Re: [EM] MMPO(IA>MPO) (was IA/MMPO)

l end up in situations where you have to answer e.g. "what is DMC and why is it good" while never using the D, the M, or the C in your answer because they're not really that relevant to the concept. Too bad, that appealing yet descriptive names are so hard to find. Kevin Venzke Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info

Re: [EM] MMPO(IA>MPO) (was IA/MMPO) correction

Mistake: - Mail original - > De : Kevin Venzke > À : Forest Simmons ; em > Cc : > Envoyé le : Dimanche 13 octobre 2013 12h02 > Objet : Re: [EM] MMPO(IA>MPO) (was IA/MMPO) > > Hi Forest, > > I read your first message: At first glance I think the new me

Re: [EM] MMPO(IA>MPO) (was IA/MMPO)

ke it is mainly an MMPO tweak (since the MMPO winner usually will not be disqualified) with corrections for Plurality and SDSC/MD. Off the top of my head I can't see that anything is happening that would break FBC. > De : Forest Simmons >À : Kevin Venzke >Cc : em >Envoyé le

Re: [EM] IA/MPO

Hi Forest, > De : Forest Simmons > >On Thu, Oct 10, 2013 at 9:23 AM, Kevin Venzke wrote: > >Hi Forest,  > >>Unfortunately, I realized that an SFC problem is possibly egregious: >> >>51 A>B >>49 C>B >> >>B would win easily, contrary t

Re: [EM] IA/MPO

Hi Forest, > De : Forest Simmons >À : Kevin Venzke >Cc : em >Envoyé le : Mercredi 9 octobre 2013 19h51 >Objet : Re: [EM] IA/MPO > >Kevin, > >thanks for working on the property compliances. > >I agree that this method does satisfy the FBC, is monotone, a

Re: [EM] IA/MPO

te Y and also Y's opposition to X Let c be the maximum opposition to Y Then IA/MPO violates SFC when a/b > b/c and a > b > 0.5 > c. Possible to do, but it would hardly ever happen, I think. Kevin Venzke Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info

Re: [EM] Try this method on your favorite election scenario

hough MAMPO satisfies those as well as SFC, it's probably less sensitive to the rankings. (MDDA has SFC but can fail Plurality.) I should get my simulations running again. I seem to recall being disappointed with the performance of MDDA and MAMPO. Kevin Venzke Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info

Re: [EM] How to find the voters' honest preferences

oters) for each candidate turns >out to be the same as the total rating would have been.] If I understand this correctly then this means that if you rate one candidate 100%, one candidate 99%, and then a dozen candidates at 0%, you will approve only the candidate at 100%. Can that be right? Kevin Venzke Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info

Re: [EM] Score Voting and Approval Voting not practically substantially different from Plurality?

Hi, > > De : Benjamin Grant >Cc : EM >Envoyé le : Lundi 24 juin 2013 17h53 >Objet : Re: [EM] Score Voting and Approval Voting not practically >substantially different from Plurality? >  > >The only way to avoid this, I *think*, is with a system in which expressin

Re: [EM] [CES #8922] Score Voting and Approval Voting not practically substantially different from Plurality?

Hi Benn, > > De : Benjamin Grant >À : Kevin Venzke >Cc : em >Envoyé le : Lundi 24 juin 2013 12h11 >Objet : Re: [EM] [CES #8922] Score Voting and Approval Voting not practically >substantially different from Plurality? > >On Mo

Re: [EM] [CES #8922] Score Voting and Approval Voting not practically substantially different from Plurality?

Hi Benn, > > De : Benjamin Grant >À : Kevin Venzke >Cc : em >Envoyé le : Lundi 24 juin 2013 11h45 >Objet : Re: [EM] [CES #8922] Score Voting and Approval Voting not practically >substantially different from Plurality? > > >On

Re: [EM] [CES #8922] Score Voting and Approval Voting not practically substantially different from Plurality?

Hi, (Benjamin wrote:) >On Mon, Jun 24, 2013 at 11:08 AM, Stephen Unger wrote: > >Regarding the plurality criterion: >> >> The Plurality Criterion is: "If there are two candidates X and Y so >> that X has more first place votes than Y has any place votes, then Y >> shouldn't win". >> >>It is NOT

Re: [EM] Associated Student Government at Northwestern University uses Schulze Method

Hi, It's true that *with the ballots as cast* any Condorcet-compliant method would have worked identically. What you don't know until you try it, is whether voters would actually cast those ballots, given the incentives created by the method. That said, I don't see an obvious reason why Tideman

Re: [EM] The successful repeal of Approval by the Dartmouth Board of Trustees

Hi, > > De : Gervase Lam >À : election-methods@lists.electorama.com >Envoyé le : Dimanche 27 janvier 2013 16h49 >Objet : [EM] The successful repeal of Approval by the Dartmouth Board of >Trustees > >I was looking through the Approval Voting article and notice

Re: [EM] Symmetrical-IC-Beatpath(lv)?

