On 13 February 2012 01:18, Joseph Knight wrote:
> Yes it is, with the Movie Graph Argument. The MGA shows that assuming COMP,
> consciousness cannot be explained by appealing to any physical system. Not
> even a little.
Whereas I would concur with this conclusion, I realise on reflection
that I'
d to
instantiate such an episode as originally postulated, but "qua
computatio" rather than "qua materia"? Or not?
David
>
> On 13 Feb 2012, at 16:24, David Nyman wrote:
>
>> On 13 February 2012 01:18, Joseph Knight wrote:
>>
>>> Yes
quot; to a doctor who proposed
a partial brain substitution by some such contrivance as that
described by Maudlin? In short ;-)
David
> On 14 Feb 2012, at 17:52, David Nyman wrote:
>
>> On 14 February 2012 12:56, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>>
>>> David, Tell
On 15 February 2012 16:27, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> OK?
>
Thanks, that helped a lot. Sorry about the initial misunderstanding.
David
>
> On 15 Feb 2012, at 01:21, David Nyman wrote:
>
>> On 14 February 2012 20:00, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>>> The r
http://harpers.org/archive/2011/12/0083720
Excerpted from the above article on multiverse theories:
“The reason I went into theoretical physics,” Guth tells me, “is that I
liked the idea that we could understand everything—i.e., the universe—in
terms of mathematics and logic.” He gives a bitter
On 24 February 2012 11:52, acw wrote:
> I look at it like this, there's 3 notions: Mind (consciousness, experience),
> (Primitive) Matter, Mechanism.
> Those 3 notions are incompatible, but we have experience of all 3, mind is
> the sum of our experience and thus is the most direct thing possible
On 5 March 2012 21:30, John Clark wrote:
> Yes. I John K Clark just saw a 90 minutes documentary on the history of
> asphalt, and as that is certainly one of the large but finite number of 90
> minute movies I can see on that screen it is entirely consistent with my
> prediction that John K Clar
pect to the present instance, that Bruno is
talking about.
David
> On 3/5/2012 3:23 PM, David Nyman wrote:
>>
>> On 5 March 2012 21:30, John Clark wrote:
>>
>>> Yes. I John K Clark just saw a 90 minutes documentary on the history of
>>> asphalt, and as that
On 7 March 2012 17:40, John Clark wrote:
>> > You persistently confuse the 1-view from its own perspective (on which
>> > the probability/uncertainty bears), and the 1-view than an outsider can
>> > attribute to each reconstituted person.
>
>
> And you persistently ignore that YOU HAVE BEEN DUPLI
dies, we would need a more sophisticated
book-keeping method to keep track of them. But the copies in question
could be in no doubt as to their possession of separate and
mutually-insulated perspectives after duplication, even if they might
be apt argue fruitlessly about which was the "
will there be any remaining
doubt about the upshot. Any problem with this?
David
> On Thu, Mar 8, 2012 at 7:10 PM, David Nyman wrote:
>
>>
>> > After duplication and reconstitution in W and M the two copies cannot
>> > possibly have
>> "identical pers
John, I hope you will not think me impertinent, but you're expending a
great deal of time and energy arguing with an elaborate series of
straw men. No doubt this is great fun and highly entertaining, but
would you consider the alternative of requesting clarification of the
real point at issue? It
On 14 March 2012 15:12, John Clark wrote:
> No, in this case that is a perfectly legitimate question because in the
> above you didn't say anything about making numerous copies of yourself so in
> the quotation it is clear who "me" is, and that is the case with most normal
> conversations. Normal
On 14 March 2012 18:32, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> He uses also bad rhetorical tricks by
> attributing me intention, and seems even aggressive sometimes, or is it an
> impression?
Vous êtes ironique, je l'espère!
David
>
> On 14 Mar 2012, at 07:57, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>
> Hi,
>
>
> 2012/3/14 J
On 16 March 2012 05:57, John Clark wrote:
>> > it is obvious that you have seen the point that the first person are no
>> > duplicable from their first person point of view.
>
> To me that is about as far from "obvious" as you can get! And you can't
> explain to me what's so original about the or
ternative assumptions do you base this
belief?
David
> On Fri, Mar 16, 2012 at 8:47 AM, David Nyman wrote:
>
>> > What is intended by "the first person are no duplicable from their first
>> > person point of view" is just the mundane assumption that any subje
n beings were able to
perform a similar trick, cell-by-cell, and then wander off in
different directions, the divergence of personal identity from a
common source would in fact be seen as commonplace, not the stuff of
obscure logical thought experiments.
