On 16 Oct 2013, at 17:41, Richard Ruquist wrote:
Bruno Marchal via googlegroups.com
2:47 AM (8 hours ago)
to everything-list
On 15 Oct 2013, at 19:02, Richard Ruquist wrote:
Bruno: Arithmetical truth escapes largely the computable
arithmetical truth (by Gödel).
Richard: I guess I am
On 16 October 2013 06:02, Richard Ruquist yann...@gmail.com wrote:
Richard: I guess I am too much a physicist to believe that uncomputible
arithmetical truth can produce the physical.
Since you read my paper you know that I think computations in this
universe if holographic are limited to
By the way, my son (14) asked me the other day what's the oddest prime
number?
Fortunately, I got the right answer!
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On 10/16/2013 3:49 PM, LizR wrote:
By the way, my son (14) asked me the other day what's the oddest prime number?
Fortunately, I got the right answer!
2, because it's the only one that's even.
Brent
There are 10 kinds of people. Those who think in binary and those who don't.
--
You
Or the largest prime number less than 10^120, because it's the biggest
prime number...?!?!? :)
There are two secrets to success.
The first is not to give away everything you know...
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On 14 Oct 2013, at 21:30, meekerdb wrote:
On 10/14/2013 1:29 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 13 Oct 2013, at 22:11, meekerdb wrote:
On 10/13/2013 1:48 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 12 Oct 2013, at 22:53, meekerdb wrote:
On 10/12/2013 10:55 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 11 Oct 2013, at 03:25,
Bruno: On the contrary: I assume only that my brain (or generalized brain)
is computable, then I show that basically all the rest is not. In
everything, or just in arithmetic, the computable is rare and exceptional.
Richard: Wow. This contradicts everything I have ever though Bruno was
claiming.
2013/10/15 Richard Ruquist yann...@gmail.com
Bruno: On the contrary: I assume only that my brain (or generalized
brain) is computable, then I show that basically all the rest is not. In
everything, or just in arithmetic, the computable is rare and exceptional.
Richard: Wow. This contradicts
-- Forwarded message --
From: Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com
Date: Tue, Oct 15, 2013 at 6:54 AM
Subject: Re: The probability problem in Everettian quantum mechanics
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
2013/10/15 Richard Ruquist yann...@gmail.com
Bruno: On the contrary
2013/10/15 Richard Ruquist yann...@gmail.com
-- Forwarded message --
From: Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com
Date: Tue, Oct 15, 2013 at 6:54 AM
Subject: Re: The probability problem in Everettian quantum mechanics
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
2013/10/15
On 15 Oct 2013, at 12:45, Richard Ruquist wrote:
Bruno: On the contrary: I assume only that my brain (or generalized
brain) is computable, then I show that basically all the rest is
not. In everything, or just in arithmetic, the computable is rare
and exceptional.
Richard: Wow. This
On 15 Oct 2013, at 13:21, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
2013/10/15 Richard Ruquist yann...@gmail.com
-- Forwarded message --
From: Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com
Date: Tue, Oct 15, 2013 at 6:54 AM
Subject: Re: The probability problem in Everettian quantum mechanics
: The probability problem in Everettian quantum mechanics
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
2013/10/15 Richard Ruquist yann...@gmail.com
Bruno: On the contrary: I assume only that my brain (or generalized
brain) is computable, then I show that basically all the rest is not. In
everything, or just
On 10/15/2013 3:54 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
2013/10/15 Richard Ruquist yann...@gmail.com mailto:yann...@gmail.com
Bruno: On the contrary: I assume only that my brain (or generalized brain)
is
computable, then I show that basically all the rest is not. In everything,
or just
in
On 10/15/2013 7:49 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 15 Oct 2013, at 12:45, Richard Ruquist wrote:
Bruno: On the contrary: I assume only that my brain (or generalized brain) is
computable, then I show that basically all the rest is not. In everything, or just in
arithmetic, the computable is rare
On Tue, Oct 15, 2013 at 01:02:13PM -0400, Richard Ruquist wrote:
Bruno: Arithmetical truth escapes largely the computable arithmetical truth
(by Gödel).
Richard: I guess I am too much a physicist to believe that uncomputible
arithmetical truth can produce the physical.
