Re: Daniel Yergin pal on the grid
An article by Andrew Goetz in The Journal of Transport Geography, March 2002 does a pretty convincing job on US airline deregulation. Among other things, he notes that because of the economics of hub and spoke routing/scheduing, one airline has come to more or less monopolize each regional hub, creating a local monopoly, higher prices. Another issue is perhaps more danger due to the congestion of waves of flights in and out timed to enable tighter connections. Journal of Transport Geography Volume 10, Issue 1, March 2002, Pages 1-19 112ed3.jpg Deregulation, competition, and antitrust implications in the US airline industry Andrew R. Goetz112f41.jpg, mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]112f55.jpg Department of Geography and Intermodal Transportation Institute, University of Denver, 2050 E. Iliff Ave., Denver, CO 80208, USA Abstract: Current problems in the US airline industry such as increasing industry consolidation, fortress hub dominance, predatory behavior, and high fare pockets of pain have their roots in the flaws of the theories that supported airline deregulation in 1978. Contrary to pre-deregulation expectations, the industry is characterized by large economies of scale, large barriers to entry, and a lack of contestability in airline markets. These inexorable economic forces are producing increased levels of monopoly and oligopoly control over city-pair markets resulting in a larger share of travelers paying higher fares. Additional mergers and acquisitions will exacerbate the problem. As these trends continue, the US Congress and the US Departments of Transportation and Justice will be under increasing pressure to take serious corrective actions. At 11:51 AM 19/08/2003 -0400, you wrote: Speaking of which, anybody know of a good relatively recent article from a progressive perspective about how airline deregulation fared? I've seen a couple of moderates in the last few days who have said, hey deregulation isn't all that bad look at the airlines. My impression is that in the airline industry, prices are down for lucky people like myself who live in DC but not for people who live in my hometown, Syracuse New York, and that travel biplane is a lot more painful than it used to be -- nothing seems to run on time, even when you take into account the new security. But that's only my impression, and I'd be curious what the data say. Thanks, Anders It's as with airline deregulation, when some airlines cut back on maintenance (e.g.?, Alaska Airlines). Jim inline: 112ed3.jpginline: 112f41.jpginline: 112f55.jpg
Re: US Manufacturing
A point and some questions about the issue of US manufacturing: Since productivity gains in manufacturing are greater than in most other sectors, the relative dollar value of manufacturing output and its share of GDP inevitably decline. To get a more balanced picture of the status of manufacturing I think we should also look at the trends in _physical_ output (despite the difficulty in measuring this, given quality changes, etc; think of computers). I was following this a couple of years ago and was struck by the growing gap in the trends of dollar output and physical output (the Federal Reserve published a series on physical output by sector and somehow aggregated it into an index for all industrial sectors). can anyone cite the most recent trends in physical production? I'm guessing they provide a rather different image than that of US-manufacturing-is-a-sunset-sector-and-now-its-the-new-economy-that-really-matters. The other angle on this is to stay with dollar value data but look at industrial output divided by _stage of production_, i.e., crude materials vs. final products. Again, when I looked at this a couple of years ago I was struck how the value of materials production within the US was rising faster than the value of final products. Since I assume that the US is not a big exporter of crude materials, it seemed to me this also indicated that 'real' output of final products was rising more than their dollar value suggests (also, from another angle, how circulating constant capital is probably rising faster than fixed constant capital). I just clicked on the Federal Reserve series on output by stage of production (see http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/G17/ip_notes.htm ), and without studying it too carefully it seemed this trend has continued into 2002. Can anyone cite recent data on either trend (physical production and stage of production), or do you have any thoughts on their significance for the 'future of manufacturing'? Although I realize that the comparative trends with other countries are also important, is it not true that in 'real' terms, US domestic manufacturing is bigger than ever (of course, not as big as capacity, especially as the depression bites)? For example, if trade barriers went up, doesn't the US still retain the capacity to be _relatively_ self-sufficient in most manufactured goods (compared to other advanced capitalist economies)? When the new economy bubble really bursts and the relative prices of 'real' goods rise? won't there still be a very large base for this increase in 'value'? Bill Burgess At 04:34 PM 15/08/2003 -0700, you wrote: I have a question about the U.S. economy and a comment to make about FDI to the third world. We all know the U.S. is running a huge and growing trade deficit. Moreover, the manufacturing sector has lost jobs for some thirty-five consecutive months. That is pretty amazing. My question: are these developments tied and can we confidently say that the U.S. industrial sector has been hollowed out? In other words has the job loss been largely the result of the continually increasing import of manufactured goods, many of which are produced by U.S. firms in other countries? And has this development gone long enough that there has been significant structural damage to U.S. manufacturing such that it is unlikely that anything, including a falling dollar, will promote its renewal? Or is it just productivity that is causing this job loss or is it ...? I would really like to know what people think about this. As to on FDI, I cannot remember who the person was, but in response to someone I had mentioned that FDI is becoming more and more concentrated. That person had argued the opposite and asked for some supporting information for my position. I just came across something relevant from the World Investment Report 2002. On page 9 the report says: In spite of the substantial liberalizing measures of the past decade, developing countries still attract less than a third of world FDI flows, and these flows remain highly concentrated. In 2001, the five largest host countries in the developing world received 62 percent of total inflows and the 10 largest received three-quarters. The level of concentration of FDI in developing countries has in fact risen in recent years. On page 11 there is a chart that shows the share of the top 5, 10, and 30 host developing countries. The increased share of FDI flows going to each of these groups shows a marked gain beginning in 1996. Marty Hart-Landsberg
[no subject]
Hey Tom I'm teaching Mike Lebowitz's old Marxist economics course at SFU this semester. Any chance you would enjoy coming to talk to 40 economics students about the world-historic issue of shorter work time on a Tuesday or Thursday between 1.30 and 3.30? I can't really offer any benefit other than as much beer as you can drink in one sitting and vague notions of karma. Bill
Re: +
Apologies for mistakenly sending a message to Pen-L, but the result was making making contact with others doing courses on Marx, so I don't feel so bad. Bill
Havana conference CORRECTION
Apologies, important sections were somehow excluded from the text that was previously forwarded: International Conference The work of Karl Marx and challenges for the XXI Century - Second Call for Papers The Institute of Philosophy of the Ministry of Science, Technology and Environment of Cuba is organizing the International Conference on The work of Karl Marx and challenges for the XXI Century which will take place in Havana, Cuba, from May 5 to May 8, 2003 at the Conference Rooms of the Cuban Workers Labour Union (Central de Trabajadores de Cuba). This important event has the auspices of: Cuban Association to the United Nations The National Association of Economists and Accountants of Cuba, ANEC The Cuban Workers Labour Union/Central de Trabajadores de Cuba Ministry of Economy and Planning The Juan F. Noyal Centre for Economic Studies and Planning The Council for Social Sciences of the Ministry of Science, Technology and Environment CITMA The Directorate for Marxism and Leninism Ministry of Higher Education Faculty of Philosophy and History University of Havana Higher Institute of Art ISA of the Ministry of Culture Cuban Society for Philosophic Enquiry Economic Society of Friends of the Country Popular University of the Mothers of the Plaza of May, Argentina Objectives of the Event: Next year will mark 120 years since Karl Marx's death. Marx's heritage, as Frederick Engels pointed out, has been an invaluable 'guide to action' for all those who share his goal of a society permitting the full development of human potential, a society that goes beyond capitalism. As we know, though, Marx's work was always rooted in the real movements of society. To be consistent with that work and to be faithful to its goals, we need to understand the experiences of those 120 years both in relation to changes in capitalism and also in the attempts to create a humane alternative to capitalism, a socialist society We think this is an important time to look at Marx's ideas and to see how they can help us not only to understand the world but also to change it. We see the need to develop progressive thought for the beginning of the XXI century and the necessary link to revolutionary practice without which there can be no change. In this way, we want to honour Marx, who dedicated his life (both in his theory and also his practice) to the development of a society of free and fully developed men and women, a socialist society. Since socialism for Cuba has always been internationalist and has always been marked by international solidarity, we invite scholars and activists from around the world who share Marx's commitment to join us at this conference We call for proposals around two main themes: -The limits and contradictions within contemporary capitalism and the new forms of revolutionary struggle. -The limits and contradictions within socialist experience at the end of the 20th Century: elements of improvements within the emmancipatory paradigm. From these two main themes we hope that participants will develop their presentations along the following sub-themes: · Communist Revolution and Human Emancipation: the subject of revolution in the new world order · Workers and the trade union movement in the contemporary world · State and Economy in the current world · Under-development and Capitalism · Globalization and sustainable human development · Latin America: the FTAA and the USA · Property and social development PROPOSALS ARE INVITED Those wishing to participate in the conference should contact the Co-ordinator of the Scientific Committee, Dr. Jesus Pastor Garcia Brigos (see below paper submission guidelines prior to the 31st of January 2003. Our fee schedule is as follows: professional category US$80.00, companions of professionals US$60.00 and students US$50.00. The goal of the organizers during the Dias of the conference is to achieve the closest and richest dialogue and discussions possible, and that resulting from these interchanges we can continue strengthening the necessary formative praxis for human progress. Paper submission guidelines: · : Papers should be sent to the Co-ordinator of the Scientific Committee: Dr. Jesus Pastor Garcia Brigos by e-mail: [EMAIL PROTECTED] or 3.5 disk · An abstract of the paper, maximum one page in length · Papers may be submitted in English or Spanish · Paper length maximum 30 pages (Windows 95 or later versions, New Times Roman font 12. double spaced, paper size 8-1/2 x 11, side margins 2 centimetres, top and bottom margins 4 centimetres Authors of papers that are selected for presentation will be notified by March 31st 2003. It is expected that all papers that are presented will be circulated in advance via electronic mail among all participants to facilitate their study and thus have a better preparation prior to their debate and
Havana Conference announcement
Forwarded on behalf of Mike Lebowitz [the attachment is reproduced
below]:
Dear Friends and Comrades,
Attached (this time it should open!) is an announcement of a
conference next May in Havana which I have been helping to organise.
The
theme, Karl Marx and the Challenges of the 21st Century,
is one that
should interest listmembers, and the hope is to have papers
distributed
in advance and a series of continuing panels ('commissions') which
maximise discussion among participants.
Among those who have already indicated their intention to present
papers are Greg Albo, Robert Albritton, Samir Amin, Patrick Bond,
Werner
Bonefeld, Paul Burkett, Alexander Buzgalin, Al Campbell, Paresh
Chattopadhyay, Simon Clarke, Han Deqiang, Heinz Dieterich, Elizabeth
Dore, Gerard Dumenil, Roxanne Dunbar-Ortiz, Helio Gallardo, Marta
Harnecker, Martin Hart-Landsberg, Remy Herrara, John Holloway,
Francois
Houtard, David Kotz, Georges Labica, Michael Lebowitz, Hein Marais,
Terrance McDonough, Istvan Meszaros, Dimitri Milonakis, Simon Mohun,
Fred
Moseley, Trevor Ngwane, Leo Panitch, James Petras, Robert Pollin,
Richard
Westra and Brigitte Young.
If you are interested in presenting, unfortunately there is a
relatively short deadline that has been set (although there may be
some
flexibility-- in Cuba there generally is). Another possibility is to
serve as a paper discussant; if you are interested in this (or have
any
other specific questions ), write to me with a copy to Nchamah
Miller
[EMAIL PROTECTED],
indicating the subject area you would prefer.
Also, could you please circulate this to any other lists where
you think this conference will be of interest. Thanks.
in solidarity,
mike
---
Michael A. Lebowitz
Economics Department
Simon Fraser University
Burnaby, B.C., Canada V5A 1S6
Office: Phone (604) 291-4669
Fax (604) 291-5944
Home: (604) 689-9510 [NOTE CHANGE]
Lasqueti Island: (250) 333-8810
[Content of attachment referred to above]:
Havana conference: May 5 - 8, 2003
Karl Marx and the Challenges of the 21st Century
At the time of posting of this notice we already have the
confirmation of many internationally recognized scholars from all
continents and thus we are driven in our efforts to making this
conference as open as possible and maintaining our set
objectives.
Other Conference related activities
With a view to maintaining communications post the conference, the
Organizing Committee will be presenting a proposal to establish an
on-going Permanent International Workshop: Marx and the challenges of the
Century XXI which would publish, organize events and in general maintain
a continued interchange between participants to the conference and new
colleagues that may wish to join us.
Those who wish to participate in the activities that will be organized
for the International Workers Day on May 1st, and others that will be
co-ordinated by the Cuban Workers Labour Union together with the
Organizing Committee during the 2nd, 3rd, and 4th of May should advise
the Co-ordinator of the Scientific Committee prior to the 31st of January
2003. The program for the activities for those days will be
published shortly and will include academic discussion and interchanges
with Cuban specialists and well as activities with the Cuban labour
movement among others.
We will be offering courses and events pre and post the conference as
well as co-lateral activities that will be published in other
notices.
All work will be done in commission-oriented sessions in panels grouped
by themes.
There will also be optional evening sessions at conference rooms nearby
the hotels that have been selected for the conference. These
sessions will be dedicated to interchanges on themes that affect current
day Cuba, among other topics of relevance. Work sessions will be in
English and in Spanish.
CONFERENCE FORMAT
Presenters will be allotted a 15-minute presentation period for their
papers, and these will be the basis for discussions in working
commissions.
The Conference Schedule is as follows:
MONDAY: May 5
8:00 - 9:00 Registration of foreign participants Cuban participants
will register at the Instituto de Filosophia on April 28th to
30th.
9:30 - 11:30 Plenary Session Opening Speech Presentation of Scheduled
Work Program among others a proposal for the continuation of the work
commenced at this Conference on the basis of a Permanent International
Workshop: Marx and the Challenges of the Century XXI.
11:00 - 11:30 Coffee Break
11:30 - 13:30 Work in Commissions
13:30 - 14:00 Lunch
14:00 - 16:00 Work in Commissions
16:00 Welcome cocktail.
Tour through Havana Tuesday May 6
Wed. May 7
9:00 - 11:00 Work in oriented commissions
11:00 - 11:30 Coffee break
11:30 - 13:30 Work in oriented commissions
13:30 - 14:00 Lunch
14:00 - 16:00 Work in oriented commissions
21:00 - 23:00 Optional theme sessions
Thurs. May 8
9:00 - 11:00 Work in oriented commissions
11:00 - 11:30 Coffee break
11:30 - 13:30 Plenary
Re: Maquiladoras not beneficial
At 01:04 PM 12/2/2002 -0500, Louis quoted: Maquiladora workers receive wages considerably below those paid to non-maquiladora manufacturing workers. What is it about the stats I've seen quoted by bourgeois economists that makes it possible for them to represent the opposite as true? Bill
Re: Harvey
I think Harvey means something close to what you write below about the destruction of the planet. I don't really know if his criticism of Foster as an exemplar was fair, but he complained about the lack of a ''class line' (my term) in Foster's suggestion that there is a common interest by humanity to stop despoiling the earth, or in Barry Commoner-like 'laws' of ecology ( 'nature knows best', etc). Harvey argues the eco-socialist program is still under-developed (my term). He has emphasize the environmental justice movement (e.g. against toxic sites in poor/Black/Latino neighbourhoods) as an under-rated site of eco/class struggle. Louis P. describes such criticism as 'brown Marxism', but I think that is off the mark. Bill Burgess At 10:24 PM 8/27/2002 -0700, Ken wrote: Why is the distinction lost on you? Surely it is likely that the planet will survive. The idea of a vulnerable planet is a bit weird in itself except that a meteorite or MAD atomic blast might destroy it. What is vulnerable are some species and perhaps humans are one of them. I really dont know. But surely not all species are likely to be destroyed and even some members of the human species will probably survive a considerable amount of environmental degradation but not with a standard of living such as we now have. So what is it you mean when you claim not to understand Harvey's distinction? Or does he mean something different that what I described above? Cheers, Ken Hanly ) Neither of these characters have anything to do with Marxism, but they both figure in debates between Marxists over the ecological crisis. For example, David Harvey argued that MR editor John Bellamy Foster was veering in the same direction as people like Erlich because he titled his book The Vulnerable Planet. Harvey argued that we might despoil the planet, but it will survive. This was a distinction lost on both John and me.
Re: Cuba
The quotes around real were to acknowledge the technical issues. But at root it comes down to the hours and skill of labour in sugar in Cuba vs. for oil in the USSR. Che Guevera wrote about this issue from Cuba's point of view when he was the Minister of Industry or head of the National Bank. No doubt it is partly a political judgement. I maintain it is more accurate to say that the long term contracts and higher average prices that the USSR paid for sugar better reflected the real value and utility of sugar (they were arguably still too low), than to say that the USSR subsidized Cuba because it paid more than the incredibly underpriced rate imposed on 'third world' suppliers by the capitalist sugar monopolists who control the world sugar exchanges. I don't have the earlier numbers for the period we are discussing, but according to the World Bank's _1998 World Development Indicators_, the index for the prices of manufactured good exports by the G-5 rose from 72 in 1980 to 108 in 1997, while the index for the price of world sugar fell from 87.7 to 23.3! I understand that neoclassical economists argue this reflects their relative income elasticity of demand. Would you chose this criteria for valuation over mine? Bill Bill Burgess wrote: IMHO it is important to put the USSR-Cuba economic relations in the framework of the capitalist unequal exchange - Instead of subsidizing Cuba, the USSR paid something closer to 'real' value of sugar. The arrangement was generous, and far superior to capitalist convention, but what's the real value of sugar? How do you know? How are you valuing labor? Doug
Question on US local government revenues
I've scanned the footnotes and definitions for data for US local government finances, but can't figure out: Do state and the federal govt. pay property taxes to local governments in the US? Or, do they pay a grant in lieu of property taxes (as in Canada), and if so, is it included under property tax revenues (as in Canada), or under intergovernmental transfer revenue? (I'm aware that District of Columbia is a special case.) There is currently a big campaign underway in Canada to give municipal governments more fiscal (and even constitutional!) power. It is usually motivated as necessary for cities to become more 'competitive' locations in the world market, especially as federal and provincial governments withdraw or download service responsibilities to local governments. The US is being cited as a **positive example** of the ability of (some) local governments to tax local income, sales, payroll, hotel rooms, etc., while in Canada local governments are (generally) restricted to taxing only real property. I'm trying the show that more fiscal power for individual local governments generally means more disparity in the public goods and services local governments provide. Thanks in advance to anyone who can help. Bill Burgess
Re: Re: rejecting a school
I'm not convinced by Irigarary that the _particular_ obstacle to better physics was masculinity, but in any case, I don't see how the _general_ point about the social construction of science and the rejection of pretensions to objectivity is a (new) achievement. Well, maybe the development of an old insight in a new way is worth doing. I don't say that Irigiray has done it. I rather doubt it. Yes, it is certainly worthwhile when someone recovers (and especially improves on) an old or forgotten insight. That's all most worthwhile efforts ever amount to. It _is_ worth thinking about the link Irigarary is reported to draw between masculinity and Newtonian physics. But I'm asking, it is fair that the credits for this kind of challenge to positivism be placed in their (new?) column in the balance sheet of intellectual accomplishment? It is sometimes not even acknowledged that credits have already been earned in other columns. Bill
Re: RE: Re: rejecting a school
I don't understand the physics, but wasn't Newtonian physics transcended long before post-structuralism (by Einstein, a socialist, for one)? I'm not convinced by Irigarary that the _particular_ obstacle to better physics was masculinity, but in any case, I don't see how the _general_ point about the social construction of science and the rejection of pretensions to objectivity is a (new) achievement. Engels discussed flows in _Dialectics of Nature_, and Marx's _Capital_ is all about bourgeois objectivity. Bill Can someone name the main achievement of one author who has been dubbed post-structuralist? the lads at http://www.adequacy.org had a go at claiming that Luce Irigaray anticipated Stephen Wolfram's New Kind of Science: (I have added a couple of question marks to words which do not get through my firewall)
Re: Re: rejecting a school
I'm skeptical of this achievement. Certainly the blind spot of liberal equality is exposed by post-prefixers' focus on marginality, but how much, really, been added to the earlier Marxist, feminist, anti-imperialist etc. appreciations of social inequality/complexity (the better versions; I'm not thinking of the Stalinist types)? My sense is that, politically, post-prefixism has been one step forward and two steps back. The emphasis on difference tends to result in abstention over what is common. What is a good example of post-prefixism yielding politically richer mixtures of difference and commonality than we knew of before? Bill Burgess Can someone name the main achievement of one author who has been dubbed post-structuralist? It is much better to talk about one specific thing than to go on and on about abstractions such as post-structuralism. Achievement? Well, I think that the popularization of the value of marginality has something to do with post-structuralism. And, though I don't give litcritters credit for it, our awareness of the way that gender, ability, race, sexual orientation, etc. have been meaningfully, materially excluded from consideration of rights discourse has something to do with poststructuralism. Or were you thinking achievement like book titles? Christian
Marxist economics courses
I'll taking advantage of Eric's request to pose my own: I get to teach a 3rd year Introduction to Marxist Economics course next January. I'm looking for ideas on what topics to cover and especially how. Any thoughts/suggestions if you have done this, or if you know of good and bad examples? What do you think about Charlie Andrew's _Capitalism and Equality_ as a possible course text? Bill Burgess At 02:26 PM 09/07/2002 -0700, you wrote: All, I'm looking for a short book about Marx's _social_ theory appropriate for undergraduates. In the past I've used Berlin's biography, parts of the Cambridge Companion to Marx, and Wood's KM in the past but want something different this time. I've also used KM's original writings but don't want to take this route this time and much of it is too hard for many undergraduates. Is anyone familiar with: (1) Marx: A Very Short Introduction by Peter Singer (of animal rights fame) (2) Marx: The Great Philos by Terry Eagleton I've not seen either but the price seems right on both of these ($10). Thanks for any thoughts. Eric .