David
> On 3/16/2012 3:09 PM, David Nyman
lusive perspectival instances that we must look for the
antidote to solipsism, and for the ultimate reconciliation of all
consistent points of view.
David
> On 3/17/2012 8:18 AM, David Nyman wrote:
>>
>> On 16 March 2012 21:04, Stephen P. King wrote:
>>
>>> Would it
On 29 March 2012 20:47, meekerdb wrote:
> You don't know that. It's an assumption based on the idea that conscious
> experience is something a certain physical body, a brain, does. But if
> conscious experience is a process then it is certainly possible to create a
> process that is aware of be
rt of Kent's criticism.
I agree. It can't explain the facts without selection, on which it
relies implicitly (and I don't understand why this doesn't strike more
people as problematic). But I also don't believe that Kent's proposal
on its own goes all the way to dea
other. Can you direct me
to any other reference to this in the Monadology?
David
>
>
> On Thu, Mar 29, 2012 at 9:20 PM, David Nyman wrote:
>>
>> On 29 March 2012 20:47, meekerdb wrote:
>>
>> > You don't know that. It's an assumption based on the idea th
ording to Gribbin it was
rather more than a fictional conceit for him) was precisely that his
making it explicit exposed an "elephant in the room" that few others
were prepared to acknowledge.
David
> On 3/30/2012 4:38 AM, David Nyman wrote:
>>
>> The problem with all this (a
On 31 March 2012 17:24, John Clark wrote:
>> > You should care to be able to answer the simple question: "what do you
>> > expect to feel in the multiplication-movie experience"
>
> I would expect to feel exactly the same as if duplicating chambers and
> multiple copies of myself were not involve
nce the subjective locus is not itself subject to
change, every perspective is "mine", but not all perspectives are
associated with David Nyman. It may seem strange at first, but it
unravels surprisingly many of the conceptual puzzles.
David
> On 3/31/2012 11:11 AM, David Nyman wrote:
>&g
epistemological horse.
David
> On 3/30/2012 4:23 PM, David Nyman wrote:
>>
>> On 30 March 2012 19:54, meekerdb wrote:
>>
>>>> >> The problem with all this (as Kent makes explicit) is that there is
>>>> >> nothing in the mathematics
Bruno, when you talk about the doctor offering one a replacement brain
you usually describe the substitute as digital, although I think you
have sometimes just said that it is artificial. My recent remarks
about "game physics" got me thinking about this distinction, if indeed
there is one.
Suppos
agmatic, as opposed to merely philosophical, issue in the
not-too-distant future. Suffice it to say, I'm unlikely to be an
early adopter!
David
> David, acw,
>
>
> On 01 Apr 2012, at 16:36, acw wrote:
>
>> On 4/1/2012 14:33, David Nyman wrote:
>>>
>>> B
that! But, in the light of "epistemology
first", can you make any sense of the notion of consciousness as an
epiphenomenon of its own constructions?
David
> On 4/1/2012 4:55 AM, David Nyman wrote:
>>
>> On 31 March 2012 01:09, meekerdb wrote:
>>
>>> That
Apr 2, 2012 at 2:12 AM, David Nyman wrote:
>> On 1 April 2012 16:48, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>> David, if Dick does not have the impression that Harry has became a sort of
>>> zombie of some kind, for a time, I would suggest he trusts Harry and his
>>> docto
On 4 April 2012 18:55, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> If any one else can help John K Clark to make his point, please help him. If
> some people believe, like I begin to believe, that John Clark only fake to
> not understand, and that I should abandon to try, please give your opinion,
> because I begin t
On 5 April 2012 17:37, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:
>> (a) It is impossible to make a philosophical zombie as consciousness
>> is just a side-effect of intelligent behaviour;
>> (b) It is possible to make a philosophical zombie but the mechanism
>> for intelligent behaviour that nature chanced upon has
ical level than that of "physical causation" (i.e.
the reductive structural relation between states).
David
> On 05.04.2012 20:39 David Nyman said the following:
>
>> On 5 April 2012 17:37, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:
>>
>>>> (a) It is impossible to make a p
ot; as opposed to a
mere belief, in that there is simply no need of the hypothesis of
composition in the ontologically-reduced objective account. Be that as
it may, it has proved to be an elusive intuition for many.
