Re: LOV and LTV
I'D LIKE TO HEAR YOUR RESPONSE TO THIS CRITICISM OF YOUR IDEA THAT WE ONLY NEED EXPLOITATION NOT VALUE THEORY. > >More on your papers as I read through them. > I'm tuckered out on value theory. But as a matter of philosophy of social science, I note that it was never an objection of mind that: Value theory is a lawlike generalization, but there are no such in social sciences, so value theory is false. That was not what I said. Even if laws as lawlike as you like are available in social science, itdoes not follow that anything that has the form of a lawlike generalization is true or useful. However, this is a point about philosophy of science. I am not discussing value theory any more. Sorry. jks _ Join the worlds largest e-mail service with MSN Hotmail. http://www.hotmail.com
LOV and LTV
CBThe laws of physics are formulated with plenty of exceptions. Take the >first law of Newton and Galilei as presented by Einstein below. The clause >"removed sufficiently far from other bodies" is a ceteris paribus clause >and implies exceptions to the law ( i.e. when the body is not removed >sufficiently from other bodies there is an exception). Justin: Not the same thing. If you factor in the gravitational attraction of other bodies, you can (with difficulty, the many-body problem is very challenging), predict the path of the body affected as precisely as you like. With physics, the sources of deviation are few in kind, well understood, and rigorously accountable for. ^^^ CB: It is the same thing as an "exception". It is an exception to the general law. I named about four others with exceptions. ^^ Social systems by contrast are open. We don't know even what kinds of things might count as disturbances. ^ CB: This is overstatement. We do know some of the kinds of thing that might count as disturbances. And the "ideal type" models, freed from disturbances, are of unclear status. The best ideal type we have of that sort is the rational actor model underlying game theory and neoclassical economics. Even there the terms are disputed. With the rational actor minimax or maximin or what? ^^^ I repeat that I am not, as a social scientist, gripped with physics envy. I do not think that physics is better as science merely because it is more precise. I also agree that the differences between the natural and the social sciences are differences in degree rather than kind. This was the thesis of my doctoral dissertation. That doesn't mean that there are no differences. ^^ CB: Well I can agree with most of this. We started out arguing over whether social science has lawlike generalizations. It does. And we don't have dis them because they are not all around as precise as those in physics. More specifically, the law of value is a theoretically and practically useful generalization, and it makes our understanding of capitalist exploitation more precise than your falling back to just "exploitation". I'D LIKE TO HEAR YOUR RESPONSE TO THIS CRITICISM OF YOUR IDEA THAT WE ONLY NEED EXPLOITATION NOT VALUE THEORY. More on your papers as I read through them.
Re: LOV and LTV
>^ > >CB: Are you saying that probablistic laws are not fuzzier than laws that >are more definitive ? Depends on the probablistic laws. The laws of quantum mechanics are as precise as can be. So too are the laws of Mendelian genetics. Essentially they can predict the probabilities they describe extremely precisely. A "law" of thefalling rate of profit is not like that that. > >The laws of physics are formulated with plenty of exceptions. Take the >first law of Newton and Galilei as presented by Einstein below. The clause >"removed sufficiently far from other bodies" is a ceteris paribus clause >and implies exceptions to the law ( i.e. when the body is not removed >sufficiently from other bodies there is an exception). Not the same thing. If you factor in the gravitational attraction of other bodies, you can (with difficulty, the many-body problem is very challenging), predict the path of the body affected as precisely as you like. With physics, the sources of deviation are few in kind, well understood, and rigorously accountable for. Social systems by contrast are open. We don't know even what kinds of things might count as disturbances. And the "ideal type" models, freed from disturbances, are of unclear status. The best ideal type we have of that sort is the rational actor model underlying game theory and neoclassical economics. Even there the terms are disputed. With the rational actor minimax or maximin or what? I repeat that I am not, as a social scientist, gripped with physics envy. I do not think that physics is better as science merely because it is more precise. I also agree that the differences between the natural and the social sciences are differences in degree rather than kind. This was the thesis of my doctoral dissertation. That doesn't mean that there are no differences. jks _ Join the worlds largest e-mail service with MSN Hotmail. http://www.hotmail.com
Re: Re: LOV and LTV
Chris, Marx puts the dynamism in, in part, by saying that value represents the cost of REPRODUCTION, not production. This is a key element in his analysis of the devalorization of capital. Chris Burford wrote: > At 06/02/02 20:10 -0800, you wrote: > >This definition of course does not capture the systemic and dynamic > >features which Chris B is attempting to build into his definition. > > "The law of value of commodities ultimately determines how much of its > disposable working-time society can expend on each particular class of > commodities." > > V Vol I Ch 14Sec 4 > > And how could Marx define the "absolute general law of capitalist > accumulation" in the way he does in Ch XXV if his theory of value was not > a) dynamic > b )systemic? > > Mine is not an overimaginative reading of the overall thrust of Marx's > approach, (although unimaginative readings of Marx's theory are more than > possible). > > Chris Burford -- Michael Perelman Economics Department California State University Chico, CA 95929 Tel. 530-898-5321 E-Mail [EMAIL PROTECTED]
LOV and LTV
LOV and LTV by Justin Schwartz 07 February 2002 06:13 UTC > >CB: What's the difference between a lawful explanation and a lawlike > >explanation ? ( no fuzzy answers) > > > >The explanations invoked in physics are lawful, i.e., they use preciselt >formulated lawsto generate specific (if sometimes probabilistic) >predictions. > >^^ > >CB: Of course, admitting probablism admits the very fuzziness that this old >superiority complex of "hard" sciences claims is its superiority to "soft" >social science. Not at all. With quantum probabilities you can predict values down to as many decimal places as you care to write. Quantum is not riddled with exceptions and ceteris paribus clauses. ^ CB: Are you saying that probablistic laws are not fuzzier than laws that are more definitive ? The laws of physics are formulated with plenty of exceptions. Take the first law of Newton and Galilei as presented by Einstein below. The clause "removed sufficiently far from other bodies" is a ceteris paribus clause and implies exceptions to the law ( i.e. when the body is not removed sufficiently from other bodies there is an exception). Then his whole discussion about the fixed stars etc. , is one big exception. Albert Einstein (1879*1955). Relativity: The Special and General Theory. 1920. IV. The Galileian System of Co-ordinates AS is well known, the fundamental law of the mechanics of Galilei-Newton, which is known as the law of inertia, can be stated thus: A body removed sufficiently far from other bodies continues in a state of rest or of uniform motion in a straight line. This law not only says something about the motion of the bodies, but it also indicates the reference-bodies or systems of co-ordinates, permissible in mechanics, which can be used in mechanical description. The visible fixed stars are bodies for which the law of inertia certainly holds to a high degree of approximation. Now if we use a system of co-ordinates which is rigidly attached to the earth, then, relative to this system, every fixed star describes a circle of immense radius in the course of an astronomical day, a result which is opposed to the statement of the law of inertia. So that if we adhere to this law we must refer these motions only to systems of co-ordinates relative to which the fixed stars do not move in a cir! cle. A system of co-ordinates of which the state of motion is such that the law of inertia holds relative to it is called a "Galileian system of co-ordinates." The laws of the mechanics of Galilei-Newton can be regarded as valid only for a Galileian system of co-ordinates. >Physics is now a contradictory unity of extreme precision and extreme >fuzziness, just as a dialectics of nature might have expected. What are you talking about? ^^ CB: I'd say for something to be uncertain in principle is extreme fuzziness. Or what exactly and precisely do you take fuzziness to be ? And then Ian has mentioned some of the imaginings of recent physics whereby , for example, a sort of shadow Napoleon still exists somewhere. That's pretty fuzzy. >> >On the most charir=table interpretation of laws in social >science, any lawlike generalizations that exist are not like this. > > > >CB: Naw. I overcame my social science inferority complex to physical >sciences long ago. It's not superiority/inferiority thing, it's just different. CB: If its not superiority/inferiority why would you be talking about being "charitable" ? We don't need your "generalization" charity. Our generalizations are very powerful and useful in practice. Your claim that there are no lawlike generalizations in social science is a sort of echoing of physical science arrogance and an expression of an inferiority complex by social scientists. There are plenty of literally LAWlike generalizations in social science , as you should be aware of now that you are learning more about the law. For example, marriage in the U.S. is endogamous with respect to race. That is generally true LIKE it is generally true that most people obey the law against murder. It should be clear that I have just given you a lawlike generalization in social science. We can use it to predict, although it will be a probablistic prediction. ^^^ >This won't fly anymore with us social scientists. I'm a Michigan=trained socisl scientists myself, Charles--my PhD is joint polisci and philosophy. ^^ CB: So you should be well aware of the validity of what I am saying. At any rate, it is mostly social scientists who have the inferiority complex I have discovered ( in a little bit of social scientific generalizing about social science that I did myself). For example , I recall Michael Perelman discussing
Re: Re: Re: LOV and LTV
Christian, Can't follow what you're getting at. Please restate. >Rakesh, > >>Let me try this definition (open to revision of course): > >>Value is the socially necessary abstract labor time which >>potentially objectified in a commodity has as its only and >>necessary form of appearance units of money. > >This is what I meant yesterday by "debt and wages" as the terms of >capital depreciation. Well that's not what I mean since I still don't understand what you are saying. > If I were being polemical, I might ask how you know that money >always distorts value if you have no other measure of it. What's the problem? >It seems to me that you accept that what is the reference to that? > as a first principle, based on the existential description of class >antagonism. But I wonder if this distortion always takes the same >shape: is the value produced by the LA Lakers distorted in the same >way as that by the workers who prep and clean the Staples center? I >don't think so, although you could argue that what's being distorted >is the snalt, not subjective labor time. Wage differences (like >wages themselves), you might say, express this distortion. But then >you're left explaining how Shaq's and Kobe's wages, as >representations of surplus value/snalt are only in _appearance_ >(since that's what wages are) different from those of the staff at >Staples--in principle, they really aren't different; there's still >extraction of surpl! >us! > value;, it just looks like they have better lives because their are >multimillionaires. Then what? > >Christian
Re: Re: LOV and LTV
> >And how could Marx define the "absolute general law of capitalist >accumulation" in the way he does in Ch XXV if his theory of value >was not >a) dynamic >b )systemic? > > > >Mine is not an overimaginative reading of the overall thrust of >Marx's approach, (although unimaginative readings of Marx's theory >are more than possible). > > >Chris Burford Not at all Chris. I was suggesting that my definition was limited, in need of supplmentation because it did not capture the meanings on which you are rightly focused. Rakesh
FW: Re: Re: LOV and LTV
