of logic. Your view, as I understand it, that biosemiotics
>> is a 'free interpretation of Peirce' is simply not - in my view, valid.
>>
>> Biosemiotics is not a special use of Peirce. It does not go beyond
>> Peircean framework but is thoro

Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Biosemiosis (was Lowell Lecture 3.12

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Edwina, List:

You keep attributing words to me that I have not said; please stop doing
that.  For example, classifying biosemiotics under the special sciences
does not somehow turn it into "a special use of Peirce"; it simply
recognizes that it does not fall under (cenoscopic) philosophy, which I
thought (perhaps mistakenly) was obvious and non-controversial.  For my own
clarification, do you consider biosemiotics to be fundamentally *normative*,
such that it primarily investigates how biological systems *ought *to
behave; or *descriptive*, such that it primarily investigates how
biological systems *actually do* behave?

Thanks,

Jon

On Mon, Jan 22, 2018 at 11:56 AM, Edwina Taborsky 
wrote:

> Jon - you have used those terms before- therefore, it is irrelevant that
> you haven't used them in the current thread. And I disagree that forbidding
> such terms as 'unPeircean' and 'more/less legitimate' would block 'the way
> of inquiry. I consider that their use actually blocks inquiry since it sets
> up boundaries to the discussion. It tells the other person in the debate:
> No- I won't consider your view as having any validity because it is
> 'judged' as 'unPeircean'.
>
> As for your other comments - I disagree with your compartmentalization of
> Peirce. Since, as you note:
>
>   Hence the normative science of logic as semeiotic explores how "every
> intelligence which can learn from experience" (CP 3.428; 1896) ought to
> go about pursuing truth as "the conformity of a representamen to its
> object" (CP 5.554, EP 2:380; 1906).  Likewise, "Metaphysics ... endeavors
> to comprehend the Reality of Phenomena" (CP 2:197; 1903).  "Its business is
> to study the most general features of reality and real objects" (CP 6.6, EP
> 2:375; 1906).
>
> Then..the fact that biological systems have intelligence and can learn
> from experience means that Peircean semiosis should not be defined as a
> 'special science'. And what does 'special science' mean? You seem to
> consider that it is a 'broad and open' use of Peircean theories. No.
>
> That is, in my view, biological systems ARE logical - and biosemiotics
> certainly wants to 'comprehend the reality of phenomena. Many may consider
> that logic and metaphysics are the sole domain of the human mind - and
> certainly, the human mind is focused on these areas as conceptual areas of
> thought  - but - although the biological realm does not itself reflect on
> or study the nature of logic and metaphysics - it nevertheless operates
> within the rules of logic. Your view, as I understand it, that biosemiotics
> is a 'free interpretation of Peirce' is simply not - in my view, valid.
>
> Biosemiotics is not a special use of Peirce. It does not go beyond
> Peircean framework but is thoroughly grounded in his theories.
>
> Edwina
>
> On Mon 22/01/18 12:39 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com sent:
>
> Edwina, List:
>
> Your labeling of evaluations such as "unPeircean" and "more/less
> legitimate" as "Gatekeeper terminology" is likewise a judgmental assertion
> that expresses your personal opinion.  If we were to forbid all such
> statements from the List, then there would be very little discussion at all
> going forward; it would thus "block the way of inquiry" (CP 1.135, EP 2:48;
> 1898).  Please also note that I have not applied these or any similar
> descriptions to anything that you have (or anyone else has) said in the
> current thread; nor have I argued here or elsewhere that "Peircean semiosis
> is confined to the philosophies of logic or metaphysics."  I have simply
> suggested that we be clear about whether we are talking about those
> branches of philosophy (as I usually am) or about broader applications in
> the physical and biological sciences (as you usually are).
>
> That said, it is not the case, at least according to Peirce, that logic
> and metaphysics apply exclusively "within the human conceptual domain."
> "For normative science in general being the science of the laws of
> conformity of things to ends, ... logic [considers] those things whose end
> is to represent something" (CP 5.129, EP 2:200; 1903).  "Logic regarded
> from one instructive, though partial and narrow, point of view, is the
> theory of deliberate thinking.  To say that any thinking is deliberate is
> to imply that it is controlled with a view to making it conform to a
> purpose or ideal" (CP 1.573, EP 2:376; 1906).  Hence the normative science
> of logic as semeiotic explores how "every intelligence which can learn from
> experience" (CP 3.428; 1896) ought to go about pursuing truth as "the
> conformity of a representamen to its object" (CP 5.554, EP 2:380; 1906).
> Likewise, "Metaphysics ... endeavors to comprehend the Reality of
> Phenomena" (CP 2:197; 1903).  "Its business is to study the most general
> features of reality and real objects" (CP 6.6, EP 2:375; 1906).
>
> By contrast, it seems to me that biosemiotics falls under the special
> sciences, rather than philosophy.  "For th

Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Biosemiosis (was Lowell Lecture 3.12

[Edwina Taborsky]

 

 BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px;
}Jon - you have used those terms before- therefore, it is irrelevant
that you haven't used them in the current thread. And I disagree that
forbidding such terms as 'unPeircean' and 'more/less legitimate' would
block 'the way of inquiry. I consider that their use actually blocks
inquiry since it sets up boundaries to the discussion. It tells the
other person in the debate: No- I won't consider your view as having
any validity because it is 'judged' as 'unPeircean'. 

As for your other comments - I disagree with your
compartmentalization of Peirce. Since, as you note: 

  Hence the normative science of logic as semeiotic explores how
"every intelligence which can learn from experience" (CP 3.428; 1896)
 ought to go about pursuing truth as "the conformity of a
representamen to its object" (CP 5.554, EP 2:380; 1906).  Likewise,
"Metaphysics ... endeavors to comprehend the Reality of Phenomena"
(CP 2:197; 1903).  "Its business is to study the most general
features of reality and real objects" (CP 6.6, EP 2:375; 1906).

Then..the fact that biological systems have intelligence and can
learn from experience means that Peircean semiosis should not be
defined as a 'special science'. And what does 'special science' mean?
You seem to consider that it is a 'broad and open' use of Peircean
theories. No.

That is, in my view, biological systems ARE logical - and
biosemiotics certainly wants to 'comprehend the reality of phenomena.
Many may consider that logic and metaphysics are the sole domain of
the human mind - and certainly, the human mind is focused on these
areas as conceptual areas of thought  - but - although the biological
realm does not itself reflect on or study the nature of logic and
metaphysics - it nevertheless operates within the rules of logic.
Your view, as I understand it, that biosemiotics is a 'free
interpretation of Peirce' is simply not - in my view, valid. 

Biosemiotics is not a special use of Peirce. It does not go beyond
Peircean framework but is thoroughly grounded in his theories. 

Edwina
 On Mon 22/01/18 12:39 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com
sent:
 Edwina, List:
 Your labeling of evaluations such as "unPeircean" and "more/less
legitimate" as "Gatekeeper terminology" is likewise a judgmental
assertion that expresses your personal opinion.  If we were to forbid
all such statements from the List, then there would be very little
discussion at all going forward; it would thus "block the way of
inquiry" (CP 1.135, EP 2:48; 1898).  Please also note that I have not
applied these or any similar descriptions to anything that you have
(or anyone else has) said in the current thread; nor have I argued
here or elsewhere that "Peircean semiosis is confined to the
philosophies of logic or metaphysics."  I have simply suggested that
we be clear about whether we are talking about those branches of
philosophy (as I usually am) or about broader applications in the
physical and biological sciences (as you usually are). 
 That said, it is not the case, at least according to Peirce, that
logic and metaphysics apply exclusively "within the human conceptual
domain."  "For normative science in general being the science of the
laws of conformity of things to ends, ... logic [considers] those
things whose end is to represent something" (CP 5.129, EP 2:200;
1903).  "Logic regarded from one instructive, though partial and
narrow, point of view, is the theory of deliberate thinking.  To say
that any thinking is deliberate is to imply that it is controlled
with a view to making it conform to a purpose or ideal" (CP 1.573, EP
2:376; 1906).  Hence the normative science of logic as semeiotic
explores how "every intelligence which can learn from experience" (CP
3.428; 1896)  ought to go about pursuing truth as "the conformity of a
representamen to its object" (CP 5.554, EP 2:380; 1906).  Likewise,
"Metaphysics ... endeavors to comprehend the Reality of Phenomena"
(CP 2:197; 1903).  "Its business is to study the most general
features of reality and real objects" (CP 6.6, EP 2:375; 1906).
 By contrast, it seems to me that biosemiotics falls under the
special sciences, rather than philosophy.  "For those [special]
sciences, experience is that which their special means of observation
directly bring to light, and it is contrasted with the interpretations
of those observations which are effected by connecting these
experiences with what we otherwise know.  But for philosophy, which
is the science which sets in order those observations which lie open
to every man every day and hour, experience can only mean the total
cognitive result of living, and includes interpretations quite as
truly as it does the matter of sense" (CP 7.538; undated).  Do we at
least agree on that much? 
 Regards,
 Jon 
 On Mon, Jan 22, 2018 at 10:00 AM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:
- Jon - my final comment on this is th

Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Biosemiosis (was Lowell Lecture 3.12

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Edwina, List:

Your labeling of evaluations such as "unPeircean" and "more/less
legitimate" as "Gatekeeper terminology" is likewise a judgmental assertion
that expresses your personal opinion.  If we were to forbid all such
statements from the List, then there would be very little discussion at all
going forward; it would thus "block the way of inquiry" (CP 1.135, EP 2:48;
1898).  Please also note that I have not applied these or any similar
descriptions to anything that you have (or anyone else has) said in the
current thread; nor have I argued here or elsewhere that "Peircean semiosis
is confined to the philosophies of logic or metaphysics."  I have simply
suggested that we be clear about whether we are talking about those
branches of philosophy (as I usually am) or about broader applications in
the physical and biological sciences (as you usually are).