David
> On 4/5/2012 12:39 PM, David Nyman wrote:
>>
>> I confess thi
I propose the following reformulation of Step 3 for pedagogical
purposes, as possibly being effective in clarifying any remaining
points in dispute. It can be further refined to remove any remaining
ambiguities if necessary. Comments and suggestions are welcome.
Assume the computational theory o
I attach a comment by Victor Stenger on Lawrence Krauss's "A Universe
from Nothing". You might also want to follow the link to David
Albert's critical review. Is it meaningful to speak of a "nothing"
beyond the void of RQFT? Or beyond the truths of arithmetic?
http://blog.talkingphilosophy.com/
On 24 April 2012 19:37, Craig Weinberg wrote:
> Really Susan Blackmore was the
> only speaker that I saw who advocated a purely materialist view and
> she was practically booed when she put up a slide that said
> "Consciousness is an Illusion".
Susan Blackmore, New Scientist, 22 June 2002, p 26-
etaphysics. Trouble is, as you
say, if you've got Deepak Chopra in the other chair, the conversation
is apt to get somewhat polarised. But, political posturing aside,
away from the public gaze there is often lot more doubt than the
slogans would suggest.
David
> On Apr 24, 2:57 pm, Dav
ematic correlation of one domain with
another has exhausted what can possibly be meant by "explanation". In
the end, it probably comes down to personal temperament and taste.
David
> On 4/24/2012 1:03 PM, David Nyman wrote:
>>
>> On 24 April 2012 20:07, Craig Weinberg
gt; On 24 Apr 2012, at 20:57, David Nyman wrote:
>
>> On 24 April 2012 19:37, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>>
>>> Really Susan Blackmore was the
>>> only speaker that I saw who advocated a purely materialist view and
>>> she was practically booed whe
people tend (understandably) to be rather
more interested in practical deliverables than in the philosophical
subtleties they might imply. And no, I don't believe in zombies.
David
> On 4/25/2012 7:36 AM, David Nyman wrote:
>
> On 25 April 2012 08:24, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>&g
On 27 April 2012 21:16, meekerdb wrote:
> And the EV is supposed to be analgous to qualia? But that paralell
> doens;t work. The EV is dismissable
> because there was never prima facie evidence for it.
>
>
> Then why was it widely believed to exist?...because somethings were alive
> and other see
On 7 May 2012 20:37, meekerdb wrote:
> "To assert that the earth revolves around the sun is as erroneous
> as to claim that Jesus was not born of a virgin."
The Cardinal was perfectly correct in this assertion, of course.
David
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On 7 May 2012 22:27, meekerdb wrote:
> Do you want to explain - and I'm well aware that 'revolves around' is
> relative to coordinate frames. But you know that Bellarme was not equating
> relativism of orbital motion with relativism about the virgin birth.
The Cardinal stated ""To assert that t
On 29 May 2012 20:42, Aleksandr Lokshin wrote:
> I'll try to explain why choosing an arbitrary element should be interpreted
> as a free will choice in mathematics.
I agree with you that an arbitrary decision cannot be either random or
the consequence of an explicit rule or law. Hence an arbitr
On 30 May 2012 04:16, Stephen P. King wrote:
> I think that the word "free" means that it is unconstrained by a pre-given
> or knowable function; it is not the result of a known computational process.
I'm sorry if my point was not clear. I simply meant that we can
define "arbitrary", if we wi
On 30 May 2012 04:41, Jesse Mazer wrote:
> Only David Nyman agreed as far as I can see
See my reply to Stephen.
David
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On 2 June 2012 10:29, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> or read my recent conversation with Charles and LizR)
On the FOAR list, that is!
David
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On 9 June 2012 11:17, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> Such a backtracking (proposed once by Saibal Mitra on this list) can also be
> used to defend the idea that there is only one person, and that personal
> identity is a relative "illusory" notion. We might be a "God" playing a
> trick to himself, notabl
On 9 June 2012 19:22, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:
> No, I have meant
>
> a) simulated computer
>
> b) simulated myself (but not in a)
>
> Now I consider a) and b). This is after all some instructions executed by
> some Turing machine. It seems that there is no difference. How would you
> define the dif
On 10 June 2012 17:26, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> I am not sure I understand your problem with that simultaneity. The
> arithmetical relations are out of time. It would not make sense to say that
> they are simultaneously true, because this refer to some "time", and can
> only be used as a metaphor.