[this was sent by mistake, before I finished it.] >>But Justin, do you accept that what you criticise as being redundant some of us would merely call a labor theory of prices?<< Justin responds:> Not merely. Marx attempted to use value theory to do a lot of work, e.g., as part od [of?] a theory of crisis, as a component of his account of commodity fetishism, as an account of the nature of money, and, of course, as the explanation of profit, exploitation, surplus value, and the rate of these things.< That's right: Marx's Law of Value was a component of his account of commodity fetishism, or is rather implied by his whole vision of the capitalist system, which involves commodity fetishism (or the "illusions created by competition" of volume III). Like Locke before him (who developed a very non-Marxian labor theory of property), money is central to Marx's LoV. The key thing about the LoV is that it "applies" -- as a true-by-definition accounting system that's an alternative to doing one's accounting in price terms -- for the capitalist system as a whole or to the average capital (abstract capital) representing the system as a whole. >However, he correctly started from the premises that to do this work, value had to be quantity with a determinable magnitude, and price is the point of entry into that because value "appears" as price and profit in the phenonemal world. If value theory breaks down there, it's toast, as Marx also recognized, which is why he and Engels and traditional Marxism were concerned with the transformation problem.< It's surplus-value that "appears" as profit in the "phenomenal world," i.e., the world that we perceive rather than the world revealed by applying the acid of abstraction. (It's only Roemer who sees profit as in essence a scarcity price.) But no matter. Marx's concern with the so-called transformation problem (the derivation of values from prices or vice-versa) comes from his early learning from Ricardo. But then he takes the whole issue in a different direction. For Marx, as I read him, the movement from value to price (or price of production) is not mathematical as much as it is one of moving from a high level of abstraction (volume I of CAPITAL) to a lower one (volume III). In volume I, he focused on capital as a whole (as represented by the representative capitalist, Mr. Moneybags), abstracting from the heterogeneity of many capitals and the relationships amongst them. Step-by-step, he brings in aspects of the picture from which he had abstracted, until he gets to volume III, where he deals with how the "configurations of capital" "appear on the surface of society, in the action of different capitals on one another, i.e., in competition, and in the everyday consciousness of the agents of production themselves" (from the first page of text in volume III). In this light, the so-called "transformation problem" should be seen as a "disaggregation problem," going from the whole to the heterogeneous parts that make it up. In Marx's thought, the distinction between individual values and individual prices is as important as their unity. (For example, the value produced by money-lenders equals zero in Marx's theory, but they receive revenues: they are paid a price for their services.) The distinction represents the role of heterogeneity of capitals and competition, whereas the unity (represented by his equations total value = total price and total surplus-value = total profits+interest+rent) represents the fact that the heterogeneity and competition take place within a unified whole. (The revenues received by the money-lenders is a deduction from the surplus-value that the industrial capitalists have organized the production of.) >In these respect he was more intellectually honest that the latter-day defenders of value theory who want the "quantity" without being able to determine its measure.< to whom are you referring? and what does this mean? It's quite possible to measure values, though only approximately. But note that even prices can be very hard to measure, especially since the quality of diffferent products varies and the cost of buying something can involve non-monetary or hidden monetary elements. Justin continues >... I don't understand why you think you can't explain inequality with value theory. Here's Roemer['s explanation: the bourgeoisie grabbed the means of production by force or acquired them by luck, and used their ill-gotten resources to maintain their unfair advantages. Not a whisper of value, and so far as it goes a perfectly true, and indeed Marxian explanation.< In our old article in ECONMICS & PHILOSOPHY, Gary Dymski and I devastated Roemer's theory. He has no explanation of why the capitalists continue to receive profits over time. Blinkered by general equilibrium theory, he presents an equilibrium (i.e., inadequate) theory which cannot explain why the key variable in the story -- the scarcity of "capital goods" -- persists over time. Th
RE: Re: Re: LOV and LTV
>>But Justin, do you accept that what you criticise as being redundant some of us would merely call a labor theory of prices?<< Justin responds:> Not merely. Marx attempted to use value theory to do a lot of work, e.g., as part od [of?] a theory of crisis, as a component of his account of commodity fetishism, as an account of the nature of money, and, of course, as the explanation of profit, exploitation, surplus value, and the rate of these things.< That's right: Marx's Law of Value was a component of his account of commodity fetishism, or is rather implied by his whole vision of the capitalist system, which involves commodity fetishism (or the "illusions created by competition" of volume III). Like Locke before him (who developed a very non-Marxian labor theory of property), money is central to Marx's LoV. The key thing about the LoV is that it "applies" -- as a true-by-definition accounting system that's an alternative to doing one's accounting in price terms -- for the capitalist system as a whole or to the average capital (abstract capital) representing the system as a whole. >However, he correctly started from the premises that to do this work, value had to be quantity with a determinable magnitude, and price is the point of entry into that because value "appears" as price and profit in the phenonemal world. If value theory breaks down there, it's toast, as Marx also recognized, which is why he and Engels and traditional Marxism were concerned with the transformation problem.< It's surplus-value that "appears" as profit in the "phenomenal world," i.e., the world that we perceive rather than the world revealed by applying the acid of abstraction. (It's only Roemer who sees profit as in essence a scarcity price.) But no matter. Marx's concern with the so-called transformation problem (the derivation of values from prices or vice-versa) comes from his early learning from Ricardo. But then he takes the whole issue in a different direction. For Marx, as I read him, the movement from value to price (or price of production) is not mathematical as much as it is one of moving from a high level of abstraction (volume I of CAPITAL) to a lower one (volume III). In volume I, he focused on capital as a whole (as represented by the representative capitalist, Mr. Moneybags), abstracting from the heterogeneity of many capitals and the relationships amongst them. Step-by-step, he brings in aspects of the picture from which he had abstracted, until he gets to volume III, where he deals with how the "configurations of capital" "appear on the surface of society, in the action of different capitals on one another, i.e., in competition, and in the everyday consciousness of the agents of production themselves" (from the first page of text in volume III). In this light, the so-called "transformation problem" should be seen as a "disaggregation problem," going from the whole to the heterogeneous parts that make it up. In Marx's thought, the distinction between individual values and individual prices is as important as their unity. (For example, the value produced by money-lenders equals zero in Marx's theory, but they receive revenues: they are paid a price for their services.) The distinction represents the role of heterogeneity of capitals and competition, whereas the unity (represented by his equations total value = total price and total surplus-value = total profits+interest+rent) represents the fact that the heterogeneity and competition take place within a unified whole. (The revenues received by the money-lenders is a deduction from the surplus-value that the industrial capitalists have organized the production of.) >In these respect he was more intellectually honest that the latter-day defenders of value theory who want the "quantity" without being able to determine its measure.< to whom are you referring? and what does this mean? It should also be noted that prices are very hard to measure, especially since the quality of diffferent products varies among them and over time. > > > > >And from the perspective of it being an expanation of > exploitation, some of > >us would say that childen notice there are grossly unfair > and inexplicable > >differences in society. > > Unlike me, right? I think that all the inequalities that > exist are just > great. But here you depart from Marxism: "Unfair" is a charge > he would > dismissa sa bourgeois whine. As a liberal democrat, I myself > think he was > wrong about that--I think justice talk is very important--but > I find it odd > that you insist on orthodoxy in political economy while > rejecting Marx's > ideologiekritik of morality in general and talk of justice > and fairness in > particular. > > Finally, I don't understand why you think you can't explain > inequality with > value theory. Here's Roemer['s explanation: the bourgeoisie > grabbed the > means of production by force or acquired them by luck, and used their > ill-gotten r
Re: Re: LOV and LTV
Rakesh, >Let me try this definition (open to revision of course): >Value is the socially necessary abstract labor time which potentially objectified in >a commodity has as its only and necessary form of appearance units of money. This is what I meant yesterday by "debt and wages" as the terms of capital depreciation. If I were being polemical, I might ask how you know that money always distorts value if you have no other measure of it. It seems to me that you accept that as a first principle, based on the existential description of class antagonism. But I wonder if this distortion always takes the same shape: is the value produced by the LA Lakers distorted in the same way as that by the workers who prep and clean the Staples center? I don't think so, although you could argue that what's being distorted is the snalt, not subjective labor time. Wage differences (like wages themselves), you might say, express this distortion. But then you're left explaining how Shaq's and Kobe's wages, as representations of surplus value/snalt are only in _appearance_ (since that's what wages are) different from those of the staff at Staples--in principle, they really aren't different; there's still extraction of surpl! us! value;, it just looks like they have better lives because their are multimillionaires. Then what? Christian
LOV and LTV
LOV and LTV by Justin Schwartz 05 February 2002 19:49 UTC > >Charles writes: > > Can we get into a little more what a heuristic is ? Seems to be a sort >of >ok device for guiding scientific enquire, but sort of not a fulfledged >...what ? Theoretical concept ? What is the term for other types of ideas >( that are more than heuristic ) that are used in scientific or economic >theories ? "Theory," "law," "variable," etc. CB: Lets talk more about scientific laws. Here's Einstein's statement of the "first" law of physics. Albert Einstein (1879*1955). Relativity: The Special and General Theory. 1920. IV. The Galileian System of Co-ordinates AS is well known, the fundamental law of the mechanics of Galilei-Newton, which is known as the law of inertia, can be stated thus: A body removed sufficiently far from other bodies continues in a state of rest or of uniform motion in a straight line. This law not only says something about the motion of the bodies, but it also indicates the reference-bodies or systems of co-ordinates, permissible in mechanics, which can be used in mechanical description. The visible fixed stars are bodies for which the law of inertia certainly holds to a high degree of approximation. Now if we use a system of co-ordinates which is rigidly attached to the earth, then, relative to this system, every fixed star describes a circle of immense radius in the course of an astronomical day, a result which is opposed to the statement of the law of inertia. So that if we adhere to this law we must refer these motions only to systems of co-ordinates relative to which the fixed stars do not move in a cir! cle. A system of co-ordinates of which the state of motion is such that the law of inertia holds relative to it is called a "Galileian system of co-ordinates." The laws of the mechanics of Galilei-Newton can be regarded as valid only for a Galileian system of co-ordinates. CB: Seems to me that Marx's law of value is just as fulfledged as the law. It generates only ordinal, not cardinal, quantitative predictions. The law has a limited application,etc. Also, in the above "law", "theory", "variable" are not "theoretical concepts" in the sense of what "value" would be in a scientific theory. "Force" would be a theoretical concept that is in a corresponding role to "value" in the theory of mechanics.