Since you read my
On 13 Oct 2013, at 22:11, meekerdb wrote:
On 10/13/2013 1:48 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 12 Oct 2013, at 22:53, meekerdb wrote:
On 10/12/2013 10:55 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 11 Oct 2013, at 03:25, meekerdb wrote:
So there are infinitely many identical universes preceding a
On 10/14/2013 1:29 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 13 Oct 2013, at 22:11, meekerdb wrote:
On 10/13/2013 1:48 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 12 Oct 2013, at 22:53, meekerdb wrote:
On 10/12/2013 10:55 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 11 Oct 2013, at 03:25, meekerdb wrote:
So there are infinitely
On Mon, Oct 14, 2013 at 2:30 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
On 10/14/2013 1:29 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 13 Oct 2013, at 22:11, meekerdb wrote:
On 10/13/2013 1:48 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 12 Oct 2013, at 22:53, meekerdb wrote:
On 10/12/2013 10:55 AM, Bruno Marchal
On 12 Oct 2013, at 22:53, meekerdb wrote:
On 10/12/2013 10:55 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 11 Oct 2013, at 03:25, meekerdb wrote:
So there are infinitely many identical universes preceding a
measurement. How are these universes distinct from one another?
Do they divide into two
On 10/13/2013 1:48 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 12 Oct 2013, at 22:53, meekerdb wrote:
On 10/12/2013 10:55 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 11 Oct 2013, at 03:25, meekerdb wrote:
So there are infinitely many identical universes preceding a measurement. How are
these universes distinct from one
an
infinity as those between 0.1 and 1.
It is the same cardinal (2^aleph_zero). But cardinality is not what
count when searching a measure.
So extrapolating to universes, the very low probability, white
rabbit universes also occur an infinite number of times, but that
does not make them
On 11 Oct 2013, at 23:46, Russell Standish wrote:
On Fri, Oct 11, 2013 at 10:07:58AM -0700, meekerdb wrote:
On 10/11/2013 2:28 AM, Russell Standish wrote:
On Thu, Oct 10, 2013 at 06:25:45PM -0700, meekerdb wrote:
So there are infinitely many identical universes preceding a
measurement. How
On 12 Oct 2013, at 00:12, LizR wrote:
On 12 October 2013 10:46, Russell Standish li...@hpcoders.com.au
wrote:
On Fri, Oct 11, 2013 at 10:07:58AM -0700, meekerdb wrote:
I don't think being uncountable makes it any easier unless they form
a continuum, which I don't think they do. I QM an
On 12 Oct 2013, at 00:14, LizR wrote:
On 12 October 2013 11:12, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote:
On 12 October 2013 10:46, Russell Standish li...@hpcoders.com.au
wrote:
On Fri, Oct 11, 2013 at 10:07:58AM -0700, meekerdb wrote:
I don't think being uncountable makes it any easier unless they
On 12 Oct 2013, at 01:04, LizR wrote:
On 12 October 2013 11:35, Russell Standish li...@hpcoders.com.au
wrote:
The UD doesn't output anything. If it did, then certainly, the output
could not be an uncountable set due to the diagonalisation argument.
Yes, I wasn't speaking very precisely.
between 0.1 and 1.
No, the two are exactly the same uncountable infinity, because there
is a 1-to-1 mapping between them.
My mathematical terminology may not be up to scratch. The measure is
different.
So extrapolating to universes, the very low probability, white
rabbit universes
On 12 Oct 2013, at 01:16, meekerdb wrote:
On 10/11/2013 4:05 PM, Pierz wrote:
It does seem that the measure problem is an open one for comp, as
far as I can tell from Bruno's responses, but he seems
confident it's not insurmountable.