That said, it is not the case, at least according to Peirce, that logic and
metaphysics apply *exclusively *"within the human conceptual domain."  "For
normative science in general being the science of the laws of conformity of
things to ends, ... logic [considers] those things whose end is to
represent something" (CP 5.129, EP 2:200; 1903).  "Logic regarded from one
instructive, though partial and narrow, point of view, is the theory of
deliberate thinking.  To say that any thinking is deliberate is to imply
that it is controlled with a view to making it conform to a purpose or
ideal" (CP 1.573, EP 2:376; 1906).  Hence the normative science of logic as
semeiotic explores how "every intelligence which can learn from experience"
(CP 3.428; 1896) *ought *to go about pursuing truth as "the conformity of a
representamen to its object" (CP 5.554, EP 2:380; 1906).  Likewise,
"Metaphysics ... endeavors to comprehend the Reality of Phenomena" (CP
2:197; 1903).  "Its business is to study the most general features of
reality and real objects" (CP 6.6, EP 2:375; 1906).

By contrast, it seems to me that biosemiotics falls under the special
sciences, rather than philosophy.  "For those [special] sciences,
experience is that which their special means of observation directly bring
to light, and it is contrasted with the interpretations of those
observations which are effected by connecting these experiences with what
we otherwise know.  But for philosophy, which is the science which sets in
order those observations which lie open to every man every day and hour,
experience can only mean the total cognitive result of living, and includes
interpretations quite as truly as it does the matter of sense" (CP 7.538;
undated).  Do we at least agree on that much?

Regards,

Jon

On Mon, Jan 22, 2018 at 10:00 AM, Edwina Taborsky 
wrote:

> - Jon - my final comment on this is that to declare that another view is
> 'unPeircean' or is 'more/less legitimate' is Gatekeeper terminology for it
> inserts a non-individual judgment.
>
>  Yes, I read your full post - and don't agree that biosemiotics goes
> ''well beyond what Peirce explicitly stated'...After all, if it goes 'well
> beyond' the explicit, 'while still remaining within the scope of broadly
> Peircean views'...then, you have watered biosemiotics down to a peripheral
> and even diluted or 'free' Peircean semiosis. As you say - such a
> definition that you use implies a 'freedom' of interpretation.  Those of us
> who refer to his many references to Mind as Matter disagree that Peircean
> semiosis is confined to the philosophies of logic or metaphysics - both of
> which are within the human conceptual domain. Instead, we consider
> that biosemiotics is fully grounded in basic Peircean semiotics. Not 'well
> beyond' but fully grounded'.
>
> that's it.
>
> Edwina
>
> On Mon 22/01/18 10:45 AM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com sent:
>
> Edwina, List:
>
> A gatekeeper is someone who seeks to restrict what others say and do; I
> have simply expressed my personal opinion, exactly the same as you.  Did
> you even read my whole post, or just stop and react after the second
> sentence?  Please note what I said in the last sentence, in particular.  In
> the past, I have not adequately recognized the difference between talking
> about biosemiotics and talking about semeiotic within logic and
> metaphysics, for which I hereby apologize.
>
> Thanks,
>
> Jon
>
> On Mon, Jan 22, 2018 at 9:16 AM, Edwina Taborsky 
> wrote:
>
>> Jon, list - using the term 'more legitimate' is terminology used by a
>> Gatekeeper. After all, to declare that 'some readings of Peirce are more
>> legitimate' is exactly the wording used by a Gatekeeper - who declares that
>> some 'readings/interpretations' are 'more legitimate'!  Legitimate
>> according to what non-individual authoritative scale?
>>
>> As I said - all each one of us, who are each equal to each other and each
>> as dumb/smart as each other can do - is to state that our individual
>> interpretation agrees/disagrees with another - and that's all.
>>
>> As Peirce himself said - to leave truth up t

Aw: Re: Re: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Biosemiosis (was Lowell Lecture 3.12

[Helmut Raulien]

Edwina, list,

with 2.2.1 and 2.2.2. I had meant firstness of secondness of secondness and secondness of secondness of secondness.

Best, Helmut

 

21. Januar 2018 um 21:09 Uhr
Von: "Edwina Taborsky" 
 


Helmut, list - this is far too convoluted for me to reply to very easily. I'll try to make a few comments.

1] My view of Peircean semiosis is that nothing exists except within a triadic infrastructure. So, there is no such thing as a separate isolate Dynamic Object. There are external objects - outside of your or my interaction - but - they exist because they are in semiosic interaction with other semiosic objects. So, that tree several miles away from me is certainly beyond my personal interaction - but - it's in a semiosic interaction with other trees, with the soil, the air, insects and so on. And thus, all of them are changing slightly because of these interactions. 

2] It is not, in my view, that an Object is 'in Secondness'. These modes refer to Relations. So, let's say that I am actually touching that tree; my semiosic interaction would be triadic. The Relation between my knowledge base [Representamen] and the external Dynamic Object could be an interaction, a relation, of Secondness and also, Secondness-as-Firstness. My Immediate Object is strictly internal to my semiosic experience.

Then, my Representamen might be in a Relational mode of Thirdness - providing me with the experience to Interpret that sensation of 2-1 as 'A Tree'..and I might articulate this within the Dynamic Interpretant as such...

3] I don't get your 2.2.1 or 2.2.2. These are triads, i.e., semiosic. ..and need more explanation.

Edwina

 

On Sun 21/01/18 1:13 PM , "Helmut Raulien" h.raul...@gmx.de sent:




Edwina, List,

I agree that the object changes, and that a sign not just replicates it, but also further constructs it, at least the immediate object, and the part of the dynamical one that is concept. The material part of the dynamical object may, but does not have to change due to the sign, or maybe much later (if you e.g. talk about a star which is light years away). My proposal is: If (just if) object is 2ns, then the immediate object is 2.1., the dynamical is 2.2., the conceptual part of the dynamical object is 2.2.1., and the material/energetic part of it is 2.2.2.

So I see, that it it is problematic to e.g. say that an astronomer´s sign functionally consists of e.g. the andromeda galaxy too, that would be a quite ample definition of functional composition, a non-interactive one.

Best,

Helmut

 

 21. Januar 2018 um 00:30 Uhr
Von: "Edwina Taborsky"
 


Helmut, list - yes, I agree. The semiosic process, the triadic Sign, is a function. It fits in exactly: f(x)=y. Or representamen [transforms the sensate data of the Object] into an Interpretant[s].

And yes, this consists of other functions, since no Sign, exists alone but is networked with other Signs - so, it does as you say, 'consist of itself and other things too'.

I'm not sure that I'd agree that the Sign, that triad, consists of the 'whole object' and the 'whole interpretant' - because that would deny the capacity for diversity and variation. That is, if a Sign simply replicated the 'whole object' rather than transforming/interpreting it into effectively a NEW objectvia its own knowledge basethen, this replication would merely be a mechanical rather than semiosic action. The strength of semiosis is that the mediation of the knowledge base [representamen] transforms and enables novelty within the resultant Interpretant.

Edwina

 

On Sat 20/01/18 5:33 PM , "Helmut Raulien" h.raul...@gmx.de sent:




Gary, List,

I have made up a way of seeing "sign" as synonym with "representamen": A sign consisting of sign, object, interpretant is possible, because this kind of "consisting" is a functional composition (A sign is a function, consisting of other functions), which is different from a spatial composition (range consisting of domains). In a functional composition this kind of re-entry is possible: Something consisting of itself and other things too. And, because function is not the same as domain, a sign (functionally) consists of (besides itself) the whole object and the whole interpretant, not only the immediate ones.

1ns: Composition from traits, 2ns: Spatial composition, 3ns: Functional composition.

Best, Helmut

 

 20. Januar 2018 um 22:54 Uhr
Von: g...@gnusystems.ca
 




John, you wrote,

[[ This is one more reason for getting a more complete collection and transcription of Peirce's MSS.  He was undoubtedly thinking about these issues for years, and he must have had good reasons for changing his terminology.  But those brief quotations don't explain why. ]]

What change in terminology are you referring to? And which “brief quotations”?

 

The change I mentioned was the change from (1) using “representamen” as a more general term than “sign” to (2) using them as synonyms to (3) dispensing with the term “representamen” as unnecessary. And the

Re: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Biosemiosis (was Lowell Lecture 3.12

[Edwina Taborsky]

 

Gary F, list

Biosemiotics isn't about the 'affirmation of the continuity of
biological evolution'. And Peirce did say quite a bit about
biological matters - all based around his concept of Mind as Matter.
Biosemiotics is about the triadic semiosic processes taking place
within the biological realm - a process that enables cells to
interact with other cells in a Mind-guided/habit forming pattern that
enables cells/organisms to intelligently react to , interact with
their environment. And to emerge, grow,  adapt within a complex
network to each other. As he said - 'protoplasm feels. It not only
feels but exercises all functions of mind". 6.255.

Edwina
 On Mon 22/01/18 10:55 AM , g...@gnusystems.ca sent:
John,
OK, I didn’t realize that you were looking for advocacy of
biosemiotics in Peirce’s writings. I don’t think he ever used the
term, and I’m not sure how Peirce would go about advocating it, if
that would take something more specific than affirmation of the
continuity of biological evolution. I don’t think Peirce had much
to say about biological matters, so I wouldn’t really expect to
find him saying much specifically about biosemiotics either.  
Gary f.

