David Honig writes:
Similarly, stego'ing an .mp3 ripped from a CD is a bad idea;
stego'ing a .mp3 you made from a signal that was analogue at some
point works.
Every algorithm is deterministic, but different algorithms will
produce different results. And there is no "standard" algorithm
Bram Cohen writes:
Not that I'm going to propose a new standard or even modifications to old
ones - there are already too many of those, the problem is making one of
them acceptable, or develpoing a new one which has a good chance of
getting universal support.
Have you looked at
Stefan Kelm writes:
BTW, what do you mean by "point-source PGP signing"?
Instead of leaving your key signing up to your friends, PGP could
benefit from a policy-based signature. You could come up with any
number of policies:
o This keyholder is a Mason/Scout/Rotarian.
o This keyholder is
Is it just me, or is PGP broken? I don't mean any particular version
of PGP -- I mean the fact that there are multiple versions of PGP
which generate incompatible cryptography. Half the time when someone
sends me a PGP-encrypted message, I can't decrypt it. Presuming that
I'm right, is anyone
If the best is the enemy of the good, is strong crypto the enemy of
all other crypto? Just something to ponder...
--
-russ nelson [EMAIL PROTECTED] http://russnelson.com |
Crynwr sells support for free software | PGPok | Damn the firewalls!
521 Pleasant Valley Rd. | +1 315 268 1925 voice |
James A. Donald writes:
It is a test of will and power. Kaplan took offense at the widespread
attitude that such an act was beyond the power of a judge, that judges not
only should not censor thei internet, but that they *could* not censor the
internet, that the internet was stronger
Ed Gerck writes:
Even though the web-of-trust seems to be a pretty good part of PGP,
IMO it is actually it's Achilles heel.
Nope. Usability is its Achilles heel. PGP needs to be wrapped in
something, and yet it's not really designed to be wrapped. Even if it
were, PGP, Inc. changed the
Ian Brown writes:
... subscribers to agree not to use the service as a means to create a VPN.
Could someone describe to me (in my ignorance) the problem this rule
is intended to solve?
--
-russ nelson [EMAIL PROTECTED] http://russnelson.com | If you think
Crynwr sells support for free
Don Davis writes:
if we are successful in making crypto that's usable enough to
become pervasive, then industry and the public will need new
laws to help resolve social conflicts involving crypto, such
as inevitably will arise.
I'm not sure this statement is as obvious as you think it
Lyle Seaman writes:
What I really want is a keyboard with a slight variation -- not a
KeyGhost but a KeySpook.
If you have no physical security, you have no computer security. I
can't think of any qualifiers to add to that statement.
--
-russ nelson [EMAIL PROTECTED]
The May 1 issue of America's Network (http://www.americasnetwork.com)
has some nice press for cryptography in its Wireless column. The
title is "Hacked again!" and the subtitle is "Another cellular
algorithm has bitten the dust at the hands of cryptographers armed
with little more than a PC.
L. Sassaman writes:
PGP's source code has always been available for public review. This has
not changed. There are no "back doors" for the NSA in PGP,
paranoiaUnless they are particularly subtle ones, based on a mathematical
understanding that is not yet publicly known. Remember that the
Bill Stewart writes:
At 02:54 PM 03/01/2000 -0500, Russell Nelson wrote:
The essence of the above algorithm (let's call it BP1, for Buried
Plaintext 1) is to force the decryption trial to be iterated until the
buried plaintext is found. It means that the decryption engine needs
to have
One could increase the difficulty of decryption by three or four
doublings by intermixing random data with plaintext in a message.
Here's the least stupid method I can think of: the first character in
a message is the start of text (SOT) character. The second character
in a message is the end of
Eric Murray writes:
On Tue, Feb 29, 2000 at 11:14:31AM -0500, Russell Nelson wrote:
One could increase the difficulty of decryption by three or four
doublings by intermixing random data with plaintext in a message.
Here's the least stupid method I can think of: the first character
lcs Mixmaster Remailer writes:
Have their been other open source projects which used patented technology
owned by the company releasing the source? How has the licensing been
handled in those cases?
Basically, "You get a license for this patented algorithm only if you
use this source
Caspar Bowden writes:
And, as a result, the Bill proposes that the police or the security services
should have the power to force someone to hand over decryption keys or the
plain text of specified materials, such as e-mails, and jail those who
refuse.
Nobody's mentioned the possibility
Ben Laurie writes:
If you want a lot of people to see it, you can't keep it secret. If you
can't keep it secret, you may as well just come out with it and publish
the bits without stego.
