On 11.7.2011, at 2.05, fsimm...@pcc.edu wrote:
Date: Sat, 9 Jul 2011 23:30:21 +0300
From: Juho Laatu
On 9.7.2011, at 22.23, fsimm...@pcc.edu wrote:
Here's an idea.
First pick a party (with full knowledge who the candidates are
in each party).
Then hold an open primary to pick
On 11.7.2011, at 2.34, fsimm...@pcc.edu wrote:
First find a clone consistent way of defining distance between candidates.
Then while two or more candidates remain
of the two with the greatest distance from each other
eliminate the one with the greatest pairwise defeat
EndWhile.
Do you know remember their arguments, or your own, on why centrists are not
good? I think methods that elect centrists (like CW) are quite good general
purpose single-winner methods. But on the other hand there are many kind of
single-winner elections, and in many cases the targets may well be
conditions.
2011/7/11 Juho Laatu juho4...@yahoo.co.uk
Do you know remember their arguments, or your own, on why centrists are not
good? I think methods that elect centrists (like CW) are quite good general
purpose single-winner methods. But on the other hand there are many kind of
single-winner
There sure are many programmers on this list as you can guess also from the
latest mails. Many of them have lots of voting related software. I don't know
what languages people use, but Python certainly is a good general purpose tool.
So maybe there is some interest in open libraries in this
This HBH method seemed interesting, so I coded it and reactivated some old code
that can produce Yee figures and do some further analysis on the election
methods. I rewrote some parts of the old software and I'm not quite sure that
the old code, the new code and the new implementation of HBH
One approach to summability and auditing is to say that the target is to allow
the district to count the votes and later check that at the top level their
votes (or the votes of all districts) were counted correctly, AND to allow the
top level to check that the districts will report their
On 23.7.2011, at 17.45, Jameson Quinn wrote:
We had a discussion about the best practical single-winner proposal, which,
while it certainly wasn't as conclusive as I'd hoped, seemed productive to
me. I think we should have a similar discussion about PR.
Obviously, the situations in the UK
One feature of single-winner district based political systems is that voters
will have a clearly named own representative that is as local as possible. In
a PR context with multiple parties one could redefine this idea so that people
should have a known representative that represents them in
On 27.7.2011, at 22.50, Toby Pereira wrote:
Very simple case - two voters and two candidates. Candidate A get scores of
0/10 and 10/10. Candidate B gets 5/10 and 5/10. Under normal range voting, it
would be a draw. But to me, candidate B seems the much fairer choice.
Different choices and
in larger and more real life like simulations (that
would be also optimization based, not exhaustive brute force based simulations
like these).
Juho
On 25.7.2011, at 1.16, Juho Laatu wrote:
One feature of single-winner district based political systems is that voters
will have a clearly named
On 28.7.2011, at 16.50, Warren Smith wrote:
I daresay this has been pointed out before, but I do not think much analysis
has
been done before, of this idea:
If you want to have V voters elect W winners, that can be considered as the
same, or anyhow a highly related, problem as the problem
Andy Jennings' question is a good question.
The original votes were
20 AC
20 AD
20 AE
20 BC
20 BD
20 BE
Let's decrease the support of A and B a bit (20 approvals reduced from both of
them).
20 C
20 AD
20 AE
20 C
20 BD
20 BE
Would {A,B,C} be a good choice now? It is not good if reduction of
?
Juho
On 31.7.2011, at 13.59, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
Juho Laatu wrote:
Andy Jennings' question is a good question.
The original votes were
20 AC
20 AD
20 AE
20 BC
20 BD
20 BE
Let's decrease the support of A and B a bit (20 approvals reduced
from both of them).
20 C
20 AD
20
I noticed that there was a lot of activity on the multi-winner side. Earlier I
have even complained about the lack of interest in multi-winner methods. Now
there are still some interesting but unread mails in my inbox.
Multi-winner methods are, if possible, even more complicated than
This method looks like one pretty natural way of measuring who should be
elected.