-Original Message-
 From: John F Sowa [mailto:s...@bestweb.net] 
 Sent: 21-Jan-18 12:24
 To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
 Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Biosemiosis (was Lowell Lecture 3.12
 On 1/21/2018 9:46 AM, g...@gnusystems.ca [1] wrote:

> His anti-psychologism, for example, which he consistently
maintained 

> from the 1860s on, is essentially a refusal to limit the
application 

> of logical principles to what goes on in /human/ minds or brains. 
But advocating anti-psychologism is independent of advocating
biosemiotics.  In discussing logic, he was emphasizing the point that
the definitions are purely formal.  They are independent of any
limitation to biological processes.
> But his logic/semiotic was always generalized from the human  

> experience of sign use, as he says in CP 1.540. And necessarily
so, 

> because “experience is our only teacher”
In CP 1.540, he was also talking about math and logic.  The fact
that he generalized his definition from human use does not imply any
limitation to just human use.  Such an assumption would "block the
way of inquiry". 
> I still don’t see a “change in terminology” here, unless
it’s the 

> change in usage of the word “sign” which occurred after 1903.
The 

> terminological change was that Peirce gave up using the term
“sign”

 > in a way that limited it to the human realm.
What I'd like to know is when Peirce generalized his views about
semiosis to animals.  I'll restate the question:  How and when did
Peirce's thoughts on biosemiosis (as implied by his MSS) develop?
 In 1887, he published an article about logical machines.  Among
other things, he cited Jacquard looms (early 1800s) and Babbage's
machines.  Ada Lovelace wrote her memoirs about programming them in
1843.  If machines could use signs, there would be no logical
objection to claiming that animals could use signs.
He talked about the use of signs by any "scientific intelligence" 

-- for which the only criterion is the ability to learn from
experience.  His anecdotes about dogs and parrots showed how they
learn from experience.  He also mentioned other kinds of animals in
various writings.  His principle of continuity and his knowledge of
Darwin's studies (1859) would lead him to extend at least some subset
of semiosis to animals.
He must have been thinking about generalizing semiosis long before
1903.  Where can we find the evidence?
John 


Links:
--
[1]
http://webmail.primus.ca/javascript:top.opencompose(\'g...@gnusystems.ca\',\'\',\'\',\'\')

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Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Biosemiosis (was Lowell Lecture 3.12

[Edwina Taborsky]

 

 BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px; }-
Jon - my final comment on this is that to declare that another view
is 'unPeircean' or is 'more/less legitimate' is Gatekeeper
terminology for it inserts a non-individual judgment.

 Yes, I read your full post - and don't agree that biosemiotics goes
''well beyond what Peirce explicitly stated'...After all, if it goes
'well beyond' the explicit, 'while still remaining within the scope
of broadly Peircean views'...then, you have watered biosemiotics down
to a peripheral and even diluted or 'free' Peircean semiosis. As you
say - such a definition that you use implies a 'freedom' of
interpretation.  Those of us who refer to his many references to Mind
as Matter disagree that Peircean semiosis is confined to the
philosophies of logic or metaphysics - both of which are within the
human conceptual domain. Instead, we consider that biosemiotics is
fully grounded in basic Peircean semiotics. Not 'well  beyond' but
fully grounded'.

that's it.

Edwina
 On Mon 22/01/18 10:45 AM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com
sent:
 Edwina, List:
 A gatekeeper is someone who seeks to restrict what others say and
do; I have simply expressed my personal opinion, exactly the same as
you.  Did you even read my whole post, or just stop and react after
the second sentence?  Please note what I said in the last sentence,
in particular.  In the past, I have not adequately recognized the
difference between talking about biosemiotics and talking about
semeiotic within logic and metaphysics, for which I hereby apologize.

 Thanks,
 Jon
 On Mon, Jan 22, 2018 at 9:16 AM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:
Jon, list - using the term 'more legitimate' is terminology used by
a Gatekeeper. After all, to declare that 'some readings of Peirce are
more legitimate' is exactly the wording used by a Gatekeeper - who
declares that some 'readings/interpretations' are 'more legitimate'! 
Legitimate according to what non-individual authoritative scale?

As I said - all each one of us, who are each equal to each other and
each as dumb/smart as each other can do - is to state that our
individual interpretation agrees/disagrees with another - and that's
all. 

As Peirce himself said - to leave truth up to an individual is 'most
pernicious' - and no individual has the right to say that a
reading/interpretation is 'more legitimate/truthful than another.
Again - all one can do is say: I personally disagree - and my own
view is quite different and is such and such. Period. None of us has
the right to declare that another view has a universal non-validity
[i.e., is 'not legitimate']. ...You can't say it's 'unPeircean' or is
'not legitimate' because that inserts an external authoritative
criterion. All you can do is say: I, personally, don't agree. 

Edwina
 On Mon 22/01/18  9:48 AM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com
[2] sent:
 Edwina, List:
 I never have and never would set myself up as gatekeeper to Peirce
or some kind of authoritative interpreter of his writings.  What I
have argued in the past, but have no desire to rehash now, is that
some readings of Peirce (or any other author) are more legitimate
than others.  Instead, I respectfully would like to suggest that when
we discuss semeiotic concepts and terminology, we should be clear
about the specific level of Peirce's architectonic classification of
the sciences in which we are operating.  There are at least three
that seem to come up regularly. 
*The normative science of logic as semeiotic.
*The metaphysical doctrine of semeiotic realism.
*The special science of biology, which includes biosemiotics.

This order corresponds not only to how they are arranged in Peirce's
scheme, but also to how much he had to say directly about them during
his lifetime.  As such, I acknowledge that there is more freedom in
biosemiotics--the topic of this particular thread--than in the
philosophical aspects of semeiotic (logic and metaphysics) to go well
beyond anything that Peirce explicitly stated, while still remaining
within the scope of broadly Peircean views. 
 Regards,
Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USAProfessional Engineer, Amateur
Philosopher, Lutheran Laymanwww.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt [3] -
twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt [4]  
 On Sun, Jan 21, 2018 at 11:54 AM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:
Just one other comment. I think that we have to be careful on this
list [and I am NOT referring to you, John] that we do not set
ourselves up as gatekeepers to Peirce. One or two people on this list
seem to think that way - i.e.,I've been told several times that my
views are 'UnPeircean'.  My response is that we are all equal; I, for
example, am as smart and as dumb as any other person. I don't think
that anyone can tell another person that their views are 'unPeircean'
or are 'not Peirce' because none of us are the Authoritative
Gatekeepers of What is Peirce.  All one c

Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Biosemiosis (was Lowell Lecture 3.12

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Edwina, List:

A gatekeeper is someone who seeks to restrict what others say and do; I
have simply expressed my personal opinion, exactly the same as you.  Did
you even read my whole post, or just stop and react after the second
sentence?  Please note what I said in the last sentence, in particular.  In
the past, I have not adequately recognized the difference between talking
about biosemiotics and talking about semeiotic within logic and
metaphysics, for which I hereby apologize.

Thanks,

Jon

On Mon, Jan 22, 2018 at 9:16 AM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:

> Jon, list - using the term 'more legitimate' is terminology used by a
> Gatekeeper. After all, to declare that 'some readings of Peirce are more
> legitimate' is exactly the wording used by a Gatekeeper - who declares that
> some 'readings/interpretations' are 'more legitimate'!  Legitimate
> according to what non-individual authoritative scale?
>
> As I said - all each one of us, who are each equal to each other and each
> as dumb/smart as each other can do - is to state that our individual
> interpretation agrees/disagrees with another - and that's all.
>
> As Peirce himself said - to leave truth up to an individual is 'most
> pernicious' - and no individual has the right to say that a
> reading/interpretation is 'more legitimate/truthful than another. Again -
> all one can do is say: I personally disagree - and my own view is
> quite different and is such and such. Period. None of us has the right to
> declare that another view has a universal non-validity [i.e., is 'not
> legitimate']. ...You can't say it's 'unPeircean' or is 'not legitimate'
> because that inserts an external authoritative criterion. All you can do is
> say: I, personally, don't agree.
>
> Edwina
>
> On Mon 22/01/18 9:48 AM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com sent:
>
> Edwina, List:
>
> I never have and never would set myself up as gatekeeper to Peirce or some
> kind of authoritative interpreter of his writings.  What I have argued in
> the past, but have no desire to rehash now, is that some readings of Peirce
> (or any other author) are more legitimate than others.  Instead, I
> respectfully would like to suggest that when we discuss semeiotic concepts
> and terminology, we should be clear about the specific level of Peirce's
> architectonic classification of the sciences in which we are operating.
> There are at least three that seem to come up regularly.
>
>1. The normative science of logic as semeiotic.
>2. The metaphysical doctrine of semeiotic realism.
>3. The special science of biology, which includes biosemiotics.
>
> This order corresponds not only to how they are arranged in Peirce's
> scheme, but also to how much he had to say directly about them during his
> lifetime.  As such, I acknowledge that there is more freedom in
> biosemiotics--the topic of this particular thread--than in the
> philosophical aspects of semeiotic (logic and metaphysics) to go well
> beyond anything that Peirce explicitly stated, while still remaining within
> the scope of broadly Peircean views.
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
>
> On Sun, Jan 21, 2018 at 11:54 AM, Edwina Taborsky 
> wrote:
>
>> Just one other comment. I think that we have to be careful on this list
>> [and I am NOT referring to you, John] that we do not set ourselves up as
>> gatekeepers to Peirce. One or two people on this list seem to think that
>> way - i.e.,I've been told several times that my views are 'UnPeircean'.  My
>> response is that we are all equal; I, for example, am as smart and as dumb
>> as any other person. I don't think that anyone can tell another person that
>> their views are 'unPeircean' or are 'not Peirce' because none of us are the
>> Authoritative Gatekeepers of What is Peirce.  All one can say is: 'I
>> disagree with your view'.and outline your own view. That's it.
>>
>

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PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L 
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Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Biosemiosis (was Lowell Lecture 3.12

[Stephen C. Rose]

The only rule I follow after being duly notified is that I try to relate
things to Peirce. Otherwise equality reigns.

amazon.com/author/stephenrose

On Mon, Jan 22, 2018 at 9:48 AM, Jon Alan Schmidt 
wrote:

> Edwina, List:
>
> I never have and never would set myself up as gatekeeper to Peirce or some
> kind of authoritative interpreter of his writings.  What I have argued in
> the past, but have no desire to rehash now, is that some readings of Peirce
> (or any other author) are more legitimate than others.  Instead, I
> respectfully would like to suggest that when we discuss semeiotic concepts
> and terminology, we should be clear about the specific level of Peirce's
> architectonic classification of the sciences in which we are operating.
> There are at least three that seem to come up regularly.
>
>1. The normative science of logic as semeiotic.
>2. The metaphysical doctrine of semeiotic realism.
>3. The special science of biology, which includes biosemiotics.
>
> This order corresponds not only to how they are arranged in Peirce's
> scheme, but also to how much he had to say directly about them during his
> lifetime.  As such, I acknowledge that there is more freedom in
> biosemiotics--the topic of this particular thread--than in the
> philosophical aspects of semeiotic (logic and metaphysics) to go well
> beyond anything that Peirce explicitly stated, while still remaining within
> the scope of broadly Peircean views.
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
>
> On Sun, Jan 21, 2018 at 11:54 AM, Edwina Taborsky 
> wrote:
>
>> Just one other comment. I think that we have to be careful on this list
>> [and I am NOT referring to you, John] that we do not set ourselves up as
>> gatekeepers to Peirce. One or two people on this list seem to think that
>> way - i.e.,I've been told several times that my views are 'UnPeircean'.  My
>> response is that we are all equal; I, for example, am as smart and as dumb
>> as any other person. I don't think that anyone can tell another person that
>> their views are 'unPeircean' or are 'not Peirce' because none of us are the
>> Authoritative Gatekeepers of What is Peirce.  All one can say is: 'I
>> disagree with your view'.and outline your own view. That's it.
>>
>
>
> -
> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON
> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to
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>
>
>
>
>
>

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Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Biosemiosis (was Lowell Lecture 3.12

[Edwina Taborsky]

 

 BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px;
}Jon, list - using the term 'more legitimate' is terminology used by
a Gatekeeper. After all, to declare that 'some readings of Peirce are
more legitimate' is exactly the wording used by a Gatekeeper - who
declares that some 'readings/interpretations' are 'more legitimate'! 
Legitimate according to what non-individual authoritative scale?

As I said - all each one of us, who are each equal to each other and
each as dumb/smart as each other can do - is to state that our
individual interpretation agrees/disagrees with another - and that's
all.

As Peirce himself said - to leave truth up to an individual is 'most
pernicious' - and no individual has the right to say that a
reading/interpretation is 'more legitimate/truthful than another.
Again - all one can do is say: I personally disagree - and my own
view is quite different and is such and such. Period. None of us has
the right to declare that another view has a universal non-validity
[i.e., is 'not legitimate']. ...You can't say it's 'unPeircean' or is
'not legitimate' because that inserts an external authoritative
criterion. All you can do is say: I, personally, don't agree.

Edwina
 On Mon 22/01/18  9:48 AM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com
sent:
 Edwina, List:
 I never have and never would set myself up as gatekeeper to Peirce
or some kind of authoritative interpreter of his writings.  What I
have argued in the past, but have no desire to rehash now, is that
some readings of Peirce (or any other author) are more legitimate
than others.  Instead, I respectfully would like to suggest that when
we discuss semeiotic concepts and terminology, we should be clear
about the specific level of Peirce's architectonic classification of
the sciences in which we are operating.  There are at least three
that seem to come up regularly. 
*The normative science of logic as semeiotic.
*The metaphysical doctrine of semeiotic realism.
*The special science of biology, which includes biosemiotics.

This order corresponds not only to how they are arranged in Peirce's
scheme, but also to how much he had to say directly about them during
his lifetime.  As such, I acknowledge that there is more freedom in
biosemiotics--the topic of this particular thread--than in the
philosophical aspects of semeiotic (logic and metaphysics) to go well
beyond anything that Peirce explicitly stated, while still remaining
within the scope of broadly Peircean views. 
 Regards,
Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USAProfessional Engineer, Amateur
Philosopher, Lutheran Laymanwww.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt [1] -
twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt [2]  
 On Sun, Jan 21, 2018 at 11:54 AM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:
Just one other comment. I think that we have to be careful on this
list [and I am NOT referring to you, John] that we do not set
ourselves up as gatekeepers to Peirce. One or two people on this list
seem to think that way - i.e.,I've been told several times that my
views are 'UnPeircean'.  My response is that we are all equal; I, for
example, am as smart and as dumb as any other person. I don't think
that anyone can tell another person that their views are 'unPeircean'
or are 'not Peirce' because none of us are the Authoritative
Gatekeepers of What is Peirce.  All one can say is: 'I disagree with
your view'.and outline your own view. That's it.  


Links:
--
[1] http://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt
[2] http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
[3]
http://webmail.primus.ca/javascript:top.opencompose(\'tabor...@primus.ca\',\'\',\'\',\'\')

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PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L 
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Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Biosemiosis (was Lowell Lecture 3.12

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Edwina, List:

I never have and never would set myself up as gatekeeper to Peirce or some
kind of authoritative interpreter of his writings.  What I have argued in
the past, but have no desire to rehash now, is that some readings of Peirce
(or any other author) are more legitimate than others.  Instead, I
respectfully would like to suggest that when we discuss semeiotic concepts
and terminology, we should be clear about the specific level of Peirce's
architectonic classification of the sciences in which we are operating.
There are at least three that seem to come up regularly.

   1. The normative science of logic as semeiotic.
   2. The metaphysical doctrine of semeiotic realism.
   3. The special science of biology, which includes biosemiotics.

This order corresponds not only to how they are arranged in Peirce's
scheme, but also to how much he had to say directly about them during his
lifetime.  As such, I acknowledge that there is more freedom in
biosemiotics--the topic of this particular thread--than in the
philosophical aspects of semeiotic (logic and metaphysics) to go well
beyond anything that Peirce explicitly stated, while still remaining within
the scope of broadly Peircean views.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Sun, Jan 21, 2018 at 11:54 AM, Edwina Taborsky 
wrote:

> Just one other comment. I think that we have to be careful on this list
> [and I am NOT referring to you, John] that we do not set ourselves up as
> gatekeepers to Peirce. One or two people on this list seem to think that
> way - i.e.,I've been told several times that my views are 'UnPeircean'.  My
> response is that we are all equal; I, for example, am as smart and as dumb
> as any other person. I don't think that anyone can tell another person that
> their views are 'unPeircean' or are 'not Peirce' because none of us are the
> Authoritative Gatekeepers of What is Peirce.  All one can say is: 'I
> disagree with your view'.and outline your own view. That's it.
>

-
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L 
to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To 
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Re: Aw: Re: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Biosemiosis (was Lowell Lecture 3.12

[Edwina Taborsky]

 

Helmut, list - this is far too convoluted for me to reply to very
easily. I'll try to make a few comments.

1] My view of Peircean semiosis is that nothing exists except within
a triadic infrastructure. So, there is no such thing as a separate
isolate Dynamic Object. There are external objects - outside of your
or my interaction - but - they exist because they are in semiosic
interaction with other semiosic objects. So, that tree several miles
away from me is certainly beyond my personal interaction - but - it's
in a semiosic interaction with other trees, with the soil, the air,
insects and so on. And thus, all of them are changing slightly
because of these interactions. 

2] It is not, in my view, that an Object is 'in Secondness'. These
modes refer to Relations. So, let's say that I am actually touching
that tree; my semiosic interaction would be triadic. The Relation
between my knowledge base [Representamen] and the external Dynamic
Object could be an interaction, a relation, of Secondness and also,
Secondness-as-Firstness. My Immediate Object is strictly internal to
my semiosic experience.

Then, my Representamen might be in a Relational mode of Thirdness -
providing me with the experience to Interpret that sensation of 2-1
as 'A Tree'..and I might articulate this within the Dynamic
Interpretant as such...

3] I don't get your 2.2.1 or 2.2.2. These are triads, i.e.,
semiosic. ..and need more explanation.

Edwina
 On Sun 21/01/18  1:13 PM , "Helmut Raulien" h.raul...@gmx.de sent:
  Edwina, List, I agree that the object changes, and that a sign not
just replicates it, but also further constructs it, at least the
immediate object, and the part of the dynamical one that is concept.
The material part of the dynamical object may, but does not have to
change due to the sign, or maybe much later (if you e.g. talk about a
star which is light years away). My proposal is: If (just if) object
is 2ns, then the immediate object is 2.1., the dynamical is 2.2., the
conceptual part of the dynamical object is 2.2.1., and the
material/energetic part of it is 2.2.2. So I see, that it it is
problematic to e.g. say that an astronomer´s sign functionally
consists of e.g. the andromeda galaxy too, that would be a quite
ample definition of functional composition, a non-interactive one.
Best, Helmut 21. Januar 2018 um 00:30 Uhr
 Von: "Edwina Taborsky" 
Helmut, list - yes, I agree. The semiosic process, the triadic Sign,
is a function. It fits in exactly: f(x)=y. Or representamen
[transforms the sensate data of the Object] into an Interpretant[s]. 

And yes, this consists of other functions, since no Sign, exists
alone but is networked with other Signs - so, it does as you say,
'consist of itself and other things too'. 

I'm not sure that I'd agree that the Sign, that triad, consists of
the 'whole object' and the 'whole interpretant' - because that would
deny the capacity for diversity and variation. That is, if a Sign
simply replicated the 'whole object' rather than
transforming/interpreting it into effectively a NEW objectvia its
own knowledge basethen, this replication would merely be a
mechanical rather than semiosic action. The strength of semiosis is
that the mediation of the knowledge base [representamen] transforms
and enables novelty within the resultant Interpretant. 