Re: Re: Re: Costly privatizing of firefighting
Among others, I think the folks at the Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives have been producing stuff on this, but I didn't find a specific title in my quick search at http://www.policyalternatives.ca/bc/index.html. The BC government has set up an agency to promote public-private partnerships in health delivery, e.g. they plan to open a new PPP hospital in Abbotsford, even though the accounting study commissioned projects savings of less than 3% (and this does not include lots of costs, e.g., for government planning). Bill At 07:44 PM 13/06/2002 -0500, you wrote: According to this guy privatisation increases efficiency in Swedish health care. I have been looking for a critique of these reforms but can't find any. Does anyone have URLs pointing to such a critique? I do know that the re-introduction of copays has increased usage of the system byt he better off compared to the less well off. Before copays there was little difference It is interesting that at least some unions support the changes. Also, the principle of universal coverage is not being challenged. What is happening is that more and more the system is opening up as an outlet for private capital and for profit health care and justified in terms of choice and efficiency. The state is able to serve private capital without challenging the principle of universal coverage. Cheers, Ken Hanly SWEDISH HEALTH-CARE REFORM: FROM PUBLIC MONOPOLIES TO MARKET SERVICES by Johan Hjertqvist* For 500 years Sweden has been a uniform and centralized country. Today it is on the road to pluralism and stronger regional governments. Often the leader of new trends in Europe, Swedes are making it clear to their politicians that they want public policies which cater better to individual needs and preferences. You can notice this change in the labour markets. Collective bargaining is in retreat, and Manpower, a temporary-help agency, is now the second-largest employer in Stockholm. In the education industry, privately operated schools are doubling their market share every year (though from a low base), and competitors who offer e-learning solutions for workplace education are booming. Signs of change are also apparent in the health-care industry: privatized hospitals, clinics and medical practices of all kinds; increasing numbers of private insurance companies; Internet-based patient information and a profusion of well documented opinions in favour of free choice, competition and diversity. Underlying this change of opinion is the success of public policy experiments that have embraced the principles of competition and choice. In 1992-94, the Greater Council of Stockholm launched a number of competitive initiatives whose success is now apparent. Competition in public transportation in the metropolitan area has reduced taxpayer costs by 600 million SEK, or roughly 25 percent. In one blow, with competitive contracting, the Greater Council reduced the yearly cost of ambulance service in the Stockholm region by 15 percent. In all areas service quality has increased noticeably. The results in health care have been just as startling. For example, privatized nursing homes have reduced costs by 20-30 percent. Or again, a recent evaluation has shown that private medical specialists are more efficient than their colleagues in public service. They focus on with-patient time, which results in more patient value. Publicly employed doctors, in contrast, have more staff, spend more of their time on paperwork and ask for 10-15 percent higher budgets to provide the same treatment levels. By 1994, when the centre-right regional coalition lost the election, 100 small and medium-size health-care contractors had been established, all of which had previously worked within the public system. All except one remain active. The change in government slowed, but did not stop, the process. In 1998, the centre-right grouping returned to power, and they picked up new steam. They have wide public support in the urban areas, including that of the largest health-care unions, and plan to turn most of primary care into contracted services, an irreversible major step. Right now, about another 100 health-care units are in the process of leaving public ownership to become private companies. The Greater Council lends significant support in the form of free training and start-up consultants. In general, the new contractors run local health-care stations, GP group practices, treatment centers for mothers and infants, laboratories and psychiatric out-of-hospital clinics. When (and if) the Council completes this transformation, private GPs and other contractors will deliver around 40 percent of all health-care services, and about 80 percent of all primary health-care in the metropolitan area. In 1999, a private company, Capio Ltd., bought one of Stockholm's largest hospitals, the St. George, from the Greater Council. Since the early 1990s, Capio has run a hospital in Gothenburg as
Re: Re: Argentina, Australia and Canada
At 11:17 AM 21/04/2002 +0800, Grant wrote: That wasn't my contention, which is more accurately that except for actual formal/military imperialism, (e.g. Britain in India) imperialist and imperialised have always been poles on a notional axis, rather than being distinct and permanent things. I mean are you saying that there is little difference between the present positions (relative and absolute) of the economies and overseas political influence of Malaysia and Indonesia, compared now with what they were 50 years ago? Nothing is pure or permanent, but yes, Malaysia and Indonesia are still imperialist-dominated countries (and also still in a different way than lesser imperialists Australia and New Zealand). The best recent candidate for the 'imperial' club is probably s. Korea, but, hello, this country is divided in half, occupied by US nukes... Forces which, some would argue, have assisted the South Korean national bourgeoisie in the same way that the capitalist economies of Japan, Taiwan and the old West Germany grew significantly as armed camps. S Korea ... could do _nothing_ if Japan, Europe and the US stopped imports from s. Korea with a stroke of a pen. Why would they do that? And there's always China... For protectionist reasons, like the current US tariffs on s. Korean steel. Korean capitalists are impressive, but they are more vulnerable than capitalists in Japan or Germany. s. Korea and Taiwan were assisted to stop 'communism', but I don't see either of them being let into the imperialist club. It is possible, but a lot of this kind of talk has been cooled by the 'Asian' financial crisis. One point of the stats was that the highly imperialised Kenya is imperialist in regard to neighbouring countries, as shown (e.g.) by the restrictions on Kenyan investment. Nigeria is an even stronger case. Yes, imperialized countries often dominate weaker neighbours, but I think the concept of imperialism should be reserved for geo-politics at a larger scale. And Kenya's outward FDI/GDP is only 1.5%; one-fifth of the inward rate. Nigeria's outward FDI/GDP is an impressive 31%, but still less than inward FDI/GDP at 51%. I mentioned South Africa before, but forgot to include the rates - inward FDI/GDP is 13.4% and outward FDI/GDP 24.8%. We need to look at other criteria, but the FDI numbers suggest that in Africa the only candidate for imperialist status is South Africa. As you can see, Belgium and Switzerland show high rates of outward FDI, and most FDI is to and from Europe - and almost nothing is _from_ the likes of Argentina, Malaysia or Saudi Arabia. I note that the HK and Singaporean outward FDI figures cited are higher than any of the European states you have cited, except Switzerland. Fair enough, but, again, I think 'real' imperialist status requires a bigger real-estate base than these city-states. They are historical/geographical accidents/exceptions who lack the (more) independent economic base characteristic of 'real' imperialists. Bill R. also notes that it is important to consider the extent to which their FDI data reflects investors from other countries (this is probably also very relevant for the Swiss data). Substitute longer term declines in prices for wheat (which in the 1950s was worth more than three times what it is now), beef and other commodities and you have substantial structural problems for Argentina and Australia, both of which (unlike Indonesia or Malaysia) have also both experienced a withering of their manufacturing industries in the last 30 years. The source I cited also reports a decline in the index for Australian coal from 55.9 in 1980 to 32.6 in 1997. However, in general terms the point is that the prices of goods produced by the rich imperialist countries have risen relative to those produced by poor imperialized countries. The Argentina-Australia comparison is very much on point. Have their manufacturing sectors really followed similar paths in recent decades? I don't have the data for Argentina on hand, but the OECD STAN database shows that per capita manufacturing output in Australia in 1997 was over US$8000, and total manufacturing output was over 5 times greater than in 1970, and about 25% greater than in 1989. (current US$). I think this suggests a different kind of 'withering' than in Argentina. There are obviously more non-thieves and fewer thieves in imperialised countries than in imperial ones; we will never stop thievery by encouraging the smaller thieves. It is my fault for having started this inelegant metaphor, so... Bill
Re: Re: Argentina, Australia and Canada
Grant wrote: country inward FDI stock/GDPoutward FDI stock/GDP Canada 23.9% 26.9% Australia 28.117.1 UK 23.335.9 France 11.715.9 Singapore 85.856.1 Malaysia67.022.7 Indonesia 73.32.4 Argentina 13.95.4 Brazil 17.11.4 Interesting figures. I haven't had time to look at the comparable figures for other countries. In any case they don't prove a permanent/structural exclusion from imperial activity. For example, what about Hong Kong (pre-1997, not that it is yet a homogenous part of China)? The last I heard there was hardly any manufacturing left in Hong Kong because proprietors had shifted operations to the mainland. South Africa? Saudi Arabia? Hong Kong 65.772 Saudi Arabia22.71.3 s. Korea6.1 6.5 Taiwan 7.8 14.7 New Zealand 66.211 Israel 11.16.8 Spain 21.512.5 Austria 11.38.2 Sweden 22.541.3 Belgium 61.750.2 Switzerland 26.569.1 I cited the FDI/GDP ratios against the suggestion that FDI from the likes of Malaysia and Indonesia is dissolving the cardinal difference between imperialist and imperialized countries. I don't see any real shift in the last 75 years or so in this division. Hong Kong has 'moved up' a couple of rungs on the product ladder, and a large part of the 'outward' FDI above is the labour-intensive factories that were opened nearby in the (rest of) PR China. But it lacks other characteristics, e.g. trade/GDP in Hong Kong is 135% - as Bill R. noted, emphasized, HK and Singapore are entrepots, and they are city-economies, which indicates the need to qualify the significance of their numbers (Malaysia has the third highest trade/GDP; these three are the only countries with annual trade greater than GDP). The best recent candidate for the 'imperial' club is probably s. Korea, but, hello, this country is divided in half, occupied by US nukes, and could do _nothing_ if Japan, Europe and the US stopped imports from s. Korea with a stroke of a pen. The balance of inward-outward FDI in Saudi Arabia tells the same story as we know about other realities of foreign-dominated oil producers. I'd be interested in more rounded characterizations of South Africa, but the FDI data is consistent with the 'white'-settler state-now-lesser imperialist status of New Zealand, Israel, etc. Bill R. and I have discussed the NZ FDI stats before; I still have a hard time accepting the 66.2% inward rate in NZ as one that provides a realistic comparison to that in other countries, but in any case, I think the difference between presenting a NZ passport and a Malaysian passport helps clarify the social relationships in world imperialism. Every bourgeoisie has to start somewhere. For example --- and I'm not going to revisit the complexities and vitriol of the Kenya Debate --- but I just came across this on the web: Don't know what you mean with the Kenya stats, but there is _zero_ danger of Kenya going imperialist in any serious use of the term. Singapore's inward and outward rates are both high, but note that inward FDI is still well above outward FDI in this city-state where annual trade is also 160% !!! of GDP. That trend is not unusual for countries with small populations and highly developed economies. What are the comparative figures for Belgium and Switzerland? As you can see, Belgium and Switzerland show high rates of outward FDI, and most FDI is to and from Europe - and almost nothing is _from_ the likes of Argentina, Malaysia or Saudi Arabia. Trade/GDP in Austria is 44% and 38% in Switzerland, again, most trade is with fellow imperialist countries, not semi-colonial countries. They enjoy 'free' trade, not the imperialist protectionism and unequal exchange faced by Malaysia or Indonesia. The price index for their manufactured goods _rose_ from 72 in 1980 to 108 in 1997, while logs from Malaysia dropped from 272 to 221, Indonesia's coffee producers faced a coffee index decline from 450.4 to 161.2 !!! The index for cotton fell from 284.3 to 162.2 and for rubber from 197.9 to 94.5 (indexes from World Bank, World Development Indicators). C. Jannuzi wrote: I guess my point was that exploiter can easily become the exploited when the US involved. As any US citizen should know. If we can't distinguish between a big thief taking from a smaller thief and theft from non-thieves we will never stop thievery. Bill Burgess
Re: Argentina, Australia and Canada
In other words, a ruling class based in domestic finance capital emerged in Canada (and Australia), and these coutnries became imperialist economies; this did not occur in Argentina. In the case of Canada this is easier to see if Armstrong's overstress on staples relative to the development of modern farming and manufacturing is corrected, and the bank-railway axis of finance capital is made explicit. Bill Burgess At 07:51 PM 11/04/02 -0400, Louis P. wrote: Warwick Armstrong, The Social Origins of Industrial Growth: Canada, Argentina and Australia, 1870-1930, in Argentina, Australia and Canada: Studies in Comparative Development, 1870-1965, edited by D. Platt Guido di Tella: Yet, within the general pattern of similarity which gave them their distinctiveness, there were also important differences. The key to such differences can, again, be identified in the nature of the social structures and relationships within the three. This, in turn, affected the way in which the economy of each interacted with others in the international system of trade and investment. The most obvious variation is to be found between Argentina on the one hand, and Canada and Australia on the other. In the latter two, the urban elements in the ruling coalition were stronger, and earlier assumed a dominance over the staples producers. By the 1880s and 1890s, the Australian squatters had become, in many cases, subaltern members of the coalition, indebted to, and dependent upon, the banking sector for their continued viability. The power of Canadian capital, too, was concentrated in the financial institutions and commercial enterprises of Montreal and Toronto, which exercised a clear economic hegemony over the staples producers, and especially over the grain farmers of Ontario and the Prairies. This economic weight was reflected also in political influence at federal level. In Argentina, the dominance of the urban groups was less evident. The landed oligarchy continued to wield much greater economic and political influence, even after the Radical Party's triumph in 1916, and acted as the principal arbiter of social, economic, and political change in a way that its Australian equivalent had ceased to do after the late nineteenth century. And in any serious confrontations, they could call upon the ultimate weapon, the armed forces, which had retained a special position in the administrative order ever since the nineteenth century. One indicator of the relative capacities of the three ruling groups may be seen in RAILWAY CONSTRUCTION. The railway networks, central to the opening up of the staples-producing prairies of Canada, the pampas of Argentina, and the outback of Australia, could be considered economic elements of national importance to each country. In Canada, the major part of the construction was carried out first by private capital, heavily promoted and subsidised by the state. Australia's federal government constructed its own system in the separate colonies, and later, federal capital remained responsible for construction and operation, although, as in Canada, it drew heavily upon foreign loans and expertise. Argentina, however, the principal lines (and most profitable) were built and run by European companies, while the state was left with the task of undertaking the peripheral and less profitable sections. The manufacturing sectors of the three societies reflected also the distinct capacity of the ruling coalition to branch out into new and innovative activity. In the 1850s Canada was already establishing a range of small-scale, manufacturing activities associated with agricultural production; these competed successfully with the later influx of US branch plants. Similarly, the steel industry of Southern Ontario remained essentially a Canadian national enterprise. By the First World War, these groups had formed a modern corporate elite, part of a powerful managerial structure. Australia diversified and industrialized later, and possibly more slowly, but its manufacturing sector was, if anything, more firmly based upon indigenous capital and entrepreneurship. The processing industries and small-scale urban manufacturers were joined, after the turn of the century, by large-scale corporate enterprises, especially in the mining metals sector. As in Canada, enterprises such as BHP and Collins House were no longer family-controlled; they were modern, twentieth-century industrial conglomerates with vertical control from mining to blast furnaces to wire-rope factories to shipping lines - and with links to foreign capital through joint ventures. The Australian state, like its Canadian counterpart, was concerned directly with this phase of large-scale, corporate manufacturing expansion. And, in both societies, the work force assumed the character of a modern industrial proletariat by contrast with the craft workers of the small-scale, urban factories of the past. It is rather more difficult to find an equivalent
Re: social democracy
According to a 1998 NBER paper by Morck, the Wallenberg family controls corporate assets equal to 40% of the market value of all corporations on the Swedish stock exchange. Statistics Canada tells us that 25 enterprises in Canada control 41% of all corporate assets in the country. Ownership concentration is lower in the US, e.g., 85% of Standard and Poor corporations were widely held, while in Canada only 22% of TSE corporations were widely held (data from the late 1980s; widely held=ownership positions under 20%). The Morck paper (cited by Michael P. on Pen-L a couple of years ago) does an absurd regression between inherited wealth and variables like the level of public debt and social assistance in various countries, but the data they collect is generally consistent with a connection between ownership concentration and social democracy. Bill Burgess At 07:06 PM 15/01/02 -0500, you wrote: Michael Perelman wrote: Another Swedish question. Doesn't Sweden have one of the most concentrated industrial structures in the world? Yup, think it does. The Wallenberg family's Investor trust controls some enormous portion of Swedish industry. Such structures are good for social democracy; dispersed stockowner structures like the U.S.'s are its enemy. Doug
Re: health and inequality
Doug, on the inequality-health relation: Christopher Jencks told me that he's done some work in this area and found that you could prove or disprove the thesis by tweaking your equations. Something so susceptible to statistical manipulation isn't very robust, is it? The relationship at the level of states and metro areas in the US is pretty strong - is this the scale at which Jencks makes his claim? The BMJ editor raised the claim that the inequality 'effect' is a disguised form of absolute income (due the the curvelinear shape of the relation). However, I notice he did not mention the Wolfson study that specifically tested this hypothesis through a clever modeling process, and found it could *not* account for the inequality effect. The data methodology was above me, but it seemed convincing. Lynch et al. had data for more countries than the original number on which Wilkinson based his study, and the additional countries undermined the goodness of fit of the inequality-health relation at the intern-national level. I havn't looked back at that study, but I have seen a similar regression for all countries with per capita income above $10,000, where inequality remains a significant variable. It seems reasonable to me to restrict the sample to 'rich' countries, and not confound the analysis with large differences in socio-economic systems, e.g. to consider only those countries those past the point where significant improvements in health status continue to accompany increases in per capita GDP. It does seem as though the US is a bit of an exception to the general rule -- that it is hard to prove the relation between health and inequality through regression analysis. Bill Burgess
Re: RE: Re: profit rate recession
Me: Isn't it worth getting some indication of the role of circulating (M) as well as fixed (K) capital, roughly, that (change in) ROP = (change in) K/Y+M/Y+S/Y? Jim: fine, do it. But I think that the rate of profit on fixed capital is more important in determining the ratio of net investment to fixed capital, which in turn is crucial to determining the fluctuations in aggregate demand. In other words, I accept Keynes' emphasis on fixed investment. Fair enough. If I can figure out where/how to get numbers for M, I'll try to answer my question. Bill Burgess
Re: profit rate recession
I wondered about Jim D. not including circulating constant capital (basically materials) in explaining the change in the ROP, especially since this is an area there have been productivity gains. Jim wrote shouldn't an improvement in inventory management techniques help labor productivity and profits (all else constant) and thus raise the rate of profit? So it wouldn't be ignored altogether. It is partly included, and (probably) raised the ROP. But as I understand it, in 'explaining' the ROP, you are assuming that K/Y moves with the OCC (and that S/Y moves with the RSV?). Isn't it worth getting some indication of the role of circulating (M) as well as fixed (K) capital, roughly, that (change in) ROP = (change in) K/Y+M/Y+S/Y? I cited a series that breaks down US industrial output into three 'stages' of production (materials, intermediate goods and final goods), noting that the first two make up half of total industrial output. I don't get how half of value-added is accounted for by materials and intermediate goods since the cost of materials and purchased intermediate goods is subtracted from total revenues when calculating a company's value-added (since they are part of another company's total revenues and we don't want to double-count). If you look at retail, intermediate goods would swamp value-added altogether. I wasn't very clear. I cited the breakdown by stage of production to note that, to the degree that the materials and intermediate goods are inputs to the final goods, M is large. It is typically? larger than one year's K, i.e., there is lots of quantitative room here for 'non-K, non-S' changes to affect the ROP. Subcontracted inputs have become more important. While I suppose that in principle the accounting in separate business units should not affect the aggregate shares of fixed capital, profits, etc., I wonder if this is really is true. For example, is subcontracting an important vehicle for transferring profit from subcontracters to their oligopolistic customers. Even if the overal capital-output ratio does not change, who gets the profits does change, through unequal exchange. Also, is it prossible that more subconstractors means that more profit is taken in the form of profits rather than big salaries for managers? I interpret these changes in terms of changing relations of production -- including intracapitalist relations -- which has an effect on the aggregate level. Do you mean, *no* effect on the aggregate level? I suggested a further reason to not focus on K alone is the problem of measuring K. Recent US manufacturing output and productivity gains are restricted to 2 sectors (industrial and electronic equipment), and may be exaggerated. Since a lot of these products become part of K in other sectors, this is another reason to question K values. As Jim notes, they are part of a recent speedup in rates of K depreciation. I don't think that the role of PCs is very large as part of the total K. It only has an effect as part of a welter of different forces affecting K/Y. I accept this, but isn't it striking that in the output and producitivity data, a 2 industry tail has supposedly wagged the all-industry dog ? Bill Burgess