Hi Mike, It's been quite awhile, but when I was trying to devise new FBC methods, I got a strong sense that any kind of path tracing wasn't going to prove compatible with FBC. The consequences of tracing effects through multiple candidates seem too unpredictable to offer the guarantee, that you w

Re: [EM] 3 or more choices - Condorcet

Hi Juho, - Mail original - > De : Juho Laatu >> Plurality is just a description that is convenient for discussion on the >> EM list. "Ranking above last place" isn't a concept that > exists (until >> someone feels it would aid their position to bring it up). >> >> It just takes s

Re: [EM] 3 or more choices - Condorcet

Hi Juho, - Mail original - > De : Juho Laatu >> I don't believe the public needs to understand the terms > "plurality criterion" >> or "implicit approval" or even "strategy" to find the > scenario problematic. > > I guess people need to understand what ranking candidates in general

Re: [EM] 3 or more choices - Condorcet

Hi Juho, >Kevin Venzke wrote: >> >>"Margins, it seems to me, is DOA as a proposal due to the Plurality criterion. >>That 35 A>B, 25 B, 40 C would elect A is too counter-intuitive." >> >>I agree. For those who don't know, the Plurality criterio

Re: [EM] 3 or more choices - Condorcet

Hi Ted, >Hi Chris, > >You discuss Winning Votes vs. Margins below. > >What do you think about using the Cardinal-Weighted Pairwise array in >conjunction with the traditional Condorcet array? I'm not Chris of course, but in my own simulations I found CWP (namely the two-slot "AWP") to be one of t

Re: [EM] 3 or more choices - Condorcet

Hi Chris, > De : Chris Benham > >Say there are 3 candidates and the voters have the option to fully rank them, >but instead they all just choose to vote FPP-style thus: >  >49: A >48: B >03: C >  >Of course the only possible winner is A. Now say the election is held again >(with >the same voter

Re: [EM] MJ rules expressed in Bucklin terminology

Hi Jameson, >[1] In fact, there aren't too many well-defined methods among the median-based >ones. "Bucklin" >is really just an ill-defined soup.  Why do you say that "Bucklin" is an ill-defined soup? Because there are several ways to treat (or not accept) equal rankings? Kevin Election-M

Re: [EM] Nontechnical words for cardinal and ordinal categories?

Hi Jameson, >Why do I think new terms are worthwhile? I think that choosing the right term >is >an important part of activism. Neither pro-life nor pro-choice activists are >satisfied with the more-descriptive "anti-abortion" or "abortion rights". >Similarly, >Republicans made no headway

Re: [EM] Election-Methods Digest, Vol 96, Issue 22

Hi, - Mail original - > De : Nicholas Buckner > À : election-methods@lists.electorama.com > Cc : > Envoyé le : Mercredi 13 juin 2012 3h39 > Objet : Re: [EM] Election-Methods Digest, Vol 96, Issue 22 > > Actually, on a weird second thought, wouldn't a method that refused to > identify a

Re: [EM] Herve Moulin's proof - maybe I see the thought

Mail original - > De : Nicholas Buckner > À : Kevin Venzke > Cc : > Envoyé le : Lundi 11 juin 2012 16h47 > Objet : Re: [EM] Herve Moulin's proof not really a proof > > No, it is a logical fallacy, since the "original" scenario is > 3 voters vo

Re: [EM] Herve Moulin's proof not really a proof

Hi Nicholas, At no point is he adding simultaneously different groups of voters. He is reaching conclusions about one group and then modifying it to get the new group, but the modification is always relevant to Participation. Let me try to understand which stage exactly it is that you do not agre

Re: [EM] Herve Moulin's proof not really a proof

Hi Nicholas, You seem to agree in your paper that Moulin's proof shows that in the original scenario, the winner can only be A. If that is granted, then we can simplify the proof by removing what we don't need. Initial scenario (from case 4): 3 voters vote A > D > C > B. 3 voters vote A > D > B