Edwina
 On Sat 20/01/18 5:33 PM , "Helmut Raulien" h.raul...@gmx.de sent:   
Gary, List, I have made up a way of seeing "sign" as synonym with
"representamen": A sign consisting of sign, object, interpretant is
possible, because this kind of "consisting" is a functional
composition (A sign is a function, consisting of other functions),
which is different from a spatial composition (range consisting of
domains). In a functional composition this kind of re-entry is
possible: Something consisting of itself and other things too. And,
because function is not the same as domain, a sign (functionally)
consists of (besides itself) the whole object and the whole
interpretant, not only the immediate ones. 1ns: Composition from
traits, 2ns: Spatial composition, 3ns: Functional composition. Best,
Helmut 20. Januar 2018 um 22:54 Uhr
 Von: g...@gnusystems.ca
John, you wrote, 

[[ This is one more reason for getting a more complete collection
and transcription of Peirce's MSS.  He was undoubtedly thinking about
these issues for years, and he must have had good reasons for changing
his terminology.  But those brief quotations don't explain why. ]] 

What change in terminology are you referring to? And which “brief
quotations”? 
The change I mentioned was the change from (1) using
“representamen” as a more general term than “sign” to (2)
using them as synonyms to (3) dispensing with the term
“representamen” as unnecessary. And the explanation of that shift
that I quoted was an excerpt from a 1905 letter to Welby. If that’s
the “brief quotatio

Aw: Re: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Biosemiosis (was Lowell Lecture 3.12

[Helmut Raulien]

 
 
 


Suppsupplement: Or just define "same" as not the same as identical, like tomorrow I will be the same person as today, but will not be identical.
 

Supplement: If it is ok. to call the mattergetic part of the dynamical object the "subject", then I would (unhumbly I´m afraid) replace Peirces saying that the next sign in a semiosis has the same object with saying that it has a new object containing the same subject.




Edwina, List,

I agree that the object changes, and that a sign not just replicates it, but also further constructs it, at least the immediate object, and the part of the dynamical one that is concept. The material part of the dynamical object may, but does not have to change due to the sign, or maybe much later (if you e.g. talk about a star which is light years away). My proposal is: If (just if) object is 2ns, then the immediate object is 2.1., the dynamical is 2.2., the conceptual part of the dynamical object is 2.2.1., and the material/energetic part of it is 2.2.2.

So I see, that it it is problematic to e.g. say that an astronomer´s sign functionally consists of e.g. the andromeda galaxy too, that would be a quite ample definition of functional composition, a non-interactive one.

Best,

Helmut

 

 21. Januar 2018 um 00:30 Uhr
Von: "Edwina Taborsky" 
 


Helmut, list - yes, I agree. The semiosic process, the triadic Sign, is a function. It fits in exactly: f(x)=y. Or representamen [transforms the sensate data of the Object] into an Interpretant[s].

And yes, this consists of other functions, since no Sign, exists alone but is networked with other Signs - so, it does as you say, 'consist of itself and other things too'.

I'm not sure that I'd agree that the Sign, that triad, consists of the 'whole object' and the 'whole interpretant' - because that would deny the capacity for diversity and variation. That is, if a Sign simply replicated the 'whole object' rather than transforming/interpreting it into effectively a NEW objectvia its own knowledge basethen, this replication would merely be a mechanical rather than semiosic action. The strength of semiosis is that the mediation of the knowledge base [representamen] transforms and enables novelty within the resultant Interpretant.

Edwina

 

On Sat 20/01/18 5:33 PM , "Helmut Raulien" h.raul...@gmx.de sent:




Gary, List,

I have made up a way of seeing "sign" as synonym with "representamen": A sign consisting of sign, object, interpretant is possible, because this kind of "consisting" is a functional composition (A sign is a function, consisting of other functions), which is different from a spatial composition (range consisting of domains). In a functional composition this kind of re-entry is possible: Something consisting of itself and other things too. And, because function is not the same as domain, a sign (functionally) consists of (besides itself) the whole object and the whole interpretant, not only the immediate ones.

1ns: Composition from traits, 2ns: Spatial composition, 3ns: Functional composition.

Best, Helmut

 

 20. Januar 2018 um 22:54 Uhr
Von: g...@gnusystems.ca
 




John, you wrote,

[[ This is one more reason for getting a more complete collection and transcription of Peirce's MSS.  He was undoubtedly thinking about these issues for years, and he must have had good reasons for changing his terminology.  But those brief quotations don't explain why. ]]

What change in terminology are you referring to? And which “brief quotations”?

 

The change I mentioned was the change from (1) using “representamen” as a more general term than “sign” to (2) using them as synonyms to (3) dispensing with the term “representamen” as unnecessary. And the explanation of that shift that I quoted was an excerpt from a 1905 letter to Welby. If that’s the “brief quotations” you mean, what is it that they leave unexplained? Here it is again :

[[ I use ‘sign’ in the widest sense of the definition. It is a wonderful case of an almost popular use of a very broad word in almost the exact sense of the scientific definition. … I formerly preferred the term representamen. But there was no need of this horrid long word. … The truth is that I went wrong from not having a formal definition all drawn up. This sort of thing is inevitable in the early stages of a strong logical study; for if a formal definition is attempted too soon, it will only shackle thought.  ] SS p.193 ]

 

Gary f.

 

-Original Message-
From: John F Sowa [mailto:s...@bestweb.net]
Sent: 20-Jan-18 15:01
To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Biosemiosis (was Lowell Lecture 3.12

 

Edwina, Gary R, Stephen, and Gary F,

 

Edwina

> I emphasize that semiosis is operative not merely in the more complex

> or larger-brain animals, but in all matter, from the smallest micro

> bacterium to the plant world to the animal world.

 

Yes.  I like to quote the biologist Lynn Margulis, who devoted her career to studying bacteria:  “The growth, reproduct

Aw: Re: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Biosemiosis (was Lowell Lecture 3.12

[Helmut Raulien]

 
 

Supplement: If it is ok. to call the mattergetic part of the dynamical object the "subject", then I would (unhumbly I´m afraid) replace Peirces saying that the next sign in a semiosis has the same object with saying that it has a new object containing the same subject.




Edwina, List,

I agree that the object changes, and that a sign not just replicates it, but also further constructs it, at least the immediate object, and the part of the dynamical one that is concept. The material part of the dynamical object may, but does not have to change due to the sign, or maybe much later (if you e.g. talk about a star which is light years away). My proposal is: If (just if) object is 2ns, then the immediate object is 2.1., the dynamical is 2.2., the conceptual part of the dynamical object is 2.2.1., and the material/energetic part of it is 2.2.2.

So I see, that it it is problematic to e.g. say that an astronomer´s sign functionally consists of e.g. the andromeda galaxy too, that would be a quite ample definition of functional composition, a non-interactive one.

Best,

Helmut

 

 21. Januar 2018 um 00:30 Uhr
Von: "Edwina Taborsky" 
 


Helmut, list - yes, I agree. The semiosic process, the triadic Sign, is a function. It fits in exactly: f(x)=y. Or representamen [transforms the sensate data of the Object] into an Interpretant[s].

And yes, this consists of other functions, since no Sign, exists alone but is networked with other Signs - so, it does as you say, 'consist of itself and other things too'.

I'm not sure that I'd agree that the Sign, that triad, consists of the 'whole object' and the 'whole interpretant' - because that would deny the capacity for diversity and variation. That is, if a Sign simply replicated the 'whole object' rather than transforming/interpreting it into effectively a NEW objectvia its own knowledge basethen, this replication would merely be a mechanical rather than semiosic action. The strength of semiosis is that the mediation of the knowledge base [representamen] transforms and enables novelty within the resultant Interpretant.

Edwina

 

On Sat 20/01/18 5:33 PM , "Helmut Raulien" h.raul...@gmx.de sent:




Gary, List,

I have made up a way of seeing "sign" as synonym with "representamen": A sign consisting of sign, object, interpretant is possible, because this kind of "consisting" is a functional composition (A sign is a function, consisting of other functions), which is different from a spatial composition (range consisting of domains). In a functional composition this kind of re-entry is possible: Something consisting of itself and other things too. And, because function is not the same as domain, a sign (functionally) consists of (besides itself) the whole object and the whole interpretant, not only the immediate ones.

1ns: Composition from traits, 2ns: Spatial composition, 3ns: Functional composition.

Best, Helmut

 

 20. Januar 2018 um 22:54 Uhr
Von: g...@gnusystems.ca
 




John, you wrote,

[[ This is one more reason for getting a more complete collection and transcription of Peirce's MSS.  He was undoubtedly thinking about these issues for years, and he must have had good reasons for changing his terminology.  But those brief quotations don't explain why. ]]

What change in terminology are you referring to? And which “brief quotations”?

 

The change I mentioned was the change from (1) using “representamen” as a more general term than “sign” to (2) using them as synonyms to (3) dispensing with the term “representamen” as unnecessary. And the explanation of that shift that I quoted was an excerpt from a 1905 letter to Welby. If that’s the “brief quotations” you mean, what is it that they leave unexplained? Here it is again :

[[ I use ‘sign’ in the widest sense of the definition. It is a wonderful case of an almost popular use of a very broad word in almost the exact sense of the scientific definition. … I formerly preferred the term representamen. But there was no need of this horrid long word. … The truth is that I went wrong from not having a formal definition all drawn up. This sort of thing is inevitable in the early stages of a strong logical study; for if a formal definition is attempted too soon, it will only shackle thought.  ] SS p.193 ]

 

Gary f.

 

-Original Message-
From: John F Sowa [mailto:s...@bestweb.net]
Sent: 20-Jan-18 15:01
To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Biosemiosis (was Lowell Lecture 3.12

 

Edwina, Gary R, Stephen, and Gary F,

 

Edwina

> I emphasize that semiosis is operative not merely in the more complex

> or larger-brain animals, but in all matter, from the smallest micro

> bacterium to the plant world to the animal world.