Re: the profit rate recession
Yes, I did find your talk interesting. Do you have any similar numbers for other countries, or when you compare your trends for the US with profit trends in other countries, what are the differences? I generally agree with your focus on fixed capital and using 'conventional' profits rates, but I also wonder if something important is not being missed when circulating constant capital (raw materials and other non-fixed-capital inputs) is left out of the analysis of the reasons for the trends, especially about the role of the organic composition of capital. If I remember correctly, Fred Mosely also leaves out circulating constant capital from his profit rate. Several questions come to mind. My impression from the business press is that faster throughput and reducing waste in transforming materials have been a key element of productivity changes in recent years. This element of change in the organic composition of capital is ignored when the profit trends are expressed as yearly profits over the stock of fixed capital alone. A useful series by the US Federal Reserve (see www.federalreserve.gov/releases/G17/ip_notes.htm) shows that more than half of industry (roughly manufacturing and mining) value-added is accounted for by materials and intermediate goods, as opposed to final goods. The materials share of total industry value-added has been rising. This breakdown of industry by the stage of production underlines the *quantitative* significance of circulating constant capital. Or, am I misunderstanding something? Subcontracted inputs have become more important. While I suppose that in principle the accounting in separate business units should not affect the aggregate shares of fixed capital, profits, etc., I wonder if this is really is true. For example, is subcontracting an important vehicle for transfering profit from subcontracters to their oligopolistic customers. Even if the overal capital-output ratio does not change, who gets the profits does change, through unequal exchange. Also, is it prossible that more subconstractors means that more profit is taken in the form of profits rather than big salaries for managers? As we all know, measures of fixed capital are always a problem. In a comparison of productivity trends in US and Canadian manufacturing, Andrew Sharpe of the Centre for the Study of Living Standards (http://www.csls.ca/pdf/lanc.pdf) notes that all of the 1990-1997 increase in US manufacturing productivity (and almost all of the difference between Canada and the US) is concentrated in industrial machinery and electronic equipment sectors alone. He seems to question how accurate the US data is, but more to the point here, the boom in this sector suggests that a lot of machinery and computers has been scrapped and replaced with the latests and greatest, but probably before passing on its value. You note the decline in K/Y is related to the shake-out in manufacturing but, for example, while computer prices have declined massively, the fixed capital numbers may not reflect their service life. Another question - how much of computer-type purchases are counted as fixed capital? Bill Burgess At 11:34 AM 27/12/01 -0800, you wrote: For those interested, I recently gave a talk at the Marxist School in Sacramento, California, suggesting that the recent recession is connected with the trend rise of the rate of profit. My notes are available at: http://bellarmine.lmu.edu/faculty/jdevine/FROP/sacramento.htm Jim Devine [EMAIL PROTECTED] http://bellarmine.lmu.edu/~jdevine
Re: Help with Research
If you are not already familiar with them, try Myron Orfield's Metropolitan Area Research Organization at http://www.metroresearch.org/index.html. They specialize in the problem of inter-municipal differences in both need for services and the capacity to provide them, and are very good at depicting these differences using maps. Orfield has a new book out, _American Metropolitics_. I take it you are looking at a rebalance in state-municipal financing while I think Orfield focuses more on fiscal capacity within metro areas. However, I think the general issues are similar, Bill Burgess At 03:29 PM 25/12/01 -0800, you wrote: Hi everyone, My name is Mitch Chanin, and I'm a community organizer in Philadelphia. I've been hoping to find someone who could help me with some research for an organizing effort I'm writing to ask whether or not you might be able to help with some research for an important community organizing effort that I've been participating in for the past few months. For several years, activists in Philadelphia and around the state have been working to change the way the Pennsylvania state government funds public education. PA has one of the most inequitable approaches to funding public schools of any state in the country -- it pays only about 35% of public school expenses, leaving local governments and school districts to depend on local property taxes for much of their funding. Districts with large tax bases are able to provide adequate funding for their schools, and other districts are not--some affluent suburbans districts near Philadelphia spend close to twice per pupil what the Philly school district is able to spend each year. Year after year, districts like Philadelphia's, including school districts in poor towns, suburbs, and rural areas throughout the state, are are desperately short of resources. Community groups and education advocates have been working through law suits and through legislative action to get the state to change its funding formula, and recently a new statewide, grassroots network called Good Schools Pennsylvania has come together to take on this campaign. I've been volunteering with Good Schools PA for several months, and I feel like there's real potential for a major change in policy over the next couple of years. The reform that's been discussed the most often involved increasing the state income tax, reducing local property taxes, and through a somewhat complicated formula, redistributing the increased state revenue to school districts around the state so as to insure that each school has an adequate amount of money to spend. A Republican state legislator from the Philly suburbs has recently introducted a proposal along these lines. In order to for us to advocate effectively for this kind of change, I think it would be extremely useful for us to have a clear picture of how the tax burden would be distributed, and I haven't so far been able to find that information. How would people in different income brackets and different kinds of households be affected? Who will pay more, and who will pay less? My sense is that the largest portion of the new revenue will come from the wealthiest people, and that at least some low-income and middle-income people will end up paying less in taxes. I'm not sure, though, how this kind of change would affect middle-income people overall, low-income renters, senior citizens living with their families or in institutions, etc.. As far as I know, no one has done a comprehensive analysis--I've talked with people from the Pennsylvania School Reform Network, which is one of the main proponents of this change, and also with a couple of local economic policy institutes. Conservative legislators are arguing against the proposal by saying that it would be unfair to young workers, or that middle class families will suffer. The more we know about how the benefits and losses from this kind of bill would be distributed, the easier it will be for us to answer these claims or to come up with changes to the proposal to make it better. If anyone knows of a research institute, and individual reseacher or student, or a college class of some kind that might be able to do an analysis of this stuff, please let me know. I'm considering taking this on myself, and if I do, I'd be extremely grateful for an advice or help anyone could provide. I'm forwarding you a longer request for assistance that I wrote up a while ago, along with some background information. If you have any questions or need more information, please feel free to call me at 215-698-2422. Thanks very much, and I hope everyone is doing well. Have a great holiday, Mitch -- Michael Perelman Economics Department California State University Chico, CA 95929 Tel. 530-898-5321 E-Mail [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Re: project for Pen-l
My list: No 1. on my list, is, paraphrasing Marx, Workers go to the wall under both free trade and protectionism. In some ways, this covers some of the same ground as one of Peter's points: 3. The case for free trade (and comparative advantage) is, in the end, the same as the case for free markets in general. I think this project is very worthwhile. Several months ago I benefited from the help of several Penners who replied with very useful advice and copies of papers when I asked for help on this topic. This list does have a 'speciality' - it has top-notch professional and other economists, who have the ability to provide both internal and external critiques of neo-classical claims. Joan Robinson said something like, The purpose of studying economics is...to avoid being deceived by economists. Pen-L could lay out some of the examples. I appreciate most of the 'non-economic' topics discussed here, but why not take more advantages of the particular strengths of the list? There was talk awhile ago about putting togeather some kind of intro textbook, but perhaps that was too ambitious. Is it too much to imagine that 'free' trade might be the first in series of informal collections of resources aimed at teachers of economics, teachers in other discipines, and for use in other spheres? Bill Burgess
Re: Fed's actions
I don't think this is all for buying bonds, but Saturday's Globe and Mail reports a $US 82.5 billion infusion of short term cash into the US financial system by the Fed on Friday, for a total of $188 billion since Wednesday. An economist with J.P. Morgan Canada is quoted as estimating the addition of funds this week by the Fed was 20 times the normal amount. Bill Burgess At 12:51 AM 16/09/01 -0400, you wrote: A question for Doug Henwood (Hi Doug) and others: The New York Times reported on Friday that the Fed purchased government bonds of $70 billion on Thursday (after buying $38 billion on Wednesday), which it called one of the biggest such operation in memory. It also said that on a normal day the purchase would be several billion dollars. Does anybody know: 1. Other examples of such high purchases, and what the numbers were? 2. How much the Fed purchased on Friday, which was not reported in Saturday's paper (at least I couldn't find it). Thanks in advance, Fred Moseley P.S. The Monday opening of Wall St. should be very interesting.
Re: Re: Income Inequality and Health
Deaton's results show that including percent Black knocks out income inequality as (partly) explaining mortality in US metropolitan areas. I wonder if the the reverse is not also be true -- are they two not well corellated? So how can his results be taken as refuting the Wilkinson-type argument that income inequality (in addition to the level of income) significantly affects health? As Martin Brown wrote, percent Black measures something, but what is it? I like the (Reich-type?) political 'explanation' of these issues -- variables like income inequality roughly represent relative social power. Mortality rates in the US are worse than in other countries because the capitalist minority in the US has relatively more power to impose their interests on the majority. There is less social solidarity. 'Free' markets are unhealthy. However, I agree this 'explanation' needs to be made more compelling. Martin also noted a practical problem in relating various Reich-type factors (like the location of 'dirty' industries) to health is that a lot of the data is not available on the basis of the SMSA (metropolitan) scale. As it happens I am beavering away at drawing togeather SMSA data in Canada and the US, including doing some aggregating of data to build up SMSA-level data on local government finances. It's a nightmare, so if anyone knows of similar efforts please contact me directly. Bill Burgess Bill Burgess ([EMAIL PROTECTED]) Department of Geography, Tel: (604) 822-2663 University of British Columbia, B.C. Fax: (604) 822-6150
Re: Income Inequality and Health
Martin Brown wrote that ecological regressions (like average health against average income plus income inequality) are not worth the effort. Could you expand a bit on why? I think regession assumptions like linearity, independendence of variables and unidirection of causality are big problems (on top of many issues regarding measuring health), but is this what you have in mind? If so, can you cite a non-econometric-technical summary of these problems, especially as they apply to health? Bill Burgess At 03:12 PM 24/08/01 -0400, you wrote: I'll try to respond to this when I have more time to do it right. But there is something else I wanted to bring up from the International Health Economics Association meeting. There were several plenary and regular sessions focusing on the Wilkinson Hypothesis. That is to say the theory that there is a relationship between macroeconomic measures of income inequality and average health status. This relationship is above and beyond that expected by the Prescott Curve, that says there is a strong relationship between the level of individual income and individual health. To make a long story short, the consensus at the meeting both from those who had been advocates and detractors of the W hypothesis in the past is that current data and/or sophisticated analysis does not support the hypothesis for most situations examined - e.g. OECD countries, within UK, within Canada, within Australia. The remaining, very important case, is within the U.S. Some cross-sectional analyses of SMSA data within the U.S. - notably by Michael Wolfson of Statistics Canada - strongly support the hypothesis. The counter-argument, put forward by Angus Deaton - an econometrician/development economist - is that when one enters percent black population into the regression for the U.S. the coefficients on the inequality measures drop out. This only happens if one looks separately at health status (e.g. mortality) for blacks and whites separately. And, note, white mortality is inversely related to percent black population. There was some discussion to the effect that macro measures of social structure still matter but that things like Gini coefficients of measured income were never very good measures. Some discussion about dysfunction urban structures in the U.S. being the real issue, etcbut apart from this what should we make of this debate?? 1] All attempts a these kinds of ecological regression are not worth the effort. 2] There is rationale for Deaton to substitute percent black for income inequality. 3] Percent black is a proxy measure for something that really is important - but what is it?? I will say this for health economics. 1] Would the questions of inequality ever dominate a meeting of AEA? 2] Would everybody at an AEA meeting, even those on the political right end of the debate, concede the importance of the Prescott curve, say that economists have ignored this for far too long and that we need to learn a lot more about the specific mechanisms behind this statistical relationship and intervene with social programs to address it? 3] Acknowledge that the Prescott Curve, alone, tells us that total social welfare would/should be improved by transfering social resources toward lower end of the income distribution (because 99% of health economists have pretty much accepted the proposition that a additional unit of health is/ought to be worth at least as much to a poor person as a rich person). On the down side, this debate has received the least visibility in the one country where the evidence suggests that both the Prescott Curve and (perhaps) the Wilkinson effects are the strongest - the US.
Re: Re: Lumber politics
Of course, the US position is the usual rotton, hypocritical protectionism. But as Warnock suggests, it has put the spotlight on how corproations are 'subsidized' in Canada by how public resources are handed over to capitalists for next to nothing. I'm waiting for the Council of Canadians to fight for our **sovereign right** to keep do this. The reason the subsidy accusation is hard to make about the Atlantic forestry is that much (most?) forestry in the Atlantic region is on private land. However, wood and fibre prices are still low because small woodlot owners have little bargaining power relative to the lumber and pulp mills they sell to. In BC most forest land is publicly owned (in Canada provinces own most resources). The stumpage rate is basically derived as a residual in an estimation of the cost of (profitable) production -- take market price, deduct a profit margin, cost of building roads to cut blocks, cost of cutting and transportation to buyers, and if there is anything left over the 'Crown' (government) claims it as the return to the owner of the resource. Well, they set a *minimum* rate, but basically it goes up and down depending on the market price. In some cases logging companies have, in effect, 'paid' **negative stumpage** on certain cut blocks, e.g., when the cost of building roads ate up any stumpage change and then some. The US industry argument has put a spotlight on this system, which in the past has been criticized by the labour movement and NDP (until the latter get into government, when they back down on any changes). Most recently it has been effectively critiqued by environmentalist groups like the Sierra Club. But Warnock is off-base on the 'neo-colonial' argument. Despite large acquisitions by US companies of forestry operations in Canada in recent years, a substantial majority of the industry is controlled by Canadian corproations -- in 1998, 69 % of wood and paper industry corproate assets were Canadian controlled; 20% were controlled from the US (Stats Can figures). The system was and is set up to primarily benefit Canadian, not foreign capitalists. And, there is proportionately less high-tech, high value-added manufacturing in Canada than most rich countries (but slightly more than in fellow G7 member Italy), and the 'gap' between Canada and other rich countries has been declining , including since 'free' trade agreements took effect (OECD data). This is a trade war between a bigger imperialist country and a smaller imperialist country. There's more to come. If we want an example of a neocolonial relation, try Canada's subsidy war against Brazil in the aircraft market -- Bombardier against Embraer. Canada even banned imports of Brazilian beef to pressure Brazil until Canadian government health dept scientists publicly denied the accusations there was any danger of mad cow disease in Brazil. Since then Canada has provided huge loan subsidies to two Bombardier customers (Air Wisconsin? and Northwest?), in violation of WTO rules, etc. etc. etc. Since Canadian left-nationalists are so confused about these questions, it fell to the _Globe and Mail_ to run a story describing how in Brazil Canada's stance...smacks of hypocritical first world imperialism, of a developed nation trying to deny Brazil the tools it needs to build up companies like [Canada's] BombardierThe message being sent is that Canada exports airplanes, Brazil exports coffee beans, and that is the say it should stay. Bill Burgess At 10:05 AM 12/08/01 -0500, Ken wrote: Sorry people but at least one Canadian source John Warnock in the July-August Canadian Dimension agrees with the US position. In fact if what he says is correct you are supporting US imperialist exploitation of Canadian forests. He argues that Canadian forestry development policy has been designed to attract foreign capital through subsidies, incentives, infrastructure development and so forth. For example, Canada has the lowest overall stumpage fees in the world according to a 1990 UN study. Except for other provinces B.C.' s stumpage fees are lowest in the world. INn 1999 they were so low it was estimated that they were about half what US companies were paying for similar wood. As Warnock puts it: The neo-colonial industrial model results in a heavy emphasis on exporting low-value-added wood products, lumber and pulp and paper. (p.41) Secondary manufacturing is relatively weak. It is interesting that two large US forest corporations Weyerhauser and Louisiana-Pacific pulled out of the Coalition for Fair Lumber Imports. They claim that the Canadian government is correct in arguing that it does not unfairly subsidise the forest industry. Just coincidentally no doubt both companies have acquired cutting rights to millions of hectares of Canadian forests. I am not sure that Warnock is entirely correct but his position makes sense. Some qualifications I have is that Atlantic
Re: question on trade _theory_
My thanks to all who replied on and off list to my question about trade theory. Bill Burgess
Re: question on trade _theory_
In _For the Common Good_ , Cobbs and __ state that factor mobility (especially of capital) cannot be incorporated in the theory of comparative advantage. Is this correct? I seem to recall someone on this list stating otherwise. Can you suggest a textbook or article that takes up this issue, and that quickly summarizes various other trade theories (e.g. 'new' trade theory)? I'm filling in for an absent colleague in a second year class discussion where these issues may come up. Bill Burgess ([EMAIL PROTECTED])
Re: Re: death income
For a quick review of research on inequality and health check out http://www.inequality.org/healthdcfr.html Bill
Re: health inequality
The non-linear effect is examined by Wolfson et al. at http://www.bmj.com/cgi/content/full/319/7215/953/DC1At. Their modeling suggests it is not responsible for the observed relation between inequality and health in the US. Bill 01:54 PM 01/03/01 -0500, you wrote: Doug, I have not dug (sic) into this lit although I have seen some of it. I think the argument that there is some kind of nonlinear effect at the personal level is very reasonable and certainly could be responsible for a lot of the apparently conflicting results. In this regard, I think that one would be more likely to find stronger connections with the percent of people in poverty rather than with inequality per se, with all of this having to take into account the nature of the medical care system if one is doing cross-country studies. Barkley Rosser
Re: Re: Re: health inequality
sorry, try http://www.bmj.com/cgi/content/full/319/7215/953/DC1 (BMJ 1999, 319) If it doesn't work go to bmj.com (British Medical Journal) and look under income inequality At 08:40 PM 01/03/2001 -0800, you wrote: This URL seems to be wrong. The non-linear effect is examined by Wolfson et al. at http://www.bmj.com/cgi/content/full/319/7215/953/DC1AT. Their modeling suggests it is not responsible for the observed relation between inequality and health in the US.