On 10 June 2012 17:49, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> Yes it is possible. And "worth", it is necessary the case.
worse?
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On 11 June 2012 13:04, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> Why do you think that pure indexicality (self-reference) is not enough? It
> seems clear to me that from the current state of any universal machine, it
> will look like a special moment is chosen out of the others, for the
> elementary reason that suc
On 11 June 2012 13:19, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> Yes worse. I am very sorry for my random spelling, which becomes easily
> phonetical when I type too fast.
It's only phonetical if you pronounce worth and worse the same way ;-)
David
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On 11 June 2012 16:27, meekerdb wrote:
That seems confused. The theory is that 'you' are some set of those states.
> If you introduce an external 'knower' you've lost the explanatory function
> of the theory.
>
Well, I'm referring to Hoyle's idea, which explicitly introduces such a
knower. But
On 12 June 2012 17:36, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Yes, but the expression "from the current state of any universal
>> machine" (different sense of universal, of course) already *assumes*
>> the restriction of universal attention to a particular state of a
>> particular machine.
>>
>
> But is that not
I also feel that one should avoid using "illusory" to wave away
whatever cannot be explained in a particular theory; rather one should
perhaps just say that an explanation of that phenomenon is beyond the scope
of the theory.
David
On 12 Jun 2012, at 22:48, David Nyman wrote:
On Apr 24, 4:39 pm, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> Any content of consciousness can be an illusion. Consciousness itself
> cannot, because without consciousness there is no more illusion at all.
- just catching up with the thread, but I feel compelled to comment
that this is beautifully and clearly put
Forgive me in advance if this has been covered adequately before in
the list, but the following occurs to me with respect to 'Bostrom'
style assessments of where I should expect my 'current' OM to be
situated with respect to the total population of OMs in which I exist.
Presumably, I should expec
e notion that
we can draw conclusions (a la Bostrom) about measure from the OM we
happen to be experiencing? IOW, the fact that I am "a human OM of a
particular age in the 21st century on Earth" is of no particular
significance in determining whether this represents some point of
maximal consc
With Bruno and his mighty handful engaged in the undodgeable (though
constantly dodged) task of working towards an elementary grasp of the
technical underpinnings of COMP, and patently lacking the fortitude of
these valorous Stakhanovites, I have been spending my time lurking,
reading and musing.
'language of the dreaming machines', towards
which any explicit version can gesture only partially and
indicatively.
David
> On Thu, Jul 16, 2009 at 8:38 PM, David Nyman wrote:
> > In COMP, the 'mechanism and language of dreams' is
> > posited to be those element
ry
> arithmetic, already describes that universal thing which can't help itself
> to reinvent hitself again and again and again, and this in an atemporal,
> aspatial frames.
> Sri Aurobindo made once a nice summary:
> What, you ask, was the beginning of it all?
> And it is
2009/7/22 Bruno Marchal :
> Ma connection at home is no functioning.
As a linguistic aside, Bruno has cleverly expressed the above
statement in perfect Glaswegian (i.e. the spoken tongue of Glasgow,
Scotland - my home town). Other well-known examples are: "Is'arra
marra on yer barra Clarra?" (Is
2009/7/19 Rex Allen :
> In your view, Bruno (or David, or anyone else who has an opinion),
> what kinds of things actually "exist"? What does it mean to say that
> something "exists"?
This is naturally the $64k question for this list - or any other, for
that matter (pun intended). I don't know
On 22 July, 16:01, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> Ma connection at home is again functioning. I am happy to have solved
> the problem rather quickly.
>
> On 22 Jul 2009, at 13:54, David Nyman wrote:
>
>
>
> > 2009/7/22 Bruno Marchal :
> You thought you could make fu
of the One. In other
words, we can't dispense with either theology or science: which is
just fine!
>> Easy, eh?
>
>
> I didn't expect this one.
We call this irony!