LOV and LTV
LOV and LTV by Carrol Cox 06 February 2002 20:42 UTC Charles, some where in Anti-Duhring Engels says that dialectics neither proves anything nor discovers anything new. Sorry I can't quote it exactly or give you an exact cite. Some writer used that as a text on the basis of which he rejected dialectics completely. ^ CB: Yes, I have a memory of something like that, but I can't remember the exact statement. I would think that it might be said of formal logic ( Aristotlean with recent additions) that it cannot discover anything new. We'd have to have the exact quote, but I would wonder about the idea that dialectics does not discover anything new. It would seem that Marx used the notion of the contradictions within capitalism as the source of the new society, socialism. This use of the logic of contradictions seems a use of dialectics to discover the fundamentals of the new society. So that would be dialectics involved in discovering something new. I also get the impression that Marx considered that he used dialectics in discovering the secret of surplus value, as he and Engels refer to it. Doesn't that seem dialectics involved in discovering something "new" ? ( I mean new to the science of political economy). In fact , I would almost say that dialectics helps with discovering the new, but maybe not proving things. Whereas, formal logic is used in proofs, but not to discover anything new.
Re: Re: LOV and LTV
>But Justin, do you accept that what you criticise as being redundant some >of us would merely call a labor theory of prices? Not merely. Marx attemptedto use value theory to do a lot of work, e.g., as part od a theory of crisis, as a component of his account of commodity fetishism, as an account of the nature of money, and, of course, as the explanation of profit, exploitation, surplus value, and the rate of these things. However, he correctly started from the premises that to do this work, value had to be quantity with a determinable magnitude, and price is the point of entry into that because value "appears" as price and profit in the phenonemal world. If value theory breaks down there, it's toast, as Marx also recognized, which is why he and Engels and traditional Marxism were concerned with the transformation problem. In these respect he was more intellectually honest that the latter-day defenders of value theory who want the "quantity" without being able to determine its measure. > >And from the perspective of it being an expanation of exploitation, some of >us would say that childen notice there are grossly unfair and inexplicable >differences in society. Unlike me, right? I think that all the inequalities that exist are just great. But here you depart from Marxism: "Unfair" is a charge he would dismissa sa bourgeois whine. As a liberal democrat, I myself think he was wrong about that--I think justice talk is very important--but I find it odd that you insist on orthodoxy in political economy while rejecting Marx's ideologiekritik of morality in general and talk of justice and fairness in particular. Finally, I don't understand why you think you can't explain inequality with value theory. Here's Roemer['s explanation: the bourgeoisie grabbed the means of production by force or acquired them by luck, and used their ill-gotten resources to maintain their unfair advantages. Not a whisper of value, and so far as it goes a perfectly true, and indeed Marxian explanation. Some of us would say that the marxian theory >of >value is much bigger than an explanation of exploitation. > >Without being persuaded by us, do you acknowedge that such different >perspectives exist? Do you mean, do I recognize that you persist in error? Yes. jks _ Join the worlds largest e-mail service with MSN Hotmail. http://www.hotmail.com
Re: LOV and LTV
At 06/02/02 20:10 -0800, you wrote: >This definition of course does not capture the systemic and dynamic >features which Chris B is attempting to build into his definition. "The law of value of commodities ultimately determines how much of its disposable working-time society can expend on each particular class of commodities." V Vol I Ch 14Sec 4 And how could Marx define the "absolute general law of capitalist accumulation" in the way he does in Ch XXV if his theory of value was not a) dynamic b )systemic? Mine is not an overimaginative reading of the overall thrust of Marx's approach, (although unimaginative readings of Marx's theory are more than possible). Chris Burford
Re: LOV and LTV
At 07/02/02 06:07 +, you wrote: >>CB: In this sense, Marx's "value" is not heuristic, but a fundamental >>theoretical concept. > >I'm not persuaded. > >jks Nobody has to be persuaded of anything. But Justin, do you accept that what you criticise as being redundant some of us would merely call a labor theory of prices? And from the perspective of it being an expanation of exploitation, some of us would say that childen notice there are grossly unfair and inexplicable differences in society. Some of us would say that the marxian theory of value is much bigger than an explanation of exploitation. Without being persuaded by us, do you acknowedge that such different perspectives exist? Chris Burford
Re: LOV and LTV
> >CB: What's the difference between a lawful explanation and a lawlike > >explanation ? ( no fuzzy answers) > > > >The explanations invoked in physics are lawful, i.e., they use preciselt >formulated lawsto generate specific (if sometimes probabilistic) >predictions. > >^^ > >CB: Of course, admitting probablism admits the very fuzziness that this old >superiority complex of "hard" sciences claims is its superiority to "soft" >social science. Not at all. With quantum probabilities you can predict values down to as many decimal places as you care to write. Quantum is not riddled with exceptions and ceteris paribus clauses. >Physics is now a contradictory unity of extreme precision and extreme >fuzziness, just as a dialectics of nature might have expected. What are you talking about? >> >On the most charir=table interpretation of laws in social >science, any lawlike generalizations that exist are not like this. > > > >CB: Naw. I overcame my social science inferority complex to physical >sciences long ago. It's not superiority/inferiority thing, it's just different. >This won't fly anymore with us social scientists. I'm a Michigan=trained socisl scientists myself, Charles--my PhD is joint polisci and philosophy. >Social scientist generalizations are very lawlike, in the original sense of >"law" , to which physics and certainly biology, have come full circle and >retuned to. Some and some, but more like evolutionary biology, which hardly has any lawlike generalizations at all. That doesn't, I say again, make it worse or inferior. > >To paraphrase the leading anthropologist Leslie A. White (sort of opposite >to postmods) a main reason that social science is rendered "soft" and >impotent in the bourgeois academy is that the best social science today, >Marxism, would overthrow the existing order. I said something like this in The Paradox of Ideology, by way of explaining why therre is no consenus in social science. > >Marxism makes very good and lawlike generalizations. > A few, but which are you thinking of? >I'm mean you can say that the laws of history are not as mechanical as the >laws of mechanics, i.e. physics. But that's a tautology. So what ? Physics is not the archtype model for all science. > You asked what the difference was. I never said social science should aspire to be like physics. > > They are >riddled with exceptions, burdened with ceteris paribus clauses, and >generally fuzzy. > >^^^ > >CB: There are lots of these in physics, chemistry and biology. > Biology, yes. Name a few in physics and chemistry. >But that subjectivities play a bigger role in social science does not mean >there are not also objective exactnesses. I agree. There are subjectivities in law situations, but the law manages to put a very precise grid over social situations. Social science can obtain a literally similar _lawlike_ precision. Not a _very_ precise grid. So, natural scientists need a new word. "Lawlike" is closer to what social scientists have. > That's what I said. > >But not only that, social science has identified satisfactorily , from the >standpoint of knowledge, many generlizations, and laws,that can guide >practice. I reject the physical sciences claims to lawlike superority and >the like. Me too. > >CB: In this sense, Marx's "value" is not heuristic, but a fundamental >theoretical concept. > I'm not persuaded. jks _ Join the worlds largest e-mail service with MSN Hotmail. http://www.hotmail.com
Re: LOV and LTV