 

Yes.  I like to quote the biologist Lynn Margulis, who devoted her career to studying bacteria:  “The growth, reproduction, and communication of these moving, alliance-forming bacteria”

lie on a continuum “with our thought, with our happiness, our sensitivities and sti

Aw: Re: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Biosemiosis (was Lowell Lecture 3.12

[Helmut Raulien]

Edwina, List,

I agree that the object changes, and that a sign not just replicates it, but also further constructs it, at least the immediate object, and the part of the dynamical one that is concept. The material part of the dynamical object may, but does not have to change due to the sign, or maybe much later (if you e.g. talk about a star which is light years away). My proposal is: If (just if) object is 2ns, then the immediate object is 2.1., the dynamical is 2.2., the conceptual part of the dynamical object is 2.2.1., and the material/energetic part of it is 2.2.2.

So I see, that it it is problematic to e.g. say that an astronomer´s sign functionally consists of e.g. the andromeda galaxy too, that would be a quite ample definition of functional composition, a non-interactive one.

Best,

Helmut

 

 21. Januar 2018 um 00:30 Uhr
Von: "Edwina Taborsky" 
 


Helmut, list - yes, I agree. The semiosic process, the triadic Sign, is a function. It fits in exactly: f(x)=y. Or representamen [transforms the sensate data of the Object] into an Interpretant[s].

And yes, this consists of other functions, since no Sign, exists alone but is networked with other Signs - so, it does as you say, 'consist of itself and other things too'.

I'm not sure that I'd agree that the Sign, that triad, consists of the 'whole object' and the 'whole interpretant' - because that would deny the capacity for diversity and variation. That is, if a Sign simply replicated the 'whole object' rather than transforming/interpreting it into effectively a NEW objectvia its own knowledge basethen, this replication would merely be a mechanical rather than semiosic action. The strength of semiosis is that the mediation of the knowledge base [representamen] transforms and enables novelty within the resultant Interpretant.

Edwina

 

On Sat 20/01/18 5:33 PM , "Helmut Raulien" h.raul...@gmx.de sent:




Gary, List,

I have made up a way of seeing "sign" as synonym with "representamen": A sign consisting of sign, object, interpretant is possible, because this kind of "consisting" is a functional composition (A sign is a function, consisting of other functions), which is different from a spatial composition (range consisting of domains). In a functional composition this kind of re-entry is possible: Something consisting of itself and other things too. And, because function is not the same as domain, a sign (functionally) consists of (besides itself) the whole object and the whole interpretant, not only the immediate ones.

1ns: Composition from traits, 2ns: Spatial composition, 3ns: Functional composition.

Best, Helmut

 

 20. Januar 2018 um 22:54 Uhr
Von: g...@gnusystems.ca
 




John, you wrote,

[[ This is one more reason for getting a more complete collection and transcription of Peirce's MSS.  He was undoubtedly thinking about these issues for years, and he must have had good reasons for changing his terminology.  But those brief quotations don't explain why. ]]

What change in terminology are you referring to? And which “brief quotations”?

 

The change I mentioned was the change from (1) using “representamen” as a more general term than “sign” to (2) using them as synonyms to (3) dispensing with the term “representamen” as unnecessary. And the explanation of that shift that I quoted was an excerpt from a 1905 letter to Welby. If that’s the “brief quotations” you mean, what is it that they leave unexplained? Here it is again :

[[ I use ‘sign’ in the widest sense of the definition. It is a wonderful case of an almost popular use of a very broad word in almost the exact sense of the scientific definition. … I formerly preferred the term representamen. But there was no need of this horrid long word. … The truth is that I went wrong from not having a formal definition all drawn up. This sort of thing is inevitable in the early stages of a strong logical study; for if a formal definition is attempted too soon, it will only shackle thought.  ] SS p.193 ]

 

Gary f.

 

-Original Message-
From: John F Sowa [mailto:s...@bestweb.net]
Sent: 20-Jan-18 15:01
To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Biosemiosis (was Lowell Lecture 3.12

 

Edwina, Gary R, Stephen, and Gary F,

 

Edwina

> I emphasize that semiosis is operative not merely in the more complex

> or larger-brain animals, but in all matter, from the smallest micro

> bacterium to the plant world to the animal world.

 

Yes.  I like to quote the biologist Lynn Margulis, who devoted her career to studying bacteria:  “The growth, reproduction, and communication of these moving, alliance-forming bacteria”

lie on a continuum “with our thought, with our happiness, our sensitivities and stimulations.”

https://www.edge.org/documents/ThirdCulture/n-Ch.7.html

 

Gary R

> Has there been any work (articles, dissertations, etc.) comparing the

> thinking of the two? As I recall, John, some of your papers touch on

> this.

 

Following is the article I presented at 

Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Biosemiosis (was Lowell Lecture 3.12

[Edwina Taborsky]

 

 BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px;
}John,list

I think the evidence for Peirce considering that semiosis is
operative in all realms - the physical-chemical, the biological and
the human conceptual, is in his many references to 'Mind as Matter'
[6.277]; that matter is 'effete Mind' 6.25; 6.158 and that
'protoplasm feels and has Mind [6.251]. 

And of course, that 4.551 assertion that 'thought is not necessarily
connected with a brain but appears in the work of bees, of crystals
and throughout the purely physical world'.

His outline of the role of chance and spontaneity inthe emergence of
novel forms of matter in his discussion of evolution; and his outline
of cosmology - again, both show the actions of semiosis in Mind
-as-Matter.

His rejection of consciousness as necessary in this semiosis
[7.364,5]

Even the notion of the semiosic process as 'transformation' 4.572

I see his semiosis as an active formative process - of Mind forming
as Matter. I don't see Peircean semiosis as confined to the human
intellect, to the rhetorical interpretation of 'things-to-words or
concepts so to speak..

--

Just one other comment. I think that we have to be careful on this
list [and I am NOT referring to you, John] that we do not set
ourselves up as gatekeepers to Peirce. One or two people on this list
seem to think that way - i.e.,I've been told several times that my
views are 'UnPeircean'.  My response is that we are all equal; I, for
example, am as smart and as dumb as any other person. I don't think
that anyone can tell another person that their views are 'unPeircean'
or are 'not Peirce' because none of us are the Authoritative
Gatekeepers of What is Peirce.  All one can say is: 'I disagree with
your view'.and outline your own view. That's it.



Edwina
 On Sun 21/01/18 12:23 PM , John F Sowa s...@bestweb.net sent:
 On 1/21/2018 9:46 AM, g...@gnusystems.ca [1] wrote: 
 > His anti-psychologism, for example, which he consistently
maintained  
 > from the 1860s on, is essentially a refusal to limit the
application of  
 > logical principles to what goes on in /human/ minds or brains. 
 But advocating anti-psychologism is independent of advocating 
 biosemiotics.  In discussing logic, he was emphasizing the point 
 that the definitions are purely formal.  They are independent 
 of any limitation to biological processes. 
 > But his logic/semiotic was always generalized from the human 
 > experience of sign use, as he says in CP 1.540. And necessarily
so, 
 > because “experience is our only teacher”  
 In CP 1.540, he was also talking about math and logic.  The fact 
 that he generalized his definition from human use does not imply 
 any limitation to just human use.  Such an assumption would 
 "block the way of inquiry". 
 > I still don’t see a “change in terminology” here, unless
it’s the 
 > change in usage of the word “sign” which occurred after 1903.
The 
 > terminological change was that Peirce gave up using the term
“sign” 
 > in a way that limited it to the human realm. 
 What I'd like to know is when Peirce generalized his views about 
 semiosis to animals.  I'll restate the question:  How and when did 
 Peirce's thoughts on biosemiosis (as implied by his MSS) develop? 
 In 1887, he published an article about logical machines.  Among 
 other things, he cited Jacquard looms (early 1800s) and Babbage's 
 machines.  Ada Lovelace wrote her memoirs about programming them 
 in 1843.  If machines could use signs, there would be no logical 
 objection to claiming that animals could use signs. 
 He talked about the use of signs by any "scientific intelligence" 
 -- for which the only criterion is the ability to learn from 
 experience.  His anecdotes about dogs and parrots showed how they 
 learn from experience.  He also mentioned other kinds of animals 
 in various writings.  His principle of continuity and his knowledge 
 of Darwin's studies (1859) would lead him to extend at least some 
 subset of semiosis to animals. 
 He must have been thinking about generalizing semiosis long 
 before 1903.  Where can we find the evidence? 
 John 


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Re: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Biosemiosis (was Lowell Lecture 3.12

[Edwina Taborsky]

 

Gary F, list:

Exactly - it's Peircean semiotics that we are focused on. And that
remains - a triadic process - something that can disappear when one
focuses only on the individual terminology. The key to Peircean
semiosis is that the triad is ONE 'complete' action of three subsets
or relations or correlates or whatever terms one uses [and Peirce
used both correlate and relation]and what is important, in my
view, is considering what that WHOLE process does.

I suspect, moreover, that you, Gary F., think of a function only as
an equation of two terms, i.e., where x=y. But a function has three
terms, of f(x)=y - and that's NOT a representational interaction but
a transformative interaction.

For example, you can get a number of hydrogen and oxygen atoms
lurking  around [X or Dynamic Objects]..and the Function
[f/representamen] will say: "According to my Rules of Chemical
Organization, you objects will be transformed into
Y/Interpretant..Water Molecules.

And...I hear some bird sounds [X/Dynamic Object]. According to
F/Representamen or my Knowledge BaseI transform these sounds to
be: Y/Interpretant/Robins.

then..I take the Y/Interpretant of Robin...and it becomes X/Dynamic
Object.