Re: [EM] Throwing my hat into the ring, possibly to get trampled

Hi Nicholas, - Mail original - > De : Nicholas Buckner > À : Kevin Venzke > Cc : election-methods > Envoyé le : Samedi 9 juin 2012 20h23 > Objet : Re: [EM] Throwing my hat into the ring, possibly to get trampled > >T hank you for the article, as it was informa

Re: [EM] Throwing my hat into the ring, possibly to get trampled

Hi Nicholas, I think that your basic method (page 2 of html version) is the same as QLTD: http://www.mcdougall.org.uk/VM/ISSUE6/P4.HTM I say this because the multiplier is expressed in terms of ranking slots and a candidate is allowed to win with only part of a subsequent slot instead of only i

Re: [EM] "FBC vs Condorcet's Criterion"

Hi Kristofer, De : Kristofer Munsterhjelm >À : Michael Ossipoff >Cc : election-meth...@electorama.com >Envoyé le : Mercredi 9 mai 2012 9h54 >Objet : Re: [EM] "FBC vs Condorcet's Criterion" > > >On 05/08/2012 08:46 PM, Michael Ossipoff wrote: >> Since Richard wants to make a "which one wins" c

Re: [EM] ICT definition. Presumed Kemeny definition.

Hi Kristofer, De : Kristofer Munsterhjelm >À : Michael Ossipoff >Cc : election-meth...@electorama.com >Envoyé le : Lundi 23 avril 2012 16h00 >Objet : Re: [EM] ICT definition. Presumed Kemeny definition. > > >On 04/23/2012 10:32 PM, Michael Ossipoff wrote: >> ICT: &

Re: [EM] ICT definition. Presumed Kemeny definition.

Hi Mike, >ICT definition: > >(as described by Chris Benham, unless I've made an error) > >Iff the number of voters ranking X over Y, plus the number of voters >equal-top-rating X and Y, is greater than the >number of voters ranking Y over X, then X "beats" Y. > >Of course that's a very weak m

Re: [EM] Newbie to the list here

Hi Peter, >3. I think that plurality is the worst possible of the voting systems >that do not involve randomness, except for antiplurality voting.   Nice, I got as far as "I think that plurality is the worst possible..." before thinking to myself "I have antiplurality performing worse," and what

Re: [EM] Obvious Approval advantages. SODA. Approval-Runoff.

Hi, De : Abd ul-Rahman Lomax >À : Kevin Venzke ; election-methods > >Envoyé le : Samedi 10 mars 2012 8h30 >Objet : Re: [EM] Obvious Approval advantages. SODA. Approval-Runoff. > > >While discussion of strategies whereby a political party might attempt to >mani

Re: [EM] Obvious Approval advantages. SODA. Approval-Runoff.

Hi, De : Abd ul-Rahman Lomax >À : Kevin Venzke ; election-methods > >Envoyé le : Vendredi 9 mars 2012 17h04 >Objet : Re: [EM] Obvious Approval advantages. SODA. Approval-Runoff. > > >At 07:36 PM 3/8/2012, Kevin Venzke wrote: >> Hi Mike, >> >> I don&

[EM] correction

De : Kevin Venzke >À : election-methods >Envoyé le : Jeudi 8 mars 2012 18h36 >Objet : Re: [EM] Obvious Approval advantages. SODA. Approval-Runoff. > > > >Hi Mike, >  >I don't think Approval-Runoff can get off the ground since it's too >apparent th

Re: [EM] Obvious Approval advantages. SODA. Approval-Runoff.

Hi Mike,   I don't think Approval-Runoff can get off the ground since it's too apparent that a party could nominate two candidates (signaling that one is just a pawn to aid the other) and try to win by grabbing both of the finalist positions. If this happened regularly it would be just an expensiv

Re: [EM] Kevin: FBC deleted from electowiki?

Hi Mike, De : MIKE OSSIPOFF >À : election-meth...@electorama.com >Envoyé le : Lundi 5 mars 2012 15h19 >Objet : [EM] Kevin: FBC deleted from electowiki? > > >Kevin: > >You wrote: > >Did they use a special term for this property?We used to have an FBC page on >Wikipedia, based on content from Rus

Re: [EM] Kevin: My failure scenario was erroneous for ABucklin

Hi Jameson, De : Jameson Quinn >À : MIKE OSSIPOFF >Cc : election-meth...@electorama.com >Envoyé le : Vendredi 2 mars 2012 13h13 >Objet : Re: [EM] Kevin: My failure scenario was erroneous for ABucklin > > > >Also, since ABucklin is in all significant regards identical to MJ, Balinski >and Lar

Re: [EM] Better Approval-voting option? Could ABucklin fail FBC?