The privacy concerns are a problem in some environments but not all. This
method could thus well suit for some real-world use (if privacy in not a
problem or if voting machines or vote counters can be trusted).
be more numerous in
multi-winner methods although some individual problems may be more challenging
in single-winner methods.
Juho
On 3.8.2011, at 19.35, James Gilmour wrote:
Juho Laatu Sent: Wednesday, August 03, 2011 6:04 AM
Multi-winner methods are, if possible, even more complicated
than
strategy free, and even
close to but better than plurality.
On 6.8.2011, at 10.46, Jameson Quinn wrote:
Well, kinda; but in a sense, that pushes the strategy into the tree-building.
2011/8/6 Juho Laatu juho4...@yahoo.co.uk
On 4.8.2011, at 2.09, Jameson Quinn wrote:
Free riding in some
wrote:
Juho Laatu Sent: Thursday, August 04, 2011 5:12 PM
On 4.8.2011, at 14.21, James Gilmour wrote:
There is only one real issue in elections: representation of the
voters.
If in a single winner partisan election the voters vote 51% for A and
49% for B, we have a major problem
...@lists.electorama.com
[mailto:election-methods-boun...@lists.electorama.com] On
Behalf Of Juho Laatu
Sent: Saturday, August 06, 2011 5:38 PM
To: EM list
Subject: Re: [EM] Record activity on the EM list?
I was also looking for pure proportional representation. The
compromise decisions would
On 6.8.2011, at 19.40, Jameson Quinn wrote:
More thoughts on the chicken problem.
Again, in Forest's version, that's a scenario like:
48 A
27 CB
25 BC
C is the pairwise champion, but B is motivated to truncate, and C to
retaliate defensively, until A ends up winning.
In my
On 7.8.2011, at 2.04, Jameson Quinn wrote:
2011/8/6 fsimm...@pcc.edu
Jan,
IRV elects C like all of the other methods if the B faction doesn't truncate.
But IRV elects A when the B
faction truncates. Of course, with this knowledge, the B faction isn't
likely to truncate, and as you
rejected).
The intention of this mail is just to point out that although the most straight
forward approach with trees is to use bullet votes only, one can use the tree
structure (and the explicit clone approach) also with more complex votes like
ranked votes.
Juho
On 7.8.2011, at 10.37, Juho
section.
Oh well.
Jameson Quinn
2011/8/7 Juho Laatu juho4...@yahoo.co.uk
On 7.8.2011, at 2.04, Jameson Quinn wrote:
2011/8/6 fsimm...@pcc.edu
Jan,
IRV elects C like all of the other methods if the B faction doesn't
truncate. But IRV elects A when the B
faction truncates
guilty at times of claiming benefits for
something before I'd sat down and really worked it out on paper, and I'm
sorry for it; that's exactly why I know how much of a waste of everyone
else's time it can be.
JQ
2011/8/7 Juho Laatu juho4...@yahoo.co.uk
I sent also another mail that explained
Ok, I agree that you need a concrete enough description to check the properties
of the method.
If the tree is (((A,B),C),D), then all of them are explicit clones at top level
(trivial), A, B and C are explicit clones, and also A and B are explicit clones
within those larger clone groups.
If
candidates)
Maybe this second option should be kept as the default option since it is
safer. It limits the set of allowed votes a bit but it meets better the needs
of all methods.
Juho
On 8.8.2011, at 0.18, Juho Laatu wrote:
Ok, I agree that you need a concrete enough description to check
Just another example vote set FYI.
2 AB
2 AC
1 B
1 C
4 D
Natural winners are maybe A and D.
100 AB
100 AC
1 B
1 C
4 D
Natural winners are maybe B and C. Is it a problem that additional support to A
(and B and C) meant that A was not elected?