Re: Re More privatisation
Michael asked what the problem was with the original Wilkinson study (showing that mortality is related to income inequality among developed countries.) I don't know that it is problem, but I think it was Lynch who added more developed countries to the list and found the relation was less clear than suggested by Wilkinson's original results (but it still exists). I attended a recent talk by Lynch where he made a convincing-sounding argument about how eating pasta and drinking red wine in Southern Europe are another part of why their populations are so much healthier than in Northern Europe (and the worst case of all, the United States). A recent article by Lynch (with Ross et al.) in the British Medical Journal, on the relation between income inequality and mortality in Canadian and US cities, is available at http://www.bmj.com/cgi/content/full/320/7239/898. They estimate that if the income share received by the poorer half of all working age households was increased by 1%, then mortality would hypothetically decline by 21 deaths per 100,000. How many other policy interventions would match this rate? In an earlier paper Lynch showed that mortality in US states is more closely related to income inequality than to income. US cities with greater income inequality have significantly higher mortality independent of their average income. In case this is where Doug's uncle comes in, the BMJ paper also cites evidence against the argument that the observed relation between health and income inequality is an artifact of the non-linear relation between income and mortality at the individual level. One question I have about these results is how income and income inequality are treated as 'independent' variables (independent of each other). Is it really true this can be 'fixed' with fancy adjustments to the regression equation and results? Bill Burgess
Re: Re:death income
Wilkinson kicked a lot of this work off, using Luxemburg Income Study data to compare inequality and mortality in a dozen or so countries.The data points available then seemed to fit the income inequality increases mortality relation, but data for additional countires that has become available makes this relation less obvious. Lynch shows there is a strong relation _within_ the US, i.e. mortality is higher in both states and cities that have more unequal incomes. If income inequality kills people, the US is the best example. Bill At 06:22 PM 27/02/01 -0500, you wrote: J. Barkley Rosser, Jr. wrote: Well, my quick off-the-cuff international regression suggests that this generalization of Jencks's is not true, even if it might be true within some countries. Thus, the US has a lower life expectancy than Japan and the European social democracies that are at similar levels of per capita income. But, this might not prove to be statistically significant, even if Auntie Deirdre says not to worry. Whatever you think about Jencks, he's extremely careful with his numbers. I'm told that he approaches every research question with no preconceptions - he lets his regressions do the talking. Which is another way of saying that he's rather apolitical, though his bias is quasi-Fabian aristo-liberal. Doug
Re: Re: Re: More privatisation
As it happens I am doing something very similar, as part of an effort to figure out why personal income _inequality_ is strongly (negatively) related to (age-adjusted) mortality rates in US cities, but not in Canadian cities. In other words, do more -- and more equal -- public goods in Canadian cities (schools, transit, libraries, sewers, etc.) mitigate some of the negative effects of personal income inequality that prevail in the US? (Of course, personal income itself is also strongly negatively related to mortality, but an additional? inequality effect seems to apply over the range of income.) BTW, some good recent work on the relation of income inequality and mortality is by Australian epidemiologist John Lynch. He offers a "neo-material" explanation for this relation in place of some of the 'social capital' ideas (trust, cohesion, civic participation, etc.) recently discussed on Pen-L. If anyone is working on similar points, please contact me to compare notes. Bill Burgess On Tue, Feb 27, 2001 at 12:15:07AM +1100, Rob Schaap wrote: G'day all, I see the best-cities-to-live-in poll for the year is out. If memory serves, Vancouver came top and the likes of Vienna, Geneva and Sydney were runners up (my favourites, Melbourne and Amsterdam did well, too - and if these gits had bothered to visit Hobart' Oz would have had the winner, too). Anyway, the reason I bring this up is because the salient virtue of these places (against traditional faves like London and Paris) are apparently the quality of *public services* and the capacity of leading candidates to resist the inhuman pace of life of our age. I'm not suggesting such poncy convocations constitute an unimpeachable source (although the bottom-of-the-listers, Brazzaville and Baghdad, are not destinations of mine right now, either), but I do suggest there's a job for an idle economist out there in the collection of the sort of data economists don't count (you could add suicide rates, all those focus group reports on quality-of-life priorities, Australian state election exit polls, intra-city and inter-state migration trends, letters-to-the-editor, and a whole lot of the sort of stuff you often find buried in little columns on page 6 of the Sunday papers). My suspicion is that, taken together, such a project would produce a monumental wall of evidence against privatisation in particular and the existence of homo economicus in general. Does anyone do this sort of thing? Cheers, Rob. -- Michael Perelman Economics Department California State University Chico, CA 95929 Tel. 530-898-5321 E-Mail [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Canada-Brazil subsidy war
Brazil's jet dogfight By MARK MACKINNON From Saturday's Globe and Mail Sao Jose dos Campos, Brazil A sleek collection of factories and office towers set against a background of multi-storey homes, Sao Jose dos Campos looks, from the highway heading into town, positively First World. The slums that dominate other Brazilian centres are almost nonexistent in this city of 500,000 nestled between the gentle green hills and scattered settlements of Sao Paulo state. Instead, corporate logos dot the landscape defence contractors, information technology startups, multinational communications firms and a fledgling space program. Tens of thousands of Brazilians work in the city, in jobs that are high-paying by the developing country's standards. Tens of thousands more apply annually for jobs here. If Brazil had a Silicon Valley, a high-tech economic engine, it would be here, 100 kilometres northeast of Sao Paulo city. And at the economic heart of Sao Jose dos Campos is Embraer SA, the country's home-grown aerospace giant, with about 10,000 employees of its own. "Embraer is good for the city," said Carlos da Silva, a chauffeur in the area. "It is the centre of everything." Somewhere in this picture is the reason Brazil is more than willing to go toe-to-toe with Canada in what would surely be a mutually harmful trade war, one that revolves around an argument over who subsidizes their aerospace industry more. Sao Jose dos Campos is a model of industrial development the government wants to replicate across this impoverished country. It can't let the working models it has die off at any cost. Since privatizing in 1994, Embraer has rapidly become the world's fourth-largest commercial airplane producer and the blood rival of Montreal-based Bombardier Inc. Two years ago, Embraer passed mining firm Vale do Rio Doce to become the country's largest exporter. In a country where horse-drawn carts compete for space on city roads with the latest Mercedes model, that's raised hopes of a high-tech revolution. "Embraer has become, in a sense, a symbol just like Bombardier is in Canada of success," said Jose Alfredo Graca Lima, Brazil's top trade negotiator. "As a country, we are concerned that we should produce more technologically sophisticated goods." Those outside Brazil, he said, do not understand the company's importance in helping modernize the country's economy. Its success is crucial, he argues, if Brazil is to change its image from that of a producer of bananas, coffee and shoes. Embraer is the byproduct of one of the few examples of long-term planning by the Brazilian government that worked out as planned. In the early 1950s, the government established the Aerospace Technological Institute, which created in subsequent decades a critical mass of well-trained aerospace engineers. The Brazilian government also created Embraer, originally to manufacture military planes, and ran it as a public company until 1994, losing millions of dollars in the process. After it was privatized, Mauricio Bothelo, the company's president and chief executive officer, launched what he called the "Redemption Project" turning the company's focus from the military side toward a regional jet market still in its infancy. It was a prescient move. The company's assembly-line-like hangars here are full of dozens of 37-, 44-, and 50-seat jets in various stages of construction. The multitude of logos painted on the sides Air
Capitalism Freedom
At 12:55 AM 24/11/00 -0500, Yoshie wrote: If you want to give a little moral credit to some Europeans, why not praise Canadians, the French Jacobins, the Latin-American Jacobin insurgents in the wars of independence? Or _some_ Canadians. William Lyon Mackenzie, leader of the 1837-38 failed national-bourgeois-democratic revolution in Upper Canada (Ontario) was a leader of the Anti-Slavery Society (don't recall its exact name). On the other hand, Canada's first PM, Sir John A. MacDonald, was the legal agent of the Southern Slave States. The assasination of Abraham Lincoln was planned in Montreal. Bill Burgess
Re: Re: Castro on US elections.
At 10:13 PM 14/11/00 -0800, Michael wrote: Let me ask a different type of question. Suppose Castro were to hold an election. Suppose he had every intention of making it free and fair. Wouldn't it be a disaster? It would be open season for the CIA to try to do everything it could to muck things up. There are regular elections in Cuba; there have been since the 1970s. Castro is directly elected as the representative of his neighbourhood. I believe the municipal representatives elect from themselves the members of the national parliament. The other big difference is that candidates _cannot_ run on political party affiliation (including CPC) -- candidates run on their _personal_ record of ability and public service. (I think I also recall that the law prohibits foreign financing of candidates, but I can't be sure of that.) The debates in the national parliament are not just for show -- they have changed things, e.g. a few years ago a proposal to impose income taxes on wage earners was rejected. Municipal governments are responsible for many important activities, including management of many local state-owned enterprises. It is a different type of electoral system but the Cuban government is still selected through elections. Bill
Re: RE: Castro on US elections.
At 12:36 PM 09/11/00 -0500, Norm wrote: OK, health care is worse than in W.Europe and some don't have it at all in the US, but it's far better for most US citizens than just about anywhere else. Far better for most US citizens? I doubt this. But more to the point - why is _health_ in the US so bad relative to other countries? Infant mortality is terrible - one figure I've seen is that black infant mortality in Washington is higher than in Havana. A recent study in the British Medical Journal found that all cause and age-adjusted mortality rates in almost every major US city are significantly higher than in Canadian cities. They suggest that part of the reason is greater income inequality in the US (average income is higher in the US, but income inequality is higher, and signficantly correllated with mortality). US capitalism is a very unhealthy system. Bill
Re: Canada, Australia, Argentina
I agree with Paul and Nestor's point about the difference in class structure, and Paul's work on Canada's WW1 financing is an excellent illustration of the consolidation of an indigenous bourgeoisie. Nestor, I think, has put his finger on the critical difference -- neither Canada nor Australia had a landed elite such that the role of Canada and Australia vs GB was one of subsidiary (dependent?) capital vs imperial capital. In Argentina, there was an intervening class, the landed aristocracy. (See, for instance, Baran on this) I have not done comparable work for Australia and Argentina, but for Canada the turning point, in my opinion, was the 1st World War. In Canada's case, Britain ceased to be a creditor to Canada because of war created debts. Canada financed the war from borrowing from capitalists made rich by war profiteering on government contracts to supply GB. After the war, the state helped smash labour and tax the working and middle class to pay off capital debt incurred during the war, a classic case of (marxist) primitive accumulation. (By the way -- more shameless promotion -- I have written a paper on this.) The railways went bankrupt and reneged on their obligations to British bond holders. Though borrowing shifted after the war from GB to the US, it was not until the "American boom in Canada" after the 2nd WW that American (direct) investment in Canada came to dominate the resourse and manufacturing industries. However, by the mid 1980s the US-controlled share of all non-financial industres in Canada declined to levels below the post-WW2 buildup (the US share has risen slightly since then, as has foreign control in all countries). I consider this 'repatriation' partial evidence that Canadian capital never lost _overal_ control of the domestic economy, which they originally gained, as I think Paul agrees, by around WW1. Just as a 'national bourgeoisie' was able to develop while formally still a British colony, it was able to survive and even gain relative strength despite extensive US ownership and control in _some_ industrial sectors. I don't think the Argentine bourgeoisie ever developed this kind of hegemony over the economy and state. As a well known member of Bill Burgess's detested left-nationalist cabal, I have also argued a form of Canadian dependency. I winced here until I remembered how Paul has written far more and better than I have against some forms of Canadian dependency. All one has to do is look at the Cdn and Australian $s and see how they dropped in parallel as "commodity currencies" (also NZ) to realize the dependency of the Cdn/Oz/NZ economies on the imperial centre dominated by the US but, in Oz/NZ also the Japanese economies. Canada has recovered somewhat better than Ozzieland in large part because the US economy has done much better than Japan. Since I don't know where Argentina's markets are dominated by, I can't comment. However, one common denominator is grain -- more particularly wheat. We are all part of the Cairns group trying to get the US and the UE to stop subsidizing agriculture so we can sell our grain at a decent price. Right now our agriculture is in the tank. This demonstrates, I would think, a certain dependence over which neither Canada, Australia, nor Argentina have little control. Where we differ is that Paul interprets this as Canadian and Australian dependence a la Frank. This would be appropriate for Argentina, but Canada and Australia are in the qualitatively different position of secondary imperialist countries. They get bullied by the US as do other secondary imperialist countries (e.g. in Europe, by the US and Japan, Germany, UK, etc.) but the politics of this relationship are very different than the politics of Frankian-like dependency. Sorry to harp on this issue but I think the failure to distinguish between the two kinds of relations with bigger-power imperialism has long been a key failing of socialism in Canada (and I think the same applies to Australia and New Zealand). Bill Burgess
Re: Re: Pomocanadianism
In reply to Doug's question, I think it was Kari Levitt who coined the term "rich dependency" to describe Canada; others have suggested terms like intermediate country, 'go-between' imperialist, advanced resource capitalism, etc. No one disputes there is a big material difference between Canada and the Third World, but what is often suggested, particularly in terms of political strategy, is that Canada shares to a very significant extent the Third World's oppression and superexploitation by US imperialism. IMHO what this misses is what is the cardinal distinction -- between greater US and lesser Canadian imperialism on one side, and the greater and lesser imperialized or semi-colonial countries on the other, e.g., Mexico or Argentina to Haiti. I've been reading about the CPC debate on this issue in the 1920s. At its founding in 1921 it was more or less assumed Canada was in the imperialist camp; in the mid-1920s the CPC began to claim that Canada was a dependent semi-colony; but by the end of the 1920s this was rejected and Canada was defined as an independent imperialist country. The CP still considers Canada imperialist _in purely formal terms_ but has dropped the independent adjective (because Canada is considered an adjunct of US imperialism). In practice the CPC has long been more Canadian nationalist than the NDP. Without being able to provide the details, I think one way of answering Brad's question of why Canada and Australia thrived and Argentina did not is that the latter was not able to make the transition to imperialist status. Canada and Australia developed the economic base and class structure necessary for admission to the imperialist club despite their formal political status as colonies (later 'dominions'). Argentina did not, despite its formal political independence. Many apply to the club. Only a few are allowed in. I think the (pomoCanadian?) attitude of being "at the margins" reflects _envy_ of major imperialist status. Bill Bill Burgess wrote: Actually, Canada has often been compared to Argentina by (some) Canadian political economists and leftists. While they would not deny the _degree_ of Canadian dependence is less, they they often do suggest that Canada is dependent "in the same way" as Argentina - or to take a more recent example, Mexico in the context of NAFTA. The traditional dependency argument is rarely made any more, but its logic persists in the Canadian left-nationalist response to current events. While nationalism in nasty imperialist France or Germany is regarded with suspicion, Canada, you see, is in a different category... How do they deal with the fact that Canadian incomes are 3 times Mexico's (according to the World Bank's PPP estimates) - and a hair higher than France and Germany's even? Doug
Re: [Fwd: [sixties-l] more on 'Steal This Movie']
It is rank nationalism. If the complaint was that film production is less unionized in Canada than in the US (I don't know if this is true) I could at least partly sympathize with the comment about skill levels, job loss, etc. Otherwise, it is a wonderful example of the arrogance that comes from living in the greatest imperialist country in the world, complete with the hypocritical argument about subsidies elsewhere. Bill At 11:10 AM 06/09/00 -0700, you wrote: what do pen-l's Canadian comrades think of this article? "Steal this Movie" -- From: Michael Everett [EMAIL PROTECTED] Even with its many flaws, which included terrible casting for the two leads, I recommend this film as a sincere attempt at a biopic of Abbie Hoffman -- an icon of the 60's and the embodiment of the American revolutionary tradition. "Steal this Movie" is of course a play on words of Abbie's 60's handbook of revolution, "Steal this Book", but for jobless filmworkers, the title has yet another meaning, because "Steal this Movie" is indeed a stolen movie. It was stolen by NAFTA and is yet another example of an American cultural product purporting to be made in the US but in fact thrown together in the Canadian movie maquiladoras where runaway productions are rewarded by fat subsidies. Alert filmworkers will notice from the credits that "Steal this Movie" was in fact made in Ontario with just enough second unit work done in NY and LA to make it appear to be an American film. And any film worker who's sat on the edge of their seat through dailies to see whether their work was absolutely perfect will recognize yet another telltale sign of the made in Canada stamp -- the final shot of Abbie, as it moves into the key closeup of the film, wanders totally out of focus. Maybe it was the mischevious ghost of Abbie himself who threw that shot out of focus, or maybe it was just a Canadian film industry so jammed with subsidized NAFTA production that it can't find camera assistants who care enough or are experienced enough to meet the exacting demands of a difficult craft. No offense to our Canadian brothers and sisters who are just trying to make a buck like the rest of us and who have no more control over the corporate free trade agenda than do American workers, but shame on Producer/Director Robert Greenwald who poses as a liberal, but makes his living out of destroying the very industry that created him. Greenwald's Hollywood credits go back to the 1970's, but he's long since abandoned the Hollywood workers who toiled on his earlier projects for the greener subsidized pastures of Canada. Of Greenwald's last seven projects, six were fake made in USA films actually produced in Canada. In addition to 'Steal this Movie", they include: "Deadlocked" (Vancouver), a TV movie about the American justice system "Audrey Hepburn" (Montreal), biopic "Outrage at Glen Ridge" (Toronto), a TV movie about a gang rape set in Glen Ridge, New Jersey "Secret Path" (Toronto), a TV movie about family abuse and race relations set in the rural South "Zelda" (Montreal), a TV biopic about Zelda Fitzgerald Isn't it time we call fake Hollywood liberals like Robert Greenwald to account for their complicity in destroying an industry that took eighty years of sweat and toil to build and for the suffering they've caused to working families? Michael Everett IATSE Local 728, Hollywood Jim Devine [EMAIL PROTECTED] http://bellarmine.lmu.edu/~jdevine
Re: Pomocanadianism
Doug wrote: This seems a bit overstated - not from the point of view of Argentina, but the parallel to Canada. Canada may be under the shadow of the U.S., but it is a rich G7 country and the home to major multinational corps and banks. It is, vis a vis the outside world except for the U.S., a mini-imperialist power. Argentina is unambiguously in a dependent position. Surely even Canadian nationalists don't deny that Canada is not dependent in the same way that Argentina is. Actually, Canada has often been compared to Argentina by (some) Canadian political economists and leftists. While they would not deny the _degree_ of Canadian dependence is less, they they often do suggest that Canada is dependent "in the same way" as Argentina - or to take a more recent example, Mexico in the context of NAFTA. The traditional dependency argument is rarely made any more, but its logic persists in the Canadian left-nationalist response to current events. While nationalism in nasty imperialist France or Germany is regarded with suspicion, Canada, you see, is in a different category... Bill
Fwd: WTO's next challenge? Unfair use of sushi - The Globe and Mail
This is too good to not pass on. X-Sender: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Unverified) X-Mailer: QUALCOMM Windows Eudora Light Version 3.0.5 (32) The Globe and Mail Thursday, August 3, 2000 WTO's next challenge? Unfair use of sushi By Jim Stanford This just in: A dispute-settlement panel of the World Trade Organization has ruled that Japan's traffic laws constitute a barrier to trade and must be changed. The judgment is considered a major victory for North American and European auto producers, who argued before the WTO that Japan's requirement that vehicles drive on the left side of the road established an unfair barrier to imports of cars and trucks. As one auto-industry lobbyist explained, "The Japanese government literally forces its citizens to drive on the wrong side of the road. It's the major reason why they don't buy our left-hand-drive vehicles." The WTO panel is similar to those that forced Canada to abolish the auto pact, its pharmaceutical patent laws, its domestic magazine policy, an aerospace technology program, and several agricultural marketing boards. The Japanese government must now enter into negotiations with other countries to determine a timetable for reforming its traffic laws. Sales of imported vehicles in Japan are expected to enjoy an immediate boost as a result of the WTO decision. Large North American sport-utility vehicles, such as the Dodge Durango and the tank-like General Motors Hummer, are likely to experience the greatest increases in market penetration thanks to their enhanced ability to withstand head-on collisions. International Trade Minister Pierre Pettigrew hailed the WTO's decision as a victory for free trade. "Sure, there will be short-run adjustment costs," he admitted, referring to the temporary increase in head-on crashes. "But, in the long run, the Japanese will start to focus their skills and resources in those industries where they are more efficient." Emboldened by the WTO decision, foreign automakers plan to launch other complaints against Japanese trade practices. Sources within the industry hint that the next challenge may target the unfair use of the Japanese language. "Japanese customers can hardly make sense of North American owner's manuals," said one Detroit-based auto analyst. "They're much less likely to buy a vehicle when they can't figure out how to make it work." It's widely expected that Japan would resist any WTO demands to abolish Japanese by claiming a cultural exemption to normal trade rules. But a WTO official scoffed. "There's even less genuine cultural value to a Japanese-language owner's manual than there is in the Canadian edition of Reader's Digest." China's trade ministry, meanwhile, expressed pleasure at the WTO decision, suggesting that it enhances the likelihood that Beijing will soon be admitted to the world trading club. "Sure, our country is still nominally run by Communists," said one official. "But we drive on the right side of the road. This clearly indicates our readiness to accept the discipline of world market forces." The implications of the WTO's ruling on traffic laws may extend to other industries. An association representing U.S. beef growers is already planning a trade challenge against the Japanese sushi industry. "Japanese consumers are indoctrinated to eat raw fish from the time they are toddlers," one beef lobbyist said. "No wonder they won't buy our meat. That's completely unacceptable." The beef challenge may be backed by powerful support from the pharmaceutical industry, which has long complained of a lack of Japanese demand for U.S.-made cholesterol-reduction drugs. The latest WTO decision represents another expansion in the scope and breadth of the trade body's dispute-settlement system. What was initially intended as a means of arbitrating relatively narrow and arcane questions of trade law has evolved into an authority with the mandate to challenge any law, policy or practice found to inhibit the pre-eminent goal of expanded world trade. The worldwide economic and cultural harmonization thus being encouraged by the dispute-settlement mechanism is a normal side-effect of globalization, said a top U.S. trade official assigned to the WTO. "Basically, it won't stop until foreigners think like Americans, act like Americans and shop like Americans." When not reporting on WTO decisions from Geneva, Jim Stanford is an economist with the Canadian Auto Workers union.