Hi Mike, De : MIKE OSSIPOFF >À : election-meth...@electorama.com >Envoyé le : Jeudi 1 mars 2012 15h55 >Objet : [EM] Better Approval-voting option? Could ABucklin fail FBC? > > >But could this happen?: > >If you rank your favorite, F,  in 1st place, s/he gets a majority, even though >s/he doesn

Re: [EM] The oldest bad-example trick in the book

Hi Mike, Personally I don't think anyone is "wronged" in the MMPO example. I just don't think voters would accept it, and it would be difficult to advocate. People will ask how the outcome can possibly make sense and I don't think you can reassure them by asking who's wronged. The issue isn't rea

Re: [EM] An interesting scenario (spoilers, utility)

Hi Jameson, De : Jameson Quinn >À : Kevin Venzke >Cc : election-methods >Envoyé le : Mercredi 29 février 2012 15h35 >Objet : Re: [EM] An interesting scenario (spoilers, utility) > > >This is indeed an interesting scenario. Something is particularly weak about >t

[EM] An interesting scenario (spoilers, utility)

be a viable trade-off, to elect the utility maximizer more often, in exchange for more complaints about spoiled elections?   Kevin Venzke Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info

Re: [EM] C/D is persistent. Another Approval C/D mitigation. IRV and sincerity.

Hi Mike, De : Jameson Quinn >À : MIKE OSSIPOFF >Cc : election-meth...@electorama.com >Envoyé le : Mardi 28 février 2012 15h29 >Objet : Re: [EM] C/D is persistent. Another Approval C/D mitigation. IRV and >sincerity. > > >(Though I'd still really appreciate it if you made quick electowiki pag

Re: [EM] élection de trois élection de trois

Hi Kristofer, De : Kristofer Munsterhjelm >À : Kevin Venzke >Cc : election-methods >Envoyé le : Vendredi 24 février 2012 15h44 >Objet : Re: [EM] élection de trois élection de trois > >On 02/24/2012 02:15 AM, Kevin Venzke wrote: >> Hi, >> >> De : Kristof

Re: [EM] élection de trois élection de trois

Hi, De : Kristofer Munsterhjelm >As a consequence, among ranked methods, some really bad methods (like >Plurality) >gets it wrong when there are two candidates plus no-hopes; some slightly >better >methods (like IRV, and perhaps I'd also put DAC/DSC here since it uses the >same >logic) can

Re: [EM] Kevin V, Richard F., Raph F

Hi David, > > De : David L Wetzell >À : election-methods@lists.electorama.com >Envoyé le : Lundi 20 février 2012 13h18 >Objet : Re: [EM] Kevin V, Richard F., Raph F > > > >>From: Kevin Venzke >>To: election-methods >

Re: [EM] (Kevin Venzke) and Richard Fobes.

(I've figured out how to quote since my last comment on that. I have no idea why quoting a message is merely an option...) - Mail original - (Richard wrote) > Unfortunately none of the third parties in the U.S. are understanding this > opportunity.  The "leaders" at the top of those third

Re: [EM] Kevin V.

Hi David, >>KV:The similarity is that with SODA, you (and like-minded candidates) get a >>benefit even if you don't >>win. Under normal methods you have the inherent pressure against running >>clones (that I think we both >>agree exists) with little possible benefit in nominating them. > >dlw:

Re: [EM] élection de trois élection de trois

They are quirky because of IIA. The papers on this are from the 1970's. Quote Wikipedia:   "The Gibbard–Satterthwaite theorem, named after Allan Gibbard and Mark Satterthwaite, is a result about the deterministic voting systems that choose a single winner using only the preferences of the vote

Re: [EM] Conditionality-by-top-count probably violates FBC

Hi, De : Kristofer Munsterhjelm À : Kevin Venzke Cc : election-methods Envoyé le : Dimanche 19 février 2012 15h28 Objet : Re: [EM] Conditionality-by-top-count probably violates FBC On 02/19/2012 09:37 PM, Kevin Venzke wrote: > Does anyone understand

Re: [EM] (Kevin Venzke) and Richard Fobes.