(A was top ranked by all the new voters. B and C
I checked the definition of SODA at the wiki page. Since the method consists of
multiple phases and has many rules, it was difficult to find a simple mapping
from that to one simple claim that could be proved or falsified. I also had
some problems with terms semi-honest, non-semi-honest,
On 24.8.2011, at 2.07, fsimm...@pcc.edu wrote:
But back to a possible generic meaning of a score or cardinal rating: if you
think that candidate X would
vote like you on a random issue with probability p percent, then you could
give candidate X a score that
is p percent of the way
On 27.8.2011, at 2.13, Jonathan Lundell wrote:
On Aug 26, 2011, at 1:17 PM, Juho Laatu wrote:
On 24.8.2011, at 2.07, fsimm...@pcc.edu wrote:
But back to a possible generic meaning of a score or cardinal rating: if
you think that candidate X would
vote like you on a random issue
On 27.8.2011, at 17.38, Jonathan Lundell wrote:
On Aug 27, 2011, at 12:25 AM, Juho Laatu wrote:
On 27.8.2011, at 2.13, Jonathan Lundell wrote:
On Aug 26, 2011, at 1:17 PM, Juho Laatu wrote:
On 24.8.2011, at 2.07, fsimm...@pcc.edu wrote:
But back to a possible generic meaning
Many people on this list agree that Condorcet methods are good methods. But
they are not necessarily good for whatever needs. Using them in single-seat
districts of a two-party system might not be a good idea. We might end up
having majority of the representatives from a small centrist party.
On 23.9.2011, at 16.31, James Gilmour wrote:
Juho Sent: Friday, September 23, 2011 12:29 PM
I think term weak CW should not be used as a general term
without referring to in what sense that winner is weak. There
are different elections and different needs. In some of them
weak CW is a
On 25.9.2011, at 20.13, Toby Pereira wrote:
This may well have been discussed before, and it wouldn't really be practical
for parliamentary elections, but could be used in other situations. You allow
a certain period for voting to take place (say a week), and when you cast
your vote
On 3.10.2011, at 11.56, James Gilmour wrote:
Michael Allan Sent: Monday, October 03, 2011 9:31 AM
ABSTRACT
An individual vote has no effect on the formal outcome of the
election; whether the vote is cast or not, the outcome is the
same regardless.
These statements worry me
On 7.10.2011, at 12.19, Michael Allan wrote:
Imagine one person is nodding
in agreement to a proposal, while another is shaking her head.
We could ask, What effect did this voter *as such*
have on the decision that was reached, or anything that followed from
it? In most cases, the answer
any political freedom in the face of state power
and laws, then it cannot possibly come from voting in elections.
--
Michael Allan
Toronto, +1 416-699-9528
http://zelea.com/
Juho Laatu wrote:
On 7.10.2011, at 12.19, Michael Allan wrote:
Imagine one person is nodding
in agreement
If that one example set of votes is bad enough for MMPO, then how about this
example for PC(wv)?
49 A
48 B C
03 C
Juho
P.S. Welcome back
On 14.10.2011, at 22.40, MIKE OSSIPOFF wrote:
Venzke's MMPO example
A B = C
1 A = C B
1 B = C A
B A = C
.
and C wins.
On 15.10.2011, at 23.24, MIKE OSSIPOFF wrote:
Another Oops!. I've just realized that I posted my most recent message to
the wrong
thread. So now I'm posting it to the right thread:
.
Oops! I forgot that B voters ranked C.
.
Yes, C wins, even though C has a very low Plurality score.
.
as strong (measured as approvals, which is related to but not
the same as first preference support) as the previous leading two parties.
Juho
On 16.10.2011, at 1.08, Juho Laatu wrote:
On 15.10.2011, at 23.24, MIKE OSSIPOFF wrote:
Another Oops!. I've just realized that I posted my most recent
.
--- En date de : Dim 16.10.11, Juho Laatu juho4...@yahoo.co.uk a écrit :
Use a Condorcet method to elect the winner among the most approved candidate
pair and those who are at least as approved as the less approved of those two.
- a pair of candidates is approved by a voter if she approves
On 17.10.2011, at 23.33, Michael Allan wrote:
Juho Laatu wrote:
True. My vote has probably not made any difference in any of the
(large) elections that I have ever participated. ...