FYI: Income shifts in Canada and US
Statistics Canada The Daily. Friday, July 28, 2000 Income inequality in Canada and the United States 1974-1997 Income distribution patterns in Canada and the United States have diverged during the past 10 years despite free trade and increased economic integration between the two nations, according to a new study. Average real incomes are higher and have been growing considerably faster in the United States. At the same time, Canada has not seen the substantial increase in income inequality that has occurred in the United States. Inequality (the gap between rich and poor) and polarization (decline in the middle class) of family disposable incomes in Canada has remained roughly stable since the mid 1970s, while it has increased in the United States, more so since the mid 1980s. The income gap between Canadian and American families has widened at the top of the income spectrum. At the bottom of the income spectrum, Canadian families are better off in terms of purchasing power than are their American counterparts. The study, «Income inequality in North America: Does the 49th parallel still matter?,» explores patterns of change between 1974 and 1997 in average earnings and income distribution in Canada and the United States. It also investigated these patterns on the basis of broad geographic regions within both countries. The study rejected a theory that increasing economic integration has lead to greater similarity in patterns of income distribution in the two countries. Rather, the results suggested a widespread difference in overall income distribution in both Canada and the United States. If anything, the differences appeared to be widening, at least up to 1997. Income inequality in United States has risen more rapidly While Canadian and American societies are similar in many respects, their levels and trends in income inequality have been quite different during the past two decades. Real incomes are higher and have been growing faster in the United States on average. However, income inequality is higher in the United States, and it has been rising more rapidly. In terms of comparative economic well-being, Canadian families in the bottom 25% of the income distribution were better off in absolute terms in 1997 than were their counterparts in the United States. However, in the top one-fifth of the income distribution, American families had disposable incomes more than 20% higher than their Canadian counterparts. In the top one-tenth of the income distribution, disposable incomes among American families were about 25% higher. In 1997, disposable incomes for American families in the top one-fifth of the income distribution averaged $61,400 compared with $50,800 for Canadian families. Government transfer programs have had a substantially equalizing impact on family income distributions on both sides of the border. In fact, between 1974 and 1985, the American transfer system appeared more redistributive than Canada's. However, between 1985 and 1997, government transfer programs in Canada generally had larger impacts. Individual income and payroll taxes have also had an equalizing impact on the distribution of family income on both sides of the border. This effect was somewhat larger in Canada than in the United States. However, in both countries, income taxes had considerably weaker equalizing impacts than did income transfers. Average earnings higher in the United States In 1997, American workers averaged about $36,500 in earnings (expressed in 1995 Canadian dollars using purchasing power parities), 29.2% more than the Canadian average of $28,300. These workers included both men and women, employed both full-time and part-time, and employees as well as the self-employed. These 1997 averages followed increases of 14.6% in the United States between 1985 and 1997 and 5.9% in Canada. The differences in earnings between the two countries was largest for workers at the top of the earnings distribution. The difference at the median - the middle point at which half the population has higher earnings and half lower - was smaller (13.6%). The median earnings of American workers were $27,500 in 1997, compared with $24,200 in Canada. Also, the rate of increase in median earnings was much closer than those for mean earnings. In the United States, median earnings increased 8.7% from 1985 to 1997, and in Canada 7.7%. Between 1974 and 1985, earnings inequality and polarization increased in both countries. These changes were more pronounced in Canada than in the United States. However, between 1985 and 1997, these trends were completely reversed in Canada, where the earnings gap narrowed and polarization declined. In the United States, earnings inequality continued to increase, but polarization declined, signaling a reversal of the "disappearing middle-class jobs" phenomenon first noted over a decade ago. The feature article «Income inequality in North America:
Re: FYI: Income shifts in Canada and US
Jim wrote: since much of the Canadian economy is owned by residents of the US, might we think of the top 1/5 (or better, the top 1/100) of the US economy as being the richest part of the Canadian distribution? Not sure why we might think this way. There are more Canadian billionaires than US billionaires in the latest _Forbes_ billionaire rankings, per capita. Canadian residents still control 6 times as many corporate assets in Canada as do US residents. Canadians hold more FDI in other countries than foreigners own in Canada. Bill Burgess
Re: query
At 09:59 AM 26/07/00 -0400, you wrote: Is anyone aware of any empirical studies on the tendency for the rate of profit to equalize across industries over time? Rudy This may not be quite your topic but if I remember correctly, in a 1991 _The Canadian Geographer_ D. Rigby showed that manufacturing profits in Canada did not equalize between places, and I think he and M. Webber have shown the same for the US in their _The Golden Age Illusion_ . But perhaps you are looking for equalization between (not within) sectors. Bill Burgess
Re: Re: Houston, we have a problem.
Ken H. asked about foreign ownership of oil in Canada. According to StatsCan, foreign control of 'energy' industries (I assume this covers oil, gas and hydro) in Canada was 19.8% by assets in 1997, down from 23.2% in 1989 when 'free' trade came into effect. (When measured by revenues foreign control is up slightly, from 32.4% to 33.7%.) The US accounts for about 70% of the foreign share. The most recent figures I have for the petroleum sector (upstream and downstream) are for 1988, when the foreign share of revenues was 59.6%; the foreign share of assets would be lower. In the 1970s foreign control of petroleum was over 90%. The government regulatory agency here in BC just approved an approximate 25% increase in gas rates on top of another recent large increase, blaming the rise in US prices. But I disagree with Ken H. that the gas hikes should be attributed to NAFTA as this lets Canadian corporations and governments and capitalism in general off the hook. Also, it is not quite true that 'Canada' can't say 'no' to the US - energy export volumes to the US can be reduced each year by up to a certain percentage of the current year's exports (I seem to remember 15%, but that may be wrong). Bill Burgess At 12:20 PM 07/07/00 -0500, you wrote: High prices are not beneficial to Canadian consumers. They benefit energy producers many of whom are US multinationals. There is an ongoing battle between ranchers and oil and gas producers. A recent bill in the ALberta legislature allows the government to end ranch leases of public land and turn them over to oil and gas developers just like that. It also channels royalties to the provincial governments rather than to the municipalities where the gas and oil wells are located. These municipalities are often sparsely populated with very low tax bases. However, representatives of rancher groups and gas and oil developers seem to be working out some compromise. The bill will no doubt be amended and regulations will involve a compromise. The original terms though show the stripes (Stars an Stripes) of the Alberta government. Alberta is one of the richest and most reactionary Canadian provinces. It is an extension of Texas to the north. My main point is that it would make sense to have a national policy as we did under Trudeau that developed energy resources in the first instance so as to benefit Canadians. Trudeau was hated by ALbertans. He nationalised a big oil player Petro-Can. Of course now it is privatised again. Why should we sign an agreement that forces us to sell energy at the same price if we export it as we charge internally? I tried to check out the percentage of foreign ownership of oil but couldn't find it. Perhaps Paul Phillips has the data at hand. I have no idea of the environmental impact of the exploration. Ranchers have complained about messes oil companies have left etc. and about the meagre compensation they get. But perhaps others know more about this. Alberta range land is not exactly as biodiverse as Amazon Rain forest. I am not sure how fragile it is. Cheers, Ken Hanly Jim Devine wrote: Ken wrote: The posts show that Canada has a shortage of natural gas and higher prices because of NAFTA. At first blush, a high 'gas' price would be as beneficial to Canada as a high oil price is to OPEC, but who is capturing the scarcity rents implied by this higher gas price? is the higher gas price encouraging environmentally-destructive seeking of new natural gas sources? BTW, could someone remind me of why deregulation of electrical power in the US (or rather, the type of deregulation implemented) has led to rapid increases in electricity prices in San Diego and "rolling brown-outs" in San Francisco? Jim Devine [EMAIL PROTECTED] http://bellarmine.lmu.edu/~jdevine
Re: Re: Malthus revisited (fwd)
At 08:07 AM 28/06/00 -0400, Louis wrote: Can the capitalist system resolve these [ecological] problems? This is a theoretical question that has challenged a wide variety of thinkers. David Harvey's new book "Justice, Nature, and the Geography of Difference" argues that it can. Harvey does NOT argue capitalism can resolve ecological problems. Did you read the book? Bill Burgrss
Re: Re: energy crises
I forget who Simon's bet was with (Paul Erlich?), but it is undeniable that better technology and higher relative prices can increase reserves of non-renewable resources faster than they are depleted through the outragious rate of consumption in rich countries. For example, according to a textbook by Agnew and Knox, in 1975 worldwide proven reserves of crude oil were 650 billion barrels. By 1985 they had risen to 765 billion barrels, and by 1995 they rose to 1 trillion barrels. Of course, the geographical distribution of oil reserves is important: reserves in Europe and N. America were lower in 1995 than in 1975. And, as has been mentioned, there are lots of 'externalities' involved, including the nasty sunburn I got last week, apparently partly because there are now more UV rays caused by ozone-depletion. I think Hegel and Marx's distinction between barrier and limit can be useful when thinking about nature and capitalism - very crudely, nature is a barrier; workers and allies are a (potential) limit. Bill
Re: RE: energy crises
Just to be clear, I was not referring to the accumulated natural production over millions of years (see below), but to the 'proven reserves' that are a function of current technology and priceand world politics. If Mark rejects the 'official' estimates of (rising) oil reserves I quoted, how do we guess if there is 10 years or 1,000 years worth left? How much is in the Alberta tar sands? I wrote that technology and prices can (not _will_) increase reserves faster than consumption; I suppose I should have added under certain conditions, and for a time, but I didn't realize this was necessary. The point is that capitalism has access to more oil now than when OPEC shook things up in the 1970s, and real oil prices can still rise a lot before they reach heights that capitalism was able to stumble over without falling flat on its back. Sorry, it is not abundantly clear to me why dwindling oil is a sound political focus for anti-capitalists. Bill: I forget who Simon's bet was with (Paul Erlich?), but it is undeniable that better technology and higher relative prices can increase reserves of non-renewable resources faster than they are depleted through the outragious rate of consumption in rich countries. Mark: This, too, is completely wrong and shows the futility of trying to debate these issues in fora where the most absurd statements which have absolutely no basis in fact or theory are uttered ad nauseam without respect for the evidence, which is contrary, abundant and clear. and, that What we are talking about here is the rate at which fossil fuels accumulate under the earth and ocean-shelves. It is very slow indeed, and therefore of no practical importance. For humankind, once the fossil carbon in the mantle NOW is bnurnt, that's IT. It took 500m years to accumulate and we've used it in 250 years.
Re: Re: stats (fwd)
Sorry, I sent the message below by mistake. I finally got my voice recognition software to run my email program, dictated the phrase as a test, but forgot to delete it when I later told it to send my messages. Bill What is the source? Who is Don, MD? Mine -- Forwarded message -- Date: Sat, 20 May 2000 11:48:06 -0700 From: Bill Burgess [EMAIL PROTECTED] Reply-To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Subject: [PEN-L:19367] Re: stats if I thought that what you wrote was correct, I would have to kill myself. Bill At 05:08 PM 19/05/00 -0400, you wrote: Statistics v Number of people in the world, (pop. 5.5 billion) that live in abject poverty: 1.4 billion v Number of people currently expected to die from starvation: 900 million v Percentage of those that live in the undeveloped nations: 97 v Number of children in world dying each year from controllable illness: 12 million v Number of people in world that died each of the five years of World War II: 10 million v Number of people in world that die each year of preventable social causes: 10 million v Cost of one new Osprey aircraft (50 planned): $84 million v Annual cost of treatment to eliminate world's malaria cases: $84 million v Money set aside annually for malaria control by organized world health: $9 million v Money set aside for Viagra pills per annum by organized world health: $40 million v Number of children in world blinded yearly from lack of Vitamin A: 500 million v Number of women who died during childbirth last year in world: 650,000 v U.N. estimate of yearly expenditure on war: $800 billion v U.N. estimate of yearly expenditure on health services: $25 billion v Number of children in world that die by age 5 (yearly): 12 million v Percentage of those that succumb to routine preventable health causes: 90 v Ratio of African-American to white new born deaths in U.S. last year: 2:1 v Number of reported pediatric measles deaths in U.S. last year: 45 v Amount of money not allocated by Congress for measles vaccines: $9 million v Average amount of 1999 year-end bonus paid to Oxford HMO execs: $6 million v Time it takes the Pentagon to spend annual federal allocation for women's health: 15 minutes - Figures compiled by Don Sloan, M.D.
Re: stats
if I thought that what you wrote was correct, I would have to kill myself. Bill At 05:08 PM 19/05/00 -0400, you wrote: Statistics v Number of people in the world, (pop. 5.5 billion) that live in abject poverty: 1.4 billion v Number of people currently expected to die from starvation: 900 million v Percentage of those that live in the undeveloped nations: 97 v Number of children in world dying each year from controllable illness: 12 million v Number of people in world that died each of the five years of World War II: 10 million v Number of people in world that die each year of preventable social causes: 10 million v Cost of one new Osprey aircraft (50 planned): $84 million v Annual cost of treatment to eliminate world's malaria cases: $84 million v Money set aside annually for malaria control by organized world health: $9 million v Money set aside for Viagra pills per annum by organized world health: $40 million v Number of children in world blinded yearly from lack of Vitamin A: 500 million v Number of women who died during childbirth last year in world: 650,000 v U.N. estimate of yearly expenditure on war: $800 billion v U.N. estimate of yearly expenditure on health services: $25 billion v Number of children in world that die by age 5 (yearly): 12 million v Percentage of those that succumb to routine preventable health causes: 90 v Ratio of African-American to white new born deaths in U.S. last year: 2:1 v Number of reported pediatric measles deaths in U.S. last year: 45 v Amount of money not allocated by Congress for measles vaccines: $9 million v Average amount of 1999 year-end bonus paid to Oxford HMO execs: $6 million v Time it takes the Pentagon to spend annual federal allocation for women's health: 15 minutes - Figures compiled by Don Sloan, M.D.
Re: Re:racism, eurocentrism
Sorry I was unclear. I was disagreeing with the positions quoted below (which I attributed to Sam P), that Lenin and Trotsky were Eurocentrist in politically important ways and that Stalinism = Eurocentrism. Mine wrote: Bill Burgess wrote: it was Eurocentric to expect a revolution in Germany in 1918-19 3) the Eurocentric policy of the Comintern led to disastrous alliances with the bourgeoisie in countries like China, Turkey and Indonesia. Thanks for the references on the Second Congress discussion, which is what I was referring to in disagreeing with Sam's suggestion that Lenin and Roy were in opposite corners on the importance of (or prospects for) revolutions in the 'colonial' countries. (I do think it is half wrong to suggest that Lenin viewed the revolution in Russia as a democratic revolution against feudalism, but what we are discussing here is the alledged role of Eurocentrism.) Bill Burgess
Re: racism, eurocentrism
At 10:56 AM 14/04/00 -0700, Sam wrote: No, it wasn't euro-centric to expect a revolution there and then [Germany 1918-19], it was eurocentric to presume that such a revolution was a necessary and maybe even a sufficient condition to lead world socialism. This is the view I was arguing against. Right up until his death Trotsky maintained that the survival of the USSR and world socialism depended on revolution in the imperialist countries. "Expect" was a poor word to use on my part. But are you saying it was wrong in 1918-19 to have the *perspective* of revolution in Germany, that Comintern stragegy should consider that this would be the next key step forward in world socialism, and that the Comintern should instead have counted on revolutions in the colonial countries as the next key step? Otherwise, what is Eurocentric about Lenin and Trotsky's perspective (all this before the Third Congress)? If the idea that the survival of the USSR and world socialism (utlimately) depends on revolution in the imperialist countries is Eurocentric, then I guess I have to plead guilty. Perhaps we should change the name of this list to Progressive Economists for Revolutions Somewhere Else. Roy believed that since no revolution in Germany or elsewhere was forthcoming this surplus value would have to be cut off at the source i.e. through revolutions in the south and east in order to press the western working class into revolutionary agency. And maybe give them some confidence and an example (this was also Marx's argument that I cited previously). Lenin didn't go this far into proto Maoism. I don't know much about Roy, but if this was his position and is an example of non-Eurocentrism, it this idea of pressing into revolutionary agency does not seem to be a gain over Eurocentrism. The alliances [post-Lenin Comintern] were disastrous and it was partly because of eurocentrism-- socialism wasn't possible in such backward places independent of European revolution. Lenin and Trotsky were both champions of arguments against the Second Interntional-Menshevic claim that socialism couldn't take root in 'backward' places. How does that make them Eurocentrist, even before Roy and the Third Congress? Right, at the second congress, this [Roy's position] was later reversed at the 3rd and subsequent congresses. Roy was given 5 minutes to speak at the third congress (!) I have the second congress resolution around here somewhere but can't find it right now. Roy and other southern delegates to the 3rd congress did compare the Comintern's policy to the Second int'l. I can't find the documentation right now. Tomorrow. I was not aware of an important change to the 2nd Congress position at the Third or Fourth Congresses, so thanks in advance for finding the references. But I seem to recall that Lenin and/or other Bolshevic leaders also criticized (some) Communist Party leaders for hanging on to Second International-type positions. Again, where is the Eurocentrism here? There were important theoretical differences between the Lenin and Stalin-Zinoviev comintern but these differences came to nothing in practice. The Comintern blew it for many reasons, one of them being eurocentrism. I don't want to reherse the issue of Stalinism (I think Stalin's Comintern turned CPs into border guards of the interests of the Soviet bureaucracy, and was the antithesis of the Lenin's Internationalist Comintern). I took up your comments because of the claim that Eurocentrism was a key problem. It seemed to me this was an example of what Carroll referred to, where a reasonably sound analysis and terminology (imperialism, opportunism, reformism, racism, etc.) already exists. Applying terms like Eurocentrism mistakes the real issues (in this case, the problem of Stalinism). Eurocentrism is real, but it should not be aimed at the 'Europeans' who contributed most, theoretically, organizationally and politically to the fight against this problem, e.g. Lenin. Bill Burgess
Re: racism, eurocentrism
If I understood Sam's comments correctly, he argues 1) it was Eurocentric to expect a revolution in Germany in 1918-19, that 2) Lenin rejected Roy's emphasis on the importance of the revolutions in colonial countries, and that 3) the Eurocentric policy of the Comintern led to disasterous alliances with the bourgeoisie in countries like China, Turkey and Indonesia. 1) Why was the perspective in 1918-19 on Germany wrong? The Comintern blamed the failure on the Communist Party's poor leadership rather than assuming the German working class were inherently reformist. 2) In fact, at the Third Congress (or the Second?) Lenin changed his original position and endorsed part of Roy's approach on the colonial revolution. I think that part of the shift in the Lenin's position was to accept Roy's sharper formulation of how unreliable allies the colonial bourgeoise classes were, and to clarify that the class struggle in these countries had a different strategic framework than in the imperialist countries. How is it Eurocentric to programitically codify the rejection of the Second International's 'socialist colonial policy'? 3) I'm sure Sam is well aware of it, so I wonder why he ignores the cardinal differences between the Stalinist policy of the Comintern in China, Turkey and Indonesia and the 'Lenin-Roy' approach adopted by the Third Congress? Bill Burgess At 11:42 PM 12/04/00 -0700, you wrote: Carrol wrote: My objection to the label "eurocentrism" is not to its false application -- all labels may be and are misused -- but to its redundancy. I claim that there is no instance of its use in which it would not be more accurate to speak of racism, of imperialism, or of racism imperialism. No. Western Marxism has been full of Euro-centrism. Two of the greatest champions and fighters for socialist internationalism and against imperialism and racism--Lenin and Trotsky-- were Euro-centrists. After the events of 1918-19 in Germany, they moved away from this position realizing that the German working class had put its eggs in the soc-dem basket. If international socialism was to become an actuality, the impetus for it would have to come from the east and the south. Further, Marxists in the East and the South could not accept the fact that their liberation from colonialism would be achieved on the coat tails of the workers of Paris, London and Detroit. This view was summed up by the Indian communist M.N. Roy in his report to the second congress of the Comintern (1920-- which can be called the 'third worldist' congress): "[Comrade Roy] defends the idea that the fate of the revolutionary movement in Europe depends entirely on the course of the revolution in the East. Without victory of the revolution in the Eastern countries, the Communist movement in the West would come to nothing. This being so, it is essential that we divert our energies into developing and elevating the revolutionary movement in the East and accept as our fundamental thesis that the fate of world communism depends on the victory of Communism in the East." This view can be found in Marx (and probably Engels) as early as 1853: "It may seem a very strange, and a very paradoxical assertion that the next uprising of the people of Europe, and their next movement for republican freedom may depend more probably on what is now passing in the Celestial Empire [China]...it may be safely augured that the Chinese revolution will throw the spark into the overloaded mine of the present industrial system and cause the explosion of the long prepared general crisis, which, spreading abroad will be closely followed by political revolutions on the Continent." *Revolution in China and Europe* New York tribune June 14, 1853. Lenin would have none of this: "Comrade Roy goes too far when he asserts that the fate of the West depends exclusively on the degree of development and the strength of the revolutionary movement in the eastern Countries. In spite of the fact that the proletariat in India numbers five million and there are 37 million landless peasants, the Indian comrades have not succceeded in creating a Communist Party in their country. This fact alone shows that Comrade Roy's views are to a large extent unfounded." As if the balance of class forces depends on how many people have a card that says "member of the Communist Party"! And this after millions had taken part in anti-British actions--including general strikes-- in 1920-1! Lenin's assistant Safarov commented: "...the Communist Parties of the imperialist countries have done extraordinarily little to deal witht he national and colonial question. Worse still, the flag of Communism **is used to hide chauvinist ideas foreign and hostile to proletarian internationalism**" Eurocentrism in the Comintern led to *disaster*.This Euro-centrism boiled down to two theses: the liberation of the world exploited by capitalism must be the re
[PEN-L:12625] Re: free labour in Canada
In reply to my suggestion that colonial policy restricted the availability
of land in 'Canada', and so retarded capitalism relative to that in the US,
Paul P. asked for any evidence that access to land was more restrictive in
Canada and retarded settlement.