According to F/Representamen/my Knowledge Baseit is transformed
to a new Interpretant/Y...to mean 'It's Spring!'

[That's wishful thinking, I know].

Edwina
 On Sun 21/01/18  9:46 AM , g...@gnusystems.ca sent:
John,
Yes, there are plenty of “earlier thoughts along those lines” of
a semiotic generalized beyond the human experience of signs. In fact
they are “as plenty as blackberries,” if you read Peirce
chronologically looking for them. His anti-psychologism, for example,
which he consistently maintained from the 1860s on, is essentially a
refusal to limit the application of logical principles to what goes
on in  human minds or brains. But his logic/semiotic was always
generalized from the human experience of sign use, as he says in CP
1.540. And necessarily so, because “experience is our only
teacher” and we humans can only learn from our experience.
I still don’t see a “change in terminology” here,  unless
it’s the change in usage of the word “sign” which occurred
after 1903. The terminological change was that Peirce gave up using
the term “sign” in a way that limited it to the human realm. In
Lowell 3.13 he distinguished between “sign” and
“representamen”; after 1905 the distinction disappears and
“sign” means the same thing as “representamen.” But that
change was only terminological, in my view; there was no change in
the object  to which Peirce used those words to direct our attention.
So I don’t see what it is that you think needs more explanation.
By the way, this is one of the areas where the unPeircean use of the
word “sign” to refer to a triadic relation (rather than a subject
of a triadic relation) tends to cause confusion. Peirce’s 1903
distinction between “sign” and “representamen” was  not a
distinction between the whole triadic relation and one component of
it. This terminological issue is perfectly clear if you read what
Peirce actually wrote instead of someone else’s revised version of
semiotics — and if it’s Peircean semiotics that you’re trying
to understand.
 Gary f.
-Original Message-
 From: John F Sowa [mailto:s...@bestweb.net] 
 Sent: 20-Jan-18 23:11
 To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
 Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Biosemiosis (was Lowell Lecture 3.12
On 1/20/2018 4:54 PM,  g...@gnusystems.ca [1] wrote:

> What change in terminology are you referring to?
I was thinking about the following point:
Gary F 

> Peircean semiotics is naturally associated with a notion of
“sign”

> which is not limited to human use of signs; but the Lowell
lectures 

> may represent his first clear move in that direction.
 I was asking about signs "not limited to human use".
If the Lowell lectures show the "first clear move", are there
earlier unclear moves?  Hints?  Suggestions?  Musements?
The clearest MSS were the most likely to be selected for publication
in CP and EP.  But there may be fragmentary MSS with passages that are
crossed out.  Perhaps he had earlier thoughts along those lines, but
he didn't have a "sop for Cerberus". 
John 


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Re: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Biosemiosis (was Lowell Lecture 3.12

[Edwina Taborsky]

 

Gary F, list: I disagree. A function is ..understood as a complex
process of transforming/assigning meaning...which is exactly what the
semiosic triad does. 

The section of 1.540 does not say one word about 'function'. Not one
word. I don't think you can justify your assertion that Peirce's term
of 'representation' is a synonym of a function. 

Peirce's use of 'representation' is NOT synonymous with the
transformative nature of a function; it is merely dyadic, in the
Saussurian sense; all it does is provide a term for the interpreter. 
But the mediate representamen is entirely different - 

We are talking about agency, an action, ..."the concrete subject
that represents I call a sign or representamen'. 1.540.

The key point is that agential power of mediation to assign meaning
to a Dynamic Object.[ the concrete subject that represents].  That
is, the semiosic action is not passive but active, via that
mediation. 

The key nature of Peircean semiosis is its agential power. 

Edwina
 On Sun 21/01/18  8:22 AM , g...@gnusystems.ca sent:
Gary R, list,
 Yes, I agree that the usage of “sign” in reference to a
“function” is a significant departure from Peircean semiotics.
Peirce does define a function in Lowell 3 (specifically CP 1.540),
but he calls it “Representation,” which is “the operation  of a
sign or its relation to the object for the interpreter of the
representation.” The word “Representation” is a hypostatic
abstraction which nominalizes the function, which is also regarded by
Peirce as a “relation.” The triadic relation which must “consist
in a power of the representamen to determine some interpretant to
being a representamen of the same object” (CP 1.542, emphasis
Peirce’s). That determining power can only be exercised by what
Peirce calls a “concrete subject,” a “sign” or a
“representamen.” 
Peirce says that “representation is precisely genuine Thirdness”
(CP 1.532). Representation is not a sign but the operation of a sign.
Logic is “the Philosophy of Representation” (CP 1.539). Using the
word “sign” as a synonym for the function of “representation,”
or for the triadic  relation instead of the one subject which
determines another subject to represent a third subject, is not only
unnecessary but misleading, for anyone trying to understand
Peirce’s semiotic. It virtually robs the sign of its life, its
power to determine.
 Gary f.
From: Gary Richmond [mailto:gary.richm...@gmail.com] 
 Sent: 20-Jan-18 23:39
 To: Peirce-L 
 Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Biosemiosis (was Lowell Lecture 3.12
Gary f, Helmut, Edwina,
Gary f wrote: 
[Peirce] used [Sign] as one “correlate” of a genuine triadic
relation. The sign, like the representamen, is “the concrete
subject that represents” (CP 1.540). In this respect the two words 
are synonymous; there is no need to make up “a way of seeing "sign"
as as synonym with "representamen".”
Gary, I fully concur, as you can imagine, with your emphasizing
"Sign" as a "correlate" of a genuine triadic relation and  not to
mean a function (as I also suggested in an earlier post)
“consisting of sign, object, interpretant.” This idea of
"consisting" leads astray, in my opinion. 
Best,
Gary R
Gary Richmond

Philosophy and Critical Thinking 

Communication Studies

LaGuardia College of the City University of New York

718 482-5690
On Sat, Jan 20, 2018 at 6:19 PM,  wrote:

Helmut,
Many have tried using the word “sign” that way, and some have
even made a habit of it. But I prefer Peirce’s definition(s) of the
word, and he did not use it to mean “a function,” or as
“consisting of sign, object, interpretant.” He used it as one
“correlate” of a genuine triadic relation. The sign, like the
representamen, is “the concrete subject that represents” (CP
1.540). In this respect the two words  are synonymous; there is no
need to make up “a way of seeing "sign" as synonym with
"representamen".”
I think the key challenge in understanding Peircean semiosis is
reading exactly what Peirce wrote about it. The further we spin off
from that, the more confused we become.
Gary f.
From: Helmut Raulien [mailto:h.raul...@gmx.de [2]] 
 Sent: 20-Jan-18 17:34
 To: g...@gnusystems.ca [3]
 Cc: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu [4]
 Subject: Aw: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Biosemiosis (was Lowell Lecture 3.12 
Gary, List,

I have made up a way of seeing "sign" as synonym with
"representamen": A sign consisting of sign, object, interpretant is
possible, because this kind of "consisting" is a functional
composition (A sign is a function, consisting of other functions),
which is different from a spatial composition (range consisting of
domains). In a functional composition this kind of re-entry is
possible: Something consisting of itself and other things too. And,
because function is not the same as do

Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Biosemiosis (was Lowell Lecture 3.12

[Edwina Taborsky]

 

 BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px;
}Gary R, list:

The triadic Sign consists of the Object-Representamen-Interpretant.
The Function is also triadic, made up of input/functional act/output.
The focus is on the mediation action by the Repesentamen or Function
which is a powerful agent/subject that assigns meaning to the input
data of the Dynamic Object.

I think it is vital to differentiate the sign/representamen and its
singular action from the triadic Sign of
Object-Representamen-Interpretant. 

The "concrete subject that represents' is, in my view, a good
definition of that mediate functional action. 

Edwina
 On Sat 20/01/18 11:39 PM , Gary Richmond gary.richm...@gmail.com
sent:
 Gary f, Helmut, Edwina,
 Gary f wrote: 
 [Peirce] used [Sign] as one “correlate” of a genuine triadic
relation. The sign, like the representamen, is “the concrete
subject that represents” (CP 1.540). In this respect the two words 
are synonymous; there is no need to make up “a way of seeing "sign"
as as synonym with "representamen".”
 Gary, I fully concur, as you can imagine, with your emphasizing
"Sign" as a "correlate" of a genuine triadic relation and  not to
mean a function (as I also suggested in an earlier post)
“consisting of sign, object, interpretant.” This idea of
"consisting" leads astray, in my opinion. 
 Best,
  Gary R
 Gary RichmondPhilosophy and Critical ThinkingCommunication Studies
LaGuardia College of the City University of New York718 482-5690
 On Sat, Jan 20, 2018 at 6:19 PM,   wrote:
Helmut, 
Many have tried using the word “sign” that way, and some have
even made a habit of it. But I prefer Peirce’s definition(s) of the
word, and he did not use it to mean “a function,” or as “
consisting of sign, object, interpretant.” He used it as one
“correlate” of a genuine triadic relation. The sign, like the
representamen, is “the concrete subject that represents” (CP
1.540). In this respect the two words are synonymous; there is no
need to make up “ a way of seeing "sign" as synonym with
"representamen".”
I think the key challenge in understanding Peircean semiosis is
reading exactly what Peirce wrote about it. The further we spin off
from that, the more confused we become. 
Gary f.
From: Helmut Raulien [mailto:h.raul...@gmx.de [2]] 
 Sent: 20-Jan-18 17:34
 To: g...@gnusystems.ca [3]
 Cc: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu [4]
 Subject: Aw: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Biosemiosis (was Lowell Lecture 3.12 
Gary, List,

I have made up a way of seeing "sign" as synonym with
"representamen": A sign consisting of sign, object, interpretant is
possible, because this kind of "consisting" is a functional
composition (A sign is a function, consisting of other functions),
which is different from a spatial composition (range consisting of
domains). In a functional composition this kind of re-entry is
possible: Something consisting of itself and other things too. And,
because function is not the same as domain, a sign (functionally)
consists of (besides itself) the whole object and the whole
interpretant, not only the immediate ones. 