You are not really in doubt, are you? You would remember if your vote
made a difference.
Most elections
-699-9528
http://zelea.com/
Juho Laatu wrote:
On 17.10.2011, at 23.33, Michael Allan wrote:
Juho Laatu wrote:
True. My vote has probably not made any difference in any of the
(large) elections that I have ever participated. ...
You are not really in doubt, are you? You would remember
On 19.10.2011, at 5.37, Kevin Venzke wrote:
Hi Juho,
Firing off quick responses, sorry:
--- En date de : Lun 17.10.11, Juho Laatu juho4...@yahoo.co.uk a écrit :
I think that your method is similar to my single contest method. I believe
you determine
the critical pair
On 19.10.2011, at 1.14, Michael Allan wrote:
But maybe if you form a small club (or a large club (=party)) that
discusses and finds an agreement on how to vote. Then maybe you get
the power that you want.
Only at the cost of political liberty. To allow a flaw in the
electoral system to
with the conclusions of the thesis because I don't
know what they are
- 1/N is maybe a better (although not perfect) estimate of the power that one
voter holds than 0
Juho
On 21.10.2011, at 0.48, Michael Allan wrote:
Juho Laatu wrote:
But maybe if you form a small club (or a large club
On 23.10.2011, at 23.18, MIKE OSSIPOFF wrote:
Juho--
Of course there won't be many polling locations Right now, I know of only
one--my own local poll, which
might turn out to be the only one. In that case, I'll have no choice but to
infer about the entire country
from a poll in my own
] On Behalf Of Juho Laatu
Sent: Saturday, October 29, 2011 5:11 PM
To: EM
Subject: Re: [EM] Proportional, Accountable,Local (PAL) representation: isn't
this a big deal?
On 29.10.2011, at 16.58, James Gilmour wrote:
Kristofer Munsterhjelm Sent: Saturday, October 29, 2011 9:14 AM
STV is not mixed
With two representatives per district this is a pretty good method, if we want
a two-party system and if we accept the idea of having representatives with
different weights. Spoiler and gerrymandering related problems are greatly
reduced, and the method allows also third parties to grow.
With
candidates).
Juho
On 6.11.2011, at 11.30, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
Juho Laatu wrote:
Since you are building this on the single-seat district tradition,
three or four seats and 10 candidates is plenty. I'm used to numbers
like 6 seats with 108 candidates, and 35 seats with 405
On 9.11.2011, at 10.06, Jameson Quinn wrote:
2011/11/8 Kevin Venzke step...@yahoo.fr
All that said, I would be interested to hear if someone has made an argument
that majority rule, as a sensible principle, depends on some other more
fundamental principle.
OK, here goes: utility is
On 9.11.2011, at 11.45, Jameson Quinn wrote:
2011/11/9 Juho Laatu juho4...@yahoo.co.uk
Utility example:
- There are two alternatives. A) One person will lose $1, others will not
lose anything. B) All will lose some equal small amount, so that the sum of
losses will be $10001
I have some problems in putting these methods in the order of preference. In
both single-winner and multi-winner methods I tend to think that the answer is
often different for different needs and different societies.
I'm used to open lists. I wouldn't recommend changing them to STV because that
On 27.11.2011, at 8.05, matt welland wrote:
On Sat, 2011-11-26 at 22:31 -0500, robert bristow-johnson wrote:
On 11/26/11 6:58 PM, matt welland wrote:
Also, do folks generally see approval as better than or worse than IRV?
they don't know anything about Approval (or Score or Borda or Bucklin
On 27.11.2011, at 12.55, Peter Zbornik wrote:
Dear all,
do anyone of you know the best way to incorporate single constraints
into STV and proportional rankings from STV (see for instance:
http://www.votingmatters.org.uk/issue9/p5.htm)?