Bruno's so confident that he argues that there
On 12 Oct 2013, at 04:52, Russell Standish wrote:
On Fri, Oct 11, 2013 at 05:46:57PM -0700, meekerdb wrote:
On 10/11/2013 4:36 PM, Russell Standish wrote:
On Fri, Oct 11, 2013 at 04:08:05PM -0700, meekerdb wrote:
Maybe I'm not clear on what UD* means. I took it to be, at a given
state of
On 12 Oct 2013, at 05:15, meekerdb wrote:
On 10/11/2013 7:52 PM, Russell Standish wrote:
On Fri, Oct 11, 2013 at 05:46:57PM -0700, meekerdb wrote:
On 10/11/2013 4:36 PM, Russell Standish wrote:
On Fri, Oct 11, 2013 at 04:08:05PM -0700, meekerdb wrote:
Maybe I'm not clear on what UD* means.
branch. Every branch of the multiverse
contains an infinity of identical, fungible universes. When a
quantum event occurs, that set of infinite universes divides
proportionally according to Schroedinger's equation. The appearance
of probability arises, as in Bruno's comp, from multiplication
On 10/12/2013 10:55 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 11 Oct 2013, at 03:25, meekerdb wrote:
So there are infinitely many identical universes preceding a measurement. How are
these universes distinct from one another? Do they divide into two infinite subsets
on a binary measurement, or do
On Thu, Oct 10, 2013 at 06:25:45PM -0700, meekerdb wrote:
So there are infinitely many identical universes preceding a
measurement. How are these universes distinct from one another?
Do they divide into two infinite subsets on a binary measurement, or
do infinitely many come into existence in
If you subdivide a continuum, I assume you can do so in a way that gives
the required probabilities. For example if the part of the multiverse that
is involved in performing a quantum measurement with a 50-50 chance of
either outcome is represented by the numbers 0 to 1, you can divide those
into
of the multiverse contains an infinity of identical,
fungible universes. When a quantum event occurs, that set of infinite
universes divides proportionally according to Schroedinger's equation. The
appearance of probability arises, as in Bruno's comp, from multiplication
of the observer in those
That is pretty much exactly my understanding. It does puzzle me that this
argument about the supposed probability problem with MWI is still live,
when that explanation seems perfectly coherent.
On Friday, October 11, 2013 10:04:40 PM UTC+11, Liz R wrote:
If you subdivide a continuum, I assume
And just to follow up on that, there are still an infinite number of
irrational numbers between 0 and 0.1. But not as large an infinity as
those between 0.1 and 1. So extrapolating to universes, the very low
probability, white rabbit universes also occur an infinite number of times
of such computations, as they dovetail on
the reals. Just keep in mind that the UD is enough dumb to implement
the infinite iterated self-duplication, which leads to uncountably
many histories.
(Having said that, there are many ways to put probability and measure
on any set, finite, enumerable, non
proportionally according to Schroedinger's equation. The
appearance of probability arises, as in Bruno's comp, from multiplication
of the observer in those infinite branches. Why is this problematic?
On Saturday, October 5, 2013 2:27:18 AM UTC+10, yanniru wrote:
Foad Dizadji-Bahmani, 2013
of the multiverse contains an infinity of identical,
fungible universes. When a quantum event occurs, that set of infinite
universes divides proportionally according to Schroedinger's equation. The
appearance of probability arises, as in Bruno's comp, from multiplication
of the observer in those infinite
.
It is the same cardinal (2^aleph_zero). But cardinality is not what
count when searching a measure.
So extrapolating to universes, the very low probability, white
rabbit universes also occur an infinite number of times, but that
does not make them equally as likely as the universes which behave
On 10/11/2013 2:28 AM, Russell Standish wrote:
On Thu, Oct 10, 2013 at 06:25:45PM -0700, meekerdb wrote:
So there are infinitely many identical universes preceding a
measurement. How are these universes distinct from one another?
Do they divide into two infinite subsets on a binary
, and ensure that the right
outcome
is observed with high probability, a quantum algorithm needs to generate an interference
pattern,
in which the computational paths leading to a given wrong outcome cancel each
other out, while
the paths leading to a given right outcome reinforce each other
mapping
between them.
So extrapolating to universes, the very low probability, white rabbit universes also
occur an infinite number of times, but that does not make them equally as likely as the
universes which behave as we would classically expect.
But computationalism only produces rational
On Fri, Oct 11, 2013 at 10:07:58AM -0700, meekerdb wrote:
On 10/11/2013 2:28 AM, Russell Standish wrote:
On Thu, Oct 10, 2013 at 06:25:45PM -0700, meekerdb wrote:
So there are infinitely many identical universes preceding a
measurement. How are these universes distinct from one another?
