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[PEIRCE-L] RE: [biosemiotics:8927] Re: Peirce's categories

Kobus, from this response, it seems to me that you still haven’t got the point I was trying to make. So I’ll try once more (but that’s about all I will have time for, until next week). I’m also copying to the Peirce list since this is more about Peirce than biosemiotics. Firstness,

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Peirce's categories

List, Just dropping in with a quick association. There is something to be said for the thought that phaneroscopy can be regarded as secondness, relative to phenomenology as thirdness. Logic can be seen as their relative difference. Best, Auke van Breemen -Oorspronkelijk bericht-

Re: [PEIRCE-L] induction's occasion

Jeff D., all, I think I wasn't clear enough about what I was saying in the list of taxa, so I've revised a bit. Jeff D., list, Sorry for the delayed response. I've rarely been so inundated with practical matters. I think that I'd agree with Kant's remark "That philosophy which mixes pure

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Peirce's categories

Gary R., Jon, List, In what sense can phenomenology "draw" things from logic? If it can draw something, what can it it draw? First off, it may have been poor choice on my part to use the word "draw" in trying to describe what we might gain by looking to logic for the sake of developing a

Re: [PEIRCE-L] induction's occasion

Dear Ben Novak, list, I should add something for a broader picture. I've talked about associating a certain impatience for a new perspective with deduction. Generally, Peirce justifies abductive inference _/in general/_ as leading more expeditiously than anything else does to new truths. The

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's categories

> On Oct 29, 2015, at 9:31 AM, Jeffrey Brian Downard > wrote: > > In what sense can phenomenology "draw" things from logic? If it can draw > something, what can it it draw? An other question. We tend to think of logic as functional in its own right. For deduction

Re: [PEIRCE-L] induction's occasion

Dear Ben Novak, list, As regards an explanation A's implying the surprising phenomenon C, that seems more on the level of implication than of an actual inference, which would be the mind's moving from A as an accepted premiss to conclude at least tentatively C. The mind already believes C and

[PEIRCE-L] Phenomenology and architectonic considerations

Ben, Gary R., Clark, List, Ben has offered two things that are quite helpful to me for the purposes of thinking more clearly about the relationships that hold between math, phenomenology and the normative sciences. First, he has pointed out that Kant's remark to the effect "That philosophy

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Phenomenology and architectonic considerations

Quick note, just to be clear: 'a revised table of the taxa' refers to my revising myself to add some lines of division. The only revision to Peirce is the showing of two cycles, he didn't mention such cycles. Also I've reinserted in Jeff D.'s response the horizontal line that I put between the

Re: [PEIRCE-L] induction's occasion

> On Oct 29, 2015, at 9:06 AM, Benjamin Udell wrote: > > I think that I'd agree with Kant's remark "That philosophy which mixes pure > principles with empirical ones does not deserve the name of philosophy" > if by "philosophy" one takes him to mean pure philosophy, or

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Phenomenology and architectonic considerations

Clark, list, I don't know whether (A) Peirce would put all applied cenoscopy (applied _/philosophia prima/_) into Science of Review or whether (B),for Peirce, some of it could be cenoscopy applied in physics, cenoscopy applied in psychology, etc. (B) seems much likelier to me. There's

Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: [biosemiotics:8927] Re: Peirce's categories

Gary F., That was a wonderful explanation! From here on out I'm gonna hold to the standard you followed: Secondness refers to the category or mode. Second (capital S) is the referent which is in the mode of Secondness because of its relation to a relata (but no other relata). second

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's categories

> On Oct 29, 2015, at 1:20 PM, Jeffrey Brian Downard > wrote: > > Peirce draws on the distinction between pure and applied mathematics. When > it comes to geometry, for instance, only topology is pure mathematics. Both > projective geometry and all systems of

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's categories

Clark, List, You ask: I wonder how we deal with things like quasi-empirical methods in mathematics (started I think by Putnam who clearly was influenced by Peirce in his approach). Admittedly the empirical isn’t the phenomenological (or at least it’s a complex relationship). I’m here thinking

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's categories

Jeff D., Clark, list, I think it's important in this to get the quotes and dates. I recall Peirce's views as changing, and partly it's his acceptance of changing terminology. Earlier, he had regarded geometry as mathematically applied science of space; later he accepted the idea that

Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: [biosemiotics:8927] Re: Peirce's categories

Correction, /relata/ is plural. /Relatum/ is singular. So, take two: The word/Secondness/ refers to the category or mode. / /The word /Second/ (capital S) refers to the referent which is in the mode of Secondness because of its relation to a single relatum (but no other). The word /second/

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's categories

In 1897 CP 4.218, Peirce makes his remarks that projective and metric geometries are not pure geometry, but goes on to say that they are so if the plane is defined so broadly as to make those geometries into chapters in topics (topology). in 1901 in "Truth (and Falsity and Error)"

Re: [PEIRCE-L] induction's occasion

Ben U, List ~ This is a great discussion but I wanted to interject a practical/physical element that is missing. One issue touched on is the role of impatience or dissatisfaction as a trigger for deductive/predictive thinking. Of course, one can whip up impatience or dissatisfaction at will,

[PEIRCE-L] Vol. 2 of Collected Papers, on Induction

Hello list, I just finished Vol. 2 of the Collected Papers, and had a couple of questions, if anyone is interested in helping out. Going through the material on induction towards the end of the volume, much of it seemed to be from Peirce's earlier work on induction, where hypothesis or

Re: [PEIRCE-L] induction's occasion

Tom, list, You wrote, In the vast majority of our deductions, we are not propelled by any specific urge or sensation. [End quote] I wouldn't say that we are _/propelled/_ by an urge or sensation to deduction in the way that we are propelled by surprise or perplexity to an abductive

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's categories

Hi Ben, Clark, List, I'm working on an essay for the conference on Peirce and mathematics that Fernando has organized in Bogota, and the topic is those three questions at the start of "The Logic of Mathematics." In order to provide a coherent interpretation of what Peirce is trying to do, my

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Peirce's categories

Jeff, list, It's VERY late on the East Coast, so I'll keep this quite brief for now: a single question. In what sense can phenomenology be said to draw "from both mathematics and from logic"? Certainly from the standpoint of > Peirce's ' > classification of the sciences' phenomenology can be

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Peirce's categories

Gary, List, This issue has been discussed before at least once. I don’t agree with Gary because I don’t think we ever experience phenomena as pure phenomena, so I don’t think we ever directly experience firsts. I see them as abstractions that must be there (both logically and psychologically)