For instance, the constraint can be that at least 1/3
On 27.11.2011, at 18.35, Kathy Dopp wrote:
Nov 2011 23:05:49 -0700
From: matt welland m...@kiatoa.com
I wasn't clear. I want to hear opinions from the list: Is approval
better or worse than IRV and why?
Approval is a far superior system to FPTP and IRV because approval:
1. unlike FPTP
If we are talking about natural measures of defeat strength, then I must say
that margins and ratio seem reasonably sensible to me, and winning votes does
not. It is hard to justify the idea that defeat 49-48 is as strong as 49-0, and
defeat 49-48 is stronger than 48-0. It is also weird that if
On 29.11.2011, at 6.07, C.Benham wrote:
In IRV if you are convinced of that you have no compelling reason to
compromise because you
can expect F to be eliminated and your vote transferred to C. No, to have a
good reason to compromise
you must be convinced that F *will* be one of the top 2
On 30.11.2011, at 7.23, C.Benham wrote:
Juho Laatu wrote (29 Nov 2011):
I'd like to add that IRV is an algorithm for those that want to favour the
large parties.
The main thing that favours large parties is legislators elected in
single-member districts versus some form of PR
IRV has some strong links to the two-party system. That is also one key reason
why it is seems to be the most popular approach to reform in the USA.
Jameson Quinn talked about two-party dominance and two-party duopoly, and here
we have terms two-party and centre-squeeze. We have also seen terms
On 30.1.2012, at 8.46, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
We know that if some method X passes all criteria Y does and then some, we
can suppose that X is better than Y.
I don't think criteria are black and white in that sense. It is quite possible
that a method that meets all but one of the
On 2.2.2012, at 6.28, Jameson Quinn wrote:
Dave gives good reasons for Condorcet. I'd like to present the other side.
Condorcet systems have many advantages. So what's wrong with Condorcet?
It comes in a bewildering array of forms, thus reducing the unity of its
supporters. But that's
On 3.2.2012, at 21.45, Andy Jennings wrote:
- If someone built a computer program that presented me pairs of candidates
at a time as Kristofer suggested, that would make it somewhat easier. I
think I would still prefer to divide them into tiers first, but if I divided
them into tiers
On 4.2.2012, at 11.12, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
On 02/04/2012 06:47 AM, robert bristow-johnson wrote:
On 2/3/12 11:06 PM, Jameson Quinn wrote:
No, he's saying that when the CW and the true, honest utility winner
differ, the latter is better. I agree, but it's not an argument worth
On 4.2.2012, at 19.14, robert bristow-johnson wrote:
so, i have a few questions for everyone here:
1. do we all agree that every voter's franchise is precisely equal?
2. if each voter's franchise is equal, should we expect any voter
that has an opinion regarding the
On 5.2.2012, at 5.34, robert bristow-johnson wrote:
On 2/4/12 4:01 PM, Juho Laatu wrote:
On 4.2.2012, at 19.14, robert bristow-johnson wrote:
so, i have a few questions for everyone here:
1. do we all agree that every voter's franchise is precisely equal?
2. if each voter's
On 5.2.2012, at 5.39, Jameson Quinn wrote:
With information like this it should be (in principle) a quite mechanical
process to check all relevant available methods against the targets and
environment description, and then pick the best method (and ballot format)
(and guidance to the
On 7.2.2012, at 5.31, robert bristow-johnson wrote:
how can Clay build a proof where he claims that it's a proven mathematical
fact that the Condorcet winner is not necessarily the option whom the
electorate prefers? if he is making a utilitarian argument, he needs to
define how the
On 8.2.2012, at 7.33, robert bristow-johnson wrote:
On 2/7/12 6:30 PM, Juho Laatu wrote:
On 7.2.2012, at 5.31, robert bristow-johnson wrote:
how can Clay build a proof where he claims that it's a proven mathematical
fact that the Condorcet winner is not necessarily the option whom
On 8.2.2012, at 16.18, David L Wetzell wrote:
...