What did I miss?
It depends on how hostile the regime is. If you want to publish
something but
Okay, here's something I've been thinking of for a while. Run a
political discussion mailing list which mails audio files back and
forth. This list, at least in the US, would enjoy the highest
Constitutional protection. However, you'd never know if the low bits
of the audio stream have been
David Honig writes:
At 03:20 PM 1/25/00 -0500, Russell Nelson wrote:
I'm trying to do forward stego -- that is, publish some encrypted
steganographic document, with the idea that, once everyone has a copy,
*then* you reveal the key.
Fascinating, captain. Canna imagine why
lcs Mixmaster Remailer writes:
The problem with Steganography is that there's basically no way to
clue people in to it's location without clueing everyone into it.
Encryption is successful if the attacker can't find information about the
plaintext without the key. Ideally, he can't
Ron Rivest writes:
(*) A Post tag system has a number of rewrite rules of the form
L_i -- R_i
where L_i and R_i are strings over some alphabet (e.g. binary).
As long as the prefix of the input matches some L_i, that
L_i is removed from the beginning of the input, and
lcs Mixmaster Remailer writes:
Lucky Green [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:
Over the years, using Wei Dai's term Pipenet (or Pipe-net, as it was spelled
originally) has firmly been established as denotating an anonymous IP
network that uses constant or otherwise data independent "pipes"
Ted Lemon writes:
Apparently the sources to PGPphone have been released (after many
years). See:
According to that message, the license is not an open source license,
though, so this is unfortunately not very exciting. :'(
Right. However, you are free to download the source
Julian Assange writes:
Simon as extended by Brassard and H{\o}yer shows that there are
tasks on which quantum machines are exponentially faster than
each classical machine infinitely often. The present paper shows
that there are tasks on which quantum machines are
Steven M. Bellovin writes:
So -- how should the back door be installed? In the protocol? In the telco
endpoint? Is it ethical for security people to work on something that lowers
the security of the system? Given that it's going to be done anyway, is it
ethical to refrain, lest it
Anonymous writes:
8. Receiptfreeness: A voter can't prove to a coercer, how he has
voted. As a result, verifiable vote buying is impossible.
It appears that the votehere system does not satisfy this, since the vote
is published in encrypted form, so the voter can reveal the
Ray Hirschfeld writes:
Seriously, my first reaction was that no crime had been committed, but
upon re-examining the export regulations I'm not so sure. Perhaps the
fact that the packets are explicitly destined for the US is considered
"adequate precaution" against unauthorized transfer.
Forwarded with permission (the permission being the short quote below,
the message being the long one). I don't have a copy of the
traceroute, but it definitely showed packets going from Washington DC
to NYC through Paris.
Dick St.Peters writes:
Well, the questions were really intended to be
On Fri, 17 Sep 1999, Greg Broiles wrote:
What scares me is the possibility that there won't even be an argument
about whether or not a particular clump of ciphertext decodes to a
particular bit of plaintext because I don't think it'll be possible to
cross-examine prosecution witnesses
Ben Laurie writes:
Declan McCullagh wrote:
Another answer might lie in a
little-noticed section of the legislation the
White House has sent to Congress. It
says that during civil cases or criminal
The September 13th InfoWorld has an advertisement by RSA Security. If
you squint your eyes up real tight, and read between the lines, it
reads like this:
Our patents are running out.
Please don't forget
who invented this stuff.
John Kelsey writes:
There's some question about how hard it will be to design
hardware that will be DPA-resistant for different
algorithms.
Big on-chip caps. Lithium batteries. Tamper-resistant housings.
That's what Dallas Semiconductor uses for its 1-Wire devices,
including the famous
Greg Rose writes:
At 22:09 21/08/1999 -0400, Russell Nelson wrote:
I've been thinking about cryptographic signing of messages at the mail
transfer agent level. I can think of how to do it, but I'm not sure
what problem it solves. :) Anyone have any ideas?
Signing messages
-- BEGIN 2rot-13
David Jablon writes:
Amazing! Despite the title, this seems to be a retro-active tax
break for all developers of snake-oil and other poorly concieved or
poorly implemented cryptography.