1ns: Composition from traits, 2ns: Spatial composition, 3ns:
Functional composition.

Best, Helmut
 20. Januar 2018 um 22:54 Uhr
 Von: g...@gnusystems.ca [5]
John, you wrote,

[[ This is one more reason for getting a more complete collection
and transcription of Peirce's MSS.  He was undoubtedly thinking about
these issues for years, and he must have had good reasons for changing
his terminology.  But those brief quotations don't explain why. ]] 

What change in terminology are you referring to? And which “brief
quotations”?
The change I mentioned was the change from (1) using
“representamen” as a more general term than “sign” to (2)
using them as synonyms to (3) dispensing with the term
“representamen” as unnecessary. And the explanation of that shift
that I quoted was an excerpt from a 1905 letter to Welby. If that’s
the “brief quotations” you mean, what is it that they leave
unexplained? Here it is again :

[[ I use ‘sign’ in the widest sense of the definition. It is a
wonderful case of an almost popular use of a very broad word in
almost the exact sense of the scientific definition. … I formerly
preferred the term  representamen. But there was no need of this
horrid long word. … The truth is that I went wrong from not having
a formal definition all drawn up. This sort of thing is inevitable in
the early stages of a strong logical study; for if a formal definition
is attempted too soon, it will only shackle thought. ] SS p.193 ] 
Gary f.
-Original Message-
 From: John F Sowa [mailto:s...@bestweb.net [6]]
 Sent: 20-Jan-18 15:01
 To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu [7]
 Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Biosemiosis (was Lowell Lecture 3.12
Edwina, Gary R, Stephen, and Gary F,
 Edwina

> I emphasize tha

Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Biosemiosis (was Lowell Lecture 3.12

[Edwina Taborsky]

 

Mike, list

Many thanks. And yes, this Peircean semiosis does indeed function in
how matter itself evolved - from quarks to heavy elements and crystals
- to that 'internalization' of Thirdness [the knowledge-base] into the
individual bits of matter. That is, an atom's knowledge base is held
by the community to to speak and external to each individual
articulation of that knowledge base. That's actually important -
since it means that the organization of matter within that atom can't
randomly change; it provides for a basic stability and continuity in
our world.

BUT - once you move the knowledge base within each individual
materialization - then, you can get variations of that knowledge base
via not merely random mutations within the base, but changes effected
by input from other individuals [via degenerate Thirdness or
3-2]...and that enables an explosion of diversity and complexity. 

Edwina
 On Sat 20/01/18  2:45 PM , Mike Bergman m...@mkbergman.com sent:
+1 

Edwina, I think this is one of your best, most succinct
descriptions. It is how I understand Peirce and semiosis as
well. Without such an understanding, there is no continuity and  
  explanation for reality in relation to cosmic evolution in
Peirce's metaphysics. In fact, it should also guide our
understanding of how matter itself evolved, from quarks to heavy 
   elements and crystals.
Mike
 On 1/20/2018 1:34 PM, Edwina Taborsky   wrote:
 List - the key problem, I think, in understanding Peircean  
  semiosis as basic in all forms of matter - and he included the  
  physical-chemical realm as well as the biological and the human 
   - is that many people see semiosis primarily as a means of 
   communication. It has little to do with that; you don't need a 
   triad for communication - you can achieve that with multiple   
 linear dyads - the 'conveyor belt system'.

Peircean semiosis is triadic, which inserts that vital relation 
   of Mediation between the external Dynamic Object - and the
Interpretant. This Mediation need NOT be operative, always,
within 'genuine Thirdness' - [3-3] but must, vitally, also
operate with the two degenerate forms of Thirdness [3-2 and
3-1]. Without these two degenerate modes - the world simply
could not function, because 3-3 is pure idealism and Peirce
rejected such a Platonic world. Instead, as an Aristotelian, he  
  'grounded' semiosic actions with real material objects.
Firstness and Secondness ground reality-into-existence.

Mediation has a transformative function, using its habitual
knowledge base to transform the input sensate data into...an
Interpretant [which can be a concept OR a different form of
matter; i.e., a bird eats seeds to transform into its own
flesh]...and, as well, it has a learning function - , via
3-2, [the 'in touch with others mode of learning] . and
exploring external stimuli in its environment - to gather
information. And consolidating what it has learned via 3-1 [the  
  iconic mode of habituation]. Genuine Thirdness [3-3] is the
basic Mind, the will-to-organize and network, of the universe.   
 And as noted, genuine Thirdness vitally needs the two degenerate 
   modes to function.

Edwina   
 On Sat 20/01/18 2:05 PM ,   g...@gnusystems.ca sent:
John, list, 
I agree with much of what you’ve said here,
and my book deals with biosemiotics from Chapter
3 on, so I won’t repeat any of that here. But
I’m surprised that no one in this thread has
cited Lowell 3.13, as it’s possibly Peirce’s
clearest statement of the possibility of genuine
Thirdness and representation going beyond human
thought and language.  
In the Peirce texts I’ve quoted in the past
week, he established that representamen  
  is a more general term than sign, signs being the   
 kind of representamens that “convey
notions to human minds” (emphasis Peirce’s),
and that “Possibly there may be Representamens that
are not Signs.” But “representamen” was defined in  
  the first place by starting with signs, as “such  
  conveyers of thought are familiarly known to us,” 
   and making “the best analysis I can of what is   
 essential to a sign, and I define a   
representamen as being whatever that analysis
applies to.” T

Re: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Biosemiosis (was Lowell Lecture 3.12

[Edwina Taborsky]

 
 List - the key problem, I think, in understanding Peircean semiosis
as basic in all forms of matter - and he included the
physical-chemical realm as well as the biological and the human - is
that many people see semiosis primarily as a means of communication.
It has little to do with that; you don't need a triad for
communication - you can achieve that with multiple linear dyads - the
'conveyor belt system'. 

Peircean semiosis is triadic, which inserts that vital relation of
Mediation between the external Dynamic Object - and the Interpretant.
This Mediation need NOT be operative, always, within 'genuine
Thirdness' - [3-3] but must, vitally, also operate with the two
degenerate forms of Thirdness [3-2 and 3-1]. Without these two
degenerate modes - the world simply could not function, because 3-3
is pure idealism and Peirce rejected such a Platonic world. Instead,
as an Aristotelian, he 'grounded' semiosic actions with real material
objects. Firstness and Secondness ground reality-into-existence. 

Mediation has a transformative function, using its habitual
knowledge base to transform the input sensate data into...an
Interpretant [which can be a concept OR a different form of matter;
i.e., a bird eats seeds to transform into its own flesh]...and, as
well, it has a learning function - , via 3-2, [the 'in touch with
others mode of learning] . and exploring external stimuli in its
environment - to gather information. And consolidating what it has
learned via 3-1 [the iconic mode of habituation]. Genuine Thirdness
[3-3] is the basic Mind, the will-to-organize and network, of the
universe. And as noted, genuine Thirdness vitally needs the two
degenerate modes to function. 

Edwina
 On Sat 20/01/18  2:05 PM , g...@gnusystems.ca sent:
John, list,
I agree with much of what you’ve said here, and my book deals with
biosemiotics from Chapter 3 on, so I won’t repeat any of that here.
But I’m surprised that no one in this thread has cited Lowell 3.13,
as it’s possibly Peirce’s clearest statement of the possibility of
genuine Thirdness and representation going beyond human thought and
language. 
In the Peirce texts I’ve quoted in the past week, he established
that representamen is a more general term than sign, signs being the
kind of representamens that “convey notions to human minds”
(emphasis Peirce’s), and that “Possibly there may be
Representamens that are not Signs.” But “representamen” was
defined in the first place by starting with signs, as “such
conveyers of thought are familiarly known to us,” and making “the
best analysis I can of what is essential to a sign, and I define a 
representamen as being whatever that analysis applies to.” This way
he could use the term “sign” to refer strictly to human uses of
them, because he now had a different word for the genuine Thirdness
and triadicity of relatedness which is “essential” to signs apart
from the “accidental human element."
 As I explained in the Lowell 3.13 thread, a couple of years later
Peirce decided that he might as well use the word “sign” itself,
instead of “representamen,” for “what is essential to a sign”
(though for awhile he used the words as synonyms). And it was around
this time that Peirce began using the terms “sem[e]iotic” and
“semiosis” much more than he had before. So Peircean semiotics is
naturally associated with a notion of “sign” which is not limited
to human use of signs; but the Lowell lectures may represent his
first clear move in that direction. 
Gary f. 
-Original Message-
 From: John F Sowa [mailto:s...@bestweb.net] 
 Sent: 20-Jan-18 11:20
 To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
 Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Biosemiosis (was Lowell Lecture 3.12
Edwina and Gary R,
I changed the subject line to biosemiosis in order to emphasize that
Peirce had intended semiosis to cover the full realm of all living
things.  Note what he wrote in a letter to Lady Welby: 
CSP, MS 463 (1908)

> I define a Sign as anything which is so determined by something
else, 

> called its Object, and so determines an effect upon a person,
which 

> effect I call its Interpretant, that the latter is thereby
mediately  

> determined by the former. My insertion of “upon a person” is a
sop to 

> Cerberus, because I despair of making my own broader conception 

> understood.
I believe that "despair" is the primary reason why he didn't say
more. 

His insistence on continuity implied that the faculties of the human
mind must be continuous with the minds (or quasi-minds) of all living
things anywhere in the universe.  But if he had said that, he would
have been denounced by a huge number of critics from philosophy,
psychology, science, religion, and politics.
 Edwina

> I do think that limiting Peircean semiosis to the human conceptual


> realm is a disservice to Peircean semiosis... I won't repea