Re: Re: Aw: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Collateral Experience and Habits of Interpretation (was Immediate Objects and Phenomena)

BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px; }Jon - my own quite logical example. I know that he did refer to the syllogism somewhere but I'm not going to look it up..but, it's obviously quite a logical assumption. Edwina On Mon 05/02/18 3:26 PM , Jon Alan

Re: Aw: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Collateral Experience and Habits of Interpretation (was Immediate Objects and Phenomena)

Edwina, List: Peirce explicitly associated the conclusion of an Argument with its Interpretant--e.g., "An *Argument *is a sign which distinctly represents the Interpretant, called its *Conclusion*, which it is intended to determine" (CP 2.95; 1902). Just curious--is there any text where he

Re: Aw: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Collateral Experience and Habits of Interpretation (was Immediate Objects and Phenomena)

Helmut - No, I consider that the bird's perception of the loud sound is NOT the representamen. The bird has several means of 'perception'. IO: the Immediate Object is a first sensual perception of an external existentiality; the bird's senses absorb the sound II - the

Aw: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Collateral Experience and Habits of Interpretation (was Immediate Objects and Phenomena)

Edwina, Jon, Gary, List, I wonder if this might be agreeable to all of you: The loud sound itself is not the representamen. The bird´s perception of the loud sound is. This has to do with memory: If the bird would not know (by memory e.g. due to instinct, due to neural structure, or due to

Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Collateral Experience and Habits of Interpretation (was Immediate Objects and Phenomena)

Jon, Edwina, list, I think I'm going to drop out of the discussion as well principally, because as I wrote before my eye operations, I've already begun to move in different directions this year. I noted, Jon that you'll be reading Peirce's late Pragmatism piece (1907) which I am currently

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Collateral Experience and Habits of Interpretation (was Immediate Objects and Phenomena)

Jon, List: > On Feb 2, 2018, at 4:17 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt wrote: > > all of the correlates in this example of semiosis happen to be Existents > (2ns). In your opinion do you also believe that none of this example of semiosis that are 2ns? > As such, it should not

Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Collateral Experience and Habits of Interpretation (was Immediate Objects and Phenomena)

Edwina: I am probably going to bow out of this conversation now, because otherwise I fear that it is going to get contentious. You keep pressing me on where to "locate" collateral experience and habits of interpretation, when the whole point of this thread is that I am trying to figure out

Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Collateral Experience and Habits of Interpretation (was Immediate Objects and Phenomena)

BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px; }Jon - I don't separate Mind and Matter. Mind exists AS matter. Matter couldn't exist without habits-of-formation. And Mind couldn't exist without being those habits within Matter...Pure Aristotle. Edwina On Mon

Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Collateral Experience and Habits of Interpretation (was Immediate Objects and Phenomena)

BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px; }Jon - but you still haven't brought the habits into the semiosic process. How does the single semiosic action contact the habits? And you reduce the Representamen to merely being a 'representation' of the

Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Collateral Experience and Habits of Interpretation (was Immediate Objects and Phenomena)

Edwina, List: Analyzing the various "Signs within Signs" might be unavoidable eventually, especially if we end up going down the road of defining Dicisigns (i.e., natural propositions) as "complete Signs" and all other classes (except Arguments) as "incomplete Signs." However, right now it just

Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Collateral Experience and Habits of Interpretation (was Immediate Objects and Phenomena)

Edwina, List: As anticipated, I cannot agree with this analysis, since I understand the Representamen to be limited to whatever stands for (i.e., *represents*) the loud sound in the human's mind. The Representamen does not *itself *include the person's memories and habits; instead, the latter

Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Collateral Experience and Habits of Interpretation (was Immediate Objects and Phenomena)

BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px; }Jon, list 1. See my most recent post - which has the Representamen as the mediation between the O and the I. As to whether this semiosic triad can function 'outside or inside' - to me, that doesn't make any

Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Collateral Experience and Habits of Interpretation (was Immediate Objects and Phenomena)

Edwina, List: 1. Per my last response to Gary R., it depends on which Sign we are discussing. The loud sound is obviously outside the bird, while the neural pattern is obviously inside the bird. In my current thinking, both can be analyzed as Representamens; in yours, if I understand you

Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Collateral Experience and Habits of Interpretation (was Immediate Objects and Phenomena)

BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px; }Jon, list - there are multiple semiosic actions going on 'at the same time' so to speak. If we just take this one example of the loud sound/tree falling...whether the Receiver is a bird or human - there are

Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Collateral Experience and Habits of Interpretation (was Immediate Objects and Phenomena)

Gary R., List: Your observation that I tend to associate the concept of "Sign" with something external first (e.g., the loud sound) and internal second (e.g., the bird's neural pattern) is accurate. It seems to me that any adequate model of semiosis must be able to take both kinds of Signs into

Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Collateral Experience and Habits of Interpretation (was Immediate Objects and Phenomena)

Jon, Gary R, list: OK - let's try a human example, but it won't be different: DO: loud sound. It happens to be the old oak tree falling but I don't know that. IO: my hearing of the loud sound. IF I am partly deaf, I hear it differently than my cat or dog or

Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Collateral Experience and Habits of Interpretation (was Immediate Objects and Phenomena)

BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px; }Jon, Gary R - I thought Gary R's quotes were excellent, pointing out the necessity for memory/habits and their function in semiosis. What carries out this function of habit? The Representamen. Edwina On Sun

Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Collateral Experience and Habits of Interpretation (was Immediate Objects and Phenomena)

BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px; }Jon, list 1] In your view - where is the location of the Sign - if not in the bird? Is your Sign floating around as an ICloud? 2] Yes - semiosis only takes place within morphological units, in this

Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Collateral Experience and Habits of Interpretation (was Immediate Objects and Phenomena)

Correction: Oops. Said this just backward. I wrote, "I see you as emphasizing the external, existential sign, whereas I always tend to turn to the cognitive one (as at least springboard). In "a sign of a sign" your emphasis seems to me to be the former, mine the latter." I *meant *to say that

Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Collateral Experience and Habits of Interpretation (was Immediate Objects and Phenomena)

Gary R., List: Of course the Sign *can *be within the bird; what I said was that I think it does not necessarily *have to* be be within the bird. I have tried to avoid human semiosis in this conversation, because I suspect that Edwina and I will have many more disagreements once we go in that

Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Collateral Experience and Habits of Interpretation (was Immediate Objects and Phenomena)

Jon, Edwina, list, I'm not quite *back*, but thanks for the welcome back! Again, I would suggest that a return to a human, cognitive example would be helpful for clarifying the ideas being considered. Perhaps you hadn't read my last post when you questioned how those quotations might be helpful.

Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Collateral Experience and Habits of Interpretation (was Immediate Objects and Phenomena)

Jon, Edwina, list, Jon wrote: I still think that the IO-R-II triad is within the *Sign*, not necessarily within the bird (Receiver), but we can set that disagreement aside for now. More to the point--in your view, does semiosis *only *take place within the bird? Is there no *other *semiosis

Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Collateral Experience and Habits of Interpretation (was Immediate Objects and Phenomena)

Gary R., List: Welcome back! I hope that your recovery is going well, and that you will soon be able to elaborate on these selectively highlighted quotes, because frankly I am having trouble seeing how they bear on our current non-human, non-cognitive example. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt -

Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Collateral Experience and Habits of Interpretation (was Immediate Objects and Phenomena)

Edwina, List: I still think that the IO-R-II triad is within the *Sign*, not necessarily within the bird (Receiver), but we can set that disagreement aside for now. More to the point--in your view, does semiosis *only *take place within the bird? Is there no *other *semiosis going on, in which

Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Collateral Experience and Habits of Interpretation (was Immediate Objects and Phenomena)

Edwina, Jon S, list, At the moment I would tend to agree more with Edwina's interpretation than with Jon's. But I'm beginning to see the problem, feel the tension in this matter. I'm not quite yet up to arguing *why* I agree, but I'll offer a few quotes hints towards a direction I think might be

Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Collateral Experience and Habits of Interpretation (was Immediate Objects and Phenomena)

BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px; }The key action of semiosis that I am examining takes place within the birdthe IO-Representamen-II. A Representamen is always internal to the triad. The loud sound is both the Dynamic Object - which

Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Collateral Experience and Habits of Interpretation (was Immediate Objects and Phenomena)

Edwina, List: Just a few comments--not to start another argument, just to highlight more differences in our views that are becoming apparent. The loud sound involves the behavior of matter, which is effete mind, and mediates between the falling tree and the fleeing bird; so I am still not seeing

Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Collateral Experience and Habits of Interpretation (was Immediate Objects and Phenomena)

BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px; }1]Jon - to me, the Representamen is an act of mediation; it transforms the data from the IO [Immediate Object] into an Interpretation... So- to me, the loud sound is incoming sensate data; It doesn't act as MIND,

Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Collateral Experience and Habits of Interpretation (was Immediate Objects and Phenomena)

Edwina, List: Yes, again, we have very different definitions of "Representamen." Just to clarify--are you saying that in your view, the loud sound *cannot *be treated as the Representamen in *any *semiotic analysis of this scenario? If so, why not? Thanks, Jon S. On Sun, Feb 4, 2018 at 5:15

Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Collateral Experience and Habits of Interpretation (was Immediate Objects and Phenomena)

BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px; }I would disagree. The falling of the tree is a full Sign [O-R-I]with the actual fall as the Dynamic Interpretant. The wind-taking-down-the-tree might by a Dynamic Object to the tree...which then reacts by falling

Re: Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Collateral Experience and Habits of Interpretation (was Immediate Objects and Phenomena)

Helmut - no the relation between the Representamen and the Object can be in ANY of the three modes [1stness, 2ndness, 3rdness]. Same with the Representamen-in-itself. And the relation between the Representamen and the Interpretant can also be in any of the 2 modes. Check the ten sign

Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Collateral Experience and Habits of Interpretation (was Immediate Objects and Phenomena)

Helmut, List: In my view, we can indeed take the loud sound to be the Representamen, as I initially suggested--noting again that my definition differs significantly from Edwina's. This leads to a different analysis in which the Dynamic Object is the falling of the tree that *causes *the sound,

Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Collateral Experience and Habits of Interpretation (was Immediate Objects and Phenomena)

Edwina, isn´t mediation (thirdness) a matter of the interpretant (thirdness), not the representamen? Well,  I see representamen, object, interpretant as 1ns, 2ns, 3ns, which perhaps you don´t. Ok, representamen is also the sign, which is thirdness, because it includes all. This is difficult.

Re: Aw: [PEIRCE-L] Collateral Experience and Habits of Interpretation (was Immediate Objects and Phenomena)

Helmut - I'll disagree. You are missing the triadic semiosic process of O-R-I. You are missing the process of mediation between the Object and the Interpretant - which is the action carried out by the Representamen. Therefore - the Representamen is not 'the loud sound' -

Aw: [PEIRCE-L] Collateral Experience and Habits of Interpretation (was Immediate Objects and Phenomena)

Jon, Edwina, List, I think: - The representamen is the loud sound, and everything connected with it in the situation (as the representamen is also the sign, so including all following points too) - The dynamical object is that, what the bird initially feels to be the source of the loud sound,

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Collateral Experience and Habits of Interpretation (was Immediate Objects and Phenomena)

Jerry C., List: As I mentioned previously, before moving the conversation to its own thread, all of the correlates in this example of semiosis happen to be Existents (2ns). As such, it should not be surprising that our analysis of it *resembles* "a simplistic causal sequence"; hence Edwina's

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Collateral Experience and Habits of Interpretation (was Immediate Objects and Phenomena)

List: > On Feb 2, 2018, at 10:25 AM, Jon Alan Schmidt > wrote: > > in the specific example of a bird fleeing upon hearing a loud sound, our > analyses of the semiosis involves > The Dynamic Object (DO) is the loud sound itself. > The Immediate Object (IO) is the

[PEIRCE-L] Collateral Experience and Habits of Interpretation (was Immediate Objects and Phenomena)

Edwina, List: I has been a pleasant (and presumably mutual) surprise to discover that, at least in the specific example of a bird fleeing upon hearing a loud sound, our analyses of the semiosis involved are substantially in agreement after all. - The Dynamic Object (DO) is the loud sound