At any rate, this is why I've argued that ascertaining the best single-winner
election rule is nowhere near as important as pitching the importance of
mixing the use of single-winner and multi-winner election rules, with the
latter
On 9.2.2012, at 17.21, David L Wetzell wrote:
-- Forwarded message --
From: Juho Laatu juho4...@yahoo.co.uk
To: EM list election-methods@lists.electorama.com
Cc:
Date: Wed, 8 Feb 2012 22:29:02 +0200
Subject: Re: [EM] Utilitarianism and Perfectionism.
On 8.2.2012, at 16.18
be kept also in
the 2+ approach. (Same considerations with respect to proportional
representation in the representative bodies.)
Juho
On 9.2.2012, at 18.49, Dave Ketchum wrote:
On Feb 8, 2012, at 3:29 PM, Juho Laatu wrote:
On 8.2.2012, at 16.18, David L Wetzell wrote:
...
At any rate
On 9.2.2012, at 18.07, robert bristow-johnson wrote:
On 2/8/12 1:25 PM, Juho Laatu wrote:
On 8.2.2012, at 7.33, robert bristow-johnson wrote:
...
if it's not the majority that rule, what's the alternative?
I'm not aware of any good alternatives to majority rule in competitive
two
On 10.2.2012, at 0.59, robert bristow-johnson wrote:
On 2/9/12 5:19 PM, Juho Laatu wrote:
Condorcet is a natural extension to the multi-candidate case (still assuming
competitive elections). Maybe not the only one though. In another mail I
just addressed the possbility of having single
On 10.2.2012, at 2.02, James Gilmour wrote:
Juho LaatuSent: Wednesday, February 08, 2012 8:29 PM
I think I agree when I say that the first decision (in the
USA) is whether to make the current two-party system work
better or whether to aim at a multi-party system.
Juho
Don't you
On 10.2.2012, at 2.17, James Gilmour wrote:
Juho LaatuSent: Thursday, February 09, 2012 8:07 PM
As I earlier wrote, I think the US has many options on how to
go forward with the reform. The presidential election is
maybe the most interesting one.
Juho
This may be the most
On 13.2.2012, at 16.28, David L Wetzell wrote:
-- Forwarded message --
From: Juho Laatu juho4...@yahoo.co.uk
dlw: But I'd argue that to make our two-party system work better, we need
to provide a constructive role for 3rd parties in it. This wd be
accomplished by the use
Let us suppose that so much bad blood exists between Washington and
Lincoln that their supporters refuse to rank the other candidate and that
Hitler and Stalin have supporters. Unless one ranks the hundreds of
also-rans so that one can make certain that Hitler and Stalin are ranked
Here's my one cent on how votes should be recorded and counted. Two simple
procedures that try to outline the basic needs.
Manual approach:
- representatives of multiple interest groups monitor the voting process
- they check that the ballot box is empty and then seal it
- voter fills the paper
On 8.5.2012, at 8.33, Richard Fobes wrote:
As I've said on this forum before, some studies should be done to compare
_how_ _often_ each method fails each criterion. Those numbers would be quite
useful for comparing criteria in terms of importance. In the meantime, just
a checkbox with a
On 13.5.2012, at 4.04, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
Condorcetists:
I'm a condorcetist in the sense that I think that Condorcet methods are a
pretty good local optimum for some election types.
You want to quibble forever about which rank-count is the best.
No interest to quibble. Unfortunately
On 14.5.2012, at 22.03, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
You said:
I note that that would lead to an interesting political system that has
probably not been tested anywhere in the world yet.
[endquote]
Single winner elections have actually been tested! And widely used, Juho! I
kid you not!
On 14.5.2012, at 22.03, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
I wrote and you repled:
I don't see any denial of Gibbard-Satterthwaite or other problems. My
understanding is that many people like Condorcet methods because they think
that their co-operation/defection problems are relatively small (although
On 17.5.2012, at 0.41, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
I liked Finland's elegant open list system when I read about it.
But didn't I read that you use d'Hondt? That under-represents small parties.