Do
On Fri, Oct 11, 2013 at 04:09:20AM -0700, Pierz wrote:
The former. Deutsch goes into the problem of infinite countable sets in
great detail and shows how this is *not* a problem for these uncountable
infinities (as Russell points out)), whereas it may be a problem for
Interesting. I wasn't
On 10/11/2013 2:46 PM, Russell Standish wrote:
On Fri, Oct 11, 2013 at 10:07:58AM -0700, meekerdb wrote:
On 10/11/2013 2:28 AM, Russell Standish wrote:
On Thu, Oct 10, 2013 at 06:25:45PM -0700, meekerdb wrote:
So there are infinitely many identical universes preceding a
measurement. How are
On 12 October 2013 11:12, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote:
On 12 October 2013 10:46, Russell Standish li...@hpcoders.com.au wrote:
On Fri, Oct 11, 2013 at 10:07:58AM -0700, meekerdb wrote:
I don't think being uncountable makes it any easier unless they form
a continuum, which I don't think
On Sat, Oct 12, 2013 at 11:14:32AM +1300, LizR wrote:
On 12 October 2013 11:12, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote:
On 12 October 2013 10:46, Russell Standish li...@hpcoders.com.au wrote:
On Fri, Oct 11, 2013 at 10:07:58AM -0700, meekerdb wrote:
I don't think being uncountable makes it any
On 10/11/2013 3:44 PM, Russell Standish wrote:
On Fri, Oct 11, 2013 at 03:08:30PM -0700, meekerdb wrote:
UD* (trace of the universal dovetailer) is a continuum, AFAICT. It has
the cardinality of the reals, and a natural metric (d(x,y) = 2^{-n}, where n is
the number of leading bits in common
On 10/11/2013 4:05 PM, Pierz wrote:
It does seem that the measure problem is an open one for comp, as far as I can tell from
Bruno's responses, but he seems confident it's not insurmountable.
Bruno's so confident that he argues that there must be a measure (because he's assumed
comp is true
On Fri, Oct 11, 2013 at 04:08:05PM -0700, meekerdb wrote:
Maybe I'm not clear on what UD* means. I took it to be, at a given
state of the UD, the last bit output by the 1st prog, the last bit
output by the 2nd program,...up to the last prog that the UD has
started. Right?
Its not the
On Saturday, October 12, 2013 9:07:57 AM UTC+11, Russell Standish wrote:
On Fri, Oct 11, 2013 at 04:09:20AM -0700, Pierz wrote:
The former. Deutsch goes into the problem of infinite countable sets
in
great detail and shows how this is *not* a problem for these uncountable
On Saturday, October 12, 2013 10:08:05 AM UTC+11, Brent wrote:
On 10/11/2013 3:44 PM, Russell Standish wrote:
On Fri, Oct 11, 2013 at 03:08:30PM -0700, meekerdb wrote:
UD* (trace of the universal dovetailer) is a continuum, AFAICT. It has
the cardinality of the reals, and a natural
On 10/11/2013 4:45 PM, Pierz wrote:
On Saturday, October 12, 2013 10:08:05 AM UTC+11, Brent wrote:
On 10/11/2013 3:44 PM, Russell Standish wrote:
On Fri, Oct 11, 2013 at 03:08:30PM -0700, meekerdb wrote:
UD* (trace of the universal dovetailer) is a continuum, AFAICT. It has
On 10/11/2013 4:36 PM, Russell Standish wrote:
On Fri, Oct 11, 2013 at 04:08:05PM -0700, meekerdb wrote:
Maybe I'm not clear on what UD* means. I took it to be, at a given
state of the UD, the last bit output by the 1st prog, the last bit
output by the 2nd program,...up to the last prog that
On Fri, Oct 11, 2013 at 05:46:57PM -0700, meekerdb wrote:
On 10/11/2013 4:36 PM, Russell Standish wrote:
On Fri, Oct 11, 2013 at 04:08:05PM -0700, meekerdb wrote:
Maybe I'm not clear on what UD* means. I took it to be, at a given
state of the UD, the last bit output by the 1st prog, the last
On 10/11/2013 7:52 PM, Russell Standish wrote:
On Fri, Oct 11, 2013 at 05:46:57PM -0700, meekerdb wrote:
On 10/11/2013 4:36 PM, Russell Standish wrote:
On Fri, Oct 11, 2013 at 04:08:05PM -0700, meekerdb wrote:
Maybe I'm not clear on what UD* means. I took it to be, at a given
state of the
of probability arises, as in Bruno's comp, from multiplication
of the observer in those infinite branches. Why is this problematic?