As with most definitional debates or what seems futile hairsplitting and mere semantics, the hope is that clarity as to definitions will help prevent confusion and mutual incomprehension at a later stage in the debate. For example, I think much of the debate in value theory could be more productive if participants were clear about how surplus value is defined. Let me try this definition (open to revision of course): Value is the socially necessary abstract labor time which potentially objectified in a commodity has as its only and necessary form of appearance units of money. I believe that this definition follows from the simple fact that in an atomized bourgeois society in which social labor is organized by private money-making units social labor time relations can only be regulated in and through the exchange of things, however value is in fact misrepresented by this mode of expression. In capturing Marx's quantitative and qualitative sense, one should probably build money and fetishism into the very definition of value. This will help to clarify that Marx is not simply qualifying Ricardo's definition of value but stipulating a new meaning. This definition of course does not capture the systemic and dynamic features which Chris B is attempting to build into his definition. Of course a serious problem with my definition is that it may imply that units of money come to define the objectified social labor time that is socially attributed to a commodity, rather than money price being an expression of the socially necessary abstract labor time objectively needed for the reproduction of the commodity. While I would agree that monetary measurement is not merely a passive ascertainment of a preexisting attribute and specifically that value is not actualized without successful money sale--that is a value must prove itself to be a social use value--the value that is expressed in exchange value is based on the objective social labor time that is in fact needed to reproduce the bulk of such commodities though as Marx emphasizes this value is in fact necessarily mis-represented in exchange. rb
LOV and LTV
LOV and LTV by Justin Schwartz 05 February 2002 20:05 UTC I >think Marx was genuinely dialectical in a specific Hegelian sense--he >proceeds by immanent critique, for example--but this isn't a matter of >giving an alternative to explanation by means of probabalistic laws or >tendecies, but rather a style of explanation that offers a framework for >offering lawlike explanations. > >^ > >CB: What's the difference between a lawful explanation and a lawlike >explanation ? ( no fuzzy answers) > The explanations invoked in physics are lawful, i.e., they use preciselt formulated lawsto generate specific (if sometimes probabilistic) predictions. ^^ CB: Of course, admitting probablism admits the very fuzziness that this old superiority complex of "hard" sciences claims is its superiority to "soft" social science. Hawking is oh so fuzzily dialectical. Physics is now a contradictory unity of extreme precision and extreme fuzziness, just as a dialectics of nature might have expected. Even many of physics' laws now remind of jurisprudential laws ( as I mentioned to you in correspondence ten or so years ago, before you were in law) - probablistic and tendencies. ^^^ On the most charir=table interpretation of laws in social science, any lawlike generalizations that exist are not like this. CB: Naw. I overcame my social science inferority complex to physical sciences long ago. This won't fly anymore with us social scientists. Social scientist generalizations are very lawlike, in the original sense of "law" , to which physics and certainly biology, have come full circle and retuned to. To paraphrase the leading anthropologist Leslie A. White (sort of opposite to postmods) a main reason that social science is rendered "soft" and impotent in the bourgeois academy is that the best social science today, Marxism, would overthrow the existing order. Marxism makes very good and lawlike generalizations. I'm mean you can say that the laws of history are not as mechanical as the laws of mechanics, i.e. physics. But that's a tautology. So what ? Physics is not the archtype model for all science. ^^ They are riddled with exceptions, burdened with ceteris paribus clauses, and generally fuzzy. ^^^ CB: There are lots of these in physics, chemistry and biology. But that subjectivities play a bigger role in social science does not mean there are not also objective exactnesses. There are subjectivities in law situations, but the law manages to put a very precise grid over social situations. Social science can obtain a literally similar _lawlike_ precision. So, natural scientists need a new word. "Lawlike" is closer to what social scientists have. Moreover many social scientific explanations are, like the explanations in evolutionary biology, entirely nonwalike, but instead proceed by giving a specific sort of narrative. Darwinian explanations are generally like this. However, there sre some more or lessrobust explanatory generalizations that are like laws, if not ful--fledged laws like the laws of physics. Precise enough for you? Books have been written on this; I could give you cites. ^^ CB: See my discussion above. I have been studying and essaying this issue for over 30 years. I have concluded that the claims of physics to being more "lawlike" is ironically upside down. But not only that, social science has identified satisfactorily , from the standpoint of knowledge, many generlizations, and laws,that can guide practice. I reject the physical sciences claims to lawlike superority and the like. >CB: Is exploitation a heuristic ? Does the other way of showing that >exploitation is going on use heuristic devices ? > No, exploitation is a fundamental fact. And yes my way of proceeding does use heuristics; there's nothing wrong with using heuristics, as long as you remember they are not fundamental theoretical concepts that describe the Way Things Are. (I was a graduate student of Prof. Mary B. Hesse, author of the pioneering study "Models and Analogies in Science," still the place to start in thinking about this stuff.) CB: In this sense, Marx's "value" is not heuristic, but a fundamental theoretical concept.
: LOV and LTV
: LOV and LTV by Justin Schwartz 05 February 2002 19:49 UTC > >Charles writes: > > Can we get into a little more what a heuristic is ? Seems to be a sort >of >ok device for guiding scientific enquire, but sort of not a fulfledged >...what ? Theoretical concept ? What is the term for other types of ideas >( that are more than heuristic ) that are used in scientific or economic >theories ? "Theory," "law," "variable," etc. ^^^ CB: Marx's "value" is more precise than your "exploitation", because it is the specific form of exploitation in capitalism, differentiated from the exploitation in feudalism and other exploiting systems. Thus, the AM effort ends up with less precision than Marx had, when AM claims to be bringing more exactness. "Heuristic devices" seem to be tools used in a scientific or >knowledge process, but not the ultimate theoretical concepts. < Could not have said it better myself. jks > CB: "Value" is an ultimate theoretical concept in Marx's theory, not a heuristic. Your removal of it impoverishes Marx's theory of capitalism.
Re: LOV and LTV
Charles Brown wrote: > > Myself, I would not give dialectics a lesser status than full theoretical concepts. >I was edified by THE DIALECTICAL BIOLOGIST , well, sort of as a heuristic in coming >to an understanding of dialectics as more than a heuristic , as Marx , Engels and >Lenin use dialectics. Charles, some where in Anti-Duhring Engels says that dialectics neither proves anything nor discovers anything new. Sorry I can't quote it exactly or give you an exact cite. Some writer used that as a text on the basis of which he rejected dialectics completely. Carrol
LOV and LTV
LOV and LTV by Devine, James 05 February 2002 19:08 UTC Charles writes: > Can we get into a little more what a heuristic is ? Seems to be a sort of ok device for guiding scientific enquire, but sort of not a fulfledged ...what ? Theoretical concept ? What is the term for other types of ideas ( that are more than heuristic ) that are used in scientific or economic theories ? "Heuristic devices" seem to be tools used in a scientific or knowledge process, but not the ultimate theoretical concepts. < you've got it. A heuristic is a device for guiding thought or inquiry. One example is the dialectical way of thinking, which does not give answers as much as tell you what questions to ask: how does the whole affect the parts? how do the parts affect the whole? how does the dynamic interaction between these work? (cf. Lewontin & Levins, THE DIALECTICAL BIOLOGIST, last chapter.) JDevine ^^ CB: Yes, Stephen Jay Gould the biologist terms dialecticts a heuristic also. Myself, I would not give dialectics a lesser status than full theoretical concepts. I was edified by THE DIALECTICAL BIOLOGIST , well, sort of as a heuristic in coming to an understanding of dialectics as more than a heuristic , as Marx , Engels and Lenin use dialectics. I agree that dialectics brings our attention to the relationship between the part and the whole ( although I don't read Lewontin and Levin to quite give such an symetrical version of the relationship. The give priority to the whole over the parts, emergence, etc.). but also all the aspects that Engels summarized in his notes for the book that others compiles as THE DIALECTICS OF NATURE. I guess THE DIALECTICAL BIOLOGIST is dedicated to Engels, "who didn't always get it right, but got it right when it counted". I agree. The critical thing about dialectics is that it is an effort to understand the logic of change. Formal logic help! s with snapshots, statics. We need both. Part of the reason dialectics gets fuzzy is the same reason sometimes a camera picture of something in motion is fuzzy. The motion of something _is__ the thing, the substance of it. So, dialectics is the goal, the full concept. The snap shots of formal logical analysis are more the heuristic. Anyway, I would give both "value" in Marx's theory and "dialectics" in theories of theories higher status than "heuristic" as that is comonly understood. "Value" and "dialectics" are vital , critical for scientific understanding,not heuristic.
