Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs

> On Apr 20, 2017, at 9:32 PM, Jon Awbrey wrote: > > After that one can consider > the fine points of generic versus degenerate cases, and that is > all well and good, but until you venture to say exactly *which* > monadic, dyadic, or triadic predicate you have in mind, you >

[PEIRCE-L] Re: Laws of Nature as Signs

Helmut, John, List ... I'll answer Helmut's question first as I can think of something right off to say about it, whereas JFS and I have had this same discussion every 3 or 4 years for going on the last 20 and I'll need a while to see if I can think of anything new to say on it. I

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Laws of Nature as Signs

Hi John, Thank you for sending the links to the excerpts from Church's work in logic. His explanation of the assumptions behind extensional approaches in formal logic and the philosophical theory of logic are remarkably clear. If you have additional thoughts to add that help to explain why it

Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Laws of Nature as Signs

Jon, John, List, Is it reasonable to say that a relation has an intension and an extension, the intension is firstness, and the extension secondness (of the relation, which is secondness)? Best, Helmut   20. April 2017 um 15:14 Uhr Von: "John F Sowa"   Jon, That is an

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dyadic relations within the triadic

Jerry C., List: In the long quote that I included in my last post, Peirce acknowledged that the Sign sometimes *creates *its Object; but nevertheless, it remains the case that the Object *determines *the Sign, which shows that Peirce's usage of "determination" is not at all equivalent to

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dyadic relations within the triadic

Jon, List: > On Apr 19, 2017, at 11:42 AM, Jon Alan Schmidt > wrote: > > Jerry C., List: > > To which specific hypotheses of mine are you referring? I was referring to this conjecture / statement / assertion / hypothesis/ antecedent /… >> Since everyone

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dyadic relations within the triadic

List, Kirsti: > On Apr 19, 2017, at 11:51 AM, kirst...@saunalahti.fi wrote: > > Jerry, > Why would any pragmatic sign (even limited to science & techology > perspectives) be of natural kind? - Scientists and engineers do read and > write, do they not? Perhaps we mis-understand one another.

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Triadic forms of constraint, determination, and interaction

Jon A, John C, List, Jon wrote: I have every reason to suppose triadic relations are the very fabric of the universe, and for all I know every triadic relation has the potential to serve as a sign relation in one measure or another. I would tend strongly to agree. JA: In this view triadic

Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Laws of Nature as Signs

BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px; }The Church definition of a function is exactly why I define the semiosic triadic process as a function, where the Object [Argument] is mediated by the Representamen/Function to provide the Interpretant [value].

[PEIRCE-L] Re: The object of reasoning is to find out ...

Peircers, Here is the prettified blog version, with links and references filled in: https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2017/04/20/the-object-of-reasoning-is-to-find-out/ Regards, Jon -- inquiry into inquiry: https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/ academia: https://independent.academia.edu/JonAwbrey

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Laws of Nature as Signs

Jon, That is an extensional definition of a relation: Following the pattern of the functional case, let the notation “L ⊆ X × Y” bring to mind a mathematical object specified by three pieces of data, the set X, the set Y, and a particular subset of their cartesian product X × Y}. As before we

[PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Manuscripts (was Dyadic relations within the triadic)

Mike, List: "MS" is just a standard abbreviation for manuscript. Robin assigned numbers to Peirce's many manuscripts while preparing his catalogue back in the 1960s, so some (myself included) prefer to reference them with "R" for Robin. The catalogue itself is online at