On Saturday, October 5, 2013 2:27:18 AM UTC+10, yanniru wrote:
Foad Dizadji-Bahmani, 2013. The probability problem in Everettian quantum
mechanics persists. British Jour
to Schroedinger's equation. The appearance of probability
arises, as in Bruno's comp, from multiplication of the observer in those infinite
branches. Why is this problematic?
On Saturday, October 5, 2013 2:27:18 AM UTC+10, yanniru wrote:
Foad Dizadji-Bahmani, 2013. The probability problem
On 04 Oct 2013, at 23:30, John Mikes wrote:
Richard:
I grew into denying probability in cases where not - ALL -
circumstances are known.
I agree with this. That is why there are many other attempt to study
ignorance and beliefs (like believability theories, which is like
probability
Foad Dizadji-Bahmani, 2013. The probability problem in Everettian quantum
mechanics persists. British Jour. Philosophy of Science IN PRESS.
ABSTRACT. Everettian quantum mechanics (EQM) results in ‘multiple,
emergent, branching quasi-classical realities’ (Wallace [2012]). The
possible outcomes
, Jan 12, 2013 at 1:14 PM, Roger Clough rclo...@verizon.net
wrote:
Hi Telmo Menezes
I don't pretend to be a physicist, but I do know that
quantum waves are probability functions. There are
the radius and time t in the Schroedinger equation,
so there must be some correpondence to the physical
Hi Telmo Menezes
I don't pretend to be a physicist, but I do know that
quantum waves are probability functions. There are
the radius and time t in the Schroedinger equation,
so there must be some correpondence to the physical world,
but nothing physical is waving.
So suppose we have
that
quantum waves are probability functions. There are
the radius and time t in the Schroedinger equation,
so there must be some correpondence to the physical world,
but nothing physical is waving.
So suppose we have a physical box. The probability
waves have to conform to the dimensions
On Sun, Oct 28, 2012 at 01:14:47PM -0700, meekerdb wrote:
On 10/28/2012 10:42 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
How do you answer the person who get the 1-7 points, and concludes
(as he *believes* in a primary material world, and in comp) that
this proves that a physical universe, to procede
On 31 Oct 2012, at 08:21, Russell Standish wrote:
On Sun, Oct 28, 2012 at 01:14:47PM -0700, meekerdb wrote:
On 10/28/2012 10:42 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
How do you answer the person who get the 1-7 points, and concludes
(as he *believes* in a primary material world, and in comp) that
this
On 28 Oct 2012, at 20:41, meekerdb wrote:
On 10/28/2012 8:28 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 27 Oct 2012, at 21:35, meekerdb wrote:
On 10/27/2012 7:56 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 26 Oct 2012, at 21:30, meekerdb wrote:
On 10/26/2012 6:57 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Oh yes, I remember that
On 28 Oct 2012, at 21:14, meekerdb wrote:
On 10/28/2012 10:42 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 28 Oct 2012, at 00:19, Russell Standish wrote:
On Thu, Oct 25, 2012 at 05:13:50PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Oh yes, I remember that you did agree once with the 323 principle,
but I forget what is
On 27 Oct 2012, at 21:35, meekerdb wrote:
On 10/27/2012 7:56 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 26 Oct 2012, at 21:30, meekerdb wrote:
On 10/26/2012 6:57 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Oh yes, I remember that you did agree once with the 323
principle, but I forget what is your problem with the
On 28 Oct 2012, at 00:19, Russell Standish wrote:
On Thu, Oct 25, 2012 at 05:13:50PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Oh yes, I remember that you did agree once with the 323 principle,
but I forget what is your problem with the movie-graph/step-8, then.