My evidence is pretty thin (I was hoping Paul would help here). Wakefield's
Appendix in Lord Durham's Report advocates higher land prices in Canada but
complains that lower land prices in the US limited how high 'Canadian'
prices could be set. While Wakefield's specific proposals were not
implemented, I think the Appendix indicates the US land system was
considerably freer. I don't think farmers in the US faced the burden they
did in Canada where at least 1/7 of all land aliented was granted to the
clergy. R. Gourlet's survey in the early part of the 19th century
documented that church lands were considered a major obstacle to settlement
because they were often left 'wild' (no roads through them, etc.) and did
not pay any taxes. Certainly the colonial land system was a central issue
in the 1837-38 rebellions (Canada's failed bourgeois-democratic
revolution), including the issue of feudal tenure in Lower Canada ('Quebec').
I suggested that the colonial land policy caused high out-migration, while
Paul wrote he instead connected this to Kondratief-wave depressed commodity
prices. I don't have the data for migration to the US before the 1850s, but
I understand that during much of the first half of the century migration
rates to the US from Canada were very high, especially from Lower Canada
(Quebec) to New England states. Certainly the data does show that in the
last 4 decades of the 19th century, out-migration from Canada (presumably
mostly to the US) exceeded in-migration. I assume Canadian farmers produced
similar commodities as in the northern states. So I wonder whether the
pattern of commodity prices explains very much here, and if the 'political'
explanation of land policy is better.
Paul wrote:
I think I would disagree here. Though the American west settled
before the Canadian, the "great American desert" which includes
the Palliasers triangle in Canada was not settled until the same
time as was the contiguous area of Canada. Fowke, and others,
argue (I would say persuasively) that the settlement of this area
had to await the development of "dry-land techniques" and the
development of crops that could mature within the frost cycle. If I
am not mistaken, settlement of the western Canadian prairies did
not precede the settlement of the Dakotas, Montana and the
contiguous American prairies.
I think this is right, but my suggestion is that the western settlement was
unlike that in Eastern Canada, that is, it broke with the earlier
restrictive land policy and instead copied the 'American' pattern. It had
to, or Britain-Canada would have lost the west to the US. As I think Paul
wrote, it was the development of the west that spurred industrial
capitalism in Central Canada. My theory is that industrial capitalism in
Canada would not have been a generation or more behind that in the US if it
had a freer land system, e.g. been a democratic republic.
Paul wrote:
Hold it, is this not one of my prime contentions in this thread -- that
exploitation of the aboriginal population is one of the most
important modes of primitive accumulation in Canada/UK in this
period? If not, I have failed to communicate my main message.
My point is that the land system (seized from Natives, handed out to
colonial favourites and clergy for speculative profit) is rarely an
important part of the 'staples' explanation of Canadian political economy.
Instead of this political-national issue, it focuses on commodity markets
and the differences between commerical and industrial capital, etc. It
seems to me these are also the central issues in Paul's account. Again, my
question is whether the 'political economy of land' shouldn't occupy some
of the space usually given to the 'political economy of staples'.
Bill Burgess
[PEN-L:12394] free labour in Canada
Thanks, Paul, for your excellent synthesis of key issues about early
Canadian political economy. I have a couple of questions, though I
apologize that they are rather incoherent.
This thread began on the issue of free labour and land. What would you say
about the idea that one of the main reasons industrial capitalism in Canada
developed later and less robustly than in the US was because access to land
was more restrictive in Canada? (I'm referring here to social restrictions,
not issues of climate/soil etc., which are also important.) Very crudely,
I'm trying to relate this to the broader issue of the role of agriculture
in promoting capitalism.
Wakefield's appendix to Lord Durham's Report, Pentland's work, etc. point
out that British colonial policy in Canada tried to ensure an adequate
supply of exploitable or free labour, expecially by keeping land prices
high. However, this was often thwarted by the easier access to land in the
more democratic republican US. For most of the 19th century, out-migration
to the US exceeded in-migration to Canada from Europe.
You point out that settlement of the western plains was inhibited by the
absence of a continuous agricultural frontier. Would you agree the colonial
land system was also central? The west was rapidly settled (European
settlement) after Canada copied whole sections of the democratic post-Civil
War US Homestead Act. If further Metis settlement, or European settlement
(perhaps via the south of the lakes rather than north) had been encouraged
decades earlier through easy access to land, wouldn't there have been
takers, even before the railway?
And, in earlier periods, if the British had not maintained feudal tenure in
Lower Canada for 70 years after the Conquest, and had made it easier for
poor settlers to get land in Upper Canada (rather than granting 1/7 to the
Church and much of the rest to wealthy speculators) would a more dynamic
('American') form of capitalism probably developed?
In some ways, I suppose this is another way of looking at the balance of
power between commercial and industrial capital as the key to explaining
Canadian development, but in other ways it is a different approach. For
example, you mention commercial profits and public finance as two bases for
the primitive accumulation of capital in Canada. Why not land - seized from
Natives and granted to a colonial elite? This shifts attention somewhat
from the traditional focus on staples production. Yes, Canadian development
is different, but I wonder if the difference should be understood more in
terms of being a white-settler state than a resource-commodity exporter.
BTW, your contribution about the role of WW1 public finance sounds too
important to have to wait for completion of your book. Can you give at
least a rough outline of the argument?
Bill Burgess
[PEN-L:12257] Re: US imperialism
orts were to the United States. ``Under free trade, there has been another quantum leap in the level of cross-border trade and investment,'' says economist Mel Watkins, a nationalist guru now retired from the University of Toronto. ``Our economy is sliding into theirs'.'' So what? Europe is more tightly integrated. 95% of Canadians live within 300 kilometers of the U.S. border. Why would we expect not to integrate? Six: A new phenomenon has developed in the late 1990s. Canadian business is pouring its investment dollars into acquisitions in the United States. (This isn't a Canada-only phenomenon - Japan and Europe are investing heavily in America too). As noted above. But actually, since free trade went into effect in 1989 the US share of total Canadian FDI has gone down - Canadian capitalists are investing elsewhere even more enthusiastically. ``The huge thing that has happened since free trade is that Canadian business is running away from Canada . . . running away from unions, running away from higher taxes,'' says political scientist James Laxer of York University. ``The Canadian business class is selling its birthright and opting for the American view of the world.'' Quite apart from the issue of there being a capitalist birthright, this is a good example of blaming free trade (a policy) instead of capitalism (the system). Have capitalists ever *not* blamed unions and taxes? Seven: Head offices migrating south (Alberta's Nova Chemicals, for example, is moving its executive team to Pittsburgh) and threats of more corporate headquarters to follow bring tremendous pressure on the federal government to buckle to business's calls for tax cuts. Same as above. But why not see this as some Canadian imperialists successfully penetrating the biggest market in the world? Bill Burgess
[PEN-L:11505] Re: Bairoch, etc.
I'd like to say that while I can't follow every twist and turn in the argument about Europe and the periphery, I am appreciating this thread (when it stays on track). But a question. For a different topic I am citing estimates of long-run industrial output by Bairoch, as well as those by Angus Madison (OECD, 1995). Since some of you probably know this area well, any comments on how good these estimates are, especially Bairoch's industrial output in physical terms? Bill Burgess
[PEN-L:11177] Re: RE: Re: Re: finanz kapital
R. Hilferding, 1981, _Finance Capital_, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul At 07:56 PM 16/09/99 -0400, you wrote: Speaking of Hilferding, anyone know if Finanz Kapital has even been translated to English, and if so, how to get it (the book, not the finanz kapital)? max
[PEN-L:11048] Re: Re: Role of the Colonial Trade
Meyer's 1913 _History of Canadian Wealth_ discusses the role of the North American fur trade in the primitive accumulation of capital. He cites an 1857 submission from the [British] Committee for the Aborigines Protection Society, to the British Parliamentary Select Committee on the Hudsons' Bay Company: "The Committee of the Society stated that the Indians were the real producers of the huge wealth from the fur trade, estimated on competent authority at £20,000,000, which had already gone to England." Bill Burgess
[PEN-L:11027] Re: Social structure and hierarchy of capital
At 12:03 PM 15/09/99 -0400, Doug wrote: The conglomerates in the classic sense - those put together in the 1960s and early 1970s - have largely been dismantled. I'm not sure what you're talking about here. Perhaps the classic conglomerates (companies with divisions in various sectors), but hasn't conglomeration increased through various kinds of holding companies (more vertical than horizontal integration)? My understanding it has in most countries, though the United States is a bit of an exception. One of the traditional arguments against Canada being an imperialist country is the lack of significant ownership links between banks and industrial firms. I'm working on an argument that finance capital here takes the form of financial and industrial firms being commonly owned by holding companies, often family-controlled. Or is 'finance capital' an obsolete category? It's a bit of an oversimplification to say that the "financial oligarchy" lords it over the MNCs; the CEOs of the Fortune 500 are themselves members of the ruling class with very substantial stockholdings of their own. Actually they had a big struggle over that in the 1980s - just how much direction major corps were going to take from Wall Street. Wall Street won, but the very fact that there was a struggle suggests that it's not quite so top-down as all that. So, are there really different sectors involved in the circuit of capital? _Wall Street_ suggests that industrial firms are essentially self-financing, using aggregate data. But as noted above, 'Wall Street' has been gaining power. Isn't this a contradiction? Bill Burgess
[PEN-L:10984] Re: Re: imports
I wrote: 3% does not sound like much (assuming that figure is about right). But if we assume that imports from non-industrial core countries are goods rather than services, and that about 2/3 of GDP is services, a more relevant figure for this discussion is 9%... Bill Burgess Brad replied: No it isn't. The relevant figure for this discussion is 3%--unless you're some weird material-physiocrat who doesn't believe that services really add value... Brad DeLong It't true, I have neo-physiocrat tendencies. Silly me, I still think there is an important difference between goods and services, especially that they are not substitutes for each other. If the U.S. and Canada lost our imports of nature and labour from other countries we couldn't make it up with more lawsuits and cosmetic surgery. That is why I think that in this discussion it is better to measure the impact of trade in terms of the goods economy rather than the bubble called GDP. On the other hand, after writing the above I remembered that when tourists spend money elsewhere this is an import (of tourist services), which are considerable, so it is probably not right to assume the 3% is all goods. Bill Burgess
[PEN-L:10964] imports
At 01:17 PM 14/09/99 -0400, Brad wrote: Imports from non-industrial-core countries equal to 3% of GDP--most of which have potential domestic substitute producers who are not *that* much more costly... Brad DeLong 3% does not sound like much (assuming that figure is about right). But if we assume that imports from non-industrial core countries are goods rather than services, and that about 2/3 of GDP is services, a more relevant figure for this discussion is 9%, without considering unequal exchange. Bill Burgess
[PEN-L:9217] Re: income by 'race'
At 03:14 PM 15/07/99 -0700, Michael P. wrote: Bill's numbers concerning the earnings gap seem to show a smaller earnings gap for me in Canada than in the U.S. I recently sent in a note about unions being responsible for the lower Canadian women's earnings gap, compared to U.S. women. Could unions be playing a similar role for men? What is a ballpark figure for earning disparity by race in the U.S. before and after 'correcting' for education etc. in a similar way as the study I quoted? I agree that higher unionization rate in Canada, especially in the public sector, is probably why the male-female earning gap is lower than the U.S. (assuming this is true). Unions have also undoubtedly reduced the gap between British-origin and other white men and other men. I used to work in the relatively high-wage forest industry here in B.C. and there is no doubt that many of my fellow workers who were Punjabi and Chinese and women were a) hired in the first place and b) promoted by seniority because our union, however unevenly, opposed discrimination by race and sex. Bill Burgess
[PEN-L:9209] Re: income by 'race'
to be a thorough study. They ran separate regressions for metropolitan and non-metro residents. The 'independent' variables included full/part time labour status, weeks worked, province, household type, occupation, industry, schooling, and knowledge of English and French. Labour market experience is counted by years since completion of school or since immigration to Canada. They test for the effect of educational qualifications being from outside Canada and find this makes little difference. (An immigrant visible-minority man who completed his education in Canada may expect to earn 16.2% less than a Canadian-born white man, even though both have Canadian education). One dissapointment is that it does not address workers who are totally unemployed. I think this study reinforces my claim that race is a significant factor in determining income in Canada, but I'd like to hear any opinions on its validity, e.g. as compared to the Simpson and Hum study Paul reported on (is it easily available?), or other studies. Are there comparable results in the U.S. or elsewhere? I think Paul and Rod argue that affirmative action divides the working class while I think it is necessary to unite workers, but in any case it is important to establish the scale of earning differentials in Canada. Is this really the "kinder and more gentle" country our ruling class likes to talk about? Bill Burgess
[PEN-L:8823] Re: McDonalds union
Almost a year ago I wrote about the successful union organizing effort at McDonalds in Squamish, B.C. The Canadian Auto Workers won a representation vote, pursued negotiations for a contract, and the CAW members at McDonalds voted to accept the $0.25 raise, grievance procedure and other basic points recommended by a labour board-appointed mediator. However, McDonalds stalled, more than half the original workers are no longer employed, and a majority just voted to de-certify the union. The workers quoted in the paper said they believed that if they remained union the franchise would be sold back to the parent corporation who would then close it. They also said conditions had improved greatly since the the organizing drive. Bill Burgess
[PEN-L:8824] Re:racism
I have to strongly disagree with Rod's claims about Canada. He wrote: There is racism in Canada, but except for the native people there are is little segregation. All the school districts receive comparable financing. The private school system is very small. And believe it or not no economic studies can find any significance for "self-identified race" in determining income. We can quibble about what "little segregation" is, but taking Vancouver as an example, there certainly is residential segregation along the usual race/class lines, and the less-'white'/more working class area schools have inferior buildings, equipment, extra-curicular programs, etc. Partly this is because they have to provide more English language and special-education programs per capita. Canada's treatment of native people is scandalous but otherwise there appears to be no widespread identifiable systematic racism, at present (historically it is a different stories) Affirmative action programmes are not needed here. If the federal government would simply live up to its treaty obligations to the natives, that situation would be much better as well. No widespread, indentifiable, systemic racism in Canada at present? This is whitewash. Affirmative action has not been as big an issue in Canada but remains part of any serious program to overcome inequality. It is incredible to imply that race is not a significant factor in determining income in Canada. I'm with Rod on denying that race is a scientific category but he seems to deny most of its social reality. I don't have studies in hand on all groups, but I'm looking at a 1996 regression study by Shapiro and Stelcner that shows that unilingual francophone men in Quebec earned 20% less than unilingual anglophones in 1971 and 9% less in 1991 (17% and 8% respectively when educational levels are taken into account). Quebec is 82% francophone. The earning gap between unilingual anglophones and allophones (neither French nor English is their mother tongue) was even greater, and again, allophones who spoke only French earned less than those who spoke only English. I wonder why? And, if there is no widespread systemic racism in Canada why isn't Quebec's right of national self-determination respected? "Liv[ing] up to its treaty obligations to the natives" minimizes what is a much bigger issue. There never have been treaties covering most of B.C. and many other areas of Canada. The Indian Act, which treats Natives as wards of the state, still governs all 'Status Indians'. 'Indians' are still losing status if their mothers and grandmothers married whites (but not if their father and grandfathers did). The income of Aboriginal people in Canada was 40% lower than all Canadians in 1991, and the income of those on reserves (which make up a much smaller area than those in the U.S.) would be lower still. Aboriginals are incarcerated at 5-6 times the rate of the rest of the population, 10 times as much for female aboriginals, 12 times as much in the prairie provinces. The youth suicide rate is 6-8 times the national average. The issue of racism in Canada is different in some ways than in the U.S. but in other ways it is not. In one way it is bigger problem because it is officially denied as being a problem. The (past) treatment of Natives? A regretable error, mostly due to administrative oversight. The expulsion of the Acadiens? Long ago. Internment of Japanese in WW2? An exception. Torture-murder of Somali children by Canadian 'peacekeepers'? A totally isolated incident; besides we expelled the Nazis in that unit. Racism today? Its all in the past, except what come up from the U.S. And I would insist that children from an earlier age be indoctrinated with idea that race is a stupid idea. The trick is to meet the needs of the kids without anyone feeling left out. One of the problems with affirmative action programmes is that poor "whites" see them and say "What about us? Nobody in my family ever went to university, either." This makes them vulnerable to right wing racist appeals against the 'special interests.' A disproportionate number of "black" kids have extra needs that should be met. Appeal to the need rather than the colour of the skin. This should provide the basis for an alliance from common need of all the poor. I am sceptical of placing much hope on the bourgeois school system's ability to indoctrinate children from an early age that race is a stupid idea. Rod seems to feel affirmative action is too vulnerable to racist objections, so why would he think schools can do any better than some watered-down version of liberal equality? Again, saying races do not exist is true in one sense but race remains a central social fact and affirmative action is a necessary part of overcoming the legacy of racism. Bill Burgess
[PEN-L:8834] Re: Re: racism
point of division among the poor, when programmes that would achieve the same objective, could be designed that are not defined in racial terms. The divisions are not introduced, they already exist. Affirmative action is to overcome the divisions which 'universalist' measures can't always do, though I'm with Rod on the general idea of improving conditions from the bottom up. And for all Bill's rhetoric, there is not one solid proposal. I wrote my piece because, Jim Devine challenged me to outline the policy conclusions of my abstract claims. I would challenge Bill to do the same what is your concrete proposal. I've repeated my point on affirmative action (I think a good example of this is the language laws in Quebec that require French to be the language of work in large workplaces, and has (arguably) reduced the income gap between francophone and anglophone workers). It is always important to respond to cases of police racist brutality and similar instances. Here in B.C. defence of Native self-determination is a key issue right now. Rod may find this ironic but this includes defending the right to "separate". Malcolm X said something about Blacks having to unite with each other before Blacks can unite with whites and I think this sometimes applies. Without pre-judging the studies on race and income Rod has promised to post, I think economists can help debunk the economic studies that show racism is not a problem. As Joan Robinson said, the purpose of studying economics is to avoid being deceived by economists. Most of us are in the education system and have a wonderful opportunity in our classes to debunk the concept of race, and I agree with Rod on that. Actually, I'd appreciate more discussion on this issue of race as a category, so I can do a better job on this than when I tried last semester. Bill Burgess
[PEN-L:8814] OECD data
Apologies to those who are not interested, but I am about to compare industry structure in OECD countries using the OECD's Structural Analysis Database (STAN), which takes national data and adjusts it for greater consistency. If there are any opinions on the methods, accuracy, etc. of this source I would greatly appreciate it if you would send them to me directly. Bill Burgess
[PEN-L:7486] Re: Re: Some Disquieting Info
At 05:34 PM 31/05/99 -0400, Barklay wrote: Paul, I agree that this is disquieting information. I must admit that I really do not know what Zimmerman's motives were in 1992. I know that you are convinced of this effort to break up Yugoslavia for economic imperialism motives. But by 1992, that had already happened. Triggering a war in B-H served no purpose whatsoever to such an end, near as I can tell anyway. Is this not where competition between the US and European countries has a role? The US has sabotaged each 'peace' effort by the other leading capitalist powers in order to choose the best time to impose its own and so entrench its position within Europe. I know the idea of inter-imperialist competition is not fashionable, but it seems to me it is a necessary part of any explanation. Bill Burgess
[PEN-L:7413] Re: Harvey
At 04:47 AM 28/05/99 -0400, Louis wrote: That and the charge that American Indians drove bison off cliffs, picked up by David Harvey, I think they did, actually; it is an efficent hunting technique. My grandparents homesteaded such a spot. I agree the accusation of wanton waste is a projection by non-Indians. But where did Harvey do this? Bill Burgess
[PEN-L:7412] Re: Re: RE: Harvey, Leibniz Marx