> Sure, nice post. You still seem to reify a bit the third hypostase,
> the universal self, the
hard time seeing how "I" could ever
be. You see, "I" don't need to be 'really real' in the sense I think
you mean; but I *do* need to be *as* real - 'real' in the same sense -
as the background from which "I" emerge. RITSIAR cuts both ways:
inescapable. I am seeking
consequently to collapse at their foundations all divisibility between
knowing and being, and between perceiving, intending and acting (I've
left the scare quotes out this time, but inevitable these terms often
carry associations that are extraneous to my meaning here).
ndational personal presence. This is what, I think, rescues the
intuition of the One from a mere functionless substrate: it stands for
the foundational intuition of a continuously present and personal
whole, prior to any notions of differentiation whatsoever.
David
> David Nyman wrote:
>
On 23 July, 05:38, Brian Tenneson wrote:
> You have written about it, and at least two of its properties, and so it
> is not completely ineffable, yes?
> So I think it is "effable" even if it is exceedingly difficult to
> describe fully. What I'm having trouble believing is that it is unknowabl
On 19 July, 20:37, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> You are close to the UDA, which we discuss since years here ...
> All the problem is there.
> But once you look closely, you can see the beginning of the reason why
> "law-and-order" realities win against "dream-logic" realities. This is
> eventually com
bers, functions,
> sets and mathematical structures, that arithmetic, simple elementary
> arithmetic, already describes that universal thing which can't help itself
> to reinvent hitself again and again and again, and this in an atemporal,
> aspatial frames.
> Sri Aurobindo made once a
g which can't help itself
> to reinvent hitself again and again and again, and this in an atemporal,
> aspatial frames.
> Sri Aurobindo made once a nice summary:
> What, you ask, was the beginning of it all?
> And it is this ...
> Existence that multiplied itself
> For sh
Thanks to everyone who responded to my initial sally on dreams and
machines. Naturally I have arrogated the right to plagiarise your
helpful comments in what follows, which is an aphoristic synthesis of
my understanding of the main points that have emerged thus far. I
hope this will be helpful f
ame issues head on - as of course your own approach
attempts to do. Sorry for any confusion, but I think we're still
broadly in agreement, as before :-)
David
> David Nyman wrote:
> > Thanks to everyone who responded to my initial sally on dreams and
> > machines. Natur
On 27 July, 12:25, Kim Jones wrote:
> Hopefully, by the end of this "conversation
> without end" I will know in what sense I am real!!
Don't count on it ;-)
D
> On 27/07/2009, at 11:40 AM, Brian Tenneson wrote:
>
>
>
> > Hi Kim,
>
> > RITSIAR means real in the sense that I am real.
>
> > Ch
parts in my own intuitive history) the
more they exercise my intuitions in helpful directions. I feel that
there is something intuitively necessary in this generative approach,
and specifically in the way it seeks to resolve the 0-1-3-person
conundrums that - even if it turns out to be unsupportabl
On 27 July, 12:25, Kim Jones wrote:
> >> Could somebody kindly tell me/explain to me what "RITSIAR" means? I
> >> cannot find any explanation of this in the threads which mention it.
On a (slightly) more serious note, to the best of my recollection the
expression 'real in the sense I am real' w
On 27 July, 09:46, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> ... yet, the shadows of braids and links(*) appear somehow in the two
> matter hypostases, and this in a context where space (not juts time)
> has to be a self-referential context, in that weak sense, such work
> seems to go in the right direction. Of co
n-mind relation as a simplistic
functional identity remains pure materialist prejudice, and on the
basis of the above, flatly erroneous. To say the least, any such
relation is moot, absent a radically deeper insight into the mind-body
problem.
David
>
> Bruno Marchal wrote:
> >
> &g
candidate for such a synthesis. Actually, I haven't yet seen any
others (oops - pace Colin).
David
>
> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>> On 26 Jul 2009, at 16:52, David Nyman wrote:
>>
>>> Thanks to everyone who responded to my initial sally on dreams and
>>&g
t
retentive enough to retain the pivotal elements of the narrative
whilst we charge off on the next - no doubt essential - safari into
the logical-mathematical jungle. But could we try grandma's version
again? Even heroic failure would teach us something.
David
>
>
> On 27 Jul
incomplete) opinions on
her physics and therefore make reasonable bets on her duplicability?
> If a universal machine bet that God create earth and heaven in
> six days and that she is not duplicable, well, it becomes hard to even argue
> if the AUDA physics will change or not.
And what
justify why 'qualia' must exist, and
why 1-person experience must occur in terms of them, it remains
(necessarily) mysterious - in the Wittgensteinian sense - on what they
*are*.
David
> David Nyman wrote:
>> 2009/7/27 Brent Meeker
>>
>>> That's a bit of a stra
ically) through your state.