Hi David, De : David L Wetzell À : election-methods@lists.electorama.com Envoyé le : Samedi 18 février 2012 16h58 Objet : Re: [EM] (Kevin Venzke) and Richard Fobes.   That doesn't make much sense to me. The election method is a part of the system a

Re: [EM] Conditionality-by-top-count probably violates FBC

Does anyone understand why the DH3 concept exists? Why envision three major blocs, instead of two major blocs plus the small bloc belonging to the pawn candidate? That doesn't require four candidates and more closely resembles how burial problems are usually considered... Kevin _

Re: [EM] STV vs Party-list PR, could context matter?

Hi Richard, De : Richard Fobes À : election-meth...@electorama.com Envoyé le : Samedi 18 février 2012 14h47 Objet : Re: [EM] STV vs Party-list PR, could context matter? I do favor having more than two parties, but I don't see how three (or more) strong part

Re: [EM] (Kevin Venzke) and James Gilmour.

Hi David, De : David L Wetzell À : election-methods@lists.electorama.com Envoyé le : Samedi 18 février 2012 14h10 Objet : Re: [EM] (Kevin Venzke) and James Gilmour. You are supposed to get the EM list to agree first, before writing Soros directly. If

Re: [EM] SODA arguments

Hi Jameson,   >> >>De : Jameson Quinn >>À : Kevin Venzke >>Cc : election-methods >>Envoyé le : Vendredi 17 février 2012 19h53 >>Objet : Re: [EM] SODA arguments >> >> >> >> >>>>  >>>For those who feel that Bay

Re: [EM] SODA arguments

Hi Jameson,   Just a few thoughts. De : Jameson Quinn >À : EM ; electionsciencefoundation > >Envoyé le : Vendredi 17 février 2012 9h20 >Objet : [EM] SODA arguments > > For those who feel that Bayesian Regret is the be-all-and-end-all measure of voting system quality, that SODA's BR for 100% st

Re: [EM] JQ wrt SODA

Hi David, De : David L Wetzell >>À : election-methods@lists.electorama.com >>Envoyé le : Vendredi 17 février 2012 13h37 >>Objet : Re: [EM] JQ wrt SODA >> >> >IRV's got a first mover advantage over SODA and to catch up you need to >convince someone like Soros to help you market it.  It wouldn't

Re: [EM] Question about Schulze beatpath method

Hi Robert,   Suppose there are four candidates ABCD. B beats A with strength of 10. C beats D with strength of 20. With strength of 30, A beats C, B beats C, D beats A, and D beats B. Then every candidate has a path to every other candidate, and the best path from A to B or from B to A involves

Re: [EM] i don't get why mixed member rules use FPTP???

Hi David, De : David L Wetzell >>À : EM >>Envoyé le : Lundi 13 février 2012 20h41 >>Objet : [EM] i don't get why mixed member rules use FPTP??? >> >> >> >>It seems like the awesomeness of using PR for part of the seats somehow makes >>up for the lousiness of FPTP for the rest of the seats. >

Re: [EM] [CES #4445] Re: Looking at Condorcet

Hi Robert, De : robert bristow-johnson >>À : election-methods@lists.electorama.com >>Envoyé le : Jeudi 9 février 2012 10h07 >>Objet : Re: [EM] [CES #4445] Re: Looking at Condorcet >> >>On 2/8/12 1:25 PM, Juho Laatu wrote: >>> On 8.2.2012, at 7.33, robert bristow-johnson wrote: >>> >>> ...

Re: [EM] [CES #4445] Re: Looking at Condorcet

Hi Robert,   I would +1 to Bryan Mills' post.   >in the two-candidate case, you would have to assume unequal treatment for >voters   Yes, utility inherently does this. It's trying to maximize "happiness" which is a different ideal from giving everyone equal weight (e.g. even people who don't have

Re: [EM] Kevin V

Hi David,   De : David L Wetzell À : step...@yahoo.fr; EM Envoyé le : Mardi 7 février 2012 16h17 Objet : Re: Kevin V dlw: I argue that the strength of the US presidency and regular presidential elections has the effect of building up our two-party system.   >>> >>>This is why I take as a giv

Re: [EM] Re Raph Frank wrt 3-seat LR Hare and RV for US Senators by proxy.

Hi,     De : David L Wetzell >À : Raph Frank ; EM >Envoyé le : Mardi 7 février 2012 13h20 >Objet : Re: [EM] Re Raph Frank wrt 3-seat LR Hare and RV for US Senators by >proxy. > dlw: I argue that the strength of the US presidency and regular presidential elections has the effect of building up

Re: [EM] [CES #4445] Re: Looking at Condorcet

Hi Robert,   I think that the basic claim of "Condorcet doesn't necessarily pick the option whom the elecotorate prefers" (in terms of total utility) won't be too controversial. Any kind of model usually assumes internal utilities (such as based on distances in issue space) because we need these

Re: [EM] [CES #4445] Re: Looking at Condorcet

De : Jameson Quinn À : electionscie...@googlegroups.com Cc : EM Envoyé le : Vendredi 3 février 2012 22h06 Objet : Re: [EM] [CES #4445] Re: Looking at Condorcet > >Condorcet systems fundamentally try to maximize the wrong thing. They try to >maximize the

Re: [EM] Majority-Judgement. Condorcet.

