Dear all,
Perhaps I ought to point out the elephant in the room.
Despite your admission that:
"*any *abduction whose resulting hypothesis passes the test of the PM and
(ultimately) the other two stages of inquiry is a *good *abduction"
why do disagreements persist and why are disputants unable
Jon, List,
You wrote: I think that the discussion over the last several days has also
very helpfully clarified the distinction between logical critic and
methodeutic. In particular, CP 5.189 falls under logical critic and
pertains *only *to abduction, while the PM--like pragmat[ic]ism
itself--fal
Jon, Gary, list and friends,
In response to all those words, I say to you:
one two three...
*C A B*...
*CP 5.189*...
*as explanations of phenomena held as hopeful suggestions*
STRANGER: That the dialectical method is no respecter of persons, and does
not set the great above the small, but alway
Gary R., List:
Thanks for your kind words. I think that the discussion over the last
several days has also very helpfully clarified the distinction between
logical critic and methodeutic. In particular, CP 5.189 falls
under logical critic and pertains *only *to abduction, while the PM--like
prag
Jon, Helmut, List,
Nice summary statement, Jon, which the quotation brings home.
This discussion has been quite valuable for me as it clarified a matter
which, as I noted in my initial post on the security/uberty question, has
troubled me for some time. Perhaps most helpful was seeing that Houser
Helmut, List:
The justification of abduction/retroduction (by itself) falls under logical
critic, rather than methodeutic. However, pragmat[ic]ism as methodeutic
tells us how abduction/retroduction fits within a complete inquiry--the
justified hypotheses that it produces are admitted or rejected
Supplement: Maybe all about this is said already earlier in this thread. I am slow with catching up.
Jon, list,
yes. So I was wrong assuming, that talking about abduction implies a deduction. Only talking about the justification of abduction (plausibility) does. Obviously abduction is som
Jon, list,
yes. So I was wrong assuming, that talking about abduction implies a deduction. Only talking about the justification of abduction (plausibility) does. Obviously abduction is something personal/individual that escapes methodeutics. So the problem of uberty/security/abduction/deduction/p
Helmut:
I think that you are getting at what Peirce meant by *plausibility*, which
indeed pertains to the justification of abduction. In your example, it is
*plausible* that these white beans are from this bag that contains only
white beans. On the other hand, it would obviously *not *be plausib
Jon, list,
you are of course right. I might replace the conclusion in the second statement with: "So for the observer person it seems possible that...". This would be a true statement, but still not a deduction, because the conclusion is not based on the premisses. I think, a deduction about a
Helmut, list:
I think you’ve said something profound.
You said:
"So making an abduction is not pragmaticism (given that pragmaticism is
deductive). But talking about abduction is, because it includes a
deduction."
I think listers will object to your “abduction is not pragmaticism because
Helmut, List:
I appreciate the comment, but I do not think that your example qualifies as
a genuine deduction. It is not *necessarily* true that "it is possible
that they are from the bag"; it might, in fact, be *impossible *for some
reason, presumably having nothing to do with the color of the b
Jerry, list,
yes, and I think it was Aristotle, who thought, that a vacuum / void is impossible, so nature always fills it somehow. Anyway, "Horror Vacui" is a very ancient term, I think. But maybe modern physics corrobates it somehow: Virtual particles, dark matter, or whatver.
Best,
Helmut
Helmut, list:
Void is a place/interval with nothing in it. That conclusion is reached by
syllogism.
Best,
Jerry R
On Fri, Sep 23, 2016 at 3:06 PM, Helmut Raulien wrote:
> Edwina, list,
> I dont remember, where I have got the term "Horror Vacui" from, but I
> think it means, that the nature
Edwina, list,
I dont remember, where I have got the term "Horror Vacui" from, but I think it means, that the nature is afraid of a vacuum, so there cannot be nothing, so there must always be something, by any means.
Best,
Helmut
23. September 2016 um 21:47 Uhr
"Edwina Taborsky" wrote:
Edwina, list:
The *Divine* in Beauty, Goodness, Truth has a very particular position;
you could even say ordinality.
From Lawrence Dewan on ST. THOMAS AND THE RENEWAL OF METAPHYSICS:
As Thomas says:
The appetitive power moves [us] to inspect something, whether sensibly or
intelligibly, s
Nice outline, Helmut. But I'll quibble with a few terms.
For example, your theist claims that 'an intelligent system is a person' while
an atheist would never anthropomorphise intelligence in that way.
An atheist might well consider that this 'quasi-Mind' or Mind functions to
prevent the 'ho
r physics.
>>
>> Edwina
>>
>> - Original Message -
>> *From:* Jerry Rhee
>> *To:* Edwina Taborsky
>> *Cc:* Ben Novak ; Peirce-L
>>
>> *Sent:* Saturday, September 10, 2016 6:52 PM
>> *Subject:* Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Theo
areas;
>> after all, his own references to the biological and physico-chemical realm
>> support this.