At 08:54 AM 27/05/99 -0700, Jim D. wrote: If I remember correctly, Levins and Lewontin's discussion in THE DIALECTICAL BIOLOGIST does not employ the concept of contradictions to understand non-human nature. So we might say that there are _no_ contradictions (structurally-based conflicts) within non-human nature, a pretty large qualitative difference. If I read it correctly (I don't have it, so someone correct me if I'm wrong) they are on the other side, i.e. with Engels, that nature, matter IS dialectical, IS contradiction. Bill Burgess
[PEN-L:7325] Re: Re: Harvey and Jo'burg
At 06:12 AM 27/05/99 +, Patrick B. wrote: Bill is right on with his argument on Harvey's agenda and approach... except perhaps this last line which suggests we can't find a site of praxis in linking our worlds and thought processes with those of working-class and poor constituencies. Pen-L is a possible resource here (and I think Michael P. often expresses his desire for it to become more so). I wrote this because Louis P. is right that even the best stuff by Marxist academics has little impact on socialists outside the academy (worse, the same is probably more true vice versa). This is why I remind myself to not *confuse* the two worlds. While I appreciate the general political discussion on Pen-L, and I am probably contradicting myself, I'd prefer that Pen-L was more specialist-economic-theoretical on the one hand and more concrete-campaign-resource oriented on the other. Bill Burgess Right now, I am terribly behind schedule with lots of deadlines and the fuss associated with the SA election next Wednesday, so can't say anything original. But this debate is very inspiring. When it emerged last year and Louis was raving against "brown Marxists" I was moved to try to grapple with some city-country contradictions, to conclude a long chapter on a dam struggle my township comrades recruited me into (we lost... particularly against a World Bank that put a sleazy reformist face forward). The dam is in Lesotho, and as you may have heard, it justified the SA army's invasion of that wee country last September following a coup against an unpopular government. The Lesotho water (from the Lesotho Highlands Water Project, or LHWP) flows across a huge mountain range in order to satiate the gardening and swimming-pool thirst of the most hedonistic upper-class consumers on earth, my (white) neighbours in Johannesburg, a megalopolis (also known as Gauteng Province) without a river or other natural ground water source. I came to the conclusion that "there should be no geographical or locational grounds for Johannesburg to continue as South Africa's economic heartland over coming decades and centuries." Is this "urbicide"? Maybe. But look around this city and you'll agree there is very little compelling argument for its existence. This is the last bit of the chapter (it too does babble on a bit...): *** Cronon (1991, 385) concluded his famous study of Chicago's ecological footprint: To do right by nature and people in the country, one has to do right by them in the city as well for the two seem always to find in each other their mirror image. In that sense, every city is nature's metropolis, and every piece of countryside is its rural hinterland. We fool ourselves if we think we can choose between them, for the green lake and the orange cloud are creatures of the same landscape. Each is our responsibility. We can only take them together and, in making the journey between them, find a way of life that does justice to them both. But the questionable and expensive extension of Johannesburg's footprint up the mountains of Lesotho, when Gauteng township residents still suffered from a lack of access to water, is not the end of the matter. Environmental politics, Harvey (1996, 400-401) insists, must also deal in the material and institutional issues of how to organise production and distribution in general, how to confront the realities of global power politics and how to displace the hegemonic powers of capitalism not simply with dispersed, autonomous, localised, and essentially communitarian solutions (apologists for which can be found on both right and left ends of the political spectrum), but with a rather more complex politics that recognises how environmental and social justice must be sought by a rational ordering of activities at different scales. The reinsertion of "rational ordering" indicates that such a movement will have no option, as it broadens out from its militant particularist base, but to reclaim for itself a noncoopted and nonperverted version of the theses of ecological modernisation. On the one hand that means subsuming the highly geographically differentiated desire for cultural autonomy and dispersion, for the proliferation of tradition and difference within a more global politics, but on the other hand making the quest for environmental and social justice central rather than peripheral concerns. For that to happen, the environmental justice movement has to radicalise the ecological modernisation discourse. This radicalisation does not only entail the kinds of technical critiques of World Bank cost-benefit analyses and Inspection Panel mandates established in the LHWP case. The rational ordering of South Africa's space economy must also be considered as one o
[PEN-L:7327] Re: Re: Harvey
You are right; I took a shortcut here. The long lots in the new world were not inherently feudal, but they did reproduce an old world feudal pattern when dividing up the seignerial land grants. There was more to it than an equal access to river routes. For example, once the land adjacent to the river was all assigned, 4 or 5 more rows of similarly skinny lots were sometimes created behind the first, river-edge row. The Red River settlement in Manitoba also created long lots, and as far as I know the Red River was not a central transportation route. Obviously tradition played a role in choosing long lots. Some argue the small size and narrow shape of the long lots retarded the mechanization of agriculture. The argument is that the square grid, with larger lots, farmhouses set further apart and more compact towns (vs. the long 'ribbon like' villages that develop along the roads between the rows of long lots) are more suited to agriculture under capitalism, and a more rapid emergence of capitalist industry. My point was that Harvey can talk about clashes about "notions" of property without being the gross idealist Louis made him out to be. The first Métis rebellion led by Riel was touched off when Canadian surveyers began to drive square grid survey pegs into the Red River long lots. Bill Burgess Barkley wrote: French long lots are "feudal" and square-grids are "capitalistic"? Give me a break. The French long lots simply guarantee that everybody has access to the main transportation route, which was rivers in French North America. The idea is that people would be trading. Pretty capitalistic. The origin of the square grid was Roman urban planning (also seen independently in the layout of Beijing). It was Thomas Jefferson who imposed the square grid in the Northwest Territories Ordinance drawing on the classical model. Capitalistic? Not any more particularly than the French long lots. Barkley Rosser -----Original Message- From: Bill Burgess [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [EMAIL PROTECTED] Date: Wednesday, May 26, 1999 5:09 PM Subject: [PEN-L:7260] Harvey First, I had a similar reaction to Louis P, that Harvey flirts with idealism in his latest book, and this can be seen in his application of Liebnitz and Whitehead and the distance he takes from Engel's "strong version" of dialectics. (If I understand these issue at all, I think that Richard Levins and Richard Lewontin's _The Dialectical Biologist_ provides an excellent statement of the "strong" position, as against B. Ollman's and (perhaps) Leibnitz's "internal relations" approach.) But on other points about Harvey I think Louis is simply off-base. On p. 189 of his book Harvey does not question the Sioux claim to the plains, but rather that such a claim is based on ecological practice. What he targets here is the "**uncritical acceptance** [i.e. by some **non-Sioux** environmentalists] of of 'ecologically conscious' statements [which] can, furthermore, be misleading." Hello, Louis, have you been following the Makah whaling story [The Makah Nation in Washington state killed their first grey whale in 80 or so years a couple of weeks ago]? I agree completely with what you and J. Craven have written in defense of the Makah's right to whale. Harvey's point is exactly that the uncritical application of 'ecologically conscious' positions (like killing whales is a **Bad Thing**) leads to the reactionary rejection of Makah rights unless they are 'real Indians' who are starving to death and don't use outboard motors to tow their whales back to shore. Another example here in BC is opposition to logging by Natives on the part of some environmental groups, e.g. the Friends of Clayoquat Sound. Louis also reacts to Harvey's claim that New York is an ecosystem, as if Harvey doesn't know how capitalism has fucked up cities, especially in the U.S. Again, Harvey is simply challenging the mythical, romantic notion of Nature and ecology as something separate from human society. Louis has Harvey's view on "militant particularisms" backward. Harvey is not an opponent of militant particularism; he is a supporter, with Raymond Williams's condition that they are "properly brought togeather", i.e., united by a univeralist notions like class. I think that Louis doesn't appreciate that Harvey's book is **mainly directed** against post-modernist-type rejection of univeralist and materialist positions. It is a re-statement of his 'historical-materialist-geographical' Marxism against the pomo accusations of 'totalizing meta-narative' and the like in his earlier _The Condition of Post-Modernity_. As noted above, I have my doubts too, but let's discuss them in their proper context. One view is that the 'paleo-Indian' migration from Asia had a role in the extinction of the giant beaver, camel etc. in the Americas after the last ice age
[PEN-L:7260] Harvey
First, I had a similar reaction to Louis P, that Harvey flirts with idealism in his latest book, and this can be seen in his application of Liebnitz and Whitehead and the distance he takes from Engel's "strong version" of dialectics. (If I understand these issue at all, I think that Richard Levins and Richard Lewontin's _The Dialectical Biologist_ provides an excellent statement of the "strong" position, as against B. Ollman's and (perhaps) Leibnitz's "internal relations" approach.) But on other points about Harvey I think Louis is simply off-base. On p. 189 of his book Harvey does not question the Sioux claim to the plains, but rather that such a claim is based on ecological practice. What he targets here is the "**uncritical acceptance** [i.e. by some **non-Sioux** environmentalists] of of 'ecologically conscious' statements [which] can, furthermore, be misleading." Hello, Louis, have you been following the Makah whaling story [The Makah Nation in Washington state killed their first grey whale in 80 or so years a couple of weeks ago]? I agree completely with what you and J. Craven have written in defense of the Makah's right to whale. Harvey's point is exactly that the uncritical application of 'ecologically conscious' positions (like killing whales is a **Bad Thing**) leads to the reactionary rejection of Makah rights unless they are 'real Indians' who are starving to death and don't use outboard motors to tow their whales back to shore. Another example here in BC is opposition to logging by Natives on the part of some environmental groups, e.g. the Friends of Clayoquat Sound. Louis also reacts to Harvey's claim that New York is an ecosystem, as if Harvey doesn't know how capitalism has fucked up cities, especially in the U.S. Again, Harvey is simply challenging the mythical, romantic notion of Nature and ecology as something separate from human society. Louis has Harvey's view on "militant particularisms" backward. Harvey is not an opponent of militant particularism; he is a supporter, with Raymond Williams's condition that they are "properly brought togeather", i.e., united by a univeralist notions like class. I think that Louis doesn't appreciate that Harvey's book is **mainly directed** against post-modernist-type rejection of univeralist and materialist positions. It is a re-statement of his 'historical-materialist-geographical' Marxism against the pomo accusations of 'totalizing meta-narative' and the like in his earlier _The Condition of Post-Modernity_. As noted above, I have my doubts too, but let's discuss them in their proper context. One view is that the 'paleo-Indian' migration from Asia had a role in the extinction of the giant beaver, camel etc. in the Americas after the last ice age (10,000 or so years ago). This is speculation, but it is foolish to deny and underestimate the impact of Native societies on the environment. For example, I think it is environmenal historian William Cronan who convincingly shows that the tree species dominating 'New England' forests at the time of contact with Europeans [pine?] were the result of burning by Natives. Native settlement and activity DID alter the environment, including "destroying" previous ecosystems. How could it be otherwise? I don't know if Harvey's criticism of Foster for using phrases like "destroying" the world or the environment is fair, but it is an elementary materialist point that does occasionally need to be made. It is false that Harvey holds the idealist position that the clash between Indians and European settlers was fundamentally between the **notions** of time of space. Rather, he is making the basic materialist observation that ideas are influenced by class society, i.e. settlers from capitalist society viewed land as private property and capital, which has to be measured and demarcated, and precisely represented on maps for the purpose of legal documents, land title offices, etc. It is an an ABC point in Harvey's discipline of human geography to show how different land survey systems, i.e. different "ideas" affect how agriculture and towns develop. (An example is the difference between the French feudal long lots in the 1600s along the St Lawrence River, and the 1800s capitalist square-grid township system inscribed onto the prairies). Again, I'm for discussing whether or not Harvey goes too far down the idealist road on some of these points, but Louis' version is a gross exaggeration. BTW, I thought the related thread on the contradiction of academic writing and politics is worth discussing more in a forum like Pen-L. My take on this is to try to remind myself every day to not confuse my academic activities with advancing left-wing politics. How do others view this? Bill Burgess
[PEN-L:6852] Re: Re: una preguntita
Tom L. replied to my objection to protectionism: Ok. Bill what's your plan? Unions should focus on defending workers from *our* bosses, not delude ourselves that we can fix international capitalism. I responded to your suggestion that our task is to set the standards for the rest of the world because this is another edition of the white mans' burden. My 'plan' is: Stop the imperialist war on Yugoslavia, '30 for 40', affirmative action, and cancel the third world debt. Bill Burgess
[PEN-L:6825] una preguntita
At 04:04 PM 13/05/99 -0400, Tom L. wrote: What we do here sets the standard for the rest of the world! This is partly true, but when linked to various protectionist-like schemes it really means "we" come first, which is not a sound basis for international solidarity. Bill Burgess
[PEN-L:5517] Young Democratic Socialists position
The YDSA says they belive in acting through international institutions but since the latter are not ready to do it socialists should support the intervention of their own imperialist bourgeosie. The context is slightly different, but this brought to mind the explanation given by a leader of German social democracy in 1914 for giving up their traditional position on capitalist wars - "it is still to early to speak of an international soidarity of the working class": "Theoretically the solidarity of interests among the proletariat of the great industrial countries did exist to be sure, but not yet practically...It presupposes a certain equality of status among the powers involved. As long as one nation is so superior to another as to be regarded as a world dominion, this contrast, insofar as it is matter of other nations standing in opposition to a single world domination, is transposed upon their respective working classes as well. The war opened the eyes of German social democrats to this fact, that historically considered, it is still too early to speak of an international solidarity of the working class." Bill Burgess
[PEN-L:5062] Re: self-determination
Louis wrote: Yes, the same thing was true of Nicaragua. The Sandinistas acted in a racist manner toward the Miskitus, who they intended to "civilize". The problem is that the Miskitus then got used as pawns by US imperialism. As far as the Kosovars are concerned, I am afraid that the character of the movement in the 1980s had very few progressive possibilites. It was inspired by the desire to have a racially and religiously pure republic. The central government struggled to raise the Kosovars to the same level of the rest of the republic, but as often happens, the inability to immediately resolve inequality only led to more unrest. The same thing happened in the US among the black community in the 1960s, but with a more progressive dynamic. Here is an article that illustrates the good-faith intentions of the central government, but the obstacles that stood in the way: To their credit, the Sandinistas recognized their error and tried to correct it, but the damage was largely done. The analogy here is the damage in Kosovo was done by failing to carry through the early promise of the Yugoslvian revolution, and now may be compounded by socialists elsewhere who fail to support the *principle* of self-determination in Kosovo asnd elsewhere. I don't know enough to cite detailed evidence, but I think your statement that the Kosova nationalist movement "was inspired by the desire to have a racially and religiously pure republic" is slander. What is your evidence for this? I think the implication they were fighting for an Islamic republic is particularly dubvious, and perhaps an example of what I argued against in an earlier post about how "Islamic fundamentalism" is often a reactionary description. Even the CSM article you appended described opposition to social service cutbacks, unemployment and the like - which were part and parcel of the resort to market mechanisms, reliance on imperialism and so on. As always, national and social demands are mixed up togeather. Bill Burgess
[PEN-L:5071] self-determination
I wrote: I don't know enough to cite detailed evidence, but I think your statement that the Kosova nationalist movement "was inspired by the desire to have a racially and religiously pure republic" is slander. What is your evidence for this? Louis posted this article: The New York Times November 10, 1987, Tuesday, Late City Final Edition SECTION: Section A; Page 4, Column 3; Foreign Desk Pristina Journal; Blood Will Have Blood; It's the Code of the Clans By DAVID BINDER, Special to the New York Times An anecdote about 'blood feuds' is evidence? The article doesn't even quote anyone calling for racial (certainly not religious) purity. But if it is correct about the extent to which Albanians used to run the show one can certainly understand why they nearly all got pissed off about their lot in Milosovic's Yugoslavia. I had written: There is no way the Kosovars and the other citizens of the old Yugoslavia will ever dump reactionary nationalist leaders and re-federate or cooperate in some other progressive form without crystal-clear assurances of national rights, which include the right to make the occasional 'wrong' decision. Yoshie replied: What if the reactionary nationalist leaders made, in the name of 'self-determination,' the wrong decision whose effect would be the negation of self-determination? Obviously, under the rule of the NATO ground troops (or other 'peace-keeping' forces from foreign nations), ethnic Albanians and other peoples in Kosovo will have no power of self-determination. What they can and cannot do will be determined by foreign military powers. Yes, like the KLA is doing now. NATO/US is ultimately the greatest enemy of of Kosavar self-determination there is. The Albanians will be be abandoned, like the Kurds, or turned into a outright protectorate, as is being discussed now. I'm still expecting a deal with Milosovic - the US has made it clear the last thing they want is 'Kosovo for the Albanians'. But reactionary leaders and wrong decisions don't change the basic point, that support for Yuglosavia against imperialism should not imply acceptance of Milosovic's chauvinism and physical aggression towards Kosovars. This stance writes off millions of potential allies against both imperialism and the national chauvinism. Support for self-determination has to be unconditional or it means nothing, but that doesn't mean it has to be uncritical or imply political support for any current policy. I responded here on the issue of self-determination, but I am also struck at how much we all (myself included) get sucked into the line of both chauvinists and imperialism that this is all about national or ethnic tensions. It is ABC that social factors are the real underlying issue. Bill Burgess
[PEN-L:5052] self-determination
In his comment on the article about Kosova independence, Louis P. basically argues that nationalism of the opressed against capitalist imperialism is good, but isn't worth supporting when directed at post-capitalist governments (my crude and selective summary, not Louis' words). Yes, many oppressed nationalists are reactionary, and are often used as pawns by other reactionaries. So how do you ever hope to appeal to the majority of these populations - tell them to drop their nationalism and become no-name communists? Lenin argued the opposite (including against Rosa Luxemburg and others). He said communists had to champion their demands, practice 'affirmative action' and *prove* good faith by guaranteeing their right to freely leave the socialist federation. Despite their gains within Yuglosvia, my understanding is that the Kosovars still did not achieve nationalist equality, and individually were often second-class citizens. Serb chavinists like Milosovic considered themselves 'first among equals'. There is no way the Kosovars and the other citizens of the old Yugoslavia will ever dump reactionary nationalist leaders and re-federate or cooperate in some other progressive form without crystal-clear assurances of national rights, which include the right to make the occasional 'wrong' decision. Bill Burgess
[PEN-L:4961] productivity
A question about U.S. productivity growth and statistics: Statistics Canada and the Centre for the Study of Living Standards in Canada have each recently released comparisons of productivity change in Canada and the US. They claim that, contrary to previous reports and widespread claims by the usual slash-and-burn-social-services crowd, Canadian productivity growth has basically matched that in the US over the last decade or so. The Centre for the Study of Living Standards calculates that GDP/worker between 1989 and 1997 grew by 0.9% in both Canada and the U.S., but that GDP/hours worked actually increased more in Canada - 1.2% vs. 0.8% in the US. (I forgot to check, but I assume this is per year.) The big difference is in manufacturing, where US growth is greater. But the CSLSC study says that if industrial machinery and equiptment and electric and other electronic equiptment sectors are removed, US productivity growth is greatly diminished but unchanged in Canada. They cast doubt on the accuracy of US data (Dept. of Commerce) for these two sectors, noting that their output doubled over the time period while the rest of manufacturing output actually decreased in the 1990s. Any thoughts on why the output and productivity growth in these sectors is so great compared to others? How much of this is real? Was there some shift in the data methods or industry definitions? Bill Burgess
[PEN-L:4820] Re: Stats on recent atrocities
Estimated # of persons killed: In Iraq due to US-led sanctions: over 1,000,000 In the Sudan over the past 15 years: 1,500,000 In Rwanda over the last 5 years: 500,000 In Chechnya: 80,000 Around the world each day because of lack of water, clothing, shelter, food or medicine: 100,000 Est # of people in the world who go to bed hungry: 800,000,000 Est # of persons killed in Kosovo last year: 2,000 ...from Sam Smith's "The Progressive Review"
[PEN-L:4819] Re: Rightwing rumblings
At 12:25 PM 05/04/99 -0400, Louis wrote: mostly the discussion was around how the war was a promotion of New World Order/Globalization economic interests rather than humanitarianism. In fact the points being made were objectively anti-imperialist, compared to the awful crap being disseminated by NPR. What's "objectively anti-imperialist" about this? Bill Burgess