Re: Re: Re: LOV and LTV
> > I discuss this is What's Wrong with Exploitation?, look it up, and see >if > > you disagree. jks > >What is wrong is endegenous accumulation which is enabled by "exploitation" >as the profit source. And if endogenous accumulation is possible, >capitalism >can not experience crises. Rosa Luxemburg understood that, ninety years >ago. > Say more, I don't understand this. jks _ Send and receive Hotmail on your mobile device: http://mobile.msn.com
Heuristics Re: RE: LOV and LTV
A wonderful story on heuristics. Back in the fall of 1970 I got subpoened by a legislative commit6ee investigating campus disorders. They were a bunch of buffoons -- as shown beautifully by their interrogation of a professor of electrical engineering from the U of I. He was a German emigre and stepped right out of a cartoon of a kindly old professor. The background was that for many years he had taught a quiet course in the Engineering school on heuristics, in which only engineering students enrolled. As part of the jazzing up of distribution requirements back in the late '60s they made his course available to the general student body. The idea he came up with was to let the students choose their own goal, it could be anything sensible or not, and then their semester project would be to establish how they would work out the means to that end. They came up with some doozies. How to make a fortune selling marijuana. How to blow up the student union building. All sorts of "sixtyish" projects. The good Illinois senators decided that it was all a commie plot hauled him down to springfield to testify. The high point came when they began grilling him on those students who had, purportedly, refused to carry out the project. The Illinois Legislators (name for one of the lower forms of life) obviously thought that he had assigned subversive topics and that some patriotic students had refused to carry out the nefarious work. His reply (in a gentle German accent but very clear): "I'm sorry, zey vas just lazy bums!." Carrol
RE: Re: RE: Re: RE: Re: LOV and LTV
JKS writes: >>> I have said as much here. But it's [the Marxian Law of Value is] a far more limited heuristic than you seem to think. It's basically useful for showing ina simple way that there's exploitation going on. However, you can do this without it.<<< quoth me: >>as I write on the margins of term papers now and then, assertion is not the same as proof. I've published a couple of articles about the utility of value. If you want the references, I'll send them to you.<< he responds:> Right, Professor. I used to be a Professor too, and I think I may have heard of the concept. I also think I have argued the point.< dunno. It seems that you rest too much on your laurels rather than your logic, citing published articles rather than explaining your point of view, your assumptions, how they are applied, etc. >I would very much appreciate if you would send me the _papers_ (snail mail: ADDRESS SUPPRESSSED TO PRESERVE PRIVACY). < They're in the snail-mail. JDevine
Re: Re: LOV and LTV
> I discuss this is What's Wrong with Exploitation?, look it up, and see if > you disagree. jks What is wrong is endegenous accumulation which is enabled by "exploitation" as the profit source. And if endogenous accumulation is possible, capitalism can not experience crises. Rosa Luxemburg understood that, ninety years ago.
Re: RE: Re: RE: Re: LOV and LTV
> > > I have said as much here. But it's a far more limited heuristic than you >seem to think. It's basically useful for showing ina simple way that >there's exploitation going on. However, you can do this without it.< > >as I write on the margins of term papers now and then, assertion is not the >same as proof. I've published a couple of articles about the utility of >value. If you want the references, I'll send them to you. > Right, Professor. I used to be a Professor too, and I think I may have heard of the concept. I also think I have argued the point. I would very much appreciate if you would send me the _papers_ (snail mail: 2227 Lincolnwood Dr. Evanston IL 60201). I lack easy access to a U library, not being a Professor anymore. I will do the same, if you like, with the papers I have written attacking the utility of the LTV or showing that we can do without it. jks _ Chat with friends online, try MSN Messenger: http://messenger.msn.com
Re: LOV and LTV
> >Another point on this is that for Marx "value" mainly applies to >capitalism. Marx refers to the fruits of exploitation in pre-capitalist >societies as "surplus-labor" ( see below) not "surplus value" . So, for >Marx "value" is meant to convey the specific form of exploitation that >predominates in capitalism. "Value" is unique to capitalism, or to the >commodity production and exchange that was on the periphery of societies >until capitalism. In Marxist terms, feudal serfs were exploited , but did >not produce value. > >So, showing exploitation in capitalism without using the concept of "value" >misses the point or impoverishes rather than enriches Marx's theory. I discuss this is What's Wrong with Exploitation?, look it up, and see if you disagree. jks > _ Get your FREE download of MSN Explorer at http://explorer.msn.com/intl.asp.
Re: Re: RE: Re: RE: Re: RE: Re: LOV and LTV
Title: Re: [PEN-L:22419] Re: RE: Re: RE: Re: RE: Re: LOV and Why is domination functional for increasing exploitation? The answer highlights a third problem with Roemer's argument which turns on a crucial assumption of his models. In these what workers sell is labour, not labour power, or, equivalently, labour contracts are costlessly enforceable (1986b, 269). This is a consequence of the Walrasian assumption that there are no transaction costs, including those of contract enforcement, i.e., that markets are 'complete'. But this assumption is not a minor technical issue. Its effect is to undermine domination as an ethical reason for interest in exploitation by calling into question the explanatory interest simpliciter of domination. Marx argues that workers sell labour power, their ability to work (1967a, 167-169). Justin, this is extremely well put, though it leaves us with the task of reconstructing Marx's logic. How is it that Marx discovers on the island of free wage labor (i..e, workers own no means of production) that the proletariat alienates labor power rather than (as it seems) labor time? rb
LOV and LTV
Another point on this is that for Marx "value" mainly applies to capitalism. Marx refers to the fruits of exploitation in pre-capitalist societies as "surplus-labor" ( see below) not "surplus value" . So, for Marx "value" is meant to convey the specific form of exploitation that predominates in capitalism. "Value" is unique to capitalism, or to the commodity production and exchange that was on the periphery of societies until capitalism. In Marxist terms, feudal serfs were exploited , but did not produce value. So, showing exploitation in capitalism without using the concept of "value" misses the point or impoverishes rather than enriches Marx's theory. Also, value relations do not have to be exploitative. There can be production for exchange or commodity production, and exchange based on the proportions of labor times for producing the commodities that does not involve exploitation. Charles ^^^ http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1867-c1/ch10.htm#S2 SECTION 2 THE GREED FOR SURPLUS-LABOUR. MANUFACTURER AND BOYARD Capital has not invented surplus-labour. Wherever a part of society possesses the monopoly of the means of production, the labourer, free or not free, must add to the working-time necessary for his own maintenance an extra working-time in order to produce the means of subsistence for the owners of the means of production, [7] whether this proprietor be the Athenian calos cagaqos [well-to-do man], Etruscan theocrat, civis Romanus, Norman baron, American slave-owner, Wallachian Boyard, modern landlord or capitalist. [8] It is, however, clear that in any given economic formation of society, where not the exchange-value but the use-value of the product predominates, surplus-labour will be limited by a given set of wants which may be greater or less, and that here no boundless thirst for surplus-labour arises from the nature of the production itself. Hence in antiquity over-work becomes horrible only when the object is to obtain exchange-value in its specific independent money-fo! rm; in the production of gold and silver. Compulsory working to death is here the recognised form of over-work. Only read Diodorus Siculus. [9] Still these are exceptions in antiquity. But as soon as people, whose production still moves within the lower forms of slave-labour, corvée-labour, &c., are drawn into the whirlpool of an international market dominated by the capitalistic mode of production, the sale of their products for export becoming their principal interest, the civilised horrors of over-work are grafted on the barbaric horrors of slavery, serfdom, &c. Hence the negro labour in the Southern States of the American Union preserved something of a patriarchal character, so long as production was chiefly directed to immediate local consumption. But in proportion, as the export of cotton became of vital interest to these states, the over-working of the negro and sometimes the using up of his life in 7 years of labour became a factor in a calculated and calculating sys! tem. It was no longer a question of obtaining from him a certain quant of surplus-labour itself: So was it also with the corvée, e.g., in the Danubian Principalities (now Roumania).
Re: LOV and LTV
I >think Marx was genuinely dialectical in a specific Hegelian sense--he >proceeds by immanent critique, for example--but this isn't a matter of >giving an alternative to explanation by means of probabalistic laws or >tendecies, but rather a style of explanation that offers a framework for >offering lawlike explanations. > >^ > >CB: What's the difference between a lawful explanation and a lawlike >explanation ? ( no fuzzy answers) > The explanations invoked in physics are lawful, i.e., they use preciselt formulated lawsto generate specific (if sometimes probabilistic) predictions. On the most charir=table interpretation of laws in social science, any lawlike generalizations that exist are not like this. They are riddled with exceptions, burdened with ceteris paribus clauses, and generally fuzzy. Moreover many social scientific explanations are, like the explanations in evolutionary biology, entirely nonwalike, but instead proceed by giving a specific sort of narrative. Darwinian explanations are generally like this. However, there sre some more or lessrobust explanatory generalizations that are like laws, if not ful--fledged laws like the laws of physics. Precise enough for you? Books have been written on this; I could give you cites. >CB: Is exploitation a heuristic ? Does the other way of showing that >exploitation is going on use heuristic devices ? > No, exploitation is a fundamental fact. And yes my way of proceeding does use heuristics; there's nothing wrong with using heuristics, as long as you remember they are not fundamental theoretical concepts that describe the Way Things Are. (I was a graduate student of Prof. Mary B. Hesse, author of the pioneering study "Models and Analogies in Science," still the place to start in thinking about this stuff.) _ Get your FREE download of MSN Explorer at http://explorer.msn.com/intl.asp.