If you find the time, I am please if you
On 10/28/2012 8:28 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 27 Oct 2012, at 21:35, meekerdb wrote:
On 10/27/2012 7:56 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 26 Oct 2012, at 21:30, meekerdb wrote:
On 10/26/2012 6:57 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Oh yes, I remember that you did agree once with the 323 principle, but I
On 10/28/2012 10:42 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 28 Oct 2012, at 00:19, Russell Standish wrote:
On Thu, Oct 25, 2012 at 05:13:50PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Oh yes, I remember that you did agree once with the 323 principle,
but I forget what is your problem with the movie-graph/step-8,
On 26 Oct 2012, at 21:30, meekerdb wrote:
On 10/26/2012 6:57 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Oh yes, I remember that you did agree once with the 323
principle, but I forget what is your problem with the movie-graph/
step-8, then. If you find the time, I am please if you can
elaborate. I think
On 10/27/2012 7:56 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 26 Oct 2012, at 21:30, meekerdb wrote:
On 10/26/2012 6:57 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Oh yes, I remember that you did agree once with the 323 principle, but I forget what
is your problem with the movie-graph/step-8, then. If you find the time, I am
On Thu, Oct 25, 2012 at 05:13:50PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Oh yes, I remember that you did agree once with the 323 principle,
but I forget what is your problem with the movie-graph/step-8, then.
If you find the time, I am please if you can elaborate. I think
Russell too is not yet
On 25 Oct 2012, at 19:49, meekerdb wrote:
On 10/25/2012 8:13 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Brent wrote:
If you're going to explain purpose, meaning, qualia,
thoughts,...you need to start from something simpler that does not
assume those things. Bruno proposes to explain matter as well,
On 24 Oct 2012, at 20:58, Alberto G. Corona wrote:
2012/10/23 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be
On 22 Oct 2012, at 21:50, Alberto G. Corona wrote:
2012/10/22 Stephen P. King stephe...@charter.net
On 10/22/2012 2:38 AM, Alberto G. Corona wrote:
2012/10/22 Russell Standish
On 24 Oct 2012, at 22:20, meekerdb wrote:
On 10/24/2012 11:58 AM, Alberto G. Corona wrote:
2012/10/23 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be
On 22 Oct 2012, at 21:50, Alberto G. Corona wrote:
2012/10/22 Stephen P. King stephe...@charter.net
On 10/22/2012 2:38 AM, Alberto G. Corona wrote:
On 10/25/2012 11:13 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
If you're going to explain purpose, meaning, qualia, thoughts,...you
need to start from something simpler that does not assume those
things. Bruno proposes to explain matter as well, so he has to
start without matter.
Actually I deduce the
On 10/25/2012 8:13 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 24 Oct 2012, at 22:20, meekerdb wrote:
On 10/24/2012 11:58 AM, Alberto G. Corona wrote:
2012/10/23 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be
On 22 Oct 2012, at 21:50, Alberto G. Corona wrote:
2012/10/22 Stephen P.
On 10/24/2012 11:58 AM, Alberto G. Corona wrote:
2012/10/23 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be
On 22 Oct 2012, at 21:50, Alberto G. Corona wrote:
2012/10/22 Stephen P. King stephe...@charter.net
mailto:stephe...@charter.net
On 10/22/2012 2:38 AM,
On 22 Oct 2012, at 20:13, Stephen P. King wrote:
On 10/22/2012 2:38 AM, Alberto G. Corona wrote:
2012/10/22 Russell Standish li...@hpcoders.com.au
On Sun, Oct 21, 2012 at 11:38:46PM -0400, Stephen P. King wrote:
Hi Rusell,
How does Schmidhuber consider the physicality of resources?
2012/10/22 Russell Standish li...@hpcoders.com.au
On Sun, Oct 21, 2012 at 11:38:46PM -0400, Stephen P. King wrote:
Hi Rusell,
How does Schmidhuber consider the physicality of resources?
--
Onward!
Stephen
No. The concept doesn't enter consideration. What he considers is
).
It is still very much an open problem.
2012/10/21 Alberto G. Corona agocor...@gmail.com
Ok
I don愒 remember the reason why Solomonof reduces the probability of the
programs according with the length in is theory of inductive
inference. I
read it time ago. Solomonoff describes
. The little programs cannot get rid of them so easily
(by just matter of complexity). We are ourselves already relatively
rare *big* relative numbers.