[PEN-L:4736] the war
A few thoughts: The "Red Ken" type of backsliding on the ABCs of anti-imperialist politics is exhibited by Sven Robinson, NDP (social-democratic) MP in Canada. Robinson has been a long time opponent of Canada being in NATO and NORAD, he often spoke out against US policy in Nicaragua, El Salvador, Grenada, has defended Cuba, been arrested for joining Native blockades, and so on. But there he is in Ottawa, cheering on Canada's bombing of Yugoslavia in the name of human rights. So much for the Canadian nationalist line that we're not one of those nasty imperialist robbers, just peacekeepers for the UN. Canadian jets in Iraq mainly served as escorts for the US and UK, apparently because they didn't have the best bombing weaponry available; now an officer quoted in the paper a couple of days ago trumpeted that with new lazer bomb systems on F-18s "Canada is in the big leagues", or something to that effect. The last time Canadian forces were involved in this kind of serious offensive action was Korea; since then Canada has done its imperialist duty well in places like the Congo and Vietnam, but this is a big step, just like it is for Germany and others. And it's under the *Democrats* in the US, *Labour* in the UK, *Social Democrats/Greens* in Germany, *Socialists* in France, *Liberals* in Canada (supported by the *NDP*), and the list goes on. Welcome to the 21st century. In the middle of war hysteria I think we all have to be extra careful of our own backsliding regarding "Islamic fundamentalism". This is often a racist code word for ignoring/suppressing the national and social grievances of a huge portion of the world's population. What was it Trotsky said, religion is the envelope for the social discontent of the masses, or something like that? If we can't clearly stand for self-determination for oppressed peoples everywhere, regardless of who is currently leading them, there is no hope for socialism. I think this issue is analogous to the debate on colonialism in the Second International. By most acounts Albanian Kosavars are second-class citizens, who had their (limited) autonomy under Tito eliminated by Milosovic, and most support greater national self-determination in one or other form. Yugoslavia's socialist revolution made real gains, however limited, in overcoming uneven development and national oppression, but Milsovic's Serb chauvinism is reversing this gain of the Yugoslav workers state. It is always a messy business, but on this point it seems the Kosovar nationalists, not the Milosovic government, represent what was good about the old Yugoslavia. In one sense, if they are a real popular movement it may be a step forward. In the old Yugoslavia, national equality was very much a "top-down" process. I completely agree with the idea that we should push for our governments to allow in Yugoslav and Kosovar victims of the war. Bill Burgess
[PEN-L:4604] trade and war
The current war is not about trade, but I can't help feeling it is time to remind ourselves about the historic connections here. On March 17 a big majority of the House of Representatives voted to impose curbs on steel imports into the United States. United Steelworkers of America (USWA) president George Becker said: "Steelworkers and steel communities hold dear the notion that America's trade policies should benefit Americans first. That may be a novel idea in some quarters. But it was a winning idea today in Congress." Ultra-rightist candidate for the Republican nomination for President, Patrick Buchanan, said the vote was "a powerful message to the White House that we must stand with American steelworkers against foreign regimes that kill their jobs and destroy their towns by illegal steel dumping." He added, "The day of economic patriotism has returned to America." Occasionally we all find ourselves saying the same thing as reactionaries. Usually easy to distinguish our positions by bringing in other aspects of the question. Is Becker saying anything to make sure steelworkers and their families distinguish between his "Americans first" line and Buchanan's "economic patriotism"? What is the difference, really? Bill Burgess
[PEN-L:4531] Why Kosovo
Left off this list is what would have been included a few years ago - NATO/US encirclement of Russia, military backing for the restoration of capitalism. I don't think we can assume this has already happened, and reduce our political analysis of war!!! in Europe!!! to ratings and stupidity. Bill Burgess At 10:13 PM 24/03/99 -0800, you wrote: Is it that the Dems. ratings in foreign policy is slipping? Is it to prove that they are tough? [A local reporter says that Clinton is bombing more countries than any previous president. I suspect that more countries were involved in WWII bombing.] Is it that Kosovo is important for pipelines from the Caucacuses? Is it just to test new hardware? Is it just stupidity? -- Michael Perelman Economics Department California State University [EMAIL PROTECTED] Chico, CA 95929 530-898-5321 fax 530-898-5901
[PEN-L:3604] David Harvey and Leibniz
Louis, can you elaborate on your post about Harvey and Leibniz and material destruction of the earth? I don't understand the attention he gives Leibniz; my eyes glazed over in these sections of the book. Bill Burgess
[PEN-L:3530] Re: Re: racism
Hello angela, Thank your for elaborating your points. You wrote about the usual 'rational' arguments against racism: these ways of addressing racism only take for those who are relatively powerful, who do not attach themselves to racism as a way of recovering or explaining to themselves their own 'loss', their own lack of social power. I don't accept this. I can't give you numbers, but my observation is that 'relatively powerful' people have a hard time giving up racist attitudes because they only have liberal logic to rely on - meanwhile the bourgeoisie directly benefits from racism. Working and oppressed people find often find themselves side by side in struggle, and arguments about how racism weakens and divides our struggles not only make sense in the abstract, they accord with every-day experience. Your account of racism seems to assume that its real base is among working people rather than the 'relatively powerful', and that it is rooted in individual psychology rather than capitalist social relations. If so, I don't see any way to overcome racism; perhaps I simply refuse to be that pessimistic. Is there a ready-made psychoanalalytic explanation for socialist optimism? You said, about my question about whether explaining the fear of castration or discussing the phallus really helps combat racist attitudes by white workers: i don't know if it works becuase it is not a prominent part of anti-racist practice. i do know that to talk openly about racism as a form of enjoyment is to break with a moralising and enlightened approach which has consistently worked to deny the pertinence of desire within racism. these ways of appproaching the issure here have been taken as simply another attempt (usually figured as an attempt by 'the elites') to deny 'the ordinary bloke' their capacity for enjoyement - as another threat. they merely seek to affirm 'the ordinary bloke's' social impotence; which i would think is not how a marxist politics would wish to proceed. I appreciate that racism has not been erradicated, and we all have to ask if our understanding of it, and our strategy against it, are adequate. But I still see no evidence of any great "pertinence of desire". Sorry to be blunt, but I think this is almost inevitably an elite approach. It is stupid to assume that psychoanalytical issues have no importance, and we certainly need abstract theories, specialized vocabularies, and so on. But the reason the "desire" theory of racism is not a prominent part of anti-racist practice is because it doesn't make any sense at either the immediate level or in more theoretical terms. And it is not as if this is a brand new idea - it has had the better part of this century to win support. Someone wrote that Cuba has done more to erradicate racism than any other country. I agree, and in a couple of trips to Cuba I have never heard anyone explain that they made little progress on fighting racism until they adopted a psychoanalytical strategy. Instead, what I heard from Black Cubans was how they volunteered to fight South Africa when it invaded Angola, and their pride in having been part of the first black army to defeat the white racist apartheid regime in a major battle, at Cuito Cunavale (sp?), which opened the road to the liberation of Namibia and South Africa. Another example that comes to mind is the Civil Rights movement in the United States. Again, without denying there may be some merit to psychoanalytical insights I don't think they played any role in defeating Jim Crow segregation. In Canada, there is news coverage of Native struggles every day; a couple of decades ago it was the silence of the grave. Racism remains a central problem but let's not forget the progress that has been made and how it happened. Bill Burgess
[PEN-L:3459] Re: Doug's question
At 04:19 PM 16/02/99 +1100, angela wrote: racism works because it echoes the structural logic of this 'fear of castration'... It seems to me there are very shaky grounds for accepting that this "structural logic" really exists. Of course there may be something to it, but I can't understand building a whole political approach around it, which seems to me is what has been done. I thought Ken Hanley asked a series of very relevant questions about the usefullness of the similar notion of the phallus, but they have not been addressed. I have never tried to challenge and undermine racist attitudes of fellow white workers by explaining it is because we fear castration. Does this really work? Like, where? Bill Burgess
[PEN-L:3374] Re: Canada
At 06:20 PM 13/02/99 -0800, Tom W. wrote: There's one point that I would differ with Bill on. I agree that left nationalists have offered a lot of tactical advice. But I think "fighting" the bourgeoisie is too pugilistic and indiscriminate a term for what the left should be doing. The left should be "cultivating" the bourgeoisie. By this term, I mean the left should figuring out how to weed out the parasitic varieties; and how best to select, tend, prune, train and harvest the fruitful ones. OK, "fighting" is a crude term. But how can the 'left' "select, prune, train" and especially "harvest" without political power? Or do you have in mind some kind of tactical alliance with the most promising capitalist plants against the bourgeois weeds and deadwood? The NBER study suggests the latter are the family-controlled corporate pyramids, so I guess this alliance is exactly opposite to the one you said the left has beein pursuing in the last couple of decades with 'rentier' capitalism. Boy, that really is swimming against the stream! On a related point, I appreciate not wanting to identify "indigneous" capitalists with the interest of the nation, but isn't the real point that they identify with the Canadian state because it defends their interests at home and abroad? Canadian nationalists often suggest the government has been captured by foreign or 'continental' or 'global' capital, but what is the evidence for this? Bill
[PEN-L:3338] Re: Canada
Paul Phillips wrote about one claim of the NBER paper on Canada: This strikes me as odd because Canada has a higher proportion of foreign investment than any other industrial country I believe. Yes, inward FDI is high in Canada. But it is even *higher* in the U.K., Netherlands, and Australia, if measured by FDI stock over GDP in 1994, according to OECD data. It is past time the left dropped the nationalist fixation on foreign ownership in Canada. Ken Hanley provided a great parody of the preposterous regression method in the NBER study, but the study does make some points we should pay more attention to. For example, Ken wrote: The relative weakness of R D may be partly explained by the fact that a great deal of our industry is branch plants of US and other foreign investors. The R and D takes place mainly in the home base country often the US, not in the branch plants. In fact, the NBER paper offers evidence that it is Canadian heir-controlled firms that do relatively little R and D. I don't know how much a "great deal of our industry" is, but US control of corporate assets in all non-financial industries in Canada was only 15.9% in 1995, and 11.4% of corporate assets in all industries, according to Statistics Canada. In 1993, total foreign control of assets of the largest 25 enterprises in Canada was only 3.6%. I know Ken said the weakness of R and D is only "partly" explained by US branch plants, but I think the NBER paper shows we need to spend more time talking about Canadian finance capital and less about the foreign boogyman. I've quoted these figures before on Pen-l, and I am admittedly dense, but I don't think my claim that US control in Canada is usually exaggerated has been refuted. Ken asked what the NBER study meant by rent-seeking behavior. I only skimmed the paper, but it seems to be the usual argument - family-contolled firms use their power to rip off other shareholders and close connections to government to gain preferential regulation. On the latter they cite the example of how the Bronfman family were allowed to transfer $2 billion in family wealth to the U.S. in 1991 without paying tax on capital gains, something even the Auditor General questioned publicly. One of their main points is the widespread 'pyramiding' of corporate ownership in Canada. They point out that unlike in the U.S., companies in Canada do not pay tax on dividends received from other firms they own. They argue that corporate pyramids promote transfer pricing, preferential financing, barriers to entry, etc. It actually reminded me of the good old left-wing rhetoric about how Canada is run by "50 big shots". Until the 1960s when nationalism took hold, we generally understood (IMHO correctly) that the real problem is these home-grown capitalists, not foreigners. (Ken also wondered if the NBER paper was referring to "toothless review mechanisms for foreign investment" when they associated less openness to foreign investment with large heir wealth. The study used someone else's evaluation of Canada's relative openess to foreign investment, and I didn't see any description of the latter's criteria, but one would expect it would include the full range of issues. The study's comparison was for 1988, before the FTA, but well after the toothless Trudeau-era Foreign Investment Review Agency was morphed into Investment Canada, whose mandate is to actually "promote" foreign investment.) Tom Walker argues that the problem with left perspectives is the failure to recongize the predominantly rentier nature of "indigenous" Canadian capitalism. "Rentier" here sounds like it could be super-centralized, super-rich family-dominated organization of capitalism the NBER paper not innappropriately calls the "Canadian disease". If so, I agree with both, but I prefer the old fashioned 'finance capital', and I don't see why Tom is shy about calling it indigenous. Unfortunately, there is also some truth in Tom Walker's suggestion that The Canadian left has now reduced itself to whining incessently for a return to an implicit bargain with the big brother rentiers. I don't think there ever was a real 'bargain' with big brother rentiers, and Ken is right that the left a-la-social democracy is now outdoing itself to prove it is fiscally responsible. But left-nationalists have spent a lot of time over the past couple of decades offering tactical tactical advice on how to be a better bourgeoisie - invest more in R and D, become more competitive in world markets, etc., instead of figuring how to fight the bourgeoisie. Maude Barlow and the Council of Canadians is more of the same pie in the sky. Bill Burgess
[PEN-L:3054] Re: ong waves
Mandel and Trotsky were both pretty clear that 'waves' is a misleading term, because it implies some kind of frequency and amplitude that there is no reason to believe in. (This is why Trotsky says he refers to curves, not waves.) At the same time, it does seem evident there are long periods of relatively rapid growth and others of relative stagnation. It seems to me Mandels' argument is a more orthodox version of what the regulation school tried to do - identify more historically concrete explanations for these periods and the factors involved in the shifts from one general period to the other. Regulation theory has become a complete mish-mash but I don't think that is a reason to give up on the general task, which is where the value of 'long waves' explanations come in. Technology is one of a number of factors that combined can lead to an upturn, but to his credit I think Mandel emphasized the 'external' factor of politics, especially the physical destruction of independent working class organizations in Europe by fascism, and the impact of WW2. If this historical example is anything to go by, it seems likely the 'big battles' are ahead of us, not behind. We get another chance! The labour movement in the U.S., Canada, Europe, etc. has been eating take-backs for awhile, but there is no country where capitalists believe they have inflicted the kind of defeat **they** think is necessary. We've discussed big strikes like in France and the UPS strike in the U.S. over the past year or two - isn't it obvious there is even an upturn in labour militancy compared to the days when many workers had been convinced that concessions were necessary and justified? Of course, we can all give up, or get so pre-occupied by side-issues like 'globalization' that capitalism as a system does find its way clear. There is some truth in the claim that "Marxists have correctly predicted seventeen of the last two great depressions", but it seems to me that Shaikh's argument that the offensive against labour has gone far enough to spark a new long wave takes fatalism much too far in the other direction. Bill Burgess
[PEN-L:3053] Scratches
I was wrong in suggesting that the innoculations I mentioned before were for smallpox or polio; my parents thought it was "BCG", which is aimed at TB, tetenus and typhoid. Apologies if I muddied the waters on this question. Bill Burgess
[PEN-L:2841] Fwd: stripes for the backs of fools
A different explanation: These stripes sound like the scratches made for innoculations against smallpox, or was it polio? I faintly remember a little metal instrument with serrated edges, that left little parallel marks, though it was on our shoulders, not backsides. If not properly cared for, they got infected, and left nasty scars. Bill Burgess At 09:06 AM 03/02/99 EST, you wrote: The use of religion to mark Pikanii Children in Canada for the depths of hell. Copyright 1999 by Long Standing Bear Chief "Judgement is prepared for scorners, and stripes for the back of fools." From the Book of Proverbs, Chapter 19, Verse 29 One day in fall of 1949 Pikanii children at the Sacred Heart Residential School near what is now the community of Brocket, Alberta, Canada the teaching of the nature of sin and how to pray so that one might overcome evil thoughts was initiated and put in. "They also prepared us for a bad future at these residential schools" agreed George Yellow Horn and Elizabeth Crow Flag. Both are members of the Pikanii Nation which is now called the Peigan Nation by the Government of Canada. George Yellow Horn, also known by his aboriginal name of Sikkapii (White Horse) said, "In the Fall of 1949 when I was ten years old , our teacher Sister Houle, a Sister of Charity nun, told us we should all line up in the hallway of the school. We would Sikkapii continued, "I remember all the small kids were crying and screaming. I was very afraid since none of our parents were present and we did not know what was going to be done to us. We were forcefully taken from our parents so we knew they were not there. ' When it was my turn to go into the room I saw my friends having their shirts taken off and their pants pulled down. There were men present with what seemed like needles. ' We were then made ot lean over exposing our backside and then the men made these scratch marks on our backs, and when they were finished they smeared iodine on the wound. You should have heard the children crying and screaming." Elizabeth Crow Flag, or Yellow Dust Woman, as she is known among her people, joined in by saying, " The same thing was done to us at the St. Cryprian School near Brocket. We cried and sceamed as well. We have never been able to find out the meaning of the scratch marks. On January 29, 1999 at the home of Long Standing Bear Chief in Browning, Montana the key to the mystery of the stripes, consisting of six up and down scratch marks became abundantly clear to Sikkapii. While reading from a book entitled, "Spare the Child, The Religious Roots of Punishment and the Psychological Impact of Physical Abuse" by Philip Greven (First Vintage Books Edition, 1992) Sikkapii was heard to utter, " So this is the meaning of what the scratch marks are." Sikkapii had just read a passage from the book that read as follows, from the Book of Proverbs, Chapter 19, Verse 29: "Judgement is prepared for scorners, and stripes for the back of fools". He then said, "This is black magic This is how the Christians... There was stunned silence in the room. Now the Pikanii people are preparing for a cleansing ceremony to rid themselves of the evil put on them when the Christians scratched six marks on their backs, three on each side of the spine, when they were small children. - Return-Path: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Received: from rly-ya05.mx.aol.com (rly-ya05.mail.aol.com [172.18.144.197]) 1900 Received: from www1.gmx.net (www1.gmx.net [195.63.104.41]) by rly-ya05.mx.aol.com (8.8.8/8.8.5/AOL-4.0.0) Wed, 3 Feb 1999 03:20:28 -0500 (EST) Received: (qmail 31058 invoked by alias); 3 Feb 1999 08:20:24 - Delivered-To: GMX delivery to [EMAIL PROTECTED] Received: (qmail 31009 invoked by uid 65534); 3 Feb 1999 08:20:20 - Date: Wed, 3 Feb 1999 09:20:20 +0100 (MET) From: Hartmut Heller [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: Long Standing Bear Chief [EMAIL PROTECTED] Cc: [EMAIL PROTECTED], [EMAIL PROTECTED] Subject: Re: stripes for the backs of fools X-Authenticated-Sender: #[EMAIL PROTECTED] X-Authenticated-IP: [141.4.5.162] Message-Id: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-transfer-encoding: 7bit I wanted you to see this as it is the beginning of how the whites have gone about abusing the children of the world. There is a book that proves that Father Adolph got his actions for jew killing by following the example from Canada and the US. You were and you continue to be wrong in your assessment that I am going to roll over and play dead for my white brothers. WRONG The use of religion to mark Pikanii Children in Canada for the depths of hell. Copyright 1999 by Long Standing Bear Chief "Judgement is prepar
[PEN-L:2810] Re: USWA President Says December Import DataPortends Disaster for American Steel Industry
At 09:06 AM 02/02/99 -0500, Tom L. wrote: Dear Pen-L, Here is a press release concerning steel dumping. Last week in testimony before congress our international president George Becker said, "10,000 steelworkers have already lost their jobs because of steel dumping and another 100,000 steelworkers are on the edge of losing theirs." This is not idle chit-chat on George's part---it's the facts! Compounding this problem is the world wide weakness in demand... Shouldn't we begin from the "world-wide weakness in demand" rather than so-called dumping? One points to the problem being world capitalism; the other tends to points at workers in other countries. Becker said the December import figures dramatize the need for immediate passage of legislation imposing temporary quotas on steel imports at pre-crisis levels, coupled with a comprehensive policy to prevent U.S. markets from continuing to be used as the dumping ground for the worldwide glut of steel... Such a bill, if enacted, would curtail dumping by requiring our trading partners to limit steel shipments into the U.S. to pre-crisis levels. Writing from Canada, it is now obvious that steel exports from Canada will be a major target this year in the trade disputes that are escalating between Canada and the US. Canadian nationalists will complain about US protectionism while advocating Canadian protectionism. Perhaps they will agree that the 'real' culprit isJapan, or Korea or I find that some people often go along with nationalist and protectionist views because they highlight the plight of workers suffering from how capitalism operates. However, because progressive-minded people can't go all the way down the nationalist road, the Pat Buchanans of the world win this argument. Hasn't this approach, including the definition of "dumping" imposed by rich countries, proven to be a reactionary dead end for the labour movement? Bill Burgess