Sainte-Lague is more perfectly proportional and more fair.
Yes, Finland uses D'Hondt (and D'Hondt
On 17.5.2012, at 4.39, Dave Ketchum wrote:
Oops - took so long stripping Mike O's zillion words that I forgot to respond.
On May 16, 2012, at 10:05 AM, Dave Ketchum wrote:
On May 15, 2012, at 2:55 PM, Juho Laatu wrote:
On 15.5.2012, at 11.11, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
Juho and Kristofer
On 19.5.2012, at 4.56, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
Will it be different with Approval? You be it will.
Agreed. Change of Plurality to Approval in a two-party system will cause
changes in many areas.
I'm going to repeat this: It will be different in regards to the fact that
people who think
On 19.5.2012, at 7.25, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
You continue:
I mean that there could be need for further reforms.
[endquote]
You like to speculate. Speculations aren't really answerable. To what needs
are you referring, in particular?
One key topic was the already discussed possible
On 20.5.2012, at 1.00, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
One: No one knows for sure exactly what way of voting (by hir and some
hypothetical same-preferring and same-voting faction) will give the best
outcome.
……….That’s true in Condorcet as well as in Approval.
In Condorcet one can sincerely
On 20.5.2012, at 1.00, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
You asked if I’d answer questions that you say remain unanswered. Of course.
I answer all questions. If there’s a question that I haven’t answered, then
let me know.
But please be specific.
Maybe the number one on the list of the still
On 21.5.2012, at 18.03, Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:
Drive-by comment.
At 04:05 AM 5/21/2012, Juho Laatu wrote:
On 20.5.2012, at 1.00, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
You asked if I'd answer questions that you say remain unanswered. Of
course. I answer all questions. If there's a question that I
On 23.5.2012, at 0.18, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
First, in my Approval voting recommendations and descriptions of Approval
strategy, I meant what I said. I don’t accept or endorse Juho’s strange
interpretations. Those are not what I meant.
You identified two of your examples by giving their
On 23.5.2012, at 0.38, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
Juho says:
Maybe the number one on the list of the still unanswered questions is the
following one.
[example+question starts here]
26: A B C
26: B A C
24: C A B
24: C B A
- A and B are Democrats and C is a Republican
On 24.5.2012, at 5.40, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
If it’s a u/a election, and if Compromise is the only acceptable who can
beat the unacceptables, then rank Compromise alone in 1st place.
Maybe one can build an implementable strategy from this one. Some further
definitions are however
I'll add one additional question right away in order not to delay the
discussion by one more round.
On 25.5.2012, at 0.17, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
Juho says:
I assume that the strategy applies at least to all typical winning votes
based Condorcet methods.
Am I on the correct track so
On 26.5.2012, at 10.25, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
You said:
I assume that the definition covers at least the case where we have a top
loop of three candidates, and one of those looped candidates has
the smallest worst loss of all candidates when measured as winning votes,
and that candidate
On 27.5.2012, at 2.23, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
:-) What did I just say, Juho? I said that what I said is true of all
Condorcet versions.
Ok. The strategy (of ranking the most winnable acceptable candidate alone at
top if there are winnable unacceptable candidates) is suposed to be valid for
On 27.5.2012, at 22.37, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
You know, that's the Condorcetists' and IRVists' objection to Approval.
The question is what happens when Approval doesn't let you vote ABC. The
difference is that there is no division to minor and major candidates. The
worst Approval problems
On 28.5.2012, at 1.47, Dave Ketchum wrote:
As soon as ability to vote for A=B is in your future you think of wanting
ability to vote for FavoriteComprmise, as is doable in IRV - matters only
that Favorite is your favorite, not the possibility of Favorite actually
winning.
Yes, people want
On 29.5.2012, at 3.05, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
And Approval doesn't share Condorcet's favorite-burial incentive problem.
All Condorcet methods fail the FBC criterion. But in practice situations where
the related burial strategy would be easy to use successfully or defensive
burial would be
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