Re: RE: Re: RE: Re: RE: Re: LOV and LTV
>
> >I have argued this point ins ome detail in my What's Wrong with
> >Exploitation? Nous 1995,
>
>At this point I must once more apologise for having taken a somewhat snippy
>tone in this thread; it is entirely because I am an idiot. I seem to have
>acquired the belief that "What's Wrong with Exploitation?" and "In Defense
>of Exploitation" were the same paper and that this paper was called "In
>Defence [note spelling] of Exploitation". As a result I've been searching
>fruitlessly for this non-paper for the last three days and was beginning to
>uncharitably suspect that it didn't exist. A thousand apologies. In the
>circumstances, I agree that we'd better stop; I may come back on this once
>I've read the papers if I still disagree. Alternatively, if I find that I
>agree with you, I promise to start a cult in your name and argue with
>anybody who I decide is misinterpreting you :-)
>
>dd
Here is the link to a draft (slightly different from the published version):
http://lists.village.virginia.edu/~spoons/marxism/Exploit.htm
In defence of exploitation, Econ & Phil 1995, is at
http://lists.village.virginia.edu/~spoons/marxism/DefenseE.htm
The Brit editors britishized the spelling ("behaviour," "defence," and the
like). I wrote it in good 'murrican.
jks
>
>
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Re: RE: LOV and LTV
> >Charles writes: > > Can we get into a little more what a heuristic is ? Seems to be a sort >of >ok device for guiding scientific enquire, but sort of not a fulfledged >...what ? Theoretical concept ? What is the term for other types of ideas >( that are more than heuristic ) that are used in scientific or economic >theories ? "Theory," "law," "variable," etc. "Heuristic devices" seem to be tools used in a scientific or >knowledge process, but not the ultimate theoretical concepts. < Could not have said it better myself. jks > _ Send and receive Hotmail on your mobile device: http://mobile.msn.com
LOV and LTV
Justin: I don't think we are making progress here, hadn't we best stop? Charles: Well sure, but we know the issue will rise again on the list. It is one of the regular recurring topics here.
RE: LOV and LTV
CB: Can we get into a little more what a heuristic is? Anyone interested in heuristics should consult a wonderful little book called _How to Solve It_ by Georges Polya. The aim of heuristics according to Polya is to "study the methods and rules of discovery and invention." People like Polya (and those he influenced like Michael Polanyi) and C. S. Peirce (and his follower Norwood Hanson) believe that there is a "logic of discovery." mat
RE: LOV and LTV
Charles writes: > Can we get into a little more what a heuristic is ? Seems to be a sort of ok device for guiding scientific enquire, but sort of not a fulfledged ...what ? Theoretical concept ? What is the term for other types of ideas ( that are more than heuristic ) that are used in scientific or economic theories ? "Heuristic devices" seem to be tools used in a scientific or knowledge process, but not the ultimate theoretical concepts. < you've got it. A heuristic is a device for guiding thought or inquiry. One example is the dialectical way of thinking, which does not give answers as much as tell you what questions to ask: how does the whole affect the parts? how do the parts affect the whole? how does the dynamic interaction between these work? (cf. Lewontin & Levins, THE DIALECTICAL BIOLOGIST, last chapter.) JDevine
RE: LOV and LTV
Many "laws" such as the laws of supply and demand are really neither descriptive nor predictive, but can only really be seen as *prescriptive*. This is what you *should* do if you want such and such results. (This is what Adolph Lowe called "instrumental" analysis.) Subject: [PEN-L:22404] LOV and LTV LOV and LTV by Devine, James 05 February 2002 04:42 UTC BTW, the "laws" of supply & demand are also non-determinist. S&D cannot give specific answers to anything in the abstract. Rather, they have to be given empirical content. S&D might best be seen as a (an?) heuristic, acting as a guide to thought. Of course, Marx's value theory -- or law of value -- is also a heuristic. JDevine
LOV and LTV
LOV and LTV by Justin Schwartz 05 February 2002 05:13 UTC >Marx uses the word "law" differently than Justin does. Marx's "laws" are >dialectical, non-deterministic. But many interpret his ideas in Justin's >terms, "proving" that Marx was a determinist. How do you get "deterministic" out of "precisely formulated relatoon among variables"? The laws of quantum mechanics are as precisely formulated as could be, and nondeterministic too. Fallback to "dialectics," though, raises my antennae, because it is often an excuse to talk a lot of nonsense. I think Marx was genuinely dialectical in a specific Hegelian sense--he proceeds by immanent critique, for example--but this isn't a matter of giving an alternative to explanation by means of probabalistic laws or tendecies, but rather a style of explanation that offers a framework for offering lawlike explanations. ^ CB: What's the difference between a lawful explanation and a lawlike explanation ? ( no fuzzy answers) ^^^ > >BTW, the "laws" of supply & demand are also non-determinist. S&D cannot >give >specific answers to anything in the abstract. Rather, they have to be given >empirical content. S&D might best be seen as a (an?) heuristic, acting as a >guide to thought. Of course, Marx's value theory -- or law of value -- is >also a heuristic. I have said as much here. But it's a far more limited heuristic than you seem to think. It's basically useful for showing ina simple way that there's exploitation going on. However, you can do this without it. jks ^^^ CB: Is exploitation a heuristic ? Does the other way of showing that exploitation is going on use heuristic devices ?
LOV and LTV
LOV and LTV by Devine, James 05 February 2002 04:42 UTC Marx uses the word "law" differently than Justin does. Marx's "laws" are dialectical, non-deterministic. But many interpret his ideas in Justin's terms, "proving" that Marx was a determinist. BTW, the "laws" of supply & demand are also non-determinist. S&D cannot give specific answers to anything in the abstract. Rather, they have to be given empirical content. S&D might best be seen as a (an?) heuristic, acting as a guide to thought. Of course, Marx's value theory -- or law of value -- is also a heuristic. JDevine ^ CB: Can we get into a little more what a heuristic is ? Seems to be a sort of ok device for guiding scientific enquire, but sort of not a fulfledged ...what ? Theoretical concept ? What is the term for other types of ideas ( that are more than heuristic ) that are used in scientific or economic theories ? "Heuristic devices" seem to be tools used in a scientific or knowledge process, but not the ultimate theoretical concepts. Main Entry: 1heu·ris·tic Pronunciation: hyu-'ris-tik Function: adjective Etymology: German heuristisch, from New Latin heuristicus, from Greek heuriskein to discover; akin to Old Irish fo-fúair he found Date: 1821 : involving or serving as an aid to learning, discovery, or problem-solving by :experimental and especially trial-and-error methods ; also : of or relating to exploratory problem-solving :techniques that utilize self-educating techniques (as the evaluation of feedback) to :improve performance
Re: LOV and LTV
At 05/02/02 04:43 +, you wrote: >>Obviously I am in general sympathy with Charles's defence of the LOV >>approach, but I think Justin helpfully pinpoints a line of demarcation. For >>Justin a "law" is a "precisely formulable generalization". Many might agree >>the merits of such an approach, but I am fairly confident that Marx and >>Engels would not. > >Why do you think not? > >People will have to make a value judgement about >>this. > >Why is this a value judgment? It is a matter of taste how precise you want your map of reality to be for what purpose. I would rather have a fuzzy map of capitalism. >>In the essay [Engels] considers various definitions of the law of value >>and does >>not insist on only one. > >Is that supposed to be a recommendation? It is worth thinking about if you want to refute this law. >>But I suspect that Justin's clearest line of demarcation is in the >>importance of any theory being vulnerable to "testing and criticism". This >>is a standpoint of a philosophical approach that objects to theories like >>those of Freud or Marx on the grounds that they are not falsifiable. > >I didn't say that and don't believe it. I think Freud's a fraud as a >scientist, but Marx is the real think. I think the core of his theories is >correct. OK I note you do not accept that definition of the line of demarcation. But then there is a more precise one: for me the law of value is one of Marx's core theories. For you it is not. Regards Chris Burford
Re: RE: Re: RE: Re: LOV and LTV
- Original Message - From: "Davies, Daniel" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> Sent: Monday, February 04, 2002 11:17 PM Subject: [PEN-L:22376] RE: Re: RE: Re: LOV and LTV >I have said as much here. But it's a far more limited heuristic than you >seem to think. It's basically useful for showing ina simple way that >there's exploitation going on. However, you can do this without it. jks It's also useful for showing that the exploitation (defined in Roemer's sense) is a result of social factors rather than technical ones; I don't think you can do this without ending up committed to something which has most of the characteristics of the LTV. The clearest non-LTV demonstration that there is exploitation is Joan Robinson's observation that ownership is not an activity therefore it is not a productive activity, so any rewards to ownership must come out of someone else's production. But without something like the LTV, we miss a lot of what is important about specifically *marxist* exploitation. It's possible to believe that there is exploitation in this sense, but that this is because of a technical factor; that capital has a marginal productivity. In order to see that the reward to capital is a result of social relations rather than relations between things, you need to get off the fence and make more definite statements about value. dd = Why not focus on ownership, property, contract, corporate governance etc. in a manner that fellow citizens can relate to. How would value theory help the working class understand Enron and Argentina? Ian
RE: Re: RE: Re: RE: Re: LOV and LTV