> And here the mystery is that the apparent physical worlds seem computable.
> How could a sum on an infinity of computations be computable? (it is the
> white rabbit problem).
OK, I said it was wacky, so it's probably wrong (or not even that).
But, as a las
nk beyond Physix Textbook 101).
> 5. Is a "thought" a product of the mind-process? if so, where does it settle
> to become consciously acknowledged for us... (for WHOM???)
>
> I really do not expect from you to give adequate replies to all these
> questions - it would make
French claret (cask), 1707; of honey (a cask), 1585; of pork (a cask),
1800; of soldiers (a band or company); of tobacco, 1886; of wine (a
cask).
Fascinating. Is any of the above relevant to your meaning?
David
> On 29 Jul 2009, at 16:09, David Nyman wrote:
>
>
>
>
>
> >
se, in the
limit. However, I find that the problems in adequately expressing a
(moderately) non-standard view involves so many burdens of extraneous
sense attaching to nearly all the terms available to hand as to make
the task itself very taxing. There is I suppose the option of
inventing a totally
to follow.
So when I ask your brain a question it's your hands that reply? That
might explain a lot!
David ;-)
>
> On 29 Jul 2009, at 19:15, David Nyman wrote:
>
>>
>> On 29 July, 17:32, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>> Gosh, David, you are a champion for th
mething YOU just think about:
> it 'exists' in your mind (whatever we assign to that).
>
> Self? (May I refer to the ONE and only Koan in Oriental Science I ever heard
> about: the one handed clapping.) I made a second one? (just for the fun of
> it): the "SELF" whic
2009/7/30 1Z :
> [[sound of footsteps]]]
>
> "Please allow me to introduce myself ..."
Avaunt, ye blood-sucking fiend!
Van Helsing (retd.)
>
>
>
> On 27 July, 14:17, David Nyman wrote:
>> On 27 July, 12:25, Kim Jones wrote:
>>
>> >
2009/7/30 Rex Allen :
> It seems to me that the primary meaning of "to exist" is "to be conscious".
>
> But what causes conscious experience? Well, I'm beginning to think
> that nothing causes it. Our conscious experience is fundamental,
> uncaused, and irreducible.
>
> Why do we think that our c
ature of this conception feeds the intuition of a
'neutral' (perhaps not the best term) monism which could instantiate a
spectrum of states spanning a mental-material 'dichotomy' now more
apparent than real. Any better?
David
>
>
>
> On 28 July, 01:30, David Nym
2009/7/30 1Z :
> Unless an argument is put forward for Platonism being
> preferable to materialism, it doesn't get off the ground.
But surely it's already up in the air?
David
>
>
>
> On 28 July, 00:34, David Nyman wrote:
>
>> AFAICS, until these 'u
'primitive' awareness is
swamped in our memory by repeated re-presentation of dominant
higher-order themes. In fact, introspection reveals the constant
coming and going of 'awarenesses' of every type and degree, shading to
ultimate forgetfulness. IOW, 'consciousness' is
On 31 July, 11:43, 1Z wrote:
> There are many bad solutions too. Finding a good solution
> means having an exat grasp of the problem, not saying in some
> vague way that mind and matter are different things.
Do elaborate. It would be really helpful to have an exactly stated
exposition of the p
Given the manifest presence rather than absence
of such existence, it is clearly necessary. Nevertheless, in some
counterfactual sense, it might have been absent and never present.
But this is possibly excessively Talmudic.
> Though for it to be a mystery would imply a hidden,
> unknown cause.
lightening.
David
>
> A further thought:
>
> On Thu, Jul 30, 2009 at 4:34 PM, David Nyman wrote:
>>
>> Of course a computational narrative may turn out
>> not to be the way to go, but I strongly suspect that we still await a
>> revolution in - well not physics,
ut-not-vanishing-degree.
>> This is what my mother used to call 'having the courage of your lack
>> of convictions'. I like it.
>
> I am not sure I understand that remark.
Alas, we can no longer ask her what she meant.
David
>
> I comment on Rex's post
I note that the recent posts by Peter Jones - aka the mysterious 1Z,
and the originator of the curiously useful 'real in the sense I am
real' or RITSIAR - occurred shortly after my taking his name in vain.
Hmm...
Anyway, this signalled the resumption of a long-running debate about
the validit
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