>>
>> Edwina
>>
>> - Original Message -
>> *From:* Ben Novak
>> *To:* Jerry Rhee
>> *Cc:* Edwina Taborsky ; Helmut Raulien
>>
y, September 10, 2016 6:52 PM
Subject: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Theory of Thinking
Dear Ben, list:
I think yours is a wonderful idea.
To think Peirce could impose himself in all disciplines.
If we take the disciplines to be embedded in the three Universes, then it
should
support this.
>
> Edwina
>
> - Original Message -
> *From:* Ben Novak
> *To:* Jerry Rhee
> *Cc:* Edwina Taborsky ; Helmut Raulien
> ; Jon Alan Schmidt ;
> Peirce-L
> *Sent:* Saturday, September 10, 2016 6:16 PM
> *Subject:* Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Theor
realm support this.
Edwina
- Original Message -
From: Ben Novak
To: Jerry Rhee
Cc: Edwina Taborsky ; Helmut Raulien ; Jon Alan Schmidt ; Peirce-L
Sent: Saturday, September 10, 2016 6:16 PM
Subject: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Theory of Thinking
Dear List:
I would li
Dear List:
I would like to come back into this discussion, but first let me thank Jon
for his concise correction of my multitudinous errors. Second, let me thank
you all for the liveliness of this discussion.
But back to Jon, I ended my first post on this discussion with: "I am not
sure I am exp
Hello, list!
What Edwina said is so sensible as to be Greek.
There is a one over many in semiosis. That is, one has to cut and situate
oneself in a horizon while discussing one two three…One.
For example, there is also a fourth and a fifth that are assumed but don’t
get talked about; a four
Helmut, list
Your comments point to exactly the problem with mechanical reductionism, i.e.,
where one tries to reduce a dynamic process [the semiosic process] which is
always triadic, into 'bit parts' that somehow mechanically interact. That's the
opposite of the Peircean semiosis.
That's why I
Helmut, List:
Thank you for sharing these helpful reflections. As others have pointed
out before, how we talk about the categories depends on what type of
analysis we are performing. I am content to accept your correction of my
third bullet.
- All thought takes place by means of signs.
-
Ben N., List:
BN: While the conceptual framework you give makes great sense ...
Just to be clear, and to give credit where it is due, this conceptual
framework is not "mine," it is Peirce's; or at least, it is my
understanding of Peirce's.
BN: For example, if you tell me that there is a barn
Dear Edwina:
Your email came while I was writing mine, and thus I did not read it before
sending mine.
But I think that what you quoted from Peirce at the end of yours is what I
am trying to get at, namely, "...Consequently a thing in the general is as
real as in the concrete" 8.14..."It is a rea
Dear Jon, Jerry, Helmut, Kirsti:
This chain of emails is one of the most valuable to me. Among other things,
I am a longtime student of St. Anselm, whom I believe to be much closer to
Peirce than has been noticed.
Jon, I am particularly grateful to you for both beginning this chain with
your quest
Hi list,
Another demonstration of CP 5.189’s vitality:
C = Substance (First being)
A = Being (Second being)
B = Copula; things whose extremes are together touch (Third being)
“since the unqualified term ‘being’ has several meanings…
… if ‘being’ has many senses (for it
Helmut, List:
HR: (What I have not yet got, is the difference between reality and
existence: No idea)
Briefly, my understanding of Peirce's use of terminology is that existence
is a subset of reality--everything that exists is real, but not everything
that is real exists. All three Universes o
Kirstima, list,
I guess that is for a reason: Ontology is the theory of what is, and "is", being, is caused by a predicate, which is something percieved, so something known (epistemology), added to a thing, that otherwise would lack reality (or was it existence?), would not even be a thing? I hav
Kirsti, List:
Please elaborate--which frame does not fit?
Thanks,
Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
On Wed, Sep 7, 2016 at 9:09 AM, wrote:
> List,
>
> Did CSP ever
List,
Did CSP ever use as a dichotomy the distincition between ontology vs.
epistemology? I think not. That would be against his basic views.
This frame just does not fit.
Kirsti
Jon Alan Schmidt kirjoitti 7.9.2016 00:43:
Helmut, List:
Peirce's "Neglected Argument" is certainly NOT the sam
Jon, list,
I guess that a deductive proof of both is not possible. The nature of thinking though is proven by obviousness, I would say, like to say: I think, therefore I am, obviously I am, therefore I think. Sounds like a deduction, but the premiss "obviously I am" contains the concept of "I", w
Hi list:
The "theory of the nature of thinking"...one or many?
How would you know and how would you convince others?
*“But if there is something which is capable of moving things or acting on
them, but is not actually doing so, there will not necessarily be movement;
for that which has a potency
Helmut, List:
Peirce's "Neglected Argument" is certainly NOT the same as Anselm's
ontological argument, although I have seen it characterized as AN
ontological argument in certain respects. In any case, I am not asking
about the NA itself; I am asking about the "theory of the nature of
thinking"
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