Or for that matter, poorly selling. There's nothing in the bill that
requires that
I just read _The Incredible Bread Machine_, by R. W. Grant. A Fox
Wilkes book, available from Laissez-Faire Books. I think a quote from
page 241, on The Limits of Political Action, is appropriate in re the
recent "I told you so" observation by Lucky Green:
Government is force, and
John Denker writes:
The bad part is that Whitney has already gobbled up quite a few
bits of entropy from /dev/random before the slightest bit of
authentication is attempted.
You're presuming that you're using the standard Linux version of
/dev/random. You could quite easily write a driver
There's an EETimes article on Eason/Kawaguchi stego in the 6/28 issue.
They hide their bits in the most complex parts of the image -- where
neighboring pixels are most different from one another. Also, only a
few parameters are needed to retrieve the information, so anybody with
the appropriate
Jay Holovacs writes:
--
From: Russell Nelson [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Eason/Kawaguchi stego
Date: Tuesday, June 29, 1999 9:27 AM
. Also, only a
few parameters are needed to retrieve the information, so anybody with
the appropriate
John Young writes:
What's intriguing is whether PECSENC, now headed by an ex-NSA
honcho, is going to bite NSA's sigint bullet, and recommend that
strong encryption is better for the public interest than natsec snooping,
what with the world now getting its hands on means of strong
[I suspect we're hitting the end of this thread... --Perry]
At 9:32 AM -0700 6/26/99, Carl Ellison wrote:
I've been guilty of sloppy use of English, occasionally, and one such
sloppiness that I run into occasionally is with the word "entropy"
for cryptographic purposes.
What we need
Lucky Green writes:
OpenSSL is a library. It should support whatever the standard supports and
whatever users and/or authors of the lib desire to be in the lib. That may
include broken or null-ciphers. But the user should have to take positive
action to get at the broken ciphers. I
http://loaf.ecks.org/
Linux On A Floppy. Get networking params (IP address, subnet mask,
default router), power-down, insert floppy, reboot. Comes with ssh.
--
-russ nelson [EMAIL PROTECTED] http://crynwr.com/~nelson
Crynwr supports Open Source(tm) Software| PGPok | There is good evidence
Jeff Simmons writes:
There's also a page at http://www.well.com/user/neal/cypherFAQ.html
that is aimed at the cypherpunk list. Most interesting part is that
evidently Bruce Schneier designed a special cypher for use in the novel,
based on a deck of playing cards. (?)
I'll ask the
Bluefish [@ home] writes:
I would propose "Biprime Cryptography" or "BPC" as the generic term for
RSA. Biprime is a natural and appropriate English name for the product of
two primes.
There are other "biprimes" too,
BiPrime Factoring. BPF (no, not Berkeley Packet Filter!)
--
Hmmm Anybody thought of combining mixmaster, an SMTP client, SMTP
server, and the DNS? Here's how it would work:
1) email would arrive at the SMTP client using ordinary means.
2) The SMTP client would ask the DNS for the MX records for the host.
3) If the DNS has two MX records which
Arnold G. Reinhold writes:
I do not agree, however, that 1 bit per second would be fast enough.
Why not? Randomness never goes stale. If it did, they wouldn't print
books full of random numbers. Store the 1bps in a FIFO. Save that
entropy! There's a limited amount of it in the universe,
Black Unicorn writes:
WOAH. Are you sure you know what you are doing? You're close to imposing a
duty to decrypt punishable by penal sanctions (read jailtime). This is
precisely the WRONG way to go.
Sure, because you can't tell the difference between someone who is
unable to decrypt
Bill Stewart writes:
At 09:42 PM 12/30/98 -, Russell Nelson wrote:
Now here's a silly question: cryptanalysis requires that one be able
to recognize the plaintext. Steganography requires that one NOT be
able to recognize the cryptography from random noise. So, if I use a
legal
Enzo Michelangeli writes:
JYA and others,
The first Hong Kong free crypto archive is up and running at:
ftp://ftp.futuredynamics.com/freecrypto/
At the moment I'm just mirroring ftp.pgpi.com (about 119 Mb). More
stuff will be hopefully added later. Also, I hope to announce
Arnold G. Reinhold writes:
I am uncomfortable with the tone of this thread. There is nowhere near
enough information provided in Mr. Georgoudis' posting to conclude that
hisbank's existing floppy disk transfer scheme is secure, much less render
an opinion on the impact of a serial
Brown, R Ken writes:
If I was a bank I would be very wary of proposals like "We would write our
own transmission protocol. " That seems to introduce yet more complexity,
not to mention maintenance effort and undiscovered bugs. It would seem safer
(more conservative a bank might say) to
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