Justin wrote: >I have argued this point ins ome detail in my What's Wrong with >Exploitation? Nous 1995, At this point I must once more apologise for having taken a somewhat snippy tone in this thread; it is entirely because I am an idiot. I seem to have acquired the belief that "What's Wrong with Exploitation?" and "In Defense of Exploitation" were the same paper and that this paper was called "In Defence [note spelling] of Exploitation". As a result I've been searching fruitlessly for this non-paper for the last three days and was beginning to uncharitably suspect that it didn't exist. A thousand apologies. In the circumstances, I agree that we'd better stop; I may come back on this once I've read the papers if I still disagree. Alternatively, if I find that I agree with you, I promise to start a cult in your name and argue with anybody who I decide is misinterpreting you :-) dd ___ Email Disclaimer This communication is for the attention of the named recipient only and should not be passed on to any other person. Information relating to any company or security, is for information purposes only and should not be interpreted as a solicitation or offer to buy or sell any security. The information on which this communication is based has been obtained from sources we believe to be reliable, but we do not guarantee its accuracy or completeness. All expressions of opinion are subject to change without notice. All e-mail messages, and associated attachments, are subject to interception and monitoring for lawful business purposes. ___
Re: RE: Re: RE: Re: LOV and LTV
Devine, James wrote: >I wrote: >>Marx uses the word "law" differently than Justin does. Marx's >"laws" are dialectical, non-deterministic. But many interpret his ideas in >Justin's terms, "proving" that Marx was a determinist.<< > >Justin writes: > How do you get "deterministic" out of "precisely formulated >relatoon among variables"? The laws of quantum mechanics are as precisely >formulated as could be, and nondeterministic too.< > >they are deterministic in that they make very specific predictions. > Wow. That's a broad definition of deterministic. Are bookies determinists? Fred _ Do You Yahoo!? Get your free @yahoo.com address at http://mail.yahoo.com
RE: Re: RE: Re: LOV and LTV
I wrote: >>Marx uses the word "law" differently than Justin does. Marx's "laws" are dialectical, non-deterministic. But many interpret his ideas in Justin's terms, "proving" that Marx was a determinist.<< Justin writes: > How do you get "deterministic" out of "precisely formulated relatoon among variables"? The laws of quantum mechanics are as precisely formulated as could be, and nondeterministic too.< they are deterministic in that they make very specific predictions. >Fallback to "dialectics," though, raises my antennae, because it is often an excuse to talk a lot of nonsense. I think Marx was genuinely dialectical in a specific Hegelian sense--he proceeds by immanent critique, for example--but this isn't a matter of giving an alternative to explanation by means of probabalistic laws or tendecies, but rather a style of explanation that offers a framework for offering lawlike explanations.< Yes, "dialectics" are often used to speak nonsense, just as "the economic way of thinking" that shows up in textbooks is. But I wasn't "falling back" to dialectics (and I don't understand why you think I was doing so). Rather, I was pointing to the intellectual tradition that Marx belonged to, which meant that he used the word "law" in a different way than modern social science does. That's all. If you don't situate a thinker in his or her tradition, it weakens your understanding of his or her thought. Among other things, different traditions use words differently. See Ollman's excellent book, ALIENATION, for example. (Frankly, I don't like the way Marx uses words -- as having varying meanings depending on context -- but it's important for understanding's sake to understand what he was doing.) It's good to get beyond a knee-jerk reaction (pro _or_ con) to the word "dialectics." That kind of thing encourages the rigidity of thought. >>BTW, the "laws" of supply & demand are also non-determinist. S&D cannot give specific answers to anything in the abstract. Rather, they have to be given empirical content. S&D might best be seen as a (an?) heuristic, acting as a guide to thought. Of course, Marx's value theory -- or law of value -- is also a heuristic.<< > I have said as much here. But it's a far more limited heuristic than you seem to think. It's basically useful for showing ina simple way that there's exploitation going on. However, you can do this without it.< as I write on the margins of term papers now and then, assertion is not the same as proof. I've published a couple of articles about the utility of value. If you want the references, I'll send them to you. -- Jim Devine
Re: RE: Re: RE: Re: LOV and LTV
> >The clearest non-LTV demonstration that there is exploitation is Joan >Robinson's observation that ownership is not an activity therefore it is >not >a productive activity, so any rewards to ownership must come out of someone >else's production. But without something like the LTV, we miss a lot of >what is important about specifically *marxist* exploitation. It's possible >to believe that there is exploitation in this sense, but that this is >because of a technical factor; that capital has a marginal productivity. >In >order to see that the reward to capital is a result of social relations >rather than relations between things, you need to get off the fence and >make >more definite statements about value. > > I have argued this point ins ome detail in my What's Wrong with Exploitation? Nous 1995, from which you might as well be paraphrasing, except that while I say the notion of value in a broad sense has an important theoretical role to play, and labor time is an important component of it, particukarly in accounting for profit, the LTV as I have defined it here is false and unnecessary. You might well say that I have conceded enough so that I mighta s well admit the LTV is true. But this is a glass half-empty/full matter. I could justa s well as that if you admit that value is not definitionally or empirically equivalent to labor time, you might as well admit that the LTV is false. Some of the issue between these alternatives may be the difference between those who think of themselves as Marxists possessed of a new science,a holistic theoretical explanation of the nature of capitalsim, and pragmatic radicals like myself who are cheerly eclectic, willing to borrow from Marx, Hayek, Weber, Robinson, Keynes, etc., but who have no pretense to having more than mid level scientific theories that may help us muddle through in our reformsit ways towards unseen but aspired to radical ends. I don't think we are making progress here, hadn't we best stop? _ Chat with friends online, try MSN Messenger: http://messenger.msn.com
Re: RE: Re: LOV and LTV
"Devine, James" wrote: > > Of course, Marx's value theory -- or law of value -- is > also a heuristic. > Isn't that the primary function of most (or all) "laws"? The Law of Value serves primarily to focus attention on (a) the historicity of capitalism and (b) the oranization and temporal allocation of living human activity under capitalism? Carrol
RE: Re: RE: Re: LOV and LTV
>I have said as much here. But it's a far more limited heuristic than you >seem to think. It's basically useful for showing ina simple way that >there's exploitation going on. However, you can do this without it. jks It's also useful for showing that the exploitation (defined in Roemer's sense) is a result of social factors rather than technical ones; I don't think you can do this without ending up committed to something which has most of the characteristics of the LTV. The clearest non-LTV demonstration that there is exploitation is Joan Robinson's observation that ownership is not an activity therefore it is not a productive activity, so any rewards to ownership must come out of someone else's production. But without something like the LTV, we miss a lot of what is important about specifically *marxist* exploitation. It's possible to believe that there is exploitation in this sense, but that this is because of a technical factor; that capital has a marginal productivity. In order to see that the reward to capital is a result of social relations rather than relations between things, you need to get off the fence and make more definite statements about value. dd ___ Email Disclaimer This communication is for the attention of the named recipient only and should not be passed on to any other person. Information relating to any company or security, is for information purposes only and should not be interpreted as a solicitation or offer to buy or sell any security. The information on which this communication is based has been obtained from sources we believe to be reliable, but we do not guarantee its accuracy or completeness. All expressions of opinion are subject to change without notice. All e-mail messages, and associated attachments, are subject to interception and monitoring for lawful business purposes. ___
Re: RE: Re: LOV and LTV
>Marx uses the word "law" differently than Justin does. Marx's "laws" are >dialectical, non-deterministic. But many interpret his ideas in Justin's >terms, "proving" that Marx was a determinist. How do you get "deterministic" out of "precisely formulated relatoon among variables"? The laws of quantum mechanics are as precisely formulated as could be, and nondeterministic too. Fallback to "dialectics," though, raises my antennae, because it is often an excuse to talk a lot of nonsense. I think Marx was genuinely dialectical in a specific Hegelian sense--he proceeds by immanent critique, for example--but this isn't a matter of giving an alternative to explanation by means of probabalistic laws or tendecies, but rather a style of explanation that offers a framework for offering lawlike explanations. > >BTW, the "laws" of supply & demand are also non-determinist. S&D cannot >give >specific answers to anything in the abstract. Rather, they have to be given >empirical content. S&D might best be seen as a (an?) heuristic, acting as a >guide to thought. Of course, Marx's value theory -- or law of value -- is >also a heuristic. I have said as much here. But it's a far more limited heuristic than you seem to think. It's basically useful for showing ina simple way that there's exploitation going on. However, you can do this without it. jks _ Send and receive Hotmail on your mobile device: http://mobile.msn.com
Re: Re: LOV and LTV