Bruno
2012/10/21 Alberto G. Corona agocor...@gmail.com
Ok
I don´t remember the reason why Solomonof reduces the probability of
the programs
On 10/22/2012 2:32 AM, Russell Standish wrote:
On Sun, Oct 21, 2012 at 11:38:46PM -0400, Stephen P. King wrote:
Hi Rusell,
How does Schmidhuber consider the physicality of resources?
--
Onward!
Stephen
No. The concept doesn't enter consideration. What he considers is that
the Great
On 10/22/2012 2:38 AM, Alberto G. Corona wrote:
2012/10/22 Russell Standish li...@hpcoders.com.au
mailto:li...@hpcoders.com.au
On Sun, Oct 21, 2012 at 11:38:46PM -0400, Stephen P. King wrote:
Hi Rusell,
How does Schmidhuber consider the physicality of resources?
2012/10/22 Stephen P. King stephe...@charter.net
On 10/22/2012 2:38 AM, Alberto G. Corona wrote:
2012/10/22 Russell Standish li...@hpcoders.com.au
On Sun, Oct 21, 2012 at 11:38:46PM -0400, Stephen P. King wrote:
Hi Rusell,
How does Schmidhuber consider the physicality of
On Mon, Oct 22, 2012 at 01:45:11PM -0400, Stephen P. King wrote:
On 10/22/2012 2:32 AM, Russell Standish wrote:
On Sun, Oct 21, 2012 at 11:38:46PM -0400, Stephen P. King wrote:
Hi Rusell,
How does Schmidhuber consider the physicality of resources?
--
Onward!
Stephen
No. The
On 10/22/2012 5:50 PM, Russell Standish wrote:
Schmidhuber does not consider ontology at all. He merely asks the
question What if we're living inside a universal dovetailer?.
Hi Russell,
That is an ontological question in my thinking, but I will not
quibble this point.
He doesn't ask
On Sat, Oct 20, 2012 at 07:07:14PM -0400, Stephen P. King wrote:
On 10/20/2012 5:45 PM, Russell Standish wrote:
A UD generates and executes all programs, many of which are
equivalent. So some programs are represented more than others. The
COMP measure is a function over all programs that
On 10/21/2012 3:48 AM, Russell Standish wrote:
On Sat, Oct 20, 2012 at 07:07:14PM -0400, Stephen P. King wrote:
On 10/20/2012 5:45 PM, Russell Standish wrote:
A UD generates and executes all programs, many of which are
equivalent. So some programs are represented more than others. The
COMP
of the phisical laws, or, in other words, their low kolmogorov complexity,
that solomonov translates in his theory of inductive inference.
2012/10/21 Alberto G. Corona agocor...@gmail.com
Ok
I don´t remember the reason why Solomonof reduces the probability of the
programs according with the length
On 10/21/2012 3:48 AM, Russell Standish wrote:
I worry a bit about the use of the word all in your remark.
All is too big, usually, to have a single constructable measure!
Why not consider some large enough but finite collections of
programs, such as what would be captured by the idea of an
a definition and found the following:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/**Minimum_description_lengthhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Minimum_description_length
Central to MDL theory is the one-to-one correspondence between code
length functions and probability distributions. (This follows from the
Kraft
On 10/20/2012 5:45 PM, Russell Standish wrote:
A UD generates and executes all programs, many of which are
equivalent. So some programs are represented more than others. The
COMP measure is a function over all programs that captures this
variation in program respresentation.
Why should this be
Hi,
I was looking up a definition and found the following:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Minimum_description_length
Central to MDL theory is the one-to-one correspondence between code
length functions and probability distributions. (This follows from the
Kraft-McMillan inequality.) For any
On 10/19/2012 10:54 AM, Stephen P. King wrote:
Hi,
I was looking up a definition and found the following:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Minimum_description_length
Central to MDL theory is the one-to-one correspondence between code length functions
and probability distributions
code length functions and probability distributions. (This follows
from the Kraft-McMillan inequality.) For any probability
distribution , it is possible to construct a code such that the
length (in bits) of is equal to ; this code minimizes the
expected code length. Vice versa, given a code
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