Personally I don't understand why one would want to spend time on a method that you have to defend by saying "it might work anyway," even if as built the incentives are wrong.   I like the idea of being able to test things, so I may be biased here.   It's taking a shot in the dark. How fantastic m

Re: [EM] Sparring over AV vs IRV at Least of All Evils...

Hi David,   I'm trying to make sense of this as an anti-Approval argument, since you say we don't want people to pursue the center "too doggedly." Did you explain what bad consequence follows from pursuing the center doggedly, though? I thought I understood your post as an "IRV is not so bad" arg

Re: [EM] SODA criteria

Hi Jameson, De : Jameson Quinn >>À : Kevin Venzke >>Cc : em >>Envoyé le : Jeudi 2 février 2012 11h35 >>Objet : Re: [EM] SODA criteria >> >> > >> >> >>> >>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>In

Re: [EM] SODA criteria

Hi Jameson,   De : Jameson Quinn À : Kevin Venzke Cc : em Envoyé le : Mercredi 1 février 2012 18h35 Objet : Re: [EM] SODA criteria >> >> >>In >>>your criteria list you had "Majority" but for that you must actually be >>>assuming the opposite

Re: [EM] SODA criteria

Hi Jameson, De : Jameson Quinn À : Kevin Venzke Cc : em Envoyé le : Mercredi 1 février 2012 11h12 Objet : Re: [EM] SODA criteria 2012/2/1 Kevin Venzke >> >>Hi Jameson, >>>  >>>I expect that unpredictability (whatever there may be) of candidates'

Re: [EM] SODA criteria

Hi Jameson,   I expect that unpredictability (whatever there may be) of candidates' decisions can only hurt criteria compliance. At least with criteria that are generally defined on votes, because with such criteria you usually have to assume the worst about any other influences incorporated into

[EM] Re : Majority Judgement

Hi Mike,   In my simulations MJ and Bucklinesque methods usually show similar strategy patterns to Approval. (Though so does Range.)   If there are three candidates, you can rank them A>B>C and get protection for A from the B preference if you believe that A's viability depends on A having a top-

Re: [EM] Re : An ABE solution

Hi Jameson,     My perspective is the following: >>>1. Most real-world elections will have a sincere CW, although that might not >>>be visible from the ballots. >>>1a. Those elections without a sincere CW don't really have a "wrong answer", >>>so I don't worry as much about the pathologies in tha

Re: [EM] An ABE solution

Mike, De : MIKE OSSIPOFF >>À : election-meth...@electorama.com >>Envoyé le : Samedi 26 Novembre 2011 13h39 >>Objet : [EM] An ABE solution >> This was answered in the first part of the paragraph that you're quoting. What Woodall calls a preferential election rule is by definition a rank method

[EM] Re : An ABE solution

Hi Jameson,   De : Jameson Quinn >>À : Chris Benham >>Cc : MIKE OSSIPOFF ; "fsimm...@pcc.edu" >>; em >>Envoyé le : Mercredi 23 Novembre 2011 4h18 >>Objet : Re: [EM] An ABE solution >> >> >> >> >>>  >>My perspective is the following: >>1. Most real-world elections will have a sincere CW, altho

[EM] Re : An ABE solution

Hi Forest, De : "fsimm...@pcc.edu" >>À : Chris Benham >>Cc : EM >>Envoyé le : Mercredi 23 Novembre 2011 19h47 >>Objet : Re: [EM] An ABE solution >> The latter is correct, because I used Woodall's scheme. By definition an election method doesn't use approval ballots. You have to evaluate a

[EM] Re : An ABE solution

Hi, De : Jameson Quinn >>À : Chris Benham >>Cc : EM ; "fsimm...@pcc.edu" >> >>Envoyé le : Mercredi 23 Novembre 2011 7h43 >>Objet : Re: [EM] An ABE solution >> >I don't agree that "Sincere Favorite" is practically equivalent to the FBC. >The FBC is about not having to lower your one favorite

[EM] Re : An ABE solution

Hi Chris, De : Chris Benham >>À : "fsimm...@pcc.edu" >>Cc : EM >>Envoyé le : Mercredi 23 Novembre 2011 7h08 >>Objet : [EM] An ABE solution >> It is certainly a clear proof of the incompatibilty of  the Condorcet criterion and Kevin's later >>suggested "variation" of  the FBC, "Sincere Favor

Re: [EM] TTPD,TR (an FBC complying ABE solution?)