> >Obviously I am in general sympathy with Charles's defence of the LOV >approach, but I think Justin helpfully pinpoints a line of demarcation. For >Justin a "law" is a "precisely formulable generalization". Many might agree >the merits of such an approach, but I am fairly confident that Marx and >Engels would not. Why do you think not? People will have to make a value judgement about >this. > Why is this a value judgment? >In Chapter XXV Section 4 of Vol 1 of Capital Marx states in connection >with "the absolute general law of capitalist accumulation" "like all other >laws it is modified in its working by many circumstances, the analysis of >which does not concern us here." This doesn't show that Marx rejects the usual formulation of "law," rather, he accepts the obvious point that like many purported social laws, it states a tendency that is ceteris paribus and probabalistic. > >Now it is true that Marx's formulation of the law could still conceivably >be expressed in a clear relationship of variables despite this >qualification, but the qualification suggests to me that Marx expected the >workings of any serious law to be fuzzy in practice. Sure. But this is just a fact about social generalizations. > >The statement about the "law of value of commodities in Ch XIV Section >4 goes on to say "But this constant tendency to equlibirum ... is >exercised only in the shape of a reaction against the constant upsetting of >this equilbrium." This to my mind makes it sound much more like a strange >attractor than a simple equation. Even a precisely formed law can take a very complex form. A law doesn't have to have a simple form. > >> >In the essay [Engels] considers various definitions of the law of value and >does >not insist on only one. Is that supposed to be a recommendation? > >So this is a declaration of philosophical realism - that something has >emerged in the course of economic history and that a law describing it is >not a purely logical process but an explanatory reflection in thought of >that real process. Social laws, if there are any, are empirical generalizations, not purely logical processes. > > >Obviously like Charles I am a believer that there is some such thing as a >capitalist economy Me too. >and that it has a self perpetuating dynamic. I agree. >But I suspect that Justin's clearest line of demarcation is in the >importance of any theory being vulnerable to "testing and criticism". This >is a standpoint of a philosophical approach that objects to theories like >those of Freud or Marx on the grounds that they are not falsifiable. I didn't say that and don't believe it. I think Freud's a fraud as a scientist, but Marx is the real think. I think the core of his theories is correct. jks _ Send and receive Hotmail on your mobile device: http://mobile.msn.com
RE: Re: LOV and LTV
Chris B. writes: >Obviously I am in general sympathy with Charles's defence of the LOV approach, but I think Justin helpfully pinpoints a line of demarcation. For Justin a "law" is a "precisely formulable generalization". Many might agree the merits of such an approach, but I am fairly confident that Marx and Engels would not. People will have to make a value judgement about this. < Marx uses the word "law" differently than Justin does. Marx's "laws" are dialectical, non-deterministic. But many interpret his ideas in Justin's terms, "proving" that Marx was a determinist. BTW, the "laws" of supply & demand are also non-determinist. S&D cannot give specific answers to anything in the abstract. Rather, they have to be given empirical content. S&D might best be seen as a (an?) heuristic, acting as a guide to thought. Of course, Marx's value theory -- or law of value -- is also a heuristic. JDevine
Re: LOV and LTV
Chris wrote: > The statement about the "law of value of commodities > in Ch XIV Section 4 goes on to say "But this constant > tendency to equlibirum ... is exercised only in the > shape of a reaction against the constant upsetting of > this equilbrium." This to my mind makes it sound much > more like a strange attractor than a simple equation. Dear Chris, I have not done any work in Dynamical Systems, so I don't know much about strange attractors. All I know is that an attractor is a set with certain properties, which is associated with a nonautonomous, nonlinear differential equation, and that a strange attractor is an attractor which is chaotic. A simple equation, which based on your statement I read as one that does not exhibit chaos, is not comparable to a set, i.e., they don't belong to the same equivalance class, so I get confused here. Also, as far as I know, not all departures from equilibria are chaotic, even when the equilibria are unstable. I don't even see anything related with stability in Marx's statement. No offense is meant Chris. I read many of your posts with great interest and respect. But this time, I got confused. Best, Sabri
Re: LOV and LTV
At 04/02/02 15:37 -0500, you wrote: > > >Chris Burford:>I suggest that approaching these debates with the mind set >of LTV, sustains > >an assumption which is essentially about a simple equation: > > > >the value of something is its labour content (with various subtleties added > >about terminology and more or lessness) > > > >LOV however is essentially a whole systems dynamical approach to the > >circulation of the collective social product that is produced in the form > >of commodities. > >Justin:That's not a "law," in any normal scientific sense. A "law" is a >precisely >formulable generalization (n.b., not a definitional assumption) stating >relations between variables. I think the law of value is that the price of >commodities tends towards their value in long runm, with certain determinate >disturbances that imply that prices tend to converge on pricesof prodyction. > >CharlesB: The law of value is stated by Marx and Engels azs a relationship >between variables. The law of value is that commodities are exchanged for >each other based on the labor time embodied in them (not as Justin state >it; Engels has an essay on this in the afterward or something of Vol. III ) Obviously I am in general sympathy with Charles's defence of the LOV approach, but I think Justin helpfully pinpoints a line of demarcation. For Justin a "law" is a "precisely formulable generalization". Many might agree the merits of such an approach, but I am fairly confident that Marx and Engels would not. People will have to make a value judgement about this. In Chapter XXV Section 4 of Vol 1 of Capital Marx states in connection with "the absolute general law of capitalist accumulation" "like all other laws it is modified in its working by many circumstances, the analysis of which does not concern us here." Now it is true that Marx's formulation of the law could still conceivably be expressed in a clear relationship of variables despite this qualification, but the qualification suggests to me that Marx expected the workings of any serious law to be fuzzy in practice. The statement about the "law of value of commodities in Ch XIV Section 4 goes on to say "But this constant tendency to equlibirum ... is exercised only in the shape of a reaction against the constant upsetting of this equilbrium." This to my mind makes it sound much more like a strange attractor than a simple equation. There is the strange argument that the law of value only begins to develop itself freely on the basis of capitalist production (Ch XIX) which Engels appears to support by his argument in the appendix to Vol III of Capital on the Law of Value, which argues that the LOV has been in existence for at least 7,000 years. In stating this Engels, has a throw-away qualification "as far as economic laws are valid at all" In the essay he considers various definitions of the law of value and does not insist on only one. Furthermore he asks people to make "sufficient allowance for the fact that we are dealing with a historical process and its explanatory reflection in thought, the logical pursuance of its inner connections." So this is a declaration of philosophical realism - that something has emerged in the course of economic history and that a law describing it is not a purely logical process but an explanatory reflection in thought of that real process. The phenomenon itself may be complex enough but the reflections in our brain could be fuzzier still. Nevertheless the complex phenomenon DOES exist. > >Chris Burfod: Crudely, the difference between LTV and LOV is the > difference between a > >simple equation, which may indeed be weak nourishment, and a dynamic > >system. > > > >Justin: It's possible, and a standard move of defenders of Marxian value >theory, to >make immune from testing and criticism by making it so fuzzy that it lacks >determinate meaning. Who could object to asytstems-dynamical approach to the >economy? > > > >CharlesB: Here's an example of what I am talking about on AM. It is >Justin's understanding that seems fuzzy here . Chris Burford's seems to >have quite adequate determinate meaning. The difference Chris describes >is also that between moving from the whole to parts and moving from the >parts to the whole. A holistic approach is not fuzzier than an approach by >parts. ( See Jim D.'s discussion of this issue elsehere here) Obviously like Charles I am a believer that there is some such thing as a capitalist economy and that it has a self perpetuating dynamic. As in chaos theory, it is possible to posit something that is determinate but is indeterminate in precise form: deterministically indeterminate is a serious mathematical concept. As is fuzzy logic. But I suspect that Justin's clearest line of demarcation is in the importance of any theory being vulnerable to "testing and criticism". This is a standpoint of a philosophical approach that objects to theories like thos
LOV and LTV
> Chris Burford:>I suggest that approaching these debates with the mind set of LTV, sustains >an assumption which is essentially about a simple equation: > >the value of something is its labour content (with various subtleties added >about terminology and more or lessness) > >LOV however is essentially a whole systems dynamical approach to the >circulation of the collective social product that is produced in the form >of commodities. Justin:That's not a "law," in any normal scientific sense. A "law" is a precisely formulable generalization (n.b., not a definitional assumption) stating relations between variables. I think the law of value is that the price of commodities tends towards their value in long runm, with certain determinate disturbances that imply that prices tend to converge on pricesof prodyction. CharlesB: The law of value is stated by Marx and Engels azs a relationship between variables. The law of value is that commodities are exchanged for each other based on the labor time embodied in them (not as Justin state it; Engels has an essay on this in the afterward or something of Vol. III ) > >Chris Burfod: Crudely, the difference between LTV and LOV is the difference between a >simple equation, which may indeed be weak nourishment, and a dynamic >system. > Justin: It's possible, and a standard move of defenders of Marxian value theory, to make immune from testing and criticism by making it so fuzzy that it lacks determinate meaning. Who could object to asytstems-dynamical approach to the economy? CharlesB: Here's an example of what I am talking about on AM. It is Justin's understanding that seems fuzzy here . Chris Burford's seems to have quite adequate determinate meaning. The difference Chris describes is also that between moving from the whole to parts and moving from the parts to the whole. A holistic approach is not fuzzier than an approach by parts. ( See Jim D.'s discussion of this issue elsehere here)