Hi Chris,   >>De : C.Benham >>À : em >>Cc : MIKE OSSIPOFF ; Kevin Venzke >>Envoyé le : Dimanche 20 Novembre 2011 23h43 >>Objet : [EM] TTPD,TR (an FBC complying ABE solution?) >> >> > >Mike Ossipoff has been understandably concerned about what

Re: [EM] Re : Votes-only criteria vs preference criteria. IRV squeeze-effect. Divulge IRV election specifics?

Jameson/Mike,   De : Jameson Quinn >>>À : Kevin Venzke >>>Cc : em >>>Envoyé le : Jeudi 17 Novembre 2011 12h48 >>>Objet : Re: [EM] Re : Votes-only criteria vs preference criteria. IRV >>>squeeze-effect. Divulge IRV election specifics? >>

[EM] Re : Votes-only criteria vs preference criteria. IRV squeeze-effect. Divulge IRV election specifics?

Hi Mike,   De : MIKE OSSIPOFF >>À : election-meth...@electorama.com >>Envoyé le : Mercredi 16 Novembre 2011 11h32 >>Objet : [EM] Votes-only criteria vs preference criteria. IRV squeeze-effect. >>Divulge IRV election specifics? >> I don't object to such criteria. I just prefer not to use them. I

[EM] Re : Re : Toy election model: 2D IQ (ideology/quality) model

Hi Jameson,     De : Jameson Quinn >>À : Kevin Venzke >>Cc : em >>Envoyé le : Mercredi 9 Novembre 2011 2h06 >>Objet : Re: [EM] Re : Toy election model: 2D IQ (ideology/quality) model >> >> >> >> >>2011/11/8 Kevin Venzke >> >>Sp

[EM] Re : [Off Topic] Banning those Me-Tooing like brain-dead AOLers [/Off Topic]

 De : ⸘Ŭalabio‽ >>À : EM >>Envoyé le : Mercredi 9 Novembre 2011 22h10 >>Objet : [EM] [Off Topic] Banning those Me-Tooing like brain-dead AOLers [/Off >>Topic] >> >    ¡Hello! > >    ¿How fare you? > >    Lately, some unnamed members have been metooing like brain-dead AOLers.  >Some others have

[EM] Re : Toy election model: 2D IQ (ideology/quality) model

Speaking of quoting messages, I have to admit I don't understand how it is even supposed to be done under Yahoo. I can indent the message, and I used to be able to correctly quote plain text messages. But usually when I try to quote an html message I just end up destroying the formatting somehow

[EM] Re : (no subject)

Hi Mike,   {quote} Kevin-- You wrote: ER-IRV(whole) doesn't satisfy FBC. You may need to demote your favorite in order to get a preferable elimination order.   [endquote] How? Say that there's a particular candidate whom you need to have win. You can give him a vote by downrating your favorite

Re: [EM] (no subject)

Hi Mike, --- En date de : Mar 1.11.11, MIKE OSSIPOFF a écrit : A criterion compliance chart: -FBC3P-3PDUPABE Bucklin-YesYes-YesYesNo MDDA--Yes-YesYes-NoNo DP--Yes-Yes--

Re: [EM] Strategy and Bayesian Regret

Hi Jameson, --- En date de : Ven 28.10.11, Jameson Quinn a écrit : De: Jameson Quinn Objet: Re: [EM] Strategy and Bayesian Regret À: "Kevin Venzke" Cc: election-meth...@electorama.com Date: Vendredi 28 octobre 2011, 11h44 2011/10/28 Kevin Venzke Hi Jameson,   I am a li

Re: [EM] Strategy and Bayesian Regret

relatively easy part; whether it's first-order rational strategies (as James Green-Armytage has worked out) or n-order strategies under uncertainty (as Kevin Venzke does)   3. Try to use some rational or cognitive model of voters to figure out how much strategy real people will use under

Re: [EM] New Criterion: The Co-operation/Defection Criterion

Hi Mike, --- En date de : Jeu 27.10.11, MIKE OSSIPOFF a écrit : > I'd said: > > > There is only one candidate B. It would be nice if > {A,B} > > could be replaced > > with a larger set of candidates, but the crierion > would > > then probably be > > unattainable. > > [unquote] > > You wrote:

Re: [EM] MMPO & FBC. MMPO, PC & SDSC.

Hi Mike, --- En date de : Jeu 27.10.11, MIKE OSSIPOFF a écrit : > Kevin-- > > You said that MMPO, as I define it (applied to its own > ties) fails FBC. > > Presumably you're referring to an allegedly possible > situation in which Favorite (F) can't win in a > tie, but Compromise (C) can. So y

Re: [EM] MMPO//MMPO fails FBC? (was "New Criterion: The Co-operation/Defection Criterion")

Hi Chris and Mike, --- En date de : Jeu 27.10.11, C.Benham a écrit : > Kevin, > Addressing Mike Ossipoff on EM, you recently (26 Oct 2011) > wrote: > > > None of them satisfy FBC, but neither does your > version of MMPO. > > Mike's suggested version of  MMPO is to resolve ties > by eliminating

Re: [EM] New Criterion: The Co-operation/Defection Criterion

Hi Mike, --- En date de : Mer 26.10.11, MIKE OSSIPOFF a écrit : > Kevin-- > > You wrote: > > > I see this criterion in effect: > > If some candidate A has simple pairwise wins over every > candidate in > a set of candidates "B"... > > [endquote] > > There is only one candidate B. It woul

Re: [EM] New Criterion: The Co-operation/Defection Criterion

Hi Mike, --- En date de : Lun 24.10.11, MIKE OSSIPOFF a écrit : > You wrote: > > Basically A will have a majority over B > > endquote > > Not necessarily. A will certainly have a pairwise win over > B. When the non {A,B} > candidates lose, and MMPO is applied to its A,B tie, that > pairwi

Re: [EM] Let MMPO solve its ties. It elects A in the example. The simplest is the best

Hi Mike, --- En date de : Sam 22.10.11, MIKE OSSIPOFF a écrit : De: MIKE OSSIPOFF Objet: [EM] Let MMPO solve its ties. It elects A in the example. The simplest is the best À: election-meth...@electorama.com Date: Samedi 22 octobre 2011, 15h42 Kevin--   You wrote:   What do you make of th

Re: [EM] New criterion: The Co-operation/Defection Criterion

Hi Mike, --- En date de : Lun 24.10.11, MIKE OSSIPOFF a écrit : > Co-operation/Defection Criterion (CD): > > Premise: > > A majority prefer A and B to everyone else, and the rest of > the voters all prefer everyone else to A and B. > > Candidate A is the Condorcet candidate > > Voting is

Re: [EM] Let MMPO solve its ties. It elects A in the example. The simplest is the best.

Hi Mike,   What do you make of this example under MMPO:   49 A 24 B 27 C>B   There is no CW. Standard MMPO returns a tie between B and C. If you remove A, C is both the CW and MMPO winner. Do you think this can be accepted?   Thanks.   Kevin Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama

Re: [EM] Methods

t; 75% approval > then really, do you (pragmatically speaking) care which one > gets chosen? Well, I'm not envisioning the scenario where everybody gets 75% approval. It's the scenario where several candidates could be the sincere CW on election day. That's more like having two candidates with majority+ approval. > I think we'd all be thrilled to have that problem. This might still be true though. It would be a nice surprise if it happened that this many candidates were viable (at least on sincere preferences). Kevin Venzke Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info

Re: [EM] Single-winner method with strong winners (was: Poll for favorite single winner voting system with OpaVote)

Hi Juho,   Firing off quick responses, sorry: --- En date de : Lun 17.10.11, Juho Laatu a écrit :     I think that your method is similar to my single contest method. I believe you determine the critical pair of candidates in exactly the same way. However, while my method just has an i

Re: [EM] Methods

there are few good options (i.e. any pair of frontrunners leaves a large percentage of voters approving neither) or too many good options (i.e. several likely candidates for sincere CW) a rank method, with its "higher resolution," may be able to fish out a better result. Kevin Venzke Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info

Re: [EM] Single-winner method with strong winners (was: Poll for favorite single winner voting system with OpaVote)

Hi Juho,   Sorry in advance if I didn't read your message carefully enough, but I think I probably did: --- En date de : Dim 16.10.11, Juho Laatu a écrit : Use a Condorcet method to elect the winner among the most approved candidate pair and those who are at least as approved as the less

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